Defining Methodological Naturalism

_{April 27, 2012

Intelligent Design}

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It’s been a while since we had a good discussion about Methodological Naturalism. This time around, I want to start out simple: I’m asking everyone, particularly those who believe methodological naturalism is essential to science (Matzke, I’m looking at you) to define it. More below.

I want to be clear here: my aim in this thread isn’t to argue against methodological naturalism, and certainly not for it. I do have an idea for a future post on the subject, of course. What I’m hoping for here are definitions – again, particularly definitions that its defenders accept. I’m likely going to ask any contributor here, particularly MN advocates, to further define some aspects of the definition. So if you tell me that methodological naturalism means limiting oneself to natural phenomena, I’m going to ask what makes a given phenomena natural.

Anyway, here’s hoping some MN advocates step up and provide what I’m asking for.

Comments

Gregory@48: What are you talking about? You have a list of names given at 24 above in answer to your question. That is in addition to addressing the problem of imposition of naturalism as ideology. Design thinkers by definition are not going to be a priori Lewontinian materialists. But we do have design thinkers who are agnostics at minimum, e.g. --IIRC -- Berlinski. Hoyle is next door to that, too. KFkairosfocus_{April 29, 2012
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Yeah, it was starting to look like you didn't want a serious or rigorous conversation. That's for verifying that! :PGregory_{April 29, 2012
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Well, nullasalus, if you’re not going to be serious, this likely won’t be a fruitful discussion. :Dnullasalus_{April 29, 2012
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Nick, Now people are taking everyday words which have widely agreed upon dictionary definitions — “natural” and “supernatural”, and asking for definitions of those? First, they don't have widely agreed upon dictionary definitions. Second, I'm just making sure that whatever the definition is, is one you agree with. Third, did you happen to notice that your 'dictionary definition' provided was just 'If God did it' or 'if it's not natural', the former of which is A) pretty unhelpful, B) I asked you for your definition of natural, so saying 'the supernatural is that which isn't natural' ain't a freaking help, and C) your definition suggests that if God acts, so long as He doesn't violate various laws (particularly the law of conservation of mass/energy), His acts are fair game. In context, De Vries’s discussion of “personal” causes is referring to “God did it” explanations. Humans or aliens who are constrained by conservation of mass and energy, gravity, etc, would be natural causes. See, this is precisely why I asked you to define these things: because 'humans or aliens who are constrained by conservation of mass and energy, gravity, etc would be natural causes', isn't exactly part of any 'dictionary definition'. I still have questions here. Brian Greene went over a variety of multiverse-related concepts in his latest book. To use a far out example, he suggested that various universes - even ours - could be simulations. Complete with programmers running said simulations. Natural hypothesis? Supernatural hypothesis? What say you, Nick? Let's run in the opposite direction. The Mormon God is a material being, co-eternal alongside matter, which He is constituted of. He's certainly limited by nature, even if tremendously powerful. Natural? Supernatural? Again, what's your verdict according to the definitions you're throwing around? You mention the conservation of mass/energy. Now, my understanding is that that was a pretty late development in terms of knowledge - centuries, even millenia after most major religions. So it's not as if you had the greeks saying "Zeus violates the conservation laws!". He just helped make the world and threw lightning around. And just for fun, is Sean Carroll making supernatural claims here? There is no great mystery (except to ID advocates) about how science can infer that humans built the Empire State Building or could infer that human-like aliens send a radio signal. Humans have well-known motives, well-known means, well-known constraints and limitations (they can build a skyscraper but not suspend conservation of mass/energy). These produce a well-constrained hypothesis, where the constraints give us expectations about what data we should observe, if the hypothesis “humans did it” is correct. First, I love how I'm being entirely polite and civil with you, but you've kicked into a whole lot of passive-aggressive antics just because I've asked you a question. Really, it's adorable. ;) Second, you