Compatible? Not Really.

_{Barry Arrington

December 20, 2008

Intelligent Design}

Share: Facebook; Twitter; LinkedIn; Flipboard; Print; Email

One of our commenters says he has solved the determinism problem by becoming a “compatibilist.” Briefly, a compatibilist is someone who tries to avoid the logic of his premises by resorting to semantic dodges about the meaning of free will. The compatibilist says that free will is compatible with determinism (thus the name). Isn’t that kinda like saying my existence is compatible with my nonexistence? Yes, it is. But the compatibilist avoids this problem by re-defining “free will.” The compatibilist says that “free will” does not mean “the liberty to choose;” instead, says he, it means “the absence of coercion.” In other words, he says that so long as a choice is not coerced it is completely free even if it is utterly determined.

The problem with this approach is easy to see – just as we don’t get to win a game by changing the rules to suit us in the middle of the game, we don’t get to impose meaning on words to suit the conclusion we want to reach. The entire issue in the determinism/free will debate is whether we have liberty to choose. Suppose I ask my friend Joe the following question: “Do I have free will, if by “free will” I mean ‘the liberty to choose?’” It is obviously no answer to that question to say, “Yes, you have free will if by free will you mean, “the absence of coercion.” I really do want to explore the question about whether I have the liberty to choose, and Joe’s answer is not helpful. You might even say Joe dodged the question. Thus, in the end, the compatibilist answers a question no one has asked.

“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, aphorism 109

Comments

Ah GP: I thought I'd follow up, and responded to a direct challenge. Just possibly, someone might listen -- they certainly are monitoring. And, as fellow sons of Adam and Daugthers of Eve [the echo of C S Lewis is deliberate], they too deserve a chance to respond to the truth. Even if -- in the guise of medicine -- it is a bit hard to swallow at first. (Gil Dodgen gives hope to us all . . .) But, you are also right: we need to emphasise more positive interactions with those who are interested in genuine dialogue. Anyway: a very happy Advent Season! GEM of TKI PS: Onlookers at UD or from Antievo, we welcome genuine dialogue. It is painful when we find the sort of one-sidedness and contempt that this thread has had to expose. Here's hoping for a better spirit for the new year. PPS: Rib, that includes you!kairosfocus_{December 23, 2008
December
12
Dec
23
23
2008
07:58 AM
7
07
58
AM
PDT}

kairosfocus: I briefly looked at the Antievo site, just for curiosity, and yes, it's really depressing. But I hope that some of our "adversaries" who come here are more sincere and open to true discussion. I think we should comcemtrate on the "good" antagonists. The "bad" ones may go on with their self satisying amenities in their private world. It's interesting, however, that when one of those people comes here, even if apparently camouflaged as one who wants to discuss, soon he will show his true nature of dogma and intolerance (see rib).gpuccio_{December 23, 2008
December
12
Dec
23
23
2008
05:24 AM
5
05
24
AM
PDT}

