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Deep Blue Never Is (Blue, That Is)

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In the comment thread to my last post there was a lot of discussion about computers and their relation to intelligence.  This is my understanding about computers.  They are just very powerful calculators, but they do not “think” in any meaningful sense.  By this I mean that computer hardware is nothing but an electro-mechanical device for operating computer software.  Computer software in turn is nothing but a series of “if then” propositions.  These “if then” propositions may be massively complex, but software never rises above an utterly determined “if then” level.    This is a basic Turing Machine analysis. 

This does not necessarily mean that the output of computer software is predictable.  For example, the “then” in response to a particular”if” might be “access a random number generator and insert the number obtained in place of the variable in formula Y.”  “Unpredictable” is not a synonym for “contingent.”  Even if an element of randomness is introduced into the system, however, the way in which the computer will employ that random element is determined. 

Now the $64,000 question is this:  Is the human brain merely an organic computer that in principle operates the same way as my PC?”  In other words, does the Turing Machine also describe the human brain ?  If the brain is just an organic computer, even though human behavior may at some level be unpredictable, it is nevertheless determined, and free will does not exist.  If, on the other hand, it is not, if there is a “mind” that is separate from though connected to, the brain, then free will does exist. 

This issue has been debated endlessly, and I refer everyone to The Spiritual Brain for a much more in depth analysis of this subject.   For my purposes today, I propose to approach the subject via a very simple thought experiment. 

First a definition.  “Qualia” are the subjective responses a person has to objective experience.  Qualia are not the experiences themselves but the way we respond to the experiences.  The color “red” is the classical example.  When light of wavelength X comes into my eye, my brain tells me I am seeing the color red.  The quale (singular of “qualia”) is my subjective experience of the “redness” of red.  Maybe the “redness” of red for me is a kind of warmth.  Other qualia might be the tanginess of a sour taste, the sadness of depression, etc.

Now the experiment:  Consider a computer equiped with a light gathering device and a spectrograph.   When light of wavelength X enters the light gathering device, the spectrograph gives a reading that the light is red.  When this happens the computer is programmed to activate a printer that prints a piece of paper with the following statement on it “I am seeing red.”

I place the computer on my back porch just before sunset, and in a little while the printer is activated and prints a piece of paper that says “I am seeing red.”

 Now I go outside and watch the same sunset.  The reds in the sunset I associate with warmth, by which I mean my subjective reaction to the redness of the reds in the sunset is “warmth.”

1.  Did the computer “see” red?  Obviously yes.

2.  Did I “see” red.  Obviously yes.

3.  Did I have a subjective experiences of the redness of red, i.e., did I experience a qualia?  Obviously yes.

4.  Did the computer have a subjective experience of the redness of red, i.e., did it experience a qualia?  Obviously no.

Conclusion:  The computer registered “red” when red light was present.  My brain registered “red” when red light was present.  Therefore, the computer and my brain are alike in this respect.  However, and here’s the important thing, the computer’s experience of the sunset can be reduced to the functions of its light gathering device and hardware/software.  But my experience of the sunset cannot be reduced to the functions of my eye and brain.  Therefore, I conclude I have a mind which cannot be reduced to the electro-chemical reactions that occur in my brain.

Comments
It keeps going on, very interesting but ignoring the actual evidence. As I posted in #63 (and backed up with a lot of data in #107), "Although this philosophical/metaphysical debate is interesting, it is basically dry and empty, since it blandly ignores a mountain of empirical evidence for a “spiritual” or nonphysical component to man’s consciousness."magnan
January 17, 2008
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-----DaveScot writes, "A concept has no mass or energy but can you explain to me how it may exist without mass or energy to encode it? How is a thought stored if not in patterns of matter and energy? How can a thought exist in a perfect void? I’m not claiming it can’t. I’m claiming that there is no known way that thought can be independent of matter and energy." From the scientific perspective, I don’t think we can comment on it, at least not yet. However, it seems that, philosophically, we must posit a non-material mind that has the capacity to resist and eventually overrule the brains impulses and influence the physical world of cause and effect. It seems to me that the non-material mind produces and receives non-material thoughts, while the material brain produces and receives electrical impulses and other physical properties. In other words, the mind and the brain each produces something in its own image and likeness; each interacts with and influences the other; each plays a role in acquiring knowledge. A non material mind senses an object outside of itself, receives a non-material image that corresponds to a non-material form present in the object. Naturally, the mind is dependent on the brain in some fashion, but it can also exert its own influence on the brain and all other parts of the body. Obviously, I am assuming something like a spiritual soul, consisting of an intellect and will. We can’t accept the simplistic formula of materialism, because we have to reconcile causation with responsibility and free will. I am also assuming that both the mind and the brain play a role in storing information and retaining memories. We have two choices: either we accept the contradictions and absurdities of materialism (monism) and determinism, or we embrace the paradox of mind/body dualism. I don’t think there is a third choice. So, yes, I am claiming that a thought MUST be independent of matter and energy in order not be be their slave.StephenB
January 17, 2008
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----Daniel Kind: "Isn’t ID agnostic about what brings or brought about that design?" Sure. I refer not to the entity that brings about the design but the person that perceives it. I submit that from a philosophical perspective you can't perceive a design with a brain, you need a non-material mind. I don't think science can comment on the subject---at least not yet.StephenB
January 17, 2008
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StephenB asks, in 157, "Do you not appreciate the connection between your reluctance to acknowledge the non-material realm and your skepticism about ID?" Although that is a loaded question, I say "Yes I do". It is a requisite to have some level of skepticism about sciences, even ID. DaveScot and Daniel above give good reasons that the sketicism, within the framework of a science using the scientific method, is appropriate. StephenB says "Like many in your camp you are looking for that fourth alternative—some explanation that does not involve either law, chance, or agency." Actually, I'm much more interested in the demonstrable boundaries between each. Only if the pursuit of the boundaries leads toward a fourth explanation should one be considered, IMO.Q
January 17, 2008
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stephenb A concept has no mass or energy but can you explain to me how it may exist without mass or energy to encode it? How is a thought stored if not in patterns of matter and energy? How can a thought exist in a perfect void? I'm not claiming it can't. I'm claiming that there is no known way that thought can be independent of matter and energy. That said, I acknowledge that physics is incomplete at the extremes of large and small. We have no quantum theory of gravity and we have no idea what comprises what's believed to be the bulk of the universe as revealed by observation of the motions of large objects such as galaxy clusters and at the far fringes of the observable universe. This unknown stuff is called dark energy and is thought to homogenously permeate the universe and reveals itself as an anti-gravitational force cumulatively over great distances. If this dark energy permeates the universe and effects normal matter and energy through gravity and we don't have a quantum theory of gravity who's to say that this force isn't quite homogenenous at the smallest scale and isn't enough to tip the scales of quantum uncertainty in favor of one result or another. This could very well be the basis of what is usually thought of as the supernatural. If we had a more complete physics what's supernatural under today's physics might be quite natural in light of tomorrow's better understanding. That's par for the course for science - turning the supernatural into the natural. DaveScot
January 17, 2008
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StephenB:
ID cannot prove the existence of minds; it assumes the existence of minds.
