Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Computational Intelligence and Darwinism

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This UD post got me to thinking. I do that from time to time.

On the subject of computational intelligence I have some minor credentials, including a Silver Medal at the first Computer Olympiad in London, sponsored by David Levy of chess fame. You can access the final results of my research and efforts in computational artificial intelligence (AI) here:

If you have a computer with sufficient memory and disk space you can explore the only perfect-play endgame algorithm ever invented for the game of checkers (known as draughts in the UK).

It was my exploration into computational AI that initially caused me to have doubts about the creative powers of the Darwinian mechanism, which I now consider to be a transparent absurdity as an explanation for almost anything of any significance, and certainly not as an explanation for human intelligence.

Here’s why.

Computer programs that play games like checkers and chess involve two primary algorithms, a brute-force tree search and a leaf-node static evaluator. The tree search says, “If I move here, and the opponent moves there, and I move thus…” Unfortunately, the exponential explosion of possibilities means that the search must eventually be terminated. At that point a static positional evaluator must be invoked. This requires designing heuristics that can evaluate the position with no further search.

The problem is that these heuristics are difficult to devise and encode, and they are often wrong, because of tactical considerations that lurk beyond the horizon of the search and the fact that the heuristics can have unanticipated side-effects.

A human player might say, “Hmmm, if I move here, this will create a positional weakness from which the opponent cannot possibly recover.” There is no way to encode such knowledge, which comes from human experience and positional recognition.

The other problem is that computer programs like mine do not play against the opponent; they play against themselves. The tree search assumes that the opponent sees everything it does, which in a human-versus-human game is not the case. In one game my program played against a grandmaster human, the human was in deep trouble, and he told me so. The computer was considering the move the human feared, which would lead to a very difficult, razor-thin draw. But the program searched so far ahead that it found the draw, assumed the human would see it as well, and played a move that gave the program a few more meaningless points, letting the human off the hook.

All attempts at computational language interpretation have been dismal failures for similar reasons. Even the best spell- and grammar-checkers are astronomically stupid:

Eye halve a spelling chequer
It came with my pea sea
It plainly marques four my revue
Miss steaks eye kin knot sea.

Eye strike a key and type a word
And weight four it two say
Weather eye am wrong oar write
It shows me strait a weigh.

As soon as a mist ache is maid
It nose bee fore two long
And eye can put the error rite
Its rare lea ever wrong.

Eye have run this poem threw it
I am shore your pleased two no
Its letter perfect awl the weigh
My chequer tolled me sew.

The point is: With all our human intelligence, technology, and inventiveness, how can anyone who is still in contact with reality believe that random accidents engineered our brains and minds?

