Darwinism: Why its failed predictions don’t matter

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May 18, 2017

Culture, Darwinism, Intelligent Design, Science

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From Wayne Rossiter, author of Shadow of Oz: Theistic Evolution and the Absent God: at his book blog:

It’s an odd pattern. It was this problem that came to mind as I recently revisited Living with Darwin: Evolution, Design and the Future of Faith, by Philip Kitcher. Kitcher is a philosopher at Columbia University, and he specializes on biology. His book was published by Oxford University Press, and was the recipient of the 2008 Lannan Notable Book Award. We should take his views seriously.

His book begins with a forceful assertion: “From the perspective of almost the entire community of natural scientists world-wide, this continued resistance to Darwin is absurd. Biologists confidently proclaim that Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is as well established as any of the major theories in contemporary science.”

This is not really a prediction. But, it is a statement that was wrong even before it was penned. More.

People who are committed to intellectual integrity in their own work often miss this central point: Once a bully pulpit like Darwinism has been established the occupant does not need to be correct, accurate or even useful. He can be a drag on the system. He can lead the march into degenerate science. He can, incidentally, fix you good if you try to offer an alternative view however grounded.

Bullies are not dislodged by being shown to be wrong, only by being successful opposed. Efforts so far have been commendable but quite honestly, more is needed.

See also: Biologist Wayne Rossiter on Joshua Swamidass’ claim that entropy = information

