A Search Algorithm, And A Prize

_{Gil Dodgen

March 18, 2009

Intelligent Design}

Share: Facebook; Twitter; LinkedIn; Flipboard; Print; Email

There has been some discussion at UD about computational search algorithms, which is one of my specialties.

Just for fun, I’ve included some C source code here (as a .txt file), which is part of a research project. I’ll send a free set of my classical piano albums to the first person who runs the code and publishes the program output in the comments below, along with a correct guess as to what the ultimate purpose of the search algorithm is.

Please provide the following information: CPU clock speed and compiler used.

EIL members are not eligible.

Comments

Upright BiPed:
A code is data (meaning) sent from one entity, through a channel, to another entity to be interpreted as meaning.
I think that until you put some restrictions on what constitutes "code" and "meaning", any causal effect fits your description. I don't blame you for thinking that I'm playing word games. I mean, it's all so simple, right? But good definitions are prerequisite to the ultimate discussion on whether the FSCI-based inductive design inference has legs. I think there are problems lurking in that logic, and which problems need to be resolved depends on how exactly FSCI is defined.R0b_{March 23, 2009
March
03
Mar
23
23
2009
02:34 PM
2
02
34
PM
PDT}

Upright Biped: iconofld, you’re assuming your conclusions. Not at all. My brain's unique, and there's no evidence that it was designed, and no known candidate for the designer. My brain also contains some brand new information that no other brains contain, as does yours. No-one designed that information. Does my brain contain new and unique FSCI, or not, in your opinion?iconofid_{March 23, 2009
March
03
Mar
23
23
2009
01:38 PM
1
01
38
PM
PDT}

iconofld, you're assuming your conclusions.Upright BiPed_{March 23, 2009
March
03
Mar
23
23
2009
12:41 PM
12
12
41
PM
PDT}

R0b, if you've skimmed any of my comments, you'll not be surprised if I don't like to play words game while there is an elephant in the room. I think what is good for the goose is also good for the gander. Popper would be proud. A code is data (meaning) sent from one entity, through a channel, to another entity to be interpreted as meaning. In the case of DNA, the data is digital (AGTC) and provides the information necessary to create function in protiens and processes within the organism. You have some non-designed examples of that?Upright BiPed_{March 23, 2009
March
03
Mar
23
23
2009
12:38 PM
12
12
38
PM
PDT}

Upright Biped asks: "You asked for context. Can you name a non-designed object that carries data (in a digital and conventional code, no less) that is used to create function in a separate object." My brain.iconofid_{March 23, 2009
March
03
Mar
23
23
2009
12:24 PM
12
12
24
PM
PDT}

Upright BiPed:
Can you name a non-designed object that carries data (in a digital and conventional code, no less) that is used to create function in a separate object.
If the definition of FSCI is "carries data (in a digital and conventional code, no less) that is used to create function in a separate object", then I can certainly come up with non-designed examples. Your response will be that the object isn't really digital, or that it isn't encoded in a real code, or that the characteristic that I posit as function doesn't count as function. See the rock example in [93]. In answer to jerry, yes, my point is that the definition needs to be tightened. ID claims constitute nothing less than a scientific revolution, and such revolutions require rigor.R0b_{March 23, 2009
March
03
Mar
23
23
2009
12:11 PM
12
12
11
PM
PDT}

jerry:
So why don’t you take a crack at the best definition of FSCI and we can discuss it.
I don't know what the best definition of FSCI is. It's your (kairosfocus, jerry, gpuccio) concept, not mine.R0b_{March 23, 2009
March
03
Mar
23
23
2009
11:55 AM
11
11
55
AM
PDT}

R0b, "You also have to show that FSCI is consistently absent from non-designed things." You asked for context. Can you name a non-designed object that carries data (in a digital and conventional code, no less) that is used to create function in a separate object.Upright BiPed_{March 23, 2009
March
03
Mar
23
23
2009
11:51 AM
11
11
51
AM
PDT}

I don’t think it is difficult to give definitions of function, but still that would bring about infinite discussions with you and others, and do you know why? Because you just have to deny what is obvious.
Actually, I think it's the lack of solid definitions that brings about infinite discussions. See the example of the 104.27-pound rock in my previous post. Obviousness is in the eye of the beholder. The history of science is replete with struggles against notions that are obvious to a lot a people, but wrong.
I can define function in an universal way only as something which can be recognized as purposeful by an intelligent agent. Is that definition subjective? No.
Maybe "purposeful" means something different to you than it does to me. To me, it means intentional, but that would render an FSCI-based design inference nothing but question-begging. And I would say that such recognition most certainly is subjective. Intelligent agents have all kinds of different ideas with regards to what phenomena are purposeful.
Strangely, it seems that biologists have not your difficulties in understanding what the function of a protein is.
I have no problem understanding what the functions of proteins are. What I don't understand is what your objective distinction between function and non-function is.
Or just take a program which does not work and input it to your “computing systems will accept any sequence as meaningful” and use it. But please, could we be associates in commercializing that computer system?
Gladly -- such systems are trivial to make. That doesn't mean that every program is useful.
So, an object or a system are functional when they serve for a recognizable purpose, and purposes only originate in conscious beings.
So, to infer design via FSCI, you must determine that the object has function. To determine that it has function, you must show that it serves a conscious being's purpose. Doesn't that smack of circularity?
No, in that context functional means coding for a functional protein (I am still restricting the discussion to protein coding genes, which are the usual object of darwinian evolution).
Is that your opinion of what functional means, or is that part of an established definition? If so, can you tell me where it's published?
First of all, jerry is entitled to his opinions, and sometimes our opinions differ. My view is clear enough:
How can FSCI be defined objectively and still be a matter of opinion?
The problem is, what meaning can be conveyed to a conscious intelligent being by that string?
Are coding genes nonfunctional before they're decoded by intelligent humans?
And so? I don’t accept Dembski as an authority, I may well not accept jerry as an authority (my apologies to Dembski and jerry, I am just making an important point). Do we really need authorities to discuss? Does ID really need to be based on the authority of somebody, to be true?
Certainly not. But it's hard to see FSCI as an objective concept when its handful of promoters don't agree on what constitutes FSCI.R0b_{March 23, 2009
March
03
Mar
23
23
2009
11:40 AM
11
11
40
AM
PDT}