Why is it necessary to posit a "mind"? Isn't this "begging the question"? Isn't the aim of ID to identify "design" in nature (independent of human agency)? Isn't ID agnostic about what brings or brought about that design?Daniel King
January 17, 2008
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-----Q "This is also not to state that I have concluded that brain and mind are or are not separable. In obvious cases, there are good arguments." Why is it that those who would deny the existence of the mind express the point indirectly by saying that they have not yet reached a decision on the matter? That you cannot make the affirmation is telling enough. That you express no convictions about free-will agency is even more telling. Do you not appreciate the connection between your reluctance to acknowledge the non-material realm and your skepticism about ID? ID cannot prove the existence of minds; it assumes the existence of minds. The brain is nothing but a physical organ capable only of sense impressions, extended in the world of physical realities. A design inference, or any concept for that matter, cannot make its appearance there because it has no weight or mass. Only a non-material mind can receive a non-material thought, and only those who believe in both can accept any such thing as a design inference. It seems that you have ruled out the concept of intelligent agency apriori, and all of your objections are extensions of that prior commitment. No amount of scienific evidence or argument from analogy can overcome your presupposition that the explanatory filter simply may not cover all the bases, or that its component parts cannot be successfully isolated from one other, or that they cannot be analyzed in a sequencial manner. Like many in your camp you are looking for that fourth alternative---some explanation that does not involve either law, chance, or agency. As W. C. Fields once put it, you are "looking for loopholes."StephenB
January 17, 2008
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StephenB, in 147, mentions You don’t seem to appreciate what Barry A has accomplished with this post. In effect he has approached the mind/brain problem from both a scientific and a philosophical vantage point. Actually, I do appreciate BarryA's post. My approach to the analysis is a bit different, and I arrive at somewhat different conclusions. Not firm conclusions like your suggestion that I "disavow the existence of the mind". But, instead, the conclusions I reach require that we admit some level of ignorance (not only incredulity), i.e. that our explanations are innately limited. This is the main reason I object to KF's posts, and less with BarryA's posts. I read BarryA's conclusion as consistent within his given scenario. KF's are not. He breaks the rules of good science with his extrapolations. My main interest in the pursuit of ID is not to explore the obvious problems in which there is an obvious solution. Sure, computers are so simple as to not exhibit what is called qualia. Sure, human brains are so complex that they do. I want to see how those claims hold up when extended into the not-so-obvious domain. Such domain does exist, because things occurs in a continuum - one of my givens to approach these problems. By extrapolation, we can expect to see some brains that are less complex, and some computing machines that are more complex, and at some point, the lines of obvious-ness will be blurred. That is where things will be really interesting for ID. At that stage, experiments will be needed. Even some refinement of terms, possibly. But, while simple thought experiments may provide extrapolated clues, they will not be able to provide a sufficiently confident answer. This is not a strawman argument, as KF is insisting. It is essential to basic tenets of ID - the filters aren't cast in stone, they are built around probabilities, and we don't at this time know on which side of the filter every situation resides. Obvious situations, sure. But not all. This is also not to state that I have concluded that brain and mind are or are not separable. In obvious cases, there are good arguments. --- KF, continuing to defend his extrapolations in 152 I showed that many of Galileo’s most scientifically persuasive and telling cases were precisely where he took thought experiments that were not actually performed, or where he – the U-trough that led to the principle of inertia – idealised the real world and went beyond where experiment can go. But the experiments were performed. They were performed in many different ways. When they yielded results that differed from the prediction, the experiments were refined. The results of the experiments, although not demonstrating the ideal model Galileo may have described, have led to refinements to asymptotically reach the ideal model. And, the explanation of the ideal model was refined so that even you now agree that it is unattainable. KF asks Have you, Q, ever seen a perfectly smooth and actually friction-free trough? [Or even a friction-free air track or air table?]) No. And neither have you, I expect. Which is exactly the limitation of extrapolations I am discussing. It ties right back to the epistemology thread. In Rumsfeld form, we know what we know and we don't know what we don't know. ----- But, as others have mentioned, this seems to be quite a repetetive argument. I'm not conceding to KF, but I think I've made my point well enough that observers can see that KF's and my point are not totally contradictory. His arguments are quite fine for the black and white cases. I'm suggesting a more refined approach for the gray areas.Q
January 17, 2008
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Jerry: The posts and threads also serve as a tutorial cum forum that exposes people to the arguments and issues on both sides of the debates. When we can see that one side is on the merits and one is on the strawmen, then it is telling us something. (That is why after first arguing the ID case tentatively in another blog, I came to see that the argument is seriously compelling. That I saw seriously educated deeply informed and articulate technically competent people routinely getting hysterical and abusive in defence of their evo mat views was even more telling.) GEM of TKI PS: have a look at Rom 1:19 - 25 and 28 - 32. We have been down this sort of road before as a culture, and it would be wise to see where on history it is likely to lead.kairosfocus
January 17, 2008
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OOPS: Badly phrased point:
Is it contingent but sufficiently lacking in complexity that it could be accounted for by chance on the gamut of the cosmos as a whole acting as a vast lottery running at the rate of one trial every 10^-45 seconds, with one marked atom, and you could plunge your hand in anytime, anywhere and have a reasonable chance to pluck out that marked atom? If so, then, chance.
I meant that if the odds of winning this just identified lottery are worse or comparable to the odds of the configs in question coming about by chance, then chance is deemed -- very generously IMHBCO -- a reasonable explanation under the terms of the EF. Only if the odds of getting to functionality in the config space are much worse than that will the filter infer to agency as the most credible explanation. StephenB, also the point is that Q's mind guiding his body's servosystems [to type up his posts for instance] may be just lucky noise generating the intelligent director templates to guide his i/o processor to drive his hands etc to type out the messages. So it is possibly chance and necessity only at work, what with quantum indeterminacy to guarantee that random behaviour is conveniently accessible to the neuronal networks, to feed into the deterministic dynamics! Or, plainly speaking, we are right back at the incoherence of evolutionary materialism [as I said at 106 in the epistemology thread that led to this one]:
[evolutionary] materialism . . . argues that [a] the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature. Therefore, [b] all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of chance. But [c] human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this picture. Thus, [d] what we subjectively experience as “thoughts” and “conclusions” can only be understood materialistically as unintended by-products of the natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains. (These forces are viewed as ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance and psycho-social conditioning, within the framework of human culture.) Therefore, [e] if materialism is true, the “thoughts” we have and the “conclusions” we reach, without residue, are produced and controlled by forces that are irrelevant to purpose, truth, or validity. Of course, the conclusions of such arguments may still happen to be true, by lucky coincidence — but we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” them. And, if our materialist friends then say: “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must note that to demonstrate that such tests provide empirical support to their theories requires the use of the very process of reasoning which they have discredited! Thus, [f] evolutionary materialism reduces reason itself to the status of illusion. [g] But, immediately, that includes “Materialism.” For instance, Marxists commonly deride opponents for their “bourgeois class conditioning” — but what of the effect of their own class origins? Freudians frequently dismiss qualms about their loosening of moral restraints by alluding to the impact of strict potty training on their “up-tight” critics — but doesn’t this cut both ways? And, should we not simply ask a Behaviourist whether s/he is simply another operantly conditioned rat trapped in the cosmic maze? In the end, [h] materialism is based on self-defeating logic, and only survives because people often fail (or, sometimes, refuse) to think through just what their beliefs really mean. As a further consequence, [i] materialism can have no basis, other than arbitrary or whimsical choice and balances of power in the community [that is, might makes “right”], for determining what is to be accepted as True or False, Good or Evil. So, [j] Morality, Truth, Meaning, and, at length, Man, are dead . . .
Have fun getting out of this vicious spiral, Q. GEM of TKI GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 17, 2008
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I have two comments having just read StephenB's last post. Wow, what a great post that does not necessarily need any reference to what has proceeded. I have not followed this thread because of the time and interest in the topic itself. However, I often think that it would be great if someone would take the time to summarize the arguments made on these long involved threads. I know it is not going to happen because we all have time restrictions. StephenB's post is short and well worth preserving for future discussions so the lot of us don't spend 100+ comments rehashing the same material. My second comment is that the audience for our comments is not just each other here who actually write comments because that is a very small group. My experience is that few are moved very much to change their stripes based on discussions here. Instead they go to the wall, often with inanity and lack of logic to defend their beliefs. Can anyone name a Darwinist who has modified their views based on the comments expressed here about ID or even conceded that ID has a point? They inevitably leave quickly or get banned because of their intransigence or behavior. The threads are for those who don't comment and read the various arguments that are made and are open to a mind change. They are probably a small number of the viewers since I believe that most of the non-commenting viewers are mostly members of the choir just reinforcing their belief system but are unwilling to interject themselves into a debate.jerry
January 17, 2008
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7] These non-obvious, and relatively simple systems may or may not fall on the FCSI side of an explanatory filter. An experiment would be needed to demonstrate how well your analogy can be extrapolated to some of these non-obvious cases. WHAT such “simple systems” that manifest sufficient complexity of function to be relevant while being safely on the chance side of the EF threshold? How do these systems relate to the systems that are explicitly in view that ARE on the beyond the reach of chance side of the extended UPB? Oh . . I get it: this is “climbing Mt Improbable” step by step from simple to complex again. Basic problem: the threshold of relevant functionality for the storage element mainly in view, DNA [RNA is in effect an extension of DNA and the five key nucleic acids just implied, ACGTU are hard to get to in any plausible pre-biotic soup], is MANY ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE beyond the UPB. DNA of typical scale at least 300k - 500 k elements, to code for dozens to hundreds of proteins of typical length 300 monomers. 4^300k ~ 9.94 *10^180,617 cells in the config space, so islands of functionality of any reasonable scope are utterly lost in the config space of mostly non-functional cells. You have to get to the shores of life function to climb up to more and more effective function! And the experiments in question relvant to the microjets case are as simple as EXPT A:
how long will you need to wait for to get a drop of ink dripped in a glass of water to re-assemble by chance once diffused? [Ans: reliably, longer than the lifespan of the cosmos. Indeed, as Q knows [notice how above he never ever denied having at least a minor in physics or at least enough College-level physical science to understand what is going on] this is very close to the basis for the highly successful, enormously empirically well-supported, statistical thermodynamic version of the second law of thermodynamics.]
