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Answers for Judge Jones

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In my previous post I posed two questions for Judge Jones. The answers to the second question are A, B and C. That is, (A) Evolutionary theory incorporates religious premises, (B) Proponents of evolutionary theory are religious people and (C) Evolutionary theory mandates certain types of solutions.

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Comments
And Echidna_Levy never asked me if I believe in ghosts.ScottAndrews
June 29, 2009
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Wow. Kairosfocus compares me to Hitler, and yet I'm the one making "an outrageous distractive personal attack." Thanks, I believe I'm done with this conversation.
Do I need to remind us all of a certain notorious propaganda tactic pioneered by Herr Schicklegruber and co? [FYI, Mr Kellogg et al, endless repetition -- regardles of how many it misleads -- does not convert slanderous falsehood into truth.]
David Kellogg
June 29, 2009
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PS: An excerpt from a key stage of the argument in Ch 8 of what Mr Kellogg and other Darwinist advocates would have us believe is nothing more than TBO's commentary on the Nicene Creed's first clause. the below is pp 132 -135 of TMLO; with printing characters substituted for those that will not print [W = Omega, d = Delta; TBO used what would technically be finite increments . . . which makes no material difference to the result; S = k ln W of course.] : _____________ Determining Information: From a Random Polymer to an Informed Polymer If we want to convert a random polymer into an informational molecule, we can determine the increase in information (as defined by Brillouin) by finding the difference between the negatives of the entropy states for the initial random polymer and the informational molecule: I = -(Scm -Scr) (8 - 3 a) = Scr - Scm (8-3 b) =kln Wcr- kln Wcm (8-3c) In this equation, I is a measure of the information content of an aperiodic (complex) polymer with a specified sequence, Scm repre- sents the configurational "coding" entropy of this polymer informed with a given message, and So represents the configurationalentropy of the same polymer for an unspecified or random sequence.* Note that the information in a sequence-specified polymer is maxi-mized when the mass in the molecule could be arranged in many different ways, only one of which communicates the intended mes-sage. (There is a large Scr from eq. 8-2c since Rcr is large, yet Scm = 0' from eq. 8-2c since Rcm = 1.) The information carried in a crystal is small because Sc is small (eq. 8-2c) for a crystal. There simply is very little potential for information in a crystal because its matter can be distributed in so few ways. The random polymer provides an even starker contrast. It bears no information because Scr, although large, is equal to Scm (see eq. 8-3b). . . . . DNA and Protein Formation: Defining the Work There are three distinct components of work to be done in assem- bling simple biomonomers into a complex (or aperiodic) linear poly- mer with a specified sequence as we find in DNA or protein. The change in the Gibbs free energy, AG, of the system during polymeri- zation defines the total work that must be accomplished by energy flow through the system. The change in Gibbs free energy has pre- viously been shown to be dG = dE + pdV - TdS (8-4a) or dG = dH - TdS (8-4b) where a decrease in Gibbs free energy for a given chemical reaction near equilibrium guarantees an increase in the entropy of the uni- verse as demanded by the second law of thermodynamics. Now consider the components of the Gibbs free energy (eq. 8-4b) where the change in enthalpy (dH) is principally the result of changes in the total bonding energy (dE), with the (P dV) term assumed to be negligible. We will refer to this enthalpy component (dH) as the chemical work. A further distinction will be helpful. The change in the entropy (dS) that accompanies the polymerization reaction may be divided into two distinct components which corres- pond to the changes in the thermal energy distribution (dSth) and the mass distribution (AS,), eq. 8-2. [NB: my disdcussion on microjets here is about earlier attempts to object to this very appropriate distinction.] So we can rewrite eq. 8-4b as follows: dG = dH - TdSth - TdSc (8-5) [dG -- change in Gibbs free energy dH -- chemical work TdSth -- thermal entropy work TdSc -- configurational entropy work] It will be shown that polymerization of macromolecules results in a decrease in the thermal and configurational entropies (dSth < 0, dS, < 0). These terms effectively increase dG, and thus represent additional components of work to be done beyond the chemical work. Consider the case of the formation of protein or DNA from bio- monomers in a chemical soup. For computational purposes it may be thought of as requiring two steps: (1) polymerization to form a chain molecule with an aperiodic but near-random sequence," and (2) re- arrangement to an aperiodic, specified information-bearing sequence.The entropy change (dS) associated with the first step is essentially all thermal entropy change (dSth), as discussed above. The entropy change of the second step is essentially all configurational entropy change (dSc). In fact, as previously noted, the change in configura- tional entropy (dSc) = dSc "coding" as one goes from a random arrangement (Ssr) to a specified sequence (Scm) in a macromolecule is numerically equal to the negative of the information content of the molecule as defined by Brillouin (see eq. 8-3a). In summary, the formation of complex biological polymers such as DNA and protein involves changes in the chemical energy, dH, the thermal entropy, dSth, and the configurational entropy, dSc, of the system. Determining the magnitudes of these individual changes using experimental data and a few calculations will allow us to quantify the magnitude of the required work potentially to be done by energy flow through the system in synthesizing macromolecules such as DNA and protein. _______________ So, onlookers, you judge: technical monograph or "mere" religious tract? GEM of TKIkairosfocus