Footnote: Went across to the Antievo site [link at 4], to see what has further happened, especially whether they acknowledge and civilly address the civility issue raised above. Short answer: They don't. I did, however, see some remarks about failing to address Rib's arguments. (Never mind that I took up his arguments directed at me and showed why they are specious and strawmannish. Nor, that others and the undersigned have addressed the issues and concerns surrounding evo mat based determinism on mind, reasoning and moral responsibility in both significant details and with at least a modicum of sober and informed reflection; e.g GP at 21 and SB at 56 and 112, or VJT at 62 and 85. I found nowhere any regret for or correction of misrepresentations or disrespect. indeed, I saw further evidence of the underlying problem of zeal bound to contempt for those who differ. that's actually one definition for a certain concept.] In short, strawman misrepresentaitons joined to contempt-filled ad hominem dismissals continue, unabated. But, we can also pause to look at a sample of the arguemnts in question; on the principle that one slice of a Christmas Pudding gives the taste of the whole. Here's one, from Rib at 2 above:
If determinism is true, it does not follow that effort is hopeless, that minds cannot be changed, that tragedy cannot be averted, etc. Those things are part of the causal net and they continue to depend in part on what we do and don’t do. The fact that an argument’s outcome is fixed deterministically does not mean that it doesn’t still depend on the points raised or the skill of the debaters. It does, and it may be won or lost depending on them. It’s just that those things are predetermined also.
Translating: Rib here sees the rhetoric of persuasion as a causal force. In particular, given the longstanding deservedly bad reputation of rhetoric -- the "skill" used by debaters -- as the art of deceptive manipulation [to be studied by good men by way of self-defence in a world of the ruthless], that should give us all pause, serious pause. That is, Rib's remarks boil down to:
[a] repackaging "whatever will be will be" in deterministic form [thence; opens the door to destructive propagandistic manipulation . . . ] or else, [b] it subverts the key point that makes human dialogue important: we make contribution to a dialogue in which reasoning minds can hear, freely reflect, agree, disagree and come to divergent conclusions on the merits of the evidence and reasoning in light of their own free choice.
Sadly, judging by the approach he and his ilk have consistently taken, they plainly opted for manipulation and disrespect for civility. Sad. Further to all this, they have yet to cogently answer the issue that per evolutionary materialist premises, mind in the end reduces to delusion. Finally, the real danger:
since evo mat advocates obviously also have and must use minds, they are forced to reckon with the brute fact of discussion and debate. But if you are inclined to think in terms of deterministic, iron cause-effect bonds, that naturally pushes you towards the manipulative side.
That tendency would very easily explain a lot of what we have seen at and coming from the antievo site; sadly. I only hope we can turn back that destructive tide. Please, Rib and co. Please. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{December 23, 2008
December
12
Dec
23
23
2008
04:43 AM
4
04
43
AM
PDT}

Stephen B. et al: I don't discount any version or idea of god simply because I cannot comprehend it. However, it would be rather irresponsible to accept a view I didn't comprehend. The way I have conceptualized god works for me and my view of free will. The only reason I brought up my concerns about this particular definition of "omniscience" was in personal fairness to mark's position on compatibilism; just as I find compatibilism instinctively irreconcilable with true free will, I find this particular version of god's omniscience irreconcilable. I'm sure those more versed in logic understand the argument and find it compelling. At the end of the day, though, we both find the existence of god and free will self-evident, and materialism self-evidently destructive and nonsensical.William J. Murray_{December 23, 2008
December
12
Dec
23
23
2008
03:55 AM
3
03
55
AM
PDT}

dgosse: No, what I meant is very simple, and has nothing to do with epistemology, but rather with my conception of human interactions, and in particular of teaching. I love teaching, although that is not my professional role, but I can safely repeat that "If I taught in a class, I would never try to convince anybody that my ideas are absolute truth". Indeed, when I teach (which I di, but usually not in a class, I never do that (as afr as I am aware of). What I mean is not that I do not believe in absolute truths (I do believe in them), or that I do not believe that some of the things I believe in could be absolute truths (although about that I am less certain). What I mean is that I don't want to "convince" anybody by authority, like the authority which could be considered implicit in the fact that I am the "teacher". If anybody wants to be convinced, that must be the result of his personal evaluation of what I, and others, may say, and of his private and free assessment and choice. That's why I add: "True education lies in expressing ideas, and stimulating critical interaction". For "critical interaction" I mean the power of creative personal thought plus the humbleness of seriously considering others'ideas. I don't mean "critical" in the sense of "hypercritical", least of all of "skeptical". I mean that nobody shoud accept ideas only because someone else expresses them (although the fact that someone else expresses them, and the consideration we have for that "someone else", are certainly important informattion). Embracing ideas, especially fundamental ideas about reality, is in a sense like choosing and loving friends. It is very personal. And that is true even for scientific ideas. Although they can sometimes seem objective and impersonal, I believe there is always an important personal aspect even in science (and if I am sounding like a polanyiite, well, maybe I am). That's the beauty of intellectual (and personal) confrontation, for me: it can be passionate, sometimes it can look like a true fight, but if there is respect for the persons, bilateral and sincere respect I mean, then it's really fun! And the teacher-student relationship is in no way different: the teacher has certainly a leading role, in consideration of his supposed greater knowledge and experience, but that implies no absolute cognitive authority.gpuccio_{December 23, 2008
December
12
Dec
23
23
2008
03:28 AM
3
03
28
AM
PDT}

