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Child Rape in a Materialist World

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Here are the facts concerning the Roman Polanski case:  Polanski gave a Quaalude to a 13 year-old child; instructed her to get naked and enter a Jacuzzi; refused to take her home when she asked; performed oral sex on her as she asked him to stop; raped her (no, not the “statutory” kind, the “forcible” kind); and sodomized her.  In a plea bargain Polanski pled to unlawful sex with a minor.

As is common knowledge, Polanski has his defenders because he has made some terrific movies.  For example, critic Tom Shales says:  “There is, apparently, more to this crime than it would seem, and it may sound like a hollow defense, but in Hollywood I am not sure a 13-year-old is really a 13-year-old.”

Here’s today’s question:  “Is it wrong in all times and at all places (even Hollywood) for a 44 year-old man to drug, rape and sodomize a 13 year-old girl?”

For our materialist friends who answer “yes” to the question (as I hope you will), I have a follow-up question:  “How can you know that you are right and Polanski’s defenders are wrong?”

 UPDATE:

At first the materialists dodged my second (and much more important) question.  But then a brave soul who calls himself “camanintx” took up for the materialists the gauntlet I had thrown down, and we had the following exchange:

 

Barry:  How can you know that you are right and Polanski’s defenders are wrong?”

 

camanintx:  Because the society in which I and Polanski (at the time) live in define it as such. Had Polanski lived in 6th century Arabia, he probably would have been treated differently, no?

 

Barry:   Let’s assume for the sake of argument that drugging, raping and sodomizing a young girl was considered moral behavior in Arabia between the years 501 and 600 AD [I by no means concede that, but will accept it arguendo].  On the basis of your response, camanintx, I assume you would say that the fact that it was considered moral behavior in the society in which it occurred, is in fact determinative of the morality of the behavior, and therefore if Polanski had done what he did in that place and time it would have been moral. Is that what you are saying?

 camanintx:  Since morality is a subjective term, yes, that is exactly what I am saying.

 Thank you, camanintx, for that enlightening exchange.  Nietzsche would have been very proud of you for not flinching away from the nihilistic conclusions compelled by your premises.  You have truly gone “beyond good and evil.”  Roman Polanski was not immoral, must unlucky.  Cruel fate dictated that by the merest whim of fickle chance he happened to live in a society that, for whatever reason, condemns drugging, raping and sodomizing young girls.  If he had lived in a different society, what he did would not have been wrong.  Fortunately for the rest of us, your views remain in the minority (at least for now), and for that reason moral progress remains possible. 

 I invite our readers to evaluate camanintx’s views in light of our own very recent history in this country.  I grew up in the 1960’s in a state of the old Confederacy, and as I was growing up I heard about the condition of black people in earlier times.  Even as late as 1955, it was taken for granted in the southern United States that black people are inferior to white people and therefore have no claim to equal rights under the law.  They were turned away from the polls, made to sit in the back of public busses, and segregated into inferior schools, among a host of other indignities too numerous to catalogue here.  Now, the majority of the people in the South at the time considered this state of affairs to be altogether moral. 

 Think about that.  Under camanintx’s view the “is” of a society defines the “ought” of that society.  I assume camanintx is not a racist and that he personally believes that the conditions under which black people were forced to live in say, 1955 Alabama, were intolerable.  But if he had lived in Alabama in 1955 on what grounds could he have pressed for a change to the status quo?  He would have been in a quandary, because his premises compel him to affirm – as he did in response to my query – that the present state of affairs for a society DEFINES morality in that society. 

 Therefore, according to camanintx, if he had lived in Alabama in 1955, his logic would have compelled him to affirm that racial hatred and intolerance is fine and dandy, morally speaking.  The only thing he could have said is, “While I cannot say racial hatred and intolerance is in any sense “immoral,” I personally do not prefer it, and therefore we should change our laws and behavior to eliminate those blights on our land.”  To which, the all-too-easy response from a southern racist would have been:  “I prefer the status quo, and who is to say that your personal preference is better than mine.”  At this point camanintx would have been struck silent, because there is no answer to the southern racist’s rejoinder. 

