Back At Special Agent ERV’s Blog…

KF, Well I see you read it over the good paper. That's great. The thing that strikes me the most about the paper is how much of a "mind is more than matter and machine" kind of guy Gödel really was. One might think that his theorem was hijacked by religious zealots to support an extreme view that wasn't his own. These notes pretty much put that to rest. Chalk up another one of the greats to anti- methodological materialism. Virtually all of his most explicit comments (and what we know about him) seem to point to the fact that he was a true Platonist of the modern era. Perhaps he could be referred to as a neo-Platonist. In any event he used Husserl's phenomenology as a launching pad to help grow his philosophical views (Platonism) into what he saw as a modern synthesis. You KF are a believer in self referential experience as a means of deriving senses and truths that result in pure reason- so you must be able to appreciate his phenomenological venture. I like this quote by KG- "I do not fit into this century." I would have loved to see what he would have thought about the works of Behe and Dembski. Can you imagine that obsessive genius mind getting hold of biological data and the NFL theorems? DE would be over in a week; maybe less. Frost122585

Perhaps . . . An excerpt from the Rodriguez-Consuegra review of Wang's 1996 presentation on Godel's philosophy [Modern Logic, Vol 8 nos 3 – 4 (May 2000 – Oct 2001), pp. 137 – 152] may be helpful, and certainly help us see a wider frame of possibilities than we are wont to if we are in thralldom to he evolutionary materialist paradigm:

From the publication of Wang’s From mathematics to philosophy in 1974 we know Godel’s main arguments against any possible attempt to identify minds and computers (in the context of his comments about Turing machines). They were: that the use of the mind is in constant development, while computers are static; that the states of every computer are necessarily finite, while mental states might converge to infinity because of their development, and that there may exist mental procedures which are not mechanical in nature (he was obviously thinking of mathematical intuition, which for Godel cannot be reduced to any mechanical procedure). [HT, Frosty]

It would be helpful to understand the point of the above if we see a further excerpt:

“Even if the finite brain cannot store an infinite amount of information, the spirit may be able to. The brain is a computing machine connected with a spirit” (p. 193). As usual then, Godel was much more cautious in his publishable writings than in his private reflections.

Reverting to monads [which Godel consciously used], Godel is seeing the observable functions of the human mind as a result of a composite whole that embraces entities from a physical and a spiritual world. The brain is the mind's input/output computer that interfaces with the empirical, materially embodied world, in effect. And to support that idea, in his 1951 Gibbs lecture, he has in effect used the results of his theorems to show that mechanical axiom-theorem-proof approaches cannot exhaust the range of credibly knowable mathematical truth. He then presented the implications as a “dilemma”:

either the system of all demonstrable propositions (subjective mathematics) surpasses all machines, or the system of all true mathematical propositions (objective mathematics) surpasses subjective mathematics. If the first, the human mind cannot be reduced to the brain; if the second, mathematical objects and facts cannot be our creation, so they are independent of our mental acts. Obviously enough, both alternatives were to be unacceptable for materialists, so they together may be indirectly argued in favour of spiritualism.

Worth a few thoughts. And, the thoughts will bring us back to the issue that mathematico-logical reasoning, conclusions and associated decisions require the reality and correspondence to the empirically observed world of entities that are radically different from the elements and characteristic interactions and laws or necessity or of chance of the material world. Worse, when we try to sort out first principle propositions and systematise the rest by deductive inference, we see that for realistically rich axiomatic systems, we run into incompleteness and/or incoherence. Thus, the world of propositions, truths etc is irreducibly complex in the sense of resistance to finite, coherent axiomatisation and algorithmic inference to implications. That in turn raises serious questions on the nature of mathematical and related truths, reasoning and knowledge. Questions that point away from the materialistic picture of the world – it turns out to be far too simple to correspond to major aspects of reality. Not least, let us observe that faith and reason are not clashing opposites, but are deeply intertwined in the deepest roots of our thought life. GEM of TKI kairosfocus

Ok, finally here is a quote by Kurt Godel out of Hao Wang's personal notes from their meetings together.

"My incompleteness theorem makes it likely that mind is not mechanical, or else mind cannot understand it's own mechanism. IF my result is taken together with the rationalistic attitude which Hilbert had and which was not refuted by my results, then [we can infer] the sharp result that the mind is not mechanical. This is so, because, if the mind were a machine, there should, contrary to this rationalistic attitude, exist number-theoretic questions undecidable for the human mind."

So either the mind isn't a machine (what Gödel and I subscribe to) or there are number theoretic questions undecidable for the human mind. I the second is true that materialism is grated a new stay in that the mind may just simply be inadequate. But if Gödel is right then the idea of a mechanically deducible mind and universe is a non-reality. I should also point out that if the second possibility is correct this means that still epistemologically the mind will be incapable of understanding itself because it will be able to deduce true propositions. The only exception is that those propositions are "undecidable." That means the mind still can not be viewed in a complete formal way even if materialism is true. So materialism is either false as Gödel inferred, or it is true but we will never be able to fully prove it. My point was that I feel both are a little bit like two sides of the same coin. If we can’t prove it then how do we know it’s possibly true? This leads me to appeal to other evidences on the question of the origin of mind like those regarding the big bang and the appearance of information and form into matter which is not capable of producing or comprised of the stuff that designs or accounts for form. I see Gödel’s proof as clearly a leap away from a materialistic reductionist reality and a step in the right direction towards nonmaterial reality of the mind. He of course thought is was even more than a step in the right direction. He thought it was a proof. Remember he said as an undergraduate that he wanted to produce a mathematical result that would have meta-mathematical implications and consequences so that Platonism could be proven as the true reality of being and rationality. Gödel said he wanted to do for mathematics what Newton did for physics. And guess what, he did. Frost122585

I think that the "more than matter" inference of the mind that I gather from Gödel’s proof can be understood like this... If the mind can transcend sets then no set can contain it. Since no set can contain it, it cannot be formalized. If it cannot be formalized is cannot be deduced. In this sense the mind cannot be proven to operate in any particular mechanical way because whatever axioms that you use to represent its range- that is the "sets"- they will either be themselves incomplete or will lead to a eventual contradiction. as KF puts it so beautifully...

"...no sufficiently rich as to be useful mathematically anchored system can be complete relative to a set of coherent axioms, and [b] there is no constructive procedure for getting to a known coherent set of axioms, even where these are incomplete."

So we have said what it proves but what does it really mean? To quote from Yourgrau's book AWWT

"...the system should be complete, in the sense that all true statements expressible within the system (under a suitable interpretation) should be derivable from the axioms. To prevent circularity, the system in which consistency is to be proved must not itself employ any mathematically suspect or controversial procedures that could render its own consistency suspect. It must be, to use Hilbert's invented term, not exactly finite but rather "finitary," in the sense that its proofs must be in principle surveyable by sense experience and must not at any point appeal to an abstract, completed infinity of the kind proposed by Cantor."

So it cant be contradictory, it cant be infinite, and it MUST be complete. Since logic is not and then later arithmetic was proven to also share the same fate- knowledge is left up to true induction through intuitions and the like, to give us the sense perceptions that we use to come to formalistic proofs. In this sense to me the world begins to look more like an experience or a thought than a provable material process. It is here that I say the mind cannot be reduced and is, it seems, more than matter. The self experience of phenomenological consciousness is not materialistic in that it is self referential and matter does not display any such capacity in utero. So it seems to be that mind is more than matter. To say my conclusion in the reverse "if it could be demonstrated that a formalistic complete proof could show how the system of consciousness arose and functions as a material process then it would fallow that mind is simply a material machine." Thanks to Gödel I can rest assured. I gather from his quotes especially the one that started this discussion...

"At any rate it has not been proved that there are arithmetical questions undecidable by the human mind. Rather what has been proved is only this: Either there are such questions or the human mind is more than a machine. In my opinion the second alternative is much more likely.”

that as I siad before

“That’s right… epistemologically a complete mechanization of consciousness is logically and arithmetically impossible.”

is true and that what you said

"I am telling you it is my understanding that he was not saying anything like that.”

misses the thrust and the point. [I] think what is throwing "you" off is this part of his comment...