PPPS: DG, "truth says of what is, that it is; and of what is not, that it is not." I think GP was speaking in the context of undeniable truth no 1: "error exists." (Just try to deny it and see what happens with the resulting chain of reasoning.) My all -time favourite prof, Harald Neiderriter, always invited us to look carefully at what we were taught in the classroom, underscoring that we were responsible to check things out for ourselves. For, "to err is human . . ." GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{December 23, 2008
December
12
Dec
23
23
2008
12:37 AM
12
12
37
AM
PDT}

Dgosse: In 91, you have aptly and briefly captured the core issue on compatibilism and other forms of materialism- determinism on the mind:
Is my thinking causing activity in the matter of my brain or is the activity in my brain-matter giving me the illusion of thought? If the latter is true (brain activity causes thought) then thinking is not a reliable way of knowing and any truth-claims I make based upon that belief are rationally incoherent.
Until materialists and determinists frankly face and have a sound, cogent and credible answer to that, we have no good reason to accept their arguments. For, our massive experience is that we are thinkers who are sufficiently free to make real decisions; thus, think for ourselves ands act in light of such reasoning -- not mere unconscious forces that turn the mind into a mere delusion of freedom. (I take it for granted that between GP and SB more than enough has been said to show why freedom of the mind and will are so vitally important, as well as why on a theistic view, tehr eis no reason to infer that God's knowing what will be is proof that we are not free to act. All, on pain of evolutionary materialistic determinism [incorporating of course chance conditions, non foresighted random variations and probabilistic culling through so-called natural selection] leading to self-referential incoherence and resulting reductio ad absurdum.) Only absolutely solid evidence and logic should be permitted to change the view that we have minds of our own, however uncomfortable it may be for those who find the possibility of a notorious certain "foot" in the door is. On pain of uncomfortably echoing a certain all- too- familiar- sounding classical remark from a now notoriously "obscure" C1 letter -- NOT. GEM of TKI PS: JDH, looked to see if I had saved off your comment. Alas, no. Maybe someone else has. PPS: Moderators, has the number of permissible links per post gone up, if so what is the new limit?kairosfocus_{December 23, 2008
December
12
Dec
23
23
2008
12:27 AM
12
12
27
AM
PDT}

gpuccio "If I taught in a class, I would never try to convince anybody that my ideas are absolute truth. True education lies in expressing ideas, and stimulating critical interaction." [bold added] I hope that I am misunderstanding your statement. Let me tell you a story... The local newspaper encourages profs at the local college to contribute articles to the paper and I, being a troublemaker, watch for a prof that makes some incredibly foolish assertion and then I take their argument apart. A few years ago one contributed an article that made the claim that "ideas of absolute truth have been discredited." I knew it was a nonsensical claim and immediately engaged in debate, but my philosophy was still rather incompetent and the argument was a draw. Since then, I have cultivated a better understanding of epistemology (a word I could barely spell at the time) and developed a better understanding of "truth" as such. Any "truth" is absolute, whether it "true" that 2 hydrogen molecules and 1 oxygen molecule will combine to form water or whether it is "true" that humans have minds capable of abstract reasoning, or whether it is "true" that there is a God. Each of these statements is either "true" or "false" and they are absolutely "true" or false. Our knowledge or belief does not change the truth or falsity of any of them - we may believe something false and think it is true, but that belief is merely a false opinion, it does not change the ontological nature the subject (the thing about which we assert truth or falsity). Now, I could read your statement as an expression of that conditional sense with which we should hold any assertion of truth because of our all too human capacity of believing what we desire to be true or I could read it as an assertion that truth is not absolute. If the former, I apologize for my rather long rant, but if the latter, I would encourage you to reconsider that thought. Truth, by its very nature is absolute. Human understanding is limited. "True education lies in expressing ideas, and stimulating critical interaction.” [bold added] I am also uncertain what you mean by phrase "stimulating critical interaction." Another discipline I studied was classical logic - someone once told me I was "irrational" and I wanted to find out if he was correct. 8^> It was an adventure in self-discovery that I would recommend to anyone. I would hope that by the phrase "critical interaction" you mean the reasoning through the strengths and weakness of the ideas that you had earlier "expressed." We may not know all truth absolutely, but the truth that we do know is always absolute truth. Thanks for letting me get that off my chest. I have always wanted a rematch with the prof from the college and this helped me to resort my thoughts in preparation for that eventuality. I think it needs more work, but it is better than my last effort. 8^>dgosse_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
10:53 PM
10
10
53
PM
PDT}