 Which brings us back full circle to Roman Polanski.  Has anyone considered the irony of the materialists’ defense of Polanski’s actions?  Both of Polanski’s parents were imprisoned in Nazi concentration camps.  His mother died at Auschwitz.  Never let us forget that the Nazis came to power in a fair election, and the people of Germany never revolted against their polices.  The “final solution” was perfectly lawful in the sense that it did not violate the internal laws of the nation in which it occurred.  Therefore, camanintx’s logic compels the conclusion that the “is” of the final solution defined the “ought” of the matter, and Polanski’s mother’s death at the hands of the Nazis was in no sense “immoral.”  The irony is that Polanski’s defenders are bringing to bear the same moral relativism that led to the death of Polanski’s mother.

 Sadly, I believe we are losing this battle.  Views like camanintx’s would have been almost literally unthinkable 30 or even 20 years ago.  Now they are commonplace.  How long before they are the majority?  The other day I saw a bumper sticker:  “So many Christians, so few lions.”  I am afraid; for myself, yes, but even more so for my children and grandchildren, whom, I fear, will grow up in a society where every last vestige of the Judeo-Christian ethic will have been jettisoned from our institutions.  That bumper sticker was unthinkable 30 years ago.  What will be “thinkable” 30 years hence that is unthinkable now?  We are going to find out, aren’t we?