Comments
avo @ 155 “So are you saying it is useful for communicating certain conventions, such as we commonly experience a kind of divide between sensory reality and spiritual reality, but that at bottom we don’t really know what it means?” No. I’m saying that there is a difference. The distinction between material and immaterial seems pretty clear to me. I think if you gave me a list of things I could immediately, using that list of questions, tell you whether or not something was immaterial or material. Don’t you think so? “I agree that math is nonmaterial. Yet it can only exist in relation to material things or the conceptual possibility of material things.” Why do you say that? What does the material world have to do with the existence of math? We manipulate mathematical symbols to understand the material world but I don’t see that what you say is true. The Pythagorean theorem doesn’t depend upon matter for its existence or meaning. “But now you say the soul exists like math, being real but abstract. This I cannot see at all. Math is not like a soul. A soul is a being. I do not think math can impact matter. Yet a soul inhabits the body.” I’m merely saying the soul, or mind, is abstract. Math is also abstract but I don’t think I tried to imply that math is like the soul. Mathematics is a universal language. It is a tool that is used by our minds to understand and interpret the material world, and other things, of course. “How can a soul be an abstraction? Abstraction of what? Do you think God is abstract?” I suspect a terminology problem here. I am not referring to “abstract” as in the sense that we abstract qualities from material things. Perhaps abstract is not the right word. It can have that meaning and it was obviously confusing here. Maybe I should stick with immaterial. “By the way, regarding your post to aiguy, are you saying that if your position is true, that a matter-only reality would mean that no real thinking is possible?” Yes. That is exactly what I am saying. Thinking requires the use of language, or to put it more broadly, the manipulation of symbols according to certain rules, including the first principles of reason, Identity, Non-contradiction, and Excluded Middle. No thought or communication of thought is possible without symbols and rules. Matter in itself cannot possibly account for either the symbols or the rules. The naturalist or materialist account of the world is utter nonsense. “And given that it is abstract, it is also indestructible. That has serious implications. What do you see as the serious implications.” That our minds or souls outlast our bodies. That we have a long, long way to go here. “Yet these philosophers seem to take for granted that the laws of physics (which are immaterial) impact the material world without batting an eye. But isn’t that backwards? Aren’t the laws of physics descriptions of what actually happens in material reality?” If you look at physics as only descriptive and not causal then I can see that you would think it’s backwards. I don’t think physics is merely descriptive. If physics is only descriptive then we still don’t know what “causes” anything. Hell, I guess that could be true but it seems very unlikely to me. Something to think about, maybe. “But I agree that mind influences matter. That’s one reason I think it is more than an abstraction. I think if the ultimate reality – God – is an abstraction then there could be no existence.” I think God MUST be immaterial. I don’t want to repeat it all here but if you look at any of the “first cause” arguments based on the impossibility of an infinite regress then you come to the necessary conclusion that the first cause is infinite, that is, uncaused, immaterial, and so forth. And I do agree that mind influences matter. Who can explain that? Beats me but the immaterial laws of physics, at worst, describe the force(s) that are behind the scenes telling electrons what to do.tgpeeler
August 19, 2010
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All - Sorry, I posted these in the wrong thread :-(aiguy
August 19, 2010
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StephenB,
AIGUY: If this were true, then I believe you could have actually answered my specific questions. But you didn’t, so I’ll ask again: In ID’s view, what is it that directs “directed contingency”? What is it that guides nature when nature is not “unguided”? What is it that allows processes to “see” when they arenot “blind.”processes”? STEPHENB: What do you mean, “if it is true.” ID doesn’t depend on dualism, period. There is no “if” to it. Methods are methods, and the ID method does not base its methods on dualistic metaphysics. It bases its methods on obervations of facts in evidence. Concerning the follow up questions, I gather that many ID theorists would say that a designed program directs the kind of directed contingency that you seem to be alluding to
First of all, I am not the one alluding to this mysterious something that guides nature, directs contingencies, and enables processes to "see". These are the words used with great frequency by ID advocates themselves. It is quite right for me to ask what it is ID is proposing as the explanation of complex form and function. Saying that "blind processes" and "unguided nature" can't produce FSCI is one thing; saying what sort of process is not "blind", and saying what sort of nature is "guided", is quite another. So you finally provide an answer, which is "designed program". I have no idea what this is supposed to mean! ID proposes that FSCI in biology is the result of "directed contingency", and when I ask what is supposed to be directing these contingencies the answer is a "designed program". What does the "designed program" mean here? Does it have anything to do with conscious thought or not?aiguy
August 19, 2010
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KF,
I think everybody agrees that we see designs (i.e. complex patterns, form and function) in biology. So we don’t need to “detect” that. Rather, we’d like to figure out where these designs came from. Here you are redefining the term design from what it means in the context of our discussion. We already have a cluster of terms that describe and specify what we see in biology and int eh technological and literary worlds for that matter: digitally coded, functionally specific, complex information and related organisation. Design — directed contingency — is the routinely and reliably observed causal explanation of dFSCI.
If you would like to refer to what we see in biological systems as FSCI instead of "designs", that's fine. I don't care what words we use as long as we agree on definitions. If you would like to refer the cause you propose for FSCI as "directed contingency", that's OK, but I don't know what you mean by that. Do you mean, as Stephen Meyer does, a conscious entity? If so, then we disagree about the warrant for that conclusion. If that is not what you mean, then the term doesn't mean anything at all to me, but I'm not interested in pursuing it.aiguy
August 19, 2010
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gpuccio, You express yourself well. Thank you for your well thought out responses. Again, yes I agree with most all you say. I am still not sure whether God or soul is nonmaterial or what that might mean or how that might work. Although the sense of your transcendent I as an unmoved perceiver does feel nonmaterial. Sigh...then again I don't know if mind and soul are synonymous.avocationist
August 18, 2010