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Comments

DaveS Tell me this. What is the difference wrt probability between (1) and (2): (1) writing down "5", subsequently throwing a die, getting a "5". (2) throwing a die, getting a "5". Are both events supposed to be equally probable? If so, then there is something very wrong here.Origenes_{June 4, 2017
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I see that both Phinehas and Origenes are in today's conversation, so I ask them both what they think of 340 also.jdk_{June 4, 2017
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Yes, those are true statements. Can you give me a thumbs-up or down on my #341?daveS_{June 4, 2017
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The probability of 5 coming up is 1/6 The probability of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 coming up is 1.Origenes_{June 4, 2017
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Origenes,
So in order to meet the requirement of a pre-specification you offer the ‘pre-specification’ “each permutation”, which entails all possible outcomes? That doesn’t make sense, since a specification is supposed to be about a subset of all possibilities.
So I take it you would not agree with this statement, either?
Consider the experiment of rolling a fair six-sided die and recording the number that comes up. Then each number between 1 and 6 inclusive is expected to be recorded about once every six trials.
daveS_{June 4, 2017
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There are 4 x 10^12 specifications, just like when you flip a coin there are two specifications. Specification #1 is a particular hand: say all spades in order ... Specification# 5,668,559,453 is a particular hand: say {3 clubs, 5 diamonds, jack spades, 4 clubs, 4 hearts, 9 hearts, 10 spades, ace clubs, queen clubs, ace diamonds, 6 diamonds, 7 clubs, 3 hearts} ... Specification # 4 x 10^21 is a particular hand: say all diamonds in order. Those are all the possibilities: 4 x 10^21 individually specified hands. One of them will happen. Whichever one happens has a 1 in 4 x 10^21 probability of happening. Specification #5,668,559,453 has a 1 in 4 x 10^21 probability of happening. Specification #5,668,559,454 has a 1 in 4 x 10^21 probability of happening. Specification #5,668,559,455 has a 1 in 4 x 10^21 probability of happening. And so one for all the rest of the 4 x 10^21 specified hands. Do you agree with all that, Phineshas, and if not, what part and why?jdk_{June 4, 2017
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DaveS #338 So in order to meet the requirement of a pre-specification you offer the 'pre-specification' "each permutation", which entails all possible outcomes? That doesn't make sense, since a specification is supposed to be about a subset of all possibilities.Origenes_{June 4, 2017
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This is getting ridiculous. Let me try once more to find a statement we can agree upon. How about this?
Each permutation of 13 cards is expected to occur about once every 4 sextillion trials.
daveS_{June 4, 2017
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DaveS: But let’s say I remove the “expected”: Every time I press the button to start the program a 13-card permutation will be drawn which occurs only about once every 4 sextillion trials.
Doesn't work. The expectation is still in there — "which occurs" means "which is expected to occur". Probabilities are about expectations concerning the occurence of pre-specified events.Origenes_{June 4, 2017
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Phinehas, Please see my reformulation in #334.daveS_{June 4, 2017
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DS:
What do you think of this restatement: Every time I press the button to start the program a 13-card permutation will be drawn which would be expected to occur only about once every 4 sextillion trials.
I think the following is just as valid, and has the added benefit of lining up well with actual expectations:
Every time I press the button to start the program a 13-card permutation will be drawn which would be expected to occur every time I push the button.
Phinehas_{June 4, 2017
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Origenes, We could have determined that every permutation of 13 cards is expected to occur about once every 4 sextillion trials before we drew the cards. But let's say I remove the "expected":
Every time I press the button to start the program a 13-card permutation will be drawn which occurs only about once every 4 sextillion trials.
What do you think now?daveS_{June 4, 2017
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DaveS @332 How about this:
Every time I press the button to start the program a 13-card permutation will be drawn which would be expected to occur only about once every 4 sextillion trials, IF it was specified in advance.
The point is of course that it was NOT specified in advance. How can you expect something if it is not specified in ADVANCE?Origenes_{June 4, 2017
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Phinehas, What do you think of this restatement:
Every time I press the button to start the program a 13-card permutation will be drawn which would be expected to occur only about once every 4 sextillion trials.
daveS_{June 4, 2017
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DS:
“But you did” clearly means “but you did draw that particular permutation”.
But you will always draw that particular permutation when that particular permutation is defined after the fact by some 13-card permutation that was drawn. That's why we get the absolute weirdness of this:
Every time I press the button to start the program [that generates a random string with the length of Hamlet], what almost surely will never happen is almost surely guaranteed to happen.
If what Kitcher is doing is allowed, then what is almost surely guaranteed to happen is that the program will generate a particular string that it almost surely would never generate. And this guaranteed occurrence of the never-gonna-happen happens every time I push the button. (Note that when I say "a particular string" here, I am using precisely the equivocation at the root of this issue, but if Kitcher is allowed to use it, I should be able to do so too. So, we must all pretend I am actually talking about a particular string, since I've used the words, even though I am not.) It's almost as though Kitcher, et al have an unshakable belief in the miraculous, for how else would you describe the miraculous but as an occurrence which likely never would have happened by chance?Phinehas_{June 4, 2017