Comments
camanintx: How does one determine God’s opinion on moral truth? You'll have to read the rest of my previous comment. I try to avoid explicitly talking religion on the internet, so perhaps it was a mistake for me to go as far as I did when I'll go no further. But the question you've asked is obviously only relevant for people who believe in God to start with. I'm not sure how anyone else could even try to answer it. (That's not some I'm-so-serene nonsense, I'm just being logical.) I understand - the basis of your morality is being questioned, and in return you're challenging the basis of those who question yours. That's reasonable. If everyone is happy with what they believe, I call that a stalemate. I'm not giving an inch, but I can't take one by force, either.ScottAndrews
October 9, 2009
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Clive Hayden, #128
People try to rationalize what they’ve done after they’ve done it because they knew it was wrong to do. If something was done that was right, it would need no rationalization.
Your argument only makes sense if you believe that people's knowledge of right and wrong is fixed and unchanging. All one has to do is look at issues such as interracial marriage and abortion to see that this is not the case.camanintx
October 9, 2009
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Clive Hayden, #126
If morality is subjective, then no one can be faulted for owning slaves.
Just because an individual's concept of morality may be subjective doesn't mean that society as a whole cannot establish rules for everyone to follow.camanintx
October 9, 2009
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ScottAndrews, #125
The objective answer you’re looking for will prove unsatisfactory. Whose opinion matches moral truth? God’s.
How does one determine God's opinion on moral truth?camanintx
October 9, 2009
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camanintx,
Just as we cannot make ourselves believe a lie, I don’t think we can make ourselves act in a way we personally feel is wrong.
Really? No one has ever done anything that they thought they shouldn't have done?
That is why people have to rationalize their actions before they commit them.
No, the opposite is true. People try to rationalize what they've done after they've done it because they knew it was wrong to do. If something was done that was right, it would need no rationalization. Clive Hayden
October 9, 2009
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Brent
Let me ask you a question: Are you seriously suggesting that when people know (or believe) that something is wrong they always freely admit it and stop doing it? Are you naive enough to take everyone at their word? If so, maybe I could be your car mechanic!
Just as we cannot make ourselves believe a lie, I don't think we can make ourselves act in a way we personally feel is wrong. That is why people have to rationalize their actions before they commit them. Since people are perfectly capable of rationalizing just about anything, how can we say there is an objective standard to measure it against?
Another question, camanintx: Can you think of anything that is generally true about people’s behavior in the world today—the things people do—that are wrong? Things that are widely accepted but you believe are wrong?
Whether I agree with what other people think about what is right or wrong is not the question, but rather does an objective standard exist that both can be compared to.camanintx
October 9, 2009
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BillB, The issue of slavery cannot be used to illustrate subjective morality unless we're willing to say that slavery really wasn't wrong unless we arbitrarily deem it so, but others can, just as validly, disagree, given these grounds. If morality is subjective, then no one can be faulted for owning slaves.Clive Hayden
October 9, 2009
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So we agree that, regardless of the ontological nature of morality, people can have differing opinions of what is right or wrong. The question then becomes how we determine whose personal opinion matches the objective moral truth, if one exists? The objective answer you're looking for will prove unsatisfactory. Whose opinion matches moral truth? God's. The problem is that different people will give you conflicting information and tell you that it's God's moral truth. That can be frustrating. It takes effort to take the next step and try to figure out who's telling the truth. For a certainty, not everyone is. That effort weeds out those who never really wanted to know in the first place, as well as those who prefer the lie because it suits them. (I.e., if someone wants to do X, they find a church that tells them X is okay and then stop looking.) The result is that our own inclinations and desires determine what we look for and what we find. That's going to sound a like a lot of hocus-pocus to some people, but it's the truth.ScottAndrews
October 9, 2009
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Another question, camanintx: Can you think of anything that is generally true about people's behavior in the world today—the things people do—that are wrong? Things that are widely accepted but you believe are wrong? Homosexuality? Drinking? White lies? Pornography? Anything?Brent
October 9, 2009
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camanintx,
Are you seriously suggesting that slave owners knew that slavery was wrong but engaged in it anyway?
Yes… at least those who weren't too numbed by the fact that it was so normal. That's the way, unfortunately, it goes. We like to think what is normative is good. It sure makes life easier, what with the not having to stand up against your peers and condemning their lifestyle and all. Rationalization is a powerful thing. Let me ask you a question: Are you seriously suggesting that when people know (or believe) that something is wrong they always freely admit it and stop doing it? Are you naive enough to take everyone at their word? If so, maybe I could be your car mechanic!Brent
October 9, 2009
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StephenB, #119
The natural moral law is based on reason, and for that reason, is always reasonable. We do, after all, live in a rational universe, part of which contains a rational and objective moral law. The materialists say that we do not live in a rational universe and that there is no rational moral law —that is the problem.
I am not questioning the utility of reason to create a rational moral law, just the objectivity of the first principles upon which it is based. As vjtorley explained in #116 above, perfectly valid moral codes can be derived from simple first principles. But how can we say that these principles are objective when we have no way of measuring them? How is his first principle of "intrinsic goods" any less subjective than my first principle of reciprocity?camanintx