Similarly, EXPT B:
Collect the letters for a suitably long statement in English, say the just above last paragraph from EXPT A, which has in it by my count some 320 26-state letters. This is comparable in configurational complexity to a typical protein molecule. Now, take the letters and put them in a box, like Cicero, but don't simply shake and drop on the ground: take one out at a time, 320 times in succession, replacing the letter and shaking again after jotting down. How long on average will you have to wait for the 320 letters to give not even the same as the above, but ANY coherent sentence of at least 150 characters length? [Information theorists will immediately tell us, longer than the observed universe credibly has or will exist. Indeed, you may well see up to 6 letter words but once you go to 7-letter words and beyond, the performance will sharply drop off as rally long words are not so common in the space of possible configurations: 26^7 ~ 8.03*10^9, whilst the entire vocab of English when I was a HS student was routinely said to be 800,000 words.] Remember, in the relevant pre-biotic soups we need to get to dozens of proteins, the DNA to template them, and the algorithms and code and machinery to express all of the same – all by chance to get to the first level of functionality, thence chance + competition to get to enhanced functionality. Speculative models based on just-so stories that glide over such challenges are metaphysics, not science.
So we can safely take “non-obvious” to mean: not observed but here are some nice just-so stories. 8] As a side note, even Galileo backed up his thought experiments with actual experiments. That’s one of the main differences between him and Plato. Strawman again. As onlookers can confirm by looking above at say 116 then Q at 117 then my further at 118, I showed that many of Galileo's most scientifically persuasive and telling cases were precisely where he took thought experiments that were not actually performed, or where he – the U-trough that led to the principle of inertia – idealised the real world and went beyond where experiment can go. Since this is already a multi-parter, here is 118:
a –> Consider [Galileo's] U-troughs and metal balls rolling down then “trying” to get back up to their original level as he made the tracks smoother and smoother. b –> He then argued that in a perfectly smooth track, the balls would rise back to their original level. (Have you, Q, ever seen a perfectly smooth and actually friction-free trough? [Or even a friction-free air track or air table?]) c –> He then made the next in-thought extension: flatten out the rising arm, so that the ball is on a smooth in effect infinitely long track and never gets a chance to rise back to its original level. Thus, Galileo arrives at and in so doing warrants in effect Newton’s First Law of Motion [i.e., in our terms, of MOMENTUM], the law of inertia - BY EMPIRICALLY ANCHORED THOUGHT EXPERIMENT. (Actually, if memory serves, he mistakenly thought that the ball would go in a circle — going a bit far with the fact that the Earth has been known since 300 BC to be a sphere.) d –> This brings us to a slippery phrase that as one knowing about scientific inference to best explanation [IBE], you MUST know is utterly inappropriate to such a context for science: proof of new knowledge. [a cite from Q at 117] Scientific knowledge of consequence is provisional, and empirically testable and reliable, not “proved.” AND THE SLIPPING IN OF SUCH A LOADED CONCEPT TO PREJUDICE THE CASE IN A SITUATION WHERE YOU DON’T WANT TO GO WITH THE IMPLICATIONS OF IBE, IS SELECTIVE HYPERSKEPTICISM.
Q, one could be tempted to suggest that the rhetorical stratagem is to wait till enough time and commentary has passed to slip back in a refuted point as if it stands. But the better explanation is that you have either forgotten or simply never noticed the point in the first place. So, yet another sadly irrelevant, misunderstanding based strawman. Onlookers, at length the rhetorical pattern is painfully clearly exactly what I spoke to in 142. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 17, 2008
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5] you arrive at a wholly new conclusion using the process (That holds for DNA in OOL and OOBPLBD, and it holds for the underlying physics of a fine-tuned, life-facilitating cosmos.) The original system was not about DNA, and didn’t really mention fine-tuning. Even if the conclusion is right, your premises don’t lead that conclusion having the 100% confidence inherent in how it is written. Now, what is it that I actually said “holds for” DNA in OOL and OOBPLBD and OO POLFFTC? Let the record of post 144 speak:
11 –> Thence, when we observe the storage and transmission and use of such FSCI as system-functional information, we are well-warranted to infer to agency as the responsible force. That holds for DNA in OOL and OOBPLBD, and it holds for the underlying physics of a fine-tuned, life-facilitating cosmos. So, now, Q: just where and why is it that — on inference to best explanation across live option alternatives relative to factual adequacy, logical and dynamical coherence and explanatory elegance/power — you find the above chain of reasoning defective?
But, in my actual argument, just what are we well-warranted [cf above for why] to infer to, and relative to just what observations?
a --> OBSERVATION: the storage and transmission and use of such FSCI as system-functional information b --> CONTEXT: the empirically known reliable origin of FSCI, thus andchoering the SCIENTIFIC INFERNCE that FSCI is a reliable sign of agency acting in intelligent design. c --> INFERENCE: On IBE in the context just summarised, agency is the best explanation of the observed FSCI. d --> Is this properly subject to the OBJECTION excerpted: “your premises don’t lead that conclusion having the 100% confidence inherent in how it is written”? e --> ANS: Plainly not – we are dealing with empirically anchored inferences on IBE as does all of science. In short this is a strawman objection that flies in the face of what I have explicitly and repeatedly directly stated – and this has been going on all the way back to 109 above, Q! (One is tempted to infer to deliberate misrepresentation [and at NCSE-ACLU level, aka Dr Barbara Forrest, whom I on good reason hold to be plainly dishonest and committing of what would in any other jurisdiction but the USA with its very poor libel laws, be seen in court as failure to carry out plain duties of care resulting in improper damage to reputation, careers etc -- that is credibly the case], but the more likely problem at this level is confusion and “seeing” what is “expected” of ID thinkers, but what is actually a distortion of what we have had to say.)
In short, yet again we see a strawman argument. And the convoluted, factually inapt and incoherent rhetoric in the immediately following gives the game away . . . 6] not all systems are as complex as your original scenario. Some are no where near as obviously so complex. DaveScot was correct in mentioning that some systems can assemble from materials exposed to random events (like a tornado in a junk yard). This is even more likely (many orders of magnitude more likely) if these materials are able to exert force over a distance - like with charge. Note that this is not an argument for life-origins - it is about your claims regarding the likelyhood of some basic storage and transmission systems arising without intelligent agency. Now, on points:
f --> The EF explicitly excludes the cases of functional discrete state information that are insufficiently complex to be beyond the credible reach of chance on the gamut of the cosmos. To advert to this at this stage as if that is a cogent objection is a strawman. g --> Dave Scott explicitly observed in 124 that: “my point was that properly designed proteins self-assemble into larger complex structures. If the component parts of jet aircraft were of the same nature as proteins then they too would self-assemble. That said, to create parts that self-assemble takes MORE design, not less, more teleology, not less.” h --> Onlookers, kindly note that I have first cited point xi at 110 above; which makes it plain that this last as just bolded is the precise context of my remarks, though it is clearer to say that proteins have a key-lock fitting mechanism that is based on the coding of the amino acid chain that makes them fold into precise shapes that then when the appropriate proteins are clustered close enough makes them slide together and “click” to perform life-functions. Also, in clarifying the cross-purpose remarks based on not observing that point, I have excerpted point xi at least twice since and referred to it many times. In particular, the proteins have to be made first which is where the FSCI enters the picture. i --> And BTW amino acids actually “prefer” to react with non-amino acids. That is part of why there is the elaborate, FSCI-reeking code-reading and chaining algorithmic mechanism in the cell to manufacture proteins as I excerpted at 116 from Wiki. j --> In short, yet another strawman. For, we are NOT dealing with the emergence of “basic” information storing and using systems – that the EF deliberately sorts out before going to an inferenfce on FSCI to agency as its credible source relative to what we do know on the origin of FSCI in directly observed cases, but highly sophisticated ones that are based on codes and algorithms that themselves are manifesting FSCI far beyond the reach of chance + necessity on the gamut of the cosmos. [THAT is why the pre-jet soup is so relevant to the postulated pre-biotic soup which alleges to plausibly show how proteins and DNA etc could self assemble by chance and necessity in plausible pre-life environments. The attempts manifestly fail and fail repeatedly because they do not have the dynamic power to account for the origin of FSCI.]