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Eric Anderson,
C’mon, that is precisely why he equivocates. His example does not line up with Behe’s, even though he offers it as a refutation of Behe.
Here's the structure of Kitcher's statement:
What is the probability that you get X? The answer is one in 4 x 10^21 But you did.
What do you think he means by "But you did"? The natural reading would be, "But you did get X". If you don't think he means "But you did get X", but rather "But you did get Y" where Y is not X, how do you tell what Y actually is?daveS_{June 4, 2017
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jdk @325: Thanks for the clarification. So you've been discussing the design inference, but not in the particular cases of biology or the cosmos. Fair enough.Eric Anderson_{June 4, 2017
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daveS @327:
Through the entire passage, he is referring only to the event and probability of a particular permutation being drawn.
C'mon, that is precisely why he equivocates. His example does not line up with Behe's, even though he offers it as a refutation of Behe. Complete failure on Kitcher's part. Probably not intentional. Likely he just doesn't doesn't understand the design inference.Eric Anderson_{June 4, 2017
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Phinehas, No. Kitcher does not equivocate. Nowhere does he confuse the probability of some permutation being drawn with the probability of a particular permutation being drawn. Through the entire passage, he is referring only to the event and probability of a particular permutation being drawn. "But you did" clearly means "but you did draw that particular permutation".daveS_{June 4, 2017
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DS:
It involves equivocation. “what almost surely will never happen” corresponds to a particular 13-card permutation. “what is almost surely guaranteed to happen” is that some 13-card permutation will be drawn.
And Bingo was his name-o! Yes, you've nailed it exactly. It involves equivocation between these two things. 1) A particular 13-card permutation 2) Some 13-card permutation will be drawn But this is the exact same equivocation involved in Kitcher's original statement:
“Consider the humdrum phenomenon suggested by [Michael] Behe’s analogy with bridge. You take a standard deck of cards and deal 13 to yourself. What is the probability that you get exactly those cards in exactly that order? [1] The answer is one in 4 x 10^21…But you did [2], and you have witnesses to testify that your records are correct.” [emphasis mine]
The first highlighted section is talking about a particular 13-card permutation. The second is talking about the fact that some 13-card permutation was drawn. It is this equivocation that I've been pointing out since #5.Phinehas_{June 4, 2017
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Eric writes,
So the discussion has inevitably turned to specification and design detection.
I think specification is just part of probability theory: if I say the probability of heads = 1/2, heads is the specification: you have to state the probability of something to even make a probability statement. As the discussion progressed, I became interested in what I think I called post-specifications: a sense after the fact that a result had such a significant pattern that we might wonder if it was truly chance. Someone with absolutely no interest in design arguments about the world, as goes on here at UD, is going to be surprised, and concerned about fairness, if his bridge opponent has all 13 spades, for instance. In fact, fairness is a standard aspect of probability theory. In basic theory, we assume the coin is fair: exact 50-50 odds. However, in more advanced theory, which leads to very important real-world applications, we can look at whether an unlikely particular result (say 90 out of 100 heads) is more likely to be the result of a weighted coin than it is to to be the low probability result of a fair coin. So specification, significance, and "cheating" are all aspects of probability theory to discuss. With all that said, what I am not interested in, for various reasons, and haven't discussed, is common design issues such as fine-tuning of the universe, protein structure, the structure of genes, etc. Others occasionally bring those up, but I haven't entered into any discussion about them.jdk_{June 4, 2017
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PS: Some UD posts of reference: On the stat mech issue: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/of-s-t-r-i-ng-s-nanobots-informational-statistical-thermodynamics-and-evolution/ Second law: https://uncommondescent.com/informatics/ud-guest-post-dr-eugen-s-on-the-second-law-of-thermodynamics-plus-vs-evolution/ Hoyle, Walker & Davies: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/hoyle-with-updates-from-walker-and-davies-on-cosmological-fine-tuning-a-common-sense-interpretation-of-the-facts-suggests-that-a-super-intellect-has-monkeyed-with-the-physics-as-well-as-the-c/ Collins on Fine Tuning: https://uncommondescent.com/fine-tuning/robin-collins-on-cosmological-fine-tuning/ On FSCO/I: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/btb-q-where-does-the-fscoi-concept-come-from/kairosfocus_{June 4, 2017
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JDK (and others), I suggest you ponder the key statistical mechanics result on dominance of certain clusters of states in systems through relative statistical weight of said clusters consistent with given macro conditions. Any given individual microstate will be typically vastly improbable in a highly contingent system. But, states can be reasonably clustered and a strong pattern is overwhelmingly predominant groups. In that context, the weight overwhelms that of special, specifiable clusters, indicating the almost certain direction of spontaneous change and the persistence in the overwhelming clusters in absence of constraints. So, we can see that microstates from the predominant group will be unsurprising in a way that contrasts dramatically with allegedly spontaneously getting to special, specifiable, compressed description clusters. Indeed, this is close to the statistical form of the second law of thermodynamics. This then directly ties to the islands of function