June 29, 2009
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Getting back to TMLO: Here is the discussion at the end of Ch 9, pp 164 - 165: ______________________ Summary Discussion of Experimental Results There is an impressive contrast between the considerable success in synthesizing amino acids and the consistent failure to synthesize protein and DNA. We believe the reason is the large difference in the magnitude of the configurational entropy work required. Amino acids are quite simple compared to protein, and one might reason- ably expect to get some yield of amino acids, even where the chemi- cal reactions that occur do so in a rather random fashion. The same approach will obviously be far less successful in reproducing com- plex protein and DNA molecules where the configurational entropy work term is a nontrivial portion of the whole. Coupling the energy flow through the system to do the chemical and thermal entropy work is much easier than doing the configurational entropy work. The uniform failure in literally thousands of experimental attempts to synthesize protein or DNA under even questionable prebiotic conditions is a monument to the difficulty in achieving a high degree of information content, or specified complexity from the undirected flow of energy through a system. We must not forget that the total work to create a living system goes far beyond the work to create DNA and protein discussed in this chapter. As we stated before, a minimum of 20-40 proteins as well as DNA and RNA are required to make even a simple replicating sys- tem. The lack of known energy-coupling means to do the configura- tional entropy work required to make DNA and protein is many times more crucial in making a living system. As a result, appeals to chance for this most difficult problem still appear in the literature in spite of the fact that calculations give staggeringly low probabili- ties, even on the scale of 5 billion years. Either the work-especially the organizational work-was coupled to the flow of energy in some way not yet understood, or else it truly was a miracle. | Summary of Thermodynamics Discussion Throughout Chapters 7-9 we have analyzed the problems of com- plexity and the origin of life from a thermodynamic point of view. Our reason for doing this is the common notion in the scientific literature today on the origin of life that an open system with energy and mass flow is apriori a sufficient explanation for the complexity of life. We have examined the validity of such an open and con- strained system. We found it to be a reasonable explanation for doing the chemical and thermal entropy work, but clearly inade- quate to account for the configurational entropy work of coding (not to mention the sorting and selecting work). We have noted the need for some sort of coupling mechanism. Without it, there is no way to convert the negative entropy associatd with energy flow into nega- tive entropy associated with configurational entropy and the cor- responding information. Is it reasonable to believe such a "hidden" coupling mechanism will be found in the future that can play this crucial role of a template, metabolic motor, etc., directing the flow of energy in such a way as to create new information? __________________________ As an inspection of the three chapters will demonstrate, this is a sober, worked through conclusion based on the relevant evidence, not a religious declaration. And, it is clear why these findings led to the rise of design theory as a school of thought; as, intelligence is a KNOWN source of specified complexity. Indeed, it is the only directly observed source of this phenomenon. GEM of TKI PS: if you would dispute the definition of "specified complexity" I refer you to the weak argument correctives and ID glossary above, RH column. (In other words, the usual dismissive rhetoric will not be an adequate counter to this point.)kairosfocus
June 29, 2009
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Footnote: here -- in NYT of course! -- is a classic of turn-speech -- pardon the associated debate on ME matters -- on the materialistic redefinition of science in Kansas. Ms Overbye manges to accuse those trying to retain or restore the more or less traditional school-level "definition" of science of rewriting the definition; when it is in fact demonstrably the NAS/NSTA et al who have put forth a philosophically loaded, censoring novelty. (Just compare high-quality dictionaries . . .)kairosfocus
June 29, 2009
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PPPS: And, Mr Levy should not that it is Mr Lewontin and the NAS/NSTA who make it plain that "materialist" and "natural" explanations are synonymous, and are rooted in a priori commitments to evolutionary materialism and/or its slightly more sophisticated twin, naturalism. (And yes, theists who embrace methodological naturalism are handing the atheists a veto over science that they should not. I repeat and even insist: science -- as to values and goals -- should strive to be an unfettered (but intellectually and ethically responsible -- i.e., Dr Mengele et al need not apply . . . ) pursuit of the truth -- i.e., "that which says of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not" [Aristotle got a "few" things right . . . ] -- about our world based on empirical evidence and reasoned -- i.e. controlled by the material facts and cogent reason relative to those facts, whether by abduction, induction or deduction as relevant, and including mathematics -- discussion among the informed.)kairosfocus
June 29, 2009
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PS: I think I need to point out, again, the lamentable sophomoric ignorance that is manifest in Mr Lewontin's "justification" for the notion that God is a chaotic factor who must be excluded form science. So, I excerpt my earlier remarks at 563:
10 –> . . . we see that first Mr Lewontin sees “science” as he defines it as “the only begetter of truth,” then proceeds to define that science in terms of first methodological naturalism: “we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations . . .” 11 –> Lewontin then immediately connects that to METAPHYSICAL materialism and more broadly metaphysical naturalism: “that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door . . . To appeal to an omnipotent deity is to allow that at any moment the regularities of nature may be ruptured, that miracles may happen.” (Of course he here reveals his sophomoric ignorance of the founding vision of modern science, that God is the foundation of the order of the universe through his natural LAW that he uses to govern it; and that miracles on a theistic view must be rare if they are to stand out against the backdrop of the normal order of the world. [This was discussed above already, and is easily accessible for those interested in a true and fair view.]) 12 –> And, as we can for instance see from the Kansas education board case, this is not just personal opinion but is being enforced on science by both the NAS and the national science teacher’s association of the US. indeed, in that case, the students of the state were held hostage under threat of being deemed uneducated to go to college or find good jobs, if they were not to accept the materialism loaded tendentious re-definition by this de facto Magisterium that “Science is the human activity of seeking natural explanations [NB, = Lewontin's "material explanations"] of the world around us.”
A glance at this excerpt from Newton's General Scholium in the greatest work of modern science, Principia, will suffice to show that Mr Lewontin has been sadly misinformed about even the most elementary facts about the founding fathers of modern science; of whom Newton is of course the chief.kairosfocus
June 29, 2009
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2] Weasel: Mr Levy et al should note that I have long since laid out the relevant facts on Weasel here (including the mathematical factors at work), as was previously linked. The Anti-Evo site -- of which Mr Kellogg is evidently a representative here at UD -- is unfortunately yet another unreliable and untrustworthy darwinist advocacy site. Weasel is a case of targetted search, thus of design not at all acredible model of how chance variation and natural selection may explain body plan level biodiversity [much less first life]. And, design theory is in this context about something prior to what is empirically supportable for darwinist mechanisms: to climb Mt Improbable, you have to first credibly get to the shores of Isle Improbable, in a vast and uncharted sea of non-function through what boils down to a random walk search within the search resources of the observed universe. this, evolutionary materialist thought notoriously fails to do. To the merits, to the merits, to the merits we must go! 3] On the mistreatment of TBO by DK: Above someone cited a resume of Mr Olsen as though that rebuts my response that a detailed technical monograph on OOL studies that works from the then current scenarios and timelines to the issues of the underlying science and then brings in the weight of thermodynamics and information theory considerations cannot properly be brushed aside as a "creationist" tract. And, by implicaiton, we are invited to infer that "creationists" simply cannot do science, so we need not even look at wha they have to say on technical matters. thus, TBO have been "expelled" by Mr Kellogg and ilk above. That further failure to respond to the merits of the issue tells us all we need to know. Had Mr Kellogg dared to take up the arguments in TMLO on the merits, he would have seen that it is just as I (and others before me)described it: the technical point of departure that pioneered the modern school of thought now known as design theory. It did that by being a technical monograh that did a vital and telling critical survey of the state of OOL studies circa 1984 [which is still relevant today] and by using thermodynamics and information theory insights to bring out the significance of remarks by those "notorious crteationists" -- NOT -- Orgel, Yockey and Wickens, Polanyi and Prigogine et al, on the recognised distinguishing characteristic of living things: organised, specified complexity; as opposed to order of crystals or the randomness of an organic tar. but doubtless, we can expect to hear ad nauseum -- especially at Darwinist advocacy sites and in places where people are unlikely to know the true facts -- as though it were an established fact, that since TBO were "creationists" we can dismiss TMLO as a "creationist tract," or words to that effect. (Complete with a REAL case of quote mining, from an article in Eternity by Meyer in 1986; at which time the modern term for what TBO were doing did not exist.) Do I need to remind us all of a certain notorious propaganda tactic pioneered by Herr Schicklegruber and co? [FYI, Mr Kellogg et al, endless repetition -- regardles of how many it misleads -- does not convert slanderous falsehood into truth.] 4] On "equivocation" . . . It seems that Mr Kellogg has no cogent response to my outlining and exposing [cf. 563] of just how the false accusation of "equivocation" has been used by darwinist advocates as a "standard rebuttal" of and slanderous tag against Mr Johnson. He owes an apology to Mr Johnson, among others. 5] And, last but not least . . . Here, again, is my analysis of why Behe is correct that those committed to Lewontinian a priori materialism will find cogent evidence on the soundness of design theory unpersuasive:
if one at first accepts P and sees that P => Q, but is committed to F where F => NOT-Q, then one will be inclined to reject P by inferring F => NOT-Q, NOT-Q so NOT-P. But if NOT-P then implies absurdities, F is in deep trouble. I hold — and I believe I can justify: — that Evolutionary Materialism and the imposition of its handmaiden, methodological naturalism, on science, censors science from being an unfettered (but intellectually and ethically responsible) search for the truth about our world based on empirical evidence and reasoned discussion among the informed. [Note, I do not say "the certificated" and/or "the credentialled."]