[. . .]kairosfocus
January 17, 2008
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3] This thread isn’t about life-origin models is it? BarryA didn’t bring that up, neither did I. So, I did not argue with your xi above. BarryA was dicussing qualia, and mind being separable from brain.) . . . Classic evasion. I came in at the request of AIG, in response to his 93, where he was inter alia discussing the issue of CSI – the superset to which FSCI belongs,and the issue he makes over what intelligence is. I did so by in part highlighting why we infer to intelligent agency as a causal force in seeing FSCI based on relevant statistical thermodynamics principles-based considerations. This can be seen in my remarks at 99, where I first address the issue of definition as epistemic, investigatory process. Then I conclude by excerpting the definition process used for intelligence in my always linked, which raises precisely the issues that I later addressed. In 103, I cited the Cicero case to show just how long since a sufficiently complex and functional digital string has been held to be a marker of agency at work. In short my observations are consistent with longstanding intuitive understanding. It is in that context and in the context of the typical selective hyperskepticism used in dismissal that I pointed to the significance of DNA as an illustrative example, and then introduced the microjets case of getting to DNA [and proteins etc] in a model of the pre-jet [cf prebiotic] soup. Note in this context, onlookers, that in 104, Q is addressing very similar matters, on the probability question. To do so, he raises the issue of the explanatory filter. (Indeed, in 111, repeating the dismissive mantra on weak arguments, he then went on to misrepresent my remarks on the EF, as if I were saying – just the opposite to what I do say, repeatedly and even insistently – that the EF produces a conclusion as by deductive argument rather than by provisional, empirically anchored inference to best and explanation.) It is in that general context of discussion that I laid out my summary argument ion 109 and gave the thought experiment in 110, which in point xi explicitly identifies that it is speaking to in effect the pre-jet soup as a model of the [statistical thermodynamics principles based] dynamics of the pre-biotic soup to bring out the issues on origin of discrete-state, functionally specified information bearing strings. [DNA string elements are 4-state, and protein string elements by and overwhelming large are 20-state.] As onlookers can easily see by scrolling back up, a subsequent talking at cross-purposes occurred when Dave Scott spoke to the microjets case on the assumption that I was speaking to protein-protein functional interactions [which, once proteins are duly assembled and put into proximity is “spontaneous”], and my continued assumption that we were both talking to the context of the pre-jet soup, as an analogy of the prebiotic soup – considered as a test case on the credibility of chance + necessity alone forming FSCI-bearing information strings [thence addressing the inference to intelligent agency as the most credible source of such FSCI] – led to Q's earlier dismissal attempt that my argument was not cogent. Subsequently, the matter of cross-purpose was clarified through pointing out point xi, but instead of addressing the issue on its merits, we are back to vague “weak agument” dismissals and evasions. Just as I pointed out in 142. BTW, it should be noted that by 113 I did take up the issue in the thread in the main:
on the main issue in the blog thread, I observe that, per AmH dict as a witness, the word empirical means: a. Relying on or derived from observation or experiment: empirical results that supported the hypothesis. b. Verifiable or provable by means of observation or experiment: empirical laws. It seems to me that our first person experience of ourselves as agents with reasonably reliable minds that manifest intelligence [e.g through producing functional information], and our consistent observation of others as agents fits in under this rubric. So, I think there is excellent reason to hold that no claimed account of intelligence that ignores or cannot credibly ground this fact and its origins on its premises, is a non-starter.
4] You arrive at a conclusion about the analogy (In short, it is an intelligent agent.) Sure. That is why the analogy was selected. At last we get to a specific “analogy.” If you had paused to read Derek Smith's argument, you would have seen that he was specifically speaking of the human body as a complex servosystem. Robots are the general class of the relevant servosystems [e.g consider the control of your arm], from the perspective of control systems engineering and cybernetics. In that context, he pointed out to the existence of two levels of controllers in an autonomous system, the first being the actual i/o control processor that drives effectors/actuators and draws in feedback information on the actual vs planned track of motion. The second is the intelligent director, as I described it, which images the relevant desired path ahead of time and sets up the track that the control loop proper can then track actual expected vs intended track, thence responding tot he difference between planned and actual track, reducintg information processign dramatically. Cf here points 3 – 5 in 142, noting how DS uses, “higher order controller” in a context that explicitly addresses freedom of conception of desired path, decision and action, i.e creative self-direction, actually using the concept “it is now capable of willed behaviour, or “praxis” .” [This also raises the implication of coming close to self-consciousness and qualia as raised by BarryA, though it does not directly address it. Certainly the autonomous servosysrtems in view are sensitive to their current and anticipated environments, select goals and paths to them, then act with management of actual vs intended performance. But that still leaves out own known self-awareness -- sense of I-ness and associated phenomena such as qualia – as an open question as to what it is and whence it comes from; though it is a massive empirical fact. ] ANALOGY , as a dismissal term on my use of “intelligent agent,” is plainly inapt once we are dealing with predictive control systems in which the efferent pattern may be creatively imaged and decided on well ahead of time. For, we are now dealing with intelligent, creative, decisional and complex, functional actions that generate FSCI that guides action ahead of time, and then triggers a servo-based regulatory process that keeps complex performace close to track. Of course, this invites the point that instinct can supply some of the higher order programming, but that immediately raises the point as to where did such FSCI-based programs come from other than by their empirically known best explanation [as again discused above]: agency. Also, so soon as autonomous creativity and its qualitatively different adaptability are to be reckoned with, intelligent agency is directly implicated in the servo-system. And, such is at least possibly the target of AI research. But the bottom-line is clear: the brain can, plainly, credibly be viewed as in material part an i/o processor with a major focus on execution and regulation rather than creativity. It acts on information but is nor credibly sourcing that information through lucky noise or empirically known mechanical regularities tracing to mechanical necessity. And from our own observation of agent action, we know that agents do produce such FSCI as a matter of routine behaviour – whether or no such sits easily with evo mat paradigms. But at this cross-paradigm scientific research programme level evo mat cannot properly claim to be a privileged position, nor may it self-servingly redefine science to suit its wishes. [. . .]kairosfocus
January 17, 2008
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Q: First, sorry on the T-A links; I mistakenly assumed that they would be still available. Doubtless they are now under the US$ 32 a peek walls that are now ever more common! And, the issue of crystallisation or vortex or convection cell formation in your linked in 146 – VERY BAD ANALOGIES, BTW! -- is relevant to the overall question, as it speaks to the formation of order under chance and necessity. But as has been known since the days of the OOL researchers leading up to Thaxton et al in the early 1980's, such “order” has little or nothing to do with the information-rich “organised complexity” that is functional and specific, in the cases of interest to us. Cf the discussion on the origin of the FSCI concept here in my always linked, App 3). You, unfortunately, therefore continue to show the force of my point on the rhetorical pattern at work. On select points: 1] Analogies are weak arguments . . .
[Q, 146]: unless analogies have 100% correlation to the topic being investigation, they will provide less than 100% of an explanation of that analogous topic . . . . But there is a huge spectrum of systems that can “store”, “transmit”, and exhibit “functionality”. Some will have very few parts. Some of these will not be so obviously complex that could automatically infer that they exhibit FCSI. Some will need to be actually evaluated to see on which side of each step of the explanatory filter they lie. Again, that is not arguable - a spectrum of possibilities does exist, and we presently have limited knowledge. So, my argument with your chain of reasoning, no matter how elegant, and no matter how many references you link to, is that your conclusion is too broad for your premises.
