In a comment to a prior post StephenB raises some interesting questions:
{1}Free will requires the presence of a nonmaterial-mind independent of the brain. {2}a non-material mind independent of the brain indicates free will. . . . In philosophy, [this type of proposition] is known as a bi-conditional proposition, which means, If A/then B. Also, If B/then A. Usually, that pattern does not hold in logic, but it does hold here. [If one disavows] the existence of the mind, it is time to make the corresponding assertion about volition—go ahead and reject free will and complete the cycle. Take the final step and concede that all of our attempts to persuade each other are futile. We are nature’s plaything, and the laws of nature operating through our “brain” dictate our every move.
Given [the materialist’s] perception of reality, why [does he] bother to raise objections at all [to the proposition that mind exists independently of the brain]. If your world view is true, then [all the commenters] on this blog do what we do only because fate requires it of us. We are, for want of a better term, determined to think and act as we do. Since we have no volitional powers, why do you appeal to them? Why raise objections in an attempt to influence when it has already been established that only non-material minds can influence or be influenced? Why propose a change of direction when only intelligent agencies have the power to do that? Since brains are subject to physical laws of cause and effect, they cannot rise above them and, therefore, cannot affect them. Brains cannot influence brains. Why then, do you ask any of us to change our minds when, in your judgment, there are no minds to change?
Surely we all agree that the output of a computer is utterly determined in the sense that the output can be reduced to the function of the physical properties of the machine.
Note that this does not mean that the output of a computer is always predictable. “Determined” is not a synonym for “predictable.” An event may be completely determined and utterly unpredictable at the same time. In other words, it might be “determined” and also “indeterminate.” Example: Say a bomb explodes. It is impossible to predict where any particular piece of the bomb shell will land. Therefore, where the piece of bomb shell will land is indeterminate. Nevertheless, where the piece of bomb shell winds up landing is purely a function of the laws of nature, and is in that sense determined.
Now assume we have two computers that can communicate in machine code across a cable. Assume further that the computers are assigned the task of coming to a conclusion about the truth or falsity of a particular proposition, say “The best explanation for the cause of complex specified information X (“CSI-X”) is that CSI-X was produced by an intelligent agent.” Say computer A is programmed to do two things:
1. Respond “true” to this proposition.
2. Communicate a list of facts and arguments its programmers believe support this statement.
Here’s the interesting question. Can computer A “persuade” computer B to accept the “true” statement?
The answer, it seems to me, is obvious: No.
Computer B’s output is completely determined. It has no free will. It has no “mind” that may be persuaded. The facts and arguments communicated to it by computer A trigger a subroutine that produces the output “yes it is true” or “no it is false.” The result of that computation is utterly determined in the sense that it is reducible to the operation of computer B’s software and hardware. Computer B has no meaningful choice as to how to respond to the information provided to it by computer A.
This brings us back to StephenB’s questions. If the brain is nothing more than an organic computing machine, why do materialists bother to try to persuade us of anything?