Can One Computer “Persuade” Another Computer?

_{Barry Arrington

January 17, 2008

Intelligent Design}

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In a comment to a prior post StephenB raises some interesting questions:

{1}Free will requires the presence of a nonmaterial-mind independent of the brain. {2}a non-material mind independent of the brain indicates free will. . . . In philosophy, [this type of proposition] is known as a bi-conditional proposition, which means, If A/then B. Also, If B/then A. Usually, that pattern does not hold in logic, but it does hold here. [If one disavows] the existence of the mind, it is time to make the corresponding assertion about volition—go ahead and reject free will and complete the cycle. Take the final step and concede that all of our attempts to persuade each other are futile. We are nature’s plaything, and the laws of nature operating through our “brain” dictate our every move.

Given [the materialist’s] perception of reality, why [does he] bother to raise objections at all [to the proposition that mind exists independently of the brain]. If your world view is true, then [all the commenters] on this blog do what we do only because fate requires it of us. We are, for want of a better term, determined to think and act as we do. Since we have no volitional powers, why do you appeal to them? Why raise objections in an attempt to influence when it has already been established that only non-material minds can influence or be influenced? Why propose a change of direction when only intelligent agencies have the power to do that? Since brains are subject to physical laws of cause and effect, they cannot rise above them and, therefore, cannot affect them. Brains cannot influence brains. Why then, do you ask any of us to change our minds when, in your judgment, there are no minds to change?

Surely we all agree that the output of a computer is utterly determined in the sense that the output can be reduced to the function of the physical properties of the machine.

Note that this does not mean that the output of a computer is always predictable. “Determined” is not a synonym for “predictable.” An event may be completely determined and utterly unpredictable at the same time. In other words, it might be “determined” and also “indeterminate.” Example: Say a bomb explodes. It is impossible to predict where any particular piece of the bomb shell will land. Therefore, where the piece of bomb shell will land is indeterminate. Nevertheless, where the piece of bomb shell winds up landing is purely a function of the laws of nature, and is in that sense determined.

Now assume we have two computers that can communicate in machine code across a cable. Assume further that the computers are assigned the task of coming to a conclusion about the truth or falsity of a particular proposition, say “The best explanation for the cause of complex specified information X (“CSI-X”) is that CSI-X was produced by an intelligent agent.” Say computer A is programmed to do two things:

1. Respond “true” to this proposition.

2. Communicate a list of facts and arguments its programmers believe support this statement.

Here’s the interesting question. Can computer A “persuade” computer B to accept the “true” statement?

The answer, it seems to me, is obvious: No.

Computer B’s output is completely determined. It has no free will. It has no “mind” that may be persuaded. The facts and arguments communicated to it by computer A trigger a subroutine that produces the output “yes it is true” or “no it is false.” The result of that computation is utterly determined in the sense that it is reducible to the operation of computer B’s software and hardware. Computer B has no meaningful choice as to how to respond to the information provided to it by computer A.

This brings us back to StephenB’s questions. If the brain is nothing more than an organic computing machine, why do materialists bother to try to persuade us of anything?

