Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Logic and First Principles, 2: How could Induction ever work? (Identity and universality in action . . . )

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In a day when first principles of reason are at a steep discount, it is unsurprising to see that inductive reasoning is doubted or dismissed in some quarters.

And yet, there is still a huge cultural investment in science, which is generally understood to pivot on inductive reasoning.

Where, as the Stanford Enc of Phil notes, in the modern sense, Induction ” includes all inferential processes that “expand knowledge in the face of uncertainty” (Holland et al. 1986: 1), including abductive inference.” That is, inductive reasoning is argument by more or less credible but not certain support, especially empirical support.

How could it ever work?

A: Surprise — NOT: by being an application of the principle of (stable) distinct identity. (Which is where all of logic seems to begin!)

Let’s refresh our thinking, partitioning World W into A and ~A, W = {A|~A}, so that (physically or conceptually) A is A i/l/o its core defining characteristics, and no x in W is A AND also ~A in the same sense and circumstances, likewise any x in W will be A or else ~A, not neither nor both. That is, once a dichotomy of distinct identity occurs, it has consequences:

Laws of logic in action as glorified common-sense first principles of right reason

Where also, we see how scientific models and theories tie to the body of observations that are explained or predicted, with reliable explanations joining the body of credible but not utterly certain knowledge:

Abductive, inductive reasoning and the inherent provisionality of scientific theorising

As I argued last time:

>>analogical reasoning [–> which is closely connected to inductive reasoning] “is fundamental to human thought” and analogical arguments reason from certain material and acknowledged similarities (say, g1, g2 . . . gn) between objects of interest, say P and Q to further similarities gp, gp+1 . . . gp+k. Also, observe that analogical argument is here a form of inductive reasoning in the modern sense; by which evidence supports and at critical mass warrants a conclusion as knowledge, but does not entail it with logical necessity.

How can this ever work reliably?

By being an application of the principle of identity.

Where, a given thing, P, is itself in light of core defining characteristics. Where that distinctiveness also embraces commonalities. That is, we see that if P and Q come from a common genus or archetype G, they will share certain common characteristics that belong to entities of type G. Indeed, in computing we here speak of inheritance. Men, mice and whales are all mammals and nurture their young with milk, also being warm-blooded etc. Some mammals lay eggs and some are marsupials, but all are vertebrates, as are fish. Fish and guava trees are based on cells and cells use a common genetic code that has about two dozen dialects. All of these are contingent embodied beings, and are part of a common physical cosmos.

This at once points to how an analogy can be strong (or weak).

For, if G has in it common characteristics {g1, g2 . . . gn, | gp, gp+1 . . . gp+k} then if P and Q instantiate G, despite unique differences they must have to be distinct objects, we can reasonably infer that they will both have the onward characteristics gp, gp+1 . . . gp+k. Of course, this is not a deductive demonstration, at first level it is an invitation to explore and test until we are reasonably, responsibly confident that the inference is reliable. That is the sense in which Darwin reasoned from artificial selection by breeding to natural selection. It works, the onward debate is the limits of selection.>>

Consider the world, in situation S0, where we observe a pattern P. Say, a bright, red painted pendulum swinging in a short arc and having a steady period, even as the swings gradually fade away. (And yes, according to the story, this is where Galileo began.) Would anything be materially different in situation S1, where an otherwise identical bob were bright blue instead? (As in, strip the bob and repaint it.)

“Obviously,” no.

Why “obviously”?

We are intuitively recognising that the colour of paint is not core to the aspect of behaviour we are interested in. A bit more surprising, within reason, the mass of the bob makes little difference to the slight swing case we have in view. Length of suspension does make a difference as would the prevailing gravity field — a pendulum on Mars would have a different period.

Where this points, is that the world has a distinct identity and so we understand that certain things (here comes that archetype G again) will be in common between circumstances Si and Sj. So, we can legitimately reason from P to Q once that obtains. And of course, reliability of behaviour patterns or expectations so far is a part of our observational base.

Avi Sion has an interesting principle of [provisional] uniformity:

>>We might . . . ask – can there be a world without any ‘uniformities’? A world of universal difference, with no two things the same in any respect whatever is unthinkable. Why? Because to so characterize the world would itself be an appeal to uniformity. A uniformly non-uniform world is a contradiction in terms.

Therefore, we must admit some uniformity to exist in the world.

The world need not be uniform throughout, for the principle of uniformity to apply. It suffices that some uniformity occurs. Given this degree of uniformity, however small, we logically can and must talk about generalization and particularization. There happens to be some ‘uniformities’; therefore, we have to take them into consideration in our construction of knowledge. The principle of uniformity is thus not a wacky notion, as Hume seems to imply . . . .