First, this is nicely vague. But, FYI, I am NOT arguing by "analogy," but have pointed -- right from the beginning [starting with the 50 BC cite of Cicero, which may be seen at the HEAD of my always linked and is cited above] to the key instance of FSCI. Namely, digital -- discrete-state -- information storage with sufficient string length that chance configurations are maximally unlikely to arrive at the islands of functionality in the vastness of the configuration space relative to reasonably available probabilistic resources. In short, if something stores or transfers information that requires the equivalent of significantly more than 500 - 1,000 2-state storage elements [the upper threshold being to allow precisely for LARGE islands of functionality], then for excellent reason we routinely and reliably infer to agency, not lucky noise as its credible source. Thus, when your block of text excerpted just above gets around to saying that some things store and transmit information that is functional, while being simple, you have again gone after a strawman. I am aware of such cases, and have no interest in them; I am perfectly willing to allow inferences that would improperly assign a simple design to chance. And tha tis exaclty what the explanatory filter deliberately does: is the matter traceable to law-like necessity – then not designed. Is it contingent but sufficiently lacking in complexity that it could be accounted for by chance on the gamut of the cosmos as a whole acting as a vast lottery running at the rate of one trial every 10^-45 seconds, with one marked atom, and you could plunge your hand in anytime, anywhere and have a reasonable chance to pluck out that marked atom? If so, then, chance. Only on cases significantly beyond the reach of chance on the gamut of the cosmos, are we interested in inferring to design as the best explanation. And indeed, we routinely do just that in cases of the digital strings in say this blog thread . In short, “simple” cases of functionality are irrelevant to the cases of interest that DO exhaust the available probabilistic resources of the observed cosmos: [a] OOL based on DNA of credible minimal chain length 300 - 500,000 bases [600,000 - 1,000 bits, translating to 2-state digital equivalents], [b] OOBPLBD that may require the innovation of 100,000,000 or more such elements dozens of times to account for the Cambrian life revolution, [c] the informational requirements to get the finetuning of the observed fine of our life-habitable cosmos. [On this last, proposing vast multiples of the cosmos with randomly jiggled parameters etc is precisely an admission of just how much information needs to be accounted for -- it is a crude attempt to exhaust the config space requirements by assuming a vast invisible cluster of unobserved sub-cosmi]. 2] my argument with your chain of reasoning, no matter how elegant, and no matter how many references you link to, is that your conclusion is too broad for your premises. Naked, dismissive assertion based on a strawman. Again, my premises are – as just yet again summarised and as may be read at length in the always linked -- in the first instance relative to cases of sufficiently complex, functionally specific digital strings. [And recall, digital does not mean just 2-state.] My initial observation is that on grounds tied to basic principles of thermodynamics that underly the phenomenon of diffusion for instance, and on direct empirical observation, in all cases where we directly know the origin of FSCI, it is a product of agency. So, on induction through empirically anchored inferencer to best – and of course provisional [i.e. Falsifiable] – explanation, FSCI is a reliable marker of agent action. Indeed, as the Derek Smith link and excerpts I made in 142 show, this is sensible as agents are able to envision a suitable pattern of configurations and control actuators to move towards the islands of probable functionality in the config space. Thence, they are able to refine the functionality towards better and better results through hill-climbing, improving-of-performance behaviour: practice makes perfect. But in so doing what they have first done is to use background knowledge and/or imagination to isolate likely sites of islands of desirable functionality in the config space, i.e. they have cut out most of the search required by a random-walk starting from an arbitrary location. [And as my thought experiment, Hoyle's similar one on a grander scale and of course Robert Shapiro's remarks in Sci Am as excerpted in 116 above all show, this is not by any means an irrelevant consideration!] Let us then look at he points in say no 135, the key issue and contentions I to IV:
My key claim is simple: the core issue is where the software and reference inputs in the brain acting as controller, come from. And of course both of these are informational issues — surprise . . . . I, non-robot, contend I: that such a “software” and purposive self-determination require information storage capacity plainly far beyond UPB, so that chance is an inadequate explanation of the complex and highly specified information that is functional in intelligent life, and hard or soft-wired into our neural network architecture brains — very different from the Von Neumann archi of the classic digital computer [That is we are dealing with FSCI, for which rthe best, empirically anchored explanation is agent action.] . . . . I contend II: that we are contingent and live in a contingent cosmos, on the evidence in hand. That points to a further cosmogenetic agent of vast power and intelligence as the relevant necessary being to adequately explain the empirical data of the cosmos and us as contingent agents within it. I further contend, III: that this view is coherent, factually [empirically] adequate and explanatorily powerful and elegant; though unpalatable to the modernist mentality. Finally, I contend IV: that on a reasonable — historically well warranted and philosophically non-question begging, classical — “definition” of science, such an approach is scientific and potentially fruitful of inquiry. For we may freely explore the dynamics and programming of he i/o processor and its effects on the biotech robot, within the moral limitations of dealing with minds/souls that are ends in themselves.
[. . .]kairosfocus
January 17, 2008
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StephenB wrote Take the final step and concede that all of our attempts to persuade each other are futile. - how can he concede to do anything if he's just "following orders"? There's no answer to the "why" you're asking; he just doesari-freedom
January 17, 2008
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Q: You don’t seem to appreciate what Barry A has accomplished with this post. In effect he has approached the mind/brain problem from both a scientific and a philosophical vantage point. In other words, he is using the reasoned conclusions of each discipline to verify the reasoned conclusions arrived at by the other. In my judgment, kairosfocus has adequately addressed the scientific difficulties involved. So much so, that I think it is time to get to the bottom line, because I don’t think you are going to accept the scientific evidence for the reality of the mind. I notice, for example, that you have neither commented on or even read “The Spiritual Brain.” So I think it is time to change direction and face the philosophical point. Here is Barry A’s proposition: {1}Free will requires the presence of a non-mind independent of the brain. {2}a non-material mind independent of the brain indicates free will. This is an extremely revealing comment. In philosophy, it is known as a bi-conditional proposition, which means, If A/then B. Also, If B/then A. Usually, that pattern does not hold in logic, but it does hold here. Barry A is right but you seem to shrug off all of the implications involved. Inasmuch as you disavow the existence of the mind, it is time to make the corresponding assertion about volition---go ahead and reject free will and complete the cycle. Take the final step and concede that all of our attempts to persuade each other are futile. We are nature’s plaything, and the laws of nature operating through our “brain” dictate our every move. Given your perception of reality, why you bother to raise objections at all. If your world view is true, then Kairosfocus, myself and everyone else on this blog do what we do only because fate requires it of us. We are, for wnat of a better term, determined to think and act as we do. Since we have no volitional powers, why do you appeal to them? Why raise objections in an attempt to influence when it has already been established that only non-material minds can influence or be influenced? Why propose a change of direction when only intelligent agencies have the power to do that? Since brains are subject to physical laws of cause and effect, they cannot rise above them and, therefore, cannot affect them. Brains cannon influence brains. Why then, do you ask any of us to change our minds when, in your judgment, there are no minds to change?StephenB
January 17, 2008
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OK, on the merits: First, it is a given that unless analogies have 100% correlation to the topic being investigation, they will provide less than 100% of an explanation of that analogous topic. So, when you ask just where and why is it that — on inference to best explanation across live option alternatives relative to factual adequacy, logical and dynamical coherence and explanatory elegance/power — you find the above chain of reasoning defective?, my first point is that your analogy is less than 100% representative of all possible such systems. For extreme systems with obviously complex interactions, sure, let's not argue. But there is a huge spectrum of systems that can "store", "transmit", and exhibit "functionality". Some will have very few parts. Some of these will not be so obviously complex that could automatically infer that they exhibit FCSI. Some will need to be actually evaluated to see on which side of each step of the explanatory filter they lie. Again, that is not arguable - a spectrum of possibilities does exist, and we presently have limited knowledge. So, my argument with your chain of reasoning, no matter how elegant, and no matter how many references you link to, is that your conclusion is too broad for your premises. (BTW, I was unable to link to the Trevors and Abel links you provided. But, this link http://www.iscid.org/boards/ubb-get_topic-f-6-t-000674.html about "Self-organization vs. self-ordering events in life-origin models" does. This thread isn't about life-origin models is it? BarryA didn't bring that up, neither did I. So, I did not argue with your xi above. BarryA was dicussing qualia, and mind being separable from brain.) --- To fisk your argument (ellipses are used for brevity, and not to hide parts of a quote available directly above): You start with the analogy of brain as machine (... the brain serves as the i/o processor for the mind acting as intelligent director...; ... architecture of servo control loops in the human body considered as a bio-robot controlled by the brain ...; ... the intelligent director for the controller and of associated required memory...) Nothing really to dispute here, as it is setting up the analogy. You arrive at a conclusion about the analogy (In short, it is an intelligent agent.) Sure. That is why the analogy was selected. Then, you extend the analogy to a new scenario (... Thence, when we observe the storage and transmission and use of such FSCI as system-functional information, we are well-warranted to infer to agency as the responsible force.) This is where you apply an inference to the general case of FCSI. Note that it does not correlate 100% to the original analogy. Finally, you arrive at a wholly new conclusion using the process (That holds for DNA in OOL and OOBPLBD, and it holds for the underlying physics of a fine-tuned, life-facilitating cosmos.) The original system was not about DNA, and didn't really mention fine-tuning. Even if the conclusion is right, your premises don't lead that conclusion having the 100% confidence inherent in how it is written. As I mentioned, not all systems are as complex as your original scenario. Some are no where near as obviously so complex. DaveScot was correct in mentioning that some systems can assemble from materials exposed to random events (like a tornado in a junk yard). This is even more likely (many orders of magnitude more likely) if these materials are able to exert force over a distance - like with charge. Note that this is not an argument for life-origins - it is about your claims regarding the likelyhood of some basic storage and transmission systems arising without intelligent agency. These non-obvious, and relatively simple systems may or may not fall on the FCSI side of an explanatory filter. An experiment would be needed to demonstrate how well your analogy can be extrapolated to some of these non-obvious cases. As a side note, even Galileo backed up his thought experiments with actual experiments. That's one of the main differences between him and Plato.Q
January 16, 2008
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PS: FYI Q, it also takes up far more to responsibly address an objection on the substance implicated, than it does to assert the objection and use it as a dismissal to fend off an issue rather than actually consider the matter carefully and fairly on the balance of the merits. [That's how the classic fallacy of the closed mind works, insofar as it is "rational." Emotional prejudices we can of course dismiss as irrelevant to this discussion, surely.] In sum: Dismissals do not have to be accurate, they do not need to be balanced or balancing, they do not need to adduce facts and make arguments by explanation or by implication from accepted points, nor do they need to look at comparative difficulties. By sharp contrast, serious and responsible arguments do. So, let us return to the merits.kairosfocus
January 16, 2008
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Q: In re: it is incorrect to assume that it suggests any strength to your arguments - that strength comes directly from how well the arguments stand up against analysis, not whether the analysis stops. You just substantiated my point! Onlookers, observe the typical evo mat [and of course fellow-traveller] assertion/ assumption/ inference that the design theory conclusion is "unsubstantiated" or "weak" or a fallacy etc. Then, as the above thread documents, the attack is to the red herring leading out tot he strawman that is duly knocked over. Depending on the case, it is then left on the ground or subjected to mayhem or even soaked in oil and ignited to cloud the atmosphere and poison it. Then, when the flames are doused and the atmosphere is given a chance to clear -- whoops, there goes another red herring leading out to yet another strawman. In short, the meta-level analysis reveals a telling rhetorical pattern frequently resorted to by those who have institutional power but nor solidity on the merits, in defence of an agenda. And of course, coming down from the level of a NCSE or an ACLU to a Q, that then leads to multiple layers of red herrings, a creowd of oil-soaked strawmen a-burning and a very clouded and poisoned atmosphere. So, back to the beginning, i.e Cicero:
Is it possible for any man to behold these things, and yet imagine that certain solid and individual bodies move by their natural force and gravitation, and that a world so beautifully adorned was made by their fortuitous concourse? He who believes this may as well believe that if a great quantity of the one-and-twenty letters, composed either of gold or any other matter, were thrown upon the ground, they would fall into such order as legibly to form the Annals of Ennius. I doubt whether fortune could make a single verse of them. How, therefore, can these people assert that the world was made by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, which have no color, no quality—which the Greeks call [poiotes], no sense? [Cicero, THE NATURE OF THE GODS BK II Ch XXXVII, C1 BC, as trans Yonge (Harper & Bros., 1877), pp. 289 - 90.]