Comments

KF wrote: If the brain is nothing more than an organic computing machine, why do materialists bother to try to persuade us of anything? Since a computer is deterministic why do I even bother to enter the password. Does the point really have to be elaborated further? Say you have a computer and before it lets you on the system it has to be persuaded you're in the club. So it will ask you a number of questions, say anywhere between 5 and 20, then use fairly sophsticated AI techniques to mach your responses against a database,and finally assign you an overall average numerical score that has to be above a certain level to gain entry. Are you saying your efforts to answer correctly to get into the system are pointless because the computer is deterministic? Of course the computer could ask you logic questions as well, not just sopisticated text matching. Arithmetic is logic, so it could ask you to sum up (or multiply or divide) some random numbers, and then use its own logic to come up with the answers itself, to verify your logic.JunkyardTornado_{January 25, 2008
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KF: Just noticed your new posts, but was in the process of trying to answer a question for myself. I'm trying to recall the exact specfied complexity argument, i.e. the detachable pattern that exists in a bacterial flagellum and why there aren't enough particles in the universe to generate it. Is there any resource (on your own website or elsewhere) you (or someone else) could point me to that lays this out in a complete but concise manner. IOW no putting it on a layman's level (with handwaving, etc.) just something specific and complete (but concise.) The actual proof can be summarized to some extent, if there's a certain level of specificity in the overall argument. (I don't want to see obscure greek operators or anything more esoteric than and, or, not, for all, there exists, summation, and hopefully the point can be made without those as well.)JunkyardTornado_{January 25, 2008
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KF thought experiments and associated idealisations from the real observed world were vital to making scientific progress and are a crucial, inseparable part of scientific persuasion, to this day. Yes, then we do agree. But, that comment says nothing about the process, and limitations, of though experiments. Such as that persistent gap we both recognize, which shows that predicionts abaout the observable world are not conclusions about the observable world - experiments are needed to close the gap. Essentially, KF, the DS model you describe, with your introduced Intelligent Director, is merely a model. On its own, it says nothing about the observable world. It only suggests what we should expect - but not what we really will see. That is a limitation I'm insisting that you not ignore in your treatises. KF Really, now! Yes. Pay close attention to theassumptions you made about the model to arrive at the suggestion that mind is not material. You will see that one set of assumptions (i.e that material is all there is) doesn't preclude the operation of the model. But, another set of assumptions (that material is NOT all there is) leads to the conclusion at which you arrived. It is all a case of selectively picking your starting assumptions - i.e. your self-imposed restrictions on the allowed premises. Oh, and I used "lamest" with the intent to dismiss your argument, because your argument wasn't even internally consistent. It was just a slapdash of rehtory to arrive at a pre-determined conclusion. KF BOTTOMLINE: The DS model allows us to seriously engage the matter BarryA raised, and leads to some interesting sci-tech and phil results. The utterly predictable, imaginary nit-picking triviality of objections to those results is revealing on the true balance of the case on the merits. Yes, that model does allow us to seriously engage, etc. But, serious engaging requires the nit-picking, so that trivial errors aren't allowed to propogate - as you seem to be insisting that you be allowed to do. Good science and good philosophy says all arguments must stand up to close scrutiny - even the trivial arguments - and even the arguments that show fault in one's pet arguments. Fin.Q_{January 25, 2008
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PS: Wiki of course softens the force of the point that the core of a research programme embeds worldview level elements, and that its protective belt often includes not just auxiliary hyps but theories as well. That this is so should be obvious from the older name for what we now call science: natural philosophy. Cf for instance, Newton's General Scholium at the end of his Principia for an explicit example. Here is Lakatos in a talk in 1973:
I claim that the typical descriptive unit of great scientific achievements is not an isolated hypothesis but rather a research programme. [Science is not simply trial and error, a series of conjectures and refutations.] 'All swans are white' may be falsified by the discovery of one black swan. But such trivial trial and error does not rank as science. Newtonian science, for instance, is not simply a set of four conjectures - the three laws of mechanics and the law of gravitation. These four laws constitute only the 'hard core' of the Newtonian programme. But this hard core is tenaciously protected from refutation by a vast 'protective belt' of auxiliary hypotheses. And, even more importantly, the research programme also has a 'heuristic', that is, a powerful problem-solving machinery, which, with the help of sophisticated mathematical techniques, digests anomalies and even turns them into positive evidence. For instance, if a planet does not move exactly as it should, the Newtonian scientist checks his conjectures concerning atmospheric refraction, concerning propagation of light in magnetic storms, and hundreds of other conjectures which are all part of the programme. He may even invent a hitherto unknown planet and calculate its position, mass and velocity in order to explain the anomaly. Now, Newton's theory of gravitation, Einstein's relativity theory, quantum mechanics, Marxism, Freudism, are all research programmes, each with a characteristic hard core stubbornly defended, each with its more flexible protective belt and each with its elaborate problem-solving machinery. Each of them, at any stage of its development, has unsolved problems and undigested anomalies. All theories, in this sense, are born refuted and die refuted. But are they equally good? Until now I have been describing what research programmes are like. But how can one distinguish a scientific or progressive programme from a pseudoscientific or degenerating one? Contrary to Popper, the difference cannot be that some are still unrefuted, while others are already refuted. [When Newton published his Principia, it was common knowledge that it could not properly explain even the motion of the moon; in fact, lunar motion refuted Newton.] Kaufmann, a distinguished physicist, refuted Einstein's relativity theory in the very year it was published. But all the research programmes I admire have one characteristic in common. They all predict novel facts, facts which had been either undreamt of, or have indeed been contradicted by previous or rival programmes . . . . in a progressive research programme, theory leads to the discovery of hitherto unknown novel facts. In degenerating programmes, however, theories are fabricated only in order to accommodate known facts. Has, for instance, Marxism ever predicted a stunning novel fact successfully? Never! It has some famous unsuccessful predictions. It predicted the absolute impoverishment of the working class. It predicted that the first socialist revolution would take place in the industrially most developed society. It predicted that socialist societies would be free of revolutions. It predicted that there will be no conflict of interests between socialist countries. Thus the early predictions of Marxism were bold and stunning, but they failed. Marxism 'explained' all its failures. It 'explained' the rising living standards of the working class by devising a theory of imperialism; it 'explained' even why the first socialist revolution occurred in industrially backward Russia. It 'explained' Berlin 1953, Budapest 1956, Prague 1968. It 'explained' the Russian-Chinese conflict. But their auxiliary hypotheses were all cooked up after the event to protect Marxian theory from the facts. The Newtonian programme led to novel facts; the Marxian programme lagged behind the facts and has been running fast to catch up with them . . . . Now, how do scientific revolutions come about? If we have two rival research programmes, and one is progressing while the other is degenerating, scientists tend to join the progressive programme. This is the rationale of scientific revolutions. But while it is a matter of intellectual honesty to keep the record public, it is not dishonest to stick to a degenerating programme and try to turn it into a progressive one. As opposed to Popper the methodology of scientific research programmes does not offer instant rationality. One must treat budding programmes leniently: programmes may take decades before they get off the ground and become empirically progressive. Criticism is not a Popperian quick kill, by refutation. Important criticism is always constructive: there is no refutation without a better theory. Kuhn is wrong in thinking that scientific revolutions are sudden, irrational changes in vision. [The history of science refutes both Popper and Kuhn: ] On close inspection both Popperian crucial experiments and Kuhnian revolutions turn out to be myths: what normally happens is that progressive research programmes replace degenerating ones. The problem of demarcation between science and pseudoscience has grave implications also for the institutionalization of criticism. Copernicus's theory was banned by the Catholic Church in 1616 because it was said to be pseudoscientific. It was taken off the index in 1820 because by that time the Church deemed that facts had proved it and therefore it became scientific. The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in 1949 declared Mendelian genetics pseudoscientific and had its advocates, like Academician Vavilov, killed in concentration camps; after Vavilov's murder Mendelian genetics was rehabilitated; but the Party's right to decide what is science and publishable and what is pseudoscience and punishable was upheld. The new liberal Establishment of the West also exercises the right to deny freedom of speech to what it regards as pseudoscience, as we have seen in the case of the debate concerning race and intelligence. All these judgments were inevitably based on some sort of demarcation criterion. And this is why the problem of demarcation between science and pseudoscience is not a pseudo-problem of armchair philosophers: it has grave ethical and political implications.
Notice in particular the role of marxism as a case of worldviews being deeply embedded in the core. Also, that THE VEXED QUESTION OF DEMARCATION CRITERIA ON SCIENCE VS NON-SCIENCE IS BOT ONLY HISTORICALLY (AND CURRENTLY) IMPORTANT BUT IT IS INHERENTLY A PHIL [OF SCI] ISSUE. It would also help us to note that last part on the power games of today by the West's liberal establishment on what they object to. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 25, 2008
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Onlookers: What is interesting about the gap between computers blindly following instructions and agents being consciously aware and able to persuade one another is not so much the raw fact that there is "no agreement" but what the nature of the objections made to such an obvious fact of life reveals. Nowhere is this more telling than in a point I highlighted yesterday [in no. 82], on how cognitivism has succeeded behaviourism in psychology. Materialism-leaning “prof” Wiki again:
Cognitive psychology is not a wholesale refutation of behaviorism, but rather an expansion that accepts that mental states exist. This was due to the increasing criticism towards the end of the 1950s of behaviorist models. One of the most notable criticisms was Chomsky’s argument that language could not be acquired purely through conditioning, and must be at least partly explained by the existence of internal mental states. The main issues that interest cognitive psychologists are the inner mechanisms of human thought and the processes of knowing. Cognitive psychologists have attempted to throw light on the alleged mental structures that stand in a causal relationship to our physical actions . . .
Now, presumably, behaviourist psychologists think, reason, reflect, decide, argue and even persuade [and by obvious contrast, as BarryA trellingly points out in the OP, computers do not] – indeed, even in the very articles and books in which they attempted to dismiss or deny the reality of mental states. In short, the whole decades-long exercise was premised on absurdity – dismissal or denial of what one has to use to make the very arguments that try to dismiss or deny. Much follows from this, and it is reflected in 81 – 82, and Q's objections in 83. And, it is very noteworthy that Q's objections simply do not address this patent, commonly seen, very characteristic, self-referential and self-refuting absurdity of evolutionary materialist thought. Sometimes, silence is all too revealing about an underlying rhetorical agenda. So, now, let us look at some objections by Q, to see what they reveal: 1] Q, 83: imagine force is proportional to acceleration. Hmm… Now test it. Yup, we get asymptotically closer to the prediction of the thought experiment. Voila - now, for the observational world. See the revealing effect of a slight shift in emphasis? In short, Q's “we get asymptotically closer” is actually a hastily dashed-by confession that there is a persistent gap between the thought-world of explanatory hypothesies, theories and models and the real world of observations. Duly, distracted from by emphasising the work “predictions” in the original. The point, plainly, still stands: thought experiments and associated idealisations from the real observed world were vital to making scientific progress and are a crucial, inseparable part of scientific persuasion, to this day. We cannot simply dismiss thought exercises [and their derivatives, e.g models], and we cannot baldly claim that they must seek empirical support as thought such support is perfect or proximately perfect. Empirical data is always more rough and ready than the neat deliverances of a suitably mathematical theory – as the very existence of a whole field of study on errors of observation and their treatment (the title of a book we physics majors all had to buy in my u/grad days at UWI; a little volume which still sits on my shelves) – reveals. 2] On the observation and experience of mind:
KF: Is the observation and experience of mind a “mere” thought experiment? Plainly, not. Q: No, definitionally not. Thought experiements aren’t observations.
Isn't it interesting to see that Q fails to follow up the implications of that, as highlighted at the head of this comment. For why, let us again cite BarryA from the OP:
Surely we all agree that the output of a computer is utterly determined in the sense that the output can be reduced to the function of the physical properties of the machine . . . . Now assume we have two computers that can communicate in machine code across a cable. Assume further that the computers are assigned the task of coming to a conclusion about the truth or falsity of a particular proposition . . . . Here’s the interesting question. Can computer A “persuade” computer B to accept the “true” statement? The answer, it seems to me, is obvious: No. Computer B’s output is completely determined. It has no free will. It has no “mind” that may be persuaded. The facts and arguments communicated to it by computer A trigger a subroutine that produces the output “yes it is true” or ”no it is false.” The result of that computation is utterly determined in the sense that it is reducible to the operation of computer B’s software and hardware. Computer B has no meaningful choice as to how to respond to the information provided to it by computer A.
This brings us back to StephenB’s questions. If the brain is nothing more than an organic computing machine, why do materialists bother to try to persuade us of anything? In short, the pattern is to strain at a gnat, while swallowing a camel. This continues . . . 3] Where in physics is “raw energy” defined? That is your own tool for your own explanations . . . Of course, I have shown the meaning of this informal, descriptive term all along in my always linked, appendix 1; and in 83, I excerpted a discussion on exactly what “raw” energy refers to, by contrast with energy coupled into an energy converting device such that it may then cause an increase of order through performing work. To cite someone else (was it Janice?), we run fuel into a tank in our car, then feed it into the engine in a very controlled fashion. We don't simply pour it over the engine compartment at random, then toss in a lighted match. Thus, this objection is a trivial objection made solely for the sake of distraction from a cogent point. 4] the separation [mind vs brain as to function] isn’t a natural piece of the model, it is your own suggestion that there are two competing forms of the model - the one confined to observations, and the one expanded into the non-material domain. Really, now! It will be easy enough for onlookers to compare 82, points i – m, to see that this is simply false. I have used the DS model to separate intelligent direction out form system control through execution of programs, then have pointed out that the InDi model element is neutral across known competing, live option accounts of the mind – materialistic-monistic and dualistic. That is, as 82 (points n – v) EXPLICITLY makes, i – m bring us to the threshold of worldview level issues and associated comparative difficulties analysis. The link will discuss how such analysis explicitly includes: factual [i.e. including empirical] adequacy, coherence, and explanatory elegance. For, as Lakatos aptly pointed out, philosophical issues and worldview commitments are deeply embedded in the core of scientific research programmes. Citing "prof" Wiki:
. . . what we think of as a 'theory' may actually be a succession of slightly different theories and experimental techniques developed over time, that share some common idea, or what Lakatos called their 'hard core'. Lakatos called such changing collections 'Research Programmes'. The scientists involved in a programme will attempt to shield the theoretical core from falsification attempts behind a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses. . . . Lakatos wanted to show that adjusting and developing a protective belt is not necessarily a bad thing for a research programme. Instead of asking whether a hypothesis is true or false, Lakatos wanted us to ask whether one research programme is better than another, so that there is a rational basis for preferring it. He showed that in some cases one research programme can be described as progressive while its rivals are degenerative. A progressive research programme is marked by its growth, along with the discovery of stunning novel facts, development of new experimental techniques, more precise predictions, etc. A degenerative research program is marked by lack of growth, or growth of the protective belt that does not lead to novel facts.
My point: opening up to the possibility of mind [however constituted -- a matter to be investigated, not ruled out of order ahead of time by begging worldview questions through improperly imposing materialism (however disguised) as a part of the "definition" of science . . .] as a real entity is not only common-sense, but is a part of a progressive research programme in cybernetics and allied fields! 5] you merely show that a philosophical argument can be made - meaning no sufficient rebuttal exists (making an arguments isn’t showing a conclusion!). Then, you jump to concluding that an inference can be drawn! This, in response to a tellingly quote-mined, dismissive [“lamest . . .”] excerpt from my points:
n –> World-view level step: we are not just dealing with earth but an observed cosmos. One that in the organised complexity of its life-facilitating physics, exhibits massive FSCI. [cf always linked Section D.] o –> Thus, it is at least arguable that the cosmos as we see it has been produced by an extra-cosmic intelligent agent who is a necessary being, the sufficient basis for the observed cosmos. Thus, we may infer that immaterial mind is possible and credible, maybe even actual. AND, such an agent would be able to communicate into and interact with the space-time, matter-energy world in which we act as embodied agents. p –> Which brings us back to the evidence for such interaction, as say even Acts 27 [and 17 etc] discusses [i.e 2,000 years of testimony and record by MILLIONS who have met God in life-transforming, miracle-working power in the face of Christ]. But that is a bit afield of our purposes here. q –> Our purpose here is now more or less achieved. For, we have a basis for seeing that immaterial intelligent agency is possible . . .
In short, there was a lot more there, including for instance and entire section in the always linked. FYI, Q, at worldviews level, one considers live options across the three main comparative difficulties points. FYFI, at the core that ties together the various theories, models, hypotheses, techniques etc, scientific research programmes deeply embed a worldviews core. FYYFI, I am speaking to that level, and I am speaking in terms of the proper analytical techniques for that: possible alternatives are living options, to be compared on factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power. I then adduce evidence that materialist accounts fail these bars by contrast with accounts that accept that mind belongs to a different order form matter, including the very experience of mind that we share – including radical behaviourist psychologists and other evolutionary materialists. _____________ BOTTOMLINE: The DS model allows us to seriously engage the matter BarryA raised, and leads to some interesting sci-tech and phil results. The utterly predictable, imaginary nit-picking triviality of objections to those results is revealing on the true balance of the case on the merits. So, let us get back on track . . . GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 25, 2008
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KF: It is plain, on multiple passes on the loops of discussion, that there will be no agreement. Apparently so. But, it is because of your abuse of the tools of the various philosophies, resulting in bad premises, I reiterate. To wit: KF: Frictional forces in real-world observations are misleading us. Let us, in imagination, subtract them. Thus, Force is proportional to acceleration. VOILA! No voila allowed yet. Imagine force is proportional to acceleration. Hmm... Now test it. Yup, we get asymptotically closer to the prediction of the thought experiment. Voila - now, for the observational world. The non-material domain... you can't claim the same. KF: Is the observation and experience of mind a “mere” thought experiment? Plainly, not. No, definitionally not. Thought experiements aren't observations. KF: Dumping raw energy into a system is here being distinguished from the coupling of energy required for energy conversion systems What? Where in physics is "raw energy" defined? That is your own tool for your own explanations. Are you asserting that RawE = RawMc2, but IntelligentE=something else? Or how about RawE = hRawF? In the observable domain, Energy is energy. You need some other property than your coined "rawness" to identify intelligence. "Rawness" shouldn't even be applied to your statement. KF: In short, we have now separated mind and brain as to function, systems architecture and interface. Well, not exactly, because you also said it was "magic". Meaning, that the separation isn't a natural piece of the model, it is your own suggestion that there are two competing forms of the model - the one confined to observations, and the one expanded into the non-material domain. KF: Thus, it is at least arguable that the cosmos as we see it has been produced by an extra-cosmic intelligent agent who is a necessary being, the sufficient basis for the observed cosmos. Thus, we may infer... That is the lamest form of argument you could make. First, you merely show that a philosophical argument can be made - meaning no sufficient rebuttal exists (making an arguments isn't showing a conclusion!). Then, you jump to concluding that an inference can be drawn! Having no rebuttal is merely admission of insufficient information - i.e. ignorance. But, building inferences from ignorances does not yield valid inferences! Etc. But, as you said, it is plain that there will be no agreement.Q_{January 24, 2008
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4] BACK on TRACK – the nature of the mind in light of the DS model, implications of FSCI as originating in agency, and the telling testimony of consciousness: It is easy to become distracted by side-points and objections, especially if insisted on in the teeth of ever-mounting cycles of discussion. The focus of this thread is actually quite simple and substantial. First, from BarryA's OP:
Surely we all agree that the output of a computer is utterly determined in the sense that the output can be reduced to the function of the physical properties of the machine . . . . Now assume we have two computers that can communicate in machine code across a cable. Assume further that the computers are assigned the task of coming to a conclusion about the truth or falsity of a particular proposition . . . . Here’s the interesting question. Can computer A “persuade” computer B to accept the “true” statement? The answer, it seems to me, is obvious: No. Computer B’s output is completely determined. It has no free will. It has no “mind” that may be persuaded. The facts and arguments communicated to it by computer A trigger a subroutine that produces the output “yes it is true” or ”no it is false.” The result of that computation is utterly determined in the sense that it is reducible to the operation of computer B’s software and hardware. Computer B has no meaningful choice as to how to respond to the information provided to it by computer A. This brings us back to StephenB’s questions. If the brain is nothing more than an organic computing machine, why do materialists bother to try to persuade us of anything?
The answer I have offered is that we can look at an interesting model of how complex servosystems can (in principle – this is a thought expt so far, based on observing the human and higher animals as in effect naturally occurring biotech robots) be made up, by Derek Smith, a conscious Welshman. (Look at the Welsh flag on his web page!) In so doing we see: a --> the effectors and their targets are driven by a in input-output processor based Controller, which in turn takes feedback from sensors in various arrays. b --> The i-o Controller [I-O C] just described is of course simply a processor, following instructions and the algorithms they express. But that raises the question, where does its track to try to follow come from? c --> Ans, an Intelligent Director [as I have termed it, let's abbreviate: InDi] which gives to the I-O C, a reference track which includes in the most sophisticated case a prediction of the sensor array feedback so that the controller only needs to respond to track deviations. d --> InDi generates the projected track and expected feedback internally, creatively, imaginatively and autonomously. In DS's terms, “a higher order controller . . . replaces the external manual source of command information. This means that there is no longer any high-side system boundary, making the new layout self-controlling. That is to say, it is now capable of willed behaviour, or "praxis".” e --> A suitable architecture for such a processor as InDi is a self-learning neural network, as “prof Wiki” testifies, as excerpted 46 supra:
At each point in time t, the [reinforcement learining Neural network] agent performs an action yt and the environment generates an observation xt and an instantaneous cost ct, according to some (usually unknown) dynamics. The aim is to discover a policy for selecting actions that minimises some measure of a long-term cost, i.e. the expected cumulative cost. [Note the preset purpose.] The environment’s dynamics and the long-term cost for each policy are usually unknown, but can be estimated. ANNs are frequently used in reinforcement learning as part of the overall algorithm. Tasks that fall within the paradigm of reinforcement learning are control problems, games and other sequential decision making tasks.
f --> Of course, the relevant neural network exhibits FSCI, and is pre-programmed and structured to learn by estimating environment, deciding across alternative policies, and targets a high order aim of achieving a goal at acceptably low cumulative cost. [In short, the odds of InDi coming about by chance-based processes searching a config space are next to zero.] g --> InDi allows us to understand what an intelligent agent does, esp in light of the discussion of events in Ac 27 [cf 46 – 47 above]as we see how actual human intelligent agents in a situation operated and learned – though obviously cost was not minimised there! h --> Now, we can probably set about designing and developing such a robot ancestor to the famous fictional intelligent robot of R Daneel of Asimov's I, Robot series. In so doing we would (if successful) instantiate the point that an intelligent agent based on FSCI is capable of being produced by an intelligent agent. On excellent probabilistic resource exhaustion grounds, the odds of such a system originating by random forces and natural regularities is next to zero on the gamut of the observed cosmos. i --> But also, we now can see a bit more deeply into the mind-brain issue. j --> Namely, we have identified the sorts of things mind does, through our [so far thought-expt; but my soldering iron arm is a-itching just now] discussion of InDi, and we have distinguished such creative functionality from the i-o control processes that are essentially based on executing algorithms and processing physical signals relative to instructed and expected patterns; as opposed to exploring, learning and responding intelligently and creatively to an environment. k --> Magic step: we have no good grounds to confine InDi to material technologies, absent question-begging on the nature of reality. So, whether [i] mind is “simply” materials + 4 physical forces + energy + information [i.e. software of some level of spohistication] in the world as imagined by Evo Mat advocates, or [ii] mind is of a different – non-material order, the InDi model will work. l --> In short, we have now separated mind and brain as to function, systems architecture and interface. We can think of mind as possibly being material, or possibly being non-material, but in either case, it is not simply the i-o control processor running off software from wherever, however. m --> We also have a model for how mind and matter can interact through energy. [For the moment we can live with the idea that perhaps, the