gpuccio:
But FSCI is well defined in a general context, even in the restricted form I have given.
Not sure what that means. Can you point me to the general context definition that you're referring to?
“On massive evidence, such cases [FSCI] are reliably the product of intelligent design, once we independently know the causal story.” Indeed, just language and computer programming would be enough for that, and they are clear examples of FSCI, and of digital FSCI.
No, to show that FSCI is a reliable indicator of design, you can't just offer a few examples of designed FSCI. You also have to show that FSCI is consistently absent from non-designed things.
And, on the contrary, much is gained in terms of objectivity, formal completeness and simplicity. But, perhaps, that’s exactly what somebody does not like.
I don't know who you're talking about, but demonstrable objectivity and formality are exactly what ID critics have been calling for from the ID community. The objectivity of ID measures could be demonstrated by showing that people independently come up with the same results when using those measures, but nobody on the ID side has tried to demonstrate that.
“If we can’t look around and determine whether the things we observe are FSCI or not, this “massive evidence” doesn’t exist.” But we can do that.
Great! Where's the data published?
I don’t understand to which studies you are referring. Do you want me to publish a series of short programs in C, to demonstrate that they are digital, functional and complex, and that I am the author?
That's a great idea. To do so, you would have to flesh out what it means to be functional and what it means to be complex. Durston et al have tackled the latter, and their definition of complexity turns out to be based on probability. (Is yours also?) This is problematic for the same reason that Dembski's measures are -- namely that it requires calculating probabilities under a MET hypothesis. Durston et al, from what I can see, never define "function". Although the examples in their paper all deal with biological function, Durston's discussions on this site make it clear that his measure isn't restricted to biology. So it appears that we can choose any characteristic of the object in question and call it a function. For instance, I could say that the function of the 104.27-pound rock in my yard is to exert 104.27 pounds of force on the ground. I could argue that the odds of the rock having this exact weight are pretty slim, thus complexity. I could even fulfill your digital requirement by noting that the rock is composed of discrete atoms. You could, of course, come up with some reasons to reject my claim that this rock has FSCI, and we could debate till the cows come home. And that is exactly the problem with the current state of the FSCI concept.
“Any physical system (except ultimately elemental quanta) can be modeled as digital or analog. So the digital/analog distinction is conceptual, not empirical.” Again, I don’t follow you. Can’t you understand the difference between a vynil record and a CD?
Certainly. The signal from a CD player's optical transducer is run through an ADC, processed by digital componentry, and then run through a DAC. The signal from a record player's transducer is processed by analog componentry. You and kairosfocus (who is, if I recall correctly, the inventor of the FSCI concept) need to get on the same page. Kairosfocus argues that, "Mona Lisa etc are digitisable, so the use of a digital reference is without loss of generality. (For that matter, the structure of a workable stone arrowhead is digitisable.)" I know what you mean when you say digital, but differentiating digital from analog empirically, as opposed to conceptually, is a fuzzy concept. But you seem to be saying that the digital requirement is your own restriction for the sake of discussion, and not part of the FSCI definition proper, so I'll stop making a mountain out of a molehill. - continued -R0b_{March 23, 2009
March
03
Mar
23
23
2009
11:15 AM
11
11
15
AM
PDT}

"If FSCI is well-defined, why can’t ID proponents agree on whether watermarks are FSCI?" What point are you making? That the definition could be written a little more tight or that the concept is not useful, or that you thing the concept is too general. Your MO seems to be how I can find a glitch is something. Does the watermark or DNA pattern define the individual as the DNA code defines the polymer? No of course not. So why don't you take a crack at the best definition of FSCI and we can discuss it.jerry_{March 23, 2009
March
03
Mar
23
23
2009
10:01 AM
10
10
01
AM
PDT}

jerry:
Now if you want to go off and argue that this DNA specifies the person, then I guess you can. But that is just saying that certain parts can identify the whole. A lot of other things can also do that but when it specifies a process of building a polymer with very sophisticated capabilities that it becomes FSCI.
Of course a lot of other things can do that, and that's my point. Please show me where in the definition of FSCI it says that the information in question must specify a "a process of building a polymer with very sophisticated capabilities" in order to be FSCI. If FSCI is well-defined, why can't ID proponents agree on whether watermarks are FSCI?R0b_{March 23, 2009
March
03
Mar
23
23
2009
09:39 AM
9
09
39
AM
PDT}

gpuccio, The essence is that you're asking us to accept that empirical observations compel us to accept an empirically unobservable cause. You would prefer to excise your "definition" of FSCI from this context, but I will not agree to that. You claim to be committed to empiricism. But intelligence is a classic example of a hypothetical construct. Your belief, based purely on introspection, that your invisible intelligence causes you to create designs out of nothing has precisely the same epistemological status as the belief of some people that their invisible love causes them to emit certain sorts of behavior. Many people have claimed that an invisible love, much like that they experience inwardly, permeates the universe, just as you claim that an invisible intelligence, much like that you experience inwardly, permeates the universe. What we experience inwardly is of enormous value to us as human beings, but it will never be, in and of itself, empirical in character. When people give similar verbal reports of non-empirical observation, the reports themselves are empirical data, but not the reported observations. You have appealed illogically to the wisdom of the ages and the vox populi regarding the existence of the process of intelligent design. They do nothing to confer empirical status on introspective experience of intelligence in action. Introspection was a key component of the work of Wilhelm Wundt, at the advent of experimental psychology. But it was soon abandoned by experimental psychologists, not out of philosophical commitment to materialism, but because experimental results based on the reports of subjects asked to introspect proved difficult to replicate. I should point out also that we know from anthropological studies that there are huge cultural differences in what people say about their inward sense of self. It is hardly a given that an organism we consider to exhibit "intelligence" explains its actions in similar terms. Dembski attempts to gain physical status for intelligence by a) eliminating for some entity (e.g., the flagellum) explanations framed strictly in terms of empirically observable phenomena and b) arguing then that what introspection leads us to believe is the cause of our designs is the best cause to assign to designs of unknown origin. As I indicated above, he attempts to avoid circularity and paradox by defining CSI in terms of semiotic agents, and not unrestricted intelligent agents. You, in contrast, beg the question of -- engage in circular argument regarding -- the physical existence of intelligence in presenting FSCI as a marker of the action of empirically unobservable intelligence on empirically observable matter. You say, in essence, that we know we are intelligent designers, and that if we can locate empirical phenomena with properties like those of our artifacts (i.e., with high FSCI), then we are justified in saying that they were caused by intelligence. You are not the empiricist you make yourself out to be. Show me intelligence. That failing, show me even that there might be something non-diffuse you refer to with the term. I contend that you cannot make even "design-generating intelligence" clear-cut. Exceedingly few people are good both at designing software systems and at designing fugues. You might think that people who do well at designing mathematical proofs usually would do well at designing software, but it is often not the case. (Remember the vanished Matlab program of Dembski and Marks?) It is abundantly clear that there is a wide range of cognitive processes generating phenomena we casually refer to as "designed." The entity you would appeal to in explaining biological phenomena is nebulous even in human psychology. The fact that a term seems clear in meaning in ordinary discourse does not imply that it has much scientific utility. There was a time when earth, air, fire, and water seemed like good elements. Only when people worked at framing explanations in terms of those elements did it become apparent that they were scientifically useless. The ethologists and psychologists who study phenomena that fall under the rubric of "intelligence" do not use the term to explain -- not without restrictive operational definition, anyway.Sal Gal_{March 22, 2009
March
03
Mar
22
22
2009
08:05 PM
8
08
05
PM
PDT}

