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Darwinists Check Their Logic at the Door

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In my last post I commented on Nobel Prize winning physicist Eugene Wigner’s article “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences,” in which Wigner describes as “miraculous” (1) that “laws” of nature exist; and (2) that we should be able to discover those laws.

 In this post I will use an exchange in the comment section of that post between ID proponent “StephenB” and Darwinist “Delurker” to illustrate the utter vacuity of Darwinist argumentation, or at least the vacuity of the arguments of this particular Darwinist.  It is not my purpose to pick on Delurker per se.  I am using his arguments, because they are quite representative of the type of arguments Darwinists make on this site. 

 Exchange 1: 

 StephenB:  “You seem to be taking an awful lot for granted.  How did nature become comprehensible?”

 Delurker:  “That is not a question that is addressed by modern evolutionary theory.  To the extent that nature is comprehensible, modern evolutionary theory predicts that alignment with reality will be selected for.”

 Comment

 Delurker’s response starts with a factual misrepresentation and ends with an argument that is at the same time both self-contradictory and circular. 

 First the factual misrepresentation.  The existence of human cognitive ability (i.e., the ability to comprehend nature) is obvious.  Darwinism purports to be a comprehensive explanation of the development of all characters of all organisms.  In other words, according to the theory, if an organism has a particular character, whether the character is an eye, a fin or the ability to think, that character must have developed through Darwinian processes.  Delurker’s assertion that Darwinism does not attempt to address the question of how human’s cognitive abilities developed is spectacularly false.  It is like saying rocket scientists do not study propellant.  Indeed, there is an entire sub-field of Darwinian endeavor devoted to the study of cognition and how it might of developed, and fame, fortune and a Noble Prize awaits the first researcher who develops a half-way plausible theory. 

 Now to the argument, such as it is.  The argument is self-contradictory, because after denying that Darwinism addresses the origin of cognitive ability, Delurker then asserts that cognitive ability developed through natural selection.

 The argument is circular as well:  StephenB asks “How did the character “cognitive ability” develop in humans?  Delurker responds:  “It was selected for by natural selection.”  Delurker means that the character exists because organisms that had the character were “more fit” than those that did not.  How do we know the organisms with the character were more fit?  Because the character in question exists in them.  Which, of course, brings back to the starting place.

 Exchange 2:

 StephenB:  “How did the mind develop the capacity to comprehend it [i.e., reality]?”

 Delurker:  “That’s an interesting question.  Biologists investigating the evolution of the human brain are attempting to answer it.  Thus far the answer appears to be “incrementally.”

 Comment

 Delurker has now completely abandoned his first outlandish assertion that biologists do not attempt to account for the development of human cognitive ability.  I suppose he hoped no one would notice.  Now he responds to a serious question with a dismissive triviality. 

Does Delurker truly expect anyone to be convinced by a one-word explanation of perhaps the most important question in all of science?  Give me a break.

 Exchange 3:

 StephenB:  “How and why did the two realms get coordinated such that each makes sense with the other?”

 Delurker:  “No need to coordinate.  Reality exists.  Organisms who don’t deal with reality die (eventually).”

 Comment

 Here Delurker resorts to the old debating technique of “equivocation,” or, more commonly, “the old switch-a-roo.” 

 Keep your eye on the ball.  The ball is:  “the development of human cognitive ability” which has led to the development of mathematical theories with an amazing correspondence to physical reality.

StephenB asks how Darwinism could possibly account for that character.  Delurker says “organisms that don’t deal with reality die off.”  Again, give me a break.  Of the countless millions of species that have existed, only one has developed the character in question.  Delurker is as much as saying, “any organism that does not develop the ability to do higher math will become extinct.”  His answer would be humorous if it were not so pathetic.

 Exchange 4:

 StephenB:  “How did two realms arise in the first place?”

 Delurker:  “The nature of reality is not addressed by modern evolutionary theory.  The fitness of organisms to that reality is.”

 Comment

 Again, Delurker tells a blatant falsehood.  Every Darwinist will tell you that materialism is assumed in his research, either flatly or methodologically.  Delurker is either staggeringly ignorant of this fact or simply fabricating facts to suit his argument.

 Exchange 5:

 StephenB:  “Why should there even be two realms?”

 Delurker:  “You’re letting your terminology run away with you.  There is physical reality and there are mechanisms that allow populations of organisms to become more fit with respect to that physical reality.”

 Comment

 StephenB asks a profound question.  Given materialist premises, how can a Darwinist say there is a realm of mind that apprehends material reality that is separate from the material reality being apprehended?

 Delurker does not even attempt to answer this question.  Instead, he accuses StephenB of being confused.

 Exchange 6:

 StephenB:  “Indeed, which Darwinist even accepts the existence of two realms, one of which constitutes the immaterial mind of the investigator?”

 Delurker:  “What evidence do you have that mind is immaterial?”

 Comment

 Again, faced with a question he cannot begin to answer, Delurker changes the subject.  There is a substantial body of research supporting the existence of the immaterial mind.  Much of that research is summarized in O’Leary and Beauregard’s “The Spiritual Brain.”  But notice that the evidence for the material mind is not the issue that StephenB raises.  StephenB raises the question of how a Darwinist can ever accept the existence of a mind.  Delurker’s response to that question is conspicuous in its absence. 

 Conclusion

 Some of the greatest arguments against Darwinism are the vacuous arguments its supporters make for it.