The uniformity principle is not a generalization of generalization; it is not a statement guilty of circularity, as some critics contend. So what is it? Simply this: when we come upon some uniformity in our experience or thought, we may readily assume that uniformity to continue onward until and unless we find some evidence or reason that sets a limit to it. Why? Because in such case the assumption of uniformity already has a basis, whereas the contrary assumption of difference has not or not yet been found to have any. The generalization has some justification; whereas the particularization has none at all, it is an arbitrary assertion.

It cannot be argued that we may equally assume the contrary assumption (i.e. the proposed particularization) on the basis that in past events of induction other contrary assumptions have turned out to be true (i.e. for which experiences or reasons have indeed been adduced) – for the simple reason that such a generalization from diverse past inductions is formally excluded by the fact that we know of many cases [of inferred generalisations; try: “we can make mistakes in inductive generalisation . . . “] that have not been found worthy of particularization to date . . . .

If we follow such sober inductive logic, devoid of irrational acts, we can be confident to have the best available conclusions in the present context of knowledge. We generalize when the facts allow it, and particularize when the facts necessitate it. We do not particularize out of context, or generalize against the evidence or when this would give rise to contradictions . . . [Logical and Spiritual Reflections, BK I Hume’s Problems with Induction, Ch 2 The principle of induction.]>>

So, by strict logic, SOME uniformity must exist in the world, the issue is to confidently identify reliable cases, however provisionally. So, even if it is only that “we can make mistakes in generalisations,” we must rely on inductively identified regularities of the world.Where, this is surprisingly strong, as it is in fact an inductive generalisation. It is also a self-referential claim which brings to bear a whole panoply of logic; as, if it is assumed false, it would in fact have exemplified itself as true. It is an undeniably true claim AND it is arrived at by induction so it shows that induction can lead us to discover conclusions that are undeniably true!

Therefore, at minimum, there must be at least one inductive generalisation which is universally true.

But in fact, the world of Science is a world of so-far successful models, the best of which are reliable enough to put to work in Engineering, on potential risk of being found guilty of tort in court.

Illustrating:

How is such the case? Because, observing the reliability of a principle is itself an observation, which lends confidence in the context of a world that shows a stable identity and a coherent, orderly pattern of behaviour. Or, we may quantify. Suppose an individual observation O1 is 99.9% reliable. Now, multiply observations, each as reliable, the odds that all of these are somehow collectively in a consistent error falls as (1 – p)^n. Convergent, multiplied credibly independent observations are mutually, cumulatively reinforcing, much as how the comparatively short, relatively weak fibres in a rope can be twisted and counter-twisted together to form a long, strong, trustworthy rope.

And yes, this is an analogy.

(If you doubt it, show us why it is not cogent.)

So, we have reason to believe there are uniformities in the world that we may observe in action and credibly albeit provisionally infer to. This is the heart of the sciences.

What about the case of things that are not directly observable, such as the micro-world, historical/forensic events [whodunit?], the remote past of origins?

That is where we are well-advised to rely on the uniformity principle and so also the principle of identity. We would be well-advised to control arbitrary speculation and ideological imposition by insisting that if an event or phenomenon V is to be explained on some cause or process E, the causal mechanism at work C should be something we observe as reliably able to produce the like effect. And yes, this is one of Newton’s Rules.

For relevant example, complex, functionally specific alphanumerical text (language used as messages or as statements of algorithms) has but one known cause, intelligently directed configuration. Where, it can be seen that blind chance and/or mechanical necessity cannot plausibly generate such strings beyond 500 – 1,000 bits of complexity. There just are not enough atoms and time in the observed cosmos to make such a blind needle in haystack search a plausible explanation. The ratio of possible search to possible configurations trends to zero.

So, yes, on its face, DNA in life forms is a sign of intelligently directed configuration as most plausible cause. To overturn this, simply provide a few reliable cases of text of the relevant complexity coming about by blind chance and/or mechanical necessity. Unsurprisingly, random text generation exercises [infinite monkeys theorem] fall far short, giving so far 19 – 24 ASCII characters, far short of the 72 – 143 for the threshold. DNA in the genome is far, far beyond that threshold, by any reasonable measure of functional information content.

Similarly, let us consider the fine tuning challenge.

The laws, parameters and initial circumstances of the cosmos turn out to form a complex mathematical structure, with many factors that seem to be quite specific. Where, mathematics is an exploration of logic model worlds, their structures and quantities. So, we can use the power of computers to “run” alternative cosmologies, with similar laws but varying parameters. Surprise, we seem to be at a deeply isolated operating point for a viable cosmos capable of supporting C-Chemistry, cell-based, aqueous medium, terrestrial planet based life. Equally surprising, our home planet seems to be quire privileged too. And, if we instead posit that there are as yet undiscovered super-laws that force the parameters to a life supporting structure, that then raises the issue, where did such super-laws come from; level-two fine tuning, aka front loading.