Adel, OK, that's fine for me, I will not insist any more. Just a personal clarification, if you allow. I have certainly no hostility to science as currently practiced in general. Indeed, I have great admiration for good science, wherever it is practiced, and I know that a lot of good science is being practiced in all fields, including biology. I am sorry if I have given you the impression that I am against naturalistic science. Indeed, I currently practice naturalistic science in my field, which is medicine. But it is true that there is something in the current scientific environment for which I have, if not hostility, certainly great distaste: it's the dogmatic materialistic prejudice, as it is expressed in the two great scientistic philosophies which dominate our culture: darwinian evolution and strong AI. Both, IMO, have nothing to do with good science, and are rather general (and bad) philosophies of reality. Both have contributed almost nothing to a real understanding of nature, and have on the contrary imposed to our times a lot of false and unsupported notions and an almost universal cognitive arrogance which is the true contrary of what science should be. For those two theories, I have no sympathy at all. All that, obviously, is my personal view, and I don't expect you to agree. But again, I love science. Indeed, I have always expressed here my firm conviction that the affirmation of ID will come, is coming, thanks to the growing understanding of biology which is daily provided by the work of those who seriously operate to find new data. The fact that those data are currently intepreted according to the official theory of darwninian evolution is not really important: data are data, and in the long term they will support the best theory. Please excuse the intensity of my expressions, which comes from a deep sense of commitment to what I believe to be scientific truth. Best wishes for you too.gpuccio_{March 22, 2009
March
03
Mar
22
22
2009
08:18 AM
8
08
18
AM
PDT}

I appreciate your input, and obviously respect your positions. Let me just add some comments, in the hope that they may useful to a reciprocal understanding.
I thank you for all of your good efforts to increase my understanding, and I think you can tell that you have succeeded. But I doubt that my poor efforts have accomplished anything. You have shown me that ID may promise much, but so far has delivered no new causal explanations to our understanding of nature. You insist that the contrary is the case, but you (and the ID movement) have offered only hopes and promises, while mainly expending your collective energies disparaging scientific naturalism. I doubt that anyone could find a way to raise any doubts in your mind that your hostility to science as currently practiced is misplaced. (Parenthetically, I have been stunned by the intensity of that hostility.) I'll be watching for the causal explanations that you promise will be generated from ID theory. As long as they are lacking, I will take the liberty of pointing out their absence. Best wishes for now, AdelAdel DiBagno_{March 22, 2009
March
03
Mar
22
22
2009
06:06 AM
6
06
06
AM
PDT}