Onlookers, do you see any credible reason to conclude that on the gamut of the observed universe, chance + necessity can spontaneously create FSCI-bearing configurations? Why then is there always an objection to the FACTS:
[i] that the only directly known cause of FSCI is agency, and [ii] that on grounds of how hard it is to get by random walk from arbitrary initial points to isolated islands of function in vast config spaces specified by FSCI, we will reliably -- on good statistical thermodynamics principles as already discussed and exemplified [and BTW, thought experiments ARE from Galileo on used as part of the warranting process of modern science pace Q's objections] -- starve for probabilistic resource exhaustion on the gamut of the cosmos before we can reach to the shores of bare functionality so that much-beloved hill-climbing optimisation algorithms [such as NS in various forms] can move on towards "the fittest."
In short, chance + necessity alone do not credibly account for FSCI relative to principles of scientific induction. But, agency is KNOWN to routinely do so. So, inference to agency on cases where we just happened not to be there to directly observe is reliably warranted and routinely used all over science. Indeed, it is selective hyperskepticism that suddenly objects when evo mat assertions are under challenge by the direct implications of key cases in point. Let's cut to the chase, in points:
1 --> Q, this thread is about the nature of agency, in light of the significance of agency. [For brevity, cf, BarryA's OP. That's another complaint -- refusal to look at references or quote-minig od references e.g. the missing of my point xi above.] 2 --> Incidental to that, the issue of the legitimacy of inference to probabilistic resource exhaustion by random searches on a ocnfig space came up, leading to my example of the scaled-down Fred Hoyle tornado makes a jumbo as it passes through a junkyard in Seattle. [Onlookers, observe the tiptoe-away once the relevance of xi was highlighted on the strawman objection on protein-protein interaction being "spontaneous -- also Dave Scott's point that if components are so-made that they self-cluster for working, that is a sign of MORE design, not less.] 3 --> Back on point, I have highlighted that it is arguable that the brain serves as the i/o processor for the mind acting as intelligent director, using Derek Smith's exploration of cybernetics issues as a context. 4 --> In particular, I have pointed to the significance of the architecture of servo control loops in the human body considered as a bio-robot controlled by the brain, the information storage transmission and algorithmic processing requirements and their implications for the presence of multi-layered FSCI. [This is already well beyond the credible reach of chance on the gamut of the cosmos, cf. Trevors and Abel (in a peer-reviewed article), also here in a second peer-reviewed ID-supportive article, on the implications of sequence complexity.] 5 --> Further to this, I have also pointed to the significance of Smith's introduction of the intelligent director for the controller and of associated required memory, imaginative projection of scenarios for action, decision-making etc. 6 --> Namely, and autonomous sophisticated servo- system sufficient to manage the functions of a bio-robot, is highly information-rich, and that with information that is imaginative, speculative, exploratory and creative, though anchored to real-world experience. 7 --> In short, it is an intelligent agent. 8 --> Further more, it draws on the "imaginative info-sphere" of likely to be effective dynamical configuration and change models, to guide i/o control and actuation, which act into the world to effect desired purposes and achieve goals. 9 --> These imaginative infosphere models are creative and reasoned based on the logic of the dynamics of functional islands in configuration spaces, not at all the fruit of random walks from arbitrary initial positions. Precisely, they are the work of intelligent agents. 10 --> So, we see again that when we observe say the FSCI of this comment, we infer to actuation under intelligent agent control acting through fingers and PC technology to end up as messages sent and posted at the UD blog, not mere lucky noise. Mind over matter in short. 11 --> Thence, when we observe the storage and transmission and use of such FSCI as system-functional information, we are well-warranted to infer to agency as the responsible force. That holds for DNA in OOL and OOBPLBD, and it holds for the underlying physics of a fine-tuned, life-facilitating cosmos.
So, now, Q: just where and why is it that -- on inference to best explanation across live option alternatives relative to factual adequacy, logical and dynamical coherence and explanatory elegance/power -- you find the above chain of reasoning defective? [Worldview-level question-begging and/or selective hyperskepticism are not allowed. Also, you should reckon with Trevors and Abel's two peer-reviewed papers -- even if only the abstracts and whatever dipping you need to do to make sense of the summaries -- in your answer.] GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 16, 2008
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KF, mentions in 142, "(That is beginning to suggest to me that the ID case is sufficiently strong on the merits that the objections are rooted in distractions, miscommunications and side-issues — inadvertent or in some cases at say NCSE or ACLU levels, probably agenda-driven.)" Now please don't take this the wrong way, but your posts are invariably really long and cover a lot of ground. I've tried to discuss specifics of some of the posts with you, but because of the quantity of topics in your posts, it becomes difficult to stay focussed. (Maybe my deficiency, in that I can't tell the forest from the trees.) But, it is incorrect to assume that it suggests any strength to your arguments - that strength comes directly from how well the arguments stand up against analysis, not whether the analysis stops. I would prefer it if we could discuss specific issues, even if they are side-issues exploring variants of larger topics being raised. (Note that I'm not addressing any strength or weakness of any positions, but instead am addressing the process in which those points are discussed.)Q
January 16, 2008
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Kairos, GP and others (incl esp Q and AIG): First, I had hoped, over the past few days, that once the cross-purpose remarks, distractions and resulting confusions were cleared, there would now be a discussion of serious direct and incidental issues on this very important thread on AI and related ID issues, on the merits. I therefore find it highly interesting that once the situation cleared over the past few days, the field was abandoned to the ID supporters; as (by and large) happened with the previous Epistemology thread, thread NFL theorems thread and the Amazon thread. (That is beginning to suggest to me that the ID case is sufficiently strong on the merits that the objections are rooted in distractions, miscommunications and side-issues -- inadvertent or in some cases at say NCSE or ACLU levels, probably agenda-driven.) Be that as it may, I have raised the Derek Smith remarks on cybernetics and the interesting historical incident in Acts 27 as a context for further development of the key questions of this thread. For instance: 1] DS, in the previously linked on control and the use of information:
to have control you have to be able to manipulate information. Specifically, you need to transmit information on how you want your mechanism to perform in the first place, then you need to receive information on how things are currently going (in order to keep that performance within tightly preset limits of acceptability), and then you need to transmit information whenever you want to make the necessary adjustments. This gives you two types of control information. The transmitted information is feedforward - the information which instructs a mechanism or process on what needs to be done, and the received information is feedback - information coming back from that mechanism or process, and telling you how things are progressing. These two fundamental types of information then circulate in a very special way in what is known as a control loop. This is a mechanism (such as Lee's or Mead's) for detecting deviations from some preset standard, and for taking appropriate corrective action.