From Barnes:

Barnes: “What if we tweaked just two of the fundamental constants? This figure shows what the universe would look like if the strength of the strong nuclear force (which holds atoms together) and the value of the fine-structure constant (which represents the strength of the electromagnetic force between elementary particles) were higher or lower than they are in this universe. The small, white sliver represents where life can use all the complexity of chemistry and the energy of stars. Within that region, the small “x” marks the spot where those constants are set in our own universe.” (HT: New Atlantis)

That is, the fine tuning observation is robust.

There is a lot of information caught up in the relevant configurations, and so we are looking again at functionally specific complex organisation and associated information.

(Yes, I commonly abbreviate: FSCO/I. Pick any reasonable index of configuration-sensitive function and of information tied to such specific functionality, that is a secondary debate, where it is not plausible that say the amount of information in DNA and proteins or in the cluster of cosmological factors is extremely low. FSCO/I is also a robust phenomenon, and we have an Internet full of cases in point multiplied by a world of technology amounting to trillions of cases that show that it has just one commonly observed cause, intelligently directed configuration. AKA, design.)

So, induction is reasonable, it is foundational to a world of science and technology.

It also points to certain features of our world of life and the wider world of the physical cosmos being best explained on design, not blind chance and mechanical necessity.

Those are inductively arrived at inferences, but induction is not to be discarded at whim, and there is a relevant body of evidence.

Going forward, can we start from this? END

PS: Per aspect (one after the other) Explanatory Filter, adapting Dembski et al:

Comments
F/N: Notice the use of an analogy (and adaptation of a classic parable) in Beisner's argument:
while people who don’t embrace the Biblical worldview and ethic can practice science for a while, little by little the foundation, resting on sand instead of solid rock, collapses, and with it so does the superstructure, in the midst of the winds and rains of money and power, which Pat Michaels rightly identifies as (among other things) the perverse incentives now firmly embedded in the whole way science gets funded and practiced in today’s world.
Would anyone be prepared to dismiss the point simply on the fact that it is an analogy and analogies are inherently weak, almost fallacies? Or, that it appeals to literary forms? Or, would it not be wiser to examine the structures and dynamics, then judge or evaluate whether or not such dynamics are relevant and substantially correct, even though presented in the guise of a literary descriptive model or metaphor. The latter being a compressed simile, instead of A is like B, A is B. Key dynamics: foundations resting on geological substructures and ability to stand storms that undermine the substructure if loose material. Support to a functional superstructure which is valued for its utility. Effect of undermining the foundation of a building. Storms. The proper response is not to cry, "foundationalism" and sneeringly dismiss. Instead, let us examine whether the argument renders good support to conclusions. That money and power can undermine and destroy the integrity of institutions and movements is a notorious fact. Science is an institutionalised movement of great utility in our civilisation. That science is prone to abuses including funding-driven agendas and power-driven agendas is notorious. Ideology is also a problem. New ideas often advance one funeral at a time. (Notice, advance is yet another metaphor.) It is true that " science—not an occasional flash of insight here and there, but a systematic, programmatic, ongoing way of studying and controlling the world—arose only once in history, and only in one place: medieval Europe, once known as “Christendom,” where that Biblical worldview reigned supreme." Some would debate could not have come about otherwise, but the historically unique fact is a sobering point. Likewise, it is obvious that our life of the mind is governed by known duties to truth, right reason, fairness/justice, neighbourliness etc. This is another way to say that rationality has responsibilities and is inescapably morally governed. Thus the IS-OUGHT gap is pivotal. (Another metaphor!) That -- post Hume (and post Euthyphro) -- points to the only level that it can be bridged, the world-root. Thence, we see the only serious candidate (others invariably cannot bridge), ethical theism. Which, in our civilisation comes to us through the Bible and the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Where, to fuse is and ought, we see the inherently good creator God, a necessary and maximally great being; worthy of loyalty and of the responsible, reasonable service of doing the good that accords with our evident nature. In the tradition, that God has spoken redemptively in the Scriptures and has come in fulfillment of prophecies of Messiah as Saviour, Lord, healer, transformer. So, major cultural impact is expected and manifest; including in science, education, technology, business and economics. Countervailing movements or influences that undermine moral government of the mind and of knowledge are patently dangerous. Dirty money and abusive, corrupt power are clear examples. Amoral worldviews that invite nihilism are another relevant danger. The metaphor injects another relevant point: seldom are substructures swept away all at once. There is a gradual undermining until critical mass is attained. The rate depends on the intensity of the storm. Cultural habits and attachments to principle would retard corruption, but the undermining of cultural support will weaken such until a critical point is reached. Then, tipping point leads to spectacular disintegration and eventual collapse. The spreading of structural cracks is a further metaphor that invites itself, noting that such can be gradual or rapid, often creeping along to critical length then exploding suddenly. One may reject such an analysis, but that would need to be on a substantial basis -- there we go again -- rather than a rhetorical brush-off. KF PS: Notice an evident case in point where an institutionally dominant controversial (and arguably potentially ruinous) agenda uses power to characterise attempts to critique and reform on objective criteria tracing to genetics and manifest in body form and major organ systems critical to reproduction -- sex -- as an "assault." This is the now habitual move of stigmatising those who would question the agenda; in some hands that can then turn into accusations of "hate" and by that further stigmatisation subjected to the further act of censorship. Eventually, it is likely that credibility of co-opted institutions will collapse, wreaking havoc.kairosfocus
December 6, 2018
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F/N2: He goes on:
As such diverse historians and philosophers of science as Alfred North Whitehead, Pierre Duhem, Loren Eiseley, Rodney Stark, and many others have observed, and as I pointed out in two of my talks at the Ninth International Conference on Climate Change (ICCC), science—not an occasional flash of insight here and there, but a systematic, programmatic, ongoing way of studying and controlling the world—arose only once in history, and only in one place: medieval Europe, once known as “Christendom,” where that Biblical worldview reigned supreme. That is no accident. Science could not have arisen without that worldview. Although many, probably most, of those at the ICCC weren’t, like me, evangelical Christians, I heard only one complaint about that message. It was from another friend, a geologist who is, I think, either atheist or agnostic. She protested that many atheists and agnostics are good scientists. That is true, and she’s one of them. But while people who don’t embrace the Biblical worldview and ethic can practice science for a while, little by little the foundation, resting on sand instead of solid rock, collapses, and with it so does the superstructure, in the midst of the winds and rains of money and power, which Pat Michaels rightly identifies as (among other things) the perverse incentives now firmly embedded in the whole way science gets funded and practiced in today’s world. Science will restore its trustworthiness only when, and only to the degree that, its practitioners rediscover, and re-embrace, the Biblical worldview that is its only firm foundation.
Again, food for thought. KFkairosfocus
December 3, 2018
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F/N: I took time to follow up Calvin Beisner. Here is his tipsheet on logic (at Wayback Machine): https://web.archive.org/web/20090824011241/http://www.ecalvinbeisner.com/freearticles/Logicsummary.pdf In his essay that you excerpted, notice . . . I echo and amplify:
Empirical observation [--> the core of scientific evidence] alone doesn’t tell us how to sort the many different stimuli our senses receive at any given moment. It doesn’t tell me why I should collect the stimuli of patterns of light and darkness on my computer screen and identify them as coherent, meaningful text and pictures while ignoring the stimuli of sound (our air conditioning system and my keystrokes and the vibration of my cell phone and kids shouting in the community pool across the street) touch (the coolness and hardness of the floor under my feet, the texture of my cotton shirt), smell (the soap residue on my just-washed hands), taste (the lingering flavor of my raisin bran with the more recent flavor of my green tea), and sight (the dark corners of my desk, the brightness of my windows, the many colors of the books on my bookcases, and the cloudy sky and green trees out my window) all into one thing and call it a schmooglewop. Neither does mere sensory stimulation tell us the basic laws of thought (identity, contradiction, and excluded middle) or the rules of logical inference [--> which pivot on distinct identity, world W = {A|~A} so A is itself i/l/o core characteristics, no x in W is A AND ~A, any x is A X-OR ~A, and of course A vs ~A gives twoness thus opens up number systems and Math, an abstract discipline that studies the logic of structure and quantity, being foundational to but distinct from science] (see my “Summary of Major Concepts, Principles, and Functions of Logic” [--> his link is dead cf. Wayback Machine]), yet those, along with the categories by which we untangle various sounds, sights, smells, textures, and tastes and group them into defined, external objects and events the recognition of which we share with others, are absolutely indispensable to all reasoning, including scientific reasoning about the external world. And finally, empirical observation doesn’t tell us there are objects external to ourselves. It only tells me that I’m having experiences. (You, too? By mere sensory observation I can’t know that.) But it cannot tell me those experiences are stimulated by things external to me. To be confident of that (and note the root of “confident,” fides, faith), I must know something before thinking about my sensations (if I may even be said to have any, according to the definition of “sensation” inherent in empiricism—but that’s another subject): that there’s an external world and that it’s understandable according to the structure of my mind and that my mind and body relate to it and each other in a way that facilitates my understanding it truly. In short, one must begin with axioms, presuppositions. [--> hence worldviews and the challenge of reasonable, responsible faith requiring comparative difficulties] As a corollary to Herbert Stein’s Law (“If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.”) I posit Beisner’s Law: “If something not eternal does not start, it cannot continue.” [--> This points to necessary vs contingent beings and so to what is required as framework for a world, especially one inhabited by rational, responsible, morally governed creatures] Though most modern scientists are empiricists, they are unaware that empiricism—real, consistent empiricism—leads directly not to skepticism, which is a good thing (1 Thessalonians 5:21, “Test all things, hold fast what is good.”) but to irrationalism, which, frankly, is what is taking over the world of science, particularly with the rise of post-normal, highly politicized science . .
Much food for thought there. KF PS: Given how "skepticism" is too often used, I prefer "critical awareness." Paul is right: test, hold on to the good; which implies that key truths are intelligible, can be tested and warranted, also that the good can be rationally discerned from the evil. That is, there is moral government in our rationality and there is also moral knowledge. (This last cuts across how facts vs. values is too often used, to suggest the IS-OUGHT gap cannot be bridged. In fact it is bridged in the root of being by the inherently good and wise creator God, a necessary and maximally great being. Who, is worthy of loyalty and of the responsible, reasonable service of seeking, testing and doing the good that accords with our evident nature.)kairosfocus
December 3, 2018
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JAD, you described an example of failure to correctly understand and apply logic, compounded by the usual categorical errors of naturalism, assuming that science monopolises serious knowledge. The study of knowledge and its conditions is of course another branch of philosophy, epistemology. Logic, of course is a main branch of philosophy. Rhetoric is the study of persuasion, which Aristotle traces to the applied power of pathos, ethos, logos; in effect emotions, character/credibility, the facts and logic. Emotions are most persuasive but are no better than underlying perceptions and judgements. Authority or credibility is no better than facts or logic, where 99% of arguments rely on this inductive (modern sense) appeal. Only facts and logic can actually warrant but that is an acquired taste. Schaeffer saw many, many things that we need to listen to again. KF PS: My readings were a decade later than yours, late 70's.kairosfocus
December 3, 2018
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Kf, The problem of emphasizing logical thinking is that logical thinking has been supplanted, especially on-line, by a smug kind of scientism. Indeed, if you are truly “scientistic” in your thinking you don’t have to give logically sound arguments which rely on the rules of logic all you need to do is say “science says” or something that’s rhetorically equivalent and be willing to not give in. In other words, instead of making an actual argument you become argumentative. This is something we see here (at least I do) on the part of our regular interlocutors all the time. Calvin Beisner, at Town Hall (ht BA77) gives a good summary of what is going on in America and other western cultures.