Onlookers, observe carefully: after hundreds of posts since no 293, NOT ONE DARWINIST ADVOCATE IN THIS THREAD HAS BEEN ABLE TO COGENTLY OBJECT TO THIS. (Instead, every resort to distraction and distortion has been indulged in. What does that tell us?) _______________ I conclude by again saying what science at its best should be about: the unfettered (but intellectually and ethically responsible) pursuit of the truth, based on empirical evidence and reasoned discussion among the informed. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
June 29, 2009
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Onlookers: Some follow-up points: 1] Did I "quote-mine" Mr Lewontin's remarks? This of course is yet another example of an outrageous distractive personal attack by Mr Kellogg. And that, in a context where he again seeks to play at propagandistic turnabout accusations, since it is plain on much evidence above that he has slandered Mr Johnson and Messrs Thaxton, Bradley and Olsen, and that the ACLU/Jones decision has twisted the evidence in front of it from Mr Behe, Mr Fuller and others, in the interests of what is plainly an unjust, ill-founded verdict. As you will see I have repeatedly linked the entire NYRB article (and my longer excerpt which now appears below -- also linked in every post I make at UD . . . complete with a reference in the table of contents); the article as a whole reflects exactly the perspective that appears in the quote. My citation from NAS member Mr Lewontin is thus accurate and in context as an admission inadvertently against interest, and what is more, it is reflective of the policy the NAS has now pursued in places like Kansas. ++++++++ >> . . . to put a correct view of the universe into people's heads we must first get an incorrect view out . . . the problem is to get them to reject irrational and supernatural explanations of the world, the demons that exist only in their imaginations, and to accept a social and intellectual apparatus, Science, as the only begetter of truth . . . . Sagan's argument is straightforward. We exist as material beings in a material world, all of whose phenomena are the consequences of physical relations among material entities. The vast majority of us do not have control of the intellectual apparatus needed to explain manifest reality in material terms, so in place of scientific (i.e., correct material) explanations, we substitute demons . . . . Most of the chapters of The Demon-Haunted World are taken up with exhortations to the reader to cease whoring after false gods and to accept the scientific method as the unique pathway to a correct understanding of the natural world. To Sagan, as to all but a few other scientists, it is self-evident that the practices of science provide the surest method of putting us in contact with physical reality, and that, in contrast, the demon-haunted world rests on a set of beliefs and behaviors that fail every reasonable test . . . . [Now, we get to Lewontin's comentary in his own voice:] Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. The eminent Kant scholar Lewis Beck used to say that anyone who could believe in God could believe in anything. To appeal to an omnipotent deity is to allow that at any moment the regularities of nature may be ruptured, that miracles may happen. >> ["Billions and Billions of Demons," NYRB, Jan 1997; reviewing Sagan's the Demon Haunted World] ++++++++ In short, Lewontin has plainly said -- and, sadly, meant --all that I have cited him as saying, and worse. No to mention, I forgot earlier to point out yet another piece of sophomoric ignorance: "science as the ONLY begetter of truth." In fact to even ask what is "the" method of science and how credible it is in delivering reliable knowledge, one has to step out of science into the worlds of philosophy and history. (And BTW, the best answer [cf here] is that there is no one step by step method of science that is unique to science and is so reliable that it can be justly claimed to be "the only begetter of truth." For: (i) there are many methods used by people practicing what is conventionally called science, (ii) those methods are not foolproof, and (iii) the methods overlap considerably with what people do in many other fields of serious praxis. Indeed, (iv) much of science is based on glorified common sense, aided by mathematical modelling and assorted simulation techniques and experimental or observational procedures and equipment.) These fields will teach us that there is no hard and fast line between science and other fields of serious endeavour in which we seek to discover the well-warranted credibly true state of the world. Science is by no means the only or even the principal "begetter of truth"! [ . . . ]kairosfocus
June 29, 2009