"it has not been proved that there are arithmetical questions undecidable by the human mind"

What he means is that perhaps the mind can "know" and therefore, to use his word, "decide" all things but that some cannot be mechanically formalized into complete expressions that are provable within themselves. THis means that any mechanical, material explanation of consciousness would have to appeal to richer axioms or intuitions that do not exist within the system to complete it. The first possiblity of his dialectic refers to concepts, numbers- but the second refers to the system by which those numbers can be formalistically proved meaningful. My focus was not on whether we can or can not understand or rationalize all things but that all things cannot be proven in a material mechanically reductionist model that say Dawkins would subscribe to. The one place I go further is that I take the ontological point behind Godle and assume it true for the mind. Any why not? The mind ontologically exists to me and I see no reason why it should not be freed by incompleteness as well. Call it "irreducible complexity of the nonmaterial consciouness." Frost122585

I think that you are taking the position of demoting his proof to something more like an anomaly- but here is another Gödel quote that I think pertains to how he felt about his proof and its implications- for anyone who has any doubts... "It was to be expected that my proof would be taken up by religion sooner or later. This is justified in a certain sense." From what I gather up until the end of his life he remained a deep believer. Though I think he died an atheist. But for most or all of his life he believed like Newton that the world was made to be understood and was in fact like the mind, rational. That is he didn't just think that the mind was rational because of evolution, but that the world , like the predictable effects of gravity, was meant even perhaps designed to be understood. Here at some last Gödel quotes to consider... "Human reason will develop in all directions." "Religions are mostly bad, but religion is good." "My philosophical views: 1.The world is rational." Frost122585

JYT said,

"That’s right…epistemologically a complete mechanization of consciousness is logically and arithmetically impossible.” I am telling you it is my understanding that he was not saying anything like that."

We he simply is because if you cannot show how the mind works with some deductive logical analysis then your model cannot be proved. Gödel’s proof is about deduction and it was Hilbert's hope to prove deduction as a system rich enough to deal with all things. Consciousness will never be proven mechanistically- simple as that- and it cannot be proven as such then why should be think it TRULY so? In fact Gödel was convinced that the mind was more than could be contained in it- as clearly expressed in that quote. Hence, my conclusion fallows like the night to the day. Gödel’s proof is that strange place where epistemology and ontology meet vis-a-vis. Frost122585

A footnote or three, but first a thank-you: Thanks to DK, EM MA, JT etc and of course Frosty, SB, etc for a useful thread that has prompted then contributed to the development of appendix 6, the always linked, on mind and matter [and thence morality]. This thread is now winding down, but it has served to show again to the discerning reader just where the balance on the merits lies on the key matters raised above. I see some further remarks, though, and think it is worthwhile noting a few hopefully final observations: 1] DK, 199: I don’t despise theologians. I noted only that they have sectarian beliefs that I disagree with and that they would be lost without metaphysics. And, post-Lakatos et al, and in light of the underlying implications of say methodological naturalism for how they too often look at the world, evolutionary materialist scientists have no metaphysical commitments that they would be “lost without”? That is, sadly, the objection is plainly selectively hyperskeptical, and shows the underlying prejudice that I spoke of. Perhaps, though, I spoke too sharply: “dismisses” may be a better term. 2] “What is your warrant for “the credibility of the mind?” From one perspective, this looks a lot like an attempt to turn around the burden of proof, serving to distract from the self-referential incoherence difficulties of evolutionary materialism as highlighted above [and in the draft appendix 6 the always linked], once it has to address the nature and origin of mind. But, we can look at the matter from a philosophical perspective as a call to comparative difficulties analysis, across factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power. Let us use the latter view for the moment, noting that this is addressed to me as an individual with his own worldview and associated presuppositional framework of first plausibles articulated into a story of the world and our place and mission in it. In my case, a Judaeo-Christian, theistic worldview [anchored in the end principally through knowing God as a person, in relationship based ont eh risen Christ, and historically by the resurrection, attested to by 500+ eyewitnesses and associated power flowing across the centuries of history above and beyond all the failures, sins and limitations of the Christian church as a very human institution. The glory yet shines out through the cracks in the “clay pots” . . . Such a framework is theistic, and sees our cosmos as a creation by a supremely Intelligent, wise and powerful designer, a creation that brims over with his signature style. Thus, it is not surprising that there is an intelligible, mathematically, empirically and logically discernible order to the cosmos, and that we are placed and adapted to discover it at least in part, using minds that are made in the image of the Mind who formed the worlds. Indeed, historically, this is the precise worldview that in a unique time and place then generally known as Christendom, gave birth to the still ongoing scientific revolution. Newton's General Scholium to his Principia -- cf here App 4 the always linked -- states that historically foundational scientific view aptly, even eloquently:

. . . This most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being. And if the fixed stars are the centres of other like systems, these, being formed by the like wise counsel, must be all subject to the dominion of One; especially since the light of the fixed stars is of the same nature with the light of the sun, and from every system light passes into all the other systems: and lest the systems of the fixed stars should, by their gravity, fall on each other mutually, he hath placed those systems at immense distances one from another. This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all; and on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God pantokrator , or Universal Ruler . . . And from his true dominion it follows that the true God is a living, intelligent, and powerful Being . . . He is not eternity or infinity, but eternal and infinite; he is not duration or space, but he endures and is present. He endures for ever, and is every where present; and by existing always and every where, he constitutes duration and space . . . God is the same God, always and every where. He is omnipresent not virtually only, but also substantially; for virtue cannot subsist without substance. In him are all things contained and moved [i.e. cites Ac 17, where Paul evidently cites Cleanthes] . . . It is allowed by all that the Supreme God exists necessarily; and by the same necessity he exists always, and every where. [i.e accepts the cosmological argument to God.] . . . . We have ideas of his attributes, but what the real substance of any thing is we know not. In bodies, we see only their figures and colours, we hear only the sounds, we touch only their outward surfaces, we smell only the smells, and taste the savours; but their inward substances are not to be known either by our senses, or by any reflex act of our minds [notice his awareness of the limitations of empirical thought and his anticipation of the noumenal-phenomenal challenge]: much less, then, have we any idea of the substance of God. We know him only by his most wise and excellent contrivances of things, and final cause [i.e from his designs]: we admire him for his perfections; but we reverence and adore him on account of his dominion: for we adore him as his servants; and a god without dominion, providence, and final causes, is nothing else but Fate and Nature. Blind metaphysical necessity, which is certainly the same always and every where, could produce no variety of things. [i.e necessity does not produce contingency] All that diversity of natural things which we find suited to different times and places could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing [That is, implicitly rejects chance, Plato's third alternative and explicitly infers to the Designer of the Cosmos.] . . . And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearances of things, does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy.