Comments
Last one! Thanks Diffaxial. Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe Juliane Kaminski, Josep Call, Michael Tomasello in Cognition 109 (2008), pp. 224–234. Abstract - There is currently much controversy about which, if any, mental states chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates understand. In the current two studies we tested both chimpanzees' and human children's understanding of both knowledge-ignorance and false belief - in the same experimental paradigm involving competition with a conspecific. We found that whereas 6-year-old children understood both of these mental states, chimpanzees understood knowledge-ignorance but not false belief. After ruling out various alternative explanations of these and related findings, we conclude that in at least some situations chimpanzees know what others know. Possible explanations for their failure in the highly similar false belief task are discussed.vjtorley
September 9, 2009
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Here's the next one. Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later Josep Call and Michael Tomasello in Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2008) Vol. 12 No.5, pp. 187-192. Abstract - On the 30th anniversary of Premack and Woodruff’s seminal paper asking whether chimpanzees have a theory of mind, we review recent evidence that suggests in many respects they do, whereas in other respects they might not. Specifically, there is solid evidence from several different experimental paradigms that chimpanzees understand the goals and intentions of others, as well as the perception and knowledge of others. Nevertheless, despite several seemingly valid attempts, there is currently no evidence that chimpanzees understand false beliefs. Our conclusion for the moment is, thus, that chimpanzees understand others in terms of a perception-goal psychology, as opposed to a full-fledged, human-like belief-desire psychology. Conclusion (excerpt) ... Even if chimpanzees do not understand false beliefs, they clearly do not just perceive the surface behavior of others and learn mindless behavioral rules as a result. All of the evidence reviewed here suggests that chimpanzees understand both the goals and intentions of others as well as the perception and knowledge of others. Moreover, they understand how these psychological states work together to produce intentional action; that is, they understand others in terms of a relatively coherent perception-goal psychology in which the other acts in a certain way because she perceives the world in a certain way and has certain goals of how she wants the world to be... But chimpanzees probably do not understand others in terms of a fully human-like belief-desire psychology in which they appreciate that others have mental representations of the world that drive their actions even when those do not correspond to reality... Why chimpanzees do not seem to understand false beliefs in particular - or if there might be some situations in which they do understand false beliefs - are topics of ongoing research.vjtorley
September 9, 2009
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Diffaxial Thanks very much for the references. I found Michael Tomasello's Home Page and it had lots of interesting articles online. I'll just copy the abstracts here for interested readers. My initial impression is that Tomasello has certainly been very methodical in his research, and I don't think I'd quarrel with any of his main conclusions. Chimpanzees are smarter, it seems, than Povinelli gave them credit for. Nevertheless, they lack the human capacity to distinguish between true and false beliefs, and they appear to be incapable of referring to absent objects. Apparently, chimps understand other agents' behavior in terms of a perception-goal psychology, rather than a belief-desire psychology. 2,300 years ago, Aristotle considered the ability to distinguish between appearance and reality to be a uniquely human trait. I don't think he would have been at all perturbed by Tomasello's findings. I think he would still insist that the mental Rubicon between chimps and humans remains as real as ever. Anyway, here is the abstract of Tomasello's latest article. Prelinguistic Infants, but Not Chimpanzees, Communicate About Absent Entities Ulf Liszkowski, Marie Schafer, Malinda Carpenter, and Michael Tomasello in Psychological Science (2009), Vol. 20 No. 5, pp. 654-660. Abstract - One of the defining features of human language is displacement, the ability to make reference to absent entities. Here we show that prelinguistic, 12-month-old infants already can use a nonverbal pointing gesture to make reference to absent entities. We also show that chimpanzees - who can point for things they want humans to give them - do not point to refer to absent entities in the same way. These results demonstrate that the ability to communicate about absent but mutually known entities depends not on language, but rather on deeper social-cognitive skills that make acts of linguistic reference possible in the first place. These nonlinguistic skills for displaced reference emerged apparently only after humans’ divergence from great apes some 6 million years ago.vjtorley
September 9, 2009
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Er..."too bad."Diffaxial
September 9, 2009
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VJ: one more quick observation: I had not, prior to writing 87 above, followed your link to Bering and Povinelli's chapter, because I am very familiar with Povinelli's work, own a copy of his (and Eddy's) monograph on Chimpanzee "seeing," etc. Now I have - and found that the subsequent chapter was penned by Call and Tomasello, presenting the alternative view and the experimentation upon which it is based. It so happens that the entire chapter is there, with no holes. Bering and Povinelli's chapter is missing the opening pages. Give it a look. (To bad the references are absent.)Diffaxial
September 9, 2009
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StephenB (83), "Until someone offers a credible alternative to my answer, I will affirm mine as the most reasonable." Yours is the LEAST reasonable because it hasn't been properly reasoned - as most of your views aren't. Diffaxial and others have given you the most reasonable position, which is that the universe is comprehensible by us because we have evolved to comprehened it - creatures which DON'T properly comprehend it don't survive. A creature that perceives a predator as being a mile away when it is only a yard away will soon be eliminated from the gene pool. Even then, the universe is really only comprehensible in the physical realms in which we exist. At the micro level where quantum mechanics dominates, the universe is not comprehensible and we have different, and competing, "interpretations" of what is going on, none of which are entirely satisfying from the point of human comprehensibility. There again, they don't need to be comprehensible for our survival because we as humans aren't directly affected by what is going on in the quantum mechanical realm. And that is another reason why your answer is inferior, indeed why it's almost certainly wrong. If a designer did design the universe to be "comprehensible" then it did a lousy job at the quantum mechanical level. Why didn't the designer - who would surely have known that its designed universe would lead to curious creatures eventually developing sophisticated devices for investigating the micro universe - make the quntum mechanical world more comprehensible for us? That's why the view put forward by Diffaxial and others is better, and explains more, than yours.Gaz