mention 'well-known motives' and 'well-known means'. Are these 'well-known' due to science by your reckoning? You can't really be telling me that science once upon a time revealed that humans have these things called "motives", for example. The SETI hypothesis thus makes all kinds of ambitious assumptions about aliens — humanlike technology, humanlike motives, constrained by mass/energy conservation, etc. We don’t know for sure that those are good assumptions. For all we know, humans are weird and the aliens don’t like talking, or if they do communicate interstellarly they don’t use radio waves, or whatever. If any of the assumptions of the hypothesis is violated, we won’t find ET even if ET exists. Granted. But is SETI scientific? I didn't see an answer out of you on that front. Because SETI, as you just described it, is playing pretty fast and loose - they're making a whole lot of assumptions to do what they're doing. I'd have trouble believing you'd take the position "You can make inferences about agents you've never even encountered before, so long as you make some real big assumptions about them, and it's scientific". But maybe you are. I make no argument that miracles are impossible. But if they happen, they are very rare, peculiar things that violate the usual fundamental structure of reality (e.g. conservation of mass/energy). That's nice, but I haven't defended miracles-as-science once here, and ID proponents insist they don't defend miracles-as-science. Also, I have no idea why you'd suggest that miracles are very rare, peculiar things - that certainly isn't a finding of science. It's, at best, an assumption science requires - remember? It's also a whole other topic. Right now I've got my hands full just trying to nail down a proper definition of MN and natural/supernatural out of you. I'd say you should drop the pissiness until I actually offend you, but what the hell, go for it if you like. Like I said, it's amusing. :)nullasalus_{April 29, 2012
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Well, nullasalus, if you're not going to be serious, this likely won't be a fruitful discussion. One cannot conclude from your remarks if you believe *any* ID leaders can and should be called 'naturalists' or not. If this thread wishes to speak of a qualifier (methodological), it should surely speak of the qualified (naturalism) first. IDers claim their methods are the methods of natural scientists and I've asked for a distinction between 'natural scientists' and 'naturalists,' since some ID leaders are 'natural scientists'. This doesn't seem unreasonable to ask. Tightly specified questions in #48 remain for those who might wish to take them seriously. As someone who has studied PoS at the PhD level, like Stephen C. Meyer among perhaps a few other ID leaders, I find these questions rather important as grounding upon which the MN discussion is or can be properly conducted.Gregory_{April 29, 2012
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Is nullasalus thus affirming that some leaders of the IDM can and should be called (i.e. that they are) ‘naturalists’ or not? Clearly they are not only naturalists, but ID is adheres to methodological naturalism, since ID's methods would just be the methods of naturalists. It's also philosophy, and so is particle physics, because all scientists are philosophers, so science and philosophy are the same thing. Again, does he really believe this or is it humour or sarcasm or…? That's a tough one! Better ask a philosopher/scientist.nullasalus_{April 28, 2012
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"All scientists are philosophers." - nullasalus Does he really believe this or was it humour? It would be wrong if nullasalus was trying to put those words into my mouth. I didn't say that "all scientists are philosophers" or that "all science is philosophy anyway." My questions are more tightly specific than that. "It’s the fact that scientists were originally called philosophers of nature. That’s what makes them philosophers." - nullasalus 'Originally,' but not today. Again, does he really believe this or is it humour or sarcasm or...? We are speaking about a Philosophy of Science (PoS) that is relevant or irrelevant, illuminating, clarifying or obscuring today (i.e. MN). The very specific questions in bold remain. Unless, was this a serious attempt to answer one of them: "they’re all naturalists," i.e. referring to Behe, Axe and Gauger, Wells and Minnich? Is nullasalus thus affirming that some leaders of the IDM can and should be called (i.e. that they are) 'naturalists' or not?Gregory_{April 28, 2012
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Sorry, I didn't see the question earlier amidst the numerous posts not-discussing-the-thorough-previous-scholarly-works-on-the-topic which I referenced. The thread title was "defining methodological naturalism", that's what I did. Now people are taking everyday words which have widely agreed upon dictionary definitions -- "natural" and "supernatural", and asking for definitions of those?