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Avo: Regarding mind-brain/body interaction, you might want to look at the possibilities in the Derek Smith cybernetic loop model, especially the informational interaction and influences between the two tiers of controller. Multiply that by the issues connected to the implications of the evidence that we inhabit a fine-tuned cosmos fitted out to support the possibility for and actual existence of c-chemistry cell based, intelligent life. Gkairosfocus
August 18, 2010
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GP: Revisiting. I think we should all pause to read this from G K Chesterton, on the wind and the trees. Gkairosfocus
August 18, 2010
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avocationist: I have the impressionform what you say that our views are nearer than it seems. You see, I like concrete and pragmatic thinking, and I believe you do too. The problem is: what is really concrete? What is really pragmatic? Materialists are comforted by the conviction that matter is a reliable reality, because we can easily perceive it and because it has some consistency. But what we perceive as material reality is constantly changing, and we probably understand its nature only scarcely (QM has already given us some "uncomfortable" cognitive experiences, and what about dark ebergy, if it exists?). On the other hand, our consciousness is the fundamental, and most persistent, experience in our life. It is our being conscious, and the properties of our conscious experiences, which gives strength and meaning to our representations of our outer reality. So, if I had to bet on one or the other as a fundamental "substance", you can imagine what I would do. But really, I don't want to cut out of my map of reality anything which really exists. In my map, material things, strange material things (including possibly dark energy), conscious agents, thoughts, abstract representations, dreams, feelings, and so on, all share the same right to be reals, the same cognitive dignity. It is up to us to coordinate our map so that each of the things which are real may find a right place. The reason why I give such a great importance to the concept (and to the intuitive experience) of a transcendental I, is because the only simple way we can descrine conscious experiences, IMO, is the following: multiple representations referred to a same, unifying perceiver The true difference between my representations and yours is that I perceive mine and you perceive yours: for the rest, the representations could well be similar. So, the I is more and different form its representations: the representations constantly change, the perceiving I remains the same. I am obviously including the inner states of the mind in the representations, distinct from the perceiver). So, I don't like the word "substance", but if you really want to use it, to what should we first apply it?gpuccio
August 18, 2010
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tg,
I like the term material because I think it can be described in such a way that is generous when it comes to “scientific” entities and what “science” may further discover yet specific enough to allow for real distinctions in ontology.
So are you saying it is useful for communicating certain conventions, such as we commonly experience a kind of divide between sensory reality and spiritual reality, but that at bottom we don't really know what it means? I agree that math is nonmaterial. Yet it can only exist in relation to material things or the conceptual possibility of material things. But now you say the soul exists like math, being real but abstract. This I cannot see at all. Math is not like a soul. A soul is a being. I do not think math can impact matter. Yet a soul inhabits the body. How can a soul be an abstraction? Abstraction of what? Do you think God is abstract? By the way, regarding your post to aiguy, are you saying that if your position is true, that a matter-only reality would mean that no real thinking is possible?
And given that it is abstract, it is also indestructible. That has serious implications.
What do you see as the serious implications.
Yet these philosophers seem to take for granted that the laws of physics (which are immaterial) impact the material world without batting an eye.
But isn't that backwards? Aren't the laws of physics descriptions of what actually happens in material reality? But I agree that mind influences matter. That's one reason I think it is more than an abstraction. I think if the ultimate reality - God - is an abstraction then there could be no existence.avocationist
August 17, 2010
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gpuccio,
Can we agree on these simple points for a start?
Absolutely, and with most everything else you wrote as well.
for me the soul can best be described as the transcendental I
Yes...what I am wondering is more concrete than that. What is it made of?
In that sense, energy is probably not completely appropriate as a concept for the soul, while it could be probably used for mental realities.
Funny, I would say the opposite. As I first said, I can agree that the concept I have of the number four is completely nonmaterial but a soul is a something, a being, possibly one capable of influencing matter.
That’s the number one question. Most models which try to be scientific, and not only philosophical, rely more ore less on quantum level as a suitable interface between consciousness and physical reality.
Yes, I think so and my theory is that planck length is the doorway to another, inner dimension.
The main reason for that is that QM, with its inherent probabilistic level, allows that possible interaction without necessary violations of the known laws of physics.
Well, that sounds interesting, although I don't quite understand what exactly that might entail.
This point is specially important for ID because, whatever the modality by which human consciousness interacts with the brain, it is possible that something similar takes place between the designer and biological realities.
I think so!
Again, this is easy: whatever the soul is, it exists. It certainly is not nothingness.
But no, this is not easy. I did not mean to imply that the soul does not exist, rather I ask what nonmaterial means if not nothingness? When we use that term for spiritual things, do we know what we are talking about? A concept in a mind may be nonmaterial, but a living being? (I use the word living here in the spiritual sense, not as aiguy uses it for biological organisms.)avocationist
August 17, 2010
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avo @ 151 "I feel like you didn’t read my post. I’m not sure how to state it better but I’ll try. The term nonmaterial has been around a long time. I don’t know if people have really considered what it might mean. I don’t know what it might mean." I like the term material because I think it can be described in such a way that is generous when it comes to "scientific" entities and what "science" may further discover yet specific enough to allow for real distinctions in ontology. I agree that this term usually needs to be defined up front else confusion reigns. I like to think of "material" like this. If something meets one of the following five criteria then I call it material. 