September 9, 2009
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--StephenB: Unlike Darwinists, I recognize both the subject, the object, and the correspondence between the two. It is the Darwinists who treat subject and object as one and the same—matter reflecting on matter—molecules contemplating other molecules–material brains responding in slavish obedience to other material realities. Now you are talking about a different level of abstraction. Your original point was about the universe and the creatures living in it and observing it. Nobody claims that these are one and the same in the context of the one comprehending the other. So what about my point that comprehensibility is not a property of an observed entity (the object), but rather a function of the cognitive capabilities of the observer (the subject)? I think it is rather obvious that the comprehensibility of an object depends entirely on who is observing it. fGfaded_Glory
September 8, 2009
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VJ @ 86: I'll have to defer until tomorrow a close look at this post. For now it is interesting to note that Michael Tomasselo, Josep Call, and their colleagues at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology have had a long running dialog and debate in the scientific literature with Daniel Povinelli and his colleagues regarding the most appropriate interpretation of recent research in to the cognitive attainments of great apes. Povinelli has ascribed the behaviors of apes that resemble expression of theory of mind to operant learning, only, largely denying that they have attained conceptual achievements such as "understanding that others see," while Tomasello's group ascribes much more cognition and abstraction to apes. Both teams have devised and conducted ingenious empirical work in support of their theoretical positions, although in my opinion Tomasello et al. have it more right. The point being that Bering and Povinelli's view of the cognitive attainments of non-human primates is not the only, or necessarily the dominant, contemporary take on this topic. Link to the Max Planck Institute: http://www.eva.mpg.de/english/index.htm By the way, I noted the emptiness of the universe, not its size. And none of that bothers me in the least.Diffaxial
September 8, 2009
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Diffaxial (#85) Thank you for a very well-argued post. I realize now that I did not do justice to your account of the social and cognitive developments which made the emergence science possible, and I would agree with your assertion that "joint attention and intentionally informative and cooperative communication," in the metaphysically robust sense in which you have defined these terms, is indeed "unique to human beings," as it presupposes a knowledge of what other individuals are attending to - and hence, a fully developed theory of mind. I'll have to have a look at Tomasello's book when I get the chance. I think you are quite correct in proposing that science is something that emerges when "social networks distributed over space and historical time" reach a critical mass. All human beings have the cognitive wherewithal to do science. What made its emergence possible in ancient Greece was the fact that Greece was situated at a very favorable location where ideas from different cultures were freely exchanged, coupled with a prevalent and widely shared metaphysical belief that nature was amenable to rational investigation. I would, however, take issue with your contention that "the key social-cognitive adaptations that provided the requisite cooperative and intentional foundation for the comprehension of nature by scientific means themselves arose as evolutionary adaptations." While these changes may well have been biologically adaptive from their inception, that fact alone does not account for their origin. I would contend that an evolutionary account of human cognition is an oxymoron. The reason is that human cognition presupposes a capacity to form abstract concepts, and I would maintain that that's not a capacity that can meaningfully be said to belong to a physical system. Animals have perceptual concepts, as discussed an article by Jesse M. Bering and Daniel J. Povinelli, entitled “Comparing Cognitive Development” in Primate Psychology, (edited by Dario Maestripieri, Harvard University Press, 2003), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=B0XFECgUC5oC&pg=PA228&lpg=PA228&dq=chimpanzees+causation+tools&source=bl&ots=mOMTy-2WRC&sig=VK3yfvmKm48QHRpnVPIfdu5-Xl4&hl=en&ei=1cqjSozfAcGJkQWFsfnnDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false . (See especially pages 228-229 and the accompanying table 8.1.) I drew this article to the attention of readers on this recent thread , to which you also contributed, so I won't repeat myself here. (I've added a couple of comments by the way.) Only humans have abstract concepts. If you believe, as I do (for reasons outlined here (see especially the articles by Oderberg and Ross), that the capacity to have abstract concepts is not a physical capacity, then it follows that our ability to do science will have no satisfactory natural explanation. By the way: if the size and monotony of the universe bothers you, I suggest you read this article and this one too. A smaller universe would require a lot more Divine intervention to keep it going.vjtorley
September 8, 2009
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VJ @ 78:
There are several problems that I have with the analogy you’ve proposed. (1) Science is a theoretical enterprise, not a practical one. The scientific enterprise isn’t about saving lives as such, although some scientific discoveries may happen to do so. (2) Science aims at understanding reality, not merely describing it. Cataloguing and correlating the properties of the various kinds of things we observe is not science proper. It’s the preliminary spadework. Someone still has to construct a theoretical model which explains why things hang together the way they do, and then generate some testable hypotheses from that model.
These responses overlook a crucial distinction that I note above, and here emphasize. That is between the foundational human cognitive adaptations that emerged through biological evolution, which include the capacity for joint attention, shared reference, cooperation, theory of mind, and language, and the vastly more recent superstructures of the scientific method and related academic and political institutions, which have been present for something like 0.25 percent of the run of Homo sapiens (depending upon what you count as the onsets of Homo sapiens and of the scientific method). Hence I remarked to Denyse O'Leary in 37 above:
The scientific method has cultural, not evolutionary, origins, and has been progressively refined in such a way that, when it is working, our quite fallible cognitive biases may be subtracted from our conclusions...it does not follow from the fact that the main features of human cognition originated due to local adaptive value, and are therefore limited and imperfect, that we cannot devise and perfect methods for maximizing the accuracy and usefulness of scientific conclusions...
And in 75:
Our history (evolutionary and cultural) inscribed into us the ability to comprehend, and the cultural means to build distributed networks of historically cumulative cognition and comprehension. That is all that is required.
Although founded upon biologically derived cognitive adaptations, science, as a cultural artifact, and like all human cultural innovations, may enunciate goals and aspirations that have nothing whatever to do with survival and reproductive success, including interest in theoretical rather than practical results, understanding rather than simply "cataloguing," and so on. The emergence of such aspirations and emphases does not in the least contradict the fact that the key social-cognitive adaptations that provided the requisite cooperative and intentional foundation for the comprehension of nature by scientific means themselves arose as evolutionary adaptations.
(3) A species with a well-developed capacity for “joint attention and cooperation” will be very good at observing changes in its environment that threaten its survival, and at communicating news about some impending danger. Monkeys do as much – they warn each other of approaching predators. That doesn’t make them good scientists.
While chimps, in particular, do exhibit clear elements of theory of mind (such as gaze following, some capacity for imitation, awareness of what others see or have seen in competitive contexts, etc.), they do not engage in cooperative episodes of joint attention and "we intentionality" in the sense currently described by Tomasello and others, which entails not only that you and I attend to the same object or event, but that I know that you are attending to the feature to which I am attending, and you know the same about the alignment of my attention and yours (knowledge that can be taken further recursively, as when I know that you know that I know that you are attending to the feature to which I am attending, and so on). Only human beings do that. Similarly, research makes it clear that when a vervet monkey emits one of several fixed, but apparently referential, warning cries, it does so automatically as an affective response to the given threat with no intent to communicate, as indicated by the fact that it takes no note of whether others in their troop actually attend to its cries or have already climbed to safety. It is absolutely clear that joint attention and intentionally informative and cooperative communication is unique to human beings, and is one of our most foundational social-cognitive adaptations. All of the ways we strive to comprehend the world are founded upon those unique adaptations, as well as upon our talent for cultural innovation and retention, including science. It's what we do.
(4) Science is a relatively recent enterprise in human history. It only goes back about 2,600 years, to the ancient Greeks, who are generally considered to have been the world’s first true scientists. That makes the origin of our ability to understand constructs from theoretical physics, not to mention bioinformatics, all the more mysterious – and I have to say that I find the “spandrels” explanation rather lame.
I don't find these developments mysterious at all. The histories of these cultural innovations are histories of the impact of the cultural invention of distributed cognition - essentially thinking and problem solving accomplished by social networks distributed over space and historical time (the scientific community in the historical past, in this instance). That explosive social/cultural innovation, and the technologies that foster it (the inventions of writing and number systems, the printing press, libraries and universities, etc.) are recent, and reasonably well documented and understood.
(5) The universe is too beautiful – it’s much more elegant than we would expect it to be, if all it had to do was support intelligent life.
Surely it is inevitable that any universe of sufficient richness to give rise, by unguided means, to creatures as talented and terrible as ourselves is also inevitably profligate in every other imaginable way, including profligate in beauty. It is also overwhelmingly profligate in emptiness and monotony. I hope your view of God also embraces a love of emptiness and monotony (as well as Haldane's "inordinate fondness for beetles") - as there is at least as much emptiness and monotony in the universe as there is beauty (if such things can be quantified at all). But scratch the above paragraph. It seems to me that the ultimate meanings of these excesses are subjective judgments that arise from, rather than prove the rightness of, one's biases and expectations about the world.Diffaxial
September 8, 2009
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---faded glory: "I think you are confusing the object and the subject." On the contrary. Unlike Darwinists, I recognize both the subject, the object, and the correspondence between the two. It is the Darwinists who treat subject and object as one and the same---matter reflecting on matter---molecules contemplating other molecules--material brains responding in slavish obedience to other material realities.StephenB
September 8, 2009
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----damitall: "I think that that statement contains an unsupported assertion – that the logic of the “operations of the universe” harmonise perfectly with the logic of the human brain; hence needs further explanation or support." It makes no sense to characterize the obvious as an "unsuppored assertion." We confirm the correspondence between subject and object every time we measure the rate of a falling object, or express the probablity that it will snow, or calculate the distance to the nearest galaxy. Obviously, nature's behavior fits our mental models. That needs to be explained. Why do the two realms match? Darwinists reveal their ideological partisanship by refusing to confront the problem or by providing nonsensical answers. As far as I can tell, there is only one reasonable explanation: Someone created a rational universe ripe for investigation and fashioned rational minds to apprehend it. Until someone offers a credible alternative to my answer, I will affirm mine as the most reasonable.StephenB
September 8, 2009
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DeLurker used to go by the name JayM, who claimed to be, if you remember, an ID supporter, even though everything he wrote was against ID. He justified this by saying that he was just trying to help ID to gain credibility. This was, of course, not true. It was, in reality, an underhanded way to critique ID. These folks, they'll go to any length to argue against ID, even by being disingenuous. So, no, JayM, I'm not going to re-instate you under a sock-puppet name, so stop emailing Denyse about it. Your insincerity is, quite honestly, bothersome.Clive Hayden