In short, once we see tight, feedback-based control in the face of environmental disturbance, we have significant information processing in the context of a specific architecture and algorithmic framework. This of course very rapidly exceeds the UPB, and plainly manifests FSCI. 2] Another important control concept emerged with the development of power-assisted steering for ships. Here, too, the essence of the problem was that muscle power alone was not enough . . . The turning of all such rudders required considerable manual effort especially in high seas, and in vessels of any size block-and-tackle systems had to be used to "gear down" a lot of turns on the helm (ie. the steering wheel) to a small displacement of the rudder itself . . . . Servomechanisms (or "servos", or "slave systems") are important because they allow a small control system to control pieces of far heavier machinery. This is of course most directly relevant to the challenges in the Ac 27 case, which also allows us to distinguish local direction control and global decision-making, planning, management and emergency response on the path to the desired port, i.e control in the small and in the large for a mechanical displacement requiring considerable power. This is also relevant to animal navigation and to proposed autonomous robots that exhibit AI. 3] a comparator cannot actually do its job at all without some sort of memory capability, and things get worse in servo-assisted systems due to the physical separation of servo and controller . . . motor activity - efference - does not just induce movement, but also affects what is picked up by the senses. As soon as you start moving, proprioceptors will tell you about limb position and balance, cutaneous receptors will tell you about changes in touch, pain, temperature, and pressure, homeostatic systems will signal requests for blood pressure and blood glucose maintenance, and special senses (eyes and ears) will detect the changing visual and auditory shape of the world. The senses, in short, are involved every bit as much in motor activity as are the motor pathways. He then speaks to the practical solutions:
What efference copy systems do, therefore, is subtract what you expect your senses to tell you next from what they actually tell you next. This gives zero if things are going to plan, but a non-zero error signal if they are not. This comparison is achieved by momentarily storing an image of the main motor output - the efference copy - and by then monitoring what is subsequently received back from the senses - the reafference. The principal benefit, of course, comes when the two flows totally cancel each other out, because this leaves the higher controller free to get on with more important things. Every now and then, however, the system encounters some sort of external obstacle, or "perturbation". This causes the reafference not to match the efference copy, and this, in turn, causes the higher controller to be interrupted with requests for corrective action. And because the sensors in an efference copy system thereby become capable of confirming for themselves that the effectors are working to plan, this is a highly efficient way of reducing unnecessary network traffic.
This, BTW, has a lot to say to the significance of athletic visualisation of perfect performance as an aid to such performance! (And to how once we have got the knack through supervised or exploratory instruction and practice, we can then have "muscle memory" of how to do a skilled task "effortlessly.") Perhaps, not so BTW: this speaks straight into the issue of training of AI type systems! That brings us to: 4] An even more advanced way to make use of past experience is to develop some form of predictive control system, that is to say, a system where the efference at every level of the control hierarchy is prepared well ahead of actual need (up to seconds ahead in many cases, but hours or even days ahead in the case of more "strategic" predictions). Indeed, there is considerable insight to be gained (even as non-technologists) by considering the problems faced by robotics engineers. Maravall, Mazo, Palencia, Perez, and Torres (1990), for example, are among the many research teams working in this area, and have obtained good results with robots capable of constantly making guesses at what is coming next. Thus, we see what-if planning and foresight and anticipation of contingencies etc etc, thence all the issues of governance to plan and guide the ship to the best advantage of its company. unfortunately, unsound counsels prevailed and led to disaster. (And at a yet higher level, these freedoms of action and error were used by God in the account, to advance his own long-term strategy of moving Paul from Jerusalem to Rome!) That brings up the significance of issues tied to DS' fig 2: 5] This is a more powerful version of the control system shown in Figure 1. The three original modules are still there (albeit the internal logic is no longer shown), only now they have to support multiple muscle groups (top right), which, properly coordinated, allows the organism to develop significantly more complex behaviours such as swimming, running, flying, etc. There are also several important new modules (and important new memory resources to go with them). (1) a higher order controller (far left) replaces the external manual source of command information. This means that there is no longer any high-side system boundary, making the new layout self-controlling. That is to say, it is now capable of willed behaviour, or "praxis" That is, once there is an intelligent controller to drive the servo loops etc, there is now a capacity for autonomy: self-controlled behaviour. Thus now we have a conceptual apparatus to address the issue of the brain as a controller and the mind as the intelligent director that in effect feeds creative, decisional, configurational information to the lower level i/o processor, the controller. The evo mat contention is that such higher order direction is emergent from the lower order controller, and that it is in effect the product of a process of random variation and natural selection ultimately going back to the proposed events in a hypothesised pre-biotic soup aeons ago. The design argument on this is that the relevant entities, starting with the basic biochemistry of life, exhibit multiple tiers of FSCI which is beyond the probabilistically credible reach of random walk based config space initial searches [arrival of the fit -- not survival of the fittEST -- issue] that would be required to get us to the islands of functionality in the beyond merely astronomical sea of possible configurations. The vast majority of these are non-functional in the relevant senses. So, may we now proceed? GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 16, 2008
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#137 kairosfocus Very suitable: the WORD/REASON/LOGIC/INFORMATION himself as the author of creation! That looks like the fundamental ID prediction, and one that is being substantiated more and more tot he astonishment, anger and confounding of those who thought lucky noise and natural regularities tracing to mechanical necessity were enough . . I've always thought that the incipit of John's gospel is one of the most powerful statement of the intelligent and pervasivecreation by God, especially in the words (which in Greek sound even more effective): 3. PANTA DI AUTOU EGENETO KAI XWRIS AUTOU EGENETO OUDE EN O GEGONEN I think that this point should be more and more read by christians that are supporters of theistic evolution.kairos
January 15, 2008
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GP: In fact the issue of the Frankenstein destructive monster led to a first take on robotics which was a condition of slavery. In the 1990's,m Asimov more or less "oversaw" an emancipating, partnership-oriented revision to his laws:
In the 1990s, Roger MacBride Allen wrote a trilogy set within Asimov's fictional universe. Each title has the prefix "Isaac Asimov's", as Asimov approved Allen's outline before his death. These three books (Caliban, Inferno and Utopia) introduce a new set of Laws. The so-called New Laws are similar to Asimov's originals, with three substantial differences. The First Law is modified to remove the "inaction" clause (the same modification made in "Little Lost Robot"). The Second Law is modified to require cooperation instead of obedience. The Third Law is modified so it is no longer superseded by the Second (i.e., a "New Law" robot cannot be ordered to destroy itself). Finally, Allen adds a Fourth Law, which instructs the robot to do "whatever it likes" so long as this does not conflict with the first three Laws. The philosophy behind these changes is that New Law robots should be partners rather than slaves to humanity. According to the first book's introduction, Allen devised the New Laws in discussion with Asimov himself . . .
Onward in discussion various other playouts, the point of further modiufyinghte first law has been raised: a small group of robots claims that the Zeroth Law of Robotics itself implies a higher Minus One Law of Robotics: A robot may not harm sentience or, through inaction, allow sentience to come to harm. [But what if these sentient beings happen to be evil and destructive, a la Hitler and co or Stalin ands co?] This is all very interesting and shows the potential of sci fi [and related fantasy and apocalyptic of various stripes; cf the online book here on Islamic vs Christian apocalyptic and how this may play into our near-future . . .] to pay out models and test the core worldviews issues. Ze plot thickens my dear Dr Watson . . . GEM of TKI PS: I would like for us all to read the Derek Smith article on cybernetics just linked, and Acts 27, considered as a microcosm of cybernetics with active agent involvement [including the issue of of the supernatural-prophetic interacting with men making self-determined collective decisions shaped by rhetoric and by events . . .] -- including questions of democratic governance in a socio-technical systems context -- and then take this thread to the next level. I think we can do something serious with it, if we keep on issue!kairosfocus
January 15, 2008
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PPS: Finally found a useful discussion on control theory and related cybernetics, with nice pics, here.kairosfocus
January 15, 2008
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Hi, kairosfocus. Obviously, you are right: I just meant "proved" in the empirical scientific sense, that is supported by facts, not in the logico-mathematical sense of "demonstrated". It is good to be precise, anyway, given the general epistemological confusion in these debates, especially with darwinists/materialists. About your remark: "The real question is whether we can create embodied artificially intelligent agents", I would say: If we can, then they will not be purely material deterministic machines. But indeed, I believe that consciousness and intelligence are the manifestation of a "transcendental" I "through" complex phenomenic realities (bodies, minds, etc.). By the way, are you suggesting a racial discrimination against frankenstein monsters? :-)gpuccio
January 15, 2008
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Kairos: Thanks! Very suitable: the WORD/REASON/LOGIC/INFORMATION himself as the author of creation! That looks like the fundamental ID prediction, and one that is being substantiated more and more tot he astonishment, anger and confounding of those who thought lucky noise and natural regularities tracing to mechanical necessity were enough . . . GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 15, 2008
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PS, FYI: Asimov's laws of robotics (for guiding AI research and technology):
the Laws state the following: 1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. 2. A robot must obey orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law. 3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. Later, Asimov added the Zeroth Law: "A robot may not harm humanity, or, by inaction, allow humanity to come to harm"; the rest of the laws are modified sequentially to acknowledge this.