Adel: I appreciate your input, and obviously respect your positions. Let me just add some comments, in the hope that they may useful to a reciprocal understanding. "It is thus a parasitic notion (parasitic in a descriptive, not pejorative sense). Only after experimental data have shown that a sequence is functional, can an FSCI expert make a guess that it might be beyond the bounds of naturalistic causation. So, FSCI appears to be useless in any scientific sense." I don't understand what you mean. Proteins we find in biological beings are practically always functional. The problem is not to determine their function (although sometimes that requires time), but rather to understand the relationship of function to dtructure, and especially how that function arose. Both darwinian theory and ID are about the "origin" of biological information. If you read the Durston et al. paper about protein families and the special method they give to measure functional bits in them, you will see that such an approach, based essentially on the concept of FSCI, can open vast insight regarding the relationship between proteins and the quantity of information necessary to implement a function. The real proble, today, is to measure the target space, the functional space: how many different sequences can implement a function, and what is the topographical structure of those islands of functionality in the general search space? Those are crucial problems for any theory of origins, and while protein engineering is giving us new insights about them, they are still largely unsolved. The concept of FSCI, and practical methods to measure it, like that proposed by Durston, can greatly help to investigate those new territories, while the conventional and universallyb accepted view of random search and NS, without any quantitative assessment of the model, is really a science stopper. "This assertion needs supporting evidence. It currently stands only as an opinion." A design scenario allows us to reason in very natural terms about objects which do appear designed. It allows us to detect the connections, to investigate the general plans, and to learn about the strategies of the designer, without having to forcibly "explain" all those things in term of an innatural theory which does not work and cannot work. Indeed, most reasonings in biology and medicine are teleologic, even if they are disguised as non teleologic just to comply with the accepted dogma. The simple truth is that design "can" explain what we observe in bilogy, and darwinian theory cannot. That is not only an opinion. The whole ID theory is behind that, and we have only scratched the surface of it in our discussions on this thread. For instance, I have just given an operating definition of FSCI, but we have in no way deakt with how it brings to the design inference. And we have in no way treated in detail the reasons why darwinian evolution cannot work. So, when you say that "it's only an opinion", you seem to forget that we haven't yet discussed the motivations behind that opinion. To begin with, you asked for a definition of FSCI, and I have given it. Please, make further questions, and you will receive answers. Nothing has to be accepted as simple opinion. "Opinions. No examples or evidence were provided above." I have given only a brief summary of vast scenarios. I have dedicated hours and hours to the discussion of those themes here, form ID proper to strong AI, form the definition of consciousness to the problem of free will, and I am ready to repeat it all, if you are interested. But I cannot give you everything in one short post. But I have suggested some important points, especially the concept that consciousness and its properties are empirical data, and that unless and until we have a satisfying explanation of them in terms of other types of data (material objects) we have no right to either ignore them or consider them as a byproduct of those objects. "That the source of design is not ruled out by design theorists is evidently an extremely common misunderstanding in these precincts. How will it be investigated? Is it natural or supernatural? Is it possible to choose, so one can proceed to evaluate the claim?" The source of design can be investigated exactly like any other thing which we do not understand, but whole effects we can observe. Take the mysterious "dark energy", for instance. We know nothing about it. We don't even know if such a thing really exists. And yet, it is at present the main object of investigation of many physicists and astrphysicists. Why? Because we observe effects which we cannot explain otherwise. The same is true of the effects of biological design: we cannot explain them otherwise. that's why the source of design must be investigated, even of at present we know nothing about it. You seem to share the common prejudice that we in ID expect form our theory only a confirmation of the existence of God. That is not true. Personally, I need no confirmation of the existence of God from science. I am rather sure of that, and ID will not add anything to that. But I do expect from ID and science a better understanding of observable reality, and of the designed aspects which I perceive in it. You ask: "Is it natural or supernatural?" The only reasonable answer is that I don't know, If I knew, I would not need to investigate. I don't even understand what "natural" and "supernatural" mean. I am always uncomfortable with those words, as I am uncomfortable whenever the scientific discussion about ID is mixed to religious problems. I don't like that. I don't like that at all. "Is it possible to choose, so one can proceed to evaluate the claim?" Anyone can choose as he likes, and investigate whatever claim he likes. That is one of the few rules of science. "Neuroscientists will be surprised to learn that they ignore and misinterpret consciousness, purpose, design, intelligence, feeling, and all the other mental activities that humans and our nonhuman biological brethren experience." Neuroscientists will be surprised of many things, believe me. I am speaking, obviously, of materialist neuroscientists, but they are the vast majority. I don't know if they ignore consciousness (some certainly do, however bizarre that may seem), but they certainly misinterpret it. And I, as a human, and in the name of our nonhuman biological brethren who cannot take part in this blog, do rebel against that. My experience, and the experience of all my brethren, cannot be denied in the name of ideology. Hofstadter and the likes of him can go on affirming that my consciousness is just a loop in a software, and famous neurologists can well write in popular magazines that the origin of consciousness from the material brain is absolutely proved, but I know better. "On the contrary, design theories are as old or older than recorded history. So far, the score for naturalistic science as an explanation of nature is high. The score for design theories is zero." I know very well how old they are. that's why I added "for contemporary science, at least". Indeed, universal non teleologic thought is only a recent anomaly in the history of human culture, and it will not last. And the score for naturalistic science as an explanation of material non living nature is high, while that score as an explanation of biological information and of conscious beings is absolutely zero. That's where design theories score very well.gpuccio_{March 21, 2009
March
03
Mar
21
21
2009
04:08 PM
4
04
08
PM
PDT}

gpuccio, I admire your patient willingness to answer all questions put to you. And I regret that I have to disagree with some of your answers. But I do disagree and I must so inform you. When I started to comment on this thread, I thought that the concepts of FSCI and CSI might lead to new insights into biology. I thought that the mathematical tools developed by Dr Dembski would enable us to distinguish biologically meaningful sequences from nonsense sequences. Now, gpuccio and the others commenters here have claimed that FSCI depends on the findings of working scientists to identify function. It is thus a parasitic notion (parasitic in a descriptive, not pejorative sense). Only after experimental data have shown that a sequence is functional, can an FSCI expert make a guess that it might be beyond the bounds of naturalistic causation. So, FSCI appears to be useless in any scientific sense. gpuccio [70]
Adel: “My difficulty with that goal is its negativity. From my limited readings in the history of science, mainly Thomas Kuhn, it appears that theories are overcome by the encroachment of new theories that explain the data better.” the design theory does explain the data better.
This assertion needs supporting evidence. It currently stands only as an opinion.
Falsification of the current (wrong) theory is only a part of it. The positive part of ID includes scientific perspectives about the nature of consciousness and intelligence, the complete or incomplete determinism of observed nature, the relationship between computation and creativity, the nature of life, and so on. All of these are very positive problems. ID, like any other scientific theory, starts from the observation of data: designed objects, the process of design, the nature of designers. It is just a first, important attempt at approaching scientifically facts we have always had under our eyes, and whose appropriate intepretation has been prevented by scientific prejudice and materialistic ideology, through the instrumentality of wrong theories like darwinian evolution and strong AI. ID is not the only approach which is contributing to change that scenario of scientific thought, but its role is certainly fundamental.
Opinions. No examples or evidence were provided above.
“Since scientific explanations involve causal chains (and since the source [cause] of design in Intelligent Design theory has been ruled out as an object of study), what new purchase on nature does Intelligent Design theory provide to the scientist?” The source of design is not ruled out as an object of study. That is a common misunderstanding. ID is at present mainly a theory about design detection, and therefore can tell us nothing (or very little) about the nature of the designer, his methods and modalities of implementation of design, his purposes and so on. But that does not mean that all those aspects are not open to scientific inquiry. In an ID scenario, all those aspects can and will be investigated scientifically, but that will require new approaches and methods, and certainly new data. Naturally, nobody can now how far the current or future scientific methods can bring us on that way. We have to try to know that. But ID is the necessary premise to do that.
That the source of design is not ruled out by design theorists is evidently an extremely common misunderstanding in these precincts. How will it be investigated? Is it natural or supernatural? Is it possible to choose, so one can proceed to evaluate the claim?
“what new purchase on nature does Intelligent Design theory provide to the scientist?” ID is a new scenario, and one which is infinitely richer than the existing ones. In the current scenarios, reality is interpreted as a completely blind and objective dominion, and all subjective realities (consciousness, purpose, design, intelligence, feeling) are just ignored or interpreted as byproducts of strange and undefined mechanisms. In ID, consciousness, intelligence and purpose are empirically observed and investigated for what they are, an essential and common part of reality, detectable both as designers (humans) and designed objects, and a whole field of reality, biological reality, is shown to share the same characteristics as designed objects.
Neuroscientists will be surprised to learn that they ignore and misinterpret consciousness, purpose, design, intelligence, feeling, and all the other mental activities that humans and our nonhuman biological brethren experience.
That’s a completely new perspective (for contemporary science, at least). And one which will change all the future of science. It is a true scientific revolution, in the sense of Kuhn, and one of an extremely universal nature.
On the contrary, design theories are as old or older than recorded history. So far, the score for naturalistic science as an explanation of nature is high. The score for design theories is zero.Adel DiBagno_{March 21, 2009
March
03
Mar
21
21
2009
02:58 PM
2
02
58
PM
PDT}