Onlookers, no prizes for guessing why this passage is not commonly mentioned when discussions on the roots of ID thought come up! 3] PS to JT: on the implications of Godel . . . I raised Marks' remarks on Godel and other topics as a matter of interest primarily. FYI, the central implication of the incompleteness theorems is that [a] no sufficiently rich as to be useful mathematically anchored system can be complete relative to a set of coherent axioms, and [b] there is no constructive procedure for getting to a known coherent set of axioms, even where these are incomplete. As a direct consequence, mathematico-deductive reasoning loses all claim to certainty of proof. We may know with high confidence and good warrant, but we must never confuse our degree of certitude with certainty. Thus, mathematicians, computer scientists and scientists all must live and work by trust relative to core first plausibles, i.e points of faith. And so wisdom is to be open-minded and open-hearted about this, for we are finite and fallible. So, in the end, we all live by such faith-points, the cores of our worldviews, and wisdom is to be aware that the first undeniable truth is this: error exists, which means that truth exists but we may at least in part be mistaken about it. Reason and belief are inextricably intertwined in the roots of our worldviews and intellectual careers. Here endeth the lesson. Grace to all, and thanks again . . . GEM of TKI kairosfocus

To me, all Godel’s theory says is that there is no perfect model, i.e. it is indeed true that, “two things that are different cannot be the same.” Any body of knowledge is an abstract model, whereby we attempt to capture certain properties relevant to us of some aspect of our external environment such that we can predict the behavior of the thing modelled with a certain degree of accuracy. We know that whatever that formallized body of knowledge is, its going to miss something. Call the unknown or unpredicted phenomena "God" or "spirit", or just "the unknown", or perhaps merely "the unmodelled". The only perfect model of a human brain would be another human brain subject to the exact same stimuli at the same time and the same place, which is impossible. JunkyardTornado

To me, all Godel's theory says is that there is no perfect model, i.e. it is indeed true that, "two things that are different cannot be the same." So of knowledge is building models whereby we can predict the behavior of something else, we know tha JunkyardTornado

KF thanks for taking the time to post that presentation. Most of it I was already familiar with. I think people should fully understand that nothing in Godel's proof or that presentation has any bearing on the subject of dualism at all, i.e. whether the human mind transcends mechanism (i.e. whether the human mind works by virtue of something that cannot be systematically described at all, i.e. something that is not a mechanism, whatever that might mean.) Something else I wanted to point from FrostN's Godel quote: "At any rate it has not been proved that there are arithmetical questions undecidable by the human mind. Rather what has been proved is only this: Either there are such questions or the human mind is more than a machine. In my opinion the second alternative is much more likely". So, to Godel, the idea that there could be arithmetical questions undecidable by a human mind was apparently just too incredible for him to fully accept. In fact he asserts that in his opinion it is much more likely that it is not the case, i.e. that man must therefore be something more than a mechanism. His personal viewpoint seems to be only explainable by some culturally-conditioned hubris that would ascribe God-like attributes to our species by default. Furthermore his personal viewpoint is nothing that by any means he claims are implies to have proven. In the presentation you supplied, only by the vaguest and briefest allusions does the author imply that we can infer somehow that man transcends mechanism: "There are some things we know exist that we can prove we will ever know. Most doubt a computer will ever write a deeply meaningful poem or a classic novel." That's it - the only remark in the entire presentation that touches on the subject of dualism. To me, it is just kind of pathetic for someone to consider "Ode to a Cloud", e.g. "Oh Cloud! How doest thou traverse the endless sky... blah blah blah..." and exalt that as some indelible mark of Godhood in the human race. Could a computer ever come up with something so brilliant? Could a human ever write a first-hand account of what it feels like to be dog? If not, would that mean a dog is superior to a human? Would it prove a dog isn't a mechanism? Can two things that are different be the same? Here's an interesting discussion from The Straight Dope on "the seven basic literary plots" JunkyardTornado

GEM of TKI: Thank you for your extensive rebuttal #194. I have rested my case.

Let's start here, with the theologians that DK so plainly despises:

I think that is unfair. I don't despise theologians. I noted only that they have sectarian beliefs that I disagree with and that they would be lost without metaphysics. One final request and I will depart these premises. Nowhere within your #194 did I find an answer to the question I posed in my #191, "What is your warrant for “the credibility of the mind?” I will not challenge whatever answer you care to give. I simply want to know. With respect and good wishes, Daniel King Daniel King

Frosty and JT: I believe you will find this discussion by Prof Marks of Baylor interesting and relevant. [HT: Ms O'Leary.] GEM of TKI kairosfocus

Frost: Just following up because maybe my remarks weren't fully understood. The following was your characterization of the quote you provided from Godel: That’s right…epistemologically a complete mechanization of consciousness is logically and arithmetically impossible.” I am telling you it is my understanding that he was not saying anything like that. The following part of Godel's quote might have thrown you off a little bit: What has been proved is only that the kind of reasoning necessary in mathematics cannot be completely mechanized. Rather constantly renewed appeals to mathematical intuition are necessary... I can tell you for a fact that he did not mean he had proven that in order to derive a mathematical proof for a proposition, it is necessary for someone to employ a non-mechanistic process of "intuition". It is patently clear from the last part of his quote that I emphasized previously that he accepted the possibility that thought might be a mechanism. By "intuition" what he meant was generally accepted axioms which are merely assumed by not proven and from which all other truths are mechanically derived. In short, I feel you mischaracterized completely his quote, so was curious whether you concede that you did (although I'm not a Godel historian in case you have some other quotes of his.) JunkyardTornado

Frost wrote: Wittgenstein’s argument goes “if it’s devoid of real meaning we cannot truly speak of it at all.” Or can we? Of course in light of such a maniacal and “detached” demand, we will first need to recruit something reminiscent of the thought police out of Orwell’s 1984 if Wittgenstein’s modus operandi is to be realized. People dont speak about what they think they can speak about about. They speak about what they can speak about. End of story. How could Wittgenstein not realize that anything that can be verbally alluded to in some way is of necessity a coherent and meaningful concept. (Actually, I'm having a little trouble with that concept myself.) (Frost:)"And this quote regarding the impact that Gödel perceived of his own great work the [incompleteness theorem] on the nature of mind…

“What has been proved is only that the kind of reasoning necessary in mathematics cannot be completely mechanized. Rather constantly renewed appeals to mathematical intuition are necessary. The decision of my “undecidable” proposition … results from such an appeal. … Whether every arithmetical yes or no question can be decided with the help of some chain of mathematical intuitions is not known. At any rate it has not been proved that there are arithmetical questions undecidable by the human mind. Rather what has been proved is only this: Either there are such questions or the human mind is more than a machine. In my opinion the second alternative is much more likely.” [emphases added].

—Kurt Gödel [9, p. 162, Letter to David F. Plummer] That’s right...epistemologically a complete mechanization of consciousness is logically and arithmetically impossible." Please reconcile your direct commentary above on the Godel quote you provided with the highlighted portion of that quote. In my experience virtually every theorem in every mathbook I have ever seen has been proven mechanically, and that mechanical proof is always provided. I guess ID wants to fill textbooks with theorems which cannot be proven. Any proposition must be proven by demonstrating how it follows mechanically from already accepted axioms. Its how Godel proved his theorem as well. Godel said there is not a finite set of axioms (or recursively enumberable set of axioms or whatever) from which all other truth can be derived. Fair enough. But we have no choice but to work with a finite set of axioms at any given time. What point is there in verbally rhapsodizing about some hazy unknown out there which exceeds our ability to fully capture or predict with our current state of knowledge. Or are we going to denegrate science because no matter what brilliant theory they come up with its provable that contradictions to it will eventually be found. In other threads someone has talked about the human mind's inherent ability to discern and detect Truth and questioned how could evolution have produced that. Well, we don't have some magical ability to discern and detect Truth. JunkyardTornado

KF and onlookers, It was Wittgenstein that said "of that which we cannot speak of we must remain silent." His point was to get rid of all the stuff you just said KF because it creates too much and too deep confusion. You are right that we "infer" non material matter as a matter of internal experience and the existential evidence we like to call ontological. The big bang has reopened the question of design and the existence of evidence for God, and has also had the effect of adding weight to the logical assumption that form is imparted onto matter and in fact seems to preced matter with a transcendent nature. That is to say that matter appears, and then BOOM out of nowhere (and I mean literally "nowhere") the magic that is uniquely capable of imparting SC comes from the nonmaterial realm into the material one. Matter comes alive after it is imparted with this mysterious ineffable “mind like” special dominating force. From the Design inference we discern this nonmaterial property of being closest to "mind" in its meaningful SC actions and driven nature. Our mind is of course the product of our consciousness. Yet Wittgenstein is not happy. If we don’t know where or what this magic stuff is, and what it's all about, then we should not---we cannot--- discuss it, not at least in a meaningful way and so as Wittgenstein's argument goes "if it's devoid of real meaning we cannot truly speak of it at all." Or can we? Of course in light of such a maniacal and “detached” demand, we will first need to recruit something reminiscent of the thought police out of Orwell's 1984 if Wittgenstein’s modus operandi is to be realized. People dont speak about what they think they can speak about about. They speak about what they can speak about. End of story. It has already been done, it has been thought and so it has been spoken! [Gasps] The mind’s essence (found in consciousness, self reflection and phenomenology) is, so it seems, “nonmaterial.” Yet to put such nonsense and the suspense of this synthetic conflict, in it's proper light I give you a quote about Wittgenstein's hypocritical behavior (do as I say but not as I do)... "Did Feigl tell you how Wittgenstein and Schlick enjoyed talking for hours about the unspeakable?" --Marcel Natkin to Gödel We shall not be silenced by positivism, materialism or mechanical determinism. And this quote regarding the impact that Gödel perceived of his own great work the [incompleteness theorem] on the nature of mind…