September 8, 2009
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It may be that that part of the universe not yet comprehended by man may be incompehensible by man. Should that thought stop us trying to comprehend it? It may be that underlying the order and logic we think we see, there is chaos and randomness. Should THAT possibility cause us to give up the attempt at comprehension? StephenB at 62 wrote "If you do, then you must have some idea about how the logic of its operations harmonizes perfectly with the logic of the human mind [brain, if you like] that comprehends it." I think that that statement contains an unsupported assertion - that the logic of the "operations of the universe" harmonise perfectly with the logic of the human brain; hence needs further explanation or support.damitall
September 8, 2009
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DeLurker: Not meaning to be coy here, but am I wrong to find it funny that to the one that finds comprehension of other than itself (the universe by the mind) can be either the thing itself comprehending itself or that no such thing is really happening and all is ultimately not capable of true meaning or even only illusion (whatever that is) yet that very one spends so much time and "thought" trying to make meaningful paragraphs about it when they actually believe it is meaningless outside their own creative ability make up some sort of meaning for themselves, thus giving themselves the actual creative power to make the universe themselves and therefore being both the cause and the effect? (whew!) offering a tool for discernment - "Jesus spoke in parables and WITHOUT a parable He did not speak" You might want to read why (Lk 8:10) because all this (the universe) actually has a meaning and a purpose towards an end, but- A profound truth of the "universe" (a Created thing) is its comprehensibility beyond - yep thats a rock alright and it really is a rock - but only to those given it by the One Ultimate Mind that said very plainly that one can (not may not) not see the Kingdom of God (the Beginning and End; the Author and Finisher - the reason for it all and its Results (Revelation of an Eternal State) UNLESS - and that both of those particular Beliefs (philosophical position commitment towards Created or material) is actually given as a gift so each one "has his reward". Diffaxial: #75 Which came first - the chicken or the egg? Yours is quite the statement of faith - IS IT NOT? Now the interesting question I will proffer is - how does one come to their position other than which one they WANT to be true and from whence does that WANT arise.? Is it not predictive/discerning that one would need eyes to see and ears to hear, but could only have or get them if wanting them? Why would one NOT want them? The inside story here is that there IS meaning here unless you don't want there to be in which case you would wright a bunch of meaningless paragraphs explaining why there isn't. :)alan
September 8, 2009
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DeLurker (#74) Thank you for your post. You wrote:
Even if you eliminated the vague language and tied it to an actual scientific hypothesis that explains existing empirical evidence, it would not serve to distinguish between a universe with a designer and one without.
OK. You want specific predictions? I'll give you one. I predict that the universe will be found to exhibit the geometry of E8 . Physicist Garrett Lisi, author of the Exceptionally Simple Theory of Everything explains why in this interview by Zeeya Merali in New Scientist (15 November 2007) entitled "Is mathematical pattern the theory of everything?" (see page 2 of the online version):
"I think the universe is pure geometry - basically, a beautiful shape twisting around and dancing over space-time," says Lisi. "Since E8 is perhaps the most beautiful structure in mathematics, it is very satisfying that nature appears to have chosen this geometry." (Emphasis mine - VJT.)
As Lisi points out in the same interview, there are other nice bonuses that his theory offers:
Lisi is specially pleased that his model is "without strings, extra space-time dimensions or other weird inventions that there's no evidence for", which bedevil string theory. The maths is simpler, too, which he says makes it even more compelling. Compared with string theory, "this uses baby mathematics," he says.
As a theist, I would expect God to make a universe like that. As Robin Collins argues in his essay, Universe or Multiverse? A Theistic Perspective (scroll down to part VI), "it has been part and parcel of traditional theism that God would be motivated to bring about an aesthetically pleasing universe." Thus the antecedent probability that the universe should instantiate "the most beautiful structure in mathematics" is very high indeed. For an atheist, by contrast, the antecedent probability that the universe should just happen to exhibit the most beautiful geometrical structure is very low. It's still early days for Lisi's theory, which remains at a very incomplete stage. However, Lisi's theory could easily be disproved by the Large Hadron Collider experiments, if a particle is discovered which his theory cannot account for. For what it's worth, I'm willing to stick my neck out for E8, and predict that some version of Lisi's theory will be validated.vjtorley
September 8, 2009
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Diffaxial Thank you for your post. You argue that the environment in which we came to develop our "capacity for cumulative comprehension by means of joint attention and cooperation... which was crucial to our survival" was "no more devised for our comprehension than oceans were for swimming." There are several problems that I have with the analogy you've proposed. (1) Science is a theoretical enterprise, not a practical one. The scientific enterprise isn't about saving lives as such, although some scientific discoveries may happen to do so. (2) Science aims at understanding reality, not merely describing it. Cataloguing and correlating the properties of the various kinds of things we observe is not science proper. It's the preliminary spadework. Someone still has to construct a theoretical model which explains why things hang together the way they do, and then generate some testable hypotheses from that model. (3) A species with a well-developed capacity for "joint attention and cooperation" will be very good at observing changes in its environment that threaten its survival, and at communicating news about some impending danger. Monkeys do as much - they warn each other of approaching predators. That doesn't make them good scientists. (4) Science is a relatively recent enterprise in human history. It only goes back about 2,600 years, to the ancient Greeks, who are generally considered to have been the world's first true scientists. That makes the origin of our ability to understand constructs from theoretical physics, not to mention bioinformatics, all the more mysterious - and I have to say that I find the "spandrels" explanation rather lame. (5) The universe is too beautiful - it's much more elegant than we would expect it to be, if all it had to do was support intelligent life. The more scientists understand the universe, the more they come to realize that it exhibits at all levels the characteristic of "simplicity with variety" which William Hogarth (1753) defined as the hallmark of beauty in his classic, The Analysis of Beauty. The discovery of this "beauty all the way down" in the cosmos is unexpected. As Robin Collins puts it in his essay, Universe or Multiverse? A Theistic Perspective (scroll down to part VI),