1) What is “within nature” or outside of nature? A better way to put this is: what makes something ‘natural’ and something else ‘not natural’? This seems essential to DeVries’ definition.
The distinction between "natural" and "supernatural" goes back to Christianity and probably even pre-Christian ancient times, it's not like it was dreamed up recently. Supernatural events are events alleged to be due to the mysterious workings of God or occult powers, unconstrained by the otherwise universal normal rules all physical things follow. E.g., normally, 5 fishes + 5 fishes = 10 fishes, people don't come back to life after being dead, objects don't rise without a force on them that is stronger than gravity, and energy and mass are conserved (First law of thermodynamics, another statement of 5 fishes + 5 fishes = 10 fishes). But, in supernatural events, any or all of these rules are broken. A more specifically Christian way to say it is God set up the laws of nature, events which follow those laws are natural, but if those laws are broken/suspended, that's supernatural. Or the dictionary definition works fine:
su·per·nat·u·ral adjective 1. of, pertaining to, or being above or beyond what is natural; unexplainable by natural law or phenomena; abnormal. 2. of, pertaining to, characteristic of, or attributed to God or a deity.
Moving on:
2) What should we take “non-personal” to mean here? The SETI example comes to mind: can science infer that a given signal came from or likely came from a person? Or even use a more mundane example: can science determine that the Empire State Building was built by humans? Or is that known by a method other than science?
This is why it is so tiresome when blog discussants can't be bothered to read fundamental work on a topic. In context, De Vries's discussion of "personal" causes is referring to "God did it" explanations. Humans or aliens who are constrained by conservation of mass and energy, gravity, etc, would be natural causes. Obviously, there are different sorts of natural causes (De Vries even lays out how we could hypothetically have both a complete electrochemical description of a person's brain as an explanation of a person's action, and a subjective description in terms of emotions and thoughts, and these could both be true simultaenously), so one could distinguish artificial and non-artificial within natural causes. There is no great mystery (except to ID advocates) about how science can infer that humans built the Empire State Building or could infer that human-like aliens send a radio signal. Humans have well-known motives, well-known means, well-known constraints and limitations (they can build a skyscraper but not suspend conservation of mass/energy). These produce a well-constrained hypothesis, where the constraints give us expectations about what data we should observe, if the hypothesis "humans did it" is correct. Even with SETI, basically the hypothesis is that "we hypothesize that aliens have similar motives, means, capabilities, constraints and limitations as we humans do. Limited by the laws of physics and available energy sources, if we humans wanted to communicate across interstellar distances, we'd use radio waves. Thus, we can listen for radio waves and test the hypothesis that aliens are broadcasting at us." [In real life, SETI searches have all kinds of technical limits, I believe they only look at a certain number of nearby stars, so really all that is being tested is "is anyone broadcasting to us in our neighborhood?"] The SETI hypothesis thus makes all kinds of ambitious assumptions about aliens -- humanlike technology, humanlike motives, constrained by mass/energy conservation, etc. We don't know for sure that those are good assumptions. For all we know, humans are weird and the aliens don't like talking, or if they do communicate interstellarly they don't use radio waves, or whatever. If any of the assumptions of the hypothesis is violated, we won't find ET even if ET exists. But without the assumptions, we don't have a testable hypothesis. You aren't given radiotelescope time to just sit around and wait for a UFO to fly up to you, or whatever you think is going to happen. So, anyway, humans and assumed-to-be-humanlike aliens are within science, because these entities are well-constrained and thus supply hypotheses that put constraints on the data, i.e. they are testable explanations. But GodDidIt? Not so much. When GodDidIt is the hypothesis, you aren't even constrained by conservation of mass/energy. Not even math works in such a situation. Normally, 5 fishes + 5 fishes = 10 fishes, but (as we know from the loaves and fishes story in the NT), you can take logic and