deeply isolated in vast config spaces dominated by non-functional states issue and it is a red herring led away to a strawman caricature to in effect divert from this issue. The design inference is connected to a known way to get to islands of function: intelligently directed configuration. Indeed, the only empirically validated way, as is evident from text strings in this thread. I suggest you ponder L K Nash's discussion of the binomial distribution for cases of say 500 bits or 1,000 its with possible values 0, 1. You will find a dominant peak near 50{50 0/1 for even odds. Special clusters will be maximally implausible on blind search but can readily be explained on design, e.g. ASCII coded text strings. Mandl gives an easy physical instantiation: a weak B field giving defined direction to a paramagnetic substance with a like number of elementary units, say atoms for convenience. We can extend to magnetic media and chance and/or mechanical necessity driven random text generation vs writing text in English or a machine code, etc. KFkairosfocus_{June 4, 2017
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jdk @320: As mentioned, I haven't gone back to read all 300+ comments in this thread, but thank you for pointing me to your two specific comments. You have some excellent thoughts, and although we could quibble over some details, there is much we agree upon. You have even hinted at some of the very things I wish to cover in my OP if I get around to it. Hey, don't steal my thunder! :)
But people keep protesting that no, it is wrong to say of a bridge hand that “this hand was improbable”, so it doesn’t seem to be such a pedestrian conclusion.
Was this in the context of whether design can be detected? Was it inferred? If not, and it was clear from the discussion that it was a pure probability analysis and not any kind of argument against design (more technically correctly stated: that the examples were given under the assumption that there was not design), then I agree with you.
One of the things I have done in this thread is ponder a bit the ideas of specifications and significance, because I find those interesting also. I have pointed to 105 and 192 as long posts where I reflect and brainstorm a bit.
I see. So the discussion has inevitably turned to specification and design detection. Just as I suspected. :)
In general, I am interested in the role of chance and causality, and the ideas associated with the fact that each moment flows into the next one in ways that include what are, at least from our perspective, contingent events. However, I also am a retired math teacher, and just like probability as a subject, in part because grasping it correctly is so slippery.
Well said and good stuff. Definitely interesting topics worth discussion. ----- I apologize if it sounded like I was trying to dispute your motives. Indeed, I was trying to assume, and still do assume, they were as you stated. However, the interesting part of the probability discussion is indeed in relation to specification and design detection. If I can get my OP up soon, I'll be very interested in your thoughts and additional ideas.Eric Anderson_{June 3, 2017
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Reading back over this, I see a typo in mu comment at 315. This thread being so awash with misunderstanding already, it seems best to re-write this if full Before anyone writes something down, and presuming a uniformly random probability of writing down a particular hand, then sure the probability of writing down a specific hand in order then drawing that same hand in the same order is 1/ (4 x 10^21)^2. The probability writing down a hand (under the same provisos as above) then getting it is 1 in 4 x 10^21. Another way of seeing this is that the probability of matching the hand (in order) once you have written it down 1 in 4 x 10^21 (the hand you just wrote down is on of 4×10^21 possible hands, after all).wd400_{June 3, 2017
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Eric writes,
I should add that I expressed to jdk some doubt that anyone would be spending a lot of time on the “improbable things happen all the time” observation outside of the design context, because the observation is quite pedestrian and not worthy of particular fascination as a general matter.
But people keep protesting that no, it is wrong to say of a bridge hand that "this hand was improbable", so it doesn't seem to be such a pedestrian conclusion. And there have been more issues than just that one that have stimulated my "fascination" and my participation in his discussion. I'm not quite sure why being interested in ways peopple do and do not understand probability, and enjoying discussing and trying to clarify what I see as misconceptions, should strike one as odd. One of the things I have done in this thread is ponder a bit the ideas of specifications and significance, because I find those interesting also. I have pointed to 105 and 192 as long posts where I reflect and brainstorm a bit. In general, I am interested in the role of chance and causality, and the ideas associated with the fact that each moment flows into the next one in ways that include what are, at least from our perspective, contingent events. However, I also am a retired math teacher, and just like probability as a subject, in part because grasping it correctly is so slippery. And I get addicted to somewhat argumentative discussion sometimes. :-) So I ask that you don't try to read more into my participation in this thread than is warranted by what I have written.jdk_{June 3, 2017