I would just like to quickly thank all of those involved (kairo, gpuccio, etc.) for taking the time to discuss these concepts (FSCI, CSI, function). I would also like to second the notion that this has been a rather productive discussion. Though I've been "lurking" here for only the past several months, it seems more is accomplished in a topic such as this than in others (for example, Darwin's racism). I don't mean to say that I don't enjoy posts concerning evolution/Darwin and some of these other extraneous topics, I just believe a topic like this is conducive to a more candid and intellectual climate. In short, I look forward to more posts of this nature. To avoid derailing discussion any longer, I would just like to once more say thanks!HouseStreetRoom_{March 21, 2009
March
03
Mar
21
21
2009
01:32 PM
1
01
32
PM
PDT}

GP, Jerry et al: Excellent points. Quite productive discussion! A few remarks: 1 --> Analogue vs Digital. Yes, the Q-world picture is digital, but that does not obviate the value of the analogue approach. Indeed, for a great many things, before we can use them we have to get back from digital to analogue. On the other hand, it is true that any analogue info can be reduced to digital form, and such can be reduced to appropriately formatted and organised strings of bits. (but if you have ever used and anlaogue computer, you will see that it can work with differential eqns easily that would tax teh most sophisticated mathematicians to analyse on calculus principles. Just so, no one knows how to integrate e^-[x^2], apart from numerically, i.e by going to a digital filter approach.] 2 --> FUNCTION, whaz dat? Ans, look at concrete examples and build up your concepts from describing what you see on a family resemblance basis, then try to pin down fine borderlines. You will see that the common features are parts that fit together in wholes, and that the wholes do a job. The parts that contribute to the job are functional, those that do not are non-functional. e.g. Letters --> Words --> sentences --> communication (linguistic). e.g. 2 letters --> reserved and internally defined words --> C format lines of code --> C format programs; thence Source code --> compiler --> Object [assembler thence machine] code --> memory storage --> execution --> machine implements program. Eg 3 G/C/A/T monomers --> DNA chains --> unzip, RNA --> ribosomes, enzymes etc --> aa strings --> fold and agglomerate --> proteins --> Cell works --> life. e.g. 4 resistors, transistors, capacitors, IC's, transducers, Cu traces on circuit board etc --> electronic circuits --> apply power and inputs --> a radio that can be tuned to listen to your fav FM station. Observe the common pattern here,and the diverse contexts. Also, that function once complex requires very specific elements put together in very specific ways, under very specific circumstances to get out the result. Such clusters are maximally improbable on undirected contingency, but are routine, observed products of intelligence. 3 --> But anything direction can do chance can do too! Sure, lucky noise, given enough gamut and a randomiser to drive it can in principle do just about anything. But, on the scope of large configuration spaces -- what "complexity" is about -- we are looking at such long odds of getting there by chance that EMPIRICALLY chance is not a likely cause of the outcomes. [And that is exactly what the Weasel program so used by Mr Dawkins ducks.] 4 --> Well, what about unknown mechanical forces, aka unknown necessity? mechanical forces of course do not produce high contingency; that's how we recognise them. What this question is really raising, then, is the question of whether the laws of our cosmos are set up to make the production of life not a contingency but a sure thing. To do that, requires a lot of fine tuning, starting form setting up a universe in which life facilitating terrestrial planets on which C-based, aqueous medium cell based lifeforms are possible. It turns out that that is so complex and finely tuned a balance, that it raises the question posed by -- you guessed it -- Sir Fred Hoyle: did someone monkey with the physics to make life possible? And it goes one better, it demands positive programing of the universe to make life inevitable. On our massive experience, what is responsible for programs? (In short, this has not got rid of the issue, but has pushed it up a level.) 5 --> Well, don't the laws of nature make chem evo and life evo inevitable? First, thermodynamics implies that simpler, more energetically favourable chemicals will uterly dominate any pre-biotic environment so we do not even get to the full set of required monomers for life, much less to the complex organisation of same that we find as an irreducibly complex system in life. Second, DNA is not constrained to load for proteins by the laws of chemistry, no more so than the chemistry of paper and ink forces what is written to appear. And, on the relevant statistics and probabilites, the laws of thermodynamics are just about the strongest laws we have. Information and organisation will not on the gamut of our universe or any other one with similar laws, spontaneously form life. But, we know that design can easily form complex functional entities, even those based on the nanotechnology of information-rich polymers. _______________ That much is pretty clear. just, it is not welcome to the friendly local magisterium; one of whom just tried to "out" me in the obvious hpe that he would thereby do me harm. All he has manged to do is to expose his utter irresponsibility and want of basic civility. There is a name for such uncivil behaviour; retaliation against whistleblowers. I think there are some laws about that. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{March 21, 2009
March
03
Mar
21
21
2009
02:20 AM
2
02
20
AM
PDT}