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StephenB:"That is because you are reading your personal prejudices into it and ignoring the clear meaning of his words. It isn’t just scientists, by the way that are not supposed to reject facts because of their implications; it is everyone. In fact, you are rejecting the fact of Behe’s clear meaning because of the social implications. You want him to be guilty of double talk no matter what. He isn’t. Not even close." Srephen, It’s a pretty interesting contrast between what David says we need to do in order to be fair to the Lewontin quote and his analysis of Behes testimony. According to David unless one has read Lewontins books, read his essays, understand his politics, his philosophy of dialectical materialism, to take his quote at face value is to distort and misrepresent his views. However when it comes to Behe his books, his essays, his politics ( whatever they are) are not considered by David. Furthermore I just went line by line through each sentence of the part of the testimony where he claims , in so many words, that Behe contradicts himself. Note nowhere does he do so. A contradiction cannot be divined from a line by line reading of what he said , I can only attribute his conclusions to some sort of projection on his part. It is a bit disturbing that David cannot see that he applies two different standards, one standard for those he agrees with and another for those he does not. At least he is consistent in this one thing. In the case of Lewontin we are to embrace the very opposite of what he says otherwise we are distorting his position, so too we are to take the very opposite of what Behe says and attribute those positions to him. Crazy isn’t it? Vividvividbleau
June 28, 2009
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And again, my statement as written is certainly correct. And it’s happened time — many times in science, and, again, I’ll just refer back to John Maddox’s article Down With the Big Bang. He didn’t like the Big Bang theory. And it wasn t because the data were inconsistent with it, it’s because it was philosophically unacceptable. Walter Nernst hated the idea of a beginning to the universe. It was unscientific. So — and other people have said similar things. Here he embraces the science of the statement he just said was not science.” So you say , how you can say this is hard to fathom. Lets parse this. You say “he embraces the science of the statement he just said was not science” What does he say is not science? He says philosophy is not science and to say that something is God friendly is not a scientific statement. The only way one could then make sense of your contention that he embraces the science of the statement he just said was not science would be to say that philosophy is science or that to say that something is “God friendly” is a scientific statement. Where does he do this? Lets go line by line. 1)And again, my statement as written is certainly correct. He is correct ID is God friendly. 2)And it’s happened time — many times in science, and, again, I’ll just refer back to John Maddox’s article Down With the Big Bang. Here he is referring to an article written by John Maddox regarding something that has happened many times in science. 3)He didn’t like the Big Bang theory. Evidently he did not like the Big bang theory. 4)And it wasn t because the data were inconsistent with it, it’s because it was philosophically unacceptable. He did not like it because it was philosophically unacceptable. 5) Walter Nernst hated the idea of a beginning to the universe. Evidently Nernst hated the idea of the big bang for the same reasons. 6) It was unscientific. Their reason for rejecting the Big Bang were unscientific. Why? Because they were rejecting he Big bang not for scientific reasons rather based on philosophical reasons. Philosophy is not science. 7)So — and other people have said similar things. Other people have said similar things to the things Maddox and Nernst have said. Now I have just gone line by line of the collection of Behe’s testimony that you say he says that philosophy is science after saying it wasn’t. Your assertion cannot be found. In fact he says the exact opposite. Vividvividbleau
June 28, 2009
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vividbleau, here is a more reasonable interpretation: Question: “It’s a God-friendly theory, yes?” Behe responds: Behe: “Let me respond in a couple of ways to that. First, let me clarify for context that this is a journal called Biology and Philosophy. So not only am I speaking about scientific matters here, but I’m also talking about nonscientific matters here in an academic forum. Academics embraces more than just science. This is an academic forum which also embraces philosophy, and so I addressed philosophical issues as well. ----David Kellogg: “So here he tries to distance himself from the statement as having anything to do with science. It’s philosophy, not science. He goes on: “ No, he is not distancing himself from anything. He is explaining that the forum will sometimes express scientific view and sometimes transcend scientific views and focus on philosophy, which could just as easily include the intersection of science and philosophy or even the philosophy of science. Behe: “And again, my statement as written is certainly correct. And it’s happened time — many times in science, and, again, I’ll just refer back to John Maddox’s article Down With the Big Bang. He didn’t like the Big Bang theory. And it wasn t because the data were inconsistent with it, it’s because it was philosophically unacceptable. Walter Nernst hated the idea of a beginning to the universe. It was unscientific. So — and other people have said similar things.” -----David: “Here he embraces the science of the statement he just said was not science. Obviously it’s better not to disavow his words, so he’s going to align them with other moments in science like the Big Bang.” No. He is saying this: Some people, as it turns out, don’t want ANY scientific theory to be God-friendly. John Maddox and Walter Nernst, for example, reflected that attitude. They hated the idea of a big bang not because it was bad science, but because of