One more point about the thought experiment from Mark Frank: It makes no sense from an informational point of view, or a causative point of view. He states that the MRI machine analyzed my brain state and it showed "...that you would spend a minute luxuriating in your choice..." yet the MRI machine could not possibly see on a brain scan all that would input during that minute. For example, would I make the same choice if a fly was in the room? What if the fly landed on my mouth? That certainly would stir up the old brain. It would probably invalidate the neuron state that existed before. For that moment, what if the seven of diamonds is a bit sticky and repulses my touch. The truth is that his thought experiment really is not very interesting when you demand it face anything that resembles reality. It only is interesting for people who are trying to find some story that allows consciousness not to indicate design. If this is truly a popular story "...which comes up from time to time in philosophy classes..." those who choose to deny design are worse off than I previously thought.JDH_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
08:25 PM
8
08
25
PM
PDT}

re: Gods foreknowledge and free will. To say that if one knows with certainty what one will does it follow that this means the negation of free will? Suppose I am a real jerk, (which some actually think I am btw)and get my kicks by terrifying mothers. How I do this is that I first research mothers. The mothers must be caring, loving, devoted and extremely protective of their children. Additionally they must be great swimmers and allow (under their supervision) their children to play in a park that has a pond. What I do for kicks is that I take their children who canntot swim and throw them into the water. Based on my research I know that the mothers I have targeted will most certainly rescue their child. Does this negate the mothers free will because I know what they would do? Another point to ponder: Now I am speaking from my understanding of how God must be if God exists at all. If God is eternal then he must know all possibble existences. Included in thoe possible existences would be my existence as well as all the possible free choices I would make at any time ,any circumstance at any time in history I might inhabit. Out of all the possible existences and possible free choices I could make God spoke into being the one I am now living. Are not my choices free? Vividvividbleau_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
07:31 PM
7
07
31
PM
PDT}

Clive, in case you find it useful: Wordpress will allow you to 'unapprove' a comment, which effectively kicks it into moderation, but keeps it in the database. This can be done through wp-admin->comments.Apollos_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
04:04 PM
4
04
04
PM
PDT}

William J. Murray Have you ever considered the idea that God's omniscience is completely compatible with human free will in the context of God's viewpoint, but that we can not possibly see it from our view point. Let me illustrate. ( Apologies to author of "Flatland" ). Imagine you are a two dimensional being ( perhaps a square ) living in a plane. You inhabit a world occupied with other two dimensional beings. You have a vision like sense ( necessary for life in two dimensions ) that allows you to instantly know how far another line is away from you. You also have an instant sense of time. There is a wall ( a line ) which divides your living space into two sections. A small door operates to separate the two spaces. ( i.e. a door in 2-d is just a line that can swing across the blank space in a line ). When the door is shut, the two worlds are completely separate with no communication possible. You have a friend on the other side of the wall. You are visited by a three dimensional being which is shaped like a half donut. He can insert his body into your world. He appears to you to be a circle. You can move all around him. The odd thing is that because he is three dimensional, and extends out of your plane, and is shaped like a half donut, he can insert his body into both sides of the wall. He can instantly tell you how far your friend is away from the wall at any instant in time, even though you clearly see he is on your side of the wall. You later confirm with your friend that he was the stated distances from the wall at the times specified. You go back to the "half donut" and ask for an explanation as to how he does this. He says... There is no way he ( a three dimensional being ) can explain to a two dimensional being how he sees both sides of the wall at the same time. The word "up" or out just does not make sense. I hope this helps you.JDH_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
04:01 PM
4
04
01
PM
PDT}