R0b: "The basis of that induction makes no sense unless FSCI is well-defined in a general context." But FSCI is well defined in a general context, even in the restricted form I have given. That restricted form is perfectly enough to justify the claim that: "On massive evidence, such cases [FSCI] are reliably the product of intelligent design, once we independently know the causal story." Indeed, just language and computer programming would be enough for that, and they are clear examples of FSCI, and of digital FSCI. Take the case of a computer code written in C. for instance. It is perfectly equivalent, conceptually, to a DNA code. It is symbolic and digital, it has to go through a translation system (the compiler) to convey its information to the final thing (the program itself), and the final thing is functional (it can do specific things in the right context). So, the ability of humans to generate easily and abundantly language and computer programs is certainly "massive evidence". Those things are always the product of the intelligent design of humans, as far as we can observe. The fact that humans can generate CSI in other forms, like analogic CSI (Mount Rushmore, paintings, arrow heads, and so on) is just another form of the same process, but requires a different and more general approach to be formalized satisfactorily. That's what Dembski is trying to do. But again, by restricting the discussion to digital FSCI for the purpose of discussing the origin of biological information, nothing is lost, not the specificity of the concept, and not the massive evidence (may be the evidence would be a little bit more massive if we included other kinds of CSI, but we are not looking for perfection). And, on the contrary, much is gained in terms of objectivity, formal completeness and simplicity. But, perhaps, that's exactly what somebody does not like. "If we can’t look around and determine whether the things we observe are FSCI or not, this “massive evidence” doesn’t exist." But we can do that. My definition is very clear, and I have answered all your questions about what is FSCI or not. We just need digital strings of information (already coded into digital form), complexity above a conventional level, and a recognizable function conveyed by that information (more on that later). If all of these characteristics are present, you have FSCI. If even one is missing, you have not. If the function is not recognizable, then you have not FSCI (but it could be a false negative, in case a function is present but we don't recognize it). Similarly, we can have false negatives in the case of function present, but complexity too low. All that is essentially the EF, with a restricted definition of specification. And it works fine. "(And until actual studies are done, there is nothing scientific about this evidence.)" I don't understand to which studies you are referring. Do you want me to publish a series of short programs in C, to demonstrate that they are digital, functional and complex, and that I am the author? Or shall we send the posts in this thread to Nature as an example of FSCI? Ah, but I am afraid we would not pass peer review! :-) "Any physical system (except ultimately elemental quanta) can be modeled as digital or analog. So the digital/analog distinction is conceptual, not empirical." Again, I don't follow you. Can't you understand the difference between a vynil record and a CD? Well, that's enough. I am restricting my definition to CDs. And not because vinyl records are not information, but because they are in a different form. Talking of the information on CDs, I can easily count the bits, verify the changes caused even by a single bit modification, and so on. So what is so difficult in restricting the definition, for convenience, only to that form of information? "Why do you claim that it isn’t? If you had an objective operational definition for the term, then we could be confident that people could independently apply that definition and come to the same conclusion as to whether something is functional or not. But you have offered no such definition." I don't think it is difficult to give definitions of function, but still that would bring about infinite discussions with you and others, and do you know why? Because you just have to deny what is obvious. So, let's put it this way: I can define function in an universal way only as something which can be recognized as purposeful by an intelligent agent. Is that definition subjective? No. It is based on intelligent agents, but you know, intelligent agents exist, and are a very important part of reality. The problem is only there, and again it is merely ideological. If you deny the existence of realities like intelligence, consciousness and purpose, then the discussion will never go on. ID is based on the empirical recognition that such realities do exist, and that they are empirically observable and describable. Strangely, it seems that biologists have not your difficulties in understanding what the function of a protein is. You can find those functions listed in any public protein database. Maybe you should warn them that they are not making true science, and that they have been corrupted by those devious ID people. Why do they insist that proteins serve for a purpose? Or just take a program which does not work and input it to your "computing systems will accept any sequence as meaningful" and use it. But please, could we be associates in commercializing that computer system? I believe we could solve some of our personal problems... :-) So, an object or a system are functional when they serve for a recognizable purpose, and purposes only originate in conscious beings. Conscious intelligent beings easily recognize purpose. Even if there can be controversy in some cases, we can well restrict our definition to cases where purpose is easily recognized by all, or at least by the majority. Machines are functional. Computer programs are functional. Language is functional. Proteins are functional. If a machine which did something stops working, you know it has to be fixed, If a protein is crucially changed, it becomes non functional, and disease ensues. What is subjective in all that? "In the context of genes, functional seems to mean coding." No, in that context functional means coding for a functional protein (I am still restricting the discussion to protein coding genes, which are the usual object of darwinian evolution). It is important that we refer to the function of the protein, because that's the basis of the phenotype. "Except in the case of Venter’s watermarks, which jerry’s logic says are non-functional, but Durston and kairosfocus say are functional." First of all, jerry is entitled to his opinions, and sometimes our opinions differ. My view is clear enough: if the function is to mark something uniquely, then the whole system which accomplishes that can be recognized as functional, but not necessarily the part which is used as a mark. So, Venter and his laboratories and his watermarks are certainly a functional system. I don't know what his mark is, but if it is just a random sequence, it is not functional in itself. If, on the other hand Veneter uses an objectively recognizable sequence, like the first 500 figures of pi, or the phrase "Hey, I am Venter, how are you? You are certainly aware that I did this, because you are just reading my signature. Best regards" then I would say that he is using a functional string in the context of a bigger functional system. Is that clear enough? "In the context of sequences of symbols, functional seems to mean “meaningful in some language”. That would seem to apply to both natural and computer languages. But some computing systems will accept any sequence as meaningful." Again, the fact that a computer system accepts some string does not mean anything. A computer just does what you order. The problem is, what meaning can be conveyed to a conscious intelligent being by that string? Or, if we speak of a non linguistic string, what function can be accomplished by that information? What can it do? Is what it does recognizable as a purpose? "And yet jerry regards them as distinct, even opposite." And so? I don't accept Dembski as an authority, I may well not accept jerry as an authority (my apologies to Dembski and jerry, I am just making an important point). Do we really need authorities to discuss? Does ID really need to be based on the authority of somebody, to be true? "That is exactly what Venter’s watermarks do. Durston and kairosfocus see them as functional, but you seem to disagree." See my discussion above. "There’s no question that it’s a superficially simple concept. The question is whether it’s well enough defined to be the subject of scientific hypotheses and claims." I do believe it is. "Sometimes simple concepts even turn out, on closer scrutiny, to be nonsensical, as in the concept of a “complete and consistent number theoretical system”. Sometimes it happens. That just means that in all other times simple concepts just work. Obviously, you have to judge case by case. Generalizations will not bring us anywhere. I have tried to give you very detailed reasons why I believe that "these" simple concepts do work.gpuccio_{March 21, 2009
March
03
Mar
21
21
2009
12:28 AM
12
12
28
AM
PDT}

jerry
I do not know what sections of the DNA are used for identification but it does not necessarily have to be the same DNA that is used in specifying something else such as a protein or a RNA strand. Maybe someone here who is familiar with the process can tell us what is used for identification.
Biologists refer to it as junk DNA.sparc_{March 20, 2009
March
03
Mar
20
20
2009
10:18 PM
10
10
18
PM
PDT}