October 9, 2009
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Brent, #115
No, that clearly was not my point. My point, which is painfully obvious, is that people do things that, regardless of absolute morality, even they themselves believe to be wrong.
StephenB, #117
No one who is proposing the existence of an objective moral code believes that or has even come close to saying anything like that.
Are you seriously suggesting that slave owners knew that slavery was wrong but engaged in it anyway? I suggest you go back and brush up on your history.camanintx
October 9, 2009
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----camanintx: "If half of a society says that gambling is immoral and the other half says it is just harmless recreation, how do we decide which is objectively true?" There is no moral law concerning gambling or most other activities that might fall under the category of “games.” .In itself, it is neither a moral nor an immoral act. What matters is how, why, and under what conditions it is done. If a gambler becomes addicted, neglects his duties, fails to care for his or others’ needs, resorts to cheating, establishes institutions that harm others, uses others callously as a source for profit, or acts irresponsibly with large sums of money, it is wrong. If, on the other hand, a gambler approaches it like a game and uses due proportion, it is no more wrong that spending the same amount of money attending a sporting event. The moral law, then, covers the behavior that informs the gambling, not the gambling itself. The natural moral law is based on reason, and for that reason, is always reasonable. We do, after all, live in a rational universe, part of which contains a rational and objective moral law. The materialists say that we do not live in a rational universe and that there is no rational moral law ---that is the problem.StephenB
October 9, 2009
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vjtorley, #116
How do we resolve ethical disputes between experts like A and B? Answer: through vigorous debate, in which each side has the opportunity to critique the other side’s underlying assumptions, as well as their ethical logic.
Even assuming that we have an objective morality based on the fact that certain goods, such as life and health, knowledge, and harmony with other people, are intrinsically desirable, how is this objective reality revealed? If the arguments on each side are based on a person's personal preference as to what constitutes "intrinsic goods", how is this any different than saying that morality itself is subjective?
part from the absence of experimentation, how different is this from the way scientists resolve their own scholarly disputes?
When discussing objective properties such as length and mass, don't scientists assign units to these properties against which they can be measured? Doesn't this allow us to conclusively state that one object is longer or heavier than another? If morality exists objectively, would you please tell me what units we assign to it and how we go about measuring them?camanintx
October 9, 2009
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----camanintx: "So we agree that, regardless of the ontological nature of morality, people can have differing opinions of what is right or wrong." No one who is proposing the existence of an objective moral code believes that or has even come close to saying anything like that.StephenB
October 9, 2009
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camanintx (#107) Thank you for your post. You write:
So we agree that, regardless of the ontological nature of morality, people can have differing opinions of what is right or wrong. The question then becomes how we determine whose personal opinion matches the objective moral truth, if one exists?
I'd like to sketch very briefly how ethical disagreements arise in the first place. I hope that will answer your question. 1. Failure on the part of a few people to recognize intrinsic goods. I have sketched an account of morality (#101) based on the objective fact that certain goods, such as life and health, knowledge, and harmony with other people, are intrinsically desirable – not only for onself but for anyone else. Now, certain seriously misguided individuals might subjectively believe that these intrinsic goods are not really good at all, but that in no way undermines the objective fact that these goods can indeed be desired by anyone for their own sake. The first principles of practical reason are undeduced, as I explained above. If we ask: "What kinds of actions and dispositions are right?", the only answer that no-one could rationally quarrel with is: actions and dispositions that promote intrinsic human goods. That is our safest and surest starting point. 2. Building one's ethical system on a house of sand: doubtful assumptions. Certain ethicists have built their ethical systems on high-sounding general principles such as "the greatest good of the greatest number." Lofty these principles may be, but they rest on shaky epistemic foundations. By contrast, the fact that intrinsic goods can be desired in their own right is indubitable. 3. Disagreements over the precise list of intrinsic goods, and their scope. Natural law theorists have had differing opinions as to precisely which goods deserve to be called intrinsic goods. These disagreements seldom have any practical significance, just as scientific disagreements on the classification of a few organisms has little effect on taxonomy as a whole. Nevertheless, it may occasionally happen that natural law theorist A believe that action X subverts an intrinsic good, while theorist B (whose list of goods is different) disagrees. How do we resolve ethical disputes between experts like A and B? Answer: through vigorous debate, in which each side has the opportunity to critique the other side's underlying assumptions, as well as their ethical logic. Apart from the absence of experimentation, how different is this from the way scientists resolve their own scholarly disputes? 4. Disagreements as to whether a particular course of action will indeed promote (or alternatively, subvert) a basic human good. We are not always sure of the effects of our "here-and-now" choices. The future is highly uncertain. Hence this kind of ethical disagreement between moral agents, and even between ethical thinkers, is entirely appropriate. To resolve disputes of this sort, one needs a wealth of life-experience, and one also has to be a keen student of human nature. In a related vein, I would ask: does the fact that scientists cannot agree on the merits of geo-engineering mean that there can be no science of geology? Surely not. So why should the existence of ethical disagreements entail that there can be no objective science of right and wrong? You then wrote:
If half of a society says that gambling is immoral and the other half says it is just harmless recreation, how do we decide which is objectively true?
Here's a good way. (a) Ask gambling opponents to specify precisely which intrinsic human good gambling undermines. (b) Ask gambling supporters to specify precisely which intrinsic human good gambling promotes. (c) Ask gambling opponents to set out a logical argument showing that gambling is immoral, based on rationally indubitable premises of the sort described above. (d) Ask gambling supporters to set out a logical argument, because on factually coeffeients, showing that gambling is perfectly moral. (e) Give supporters and opponents an open forum where they can exchange views and debate one another vigorously, preferably for a period of decades to come.vjtorley
October 9, 2009
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camanintx,
So we agree that, regardless of the ontological nature of morality, people can have differing opinions of what is right or wrong.
No, that clearly was not my point. My point, which is painfully obvious, is that people do things that, regardless of absolute morality, even they themselves believe to be wrong. Whether a thing really is, in itself, morally wrong is neither here nor there. If people do things that they themselves think are wrong, and they very clearly do, I have answered your question of how it could be seen (rationalized) as morally acceptable for people to have done for great lengths of time what we now admit is morally wrong—the key word being admit. Nothing changed in regards to absolute morality, only in our willingness to line up with it more than we previously had. The most succinct way to put it is that people are very good about rationalization when it comes to things they really want to do, but know are wrong. Have you never noticed this?Brent
October 9, 2009
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#112 That is the kind of comment that would get me banned were I to make it about a leading Christian. EDITORS: What an absurd statement. Mark, would you like some cheese with that whine?Mark Frank
October 9, 2009
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cam @110
Do you really think that morality based upon the assumption that (1) God exists and (2) the God you worship is this God, is more reliable than one based on the simple concept of reciprocity?
Chicago has been the latest location to show us the Simple Concept of Reciprocity. The First Simple Concept of Reciprocity: "Do unto others because they did it to you." The Second Simple Concept of Reciprocity: "Do unto others before they do it to you." The Third Simple Concept of Reciprocity: "Do only unto others who cannot do it back to you."SpitfireIXA
October 9, 2009
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Mark Frank @17
Hume is probably the most famous exponent [of materialist moral codes].
Hume came to the final conclusion that he can't determine the certainty of anything, and decided the only meaningful thing to do is to stop thinking about it and go play cards with his friends. So I would say that Hume failed in his quest.SpitfireIXA
October 9, 2009
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tribune7, #109
camanitx — people can have differing opinions of what is right or wrong. The question then becomes how we determine whose personal opinion matches the objective moral truth, Bingo. And if you should guess wrong/choose unwisely?
Do you really want to bring Pascal's wager into this discussion?camanintx
October 9, 2009
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vjtorley, #101
(2) In practice, will we reason reliably about right and wrong if we assume at the outset that there is no God? Probably not.
Do you really think that morality based upon the assumption that (1) God exists and (2) the God you worship is this God, is more reliable than one based on the simple concept of reciprocity?camanintx
October 9, 2009
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camanitx -- people can have differing opinions of what is right or wrong. The question then becomes how we determine whose personal opinion matches the objective moral truth, Bingo. And if you should guess wrong/choose unwisely?tribune7
October 9, 2009
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I wish Barry would respond to my comment #56. Underlying his whole argument is the assumption that good and bad are properties of people or actions. Therefore they are something that we can discover or work out and ask how do we get to know their values. But actually the concepts play much more fluid and subtle roles in our lives. If the facts are known and someone asserts that an action is wrong we don't respond by saying "how do you know it is wrong?" (with perhaps the expectation that they looked it up in the Bible?). That would be vaguely absurd. We ask something on the lines of "why do you say that?". When someone says: "Polanski acted wrongly" They are doing a number of things, including (but not limited to). 1)They are describing their personal dislike of his behaviour and their personal desire that others should not do this type of thing 2) They are suggesting that others around them would have similar feelings if they understood all the facts 3) They are making a commitment not to behave like that themselves 4) They are asking others to commit themselves not to behave like that 5) They are suggesting that Polankski is a suitable object for blame and retribution It wouldn't make sense to respond to any of these by asking "how do you know". It would make sense to respond by asking "why are you doing this?". This is neither subjective nor objective because it is not that kind of action. Now consider this argument of Barry's On the basis of your response, camanintx, I assume you would say that the fact that it was considered moral behavior in the society in which it occurred, is in fact determinative of the morality of the behavior, Camanintx simply responded by saying yes because morality is subjective. I would respond differently. I abhor the act whether it was done now or in a completely different society. Had I the opportunity I would seek to persuade the members of that society to abhor it as well and seek their commitment not to do it. It would be a lot harder to succeed in getting that commitment than it is now. (But not impossible. There is a widely shared core to human nature and it might be possible to relate sodomy to that shared core). So I would say his behaviour was just as wrong at that time as it is now. Arguments on the lines of "So Polanski was just unlucky to be born in a time when sodomy is wrong" miss the point. There is no property of wrongness which might or might not have been ascribed to his act. This comment is not adequate to describe the subtle and fascinating field of the foundations of ethics. But perhaps some readers will agree it is much subtler than some of the comments above suggest.Mark Frank