[A]lthough the observable phenomena have an incredible variety and much seeming chaos, they can be organized via a relatively few simple laws governing postulated unobservable processes and entities. What is more amazing, however, is that these simple laws can in turn be organized under a few higher-level principles... and form part of a simple and elegant mathematical framework... Further, this "fine-tuning" for simplicity and elegance cannot be explained either by the universe-generator multiverse hypothesis or the metaphysical multiverse hypothesis, since there is no reason to think that intelligent life could only arise in a universe with simple, elegant underlying physical principles. Certainly a somewhat orderly macroscopic world is necessary for intelligent life, but there is no reason to think this requires a simple and elegant underlying set of physical principles. This is especially clear when one considers how radically different the framework and laws of general relativity and quantum mechanics are from the world of ordinary experience: although the regularities of the everyday world are probably derived from the underlying laws of quantum mechanics and general relativity, they do not reflect the structure of those laws. Indeed, it is this difference in structure between the classical, macroscopic world and the quantum world that has largely given rise to the interpretive problems of quantum mechanics. Thus, there is little reason based on an observation selection effect to expect the sort of macroscopic order necessary for intelligent life to be present in the underlying, microscopic world... Theism offers a natural, non-ad-hoc explanation, of why the laws of nature can be encompassed by such principles. As mentioned above it has been part and parcel of traditional theism that God would be motivated to bring about an aesthetically pleasing universe.
Belief in God sounds pretty reasonable to me, given what we now know about the world.vjtorley
September 8, 2009
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VJ @ 72:
But I do think it is dogmatic to rule out the most intuitively obvious explanation – that the reason why nature is so amenable to scientific investigation is that it was designed to be understood by intelligent creatures like ourselves – simply on the grounds that we cannot understand the Designer.
In this instance, VJ, intuitions cancel. I find this notion as intuitive as the idea that seas are so swimmable because they were designed for fish, the atmosphere so flyable because it was designed for birds, and terrain so walkable because it was designed to be walked upon by ambulators like ourselves. IOW, not at all intuitive, and indeed toweringly backward. Our principle adaptations include a capacity for cumulative comprehension by means of joint attention and cooperation. It's what we do. The environment in which we came to do it (those elements of the natural and social environments the comprehension of which was crucial to our survival) was no more devised for our comprehension than oceans were for swimming. (Intuitions better ask questions than they answer them.)Diffaxial
September 8, 2009
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StephenB, you claim that the universe is comprehensible and therefore that this comprehensibility must have an origin. I think you are confusing the object and the subject. The universe it what it is. Creatures living in it comprehend it to various degrees - a fir tree comprehends it less than a dog who in turn comprehends it less than me. Clearly comprehensibility is a variable, not a constant, and furthermore it is not a property of the observed but a function of the degree of comprehension that resides with the observer. Your question of how the universe obtained the property of comprehensibility is meaningless because it is based on an incorrect premise. Your example of the written paragraph suffers from the fact that a paragraph is written by someone who is not just a writer but also a reader. A writer can make a paragraph comprehensible to others (i.e. make it conform to the degree of reading comprehension in others) only because the reader in him instructs the writer in him on how to do this. It should be obvious that someone who can't read will be unable to write a comprehensible paragraph. This is totally different from the universe and a living creature observing it without having created it, so you need to think of a different example. A solution to the question how a creature can come to comprehend the reality around him, a reality that originated independently from him, has already been suggested by others. fGfaded_Glory
September 8, 2009
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StephenB @ 63:
How does our history inscribe comprehensibility in the universe?
It doesn't, and it didn't. Our history (evolutionary and cultural) inscribed into us the ability to comprehend, and the cultural means to build distributed and networks of historically cumulative cognition and comprehension. That is all that is required.Diffaxial
September 8, 2009
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vjtorley#72
And if there is such a science-friendly Designer, we can be confident that the current theoretical tensions which exist within the scientific domains of physics and cosmology will have a satisfactory resolution which we can grasp, and will soon discover. Now that’s a falsifiable prediction.
No, it isn't. Even if you eliminated the vague language and tied it to an actual scientific hypothesis that explains existing empirical evidence, it would not serve to distinguish between a universe with a designer and one without.DeLurker
September 8, 2009
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StephenB#71
—Delurker: “We know how written paragraphs are created. We’ve written them ourselves and we’ve seen other humans write them.” You are confusing yourself. I didn’t provide that example to sell you on the idea that the universe was designed.
I know you didn't, which is why I noted that it was a good example but for reasons other than those you probably had in mind.
I was responding to your mistaken notion that the idea of a comprehensible universe is incoherent.
If that was your intention, you haven't yet addressed the issue.
—”It is by no means as obvious that a universe is the same kind of thing as a written paragraph.” It is obvious that in order to understand both, both must be comprehensible.