“What has been proved is only that the kind of reasoning necessary in mathematics cannot be completely mechanized. Rather constantly renewed appeals to mathematical intuition are necessary. The decision of my "undecidable" proposition ... results from such an appeal. ... Whether every arithmetical yes or no question can be decided with the help of some chain of mathematical intuitions is not known. At any rate it has not been proved that there are arithmetical questions undecidable by the human mind. Rather what has been proved is only this: Either there are such questions or the human mind is more than a machine. In my opinion the second alternative is much more likely.” ---Kurt Gödel [9, p. 162, Letter to David F. Plummer]

That’s right. Not only is the evidence of the mind ontologically pointing towards a nonmaterial nature but epistemologically a complete mechanization of consciousness is logically and arithmetically impossible. The quote may be over used by yours truly but it is only because it is of the utmost illustrative importance and relevant to so many diverse matters. The mind is, it seems, indeed more than matter and it is also "clearly" more than a deterministic machine. Frost122585

DK: I will further comment on your onward remarks, starting with a few bracketed remarks in the excerpt below, from your comments in191:

I know nothing of “the mind.” [NB: actually, you can only be aware and KNOW by using – your mind!] I know of behaviors exhibited by myself and my fellow creatures that may be labeled “mind.” [And, do the labels “say of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not”? If that is not possible beyond perceptions and behaviours driven by chance and necessity in a causally closed evolutionary materialistic world then reasonable discourse is at an end] kairosfocus evidently considers the reliability of minds to be a metaphysical issue [false, and I am on record that I consider that factual adequacy, logical and dynamical coherence and explanatory power are three tests of warrant for claims, scientific and otherwise] , but I see it as an empirical issue. In that view, I am in the good company of neuroscientists, neurologists, psychiatrists, and law-enforcement authorities, family members, friends, acquaintances etc, etc. [but the problem here is that too often the so called hard problem of consciousness is set up in a way that begs the question in favour of materialism as a worldview, as I discuss in the app 6, the always linked] In real life, we judge an individual’s rationality by his behavior. [Irrelevant, as you have long since repeatedly been told: we are not dealing with rationality of individuals, but addressing the GROUNDs for such rationality in light of the claims of evolutionary materialist systems of thought and associated scientific research programmes] No further warrant is needed [That is DK wishes to beg the real question actually at stake] - except by metaphysicians and theologians who require nonobservable entities to justify their sectarian beliefs. [I will deal with this ad hominem below, and also with the issue of unobservables, as DK here inadvertently reveals his profound ignorance of science and the balance between observations and explanations in science . . . not to mention the easily shown fact that one cannot extricate sicence from philosophical considerations so easily as he imagines]

Let's start here, with the theologians that DK so plainly despises: a --> There is an old pulpit joke about a contest between God and a scientist, who proposed to create life for himself. As the scientist set out to create life, scooping up some mud, God stopped him: “Get your own dirt, first.” b --> And, that joke with a deadly serious point highlights precisely the first big problem with your insistently attempted dismissal of a considerable body of evidence that points to mind as the source of matter, rather than the converse. c --> For, once we see the multidimensional, convergently fine-tuned nature of the physics that undergirds our life-facilitating observed cosmos [which is also of finite age and is aging as we speak, i.e it is a contingent entity which had a beginning and thus a cause], we see that it shows what we know to be reliable signs of design. Also, we see that with but slight local variation, such a life-facilitating cosmos would just not happen: no “dirt” to make brains, in short. d --> That inference leads on to the empirical evidence anchored point that mind is SCIENTIFICALLY arguably logically independent of matter as we know it, including that matter that forms our brains. Not to mention, we here have seen in ourline, evidence of mind as causally and ontologically prior to matter; not on a basis of demonstrative proof beyond rational dispute [does such even exist, post Godel?], but on the basis on which we conduct scientific reasoning – inference to best explanation in light of the observed credible facts. e --> That leads to your main fallacy no 2. For, if you consult modern, post Lakatos phil of science -- and the study of how scientific warrant works is a project in phil not science -- you will see that scientific research programmes [the term is from Lakatos] have a characteristic structure. We see a belt of outer [sub-]theories and empirically linked models that connect more directly to observed reality, and then in the middle a core of inner theoretical ideas and constructs that are deeply embedded with worldview-level commitments. In short your attempt to divide objective scientists from sectarian metaphysicians and theologians fails, spectacularly. Indeed, it brings up the classic philosopher's rebuttal that: one cannot escape having a metaphysics, the issue is whether it is a critically examined metaphysics or a naïve, blind metaphysics that is a classic case of endarkenment posing as enlightentment. And had you listened to a certain wise theologian from Nazareth, you would have been in a better position on this one, noting how we still talk in terms of worldVIEWS:

MT 6:22 "The eye is the lamp of the body. If your eyes are good, your whole body will be full of light. 23 But if your eyes are bad, your whole body will be full of darkness. If then the light within you is darkness, how great is that darkness!

f --> Furthermore, and using examples form my home discipline, physics, often these inner components of unquestionably scientific theories include unobservables -- some, in praxis, some in principle. [E.g. if you think you have ever observed, e.g. an electron (negative or positive [positron]), think again: we have observed phenomena we trace through theories and models of how instruments and displays and bubble chambers or photo plates etc work, to electrons. Indeed, one of my favourite models is the idea that a positron is an electron travelling from the future to the past. Of course, both the past and the future are strictly speaking unobservables, too. You may recall my remarks that geological reconstructions of a plausible past for any significant feature, strictly speaking are scientifically informed historical reconstructions.] g --> In short, your ever-ready datum line between the scientific and philosophical is fallacious. h --> On the specific issue of the mind vs the brain, I note again, on the Taylor example you and otehrs have so often diverted from in this thread:

. . . suppose you were in a train and saw [outside the window] rocks you believe were pushed there by chance + necessity only, spelling out: WELCOME TO WALES. Would you believe the apparent message, why?

Here are my remarks from the work in progress Appendix 6 the always linked:

1 --> We know, immediately, that chance + necessity, acting on a pile of rocks on a hillside, can make them roll down the hillside and take up an arbitrary conformation. There thus is no in-principle reason to reject them taking up the shape: "WELCOME TO WALES" any more than any other configuration; especially if, say, by extremely good luck we have seen the rocks fall and take up this shape for ourselves. [If that ever happens to you, though, change your travel plans and head straight for Las Vegas before your "hot streak" runs out!] 2 --> Now, while you are packing for Vegas, let's think a bit: [a] the result of the for- the- sake- of- argument stroke of good luck is an apparent message, which was [b] formed by chance + necessity only acting on matter and energy across space and time. That is, [c] it would be lucky noise at work. Let us observe, also: [d] the shape taken on by the cluster of rocks as they fall and settle is arbitrary, but [e] the meaning assigned to the apparent message is as a result of the imposition of symbolic meaning on certain glyphs that take up particular alphanumerical shapes under certain conventions, i.e. it is a mental (and even social) act. 3 --> But, this brings up the key issue of credibility: should we believe the substantial contents of such an apparent message sourced in lucky noise? That is, would it be well-warranted to accept it as -- here, echoing Aristotle in Metaphysics, 1011b -- "saying of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not"? (That is, is such an apparent message credibly a true message?) 4 --> The answer is obvious: no. For, the example illustrates how cause-effect chains tracing to mechanical necessity and chance circumstances, acting on matter and energy are utterly unconnected to the issue of making logically and empirically well-warranted assertions about states of affairs in the world. For crude but illuminating instance, neuronal impulses are in volts and are in specific locations in the body; but meaningfulness, codes, algorithms, truth and falsehood, propositions and their entailments simply are not like that. That is, mental concepts and constructs are radically different from physical entities, interactions and signals and it is highly questionable (thus needs to be shown not merely assumed or asserted) that such radical differences could or do credibly arise from mere interaction of physical components. Indeed, in a typical cybernetic system, the physical cause-effect chains around a control loop are set up by intelligent, highly skilled designers taking advantage of and manipulating a wide range of natural regularities, so that the sensors, feedback, comparator, and feedforward signals, codes and linkages between elements in the system are organised to cause the desired interactions and outcomes of moving observed plant behaviour closer to the targetted path in the teeth of disturbances, drift in component parameters, and noise. [ . . . . ] 10 e] . . . we have reason to note that the observed cosmos' underlying physics reflects multi-dimensional, convergent, fine-tuned, highly complex, functional order, and similar reason to note that the said observed cosmos began at a specific time in the past. Thus, we have good reason to infer (per inference to best, empirically anchored explanation) that the origin of the cosmos itself is marked by the signs of intelligent design. And, pace the remarks of objectors, as the just linked section discusses, that IS evidence of non-human intelligent agent(s). For, mere objection on your part does not constitute "absence of evidence" on my part! 10 f] Moreover, since we are speaking of the beginnings of our observed matter-energy and space-time domain, said inferred intelligence was credibly able to create and initiate -- thus, interact with -- matter while not being material; this last referring to the "stuff" of the physical cosmos. For, matter is here an effect, not a cause, and -- per self-evident proposition -- an entity cannot cause its own origin. (Classically: "that which begins has a cause, but that which has no begining needs have no cause"; i.e we are here raising the issue of the difference between contingent and necessary beings; duly modified by the observation that we credibly live in an observed, contingent cosmos. And, the most credible "alternative," in effect a quasi-infinite array of sub cosmi, is just as much a metaphysical proposition -- and one that runs into much more serious difficulties on a comparative basis. ) 10 g] Consequently, it is not at all an obvious given that a "pure mind" entity would be unable to observe, interact with, speak into and act upon -- thus, experience -- the physical world. 10 h] Indeed, considering our own minds and brains, the brain is a bodily, material entity; subject therefore to chance and necessity under the electrochemical etc forces and interactions acting on and in it; which (given the Wales example) makes it not credible as the ultimate source of messages and actions that point -- beyond the credible reach of such forces -- to intelligent, purposeful, creative [as opposed to mere random], functionally successful action. (NB: The Derek Smith cybernetic model of a two-tier controller for a biologically relevant system, with the upper level strategic and creative controller guiding and overseeing a lower level one acting as a supervised input-output controller, may be a fruitful discussion model for a mind-brain system, e.g. if one -- for the sake of argument -- looks at a mind using quantum gaps to "feed" signals into the brain-body system.)

In short, with all due respect, it is not want of empirically based evidence -- evidence, BTW, that you have simpley never seriously addressed above -- leading to a well-warranted inference to best current explanation on my part that is the evident problem. GEM of TKI kairosfocus

192 Extended>>>> —–--DK: “I know of behaviors exhibited by myself and my fellow creatures that may be labeled “mind.” kairosfocus evidently considers the reliability of minds to be a metaphysical issue, but I see it as an empirical issue. In that view, I am in the good company of neuroscientists, neurologists, psychiatrists, and law-enforcement authorities, family members, friends, acquaintances etc, etc. In real life, we judge an individual’s rationality by his behavior.” You are focusing on the effects of rational behavior when you should be focusing on it causes. The question is, what is the origin of that behavior? How can a brain overrule its own impulses if there is no mind? If there is no immaterial mind or will, how do you explain free will? Or, do you even believe in free will? You are the one who is arguing against common sense, so make your case. StephenB

-----"Daniel King: "Ain’t seen no evidence that “mind” is a substance separable from the activity of a brain…yet." That is because you dismiss evidence that you don't like. I take it, for example, that you have not yet read, "The Spiritual Brain." I will not take time to present the arguments, but I would ask you a related question. What is your answer to the phenomenon of medicine’s “placebo effect?” -----DK: “The appearance of that evidence seems to have been delayed by a confusion on the part of the metaphysicians here about the difference between evidence and argument. But that is autochthonous to the species, is it not?” I, for one, am not confused by the difference between evidence and argument, although I do use both. Logical arguments are often better than evidence. For example, I have tried to supplement KF's evidence with philosophical arguments of my own, humble though they may be. No one has even come close to addressing them, except of course, to deride them as “metaphysical,” which is another way of saying that they can’t answer them. Science is not the only or even the best way of knowing. -----“I know of behaviors exhibited by myself and my fellow creatures that may be labeled “mind.” kairosfocus evidently considers the reliability of minds to be a metaphysical issue, but I see it as an empirical issue. In that view, I am in the good company of neuroscientists, neurologists, psychiatrists, and law-enforcement authorities, family members, friends, acquaintances etc, etc. In real life, we judge an individual’s rationality by his behavior.” You are focusing on the effects of rational behavior when you should be focusing on it causes. The question is, what is the origin of that behavior? How can a brain overrule its own impulses if there is no mind? If there is no immaterial mind or will, how do you explain free will? Or, do you even believe in free will? You are the one who is arguing against common sense, so make your case. StephenB

kairosfocus #185

There comes a time when it is plain that a matter cannot — or at least will not — be addressed on its merits by the other side of an exchange. In this case, the persistent resort to side issues and strawmen and refusal to address a clear enough mater on the merits, makes the matter plain enough.

Well put. That is exactly my view of your behavior on this thread.

In the case of DK, let us note that this is the SECOND extensive blog thread in recent months where he has been unable to provide warrant for the claim that evolutionary materialism can ground the credibility of the mind — and in the previous thread, his persistent resort was to strawmen also.

Please specify the "strawmen" to which you are referring. As to providing warrant for the credibility of "the mind," that is meaningless to me, because I know nothing of "the mind." I know of behaviors exhibited by myself and my fellow creatures that may be labeled "mind." kairosfocus evidently considers the reliability of minds to be a metaphysical issue, but I see it as an empirical issue. In that view, I am in the good company of neuroscientists, neurologists, psychiatrists, and law-enforcement authorities, family members, friends, acquaintances etc, etc. In real life, we judge an individual's rationality by his behavior. No further warrant is needed - except by metaphysicians and theologians who require nonobservable entities to justify their sectarian beliefs. A second request, sir: What is your warrant for "the credibility of the mind?" I am confident that you will take the opportunity to have the last word, kairosfocus. It is your modus operandi. Indeed, it seems to be your modus vivendi. It is now ten days since I wished you well in your more productive endeavors. I reiterate those wishes. You can do better than this. Daniel King

KF at 188, Thanks be to you for giving me the online search version! I have been skimming it from time to time and found that aformentioned gem of a passage. It's point is timeless. So much of Kant is. Frost122585

evo-materialist and Megan Alavi: Inasmuch as neither of you believe in a mon-material mind, you obviously cannot believe in fre will. Since you obviously do not believe in free will, why do you bother to argue for anything? How can minds be changed if there are no minds to change? StephenB

Frosty: Please don't get my bad insomniac habits! [Do as I say, not as I do, pleeeze . . .!] Your Kant cite is really interesting, especially the punchline:

But if–as often happens–empiricism, in relation to ideas, becomes itself dogmatic and boldly denies that which is above the sphere of its phenomenal cognition, it falls itself into the error of intemperance–an error which is here all the more reprehensible, as thereby the practical interest of reason receives an irreparable injury.