The problem is in thinking that science is “the basis for knowledge.” It isn’t. It never has been. It never can be. That is because science—in terms of scientific method, testing hypotheses by real-world observation—cannot justify any truth judgments based solely on empirical observation. Empirical observation alone doesn’t tell us how to sort the many different stimuli our senses receive at any given moment. It doesn’t tell me why I should collect the stimuli of patterns of light and darkness on my computer screen and identify them as coherent, meaningful text and pictures while ignoring the stimuli of sound (our air conditioning system and my keystrokes and the vibration of my cell phone and kids shouting in the community pool across the street) touch (the coolness and hardness of the floor under my feet, the texture of my cotton shirt), smell (the soap residue on my just-washed hands), taste (the lingering flavor of my raisin bran with the more recent flavor of my green tea), and sight… Neither does mere sensory stimulation tell us the basic laws of thought (identity, contradiction, and excluded middle) or the rules of logical inference (see my “Summary of Major Concepts, Principles, and Functions of Logic”), yet those, along with the categories by which we untangle various sounds, sights, smells, textures, and tastes and group them into defined, external objects and events the recognition of which we share with others, are absolutely indispensable to all reasoning, including scientific reasoning about the external world. And finally, empirical observation doesn’t tell us there are objects external to ourselves. It only tells me that I’m having experiences… But it cannot tell me those experiences are stimulated by things external to me. To be confident of that (and note the root of “confident,” fides, faith), I must know something before thinking about my sensations… that there’s an external world and that it’s understandable according to the structure of my mind and that my mind and body relate to it and each other in a way that facilitates my understanding it truly…
https://townhall.com/columnists/calvinbeisner/2014/07/23/the-threat-to-the-scientific-method-that-explains-the-spate-of-fraudulent-science-publications-n1865201 I remember just after graduating from high school in the 1960’s reading a booklet by Francis Schaeffer entitled Escape from Reason. At the time I didn’t really understand it-- maybe it was because I really didn’t think that people were that irrational. Now, however, after spending 12 years dialoguing with people pushing naturalism, materialism or secular progressivism on the internet I understand what Schaeffer was talking about. But no doubt because he lived in Europe he encountered this kind of thinking a lot sooner than those of us who live in “fly over country” here in the U.S.A.john_a_designer
December 3, 2018
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JAD, I have been busy elsewhere (e.g. here), pardon. I suggest, first, that we find mechanical regularities in the world such as the reliable annual, monthly and daily cycles. Also, food items remain that way as a rule and when they don't there are reasons: spoilage, contamination, poison etc. Walking, breathing, sitting on chairs etc all rely on an often overlooked pattern of natural regularities. We can also identify such in our thoughts, e.g. the principle of distinct identity and linked things, including number etc. Where, we also find ourselves under duties of care to truth, right reason, fairness etc. Moral government. A world of law that indeed raises the question of a law-giver. So, ethical theism in the Judaeo-Christian tradition leads to a worldview that expects law and law that is in material part intelligible rather than inscrutable. C S Lewis was right. So was Paul in Rom 1 as I alluded to. I would further suggest that we are here exploring first principles of right reason, noting that we reason inductively as a matter of fact where this is too often treated as though it were little more than fallacies. Such reasoning based on support rather than entailment is likely most of practical thinking. So, it is vital for us to come to a better appreciation. As the OP indicates, on pondering, I am -- yet again -- led to the principle of identity. A is itself i/l/o core characteristics. So, we can look at the world or a relevant aspect and on case studies look for stable patterns. Providing we have plausible reason to tie observed patterns P to such archetypal attributes, we should then be able to reasonably expect that in different or new situations, the pattern will continue to be stable. Where a strong track record of successful prediction is itself an empirical observation. For example, the colour of a pendulum bob is obviously less relevant to its swinging behaviour than other candidate influences; the surprising one being that for small swings (and negligible air resistance) mass also does not affect period. Similarly, given cygnet colouration and the highly variable colour of the wider duck family, to expect that as all observed adult swans to date have been white, all swans will be white. The fact that settlers recognised black swans as swans despite colour is a clue. Further, given that well regulated stability and our responsiveness to such are requisites of survival, it should be no surprise that there is an in-built biological expectation. But that does not prove that we are imposing perceived order on a chaos; we are back at senses fit to operate in their proper environment through accurate or reasonably accurate perceptions. Another long story. Of course, I believe that Science and Math can discover and responsibly (albeit provisionally) warrant truths about our world. But we must walk by faith, post the rise of modern physics and post Godel. Reasonable, responsible faith. KFkairosfocus
December 2, 2018
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You’re missing the point I’m trying to make, Kf. While scientists like Newton and Einstein can be said to have discovered laws of nature, they only did so because they already believed that nature was law-like. Who discovered that nature was law-like? Where did that idea come from? I think the idea goes back to at least to the ancient Greeks-- maybe even further. In the Book of Job, God asks Job, “Do you know the laws that govern the heavens, and can you make them rule the earth?” (38:33, Contemporary English Version) C.S, Lewis I think put it best when he said: “Men became scientific because they expected Law in Nature, and they expected Law in Nature because they believed in a Legislator [or “lawgiver”.] In most modern scientists this belief has died: it will be interesting to see how long their confidence in uniformity survives it. Two significant developments have already appeared – the hypothesis of a lawless sub-nature, and the surrender of the claim that science is true. We may be living nearer than we suppose to the end of the Scientific Age.” Is the belief or expectation that nature is law-like something we arrived at by rigorously following rules of inductions or is it something inborn and intuitive? Some of the research carried out by child psychologist Jean Piaget seems to suggest that it is the latter.john_a_designer
December 2, 2018
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JAD, in Physics, there is hardly ever a proof, just arrival at a framework which shows itself empirically reliable with strong predictive power. In this case, the observation came first as a surprise, there was no aether drift seen in the Michelson-Morley experiments, and this was one of a cluster of anomalies that showed that classical Physics was broken. As noted, Einstein took the empirical finding seriously, not as proved but as empirically warranted. From this came one of the key breakthroughs. KFkairosfocus