its philosophical implications. That is an unscientific attitude for a scientist, and sadly, it is not all that unusual. Behe: “So it’s clearly true that people make decisions even about a scientific theory, based not only on the science itself, but what they perceive as other ramifications of the theory.” -----David: “Here he says that people (I assume he means scientists) decide on a theory for reasons other than science: that happens, he suggests, all the time. Your phrase, "all the time" is too strong. A better interpretation would be, it isn't all that unusual. Behe: “But I argue, I’ve argued a number of places, that it’s the proper role of a scientist to leave aside those other considerations as much as possible and focus simply on the scientific data.” ----David: “But, he says, it shouldn’t. He is saying this: But I have argued that a scientist should not allow these kinds of biases and prejudices to leak into their science. A good scientist will leave aside those other considerations as much as possible and focus simply on the scientific data. ----“David: “All of this was in response to a quote from his own essay and a question: “It’s a God-friendly theory, yes?” Nobody interrupted him or asked a follow-up question. This back-and-forth was entirely Behe’s doing. I find Behe to be very nervous and ambivalent about whether he wants to embrace this text or distance himself from it.” What back and forth? It’s called nuance. ----David: “Behe’s testimony as a whole, when I read it, doesn’t represent him at all well.” That is because you are reading your personal prejudices into it and ignoring the clear meaning of his words. It isn’t just scientists, by the way that are not supposed to reject facts because of their implications; it is everyone. In fact, you are rejecting the fact of Behe’s clear meaning because of the social implications. You want him to be guilty of double talk no matter what. He isn't. Not even close.StephenB
June 28, 2009
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Yeah I read it, and the cross examination didn’t pertain to interest or bias, but to Behe’s opinion on his personal views of religion and how they pertain to ID. Then Rule 610 is completely inapplicable. The rule doesn't say you can't ask witnesses their opinion on religious matters. It says that their testimony on religious matters is inadmissible "for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced." A party can call a witness and ask, "Is X religious? Does your religion say Y?" The answers to both questions are admissible, if they're relevant. But if the party asks, "Do you really believe X," intending that the answer will discredit the witness because X is seen as ludicrous, the answer is inadmissible. The questions posed to Behe were relevant. They were not intended to get him to give crazy answers to impair his credibility. Nor did the court find that Behe was incredible on grounds of his religious beliefs. The rule is inapplicable.Learned Hand
June 28, 2009
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"Yeah I read it, and the cross examination didn’t pertain to interest or bias, but to Behe’s opinion on his personal views of religion and how they pertain to ID." I'm impressed: a non-lawyer can spot objections that would have stopped the testimony in its tracks! Too bad you weren't the attorney at Dover. Are the attorneys for the Thomas More Law Center idiots, or is it maybe the case that you are, um, wrong?David Kellogg
June 28, 2009
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Okay vividbleau, I'll walk through Behe's response. Remember, he's just been asked about the "Reply to My Critics" essay, and the plausibility line has been read to him. The attorney asks, "It's a God-friendly theory, yes?" Behe responds:
Let me respond in a couple of ways to that. First, let me clarify for context that this is a journal called Biology and Philosophy. So not only am I speaking about scientific matters here, but I’m also talking about nonscientific matters here in an academic forum. Academics embraces more than just science. This is an academic forum which also embraces philosophy, and so I addressed philosophical issues as well.
So here he tries to distance himself from the statement as having anything to do with science. It's philosophy, not science. He goes on:
And again, my statement as written is certainly correct. And it’s happened time — many times in science, and, again, I’ll just refer back to John Maddox’s article Down With the Big Bang. He didn’t like the Big Bang theory. And it wasn t because the data were inconsistent with it, it’s because it was philosophically unacceptable. Walter Nernst hated the idea of a beginning to the universe. It was unscientific. So — and other people have said similar things.
Here he embraces the science of the statement he just said was not science. Obviously it's better not to disavow his words, so he's going to align them with other moments in science like the Big Bang.
So it’s clearly true that people make decisions even about a scientific theory, based not only on the science itself, but what they perceive as other ramifications of the theory.
Here he says that people (I assume he means scientists) decide on a theory for reasons other than science: that happens, he suggests, all the time.
But I argue, I’ve argued a number of places, that it’s the proper role of a scientist to leave aside those other considerations as much as possible and focus simply on the scientific data.