relevant information can be slipped into appropriate storage registers accessible to the I-O Controller within the windows of the uncertainty principles of Quantum mechanics. Indeed, educational psychologists tell us that there is an observed/inferred sensory input storage register that can hold 4 – 9 “items” at once in the focus of attention, and a further working store of about 50,000 items for a context of working. So a similar mind-side i/o register is possible, even plausible for now at least.] n --> World-view level step: we are not just dealing with earth but an observed cosmos. One that in the organised complexity of its life-facilitating physics, exhibits massive FSCI. [cf always linked Section D.] o --> Thus, it is at least arguable that the cosmos as we see it has been produced by an extra-cosmic intelligent agent who is a necessary being, the sufficient basis for the observed cosmos. Thus, we may infer that immaterial mind is possible and credible, maybe even actual. AND, such an agent would be able to communicate into and interact with the space-time, matter-energy world in which we act as embodied agents. p --> Which brings us back to he evidence for such interaction, as say even Acts 27 [and 17 etc] discusses. But that is a bit afield of our purposes here. q --> Our purpose here is now more or less achieved. For, we have a basis for seeing that immaterial intelligent agency is possible. r --> Now, bring that to bear on the key points BarryA has made in this thread and in the BiG Blue thread: the observed phenomenon of I-ness, which is self-conscous and self-directing, gives rise to Qualia and allows one agent to consciously persuade another – not merely reprogram the other. s --> InDi insofar as it is conceived of as a pre-programmed material computer entity has no known and empirically specifiable causal basis for such self-awareness. t --> One may infer that somehow such self awareness etc “emerges” from the process of making ever more sophisticated software, but that is a promissory or baldly assertive statement of blind, ad hoc faith. Such an inference, assertion or conviction is certainly not scientific; it is a worldview level ad hoc response to experiences that the story of the late Behaviourist school of psychology and the rise of cognitivism is eloquent testimony to, sits poorly with materialism. Materialism-leaning prof Wiki again, on cognitivism in psychology:
Cognitivism became the dominant force in psychology in the late-20th century, replacing behaviorism as the most popular paradigm for understanding mental function. Cognitive psychology is not a wholesale refutation of behaviorism, but rather an expansion that accepts that mental states exist. This was due to the increasing criticism towards the end of the 1950s of behaviorist models. One of the most notable criticisms was Chomsky's argument that language could not be acquired purely through conditioning, and must be at least partly explained by the existence of internal mental states. The main issues that interest cognitive psychologists are the inner mechanisms of human thought and the processes of knowing. Cognitive psychologists have attempted to throw light on the alleged mental structures that stand in a causal relationship to our physical actions . . .
u --> Telling isn't it that it took a major debate among supposedly thinking and experiencing psychologists etc, to see and accept that “mental states exist”! v --> Thus in the end, plainly, the evidence of consciousness is very persuasive and points straight to immaterial agency. BOTTOMLINE: BarryA has squarely hit the nail on the head. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 24, 2008
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Q: It is time to pull a few threads together and draw some conclusions on the nature and action of mind, however provisionally. But first, I will note on a few corrective points, just for the record. It is plain, on multiple passes on the loops of discussion, that there will be no agreement. For, the following excerpts deserve to be highlighted and commented on for the sake of onlookers – to move the thread and blog on from unproductive circles of debate to progressive spirals of learning, thence perhaps to actual applications of design thought to robotics: 1] Q, 76: It is also from the experimental that the idealisation of the theories are shown to be an inadequate explanation of the material portion of the world Now, if one traces back above one will see that the context is the origins of the key insights of modern physics in thought-experiment idealisations from real world observations. For instance:
ARISTOTLE: Observed say a cart being dragged a long by a donkey. Force proportional to speed. Empirical [and roughly correct for the circumstance], but uninformative and even misleading. GALILEO & NEWTON: Frictional forces in real-world observations are misleading us. Let us, in imagination, subtract them. Thus, Force is proportional to acceleration. VOILA!
In short: while it is trivially true that experimental tests may falsify theories and invalidate models, it is more relevantly true that key theories are often built up from and are made plausible in light of thought experiments. So, we should not merely dismiss thought experiments in the progress of science as wanting in degree of “proof.” 2] Is the observation and experience of mind a “mere” thought experiment? Plainly, not. As noted above, our experience of conscious, intelligent I-ness is the very first empirical datum we encounter, and all observations of the external world are filtered through it. [Indeed, this through-ness is what unfortunately led the Kant and the Kantians astray, through that little error at the beginning that has come up repeatedly in this thread. Namely, of dichotomising the phenomenal (as-perceived and interpreted by us) and the noumenal (that of things in themselves) worlds.] 3] the reality is that information flow ALWAYS increases randomness as per the laws of thermodynamics . . . information can’t be wholly distinguished from dumping raw energy, because that is what information is - dumped raw energy. Q, information flow, is associated with energy flows, which in praxis will always have waste, i.e some conversion to random thermal agitation of one form or another. So indeed, information flows will increase randomness SOMEWHERE. The issue is: where is that “somewhere.” In the case of the simple heat flow from body A to B within an isolated system discussed in my always linked, App 1, and summarising no end of basic thermodynamics texts:
a] Clausius is the founder of the 2nd law, and the first standard example of an isolated system -- one that allows neither energy nor matter to flow in or out -- is instructive, given the "closed" subsystems [i.e. allowing energy to pass in or out] in it . . . . Isol System: | | (A, at Thot) --> d'Q, heat --> (B, at T cold) | | b] Now, we introduce entropy [“disorder”] change dS >/= d'Q/T . . . "Eqn" A.1 c] So, dSa >/= -d'Q/Th, and dSb >/= +d'Q/Tc, where Th > Tc d] That is, for system, dStot >/= dSa + dSb >/= 0, as Th > Tc . . . "Eqn" A.2 e] But, observe: the subsystems A and B are open to energy inflows and outflows, and the entropy of B RISES DUE TO THE IMPORTATION OF RAW ENERGY. f] The key point is that when raw energy enters a body, it tends to make its entropy rise. For the injection of energy to instead do something useful, it needs to be coupled to an energy conversion device.
When that is done, the energy flow through the energy conversion device can in effect increase the order or complexity or even organised complexity in one lace, whilst exporting the waste heat to the environment. That is the physical foundation of manufacturing and a lot of our world of work. And, it is what I spoke to above. Namely, that information [transfer] is to be distinguished from dumping raw energy into a system – as one does that, the randomness rises as per the refutable but reliable assertion of thermodynamics known as 2 LOT [cf no 72, point 2]. Dumping raw energy into a system is here being distinguished from the coupling of energy required for energy conversion systems, and points onward tot he action of such coupling of energy where the focal point is transfer of information from one entity to another. I add: when the energy conversion/info transfer devices exhibit FSCI and we know where they came from by direct observation, reliably, they are the product of agency. [ . . . ]kairosfocus_{January 24, 2008
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Greetings! Chomp on this for a while... Evidence = piece of Truth... Truth leads to Trust... Possibility has two catagories probable and improbable... Possibility leads to Hope... Trust and Hope is Faith invested... Truth and Possibility requires Faith to become Trust and Hope... Guess What? Intelligence or Intelligent Agents make the improbable probable... The higher the Intelligence or Intelligent Agent the greater ability to make the improbable probable... In the case of the Intelligent Agent or Intelligence to which the universe owes it's existence, that one can make the impossible possible. In mathematics, one factor can determine an outcome many times in frequency against the odds... That is Intelligent intervention... Such as cheating at cards. Take the bio-ooze hypothesis... The "fact" that it is impossible does not alter the materialists rigid mind. All the evidence precisely points to an intelligent source... DNA and RNA do not come into existence the chemical reactions and... ... The expression goes "an amino acid, a protein, does not make." Not to mention you need energy to make it go round and round... So here is the run down... All atheist have more faith than any theist for the "fact" that they believe the impossible is possible and contrary to all evidence. They trust not evidence, but doctrine and they hope not in what is possible, but what is impossible. For all things considered one conclusion remains God is Real and therefore, all theists have less faith, for they believe the possible and the true. For what may be impossible for a child (humans) is possible for an adult (God).Unlettered and Ordinary_{January 23, 2008
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-----JT "Presumably you did not originate the “in nature vs. of nature” argument, and so your invoking it was a simple pattern matching process (perhaps a not too complicated text matching process actually)." No, actually I did originate that formulation. As far as I know, no one else has ever put things exactly that way. For better or worse, it is part of my communicative style to come to the bottom line rather quickly and to use as few words as possible. That way I tend to get bottom line responses of much the same texture. It can be very helpful, especially when the subject matter is carefully chosen, as mine was. Your bottom line response, for example, indicates that you seriously doubt that my written paragraph is a product of design. Indeed, you are asserting that it cannot be the case. I find naked admissions of that type much more revealing that a long series of technical objections about the explanatory filter. Whether you realize it or not, your message is as clear as if you were shouting through a megaphone---“My prior commitment to materialism is absolute and unyielding, and I will never consider the alternative point of view.”StephenB_{January 23, 2008
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Q said:"But the reality is that information flow ALWAYS increases randomness as per the laws of thermodynamics. It doesn’t matter if intelligence is involved or not - unless that intelligence is not bound by the limitations of the observable universe" I'll have to remember that one.JunkyardTornado_{January 23, 2008
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STephenB said: —–JT “Every design process actually undertaken by humans (or any other animal) involves actual work, the actual expenditure of physical energy. If physical energy was expended in the creation of humans, than our creation was a natural process.” To be “in” nature is not the same as being a natural process. Anyone who posts a commnet on this blog is “in” nature. That doesn’t mean that the “designed” posts occurred as the result of a natural process. In fact, we know that such was not the case. If instead of your above response you had merely said, "No it wasn't", would that be a designed response as well, and thus not of nature? Presumably you did not originate the "in nature vs. of nature" argument, and so your invoking it was a simple pattern matching process (perhaps a not too complicated text matching process actually). A few words from what I wrote triggered the retrieval of that argument (such as it is) from your mind where it has been permenantly after you encountered it yourself several times. I'm not mocking you for the brevity of your response. However it aptly illustrates how cause and effect are at work (not intelligent design.)JunkyardTornado_{January 23, 2008
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KF, in 72, This predictably gets the point backways around. As the cases show, it is from the experimental that one goes to the idealisation that is the heart of the theories – of classical kinematis and dynamics in this case. As I noted. It is also from the experimental that the idealisation of the theories are shown to be an inadequate explanation of the material portion of the world. It is the philosophers that have the point backwards when they insist that their thought experiments are adequate. No - their thought experiments are merely predictions about the material side of the duality - andn they have nothing to confirm the non-material side of the duality except internal consistency of their arguments. KF, The context is, that information is to be distinguished from dumping raw energy into a system – as one does that, the randomness rises as per the refutable but reliable assertion of thermodynamics known as 2 LOT. But the reality is that information flow ALWAYS increases randomness as per the laws of thermodynamics. It doesn't matter if intelligence is involved or not - unless that intelligence is not bound by the limitations of the observable universe. In other words, information can't be wholly distinguished from dumping raw energy, because that is what information is - dumped raw energy. You need something else to distinguish this dumped energy as informtion from that dumped energy that is not.Q_{January 23, 2008
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-----JT "Every design process actually undertaken by humans (or any other animal) involves actual work, the actual expenditure of physical energy. If physical energy was expended in the creation of humans, than our creation was a natural process." To be "in" nature is not the same as being a natural process. Anyone who posts a commnet on this blog is "in" nature. That doesn't mean that the "designed" posts occurred as the result of a natural process. In fact, we know that such was not the case.StephenB_{January 23, 2008
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God did not become incarnate in order to understand something about man, but in order that man could understand something about God. Well said!!!!tribune7_{January 23, 2008
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-----JT "But on the contention of some that the eternal God is the same sort of intelligent agent that man is, without benefit of the same organic attributes of a man - " -----"But on the contention of some that the eternal God is the same sort of intelligent agent that man is, without benefit of the same organic attributes of a man -" -----"Note that first of all it was necessary for God to become a man." [1] Intelligent agency leaves clues that are independent of the intellectual nobility of the agent. The resultant design does not necessarily represent the most sophisticated design possible, it merely indicates a design that is detectable. [2] God did not become incarnate in order to understand something about man, but in order that man could understand something about God.StephenB_{January 23, 2008