Non sequitur.
—”Suggesting that a universe is formed to be comprehensible assumes your conclusion, namely that the universe is a created artifact. Without far more evidence, this is a category error.” Again, you are confusing yourself. I am not arguing; I am describing.
Your description demonstrates that you are making a category error.
After all this time, don’t you think its time you took on the question?
I'll be happy to engage in the discussion when you phrase your question coherently. I'll restate what you wrote above:
If I asked you how a written paragraph was formed in order that a reader could make sense out of it, would you find that question coherent? If so, then why is it not coherent to ask how a universe could be formed such that a scientist could read it?
The assumptions inherent in your last question clearly show your category error and make the question incoherent. If you can rephrase without insinuating those assumptions, it may be answerable.DeLurker
September 8, 2009
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DeLurker In your last post (#67), you wrote:
It is by no means as obvious that a universe is the same kind of thing as a written paragraph. Suggesting that a universe is formed to be comprehensible assumes your conclusion, namely that the universe is a created artifact. Without far more evidence, this is a category error.
OK. Here's a question for you. Who said this?
The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible.
Albert Einstein, "Physics and Reality," in Journal of the Franklin Institute (March 1936) as quoted in Einstein: A Biography (1954) by Antonina Vallentin, p. 24. "Comprehensible" simply means "amenable to rational investigation." The scientific method presupposes that the universe is comprehensible in this sense; otherwise, it would be impossible for scientists to perform replicable experiments to test their theories, which are expressed in the language of mathematics. Or as Eugene Wigner put it in The Unreasonable Effectiveness Of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences (in Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics, vol. 13, No. I (February 1960). New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Copyright 1960 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.):
[I]t is not at all natural that "laws of nature" exist, much less that man is able to discover them... The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve.
In reply to your argument: the universe doesn't have to contain a message in order for it to legitimately described as "comprehensible." Rather, what makes the term "comprehensible" legitimate is the fact that the universe's workings can only be described using the language of mathematics. There is no category mistake here. I can certainly sympathize with a scientist who modestly refrains from speculating on why nature is comprehensible (methodological agnosticism). But I do think it is dogmatic to rule out the most intuitively obvious explanation - that the reason why nature is so amenable to scientific investigation is that it was designed to be understood by intelligent creatures like ourselves - simply on the grounds that we cannot understand the Designer. And if there is such a science-friendly Designer, we can be confident that the current theoretical tensions which exist within the scientific domains of physics and cosmology will have a satisfactory resolution which we can grasp, and will soon discover. Now that's a falsifiable prediction.vjtorley
September 7, 2009
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---Delurker: "We know how written paragraphs are created. We’ve written them ourselves and we’ve seen other humans write them." You are confusing yourself. I didn't provide that example to sell you on the idea that the universe was designed. I was responding to your mistaken notion that the idea of a comprehensible universe is incoherent. Please keep track of your own objections so you will know what it is that is being refuted. ---"It is by no means as obvious that a universe is the same kind of thing as a written paragraph." It is obvious that in order to understand both, both must be comprehensible. In that sense, the example fits very well. I didn't choose the example because it serves every purpose; I chose it because it serves that purpose. ---"Suggesting that a universe is formed to be comprehensible assumes your conclusion, namely that the universe is a created artifact. Without far more evidence, this is a category error." Again, you are confusing yourself. I am not arguing; I am describing. If I was arguing, I would be providing reasons to accept a designed universe. I haven't done that. I am simply asking you to explain, or provide a wild guess, about how the universe became comprehensible---how it became investigatable---how its functional operations are of such a nature that the laws of mathematics can quantify them---how the logic of its behavior corresponds with the logic of the human mind. After all this time, don't you think its time you took on the question?StephenB
September 7, 2009
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DeLurker (#50) You wrote:
Unless and until StephenB or yourself can provide any reproducible, empirical evidence whatsoever that the mind exists independent from the brain, the question he asked is quite literally meaningless.
You might like to have a look at the following: Kevin Williams, Scientific Evidence for Survival of Consciousness after Death http://www.near-death.com/evidence.html Brian Josephson's Parapsychology Links http://www.tcm.phy.cam.ac.uk/~bdj10/psi.html Princeton - Parapsychology Research http://www.fourmilab.ch/rpkp/ I'd also recommend the following books (haven't read them yet, but I understand they're the best summary of work in the field): The Conscious Universe: The Scientific Truth of Psychic Phenomena by Dean Radin. HarperOne; Reprint edition (June 30, 2009). http://www.amazon.com/Conscious-Universe-Scientific-Psychic-Phenomena/dp/0061778990/ref=ed_oe_p Entangled Minds: Extrasensory Experiences in a Quantum Reality by Dean Radin. Paraview Pocket Books (April 25, 2006). http://www.amazon.com/Entangled-Minds-Extrasensory-Experiences-Quantum/dp/1416516778/ref=pd_sim_b_1 The Gold Leaf Lady and Other Parapsychological Investigations by Stephen E. Braude. University Of Chicago Press; illustrated edition edition (October 16, 2007). http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0226071529/stephebraud It pays to keep an open mind.vjtorley
September 7, 2009
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StephenB#61
If I asked you how a written paragraph was formed in order that a reader could make sense out of it, would you find that question coherent? If so, then why is it not coherent to ask how a universe could be formed such that a scientist could read it?
That's an excellent example, although probably not for the reason you think. We know how written paragraphs are created. We've written them ourselves and we've seen other humans write them. It is by no means as obvious that a universe is the same kind of thing as a written paragraph. Suggesting that a universe is formed to be comprehensible assumes your conclusion, namely that the universe is a created artifact. Without far more evidence, this is a category error.DeLurker