But, he says, it shouldn't. All of this was in response to a quote from his own essay and a question: "It's a God-friendly theory, yes?" Nobody interrupted him or asked a follow-up question. This back-and-forth was entirely Behe's doing. I find Behe to be very nervous and ambivalent about whether he wants to embrace this text or distance himself from it. Behe's testimony as a whole, when I read it, doesn't represent him at all well.David Kellogg
June 28, 2009
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David Kellogg, ------"Clive, did you happen to read the advisory note on Rule 610:" Yeah I read it, and the cross examination didn't pertain to interest or bias, but to Behe's opinion on his personal views of religion and how they pertain to ID.Clive Hayden
June 28, 2009
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"you accuse me of a double standard." Indeed I do. Furthermore I dont think any fair minded person would disagree after reading how you treated Behe and contrast that to your treatment of Lewontin. "Actually I think StephenB’s interpretation of Behe’s remarks are reasonable for someone who has a prior commitment to intelligent design" Actually I think they are reasonable for someone who is not an ID supporter. As of yet you have not dealt with Stephens remarks and as of yet have not answered my questions posted before Stephen. This would be quite helpfull because for the life of me I dont understand the basis for your statement. "So. First he tries to disavow the importance of having written that — it’s not science, he says. But then he says it is science, just like the Big Bang. People take these things into account all the time. And then he says scientists shouldn’t do that." Answering my two questions I asked in 538 would help clarify things for me. I might add this is at least the third time I have asked that you do so. "To pull a paragraph from the middle of a Lewontin essay and represent it as a dogmatic statement of Lewontin’s views is problematic not just there but with any of Lewontin’s reviews and books" If only you would apply the same standards to Behe. Double standard indeed. David are you ever going to answer any of my questions? They offer you the opportunity to rebute my thinking that you have one standard for those you agree with and another for those you do not. Vividvividbleau
June 28, 2009
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vividbleau [593], you accuse me of a double standard. Actually I think StephenB's interpretation of Behe's remarks are reasonable for someone who has a prior commitment to intelligent design. I understand how Behe seems, to Stephen and IDers, not to contradict or implicate himself. I just don't think that interpretation is reasonable to someone without such a prior commitment. Of course, I'm hardly a neutral observer, having formed views against ID after having once been favorably disposed toward creationism. (I read Darwin on Trial when it first came out after seeing it it in the "creation/evolution" section of a Christian bookstore.) But I don't think neutral observers exist. As for Lewontin, if you've read any of his books or essays, you'll know that his work is laced with irony and proceeds, in accord with his Marxist way of thinking, dialectically, entertaining propositions fully before undermining them. To pull a paragraph from the middle of a Lewontin essay and represent it as a dogmatic statement of Lewontin's views is problematic not just there but with any of Lewontin's reviews and books. If you look at the whole essay, there's very little that can be taken at face value, because everything works in opposition to something else in the text. (For an explanation of dialectical criticism, see Frederic Jameson, "Towards Dialectical Criticism," in Marxism and Form, Princeton University Press, 1971.)David Kellogg
June 28, 2009
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StephenB, OK, so I took a general "yes, you believe in ghosts" from that. Fair point about the thread content, I won't derail it any more.Echidna-Levy
June 28, 2009
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Echidna-Levy---"Which of the three types of ghosts you describe do you believe in?" All three. I was just having a little fun with you. ----"Have you ever seen any type of ghost at all?" Nope. ---"If not, why do you believe in them (of course if your answer was positive to the first question)." I may take that up with you sometime when it lends itself to the subject matter of the thread.StephenB
June 28, 2009
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StephenB, Which of the three types of ghosts you describe do you believe in? Have you ever seen any type of ghost at all? If not, why do you believe in them (of course if your answer was positive to the first question). And if this is true
there remain so many trustworthy accounts of all three types of ghost
Why do you suppose in our CCTV covered world there has never been a single ghost captured on CCTV? A meteor flies overhead, a CCTV captures it. A plane lands in a rive, CCTV captures it. These three types of ghost are so common that "that only a dogmatic prejudice against them could prevent us from believing they exist" and yet when asked for the number one thing that could make people believe, nothing is available. And lastly, where do you think Dr. Peter Kreeft is getting his knowlege of Heaven from?Echidna-Levy
June 28, 2009
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Echidna-Levy ----"How many kinds [of ghosts] are there?" Three "Without our action or invitation, the dead often do appear to the living. There is enormous evidence of 'ghosts' in all cultures .... We can distinguish three kinds of ghosts, I believe. First, the most familiar kind: the sad ones, the wispy ones. They seem to be working out some unfinished earthly business, or suffering some purgatorial purification until released from their earthly business. These ghosts would seem to be the ones who just barely made it to Purgatory, who feel little or no joy yet and who need to learn many painful lessons about their past life on earth." "Second, there are malicious and deceptive spirits - and since they are_deceptive, they hardly ever appear malicious. These are probably the ones who respond to conjurings at seances. They probably come from Hell. Even the chance_of that happening should be sufficient to terrify away all temptations to necromancy." "Third, there are bright, happy spirits of dead friends and family, especially spouses, who appear unbidden, at God's will, not ours, with messages of hope and love. They seem to come from Heaven. Unlike the purgatorial ghosts who come back primarily for their own sakes, these bright spirits come back for the sake of us the living, to tell us all is well. They are aped by evil spirits who say the same, who speak 'peace, peace, when there is no peace'. But the deception works only one way: the fake can deceive by appearing genuine, but the genuine never deceives by appearing fake. Heavenly spirits always convince us that they are genuinely good. Even the bright spirits appear ghostlike to us because a ghost of any type is one whose substance does not belong in or come from this world. In Heaven these spirits are not ghosts but real, solid and substantial because they are at home there: One can't be a ghost in one's own country." "That there are all three kinds of ghosts is enormously likely. Even taking into account our penchant to deceive and be deceived, our credulity and fakery, there remain so many trustworthy accounts of all three types of ghosts - trustworthy by every ordinary empirical and psychological standard - that only a dogmatic prejudice against them could prevent us from believing they exist. As Chesterton says, 'We believe an old apple woman when she says she ate an apple; but when she says she saw a ghost, we say 'But she's only an old apple woman.' A most undemocratic and unscientific prejudice." -- from "Everything You Ever Wanted to Know about Heaven", by Dr. Peter Kreeft (Ignatius Press, 1990).StephenB
June 28, 2009
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Jerry, At 10:06 I posed quite a few links leading to quite alot of text. In under an hour you digested it all and said
What I read in the links provided was evidence for common ancestry not common descent. There is a hard break at the Cambrian Explosion and while there is much speculation, there is nothing to suggest single celled organisms led to the phyla seen in the Cambrian.