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All: I just now spent a significant amount of time on an email response to Prof Olofsson [six months after our blog exchange here . . .], harking back to the Padian thread, then took time with Q on the Big Blue thread; and I have a major mind-numbing exercise in Excel worksheet adaptation ahead [why don't people simply build and use STANDARD templates?]. So pardon my being a bit summary, especially as I see us looping back over old ground. 1] Q, 68: The real world doesn’t operate as cleanly as thought experiments would suggest - the predicted path of the trolley did not match the observed path of the trolley. Thus, the prediction made by thought experiments must be modified by the results of the experiment. This predictably gets the point backways around. As the cases show, it is from the experimental that one goes to the idealisation that is the heart of the theories – of classical kinematis and dynamics in this case. As I noted. 2] 69: in the material side of a dualistic philisophy, observation suggests an increase of disorder. But, on the non-material side of the duality, the actions of the God need not abide by the same rules. The context is, that information is to be distinguished from dumping raw energy into a system – as one does that, the randomness rises as per the refutable but reliable assertion of thermodynamics known as 2 LOT. God's intelligent action on the world produces order as the apostle Paul noted [1 Cor 14], if you want to bring God in. Order – or in this case the particular version known as organised complexity, has the characteristic: functionally specified, complex information. 3] Re JT, 70: mechanisms can be intelligent designers. So in the explanatory filter, the choices are: 1)chance 2)mechanisms that do not have the property of being intelligent designers 3)Mechanisms or non-mechanisms that do have the property of being intelligent designers . . . . the quote you included previously (to which I assume you subscribe) says that intelligent agents can be mechanisms This commenter should note that mechanism is a term best left to “natural regularities tracing to mechanical or dynamical necessity” -- i.e to the sort of systems of initial conditions, force laws and inertial resistances that characterises the Newtonian account of motion of bodies – actually, point particles [Q: a mathematical, physically impossible idealisation] under forces, the paradigm of this sort of explanation. In the precious, no such inference was made that agents are mechanisms, but rather that they are causes. Cf the classic fourfold breakdown of cause. 4] “fixed and instinctive” Said commenter needs to attend to what "prof Wiki" noted on instincts as cited at 65, supra. 5] As far as terms like “creativity” “intuition” “insight” “wisdom” and so on, to me, these are very vague terms that serve to obscure, not clarify, cognition . . . maybe those terms (”wisdom”, etc.) are convenient, but they are not indivisible primary conceptual entities themselves. Said commenter should note from the same Wiki excerpts above, that we access the meaning of such terms by example and that the terms are sufficiently precise for us to discern when they are present and when they are not. Creativity etc are characteristic of intelligent agents and , echoing Einstein, our ideas and explanatory models should be as simple as possible but not simpler than that. 6] considering DNA and cell-division - Are you saying that this process is an intelligent designer itself merely by the nature of its output? The always linked sections B and C discuss the case. DNA etc cluster to perform a complex algorithmic process, and are themselves highly complex entities exhibiting FSCI. This is known to be a reliable marker of agency, on much experience and observation. Thus on inference to best explanation, DNA etc as to their ultimate -- as opposed to the proximate origin in one or more previous organisms -- origin, trace to agency. That is OOL is reasonably traced to agency, and OO BPLBD similarly; on empirical grounds. Inferences as to the identity of the agent should build on that. 7] Why does all that energy exist out there if it had nothing to do with us and our creation? . . . Was any actual physical work done in the creation of humans? Onlookers are invited to examine APP 1, the always linked, esp the case study at point 6. Energy can be just as easily chaotic as constructive. When we see the constructive in the context of FSCI, we know empirically – thus reliably though provisionally -- that such traces to agency. 8] Every design process actually undertaken by humans (or any other animal) involves actual work, the actual expenditure of physical energy. If physical energy was expended in the creation of humans, than our creation was a natural process. First issue: work, physical sense, is done when forces impart orderly – as opposed to random – motion to their points of application. [This is also the link to work in the economic sense.] When that orderly motion results in configurations of mater and energy that exhibit FSCI, we see on much observation that this is reliably because of the action of agents. On the principles of statistical thermodynamics, this is because the functional configs are so rare in the config space of all possible configs, so a random walk-based search from an arbitrary initial condition, regardless of testing for functionality step by step, is maximally unlikely to issue in such a config that manifests FSCI. So, empirically, starting from observation of FSCI and inferring to agency is well warranted. Second issue: the dichotomy natural-supernatural is not the correct one. The analysis in terms of known causal factors – which can all be at work in a given case in different ways [cf dice throw example], is a more fruitful one. Agents may possibly be within and/or beyond the cosmos, depending on context; but that agency is, is not subject to debate – we are cases in point. 9] It truly does amaze me how ID’ists continually appeal to subjective experience for validation. Here we see failure to understand that the first datum of anyone in this thread is her/his own consciousness and, specifically, that of an intelligent agent. [The link is for illustrative purposes only.] One has to be aware and active to read, think comment etc. Thus, subjectivity – “I-ness” in this case – is an undeniably objective datum, though of course a subjective experience. It is though I-ness that we observe entities such as books and web-posts, and are able to read and interpret their contents. 10] obviously we are the output of mechanisms. e.g. DNA. If one mechanism was necessary, why not another behind that? But if f(x) outputs y then in a very real sense f(x) and y are the same thing. We are in bodily part partly conditioned by DNA – epigenetic structures also play a significant role, on other relevant scientific data. That is DNA is necessary but not sufficient. There is a chain of such causal factors indeed, but that simply points to the contingency of he observed cosmos, which demands a necessary being as its sufficient explanation and cause. Also, where f(x) denotes process, and y result, they are not identical. They may be co-incident but they are not the same thing. This is like a triangle – a figure based on three non collinear points -- having angles and sides and vertices, which are distinct as to identity and meaning, but logically mutually necessary and sufficient to constitute the whole. 11] I think the “War on Terror” is a scam to condition the public to ultimately accept a world-wide totalitarian society This remark is off topic for the blog, but revealing. Perhaps, the commenter would find it interesting to see the following remark from the son of Ayatollah Khomeni dating to 1991, the time of he collapse of the East Europe Communist bloc:
"After the fall of Marxism, Islam replaced it . . . and as long as Islam exists, U.S. hostility exists, and as long as U.S. hostility exists, the struggle exists." [cited from Reynolds, David. One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945 (New York, Norton, 2000), p. 595.]
GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 23, 2008
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KF wrote: [“prof” Wiki, 1:] Instinct is the inherent disposition of a living organism toward a particular behavior. Instincts are unlearned, inherited fixed action patterns of responses or reactions to certain kinds of stimuli. Innate emotions, which can be expressed in more flexible ways and learned patterns of responses, not instincts, form a basis for majority of responses to external stimuli in evolutionary higher species, while in case of highest evolved species both of them are overridden by actions based on cognitive processes with more or less intelligence and creativity or even trans-intellectual intuition.Examples of instinctual fixed action patterns can be observed in the behavior of animals, which perform various activities (sometimes complex) that are not based upon prior experience and do not depend on emotion or learning, such as reproduction, and feeding among insects. Other examples include animal fighting, animal courtship behavior, internal escape functions, and building of nests. Instinctual actions - in contrast to actions based on learning which is served by memory and which provides individually stored successful reactions built upon experience - have no learning curve, they are hard-wired and ready to use without learning, but do depend on maturational processes to appear. Me: As far as “fixed and instinctive”, If an organism doesn’t have much in the way of saved internal state, then we can track its behavior but just looking at what’s external to it. I think that’s what most people mean by “fixed and instinctual”. If an entity has a memory, then it is operating according to something that is not apparent to us externally. So if there is an external stimulus, an entity is also keying that to some past experience which guides its behavior as well - still all mechanical though. The more memory it has, the more it can store about a stimulus and the more unpredicatable it will be. On rereading, perhaps my remark above was little more than a restatement of what you already said, only with less detail. KF: This commenter has here made a basic confusion between explanation and mechanism. Not all explanations, including not all empirically anchored inferences to best explanation, are mechanistic. To see this, consider again the simple example of a die being tossed as I have discussed in my always linked section a and mentioned many times in recent weeks in this blog’s coments: heavy objects tend to fall under the natural regularity we call gravity. If the object is a die, the face that ends up on the top from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} is for practical purposes a matter of chance. But, if the die is cast as part of a game, the results are as much a product of agency as of natural regularity and chance. Indeed, the agents in question are taking advantage of natural regularities and chance to achieve their purposes! As I went on to observe, [t]his concrete, familiar illustration should suffice to show that the three causal factors approach is not at all arbitrary or dubious — as some are tempted to imagine or assert. Indeed, explanations in the various sciences routinely infer to one or more of the causal factors above: initial conditions may be brute givens or random. Dynamical forces and inertia may be at work. An agent may be involved. Me: But the quote you included previously (to which I assume you subscribe) says that intelligent agents can be mechanisms. (So is the EF just chance,mechanisms, and other mechanisms.) By calling one aspect of your explanation an “agent”, and leaving it at that, you’re just black-boxing it. Of course that’s done all the time in explanations. But we assume that the blackbox is operating in a potentially explainable, predictable fashion, and if it is, then its a mechanism, In my response above, I was focussing on the agent being a mechanism. However if your larger point was that randomness is usually involved as well, in addition to mechanism, that I would have never denied. In my way of looking at it, the random part of a phenomena is the input to the process. So with natural selection, the natural laws would be the mechanism, and the input to the process would be the mutations, which are random. You brought up Ac 27 repeatedly, and I did find the systematic treatment of it worthwhile, (pertaining to your concept of agency), but have no comments. But on the contention of some that the eternal God is the same sort of intelligent agent that man is, without benefit of the same organic attributes of a man - Note that first of all it was necessary for God to become a man. Also the persistent anthropomorphizing God expresses in describing himself in the Old Testament, you almost get the impression that he is experiencing the world through actual humans themselves. So IOW, was it necessary for humans to exist for God to experience the world as a human. It is orthodox to say that the various books of the Bible are all God's word. But no other writer in the Bible sounds like Solomon, and no other writer sounds like David the Psalmist, and so on. It is quite evident it is their own personality that is being expressed through these writers, but are these quite distinct personalities and perspectives merely different attributes of the Godhead? IOW, is redeemed mankind the only intelligent agency of a human variety that is associated with the Godhead. Perhaps this borders on heresy. (2 Peter 1:21 comes to mind.)JunkyardTornado_{January 22, 2008
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KF wrote: So, if we see evident active, intentional, creative, innovative and adaptive [as opposed to merely fixed instinctual] problem-solving behaviour similar to that of known intelligent agents, we are justified in attaching the label: intelligence. [Note how this definition by functional description is not artificially confined to HUMAN intelligent agents: it would apply to computers, robots, the alleged alien residents of Area 51, Vulcans, Klingons or Kzinti, or demons or gods, or God.] OK, so now you're making clear that mechanisms can be intelligent designers. So in the explanatory filter, the choices are: 1)chance 2)mechanisms that do not have the property of being intelligent designers 3)Mechanisms or non-mechanisms that do have the property of being intelligent designers. As far as "fixed and instinctive", If an organism doesn't have much in the way of saved internal state, then we can track its behavior but just looking at what's external to it. I think that's what most people mean by "fixed and instinctual". If an entity has a memory, then it is operating according to something that is not apparent to us externally. So if there is an external stimulus, an entity is also keying that to some past experience which guides its behavior as well - still all mechanical though. The more memory it has, the more it can store about a stimulus and the more unpredicatable it will be. As far as terms like "creativity" "intuition" "insight" "wisdom" and so on, to me, these are very vague terms that serve to obscure, not clarify, cognition. You can give some complex behavior of a computer some convenient label as well - at the machine level it would still be, "mov,mov,cmp,inc,mov,cmp,inc..." OK maybe those terms ("wisdom", etc.) are convenient, but they are not indivisible primary conceptual entities themselves. But also, in so solving their problems, intelligent agents may leave behind empirically evident signs of their activity; So considering DNA and cell-division - Are you saying that this process is an intelligent designer itself merely by the nature of its output? Actually I might personally say it is, because to me consciousness may not be an objectively definable property, so it makes no difference if that mechanism is accompanied by the subjective experience of the average human adult or not. This commenter has here made a basic confusion between explanation and mechanism. Not all explanations, including not all empirically anchored inferences to best explanation, are mechanistic. To see this, consider again the simple example of a die being tossed as I have discussed in my always linked section a and mentioned many times in recent weeks in this blog’s coments:
heavy objects tend to fall under the natural regularity we call gravity. If the object is a die, the face that ends up on the top from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} is for practical purposes a matter of chance. But, if the die is cast as part of a game, the results are as much a product of agency as of natural regularity and chance. Indeed, the agents in question are taking advantage of natural regularities and chance to achieve their purposes!
But the quote you included previously (to which I assume you subscribe) says that intelligent agents can be mechanisms. (So is the EF just chance,mechanisms, and other mechanisms.) By calling one aspect of your explanation an "agent", and leaving it at that, you're just black-boxing it. Of course that's done all the time in explanations. But we assume that the blackbox is operating in a potentially explainable, predictable fashion, and if it is, then its a mechanism, and if it is not, it is operating randomly. 5] What if God just did everything with a lot of energy? As the always linked App 1 discusses, dumping raw energy into a system tends to increase its disorder, per Clausius’s basic example on defining entropy. Observe what happens to the subsystem that receives raw energy and why. For energy flows to lead to increased specified complexity, on experience and the principles of stat thermo-d, we need to have intelligent direction. I will rephrase a question I have posed in this thread and elsewhere: Start with the assumption that man is the endpoint of creation, as God was manifested as a man. Now consider the fact that we and the world we live in are an unimaginagly miniscule spec in a universe billions of billions of light years in extent. Why does all that energy exist out there if it had nothing to do with us and our creation? Does the entire universe exist merely so humans will have interesting tableau to gaze upon at night? Was any actual physical work done in the creation of humans? Every design process actually undertaken by humans (or any other animal) involves actual work, the actual expenditure of physical energy. If physical energy was expended in the creation of humans, than our creation was a natural process. In various parts of scripture God will say, (and I paraphrase) "by my hand I have done all these things..." Does the eternal God have a physical, five-fingered hand? I do think he has a physical hand - the physical universe itself. Does God have a physical brain? We know that a human couldn't think without a physical brain. But what is a brain - something that enables a human to store a physical model of the external world. To me the physical universe could serve as both the hands and mind of God. But anyway, if all the energy necessary to work, to plan, and to design on this planet ultimately comes from the sun, then why couldn't the stellar energy of the universe have been integral in our own creation (by creating the probabilistic resources under which man eventually emerged?) If all those trillions upon trillions of suns have nothing to do with the creation of Man - the endpoint of creation - then why do they exist? 6] Re JT, 62: "I cannot think of a more unsupernatural process than programming. I just don’t think mystical unexplained flashes of insight from some spiritual dimension are in any way involved in programming, if that is in fact what “agency” is. But since agency isn’t a mechanism, I don’t know what it is exactly. To me programming is just a mechanical, time-consuming laborious, detail oriented, mind-numbing process." The highlighted gives the game away. Here JT knows that programming is a meticulous and exacting creative task, one fit for mind only but for which many minds have but little interest. Boredom is of course a feature of intelligence! So what is a mind-numbing process - A primary need of humans is diversion, distraction, stimulation. I personally have no problem seeing this in an entirely mechanistic process. We have a desire to sit back and relax and have our senses bombarded with all sorts of pleasurable stimuli (thank you T.V.) To have to focus one's attention for long periods of time on one particular task is work, potentially exhausting work, potentially unpleasant. I don't know why we have to appeal to some transcendent, indescribable supposed attributes of humans to explain all this. Its all still mechanism. Also, this commenter knows it from the first person experience of being an agent, i.e he knows what agency is and so he DIRECTLY IN THE FIRST PERSON knows that intuition, creativity and intelligence are features of agency that routinely act effectively into the world It truly does amaze me how ID'ists continually appeal to subjective experience for validation. The Bible says, "Trust in the Lord with all your heart and lean not on your own understanding..." To me the continual message of the Bible is to deny your innate feelings and believe something that does not seem intuitive. "There is a way that seemeth right unto a man but the end thereof is death." Even science itself has a goal of marginalizing subjective feelings - the innate default assumptions we have about ourselves and the world. (Even the above was slightly confrontational - because I'm putting you in a box,saying you represent ID, and here is what you and ID think. But this is inevitable to some extent.) Just to reiterate my position, obviously we are the output of mechanisms. e.g. DNA. If one mechanism was necessary, why not another behind that? But if f(x) outputs y then in a very real sense f(x) and y are the same thing. But we know God used mechanisms. If at some starting point, you still have some f''''''(x''''''') and for whatever reason you can't come up with an explanation for it, you can still say it equates to man and leave it at that. But all science can do is try to explain by identifying mechanisms, and there's bound to be others that predate DNA. Certainly there's a great random element in all this, because God didn't consciously plan and deliberate and decide that what the world needs is leeches, ticks cockroaches, death adders, and stonefish, etc. This things were emerging at random, but tapping an eternal repository extant in God, somehow, but not something he was consciously involved in, I don't think. Even as far as pure evolution - natural laws acting on random mutation - that's still a comprehensible mechanism that must have been active in some way. The whole question is what were those natural laws. I think some have hypothesized a point event, coinciding with the Genesis account in which a huge profusion of random organic material was disgorged from the center of the earth, to get the whole process started in an efficent way. (David says, "my frame was not hidden from You when I was wrought in the lower parts of the earth...") In Genesis God says, "Let the earth bring forth creeping things..." (again, paraphrasing slightly). "Dust of the earth" almost certainly refers to microorganisms. There's a lot more to all this, actually, I think discussed by other commentators. (Eccl 4:4 NKJV) I have seen that every labor and every skill which is done is rivalry between a man and his neighbor. This too is vanity and striving after wind. What if we take the above verse literally - "all innovation arises from competition". Remind you of anything? There is a spiritual concept of "waste" in the Bible, in that the phyisical universe is a process in which things that can be destroyed are being destroyed. There is an evolutionary process that will culminate in only the "Son's of God" remaining. Poison and fangs and predation and so on will be gone. (Heb 12:27 NKJV) Now this, "Yet once more," indicates the removal of those things that are being shaken, as of things that are made, that the things which cannot be shaken may remain. (Romans 8:19-21) For the earnest expectation of the creation eagerly waits for the revealing of the sons of God. For the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly, but because of Him who subjected it in hope; because the creation itself also will be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. There's even waste in our own solar system with 8 barren waste planets and one shimmering jewel. Was God giving it his full attention and just couldn't get it right? Or, is our physical universe unfolding in its own way, tapping into the eternal Diety in some sort of chaotic fashion, that will still ultimately culminate in something God intended. But all these things are outside the realm of science. All science can do is try to identify and explicate mechanisms that operate in some predicable fashion and increase our insight at least to some degree, regarding how things unfolded in the past. Science is of course the opposite of faith, in that it can only be concerned with what can be objectively verified, no matter how marginal what can be verified might be in any given instance. (Not to imply you're somehow not aware of all this.) I think a pretty direct implication holds for Western democratic cultures today as we face elections and need to pick our leaders not for the desired smooth sailing days – which in the end are not under human control, however much we may wish to imagine — but for the possible and even highly probable storms ahead. Our kingdom is not of this world and the leaders of this world are in the process of aligning themselves with the beast, and deceiving the public. I think the "War on Terror" is a scam to condition the public to ultimately accept a world-wide totalitarian society based on mind-boggling new technology, (IMHO). I think the fallen angels are probably already here, as well. "Let the dead bury their own dead". Well, its possible most of those in power are dupes as well, and don't know about it all yet, except in very clandestine circles. 8] There’s nothing a neural network could do that a Turing Machine for example, could not. The crucial difference between the two – that suitably programmed neural networks can learn without having to be given algors in detail for the specific task to be carried out — is captured in this already given Wiki excerpt [cf 46]: You could run a neural network on your PC. There may be specialized hardware for a neural network, but nothing mandatory. Even a neural network program would just be "move(ax,n),move(bx,ax), if (cx =14) goto instruction n,increment(ax),mov(ax,dx)...." Actually just three instructions are needed to compute anything: conditional jump, increment register, and move zero into register, (and actually one other called the minimization operator).JunkyardTornado_{January 22, 2008
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KF: 5] What if God just did everything with a lot of energy? As the always linked App 1 discusses, dumping raw energy into a system tends to increase its disorder, per Clausius’s basic example on defining entropy. Well, in the material side of a dualistic philisophy, observation suggests an increase of disorder. But, on the non-material side of the duality, the actions of the God need not abide by the same rules. Or are you binding the God to be material?Q_{January 22, 2008
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KF asked [Q, are you listening . . .? I well recall my first ticker-tape timer experiments with “crash trolleys” and inclined planes 30+ years ago, and how much fiddling had to be done to get to pseudo-inertial results!] Yup. And, you exactly illustrate the limits of thought experiments. The real world doesn't operate as cleanly as thought experiments would suggest - the predicted path of the trolley did not match the observed path of the trolley. Thus, the prediction made by thought experiments must be modified by the results of the experiment.Q_{January 22, 2008
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OOPS: Point 4 should read:
First the intelligent design inference is an empirically anchored inference to just that: Intelligence. Intelligence is equally empirically known to be a ~~product~~ [should be: CHARACTERISTIC] of intelligent agents.
kairosfocus_{January 22, 2008
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4] ID, avoids having to account for the probability of God, by saying that intelligence is not a mechanism and therefore cannot be encoded, so for ID nothing called God can be encoded, so we don’t have to address the probability of God. First the intelligent design inference is an empirically anchored inference to just that: Intelligence. Intelligence is equally empirically known to be a product of intelligent agents. It is the particular context of such inferences that is the real problem for evo mat advocates and their fellow travellers, as in certain contexts the inference may make worldview level philosophical inferences to God – i.e the context is now phil not sci -- seem too plausible for their comfort. So they resort to selective hyperskepticism etc. So in the end it is the ID thinkers who are saying: stick to the empirical data and what we credibly and reasonably know about the cause of FSCI etc! 5] What if God just did everything with a lot of energy? As the always linked App 1 discusses, dumping raw energy into a system tends to increase its disorder, per Clausius's basic example on defining entropy. Observe what happens to the subsystem that receives raw energy and why. For energy flows to lead to increased specified complexity, on experience and the principles of stat thermo-d, we need to have intelligent direction. 6] Re JT, 62: I cannot think of a more unsupernatural process than programming. I just don’t think mystical unexplained flashes of insight from some spiritual dimension are in any way involved in programming, if that is in fact what “agency” is. But since agency isn’t a mechanism, I don’t know what it is exactly. To me programming is just a mechanical, time-consuming laborious, detail oriented, mind-numbing process. The highlighted gives the game away. Here JT knows that programming is a meticulous and exacting creative task, one fit for mind only but for which many minds have but little interest. Boredom is of course a feature of intelligence! [And the inference to agency on observing programs is an inference to agency not the supernatural. It is the context of he agent in question that leads us to infer whether the agent is within or beyond the physical cosmos or may be a bit of both.] Also, this commenter knows it from the first person experience of being an agent, i.e he knows what agency is and so he DIRECTLY IN THE FIRST PERSON knows that intuition, creativity and intelligence are features of agency that routinely act effectively into the world. Thence the DS framework and the relevance of an intelligent director – or of a collective of such directors [per Ac 27] -- supervising and guiding the i/o processor controlling the servosystems: robot of the future, body in the present, or ship in the past of October 59 AD makes little difference. 7] as far as I’m concerned, programs themselves performs all sorts of programming tasks all the time And the cascade of programs [each acting in accord with its own instructions], on observation, terminates in . . .? [Hint: it is an intelligent agent.] 8] There’s nothing a neural network could do that a Turing Machine for example, could not. The crucial difference between the two – that suitably programmed neural networks can learn without having to be given algors in detail for the specific task to be carried out -- is captured in this already given Wiki excerpt [cf 46]:
in unsupervised learning [in a neural network] we are given some data x, and a cost function to be minimized which can be any function of x and the network’s output, f. The cost function is determined by the task formulation. [ note this — someone sets the task, sets the goal and sets up the system, i.e the ANN does not ultimately question its final-level purpose.] Most applications fall within the domain of estimation problems such as statistical modeling, compression, filtering, blind source separation and clustering . . . . In reinforcement learning, data x is usually not given, but generated by an agent’s interactions with the environment. At each point in time t, the agent performs an action yt and the environment generates an observation xt and an instantaneous cost ct, according to some (usually unknown) dynamics. The aim is to discover a policy for selecting actions that minimises some measure of a long-term cost, i.e. the expected cumulative cost. [Note the preset purpose.] The environment’s dynamics and the long-term cost for each policy are usually unknown, but can be estimated. ANNs are frequently used in reinforcement learning as part of the overall algorithm. Tasks that fall within the paradigm of reinforcement learning are control problems, games and other sequential decision making tasks.
In the case of our imaginary prototype ancestor for R Daneel, someone would have to give him the basics of operating in the real world – a big task indeed. An unmanned UAV set up as an intelligent surveillance platform, would be a much simpler task. Ac 27 shows such agents in action in a governance situation that sets up the technical task of guiding the ship along track in its environment. Something went wrong – badly wrong with the decision-making on risk taking behaviour in the interests of certain agents who hoped to save their ship by running a gamble with the lives of the passengers – and the ship then had to shift to a survival mode, ultimately being shipwrecked. [Notice how the same set of agents then tried to again save their interests at the potential expense of the passengers.] Add this in: notice how in Ac 27, most gave up hope in the storm. This is a first person experience of a characteristic of agency. As the account gives us, a prophetic word, duly delivered to God's man on the spot, then reignited hope and moved the man to the position of leader who is the needed good man in the storm. I think a pretty direct implication holds for Western democratic cultures today as we face elections and need to pick our leaders not for the desired smooth sailing days – which in the end are not under human control, however much we may wish to imagine -- but for the possible and even highly probable storms ahead. _____________ BOTTOMLINE: The DS model and the use of neural networks thinking allows us to think in fruitful details about agency and inference to agent action. In particular, they points to the creative provision of tracks and targets, frameworks for making estimates of environments and associated dynamics, projections of on-track sensor patterns, cost-benefit functions to assess hill-climbing to more/less desirable or even in lucky cases optimal outcomes, etc etc as likely roles for intelligent directors. All of which require complex, highly contingent, functionally specified information. In short, we see again that FSCI is a reliable sign of agents in action. And -- absent imposing worldview level question-begging -- we have no good reason to confine such intelligence to material entities. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 22, 2008
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Okay: On substantial points . . . First, let's set a context for further discussion here and in parallel threads, by going back to a point in my always linked, section A and a remark by good old materialism-leaning prof Wiki on Instincts [and along the way, DV, we will make reference again to Ac 27 on governance by competing agents in a situation that exhibits tracking in the short term and navigation in the long term relative to an intended path]:
[GEM of TKI:] let us identify what intelligence is. This is fairly easy: for, we are familiar with it from the characteristic behaviour exhibited by certain known intelligent agents -- ourselves. Specifically, as we know from experience and reflection, such agents take actions and devise and implement strategies that creatively address and solve problems they encounter; a functional pattern that does not depend at all on the identity of the particular agents. In short, intelligence is as intelligence does. So, if we see evident active, intentional, creative, innovative and adaptive [as opposed to merely fixed instinctual] problem-solving behaviour similar to that of known intelligent agents, we are justified in attaching the label: intelligence. [Note how this definition by functional description is not artificially confined to HUMAN intelligent agents: it would apply to computers, robots, the alleged alien residents of Area 51, Vulcans, Klingons or Kzinti, or demons or gods, or God.] But also, in so solving their problems, intelligent agents may leave behind empirically evident signs of their activity; and -- as say archaeologists and detectives know -- functionally specific, complex information [FSCI] that would otherwise be improbable, is one of these signs. [“prof” Wiki, 1:] Instinct is the inherent disposition of a living organism toward a particular behavior. Instincts are unlearned, inherited fixed action patterns of responses or reactions to certain kinds of stimuli. Innate emotions, which can be expressed in more flexible ways and learned patterns of responses, not instincts, form a basis for majority of responses to external stimuli in evolutionary higher species, while in case of highest evolved species both of them are overridden by actions based on cognitive processes with more or less intelligence and creativity or even trans-intellectual intuition.Examples of instinctual fixed action patterns can be observed in the behavior of animals, which perform various activities (sometimes complex) that are not based upon prior experience and do not depend on emotion or learning, such as reproduction, and feeding among insects. Other examples include animal fighting, animal courtship behavior, internal escape functions, and building of nests. Instinctual actions - in contrast to actions based on learning which is served by memory and which provides individually stored successful reactions built upon experience - have no learning curve, they are hard-wired and ready to use without learning, but do depend on maturational processes to appear. [PW, 2:] Intelligence is an umbrella term used to describe a property of the mind that encompasses many related abilities, such as the capacities to reason, to plan, to solve problems, to think abstractly, to comprehend ideas, to use language, and to learn. There are several ways to define intelligence. In some cases, intelligence may include traits such as creativity, personality, character, knowledge, or wisdom. [PW, 3:] Creativity (or "creativeness") is a mental process involving the generation of new ideas or concepts, or new associations between existing ideas or concepts. From a scientific point of view, the products of creative thought (sometimes referred to as divergent thought) are usually considered to have both originality and appropriateness. An alternative, more everyday conception of creativity is that it is simply the act of making something new. [PW, 4:] Intuition is apparent ability to acquire knowledge without a clear inference or reasoning process. It is "the immediate apprehension of an object by the mind without the intervention of any reasoning process" [Oxford English Dictionary]. Intuition, by definition, has no objective validity. However it is extremely widespread as an apparent phenomenon. For this reason, it has been the subject of study in Psychology, as well as a topic of interest in the supernatural. . . . In psychology, intuition can encompass the ability to know valid solutions to problems and decision making. For example, the recognition primed decision (RPD) model was described by Gary Klein in order to explain how people can make relatively fast decisions without having to compare options. Klein found that under time pressure, high stakes, and changing parameters, experts used their base of experience to identify similar situations and intuitively choose feasible solutions. Thus, the RPD model is a blend of intuition and analysis. The intuition is the pattern-matching process that quickly suggests feasible courses of action. The analysis is the mental simulation, a conscious and deliberate review of the courses of action
These -- together with the DS architecture of a complex servo-system with a controller bases on input-output comparison to projected track, and with the projected track being creatively supplied by what I have called an intelligent director – will form a context for the further remarks. But first, a quick aside on the Q-Mapou exchange: 1] M, 52: If relativists only want to admit that which is observable (it’s a subtle lie), they must isolate FORs in the lab and show us what they are made of. First, of course it is by now well-known that while scientific theories and models more broadly [which make no claim beyond mere reliable utility] may be empirically, observationally anchored many of the core concepts and terms are precisely not observable in themselves. That is why I hold that sci theories are in effect inferences to best explanation as constrained by empirical data. [Thence my selective hyperskpeticism objection to those who would strain at the gnats of ID while swallowing camels in their evo mat “science” and day to day life. But such are the ways of the denizens of Plato's Cave of shadow shows.] Inertial frames of references [IFRs] of course are observable to the extent that we can sense that something is not subject to acceleration and/or a gravitational field [in that lies a lot of the General Theory of Relativity]. Under such circumstances, per Einstein's postulate [which is an objective, not relativist claim . . . as is the point that C is constant in vacuo for all IFRs] we see the laws of physics taking the simplest form. A semi-trivial example is that under curved motion, Coriolis [virtual] forces appear – as significant as the formation of hurricanes! Relative to us, an object may seem at rest or to be in uniform motion. If we see by our instruments that we are effectively non-accelerated and/or not immersed in a gravity field equivalent to such acceleration, we then are in a position to say that the other object is also in an IFR. Of course, we are now deep, deep into the world of thought experiment idealisations that dog even basic mechanics. [Q, are you listening . . .? I well recall my first ticker-tape timer experiments with “crash trolleys” and inclined planes 30+ years ago, and how much fiddling had to be done to get to pseudo-inertial results!] My own best comment is that in the end much of what we view as theories in physics are really models that with the various semi-empirical adjustments, give good enough results for practical cases, and help us make sense of them. 2] Re JT, 53: The whole reason of science is to deduce mechanisms that account for observed natural phenomena . . . . Any mechanism can be output by some other mechanism. The reason is simple. Any mechanism can be exactly represented as a program and any program can be represented by a binary string. Any binary string can be the output of some other program. So all we can possibly know about man scientifically could of course have been output by a mechanism. This commenter has here made a basic confusion between explanation and mechanism. Not all explanations, including not all empirically anchored inferences to best explanation, are mechanistic. To see this, consider again the simple example of a die being tossed as I have discussed in my always linked section a and mentioned many times in recent weeks in this blog's coments:
heavy objects tend to fall under the natural regularity we call gravity. If the object is a die, the face that ends up on the top from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} is for practical purposes a matter of chance. But, if the die is cast as part of a game, the results are as much a product of agency as of natural regularity and chance. Indeed, the agents in question are taking advantage of natural regularities and chance to achieve their purposes!
As I went on to observe, [t]his concrete, familiar illustration should suffice to show that the three causal factors approach is not at all arbitrary or dubious -- as some are tempted to imagine or assert. Indeed, explanations in the various sciences routinely infer to one or more of the causal factors above: initial conditions may be brute givens or random. Dynamical forces and inertia may be at work. An agent may be involved. All can be relevant and it is not a given that any of the three is reducible to one or more of the others. And, as noted already, FSCI is a known characteristic of agents, precisely because highly contingent results that can occupy at least 10^150 – 10^300 cells in a config space, are traceable in this regard to chance or agency – by reliable observation of many actual cases, and observations that have no known exception. When in addition, the observed configs are functional in such spaces, we reliably observe that the cause is agency. On the statistical thermodynamics principles of searching such spaces within the probabilistic resources of the observed universe, the plain best reason is simple. For, random walks starting from arbitrary initial conditions cannot reasonably be expected to get to the shores of islands of functionality to START hill-climbing by competitive selection in plausible environments, without exhausting the credibly available probabilistic resources. This commenter should re-examine his thinking in this light,a nd will then see that WD et al have a far more telling point than he currently realises. 3] If at some point in a regressing causal chain leading to the biological world there exists a cause that cannot be explicated as a mechanism then it is completely outside the realm of science. Question-begging, factually [historically and currently] and philosophically ill-founded, attempted materialism-serving redefinition of science. [. . .]kairosfocus_{January 22, 2008
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On a point of semi-substance: 5] maybe you’re saying that Dembski’s ideas are so self-evidently true, its only natural that his ideas would coincide with many, many persons including yourself who were already thinking along the same lines. I have never assumed or advocated that Dr Dembski's ideas – here the genetic fallacy is at work, compounded by past successful slander in the form you Americans call “well-poisoning” [BTW, the basic fact that I am a Caribbean national should easily enough explain peculiarities of my spelling relative to your Americanisms] -- are self-evidently true. Instead I have addressed the matter as a matter of science, on inference to best explanation. On what that entails, cf my remarks here in a developed form of a briefing note for a course I once taught:
Science – “knowledge” in Latin – is today’s dominant contender for the title: “provider of reliable (or at least probable and credible) knowledge,” and it has a great inherent plausibility because Scientific methods are often glorified common sense: sophisticated extensions to how we learn from day to day experience. But, while such methods and their findings have a proven track record of success that has positively transformed our world, there are in fact many limitations to scientific knowledge claims. A little deeper glance at Charles Sanders Peirce’s Logic of Abduction . . . concept rapidly shows why: 1. Observations of the natural (or human) world produce facts, F1, F2, . . . Fn; some of which may seem strange, contradictory or puzzling. 2. However, if a proposed law, model or theory, E, is assumed, the facts follow as a matter of course: E is a scientific explanation of F1, F2, . . . Fn. [This step is ABDUCTION. E explains the facts, and the facts provide empirical support for E. In general, though, many E's are possible for a given situation. So, we then use pruning rules, e.g. Occam's Razor: prefer the simplest hypothesis consistent with the material facts. But in the end, the goal/value is that we should aim to select/infer the best (current) explanation, by using comparative tests derived from the three key worldview tests: explanatory scope, coherence and power.] 3. E may also predict further (sometimes surprising) observations, P1, P2, . . . Pm. This would be done through deducing implications for as yet unobserved situations. [This step, obviously, uses logical DEDUCTION.] 4. If these predictions are tested and are in fact observed, E is confirmed, and may eventually be accepted by the Scientific community as a generally applicable law or theory. [This step is one of logical INDUCTION, inferring from particular instances to -- in the typical case, more general -- conclusions that the instances make “more probable.”] 5. In many cases, some longstanding or newly discovered observations may defy explanation, and sometimes this triggers a crisis that may lead to a scientific revolution; similar to Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm shift. 6. Thus, scientific knowledge claims are in principle always provisional: subject to correction/change in light of new evidence and analysis. 7. But also, even when observations are accurately covered/predicted by the explanation, the logic involved has limitations: E => O, the set of current and predicted observations[2], does not entail that if O is seen then E follows: “If Tom is a cat then Tom is an animal” does not entail “Tom is an animal, so he must be a cat.”[3] In short, scientific knowledge claims, at best, are provisional; though they are usually pretty well tested and have across time helped us make considerable technological, health and economic progress. Other common bases for knowledge claims are similarly limited . . .
No-one who has simply followed up this link – which I have repeatedly used in the recent context of discussion, could reasonable infer that I am seeing the inference to design as a matter of mere self-evident truth – truths obvious on reflective inspection of the meaning of what is entailed [e.g. a finite whole is greater than its proper parts, e.g 2: error exists], and which are rejected on pain of absurdity. Instead, I have adverted to empirical evidence on the significance of information and how we reliably see that it is a case of messages not lucky noise . . . . 6] The argument of the note in a nutshell: I point out that the concept of functionally specified, complex information and the difficulties of getting to islands of functionality in the config spaces leads to the reliability of such inferences. I then address cases that are relevant. I used the Dembski formulation of a common enough statistical thermodynamics point – that specified and statistically highly improbable results [cf app 1 point 6] are hard to come by through random processes as the relative statistical weight of other macrostates vastly overwhelms them. Just look up the concept of fluctuations in stat thermo-D if you doubt me. I then infer on a provisional basis to message in DNA, in body plan level biodiversity and on the organised complexity of thephysics of htre cosmos. So, how are these addressed by JT and his ilk? Not on the merits but on the strawmen, having first tracked out to them via red herrings. That tells us something about the underlying basic strength of the case as an inference to best explanation. GEM of TKI PS: I will take some time later to speak to points of substance on the main flow of the thread. --> Suffice to say for the moment that JT's remark just above on inference to the SUPERNATURAL as opposed to agency and mind is highly revealing red herring leading out to yet another Darwinista strawman. --> Likewise Turing machines in effect have to be explicitly programmed, neural networks of the types we are interested in LEARN.kairosfocus_{January 21, 2008
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Onlookers: Pardon the following in re Re JT at 53. I comment, not because they are so much interesting in themselves; rather, that they give us a cross-section on how those who object to the design thinking are thinking. This will help us better respond – especially for the onlooking general public. Okay, pardon me: 1] I never suspected you of copying and pasting from Dembski to begin with, primarily because most everything he has is in PDF with copying turned off Original accusations, from the Epistemology thread, linked through my reply at 100:
JT, 48: It is from this which kairosfocus just requested I read. Incidently kairos, why would this fifty page screed not have any author’s name attached as if it were immutable truth handed down from on high or something. Oops. I guess you wrote it. If I’m not mistaken, there are several passages you’ve taken directly from Dembski unattributed. JT, 99:it was my honest impression, before I realized the piece was written by you, that the writer had merely lifted huge sections from Dembski unattributed with only minor variations. It was an off-handed remark I made, I will admit, but I saw no reason to revise my comments once I recognized it was by you.
NB: the note in question is HEADED and initialled similar to all my comments at UD (and links to where you can contact me directly as several UD readers and commenters have. In the site linked it is easy enough to find my name. I have found tat since this is in the low traffic end of the net, keeping my name off the posts in more high traffic sites such as blogs, is good enough to reduce spam and harassment):
A Kairosfocus Briefing Note: GEM 06:03:17; this adj. 06:12:16 - 17 to 07: 12: 13a.3.1 and 30
2] I went there, and there is this 100 page long essay with no author’s name attached. I did a google search and found the same paper on an evangelical website, also with no author’s name attached. And I thought to myself, “Well, these are just Dembski’s ideas being presented as received Truth.” And in crafting my response to you, I made some snarky comments to that effect Of course the relevant context that the page in question explicitly states why I took my name off it [for harassment avoidance reasons], invites to contact me directly [with email contact] and links onward to pages that give my name etc, is neatly omitted Further to this, observe the underlying the accusation that my work is just WD presented as received truth – implying the strawman “fundy” mindset as imagined by too many secularists – rather than what it is, my own take on a serious issue of major significance for any serious thinker in early C21. Observe the focus as well, not on apology for wrongful slander, but on self-justification and exculpation – and indeed on persistence (a la Rathergate) in trying to back up a charge that it should be manifestly obvious, is ill-founded. [JT, IMHBCO, should simply acknowledge he did wrong, apologise and move on . . . that would be fully acceptable.] 3] there is this 100 page long essay with no author’s name attached. I did a google search and found the same paper on an evangelical website, also with no author’s name attached. First we have a note not a polished essay. Second, it is long but not overly long considering the context and the scope involved. Third, it leads with the name of the relevant site and organisation, gives my initials and links to contact details and a site that does give my name. So it is not as “anonymous” as is suggested. AND EVEN IF IT WERE, GIVEN THE CAREER-BUSTING TACTICS AT WORK ON THE PART OF DARWINISTAS, THAT WOULD BE JUSTIFIABLE. Third, of course, the focus on anonymity is a neat diversion from the issue on the merits, which leads out to conveniently slander-oil soaked strrawmen waiting to be ignited.. Fourth, I did a Google and a Yahoo search just now by title, opening words and the like. Google rarely hit the briefing note anywhere near the opening page. Yahoo hit it first hit, on my site – which is indeed that of an evangelical Christian who happens to also be a scientist. I could not find it anywhere else on the web up to 70 deep in the relevant searches; and have given no-one else permission to post it – if it appears elsewhere without my knowledge, strictly, that is a violation of my reservation of rights. [Note, the note is fairly regularly updated as my thought evolves . .. ] 4] I guess I would have to decide, whether to acquiese to this guy’s demand for an apology or risk his death or mine. Or maybe as your inferior, you would merely have me siezed and turned over to the authorities for a good beating. A gentleman, on seeing that he has acted wrongfully or irresponsibly, acknowledges and apologises for the wrong. In JT's case, sadly, he has falsely accused me of plagiarism – a grievous academic sin that can cost one his career, and at the very least his reputation. I have pointed out that this claimed platrgiarisation is not so and have given evidence on why. Others have corroborated my remarks. To date, even after days of trying very hard, having written a program to do so, JT has been unable to find unacknowledged excerpts from WD [or doubtless other ID leaders etc] in my work. That is evidence that he has thought the accusation above was justified on the merits – as he has said in so many words as I have again excerpted -- and has sought to “back” it, but has consistently failed. One would expect a reasonable and respnsible person would accept wrong and apologise. Yet, still we see attempts at excuses and evasion of responsibility for ill-founded, potentially damaging remarks against another. Meanwhile the search for evidence of plagiarism continues . . . That tells us all we need to know. And, it is occasion for prayer as Kairos reminds us ever so aptly. [ . . .]kairosfocus_{January 21, 2008
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KF wrote: I do put forth that we can see a way to make a sufficiently sophisticated computerised servosystem autonomous, but the underlying programming will derive from agents and in the end the last level of programming will be unquestioned. I cannot think of a more unsupernatural process than programming. I just don't think mystical unexplained flashes of insight from some spiritual dimension are in any way involved in programming, if that is in fact what "agency" is. But since agency isn't a mechanism, I don't know what it is exactly. To me programming is just a mechanical, time-consuming laborious, detail oriented, mind-numbing process. Furthermore as far as I'm concerned, programs themselves performs all sorts of programming tasks all the time. To me, just the compilation process itself, taking some program description in a high-level language and translating it into machine code seems to be a very complex task. At least the optimization part is: "Go through this 100,000 line program and analyze it to optimize it for speed and space usage. Optimize every loop, translate controls structures into the most optimal form possible for speed, - and do it in 15 seconds." Optimizing compilers do this all the time. Automated theorem proving equates to programming as well. Any time a program is given a high-level goal and can translate into a series of instructions necessary to achieve that goal, then it is programming. Thought I'd mention that the image of the Beast in Revelation might be some supercomputer or network of supercomputers tied to incredibly sophisticated sensors on a network of satellites, and used to automatically monitor and control the populace world-wide. That will certainly be an "agent". Probably is already nearing final completion, too. Historically, computers evolved from the von Neumann architecture, which is based on sequential processing and execution of explicit instructions. On the other hand, the origins of neural networks are based on efforts to model information processing in biological systems, which may rely largely on parallel processing as well as implicit instructions based on recognition of patterns of ’sensory’ input from external sources. In other words, at its very heart a neural network is a complex statistical processor (as opposed to being tasked There's nothing a neural network could do that a Turing Machine for example, could not. (Maybe that's already obvious.)JunkyardTornado_{January 21, 2008
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KF: "It is obvious that we find ourselves to be incorrigibly reasoning and moralising creatures. Even the most radical relativists find themselves seeking to correct those who differ with them, and typically hold that “tolerance” is the most absolute of virtues." In Pensees Pascal put a similar thought this way: "We have an incapacity for proving anything which no amount of dogmatism can overcome. We have an idea of truth which no amount of scepticism can overcome."BarryA_{January 20, 2008
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sorry typo above: Mapo s/b Mapou.Q_{January 20, 2008
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Mapo At the quantum level, it always takes a force to accelerate a particle across a fundamental distance (possibly the Planck length). At the quantum level, particles are simply waves, which propogate. No "jumps" are necessarily needed to keep particles bumping forward. Your "ocean of energy" fits the propogating wave model much better than the bumping particle model. But, even the particle model you mention doesn't require the constant application of force for velocity to continue. Imagine a bunch of bricks linked with springs (bricks=particles, springs=binding mechanism). Tap a brick on the end. It pushes on its spring, and may stop. But, that spring transfers the movement to the next brick, andso on, and the chain of bricks moves forward like an inchworm. When the movement gets to the frontmost brick, it has nothing pushing back, so gets to move even further. Now, by going further, it pulls on the second behind brick, which a moment later pulls on the brick behind it, continuing the inchworm movement. As long as the energy is not lost (as in radiation or friction), that chain of bricks will keep oscillating with an average forward direction related to the impulse of that first tap. This explanation even holds at the micro scale. But, I like the wave model better.Q_{January 20, 2008
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