R0b, The use of DNA as it used in forensics is certainly useful, but it is not FSCI in this sense. It is like a finger print or eye scan or some other identifying characteristic of anything. It identifies the whole to which it is a part. I do not know what sections of the DNA are used for identification but it does not necessarily have to be the same DNA that is used in specifying something else such as a protein or a RNA strand. Maybe someone here who is familiar with the process can tell us what is used for identification. Now if you want to go off and argue that this DNA specifies the person, then I guess you can. But that is just saying that certain parts can identify the whole. A lot of other things can also do that but when it specifies a process of building a polymer with very sophisticated capabilities that it becomes FSCI. I fail to understand all the fuss paid to this simple but powerful concept. The only reason I can see is people feel somehow they must be impeach the usefulness of this and this is a fruitless task because all biology recognizes the relationships that are here. It is only on this site that there seems to be a compulsion to impugn it or nitpick every small thing about it. It must be because it represents a real threat to one's arguments.jerry_{March 20, 2009
March
03
Mar
20
20
2009
09:00 PM
9
09
00
PM
PDT}

tragic mishap: You are trying to hack my credit card number that is supposedly secured by SSL encryption. Gil: You guessed it! I’ll give tragic a prize. My reply to tragic was tongue-in-cheek. I have no nefarious intentions, and I'm not trying hack anyone's credit card number. Computational number theory and computing power have advanced to the point where what was once thought to be impossible, is possible. This is a contemporary manifestation of the history of cryptography. Every new algorithm in cryptography throughout history was initially declared to be insoluble, but they were all eventually cracked. See below for a very recent example: http://www.tgdaily.com/content/view/40765/108/GilDodgen_{March 20, 2009
March
03
Mar
20
20
2009
05:05 PM
5
05
05
PM
PDT}

gpuccio:
I would suggest that we stay tuned to the model to which my definition is targeted: protein coding genes.
Sure, we can restrict the scope of FSCI/FCSI/FSC to protein coding genes, as Durston, Chiu, Abel, and Trevors seem to do. But consider the argument by which designed is inferred from FSCI:
On massive evidence, such cases [FSCI] are reliably the product of intelligent design, once we independently know the causal story. So, we are entitled to (provisionally of course; as per usual with scientific work) induce that FSCI is a reliable, empirically observable sign of design.
The basis of that induction makes no sense unless FSCI is well-defined in a general context. If we can't look around and determine whether the things we observe are FSCI or not, this "massive evidence" doesn't exist. (And until actual studies are done, there is nothing scientific about this evidence.)
So, I don’t understand you worries about the ultimate digital nature of reality (which I can agree on). From that point of view, we could never distinguish between digital and analogic information, which would be a very unpractical position.
Any physical system (except ultimately elemental quanta) can be modeled as digital or analog. So the digital/analog distinction is conceptual, not empirical.
So, why do you say that the function is “subjective”?
Why do you claim that it isn't? If you had an objective operational definition for the term, then we could be confident that people could independently apply that definition and come to the same conclusion as to whether something is functional or not. But you have offered no such definition. In the context of genes, functional seems to mean coding. Except in the case of Venter's watermarks, which jerry's logic says are non-functional, but Durston and kairosfocus say are functional. In the context of sequences of symbols, functional seems to mean "meaningful in some language". That would seem to apply to both natural and computer languages. But some computing systems will accept any sequence as meaningful.
Both things are true, and, as you can see, they ultimately express the same concept, in different ways.
And yet jerry regards them as distinct, even opposite.
If various objects are marked with 100 figures numbers, and that allows us to identify them, the single numbers are complex but not functional,
That is exactly what Venter's watermarks do. Durston and kairosfocus see them as functional, but you seem to disagree.
Again, these should be very simple concepts.
There's no question that it's a superficially simple concept. The question is whether it's well enough defined to be the subject of scientific hypotheses and claims. Sometimes simple concepts even turn out, on closer scrutiny, to be nonsensical, as in the concept of a "complete and consistent number theoretical system".R0b_{March 20, 2009
March
03
Mar
20
20
2009
04:11 PM
4
04
11
PM
PDT}

R0b: "QM says that everything in the universe is digital." I would suggest that we stay tuned to the model to which my definition is targeted: protein coding genes. A sequence of nucleotides is digital because it is based on an alphabet of 4 letters and words of 3 letters. It is a digital string of information. The physical structure of DNA, the configuration of all other atoms, does not matter here: it is just the sequence of the nucleotides which carries the information. Moreover, the information is symbolic, in the sense that it codes for another molecule, the protein, and it is the protein which has the function. So, to be more precise, here we have a double layer of function: a symbolic, linguistic function in the DNA (its sequence carries information to build another molecule); and a biochemical function in the final protein. In a sense, even the protein carries a symbolic information, because the primary structure is related to the final function in a very indirect way. But the symbolic nature of the information is more evident in the DNA. Now, I am not saying that the symbolic nature of the information is necessary to have FSCI. A protein has FSCI as its DNA gene, because the sequence of aminoacids is a digital sequence based on a 20 letters alphabet, and the sequence, and only the sequence, determines the final function. But if we consider the DNA as the carrier of the information, and the protein as the carrier of the function (as is appropriate), the symbolic and digital nature of biological information is even more evident. So, I don't understand you worries about the ultimate digital nature of reality (which I can agree on). From that point of view, we could never distinguish between digital and analogic information, which would be a very unpractical position. I can't understand why concepts which are very simple and self-evident everywhere else must become a problem as soon as we speak of ID. "One problem I have is that “function” seems no less subjective than “specification”." You have strange problems. Let's go again to the model we are interested in, functional proteins. Functional proteins are functional because they accomplish some specific task in their natural environment. Enzymes are highly powerful to catalyze biochemical reactions which otherwise would never take place. That's not something we deduce, that's something we observe. Indeed, for proteins, the first thing we know is their function, and then we try to understand how they can accomplish it in terms of tertiary structure, and so on. We don't have to discuss about which is the function: for most proteins, we know it. And we know, dramatically, that if the protein changes, the function is often lost. That's what monogenic diseases are about. So, why do you say that the function is "subjective"? It is not, in no way. Obviously, we have to describe it subjectively with words, and there may be different ways of doing that. Many proteins have multiple functions. And we can measure a function, and that again requires some subjective adaptation. But the function itself is absolutely objective, as well know those who have lost it. I don't want to answer for jerry, but I don't see any significant difference between "functionally specified" and "functionally specifying", in the following sense: the first means that the sequence is specified because it has a function; the second means that the sequence is specifying a function. It's only a matter of words. For DNA, we can well say that it is specified because it has the function of conveying the right sequence to the translation system, and it is specifying because it specifies that sequence. Both things are true, and, as you can see, they ultimately express the same concept, in different ways. Finally, I would agree with jerry about the difference between DNA as a functional sequence, and DNA as something which can be recognized as unique for forensic applications. They are two different things. Any complex sequence is unique and can be recognized, but that does not mean that it is functional. If various objects are marked with 100 figures numbers, and that allows us to identify them, the single numbers are complex but not functional, while the whole system of marking and identification is certainly complex and functional. Again, these should be very simple concepts.gpuccio_{March 20, 2009
March
03
Mar
20
20
2009
02:23 PM
2
02
23
PM
PDT}