I doubt it. As others have pointed out already, that seems to be a difference without a distinction. Make your own private terminology if you like, but know you are out of step with what the scientific community understands by common descent. As David points out, what useage does the word common serve in your usage?Echidna-Levy
June 28, 2009
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StephenB, How many kinds are there?Echidna-Levy
June 28, 2009
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----Echidna-Levy;---"Do you believe in ghosts StephenB?" Which kind?StephenB
June 28, 2009
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vividbleau to DK: ----"Compared to Lewontins paragraph Behe’s remarks are a cakewalk to defend in its context as Stephen has pointed out yet you offer Behe no charitable reading at all. Yet in Lewontins case, IMO a much harder statement to defend you argue , at least from my point of view, that we are misinterpreting and distorting what he said." That is a very interesting observation, vivid. Thank you for pointing that out.StephenB
June 28, 2009
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"It explains why people like KF who use this quote as a chestnut are quotemining:" David where I sit one has to go to very great lengths to change the meaning of Lewontins remarks. Be that as it may I always ( at least I try) want to give what people write the most charitable interpretation. what I find interesting here is your double standard. You are obviously lobbying for the most charitable reading of Lewontins quote, which BTW encompasses a paragraph, and are not willing to do so in the case of Behe. Which BTW you have yet to justify your remarks nor answer my questions posed at 538. Compared to Lewontins paragraph Behe's remarks are a cakewalk to defend in its context as Stephen has pointed out yet you offer Behe no charitable reading at all. Yet in Lewontins case, IMO a much harder statement to defend you argue , at least from my point of view, that we are misinterpreting and distorting what he said. I suppose you will fail to see the inconsistency in your behavior but actions speak louder then words. In short by doing this you have lifted your philosphical skirt and your biases are there for all to see. Vividvividbleau
June 28, 2009
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jerry, if you want to avoid confusion you should not use a term like "common ancestry" -- or at least drop "common," which implies -- well, common. All the way back.David Kellogg
June 28, 2009
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jerry, "I re read the paragraph in question from Lewontin and think it is more damning than kairosfocus claims." Did you read the paragraph in context? I provided a link to the whole article in 581. Lewontin is a subtle writer whose tone often involves (as in the paragraph at hand) implicit digs at his colleagues. This is a hallmark of essays in the New York Review of Books generally, and one reason they turn to him often. kairosfocus is tone deaf to such subtlety. I do wish you'd read the whole essay. I found the ASA board posting by Teh Google ("lewontin divine foot"), in a search for the original essay. I'm not sure why it's where it is. It may be a misplaced response to something else . There are things I disagree with -- for example, I don't think the paragraph is a parody of Sagan's view -- but on the whole I think she's correct.David Kellogg
June 28, 2009
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David Kellogg, I re read the paragraph in question from Lewontin and think it is more damning than kairosfocus claims. It is a manifesto for absoluteness. Something we see here in the responses of the anti ID people. I will not discuss it here since I think threads this long are absurd. An aside: how did you find that comment on ASA. They weren't even discussing Lewontin and it was a one off comment. I will also defend my point of view on common descent and common ancestry when it comes up again someplace and I have time. They are very different concepts. Just because you have a grandfather does not mean that several million generations back your forefather was an amoeba. But if you insist, I will humor you and let you have your druthers on your own heritage.jerry
June 28, 2009
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