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PaV @294: I have not followed this entire thread, having joined late, and I doubt I will have an opportunity to go back and read any of the first couple hundred comments. I am agreeing with jdk as to a specific point: namely, improbable things happen all the time. I have also been taking him at his word (which he has stated to me at least twice in the last 48 hours) that he is approaching this topic not with reference to design detection, but simply as a matter of basic probability. I should add that I expressed to jdk some doubt that anyone would be spending a lot of time on the "improbable things happen all the time" observation outside of the design context, because the observation is quite pedestrian and not worthy of particular fascination as a general matter. As a potential argument against design, however, it is like Medusa, with various incarnations of the argument repeatedly rearing their ugly heads. Your comment suggests to me that indeed there may be more going on here than just a fascination with the naked concept of probability. I suspect that many other commenters on this thread are also interested in the topic, not as a naked discussion of probability, but precisely because they think it has something to do with the design inference. In any case, I am more than happy to grant the point that improbable events are exceedingly common. It is true. It is readily observable. And it has no negative impact on the design inference. Indeed, the design inference takes it into account. ----- Lastly, as I said, I haven't reviewed all your comments, but my suspicion is that you are driving at an important point -- one that I hinted at to Origenes @276. I thought perhaps I had already posted an OP on this issue, but in reviewing my posts I don't see it now, although I did find a partially-completed post in my drafts folder (one of many). If I get some time in the next 48 hours I'll dust off my notes and do a new OP on this important issue. In brief, it has to do with the categorization of specification, and there are some important nuances people need to keep in mind if they are to avoid being misled by the "improbable things happen all the time" line of argumentation.Eric Anderson_{June 3, 2017
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WD400, in casesof FSCO/I the obvious specificity is being found on a deeply isolated island of function in a config space large enough to utterly swamp sol system or observed cosmos scale atomic resources used in a blind search. 500 - 1,000 bits does it. You really need new objections, things like this have long since passed any reasonable sell-by date. KF PS, Walker and Davies tell us a lot about such islands:
In physics, particularly in statistical mechanics, we base many of our calculations on the assumption of metric transitivity, which asserts that a system’s trajectory will eventually [--> given "enough time and search resources"] explore the entirety of its state space – thus everything that is phys-ically possible will eventually happen. It should then be trivially true that one could choose an arbitrary “final state” (e.g., a living organism) and “explain” it by evolving the system backwards in time choosing an appropriate state at some ’start’ time t_0 (fine-tuning the initial state). In the case of a chaotic system the initial state must be specified to arbitrarily high precision. But this account amounts to no more than saying that the world is as it is because it was as it was, and our current narrative therefore scarcely constitutes an explanation in the true scientific sense. We are left in a bit of a conundrum with respect to the problem of specifying the initial conditions necessary to explain our world. A key point is that if we require specialness in our initial state (such that we observe the current state of the world and not any other state) metric transitivity cannot hold true, as it blurs any dependency on initial conditions – that is, it makes little sense for us to single out any particular state as special by calling it the ’initial’ state. If we instead relax the assumption of metric transitivity (which seems more realistic for many real world physical systems – including life), then our phase space will consist of isolated pocket regions and it is not necessarily possible to get to any other physically possible state (see e.g. Fig. 1 for a cellular automata example).
[--> or, there may not be "enough" time and/or resources for the relevant exploration, i.e. we see the 500 - 1,000 bit complexity threshold at work vs 10^57 - 10^80 atoms with fast rxn rates at about 10^-13 to 10^-15 s leading to inability to explore more than a vanishingly small fraction on the gamut of Sol system or observed cosmos . . . the only actually, credibly observed cosmos]
Thus the initial state must be tuned to be in the region of phase space in which we find ourselves [--> notice, fine tuning], and there are regions of the configuration space our physical universe would be excluded from accessing, even if those states may be equally consistent and permissible under the microscopic laws of physics (starting from a different initial state). Thus according to the standard picture, we require special initial conditions to explain the complexity of the world, but also have a sense that we should not be on a particularly special trajectory to get here (or anywhere else) as it would be a sign of fine–tuning of the initial conditions. [ --> notice, the "loading"] Stated most simply, a potential problem with the way we currently formulate physics is that you can’t necessarily get everywhere from anywhere (see Walker [31] for discussion). ["The “Hard Problem” of Life," June 23, 2016, a discussion by Sara Imari Walker and Paul C.W. Davies at Arxiv.]
kairosfocus_{June 3, 2017
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Specified on what basis? Independently specified or an after-the-fact specified a la Kitcher?
Which of these do you think best describes most creationist probability calculations?wd400_{June 3, 2017
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wd400 @314
You are illustrating Kitcher’s point.
I do not think so.
The probability of a particular event depends on how tightly it is specified.
Specified on what basis? Independently specified or an after-the-fact specified a la Kitcher? I'm attempting to point out that there is a fundamental difference. And that probabilities that are assigned do not conform reality.
It is easy to start from almost any observation and then assign it a minuscule probability.
Eric Anderson said something important in this respect.
EA: there is an important nuance to address when we actually get down to making the specification, particularly in cases of otherwise non-functional strings, like card deals, coin tosses and the like.
His point may have to do, I believe, withh the fact that when we get into arbitrarily treating random non-functional events as wholes — while in fact they are not — things no longer make sense. IOWs what Kitcher does is treat a dealt 13-card hand as a whole, as something specific and meaningful, while, in fact, it is just a snapshot, if you will, of an ongoing random process of card shuffling. Yet in other words, "dffufdhvk.vmrp9u-4u80ytg9" should be treated differently than "I think therefore I am".Origenes_{June 3, 2017
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