1. extended or precisely located in space/time 2. has mass 3. obeys physical laws 4. converts to energy 5. heats or moves matter (is energy) So a photon, while not having mass, still meets other criteria and would be considered (in my ontology) material. Things that are immaterial, or abstract, do not meet ANY of the criteria above. For example, mathematics is not extended in space/time nor specifically located in space/time. Math has no mass. Math doesn't obey the laws of physics. Math isn't convertible to energy and Math certainly cannot heat or move matter. Yet math is real. It exists. It has ontological status. This example should help you see what I am saying. "In what way does your soul exist? What manner is its existence? Has it any energy? How does it interact with and impact matter? How does it exist nonmaterially in a way that is different than nothingness?" It exists like mathematics or the laws of physics or logic exist. It's "real" but abstract. And given that it is abstract, it is also indestructible. That has serious implications. Given my description of material/immaterial I would say that the soul does not have energy. If the soul "had energy" it would no longer be abstract to my way of thinking. As far as how it interacts with or impacts matter, as GP said, that is the big question. Naturalists (physicalists in philosophy of mind) say that nature is causally closed. That is, even if mind actually exists, it cannot have causal impact in "nature" or the physical world. Yet these philosophers seem to take for granted that the laws of physics (which are immaterial) impact the material world without batting an eye. Therefore, I am not sympathetic to the "we don't see how it could happen so it doesn't happen" school of philosophy when there is clear evidence that it does happen all the time. We clearly exercise free will since we do that every time we communicate. I hope this helps. Thanks for the opportunity to clarify.tgpeeler
August 17, 2010
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avocationist: I like explicit questions, so I would like to try some answers, at least from my point of view: 1) "The term nonmaterial has been around a long time. I don’t know if people have really considered what it might mean. I don’t know what it might mean." I can agree with you. The term "material" is not one I love too much. It has no clear meaning, or maybe it has too many possible meanings. After "natural", it is one of the terms more likely to ingenerate confusion. So, let's forget it. Let's say that there is reality (all that exists). Let's say that there is a current map of reality, at least at one level, which corresponds to currently accepted physical theories and laws, or at least the most important of them. Let's say that such a map is certainly incomplete, and probably not necessarily accurate, but has certainly great cognitive value. In this map, there are multiple fundamental entities, more or less well known (some of them, like the possible dark energt, really mysterious). Moreover, there are other kinds of maps (phylosophy, religion, theories of the mind, and others) whose relationship with the "scientific" map is unclear and debated. Can we agree on these simple points for a start? 2) "In what way does your soul exist? What manner is its existence?" There are certainly many different definitions, theories and conception of the soul. It is probably another word that we could profitably avoid. Anyway, the answer to that specific question appears easy eough: whatever the conception of the sou, I suppose that any serious theory of the soul believes that the soul exists exactly like anything else exists: it is a constituent part of reality. If we want to be more specific, we cpould say that any conception of the soul is a theory which is suppose to describe, with all possible errors and limitations, something that really exists. 3) "Has it any energy?" This is more difficult, because it depends on the specific conception of the soul. While I don't want to go in detail about my specific conception, I will say, just to go on with the discussion, that for me the soul can best be described as the transcendental I, the final subkect of consciousness, and that for me it is not the same thing as the mind. In that sense, energy is probably not completely appropriate as a concept for the soul, while it could be probably used for mental realities. But I would stay flexible on that. And anyway, we are not sure that our present understanding of energy, matter and similar is good enough to describe events which happen at the mental level. 4) "How does it interact with and impact matter?" That's the number one question. Most models which try to be scientific, and not only philosophical, rely more ore less on quantum level as a suitable interface between consciousness and physical reality. The main reason for that is that QM, with its inherent probabilistic level, allows that possible interaction without necessary violations of the known laws of physics. Eccles has been a pioneer of that approach, but many others have gone that way. For a generic review of some of these subjects, a good read is certainly "The spiritual brain". This point is specially important for ID because, whatever the modality by which human consciousness interacts with the brain, it is possible that something similar takes place between the designer and biological realities. 5) "How does it exist nonmaterially in a way that is different than nothingness?" Again, this is easy: whatever the soul is, it exists. It certainly is not nothingness.gpuccio
August 17, 2010
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tgpeeler, I feel like you didn't read my post. I'm not sure how to state it better but I'll try. The term nonmaterial has been around a long time. I don't know if people have really considered what it might mean. I don't know what it might mean. In what way does your soul exist? What manner is its existence? Has it any energy? How does it interact with and impact matter? How does it exist nonmaterially in a way that is different than nothingness?avocationist
August 16, 2010
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Yeah, bummer. Me too.tgpeeler
August 16, 2010
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It appears as if Aiguy has elected option number three after all. I wish him well.Upright BiPed
August 16, 2010
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avocationist @ 144 "I have no problem with the existence of spiritual things, souls, mind, God. But I realized some time ago that I don’t buy the concept of nonmaterial reality." This seems incoherent to me. You have no problem with the existence of "spiritual" (that is, non-material) things yet you don't buy the concept of non-material reality (things). I obviously must not understand. If you'll clarify I'll be happy to offer an opinion. If I am getting it, what you said, then my opinion has been offered.tgpeeler
August 16, 2010
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[oops on an open address link] 9 --> Now, what has been drawn on so far is that design is an empirically observable causal pattern in the present, one that on characteristic signs may be distinguished from credibly undirected chance and/or mechanical necessity. 10 --> So, we have an epistemic right to seek to explain the past in light of observed patterns in the present, and let the resulting metaphysical chips lie where they fly. [The precise way that Lyell and Darwin argued 150+ years ago. But, in the information age, the shoe is on the other foot, and it pinches.] 11 --> Once we do that, the matter is quite straightforward, providing we do not allow a priori Lewontinian style materialism to intimidate us and censor our inferences to best explanation on causal patterns per reliable sign,which would undermine the integrity of such abductive inference. 12 --> What about the embodiment objection? A simple comparison of ourselves with chimps, who by popular report share 98% genetic similarity, will suffice to show that he responsible source for abstract purposeful, verbal,code- and- algorithm-designing intelligence is not embodiment. 