So, now, back to bed for some good old fashioned ugly sleep . . . GEM of TKI kairosfocus

Also, regarding materialism and its empirical pretensions I give you Kant who reminds us to keep empiricism in check. Materialism has the pretension that all that we see is matter in form and hence all that the mind could be is thus. Yet the mysterious force of gravity is not known to be a material force but is understood as its effects on matter. Intelligence I remind you is much the same way. The empirical view though could reduce all things to material processes but it is upon close examination that we discover that minds and purpose differ from randomness and chance. It is in the materialistically indescribable phenomenology of consciousness that we appreciate it in its true character and its difference from that of material processes which from an empiricists point of view cannot real true consciousness as it actually is- an experience.

"The empiricist will never allow himself to accept any epoch of nature for the first--the absolutely primal state; he will not believe that there can be limits to his outlook into her wide domains, nor pass from the objects of nature, which he can satisfactorily explain by means of observation and mathematical thought--which he can determine synthetically in intuition, to those which neither sense nor imagination can ever present in concreto; he will not concede the existence of a faculty in nature, operating independently of the laws of nature--a concession which would introduce uncertainty into the procedure of the understanding, which is guided by necessary laws to the observation of phenomena; nor, finally, will he permit himself to seek a cause beyond nature, inasmuch as we know nothing but it, and from it alone receive an objective basis for all our conceptions and instruction in the unvarying laws of things. In truth, if the empirical philosopher had no other purpose in the establishment of his antithesis than to check the presumption of a reason which mistakes its true destination, which boasts of its insight and its knowledge, just where all insight and knowledge cease to exist, and regards that which is valid only in relation to a practical interest, as an advancement of the speculative interests of the mind (in order, when it is convenient for itself, to break the thread of our physical investigations, and, under pretence of extending our cognition, connect them with transcendental ideas, by means of which we really know only that we know nothing)--if, I say, the empiricist rested satisfied with this benefit, the principle advanced by him would be a maxim recommending moderation in the pretensions of reason and modesty in its affirmations, and at the same time would direct us to the right mode of extending the province of the understanding, by the help of the only true teacher, experience. In obedience to this advice, intellectual hypotheses and faith would not be called in aid of our practical interests; nor should we introduce them under the pompous titles of science and insight. For speculative cognition cannot find an objective basis any other where than in experience; and, when we overstep its limits our synthesis, which requires ever new cognitions independent of experience, has no substratum of intuition upon which to build. But if--as often happens--empiricism, in relation to ideas, becomes itself dogmatic and boldly denies that which is above the sphere of its phenomenal cognition, it falls itself into the error of intemperance--an error which is here all the more reprehensible, as thereby the practical interest of reason receives an irreparable injury. And this constitutes the opposition between Epicureanism* and Platonism."

That is to say that we need to be careful of our lying eyes when we have other experiential evidence that falls outside of empiricism that points to the contrary. It is usually deep within the intutive faculties of cognition and reason that our deepest truths are derived; not always in the superficial realm of plain sight. Just because you assume all things are the product of matter, based upon what you see with you eyes, doesn't mean you cannot see deeper with the mind's eye. Just ask the mathematician who's deductions paint the real world not as it can be actually seen but as it "only" can be understood. Gravity, uncertainty, black holes, etc all owe theirs to the minds transcendent reasoning and inutiton. Without the mind none of these things could be either seen nor understood. Yet they all exist. Frost122585

3] MA: why can it [C + N acting on M + E] not also create complexity as shown in biological life? Is that beyond it’s reach? This, in response to the EXPLICIT observation that we are dealing with a probabilistic resources challenge, not a question of logical or bare physical possibility. Indeed, right at the outset, the Wales thought experiment is about how there is a bare logical and physical possibility that C + N acting on M + E can create apparent messages. However, the key point is that once we pass the UPB, we are dealing with exhaustion of the probabilistic resources of the observed cosmos. To see just how much so, let us use the case of DNA. It is based on a code, and is associated with algorithms and nanotech molecular machines that implement that code. The relevant messages start at about 500 k bases and go up to 3+ bn. 500 kbases is a config space of 4^500k ~ 9.90 *10^301,029. To give an idea of what that means, even if there were 10^1500 islands of functionality, each embracing as many functional states as there are quantum states in the cosmos across its estimated lifespan, 10^150, the odds that a random walk search in any plausible or even very generous prebiotic soup could be likely to find any such island are vanishingly small: this is not a credibly winnable lottery. [This is BTW, the very same pattern of reasoning that grounds the statistical form of the 2nd law of thermodynamics.] But, we do know a causal force that easily surmounts such odds and generates FSCI on the relevant scale: intelligence. [1 M bits is at ASCII rates of 7 bits per character and average 7 characters per word of English is a text of about 20,408 words.] So, we have a case of inference to a dubious cause based on a prior and self-referentially incoherent evolutionary materialist metaphysical commitment, in the teeth of the known existence of intelligence, which can easily generate the observed order of functionally specified complexity. On inference to BEST explanation, this one is no contest. 4] What units is it [complexity] measured in? . . . i’ve seen the phrase “increase in information in a cell” alot and I want to know how this “increase” is being worked out. As has long since been identified and as has just been exemplified, the complexity part in FSCI is easily measured as information storage capacity [often measured in bits, sometimes with adjustments for configs not taken up – basic information theory this; cf. App 1 the always linked in light of Section A, with a note on Bradley's recent remarks on Cytochrome C], or as scale of configuration space. Consult Meyer's paper on the Cambrian revolution for a discussion in a relevant context. 5] Nobody is claiming the first replicator resembed a cell so the maths showing that it’s impossible for a cell to self assemble are kind of missing the point. The relevant mathematics in the always linked -- and for that matter from the onward linked online chapters 7 – 9 of Thaxton et al's 1984 work, TMLO -- is EXPLICITLY about the self-assembly of empirically observed, highly informational macromolecules -- as opposed to unobserved hypothetical molecules such as Mr Dawkins et al present on. When you have an easily accessible discussion but present a misrepresentation, that is a strawman; at best through failure to do basic homework. 6] I simply don’t know how you can say that as a) Nobody knows that the first replicator consisted of b) Therefore nobody knows what components were needed c) Therefore it’s impossible to say it’s “well beyond the UPB”. Onlookers, observe the repeated substitution of a hypothesised, empirically unsubstantiated self-replicating molecule for the known, observed macromolecules of life, which EASILY surpass the UPB collectively and in many cases -- e.g DNA -- on an individual basis. 7] can you make the argument [regarding the challenge to get to a credible logically thinking, reasoning mind] from yourself? H'mm: I did, in an appendix to the always linked, and above. But of course, the objection is evidently primarily to my citation of and excerpt from a 58 pp paper by Plantinga (as is linked above), which in the always linked, appendix 6, is embedded as a note in my citation of an updated form of a training briefing I wrote about 20 years ago. The excerpts make the case as I wish to do so, and in a way that is a commonplace of serious discussion; for, I there quote, explicitly endorse and acknowledge my intellectual debt to Plantinga's remarks as illustrative of the sort of incoherence that attempted evolutionary materialist accounts of the origin of mind face. Note how there is, again, no response on the merits. 8] And anyway “mind” is a sliding scale. Does a stick insect have a mind? As to stick insects, first show me evidence of conceptual reasoning and communication in verbal language then we can discuss what sort of mind/intelligence they have. If stick insects show “evident active, intentional, creative, innovative and adaptive [as opposed to merely fixed instinctual] problem-solving behaviour similar to that of known intelligent agents, we are justified in attaching the label: intelligence.” [Def'n of intelligence, the always linked.] 9] Citations? These were explicitly stated to be in Section C the always linked. That is but one link-click away, in a resource you have already cited in the thread above. (Or, do I need to spell out that this sort of behaviour on your part does not comment itself to me as a serious participation in a serious discussion?) GEM of TKI PS: Frosty, thankfully, the radio discussion on Energy Policy went well -- the hottest issue raised was the question of "American interference" into the Middle East. (I think we need to wake up about what Mr Ahmadinejad has been saying and reading in the Hadiths that speak of the Mahdi's global conquest starting from Iran. But that is another story for another context . . . ] kairosfocus