October 9, 2009
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vjtorley, #101
According to Finnis’ account of natural law ethics (based on his interpretation of Aquinas), our practical reasoning about what is good is founded on the reconition that certain goods, such as life and health, knowledge, and harmony with other people, are intrinsically desirable – not only for onself but for anyone else.
Brent, #102
Now, have you ever come to a point in your life where you decided to change your behaviour, even ingrained habits, after some time of reflection and pondering them—realizing that what you had been doing up to that time wasn’t quite sitting right with your own standard or morales?
Nzer, #106
Epistemic knowledge of right and wrong is known by all of us, because it is written on our hearts as described in Romans 1. The moral law, thus written on our hearts, means that we are without excuse before our creator and judge. This law is subjective (internal/conscience) and more-or-less common to all people across time and space. People disagree over the finer details in part because of the fallen nature, due to the Adamic fall.
So we agree that, regardless of the ontological nature of morality, people can have differing opinions of what is right or wrong. The question then becomes how we determine whose personal opinion matches the objective moral truth, if one exists? Issues like murder, rape and slavery do not help us here because they are too universal so let’s look at a different topic like gambling. If half of a society says that gambling is immoral and the other half says it is just harmless recreation, how do we decide which is objectively true? Many people here have pointed to religious tomes as the source of this knowledge, but if religious belief itself is subjective, then wouldn’t one’s morality be subject to which religion they believe in?camanintx
October 9, 2009
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Clive:
Because people do wrong things, if there were no objective morality, you can’t really say that slavery is wrong. In acting as if it really is wrong, and that others “should” agree, you have to know that you have to assert this on firmer ground than your own personal and private preference.
I still don't understand how you know objectively that slavery is morally wrong - or to put it another way: How do you know objectively that the Christians who supported slavery were wrong and that you are right?BillB
October 9, 2009
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First, many thanks to Barry for hammering this topic again. Keep it coming. I am intrigued by the comments of "vjtorley" (#101). He wrote: "...our practical reasoning about what is good is founded on the reconition that certain goods, such as life and health, knowledge, and harmony with other people, are intrinsically desirable – not only for onself but for anyone else ... It is important to understand that practical reason’s first principles are undeduced – which suffices to refute the common accusation that natural law ethics attempts to deduce or infer ought from is." As I have wrestled with these ideas, I have come in my current understanding to the conclusion that there are two knowledge categories to consider when talking about human morality -- ontological and epistemological. The ontological part deals with the "reality" or "being" of the moral law, while the epistemic part deals with "how we know" the moral law. Epistemic knowledge of right and wrong is known by all of us, because it is written on our hearts as described in Romans 1. The moral law, thus written on our hearts, means that we are without excuse before our creator and judge. This law is subjective (internal/conscience) and more-or-less common to all people across time and space. People disagree over the finer details in part because of the fallen nature, due to the Adamic fall. Ontological knowledge of right and wrong on the other hand is the real actual existence of the moral law, existing in the mind of God himself. God neither created this law nor is subject to it (Euthyphro's dilemma). Indeed, God is perfect in every possible way and the moral law comes out of His perfect character. Now, here is the trick as I see it ... If God does not exist, actual real (ontological) moral law cannot exist. This is plainly obvious I assume. Thus all we are left with in this case is the epistemic knowledge of morality, that is subjective and written on our fallen hearts. Thus epistemic knowledge in helpful to us all (is this natural law?) but is insufficient because our natures are fallen and in a state disrepair (we see thru a glass dimly). Therefore we need special revelation (the Bible) to attain the ontological grounding for moral knowledge. What I am trying to get at here is that it seems to me that epistemic knowledge, while attainable, subjective, and mostly right for those functioning properly, is ultimately insufficient AS A GROUNDING for morality. For the materialist, this is all they have. We all have a conscience but it is scarred by the fall, leaving us floating somewhat adrift in an stormy ocean. So back to vjtorley ... I cannot see how the materialist can get from an "is" to an "ought" because ultimately in that worldview there is no ontological basis for morals at all. Humanity can only be left with subjective claims and pragmatic solutions. If someone wants to help me out here and clarify my thinking, I would appreaciate that.NZer
October 9, 2009
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camanintx,
Please explain how, if slavery is objectively wrong, could people accept its practice as moral for hundreds, if not thousands, of years?
Because people do wrong things, if there were no objective morality, you can't really say that slavery is wrong. In acting as if it really is wrong, and that others "should" agree, you have to know that you have to assert this on firmer ground than your own personal and private preference.Clive Hayden
October 9, 2009
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I would also like to express my gratitude for vjtorley's links @99. I am now reading, "The Character of Jesus," by Charles Edward Jefferson. Splendid.StephenB
October 8, 2009
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vjtorley @101: Very nice!StephenB
October 8, 2009
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