13 --> Indeed, a comparison of the skilled with the unskilled in the matter among us will show that having 100% human genes and embodiment does not explain the capacity to design and develop dFSCI-rich information systems. 14 --> Only skill and knowledge in relevant fields does. 15 --> That is knowledge and skill-empowered intelligence is the better explanation for observed cases of dFSCI, not embodiment. 16 --> As AIG knows, or should know from his own experience and that of his colleagues. 17 --> But, notoriously, we have to reckon with the blinding, mind-endarkening, mind-closing power of a reigning ideology backed up by ruthlessly intimidatory tactics. 18 --> So, we have a strong empirical sign in hand that points to directed contingency as a key causal force at the origin of life. Specifically, digitally coded, algorithmically functional complex specific information in cell-based life that is integrated into both the metabolism and the replication facility. 19 --> So,the hypothesised RNA world replicating molecules are irrelevant: we need to explain the origin actual observed code based replication using metabolic machines coded for in the same code. 20 --> Likewise, we cannot independently account for metabolism without addressing the only known way that the relevant protein-based machines originate: coded assembly and coordinated organisation into a functional whole. (No wonder the two main OOL models mutually self-destruct.) 21 --> This brings us to a point where on evidence, we infer that life originated by design, not by undirected chance plus necessity. We do not yet know the mechanism (more than one way to skin a cat[fish]) nor the identity nor the nature of he designers, but on inference to best explanation, we can safely conclude that 'tweredun. 22 --> It's not undirected accident, nor is it just lawlike necessity in action or the two in combination. Only rather specialised and knowledgeable intelligence can explain the functional information rich empirical features of life as have been known for decades now. 23 --> But, how can we dare suggest an intelligence out there when our only experience is of cell based intelligence and it is based ont eh same cells? 24 --> Actually, for thousands of years, it is a contention of millions in our civilisation, including leading lights in history and science, that we do not only have experience or observation of ourselves as intelligence. A significant movement of millions actually holds that with 500+ eye witnesses, we have good reason to infer to intelligence with the power to reverse death and transform lives. 25 --> So the claim that we only have experience and observation of embodied, cell based intelligence may reflect more of a particular ideology than the real balance of experience and thought on the merits in our civilization across time. 26 --> But then, we do not need to conclude on a separate subject to address this one: all we need to do is to refuse to allow ourselves from being intimidated into censoring out he POSSIBILITY of intelligence at the origin of life. 27 --> Once such censorship is removed, we have good enough empirical reason and warrant to conclude that life itself was designed, which would also easily explain the huge increments in bio-information to originate body plans, including of course our own. 28 --> And, that is backed up by a separate line of inference (details and worldview inferences here) that points to design of our observed cosmos, on its evident finetuning for cell based life. 29 --> So, there is no compelling reason to believe there is no possibility of an intelligence who is a necessary being capable of designing and implementing a cosmos that is contingent and fine tuned in ways that enable onward origin and thriving of cell based life, including intelligent and even technically skilled forms thereof. ___________ So, once we remove a priori blinkers and intimidation, the evidence of signs of design in life and the cosmos as a whole point in some interesting directions. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
August 16, 2010
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Intelligent design [ID] – Dr William A Dembski, a leading design theorist, has defined ID as “the science that studies signs of intelligence.” That is, as we ourselves instantiate [thus exemplify as opposed to “exhaust”], intelligent designers act into the world, and create artifacts. When such argents act, there are certain characteristics that commonly appear, and that – per massive experience — reliably mark such artifacts. It it therefore a reasonable and useful scientific project to study such signs and identify how we may credibly reliably infer from empirical sign to the signified causal factor: purposefully directed contingency or intelligent design. Among the signs of intelligence of current interest for research are: [a] FSCI — function-specifying complex information [e.g. blog posts in English text that take in more than 143 ASCII characters, and/or -- as was highlighted by Yockey and Wickens by the mid-1980s -- as a distinguishing marker of the macromolecules in the heart of cell-based life forms], or more broadly [b] CSI — complex, independently specified information [e.g. Mt Rushmore vs New Hampshire's former Old Man of the mountain, or -- as was highlighted by Orgel in 1973 -- a distinguishing feature of the cell's information-rich organized aperiodic macromolecules that are neither simply orderly like crystals nor random like chance-polymerized peptide chains], or [c] IC – multi-part functionality that relies on an irreducible core of mutually co-adapted, interacting components. [e.g. the hardware parts of a PC or more simply of a mousetrap; or – as was highlighted by Behe in the mid 1990's -- the bacterial flagellum and many other cell-based bodily features and functions.], or [d] “Oracular” active information – in some cases, e.g. many Genetic Algorithms, successful performance of a system traces to built-in information or organisation that guides algorithmic search processes and/or performance so that the system significantly outperforms random search. Such guidance may include oracles that, step by step, inform a search process that the iterations are “warmer/ colder” relative to a performance target zone. (A classic example is the Weasel phrase search program.) Also, [e] Complex, algorithmically active, coded information – the complex information used in systems and processes is symbolically coded in ways that are not preset by underlying physical or chemical forces, but by encoding and decoding dynamically inert but algorithmically active information that guides step by step execution sequences, i.e. algorithms. (For instance, in hard disk drives, the stored information in bits is coded based a conventional, symbolic assignment of the N/S poles, forces and fields involved, and is impressed and used algorithmically. The physics of forces and fields does not determine or control the bit-pattern of the information – or, the drive would be useless. Similarly, in DNA, the polymer chaining chemistry is effectively unrelated to the information stored in the sequence and reading frames of the A/ G/ C/ T side-groups. It is the coded genetic information in the successive three-letter D/RNA codons that is used by the cell’s molecular nano- machines in the step by step creation of proteins. Such DNA sets from observed living organisms starts at 100,000 – 500,000 four-state elements [200 k – 1 M bits], abundantly meriting the description: function- specifying, complex information, or FSCI.)