I'm sorry JDH I couldn't find it. It seems that once it's deleted it's nowhere to be retrieved. In the future, I'll give a warning before deleting whole comments. Yours was a very minor issue, and I'm sorry I deleted your comment for such a minor issue.Clive Hayden_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
03:48 PM
3
03
48
PM
PDT}

Clive edited me before so let me try again with a different tack. A thought experiment has been put forward by Mark Frank and then followed by two questions. ( see comment 90 ) Quoting the relevant portions here: As you came into the room our new super MRI device took an imprint of the state of all the relevant neurons and we predicted that you would spend a minute luxuriating in your choice and choose the 7 of diamonds. We can even show you the electrochemical pathways that led to your decision. Two questions: 1) Is there anything about your current experience of choosing that tells you this can never happen? 2) If it did happen, would your choice of the seven of diamonds have been proven to have been no choice at all but an illusion? Answer to 1. Question 1 is a question about my subjective experience. Yes plenty of this is inconsistent with my subjective experience. I feel that I can make a decision independent of my state. I can choose to do something or not to choose it. I could go in completely convinced that I would choose the seven of diamonds and at the last moment choose the three of clubs. I could even have told a lot of people I was going to choose the seven of diamonds, and then go in and choose the three of clubs ( or any other card ). My subjective experience says to me I do not choose until handed the deck. I think those who say there is nothing in this scenario that contradicts there subjective experience are not being totally honest, and only answering what they think is more "intelligent". But the question asked is "could this never happen". I believe that once in a while ( about 1 out of 52 times ) the experimenter would get the card right. So it would be wrong to say it could never happen. The problem is that what the experimenter read on his machine would have no real bearing on whether or not I chose the seven of diamonds or not. Answer to 2. Why ask "if this happened..." for something which I know to be contrary to the laws of physics. Its like saying "If the Empire State building all of the sudden jumped 100 feet in the air.." It is not an interesting line of inquiry. All you have to know is a little quantum physics to see the problem here. We can know all we can possibly know about the trajectory of an electron about to pass through a crystal, and I can't predict where it will impact a screen. We can only give a probability distribution. Taking into account quantum mechanics, there is no physical way that all the information necessary to indicate that I will choose the seven of diamonds can be gleaned from an MRI. This is not a problem about technology. All of our experimental knowledge in physics states that this is about the way the real world works. There is no possible way to make all the measurements necessary to find out which way my brain is thinking, without disturbing the brain so that a different choice would occur. I know it seems a little weird, but that's the truth. You can not beat the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. Its just the way things work. As an aside, I think it may be part of the necessary tools the designer put in to make free will possible.JDH_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
03:27 PM
3
03
27
PM
PDT}

JDH, I'm looking for it. If I can find it I'll re-post it.Clive Hayden_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
03:20 PM
3
03
20
PM
PDT}

dgosse: a very sad example of "education" indeed. If I taught in a class, I would never try to convince anybody that my ideas are absolute truth. True education lies in expressing ideas, and stimulating critical interaction. I find the idea is very disturbing that anyone can "learn" to be a determinist, or, just the same, to be religious. General views of reality are such an intimate and personal issue that it cannot in any way be described as "learning". Whe one chooses a view of reality, he is really excercising his free will in a sacred way: it is not only a cold cognitive effort to be consumed on the school desks.gpuccio_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
03:13 PM
3
03
13
PM
PDT}