Note why I point out these are ethical not technical laws. (I also seem to recall, Singapore or some other jurisdiction wrote the laws into their Law.) GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 15, 2008
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A few notes: First, let us see if we can clear the air on microjets etc and cogently address the issues on the merits. BTW, GP . . .
Prelim note: proof is not in the remit of science, if it is understood as demonstration beyond rational dispute relative to axiomatic premises and empirical "facts" that are generally acceptable to rational beings. That, given the history, we can label the error of Galileo -- pope Urban VIII saw more clearly than he on this. What science can do is provide empirically anchored provisional warrant on inference to best explanation that is reliable in the world of our repeatable experiences. And, historical sciences are observational sciences that address once for all events so they really provide more or less "plausible" models of the natural regularities and chance patterns that may have acted in the past, as in effect a "science fiction" reconstruction of the unobserved distant past. So, we should not confuse geochronology and/or cosmological models and/or macroevolutionary and origin of life models with "an ideal, indisputably accurate view of the actual past (apart form minor details of course)" -- as too many evo mat advocates like to pretend that historical sciences provide; cf current US NAS statements. "Sciences" of the distant past, are at best plausible reconstructions that are consistent with the patterns and processes we observe in the here and now. At worst, they are deceptive images and stories "made to look [and sound] like" the men, birds, beasts, planets and stars of creation. (Cf. Rom 1 19 - 25 & 28 ff for this literary allusion.)
But, let us not forget the theme for the thread, so that I need to look at a few points: 1] MODEL: The brain as the mind's i/o control computer . . . Refer to BarryA, OP:
In the comment thread to my last post there was a lot of discussion about computers and their relation to intelligence. This is my understanding about computers. They are just very powerful calculators, but they do not “think” in any meaningful sense. By this I mean that computer hardware is nothing but an electro-mechanical device for operating computer software. Computer software in turn is nothing but a series of “if then” propositions. These “if then” propositions may be massively complex, but software never rises above an utterly determined “if then” level . . . . For example, the “then” in response to a particular”if” might be “access a random number generator and insert the number obtained in place of the variable in formula Y.” “Unpredictable” is not a synonym for “contingent.” Even if an element of randomness is introduced into the system, however, the way in which the computer will employ that random element is determined. Now the $64,000 question is this: Is the human brain merely an organic computer that in principle operates the same way as my PC?” . . . If the brain is just an organic computer, even though human behavior may at some level be unpredictable, it is nevertheless determined, and free will does not exist. If, on the other hand, it is not, if there is a “mind” that is separate from though connected to, the brain, then free will does exist.
As just re-excerpted, BarryA has posed the issue very well -- a mark of a good Attorney. [If I am ever in Colorado and need such help . . .] To put it in the appropriate control systems terms, we know the human body is in effect a bio-tech robot. (My favourite demo is to relax one of your hands, and use the other to press gently, first on the bulge of muscles in your forearm just beyond the elbow, then at the cluster of tendons at the writst, on the palm side. Your fingers will move like magic. It never fails to shock students who see it for the first time!) The brain is known to be the Input-output, control processor for the biotech robot. That brings us to . . . +++++++++ 2] PAUSE - controls 101 tutorial in a nutshell: As an introduction to the idea, look at the diagram here. [The Wiki article on control theory has a top-level diagram that fails to distinguish the controller from the actuator and plant in the feedforward path and so since a pic is worth a 1,000 words, it falls out of favour as a good first go-to 101 link. It also fails to show the significance of the comparator, which generates the error signal that drives the controller. When it comes to control theory, due to its supreme difficulties, I have a zero tolerance for basic errors.] I'll try a pseudo-diag,as I can find no easy simple one out there: [a] FEEDFORWARD PATH: ref i/ps [r(t)] -> COMP. -> e(t) -> CONTROLLER -> . . . -> ACTUATORS -> PLANT -> controlled o/ps, c(t) [b] FEEDBACK PATH: c(t) -> SENSORS + FEEDBACK -> b(t) b(t) -> COMPARATOR [c] COMPARATOR ACTION: r(t) - b(t) -> e(t) Summarising: --> The reference inputs r(t) give the purposive targets to the comparator-controller elements. [For us, that's the MIND; control theory is yet another situation in sci-tech where agency comes into the science] --> The comparator senses the ref i/ps and the fed back sensor data on the plant behaviour, to generate the error signal -- i.e it does a gap scale analysis. --> The conrtroller then tries to close the gap based on its error/gaps inputs, through driving actuators that act onthe plant in question. --> Of course, not all situations are controllable inthe face of external forces and noise etc --> And, feedback control lends itself to pathologies such as self-reinforcing oswcillations etc. [Turning negativce feedback into reinforcing feedback through lags inthe feedback process . . .] --> I will spare you the math on frequency and time domain continuous and discrete state analysis. [Let's just say that the complex frequency domain is an eye-opener! A great online look is here.] My key claim is simple: the core issue is where the software and reference inputs in the brain acting as controller, come from. And of course both of these are informational issues -- surprise. +++++++++ 3] The core "TKI school of thought" contention: I, non-robot, contend I: that such a "software" and purposive self-determination require information storage capacity plainly far beyond UPB, so that chance is an inadequate explanation of the complex and highly specified information that is functional in intelligent life, and hard or soft-wired into our neural network architecture brains -- very different from the Von Neumann archi of the classic digital computer. Such FSCI is vastly beyond the credible reach of lucky noise on the gamut of our observed cosmos. Thus, on inference to empirically anchored, best explanation, mind is the credible source of our agent behaviour, mind with significant [but not unlimited] freedom of choice and action that are not rooted in lucky noise (which is a-rational and unpredictable in the specific rather than decisional) or deterministic (thus unchoosable) natural regularities tracing to mechanical necessity alone. Further to this, I contend II: that we are contingent and live in a contingent cosmos, on the evidence in hand. That points to a further cosmogenetic agent of vast power and intelligence as the relevant necessary being to adequately explain the empirical data of the cosmos and us as contingent agents within it. I further contend, III: that this view is coherent, factually [empirically] adequate and explanatorily powerful and elegant; though unpalatable to the modernist mentality. Finally, I contend IV: that on a reasonable -- historically well warranted and philosphically non-question begging, classical -- "definition" of science, such an approach is scientific and potentially fruitful of inquiry. For we may freely explore the dynamics and programming of he i/o processor and its effects on the biotech robot, within the moral limitations of dealing with minds/souls that are ends in themselves. What is that definition of science? We need look no further for a good simple statement than reasonable, College-level dictionaries:
science: a branch of knowledge conducted on objective principles involving the systematized observation of and experiment with phenomena, esp. concerned with the material and functions of the physical universe. [Concise Oxford, 1990 -- and yes, they used the "z" Virginia!] scientific method: principles and procedures for the systematic pursuit of knowledge [”the body of truth, information and principles acquired by mankind”] involving the recognition and formulation of a problem, the collection of data through observation and experiment, and the formulation and testing of hypotheses. [Webster's 7th Collegiate, 1965]
That brings us to the issue: can we in turn create artificial intelligences? 4] Is AI possible? That, as GP pointed out, depends on what you mean by AI etc. But, we already know it is possible to create embodied intelligent agents, as we are just that! The real question is whether we can create embodied artificially intelligent agents -- not just sophisticated software and hardware that deterministically and/or by feeding in judicious amounts of random [or more usually pseudo-random] data, extends our natural ability to act into the world and solve problems etc. That sounds like a grand sci-tech project to me. [Just -- we must take case to obey Asimov's ethical laws of robotics so we avoid making Frankenstein monsters that would devour us! (AIG any guidance on controlling the many would-be Dr Strangeloves out there?] GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 15, 2008
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#130 Q I agree with the comment by gpuccio. And I add that the example you have provided is very ideal for a natural explanation at least for a short sequence of primes. In fact their presence in the frequency spectrum of a signal cou1d be simply due to some kind of spwecific emission event. In any case the presence of a long sequence of primes-frequencies PLUS the fact that ONLY those are present in the signal is a sure sign of non-natural production. #123 KF Maybe you can help us all sort this out? (Complete with an inspirational thought or two . . . just remember to translate the Greek this time!) What about this? I suppose translation isn't necessary :-) (John 1,1-3) 1 EN ARXH HN O LOGOS KAI O LOGOS HN PROS TON QEON KAI QEOS HN O LOGOS 2 OUTOS HN EN ARXH PROS TON QEON 3 PANTA DI AUTOU EGENETO KAI XWRIS AUTOU EGENETO OUDE EN O GEGONENkairos
January 15, 2008
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