6 --> So, immediately accessible on each and every page at UD, is a corrective presentation that AIG should at minimum have cited correctly and addressed on its merits, if he thought it in error. That he did not speaks volumes, and not to the good. Sadly. 7 --> However, let us follow up on the actual design inference for a moment: by studying causal patterns, we soon enough see that causes come in three complementary flavours that affect diverse aspects of phenomena, as the NWE enc article on ID [corrective to Wiki's ideologised hit-piece disgrace to Encyclopedia-dom] discusses, and as this apsects focussed version of the explanatory filter emphasises:
. . . different aspects of the same thing can be due to different causes. For example, an abandoned car will rust according to natural laws, though the actual pattern of rust may be due to chance. Yet, the car itself was designed. So regularity, chance, and design, though competing, can also be complementary.
8 --> Each of these flavours has characteristic signs, which can be used to distinguish them (and as the just linked flowchart on the filter identifies, can then guide onward investigations of the different complementary aspects of cause and synthesis of an overall explanatory picture). As the NWE article observes:
When inferring design, ruling out regularity is the easiest step. Ruling out chance is more difficult, since mere improbability (i.e., complexity) is not sufficient to infer design. Something that is complex could easily be due to chance. For example, if several dozen letters of the alphabet were randomly lined up, it would not be surprising to find a two-letter word such as “it” somewhere in the lineup. A two-letter word is not improbable enough to rule out chance. So, how complex must something be? Dembski sets a quantitative limit on what chance could conceivably accomplish with his universal probability bound . . . . In practice, however, the universal probability bound is not always useful, so Dembski introduces another criterion, specificity, or conformity to an independently given pattern . . . it is our universal human experience that whenever we encounter specified complexity it is a product of an intelligent agent (though the agent need not be supernatural). If specified complexity can be found in nature, then it, too, must be due to intelligent agency. As Dembski put it in The Design Revolution (2004): “The fundamental claim of intelligent design is straightforward and easily intelligible: namely, there are natural systems that cannot be adequately explained in terms of undirected natural forces and that exhibit features which in any other circumstance we would attribute to intelligence.”
[ . . . ]kairosfocus
August 16, 2010
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TGP & UB, First things first! Mebbe one day let's do the Texas coast and lake thing! (Reds or sea trout could stand in for kings. Crappie can star as themselves. Any Lakes in TX got Peacock Bass?) G _________________ Onlookers: Re AIG, 140:
While ID theory is described very differently by different people, I take Stephen Meyer’s formulation to be representative of the version most ID enthusiasts adhere to: The existence of the first living cell is best explained by the actions of a conscious, rational being, and this conclusion is supported mainly because it appeals to a cause which is known to our uniform and repeated experience. Given that version of ID, I criticize it on the grounds that in our uniform and repeated experience, all conscious rational beings are comprised of living cells – the very thing Meyer purports to account for. He may hypothesize that a conscious rational being could exist which is not comprised of living cells, but the truth of that hypothesis is not evident from our uniform and repeated experience.
1 --> It is first and foremost extremely disappointing to see, after many correctives in this thread and elsewhere, that AIG is still misrepresenting the actual Design Inference. (Beyond a certain point, AIG, that is no longer a question of mere misunderstanding, so kindly get it corrected.) 2 --> By substituting an inference to agent [and a debate over embodiment as opposed to discussing signs of intelligence] for an inference to design, AIG rhetorically diverts -- that's a red herring headed for a rhetorically loaded strawman, trifecta combination fallacy style -- the argument from an empirical inference on observed patterns of cause-effect and signs of the causal pattern, to a direct metaphysical debate on existence or not of agents in the remote past. 3 --> This also, not coincidentally, rhetorically tries to remove the possibility of empirical evidence from especially the digital code in the heart of life and the significance of such dFSCI being allowed to speak to the question of what sort of causes were acting at the point of origin of first life. 4 --> By sharpest contrast, we may read from the Definition of ID linked on this page (top right, under ID Links):
The theory of intelligent design (ID) holds that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause rather than an undirected process such as natural selection . . . . In a broader sense, Intelligent Design is simply the science of design detection — how to recognize patterns arranged by an intelligent cause for a purpose. Design detection is used in a number of scientific fields, including anthropology, forensic sciences that seek to explain the cause of events such as a death or fire, cryptanalysis and the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI). An inference that certain biological information may be the product of an intelligent cause can be tested or evaluated in the same manner as scientists daily test for design in other sciences. ID is controversial because of the implications of its evidence, rather than the significant weight of its evidence. ID proponents believe science should be conducted objectively, without regard to the implications of its findings. This is particularly necessary in origins science because of its historical (and thus very subjective) nature, and because it is a science that unavoidably impacts religion. Positive evidence of design in living systems consists of the semantic, meaningful or functional nature of biological information, the lack of any known law that can explain the sequence of symbols that carry the “messages,” and statistical and experimental evidence that tends to rule out chance as a plausible explanation. Other evidence challenges the adequacy of natural or material causes to explain both the origin and diversity of life.
5 --> While the above is reasonable, I think that how the above is set up [putting the conclusion first] opens the door for the sort of tangential tactic we saw above, and I prefer the approach in the Short Glossary of [ID-related] terms, also top right this page, under Quick Reference Resources: [ . . . ]kairosfocus
August 16, 2010
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tgpeeler, (aiguy, I am not at home for a day or so and don't have much computer time right now.) If it's not too late, I'd like your opinion on something. I have no problem with the existence of spiritual things, souls, mind, God. But I realized some time ago that I don't buy the concept of nonmaterial reality. Either a thing exists or it does not. There is no nonexistence. If a thing did not exist, that would be true nothingness and nothing could happen. But if a mind can interact with matter, or if two minds can communicate at a distance, then they are tied in with matter. No problem with different states of matter, or dimensions and such, but my question is, what does it mean to exist? How can a thing exist and be called nonmaterial? I am some sort of monist. Having said that, I agree that the concept I have of the number 4 is indeed nonmaterial, but it is based upon my experience of material things. I guess this is what aiguy was saying. Without material things, no concept of number 4. Have you seen Ervin Lazslo's book called Science and the Akashic Field? It's a modern take on the ether theory, and shows how we can begin to look for answers to such things as perhaps ESP. People speak of the Mitchelson Morley experiment, but when I read about it I see that the experiement was completely inadequate to find the ether, which they expected to be like a wind. I see the entirety of existence as being all of a piece, with everything on one side of the equation: existence. What do you mean by the term nonmaterial as regards minds or souls or even God? (I don't know why that number 1 is haning out there.)avocationist