William J. Murray: It's not really important for me to convince you of this point. It is indeed a point interesting only for those who have a certain concept of God. If your concepts are different, that problem is really not relevant for you. Just a couple of final notes inspired by your last posts: 1) I basically agre with you that concepts like omniscience and omnipotence must not be considered fanatically, because they can be self-contradictory. For instance, I don't believe that His omnipotence must include the possibility to really violate His own laws, or contradict Himself in other ways. The only difference is that I don't believe that the omniscience-free will issue really implies any contradiction, for the reasons I tried to express, but that you are perfectly free not to accept. 2) You say: "Aside from simply utlizing a word, how exactly does god “know” stuff? Doesn’t knowledge require a framework both for the specific information to exist, and a mechanism by which that information is interpreted and understood which correlates to the source?" Not in my model. I believe that God knows directly, intuitively if you want. I don't believe that He needs any framework, or interpretation, or other such thing. In other words, while we usually know through rational cognition, I believe that God is beyond that. But again, these are not really pertinent subjects here. I am happy that we agree in general about free will, which is an issue more directly related to the discussions on this blog.gpuccio_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
03:04 PM
3
03
04
PM
PDT}

Oh and let me add... I'm sorryJDH_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
02:28 PM
2
02
28
PM
PDT}

Clive, I did not keep a copy of the post, but a lot of thought went into it. Could you post it with the offending words removed and/or appropriately toned down. I apprecitate the moderation.JDH_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
02:26 PM
2
02
26
PM
PDT}

JDH, Let's be careful of calling people's statements absurd and stupid.Clive Hayden_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
02:10 PM
2
02
10
PM
PDT}

----WJM: "Knowledge requires certain limitations, correspondences, and a suitable framework." So, are you rejecting the proposition that it is possible for God to see the cause and the effect as one? If so, on what basis can you characterize that as an illogial proposition? -----"My life, to god, is like a ruler sitting on his desk. I observe myself as an inch mark somewhere on the ruler with the ability to make of myself whatever I wish. Every choice I make is my consciousness actualizing the next mark on that ruler, thinking to myself, “I want to be a metal yardstick”. However, god knows I’m a 12? inch ruler made out of hickory. I absolutely cannot make my life the equivalent of a metal yardstick, no matter how hard I try." It sounds as if you can't conceive of a God whose infinite knowledge surpasses our own finite capacities, and so you simply shug it off as unreasonable. Omniscience is not an unreasonalble proposition. Much less is it comparable to the materialist and his futile attemp to reconcile hard determinism with free will. -----WJM: ….”and I’m sorry about this - it seems to me that the arguments presented here trying to reconcile a certain kind of omniscient god with free will are almost identical to the compaitibilist argument, relying on very esoteric arguments and scenarios to avoid something that seems genuinely, simply obvious." It is the very reverse that should be simply obvious. Just because God, outside of time, knows that the stock market is going to crash doesn’t mean that he causes it. To know is not to cause. In any case, there is a big, big difference between materialistic determinism, which rejects the faculties of mind and will in principle, and Divine foreknowledge that literally created the human mind to make choices. Please!StephenB_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
01:27 PM
1
01
27
PM
PDT}

I discovered this last year when looking into the "free will" debate. It is a letter from a student a scholarship committee thanking them for the opportunites the scholarship provided him. He also tells them that he has learned from Will Provine that people have no "free will" and explains how this has helped him deal with the people he meets. Rafik Taibjee's Scholarship Report http://www.alumni.cornell.edu/orgs/int/London/rafik_taibjee.html "The class has made me a determinist who believes we cannot blame or praise anyone as there is no free will; all that we do is a result of our genetic make-up and our environment." Consider the absurdity involved in writing a thank you note to people who could not do other than what they did do...dgosse_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
12:17 PM
12
12
17
PM
PDT}

Aside from simply utlizing a word, how exactly does god "know" stuff? Doesn't knowledge require a framework both for the specific information to exist, and a mechanism by which that information is interpreted and understood which correlates to the source? I find this kind of "omniscience" to be paradoxically impossible (aside from its free will ramifications) much in the same way I find the corresponding version of "omnipotence" pardoxically impossible. God isn't so powerful that he can make a rock so heavy he cannot lift it; similarly god isn't so omnsicient that what he knows violates the very capacity and framework for "knowledge" to exist at all. Knowledge requires certain limitations, correspondences, and a suitable framework.William J. Murray_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
12:16 PM
12
12
16
PM
PDT}