Frosty and onlookers (and also MA and DK): There comes a time when it is plain that a matter cannot -- or at least will not -- be addressed on its merits by the other side of an exchange. In this case, the persistent resort to side issues and strawmen and refusal to address a clear enough mater on the merits, makes the matter plain enough. In the case of DK, let us note that this is the SECOND extensive blog thread in recent months where he has been unable to provide warrant for the claim that evolutionary materialism can ground the credibility of the mind -- and in the previous thread, his persistent resort was to strawmen also. So, there seems to be little reason to spend more time here, unless there is clear evidence of a serious engagement. (And recall, I am spending time on this as a mopping up exercise only; as I am wrapping up my extended blog visit here at UD, and moving on to other matters of priority!) [FYI, onlookers, if you are interested in a fairly simple, albeit basic College Algebra level [NB: with some extensions into basic thermodynamics in Appendix 1] survey that addresses the issues that I think are the major ones on the inference to design, I suggest that you examine the always linked. Then make up your own mind for yourself. This thread, currently, is actually on a specific point: grounding the credibility of mind relative to evo mat premises, and my appendix 6 sets up the context for th the challenge.] Having noted that, I would like to comment on a few points: 1] Re DK, 183:

GEM, 173: . . . evidence that chance + necessity acting on matter + energy cannot credibly account for accurate or reasonable information and the reason that sometimes marks our internal lives is not “evidence”? DK, 183: Correct.

That speaks for itself! Especially, given the actual remarks I made at point 5 in 173:

5] DK, 161: Ain’t seen no evidence that “mind” is a substance separable from the activity of a brain…yet. Onlookers, let’s see: evidence that chance + necessity acting on matter + energy cannot credibly account for accurate or reasonable information and the reason that sometimes marks our internal lives is not “evidence”? Thence, the observation that intelligence in action and its signs — which BTW are the most central of our experiences [i.e. we are CONSCIOUS OF and ACT INTO the external world through our . . . minds in action . . .] — has radically different properties not accountable for on the basis of such C + N etc, is not “evidence”? Ah, DK is sticking out for the old: I gotta see this with my own eyes and feel with my own fingers route. Oops, DK: HOW, on evo mat premises, do you convert physico-chemical impulses in your own eyes and hands and electrochemistry of neuronal impulses into seeing, feeling and understanding with your mind – without self referential absurdity tracing to the sort of error made by Sir Francis Crick as previously cited, or simply and plainly begging the question? Namely: F[C], The Astonishing Hypothesis, 1994: “ ‘You,’ your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.” PJ, Reason in the Balance, 1995: Observes that Sir Francis should be willing to preface his writings thusly: “I, Francis Crick, my opinions and my science, and even the thoughts expressed in this book, consist of nothing more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.” In short, “[t]he plausibility of materialistic determinism requires that an implicit exception be made for the theorist.”

2] Re MA, 182: The only “agency” we are aware of is ourselves. I find it something of a stretch to automatically presume a non-material entitiy must have created the FSCI. Logically as we have never had information on non-material entities we’ve no evidence whatsoever for their existance. And we do have evidence (us) for material agents who can create FSCI. So to me you are arguing in effect that Aliens created life. First, the Weasel example [as the above thread shows and as the aleways linked app 6 discusses] is directly about the point that, per logical and physical POSSIBILITY, chance + necessity acting on matter + energy can create apparent messages. Then, it asks about the credibility that such apparent messages are true ones – ones that refer, with credible accuracy, to the real world:

. . . suppose you were in a train and saw [outside the window] rocks you believe were pushed there by chance + necessity only, spelling out: WELCOME TO WALES. Would you believe the apparent message, why?

The answer is so obviously “no” that there is a persistent substitution of various strawmen, strawmen that provide more or less “plausible” ways to avoid addressing the implications of the limitations of C + N acting on M + E relative to getting to true messages that have credible reference to the real world. Let's pause again and bring up the already cited excerpt from a 58 pp paper by the noted philosopher Plantinga, on one way that this general point applies to the assumed or asserted evolutionary materialist origins of our minds:

. . . evolution is interested (so to speak) only in adaptive behavior, not in true belief. Natural selection doesn’t care what you believe; it is interested only in how you behave. It selects for certain kinds of behavior, those that enhance fitness, which is a measure of the chances that one’s genes are widely represented in the next and subsequent generations . . . But then the fact that we have evolved guarantees at most that we behave in certain ways–ways that contribute to our (or our ancestors’) surviving and reproducing in the environment in which we have developed . . . . there are many belief-desire combinations that will lead to the adaptive action; in many of these combinations, the beliefs are false.

That is a serious, and so far un-addressed challenge on the evo mat side. Now, how many agents are we aware of: for each of us, just one, namely ourselves. We infer that other similar creatures are self-aware agents, based on the signs of creative, self-directing intelligence that they show – i.e we see that our fellow humans are not acting on mere instinct or impulse. One of these well tested, highly reliable signs is FSCI. We then infer that when we see similar signs in other situations, it points to intelligences acting in fresh situations. Some of those it so happens are credibly not in situations where human intelligence is relevant, e.g. the origin of the FSCI encoded in DNA [bio-functional, 500 k – 3+ billion bases, at 2 bits storage capacity per base]. Also, we may look at the origin of the observed cosmos, which exhibits multidimensional, convergent, fine-tuned organised complexity in its life-facilitating physics. (This last point suggests, BTW, a connexion between the two situations.) Further to this, Megan should know that ever since the very first technical level ID work, TMLO by Thaxton et al, it has been plainly stated in regards to the origin of cell-based life with the nanotechnologies and FSCI involved:

. . . the view of intelligence creating biological specificity comes in not one, but two types: (1) a creating intelligence within the cosmos, and (2) a creating intelligence beyond the cosmos . . . . [p. 196]

And, of course, the evidence we have of signs of intelligence in cell based life points to intelligence, not the specific nature of that intelligence. Multiply that by the radically different nature of mind from the known properties, dynamics and capacities of matter + energy acted upon by chance + necessity, and we see that -- absent imposition of materialistic assumptions [which as shown, evidently end in self-referential incoherence and absurdity] – we have no good reason to confine intelligence to human and/or similar embodied entities. Indeed, since the very matter that makes up our bodies in itself contains signs of intelligence pointing to its origin in mind beyond the physical cosmos as we know it, that in turn points to the principle that it is probably far more reasonable to say that mind created matter than the converse. [ . . . ] kairosfocus

Meg says,

"If “time” did not exist before the big bang then “before” is of little use."

The modern models of the Big Bang say that it begins with "an information wave” which is nothing but SC “form” shaping into reality. Thus so as time exists you have a nonmaterial bending of space and time which comes from nowhere in the from of information imposed on matter. This to me says that if an information wave can come from nowhere to build the entire universe that there could most likely be a mind that put that wave into action. This is obvious to all. If you think that the wave was it and there was no mind then you have to accept a non-causative universe that defies the laws of physics. If you postulate a nonmaterial mind that does not obey the laws of physics because its not physical then you have an explanation that is removed from contradiction. In logic we try to avoid contradiction. Just so. If you think that there is no mind but instead some random world of nonmaterial action and laws “out there” that cause the universes design, then since everything come out of nothing you have to accept random miracles. This is of course also highly contradictory because the laws of physics give us consistent repeatable actions. In other words you need a multi-verse to bridge the gap of SC. But you can believe in your multi-verse even though “there isn’t a shred of evidence for it.” Now it is just merely a hypothesis if we don’t find other evidences. We have now a criteria of specified complexity and FSCI that gives away the game. Things like the cell or DNA don’t just self organize in the natural world even with all of the Darwinian mechanism granted. You need both origin of life and then a great deal of design world. Termites don’t EVER produce FSCI. You claims above dissolve away into thin air. Frost122585

kairosfocus #173

Onlookers, let’s see: evidence that chance + necessity acting on matter + energy cannot credibly account for accurate or reasonable information and the reason that sometimes marks our internal lives is not “evidence”?