August 16, 2010
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aiguy, I'd rather be fishing with G and Upright anyway. I can live with ideosyncratic, it's invalid and unsound that give me problems. BTW, you can't possibly ignore metaphysics as you answer this question of ID or any other question that matters to human beings. Because whatever turns out to be true about metaphysics informs everything else. You can see that, right? It would matter whether or not Jesus is the actual Second Person of the Trinity or not, wouldn't it? He can't be both and He must be one or the other. In either case, vastly different things follow. Right? "that materialism has been disproven empirically – would surprise the majority of academics working in the field, and that your idea that materialism is incompatible with abstraction was… ideosyncratic." It only surprises anyone with a prior commitment to materialism. Any fool can see that materialism is false (you see, I'm proof of that). I'm not a trained philosopher but I figured that out in about ten minutes once I determined to actually think about it. The vast majority of all of the philosophy I have read is nonsense, literally. Someone can have a stack of Ph.D.'s and still, if they violate identity or non-contradiction or excluded middle they are wrong. Authority is meaningless in argument. To say materialism could be disproved empirically is irrational anyway. Empirical evidence is about what we see, hear, smell, taste, and touch. No? Of course it is. So how to prove materialism false empirically, which would require abstract evidence, that by definition can't be empirically detected? Ha. Nice one. It only takes a tightly reasoned argument to destroy materialism and its big brother naturalism. For in those ontological systems, all explanations are necessarily confined to the laws of physics. So the only explanatory tool in the answer kit is physics. But physics cannot account for language. Why? Symbols and rules. Physics has nothing to say about either. Never has, never will. So the following modus tollens argument stands. If naturalism/materialism/physicalism are true, then physics can explain everything. (true by definition) But physics cannot explain language. (I'll elaborate if necessary but you are a smart guy. Surely you can see that.) Therefore, naturalism/materialism/physicalism are not true. In fact, it's not even possible for any of them to be true. That is, they are necessarily false. I hate to disappoint the "professionals" who spend their lives wondering about these kinds of things but that game is way past over. Of course, you are free to disabuse me of this ideosyncratic argument by attacking the validity of the logical structure. Oops, modus tollens is valid. Or you can attack one of the premises. I won't hold my breath. The thing that has amazed me about this entire conversation with you is that you appear to be a bright, educated, well-spoken person. Yet you cannot see, or will not see, the most fundamental truths of logic and how they inform every truth claim. Go figure. Good luck.tgpeeler
August 15, 2010
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CJYman - Thanks very much. I actually think we made some progress in clarity, and as a result converged just a tiny bit. We'll definitely pick it up again someday - I enjoyed it. Cheers!aiguy
August 15, 2010
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Hello aiguy, I am getting busy again so I will have to bow out of the conversation for now. I do believe I've presented my view on the issue, so with that I will say that it has been a good discussion (barring the occasional frustration -- on both of our parts I'm sure), and I look forward to continuing our discussion at another time. Take care.CJYman
August 15, 2010
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tgp,
What are you trying to say, exactly? And on what basis do you say it? Can you articulate that?
Here is the argument I've been making: While ID theory is described very differently by different people, I take Stephen Meyer's formulation to be representative of the version most ID enthusiasts adhere to: The existence of the first living cell is best explained by the actions of a conscious, rational being, and this conclusion is supported mainly because it appeals to a cause which is known to our uniform and repeated experience. Given that version of ID, I criticize it on the grounds that in our uniform and repeated experience, all conscious rational beings are comprised of living cells - the very thing Meyer purports to account for. He may hypothesize that a conscious rational being could exist which is not comprised of living cells, but the truth of that hypothesis is not evident from our uniform and repeated experience. CJYman argued, among other things, that ID did not necessarily require the Designer to be conscious (although CJY himself believed that was a reasonable inference as well). So the discussion turned to this other version of ID, where the claim is not to a "conscious" agent but rather to an "intelligent" agent. Now, it is clear what "conscious" refers to; we each experience consciousness, and we might define it as that which disappears when we fall into a dreamless sleep and returns when we awaken. "Intelligence" on the other hand is a very slippery concept. Like the concept of "life", it seems we know it when we see it, but it is notoriously different to craft a definition that captures our intuitions while being specific enough to be interpreted consistently by independent researchers. There are no scientific theories that offer "intelligence" per se as an explanation for any observed phenemon, and there are no operationalized definitions of the term that can be applied in general, and not specific to particular life forms or even life forms in general.
You make no distinction between matter and mind.
I do make a distinction between mind and matter. I do not, however, believe this distinction is ontological. But, as I've said since my first post here, I am not interested in debating metaphysics here. I have written over and over that I am making no claims regarding the truth of any particular metaphysical stance. My argument entails neither materialism nor any other view; it only entails that the matter is not currently amenable to empirical resolution (scientific test). You joined the debate and claimed that you could show, by applying reason to evidence, that materialism was false. If that were true, then my argument would fail, and Meyer would be right. I pointed out that your view - that materialism has been disproven empirically - would surprise the majority of academics working in the field, and that your idea that materialism is incompatible with abstraction was... ideosyncratic. I think it's clear that every flavor of materialism and dualism has very difficult challenges to overcome, and that it is utterly misguied to assert that the matter has been settled by clear interpretation of shared experience. I don't believe we will come to agree on that point, and I am quite content to have clarified the issues and leave it at is.aiguy