November 30, 2018
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JAD, The weirdly hostile tone baffles me. But perhaps I'm misreading you. In any case, it's obvious to me that there are regularities, for example, in the physical world. I don't have to assume there are such things as physical laws---I observe evidence for them every time I see a pendulum swinging or baseball player hitting a home run. OTOH, I highly doubt that I would have had the insight to conjecture that the gravitational force I observe on Earth also could account for planetary motion. So yes, Newton (and Einstein, and many others) were obviously much smarter than me. :)daveS
November 30, 2018
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Dave,
I don’t see any need to make assumptions here.
Maybe there isn’t from a conceited, chauvinistic contemporary perspective but someone did begin with the assumption there are universal natural laws which govern the entire universe. For example, for Newtonian physics to work for the universe at large you need to assume Newton’s laws of motion and gravity are universal. If no one had made that assumption we would still have no idea what keeps the planets of the solar system in orbit around the sun. Now we can say there is a preponderance of evidence that there are universal laws and constants. However, that hasn’t always been true. It’s a bit smug to take it all for granted.john_a_designer
November 30, 2018
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JAD, Of course I agree you can't prove it. But the empirical evidence suggests c is a universal constant. And the famous theory which postulates that c is a universal constant is very successful. Hence we (provisionally) conclude that it's true. I don't see any need to make assumptions here.daveS
November 30, 2018
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You’re missing the point, Dave. My question (and main point) was, “But who proved that the speed of light (“c”) is a universal constant?” It’s never been PROVEN. How do you prove that something is universal? Universals are assumed to be true because they cannot be proven.john_a_designer
November 30, 2018
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JAD, actually, the history goes the other way. The aether theory of electromagnetic waves (including light) ruled the roost c 1880, after Maxwell's triumph. Michelson & Morley set out to measure drift rate relative to the aether, thus absolute velocity of earth; in effect a doppler shift plus velocity variation effect similar to for other waves. They used a delicate interference experiment, running it at different points around our orbit. They could not find it. This was one of the start-points for the modern physics revolution. Einstein's relativity started from, let's take the experimental result seriously. Postulate: the laws of physics take the same simplest form in an inertial frame of reference. Postulate: in such an IFR, speed of light in vacuo will take the same constant value, c. In effect, start from the experimental results that there is no aether drift. The rest was history. KFkairosfocus
November 30, 2018
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JAD, I believe the constancy of c has been questioned and tested. AFAIK, it was Einstein who first postulated that c is a constant, although it was already implicit in Maxwell's Equations. I take it to be a conclusion rather than an assumption, btw.daveS
November 30, 2018
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The point of my question at #61 (If the speed of light is not a universal constant what becomes of the big bang model?) was that if the speed of light is not a universal constant then that completely undermines the big bang model. Indeed, not only is the big bang model undermined so is most of modern cosmology, astronomy and physics. But who proved that the speed of light (“c”) is a universal constant? From what I understand of the history of science it has never ever been questioned. For example, did Einstein ever question it? Has anyone ever attempted to prove the universality of c? Is it a warranted assumption? How is it warranted? How is it warranted logically? …scientifically? …metaphysically or philosophically? I do think it is warranted as a philosophical (world view) assumption. But worldview assumptions cannot be proven to be true logically or scientifically. In other words, it’s impossible to do science unless you begin with some philosophical assumptions about the world. However, those assumptions do not emerge out of science itself.john_a_designer
November 30, 2018
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KF,
while it is true that all worldviews face difficulties so the key phil method is comparative difficulties, that is very different from grounds for despair or shrugging and saying it does not matter.
Agreed. I would never claim it does not matter (and am not currently experiencing despair :P ).daveS
November 30, 2018
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DS, while it is true that all worldviews face difficulties so the key phil method is comparative difficulties, that is very different from grounds for despair or shrugging and saying it does not matter. For one, evolutionary materialistic scientism/naturalism (which is ideologically and institutionally dominant in North America and W. Europe) is known to be self-referentially incoherent and self-falsifying in many ways. So, this can be set aside at the outset, together with its shibboleths against theism. That will at once clear most of the toxic, befuddling, polarising smog. Next, we can start from error exists and from how it is equally self-evidently true that it is evil, wrong, wicked to kidnap, bind, gag, sexually assault and murder a young child for one's sick pleasure. At once, epistemological and moral relativism shiver, crack, collapse. Then, we can restore first principles of right reason to proper estimation, starting from distinct identity. Deductive and inductive logic duly guided by sound conscience can then begin to help us set the chaos we have made to rights. I don't know if we can now avert civilisational collapse with nukes in play, but we can begin to see a sound way forward. Going beyond, no-one is seeking to claim that a worldview foundation can be erected on a basis of certain truths. The significance of inductive reasoning in our knowledge base and its inextricable intertwining with deductive reasoning long since put that to rest. We seek a reasonable, responsible faith with prudence and conscience as guides and guards not a pose of having cornered the market on the truth by our intellectual prowess and brilliance. Remember, post Godel, this includes Math (and cf above for those who imagine this is a misreading). Where of course this thread is looking at the role of inductive logic. KF PS: Here is my own exploration at 101 level: http://nicenesystheol.blogspot.com/2010/11/unit-2-gospel-on-mars-hill-foundations.html#u2_bld_wvukairosfocus