Not "devoloping," developing. When I'm not so irritated, I spell better.Adel DiBagno_{March 20, 2009
March
03
Mar
20
20
2009
02:23 PM
2
02
23
PM
PDT}

jerry [65]
Read a biology book.
You are irritating. Grow up. Learn to address people with respect and courtesy, as gpuccio does. You are not DaveScot, and if that's whom you're emulating, you are embarrasing yourself and the cause of ID.
FSCI is the same thing as the central dogma or transcription and translation.
If it's the same thing, what does it add? Why give it a different name? What is the point?
It was one of the key insights by Francis Crick just after discovering the double helix.
Crick and Watson proposed the double helical structure of DNA in 1953. In what year did Crick coin the term Central Dogma? What experimental work did Crick do to establish the Central Dogma? When did Crick employ the term FSCI?
It led to the decoding of the DNA and amino acids. It is just making the analogy that this similar process happens elsewhere in language and computer programming.
To what does 'it' refer?
Now when you see FSCI, think Central Dogma or language or computer programming. It is that easy.
Easy, but what does FSCI add to the Central Dogma or language or computer programming? Or to biological science?
The concept for CSI is more vague than FCSI or FSCI because it tries to do a lot more. It is very general concept and an attempt to conclude intelligence in the widest range of phenomena possible.
Very helpful. You make me wonder why there is a need to "conclude" [sic] intelligence in the widest range of phenomena possible? Looks like an agenda has motivated devolopment of the concept of CSI. So much for scientific objectivity. I am sadly disappointed.Adel DiBagno_{March 20, 2009
March
03
Mar
20
20
2009
02:19 PM
2
02
19
PM
PDT}

gpuccio:
Any information can probably be encoded as a digital sequence. What I meant is that the information we observe must “already” be encoded as a digital sequence.
Actually, we observe physical phenomena and model them as digital information or digital sequences. If by "digital" you mean discrete (and I can't think of what else you would mean), QM says that everything in the universe is digital.
The measure is the existence of a function. A series of letters which encodes a well recognizable meaning in english is functional. A computer code is functional. A protein gene is functional. And so on.
One problem I have is that "function" seems no less subjective than "specification". For instance, jerry says that DNA sequences that are used to identify a criminal are not function because:
The connection is mediated by an intelligent person and does not automatically specify something else as DNA does with a protein. The connection would disappear with out the intelligent intermediary who is the one actually making the connection.
The rule that function cannot be mediated by an intelligent person seems ad hoc. That same rule would indicate that Venter's watermarks and English messages are not functional.R0b_{March 20, 2009
March
03
Mar
20
20
2009
01:02 PM
1
01
02
PM
PDT}

jerry:
While the mathematics for CSI can be daunting, FCSI is quite simple and is a subset of CSI that does not need a mathematical description to understand.
You said in an earlier thread that "In FCSI the information under analysis is doing the specifying", but "In CSI the information is what is specified (the opposite of FCSI)". My questions are: 1) Why does the S stand for "specified" rather than "specifying" in FCSI/FSCI? 2) How can FCSI be a subset of CSI if one is specified and the other specifies? 3) Do other ID proponents agree with the distinction you make, namely that one is specified and the other specifies?R0b_{March 20, 2009
March
03
Mar
20
20
2009
12:51 PM
12
12
51
PM
PDT}

GSV: I am not so interested to deepen the discussion about "important" mathematical objects, because I don't see the relevance to biology. Anyway, my idea is: if a digital string encodes anything which a mathematician would recognize as a mathematical object which has a special function in mathemathics (like pi, or e) or in physics (like a very precise measure of some physical constant), then I would say that such a string is functionally specified because it encodes for something which is extremely useful in a specific context. I will accept the judgement of mathematicians about the objective relevance of the object encoded. "What is the measure of ‘importanceness’ for non mathematical objects?" The measure is the existence of a function. A series of letters which encodes a well recognizable meaning in english is functional. A computer code is functional. A protein gene is functional. And so on. "Why not? If I encoded the beach such that a stone’s size and location were represented by a byte of information we’d notice that this string had a pattern, that is a stone’s location was related to the size. Why isn’t this functional information?" Well, first of all I don't know Chesil Beach, and maybe that's why I miss the relevance of your example. Anyway, I think that you again make confusion between a digital string of information, and an object which can be digitized. IOW, if we observed a string of DNA whose sequence of bits corresponded to the topography of Chesil Beach, that would be digital functional information, and the function would be to describe an existing object, Chesil Beach. But the Beach in itself is not a digital string, and has not a function, at least as far as I know. "I think this is the heart of what I don’t understand about the concept. Do the waves have a high FCSI then not the beach?" Why should the waves have a high FSCI? "This will lead to false positives not false negatives. How do you filter those out?" You are right. The EF is designed to avoid false positives in the sense of a random origin of the observed string. If there were a necessity explanation, that would be a false positive. But the point is: 1) Appealing to a vague and completely unknown necessity explanation, not even vaguely conceivable, is more a philosophical stance than a real argument. Such an argument could be advanced against any form of scientific knowledge: "we could some day find a better explanation, so your explanation is not good". That's nonsense. A necessity explanation is of any value only if it exists, is known abd can be verified or falsified. Otherwise, it's just myth. 2) There are important theoretical reasons why no necessity explanation is appropriate top explain the kind of information we see in biological digital strings. For that, see for example the fundamental paper by Abel and Trevors.gpuccio_{March 20, 2009
March
03
Mar
20
20
2009
11:46 AM
11
11
46
AM
PDT}

Prev 1 2 3 4 5 Next

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Leave a Reply