September 7, 2009
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----"Two problems. First, this question begs another question, in that it starts with the assumption that nature can be said to be comprehensible, then asks how that occurred. The question that first should be asked, not begged, is “can nature be rightly said to be comprehensible or incomprehensible, and/or can it be rightly said to have become comprehensible?” As Paul Davies and countless others have pointed out, science is based on the assumption that nature is comprehensible. ----"Which points to the second problem: to state either that nature may be said to be “comprehensible” or “incomprehensible” in the sense that these terms denote a property of nature, or something in nature, appears to commit a category error. The best synonym of “comprehensible” appears to be “intelligible.” It is messages (including paragraphs, as in the example above) that can be said to be comprehensible or intelligible, or conversely, incomprehensible or unintelligible. A thunderstorm, on the other hand, can’t be said to be either “comprehensible” or “incomprehensible” in anything resembling that sense, because it bears no message. It may be said that we comprehend the dynamics of a thunderstorm, or conversely that we do not comprehend the storm, but those are properties that attach to us and our level of understanding, not to the storm. The same may be said of a galaxies and quarks; galaxies and quarks are neither intelligible nor unintelligible, because they bear no messages. What can be rightly said is that we understand galaxies and quarks, or do not understand them." The terms intelligible and comprehensible are synonyms, which means that you just wasted a lot of space. ----Diffaxial: "To the extent that we do, the question then becomes how that is possible. The answer refers to ourselves and our histories." The answer REFERS? How does our history inscribe comprehensibility in the universe?StephenB
September 7, 2009
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Just as a written paragraph must be made comprehensible before a reader can comprehend it, a universe must be made comprehensible before a scientist can study it.
My comment in 64 can be sharpened with reference to this passage. The sense in which a paragraph is made comprehensible by the writer is that the meaning or message the writer wishes to convey is encoded intelligibly into that paragraph. What renders the paragraph comprehensible is that a message is intelligibly encoded therein. An incomprehensible paragraph is one that does not have an intelligible message encoded therein. Phenomena in nature such as thunderstorms, quarks and galaxies cannot be said to be either comprehensible or incomprehensible in that sense at all, because no message is encoded in those events, either intelligibly or unintelligibly. Therefore it is a category error to state that nature was made comprehensible in the same sense that a paragraph is made comprehensible, or to ask how it is that nature became comprehensible in the sense that a paragraph is comprehensible.Diffaxial
September 7, 2009
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The question on the table is this: How did the universe become comprehensible?
Two problems. First, this question begs another question, in that it starts with the assumption that nature can be said to be comprehensible, then asks how that occurred. The question that first should be asked, not begged, is "can nature be rightly said to be comprehensible or incomprehensible, and/or can it be rightly said to have become comprehensible?" Which points to the second problem: to state either that nature may be said to be "comprehensible" or "incomprehensible" in the sense that these terms denote a property of nature, or something in nature, appears to commit a category error. The best synonym of "comprehensible" appears to be "intelligible." It is messages (including paragraphs, as in the example above) that can be said to be comprehensible or intelligible, or conversely, incomprehensible or unintelligible. A thunderstorm, on the other hand, can't be said to be either "comprehensible" or "incomprehensible" in anything resembling that sense, because it bears no message. It may be said that we comprehend the dynamics of a thunderstorm, or conversely that we do not comprehend the storm, but those are properties that attach to us and our level of understanding, not to the storm. The same may be said of a galaxies and quarks; galaxies and quarks are neither intelligible nor unintelligible, because they bear no messages. What can be rightly said is that we understand galaxies and quarks, or do not understand them. To the extent that we do, the question then becomes how that is possible. The answer refers to ourselves and our histories.Diffaxial
September 7, 2009
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absolutist @ 33
#25 Seversky “My personal belief is that the reality we observe around us is best understood as a model constructed on the basis of sensory input.” This is a self-defeating statement as the belief itself cannot be verified by sensory input. Beliefs are immaterial as they have no spatial extension in the brain.
If I were to to take a position of radical skepticism, I could not verify my own existence, let alone yours. I can claim direct experience of myself but I cannot verify it to you or anyone else and my only evidence of your existence is the post on my screen. Like solipsism, however, such a view is a philosophical dead-end. It takes us nowhere. As for immaterial consciousness, I agree that it is a hard problem but my understanding is that we were discussing a dualist view which holds that the mind is an incorporeal entity, one that is capable of existing independent of the physical brain. As for beliefs, if they do indeed correspond to patterns of electrical activity in the brain then it is arguable that they do indeed have a physical dimension comprising extension in both space and time.
You saying “damage to the physical brain can produce corresponding deficits in mental capacity” only establishes correlation, much like saying that every time I start a fire I see smoke or every time my battery dies my car stops. It doesn’t mean smoke is fire or that I am the car.
If I strike a match and hold the flame to a piece of paper which then catches fire, you could indeed argue that we have only observed correlation not causation. If, however, every time I light the match I am then able to set fire to the paper, if we never observe the reverse where the paper catches fire spontaneously and then ignites the match, we can then reasonably infer a causal connection and have something approaching Stephen Jay Gould's definition of "fact":
In science, "fact" can only mean "confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent."
Seversky
September 7, 2009
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