November 30, 2018
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EricMH,
If all of the supports for our worldview are made of jelly, the whole thing collapses.
I would agree to some extent. I also suspect there aren't many/any "non-jelly" supports for the various worldviews. So if we expect to find a certain foundation, we are likely to be frustrated.daveS
November 30, 2018
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EMH, I infer, metaphorical sense. Yes, if a worldview's core cannot bear the weight it must (another metaphor) the worldview will collapse. One point is that right reason is crucial, including adequate context for inductive reasoning. From OP on, I point to the principle of identity as giving a context for archetypes that bring out in-common characteristics that allow reasonable inference from initial cases to onward ones. The key point being that core characteristics and associated behaviours will be consistent from one instance to another. This points to a world model. Notice my discussion overnight on black swans, with the issue on feather colour as not being core. KFkairosfocus
November 29, 2018
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If all of the supports for our worldview are made of jelly, the whole thing collapses.EricMH
November 29, 2018
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JAD, is there good empirical evidence that this postulate of Relativity is wrong? KFkairosfocus
November 29, 2018
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If the speed of light not a universal constant what becomes of the big bang model?john_a_designer
November 29, 2018
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EG, the big bang point is where you go by projecting back cosmological expansion per Hubble to a singularity which is a natural start point. 14 BY drops out as about right, which comports with cluster H-R patterns (where the main sequence branches off to the giants band), low proportion of white dwarfs etc. KFkairosfocus
November 29, 2018
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PS: That implies a distinction between a model and a theory. A model is frankly false (a "simplification" or even an operational emulator [black vs open box makes little difference]) and seeks only to capture a reliable and reasonably accurate result. Theories normally aim at significant truthfulness and so will normally be more complex and less amenable to easy calculation etc.kairosfocus
November 29, 2018
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F/N: I suggest that if science and wider rationality are not accountable to truth, they will end in shipwreck. KFkairosfocus
November 29, 2018
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BO'H: I spoke to axiomatic systems for complex domains comparable to "Arithmetic," not basic facts or results. The incompleteness theorems boil down, first, to the point on undecidables. That is no axiomatisation will be coherent and complete. Next, incompleteness of coherent systems: there is no process to build a system that is certainly coherent. As you may need it, SEP, summary:
Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems First published Mon Nov 11, 2013; substantive revision Tue Jan 20, 2015 Gödel's two incompleteness theorems are among the most important results in modern logic, and have deep implications for various issues. They concern the limits of provability in formal axiomatic theories. The first incompleteness theorem states that in any consistent formal system F within which a certain amount of arithmetic can be carried out, there are statements of the language of F which can neither be proved nor disproved in F. According to the second incompleteness theorem, such a formal system cannot prove that the system itself is consistent (assuming it is indeed consistent). These results have had a great impact on the philosophy of mathematics and logic. There have been attempts to apply the results also in other areas of philosophy such as the philosophy of mind, but these attempted applications are more controversial.
I infer from this that axiomatised grand logic model worlds (the big ticket systems of Math) are exercises in reasonable, responsible faith and linked praxis rather than definitively and infallibly true and complete systems. I also have noted that we have a considerable body of established facts, entities and results antecedent to the modern axiomatisation which therefore influenced it decisively. In effect, even in math and science we must all live by faith. The challenge is to have a reasonable, responsible faith that grounds a prudent, reliably effective praxis. KFkairosfocus
November 29, 2018
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Actually the big bang had to be rescued by inflation in order to make sense of what we see.ET
November 29, 2018
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EricMH
If science is about explaining and predicting data with models, is it true or false to claim a model explains/predicts data effectively?
I don't see anything wrong with that. The big bang is a model that explains what we see quite effectively, even though we don't know all of the details with certainty.Ed George
November 29, 2018
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The key point I wanted to make @# 36 & #38 is that natural law is something that is derived inductively through repeated observation of and experimentation upon physical phenomena we encounter in the world around us. These laws are not self-evidently true nor are they deduced from anything else except from the assumption or presupposition that ontologically the universe is an interdependent and coherent system of contingent physical things, and that epistemologically the human mind was somehow preadapted with the ability to discover how the physical world truly operates. In other words, science presupposes an ability for humans to discover truth about the universe which we inhabit. Ironically, science is based on philosophical assumptions and presuppositions that cannot be established empirically or “scientifically.” That does not bode well for any world view that is naturalistic or materialistic.john_a_designer
November 29, 2018
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kf @ 44 -
BO’H: induction generally cannot deliver utter absolute certainty beyond correction. But then, post Godel, neither can Math.
I'm afraid you've mis-understood Gödel's theorem. Post Gödel we can still say whether most mathematical statements are true of false. But he showed that there are some statements where this cannot be proved. So we still have certainty, just not about everything. EricMH @ 52 - Define "effectively"!Bob O'H
November 29, 2018
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