Correct. Daniel King

We have just such FSCI, and so we infer to agency

The only "agency" we are aware of is ourselves. I find it something of a stretch to automatically presume a non-material entitiy must have created the FSCI. Logically as we have never had information on non-material entities we've no evidence whatsoever for their existance. And we do have evidence (us) for material agents who can create FSCI. So to me you are arguing in effect that Aliens created life. Aliens who are just like us, insofar as they are material beings.

In a nutshell, C + N can create all things that are within logical and physical possibility, as I directly stated.

Ah, and here is the crux of the matter. Then why can it not also create complexity as shown in biological life? Is that beyond it's reach?

Complexity is measured

What units is it measured in? Bits? Just want to get this straight as i've seen the phrase "increase in information in a cell" alot and I want to know how this "increase" is being worked out.

Have a look at what is being said about the remote prebiotic origin and assembly of the macromolecules in the living cell, starting with Shapiro and Orgel’s recent work

Nobody is claiming the first replicator resembed a cell so the maths showing that it's impossible for a cell to self assemble are kind of missing the point.

Third, the issue there is that the components – before you get to assembly — are themselves well beyond the UPB.

I simply don't know how you can say that as a) Nobody knows that the first replicator consisted of b) Therefore nobody knows what components were needed c) Therefore it's impossible to say it's "well beyond the UPB". If you disagree please show your assumptions/working.

See the problem with the “selector” on getting to a credible mind on evo mat premises?

No, can you make the argument yourself? And anyway "mind" is a sliding scale. Does a stick insect have a mind?

Gross extrapolation that ignores the issue of the UPB on origin of body plans. Cf Section C the always linked and many onward discussions linked therein, starting with Meyer and Loennig in the peer-reviewed literature.

Citations? Megan.Alavi

Frosty & Megan: First Frosty, thanks -- I will need the odd prayer or two as I pick up five smooth stones and walk with a sling IN my hand. (Ole big G didn't see the sling . . . till it was too late!) Off back to sleep after trying to figure out why my HP PC keeps dumping my HP printer under Vista. [Oh well, maybe that's the problem . . .] But, as I was shutting off saw the above at UD. Sadly, several of them sound like a very familiar pattern: rushing off after red herrings leading out to strawmen to be pummelled. Some very brief initial remarks: 1] Turnabout on burden of proof Megan, I provided an account that we reliably trace cause-effect to one or more of chance, necessity, intelligence. As the very Wales example [and Section A the always linked] shows, high contingency does not trace to necessity, and chance is per probabilistic hurdles, not credible as the source of FSCI. We have just such FSCI, and so we infer to agency: on origin of a fine tuned life facilitating cosmos, origin of life relative to the FSCI in cells, origin of body plan level biodiversity per Cambrian revolution etc. On origin of our minds, I have pointed out why it is that we have good reason to infer that mater is the product of mind, and not the converse. It is you who need to address evidence not brush it aside. 2] I think it would be worthwhile to find out what you think chance + necessity can accomplish. Anything? What level of complexity can chance + necessity alone create? You have the always linked, which you have cited an excerpt from a quote from, in section B. It addresses the issue you just raised. In a nutshell, C + N can create all things that are within logical and physical possibility, as I directly stated. In terms of credibly observable creations of C + N acting on M + E, as the app 1 discusses, in effect the boundary is the available probabilistic resources. In practical terms, if a highly contingent phenomenon stores well over 500 - 1,000 bits or so, then it is credibly beyond the reach of C + N on the gamut of the observed cosmos. And, BTW, this sort of reasoning is what underlies the statistical form of the 2nd law of thermodynamics, as App 1 discusses, look at the quite from a couple of my favourite Russians, Yavorsky and Pinsky. For a lot of more common cases, a contingency bound a lot lower than that is good enough, e.g. See hyp testing using Fisherian elimination. 3] coud you tell me what units FSCI is measured in? You will see that functionality is OBSERVED, i.e it is a one-bit metric: yes/no. [Remember RION or NOIR on the different sorts of metric scales? That is measures of ordinal [e.g. Likert scales] and nominal states [e.g. male/female, true/false] are also metrics.] Complexity is measured, and in this case I have used bits and indicated the bound used by Dembski. A quantitative discussion of the overarching quantity Complex Specified Information is here. [I am using a far easier to handle subset of CSI, with a 2-d, i.e. vector metric: functionality as specification [and we could use verious metrics of that . . . e.g. measures of length of specification, per K-compressibility; cf here Able and Trevors as discussed and diagrammed in App 3 on OSC, RSC and FSC], and complexity in usually bits. multidimensional quantities are common in a lot of fields of study.] 4] I don’t believe that anybody is claiming the same for biological life. Nobody is saying that “this complex message (cell) randomly assembed from parts (rocks) lying about” Have a look at what is being said about the remote prebiotic origin and assembly of the macromolecules in the living cell, starting with Shapiro and Orgel's recent work – both of which are linked and cited in the always linked. This, of course I discuss with linked onward discussions, usually studied under the heading Origin of Life. 5] your rock example could better be reworked as something like rocks rolling down a hill but there is a mechanism at the bottom of the hill that rejects rocks based on a given set of criteria. So if the message “Welcome to Wales” has as it’s analogue in this new system “Optimised for the enviroment” then rocks that fail to meet this criteria (or within a given tolerance) are rejected. Over time rocks that meet the criteria build up the message. Where is the “selection” in your example? To use such an example and try to avoid selection (as it’s a critical component of Evilution) simply misleads the less educated reader into thinking your example actually has some relevance to the real world. First, recall, the appendix 6 is just that, a SIXTH appendix. It is in appendix 1 that a discussion on the underlying thermodynamics of OOL are done, not to mention sections A and B. And, the idea of pre-life natural selection is incoherent, i.e there was no reproduction to have differential success. Third, the issue there is that the components – before you get to assembly -- are themselves well beyond the UPB. But most of all, the Wales example is not actually about OOL as a main point. It is about the problem that evo mat accounts of MIND have to reduce mind to chance + necessity acting on matter and energy across time. In that regard, it is asking – through a very simple but surprisingly general example from Richard Taylor -- on the CREDIBILITY of a mind “produced” by such means, and ends up in showing that the deliverances of such a mind are seriously to be doubted. Let's hear Plantinga as excerpted [link is in my always linked] on one of many inter-related challenges in accounting for the mind from an evo mat view:

. . . evolution is interested (so to speak) only in adaptive behavior, not in true belief. Natural selection doesn’t care what you believe; it is interested only in how you behave. It selects for certain kinds of behavior, those that enhance fitness, which is a measure of the chances that one’s genes are widely represented in the next and subsequent generations . . . But then the fact that we have evolved guarantees at most that we behave in certain ways–ways that contribute to our (or our ancestors’) surviving and reproducing in the environment in which we have developed . . . . there are many belief-desire combinations that will lead to the adaptive action; in many of these combinations, the beliefs are false.

See the problem with the “selector” on getting to a credible mind on evo mat premises? 6] the rejection mechinsm comes from the nature of reality. Some things survive and some things don’e (they are “rejected”). The things that survive propogate. Observe Plantinga just above on what survives and what does not, then see if that gets you to a credible mind from C + N acting on M + E across time in the physical, biological, and socio-cultural worlds. 7] step by step micro-evolution leading to macro evolution Gross extrapolation that ignores the issue of the UPB on origin of body plans. Cf Section C the always linked and many onward discussions linked therein, starting with Meyer and Loennig in the peer-reviewed literature. REALLY gotta go now! GEM of TKI kairosfocus

If "time" did not exist before the big bang then "before" is of little use. In any case there is significant debate on the "big bang". Some folks think it was simply the latest in a series of bangs. And in that case there is no "coming into being" as it was always there.

Either way you need mind because that is the only thing we know of that can design form.

Termites "design" complex structures, even to the extent that they are air-conditioned. Is that the sort of mind you had in mind? Megan.Alavi