August 15, 2010
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Count me in as well. I'll bring some Lake Brownwood Crappie for comparison.Upright BiPed
August 15, 2010
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G, I'd love to go surf fishing with you some day. Maybe we can make it happen. Who knows. :-)tgpeeler
August 15, 2010
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TGP: Da's not a bad reading list, mon. Especially the Fundamentals. Fish don't play at rhetorical games. Either they bite or they don't. (And using a sounder helps freshwater fishermen solve one of the puzzles we surf rats face: is they elsewhere or is they just not interested?) But then . . . last Monday 6 am I parked just across from a beach I go by every day almost; some emergency car repairs. Quiet morning, hardly any waves; 60 ft from shore, a ~ 30" Spanish Mackerel [I assume, Kings usually are not that close in] in a classic leap -- overenthusiastic about his her (bigger) breakfast I'd say. I gotta go out about 5:00 am same beach one of these days, with my son, a heavy surf rod and a steel leader! (Razors for teeth.) "Kingfish" steaks [grill or escoveitch . . . ], probably just as nice as Crappie. [Mind you, I have never eaten the latter. But by all accounts they are pretty good for fresh water fish. Hey, look, most "snapper" in Jamaica nowadays is probably red colour hybrid Tilapia originally from Israel. So freshies can taste as good as salties. (Though there was a project to grow 'em in salt water to improve the flavour just as I left Ja to return to M'rat. I missed the fish fry to prove the claim . . . )] As to the thread, it is indeed becoming a parody of the multi-dimensional self-referential incoherence of evolutionary materialism. And, soon enough the voila-poof magic of E-M-E-R-G-E-N-T properties will doubtless show up explicitly. (It's already peeking though the fog.) Gkairosfocus
August 15, 2010
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aiguy @ 133 I don't really need for you to tell me how the materialists parse their irrationality. I pretty much get that. But thanks for trying to explain it to me. I don't want to seem ungracious. Here's the thing about your last post. What are you trying to say, exactly? And on what basis do you say it? Can you articulate that? What is the "so what" of your last post? And, btw, it doesn't look to me like you really do grasp what's going on here (you know, in the universe). That you are a neutral monist tells me that. You make no distinction between matter and mind. So to resolve the obvious differences and the obvious existence of matter and mind you just say there is no difference. There's just one "substance." And that would be different from materialism how? Exactly? Let me offer a possible problem for your ontology. I presume that you know of and are in agreement with the law of non-contradiction. Given that, how do you claim that abstract "substances" are the same as material substances when abstract substances are not located or extended in space and time but material substances are? Abstract substances do not have mass but material substances do (ok, maybe except for photons). Abstract substances are not subject to the laws of physics but material substances are (photons included). Abstract substances cannot be converted to energy but material substances can. Abstract substances cannot be used to heat or move matter but material substances (energy) can. Given these obvious differences, and the LNC, how do you say that they are the same? Movie time. Later...tgpeeler
August 15, 2010
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AIGuy: "As I have said dozens of times on this forum, I do not happen to be materialist. ..." An incoherent materialist is still a materialist. A materialist proposing ad hoc propositions and entities to graft onto his materialism in a vain attempt to ward off some of the more absurd of the logically inescapable implications of materialism is still a materialist. Only someone who actually rejects the premises of materials can say, "I do not happen to be materialist."Ilion
August 15, 2010
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aiguy, if you'd like for me to give you some references, I can. Maybe this will serve as a start. I realize that I have probably not read very much by your standards but this is just what I found in my library within five feet of where I sit. (I don't have time to do more than titles, sorry) In no particular order: The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy The Oxford Guide - Philosophy Historical Introduction to Philosophy Agents Under Fire The Really Hard Problem Infinity and the Mind Philosophy of Mind The Emperor's New Mind The Conscious Mind the blank slate Saving Belief Consciousness Explained The Problem of the Soul The Mystery of Consciousness Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them mind language and society The Rediscovery of the Mind Breaking the Spell Freedom Evolves The Emergent Self Language Truth and Logic Grammatical Man Being Logical Logic (Kant) Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy A History of Philosophy (Copleston 9 volumes) The Last Word The View From Nowhere Metaphysics (Rutledge Series) Philosophy of Mind (Heil) Being and God Epistemology An Anthology Modern Philosophy (Scruton) The Quest For Being The Passion of the Western Mind God and Philosophy Beyond Good and Evil Aristotle Posterior Analytics Aristotle Metaphysics The Consolations of Philosophy Philosophy 101 by Socrates The Breakdown of Cartesian Metaphysics Nichomachean Ethics oops, just saw another shelf Causal Asymmetries What Philosophers Know Darwin's Dangerous Idea Nature, Design, and Science German Essays on Science in the 20th Century Teleology Revisited There Is A God Critique of Pure Reason A Primer on Postmodernism Hume and Locke (Thomas Hill Green) The Vision of Hume Hume in 90 Minutes On Hume Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding The Philosophy of Language Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion The Life of David Hume (excellent, BTW) A Treatise of Human Nature Meditations on First Philosophy The Cambridge Companion to Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Introduction to Logic (Copi) Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy Logic Made Easy Introduction to the Theory of Logic An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic Socratic Logic (on my desk) Kant - A very short introduction (on my desk) Godel's Proof (on my desk) Socratic Logic (on my desk) The Ascent of Man (on my desk) I freely recognize and acknowledge that I am probably ill-read by most standards. I guess that's why I keep trying. It's just so hard to keep up with you guys. p.s. Just for fun and because you got me started on this. Here's what else is on my desk that's not been read and put away or has been read and I'm rereading. Atheist Universe Billions of Missing Links The Making of the Fittest (2 copies - how did that happen? Anybody need one?) Outliers A Christian Manifesto Crappie Fundamentals (for you, G!) Philosophia Cristi, Vol 11, No 2 Genetic Entropy & The Mystery of the Genome The Devil's Delusion The Darwin Myth Origins of Life Signature in the Cell The Descent of Man (Darwin) Golfing Wit (Christmas present) The Qur'an Empire of Liberty From Darwin to Hitler Grammatically Correct I also like SEP online. I hope this helps.tgpeeler
August 15, 2010
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