This is how my mind organizes what you two have said. My life, to god, is like a ruler sitting on his desk. I observe myself as an inch mark somewhere on the ruler with the ability to make of myself whatever I wish. Every choice I make is my consciousness actualizing the next mark on that ruler, thinking to myself, "I want to be a metal yardstick". However, god knows I'm a 12" inch ruler made out of hickory. I absolutely cannot make my life the equivalent of a metal yardstick, no matter how hard I try. Sorry. If my entire life is the equivalent of an object god has on his desk, there is no true free will. Further - and I'm sorry about this - it seems to me that the arguments presented here trying to reconcile a certain kind of omniscient god with free will are almost identical to the compaitibilist argument, relying on very esoteric arguments and scenarios to avoid something that seems genuinely, simply obvious.William J. Murray_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
12:03 PM
12
12
03
PM
PDT}

WJM: OK. I like GPuccio's explanation very much, but I will also have a go at it myself. I would argue that an omniscient God doesn’t really “foresee” at all, he simply sees. Indeed, as GPuccio has suggested, the only way foreknowledge can be reconciled with free will if foreknowledge is, in the final analysis, understood as "knowledge." In other words, foreknowledge is a term that we use to speak of events that have not yet happened. But for an omniscient God who sees the "whole," the effect is seen right along with the cause, the future is seen right along with the past, all possible contingencies are understood prior to their realization. We see things in terms of “before and after” because our intellect is designed such that we can reason only discursively, that is, in IF, THEN propositions. God doesn’t have to take those steps. He sees the IF and the THEN as a whole.StephenB_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
11:40 AM
11
11
40
AM
PDT}

StephenB: I appreciate that what you presented in #112 is probably a very conclusive logical argument, but I'm afraid it's over my head.William J. Murray_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
10:03 AM
10
10
03
AM
PDT}

William J. Murray: First of all, this is a very metaphysical point, and anybody is free to see it in his own way. But, just to clarify, my point is that if God is outside of time, he is seeing, as you say, the whole filmstrip, so he is seeing my free choices "after" I have made them. There is no problem with free will. Even if free will originates from the transcendental I, its results manifest in time and form. So, they are part of the whole formal reality. A really transcendent God is beyond that reality, indeed he has created it, and set the rules for both deterministic and free events in it. IMO, for your point to be valid, we should imagine that God knows my actions "before" I act, but that is not the case. God knows my actions as he knows everything else, beyond all relativities of time and space. He is transcendent. In a sense, we can imagine that all things that exist, anytime, anywhere, are known to His consciousness. The difficulty in conceiving that is that we can only imagine time from our relative point of view, where past, present and future are the scaffolds of all phenomenological reality. But again, this is highly metaphysical and I can only propose the way I see it.gpuccio_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
09:48 AM
9
09
48
AM
PDT}

William J. Murray: I appreciate your thoughtful posts. I do, however, agree with GPuccio on this one. Try this one from Aquinas: Summa Theologica > First Part > Question 14 article Article 13. Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things? Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above (Article 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things. Objection 2. Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things. Objection 3. Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by God. On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 32:15), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things. I answer that, Since as was shown above (Article 9), God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things. In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (Question 10, Article 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes. Reply to Objection 1. Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary. Reply to Objection 2. Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass will grow." Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i. Reply to Objection 3. Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary." Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.StephenB_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
09:37 AM
9
09
37
AM
PDT}

BTW, My definition of "omniscient" is "knowing everything that can be known" not "knowing everything one can imagine, hypothesize and theorize regardless of paradoxical implications of having such knowledge." In other words, god knows everything that can be known, and is thus omniscient; this does not, and cannot by definition, include the intentional choices of a free will agent, IMO. I'm certainly open to argument and illustration otherwise.William J. Murray_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
09:08 AM
9
09
08
AM
PDT}

gpuccio: I must be having trouble understanding your point. If god sits outside of time looking at the expanse of time like I might look a filmstrip laid out, and I am an image at one point of that filmstrip, then I certainly do not have free will, I only have the illusion of it because I don't know what is going to happen. What am I missing?William J. Murray_{December 22, 2008
December
12
Dec
22
22
2008
09:04 AM
9
09
04
AM
PDT}

Prev 1 2 3 4 5 … 7 Next

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Leave a Reply