math and shove it once a miracle has been introduced into the explanation. Random late-night screed follows I make no argument that miracles are impossible. But if they happen, they are very rare, peculiar things that violate the usual fundamental structure of reality (e.g. conservation of mass/energy). It is thus very difficult to see how they could be included in science. It is vaguely imaginable that believing a miracle occurred is reasonable in some situations, e.g. based on eyewitness testimony which you trust. That's for each person to decide for themselves. But I think even many believers would say that these should not be included within science. The whole point of invoking a miracle is to say that something amazing which ought-to-be-impossible has just happened. Science tells you why it ought-to-be-impossible. The situation for including miracles within science gets even worse when you get away from claimed eyewitness observation of miracles. When creationists/IDists invoke miracles to explain the vertebrate eye, or the origin of taxonomic families (and then allow genera and species to evolve "within the kind" of the taxonomic family), or the bacterial flagellum or whatever, they are trying to infer a miracle without even having eyewitnesses, or, even without any such event described in the Bible (I'm thinking of old-earth creationists here). It would be bad enough if they had a good argument "current science doesn't explain this organism, therefore I'll say a miracle happened" -- but essentially universally, what creationists/IDists actually do is say "I personally, and my creationist buddies, have done an incredibly superficial investigation of the relevant science, we don't even know enough to qualify as a graduate student in this area, and we misunderstand more than we understand about the organism and the relevant science, but nevertheless we are going to declare that current science has no explanation, that there never ever will be an explanation, and therefore we'll invoke a miracle." This isn't just God-of-the-Gaps-in-human-knowledge, it's God-of-the-Gaps-of-this-creationist's-knowledge. One's personal ignorance seems like particularly pitiful grounds for supposing that e.g. suspension of the conservation of mass/energy occurred.NickMatzke_UD_{April 28, 2012
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Sure (even without looking to ‘once upon a time…’ but rather staying in the present), Stephen Hawking, just like me, has a PhD, which makes him, and me, a ‘doctor of philosophy’ in a ‘science’ or scholarly field. Right. All scientists are philosophers. Clearly, because they were originally called philosophers of nature. Behe, Axe and Gauger, Wells and Minnich all have PhDs too. This doesn’t make them philosophers. Of course not. It's the fact that scientists were originally called philosophers of nature. That's what makes them philosophers. Just like they're all naturalists. Actually, I suppose since they are naturalists, and they have methods, Behe, Axe, Wells and the rest all engage in methodological naturalism. This neatly ties up a lot of controversial topics with Intelligent Design. For instance, we can't say that ID is philosophy rather than science, because all science is philosophy anyway - after all, all scientists are philosophers, and philosophers produce philosophy. And since all scientists are also naturalists, and they all use methods, then clearly ID is part of methodological naturalism. Problem resolved. Thanks Gregory!nullasalus_{April 28, 2012
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Sure (even without looking to 'once upon a time...' but rather staying in the present), Stephen Hawking, just like me, has a PhD, which makes him, and me, a 'doctor of philosophy' in a 'science' or scholarly field. Sometimes Hawking philosophises. Of course he does. So do I. Behe, Axe and Gauger, Wells and Minnich all have PhDs too. This doesn't make them philosophers. It would seem to make them 'natural scientists.' Yet sometimes they too philosophise. The questions in #48 nevertheless remain; whether nullasalus authenticates them or not. They're not going to be put much clearer than they already are (especially the bolded ones).Gregory_{April 28, 2012
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Gregory, That nobody in this thread has faced this question might indicate that it is an important one. Thus, distinguishing between ‘natural scientists,’ which nullasalus, StephenB, Cannuckian Yankee, BA77, tragic mishap, KF and others do not reject out of hand entirely (i.e. they welcome those ‘natural scientists’ Named above), and ‘naturalists’ generally, is a rather important feature of the basic theme of this thread in that it prepares the ground for the MN question to be asked. Sure, and Stephen Hawking is a philosopher. Because, remember, once upon a time scientists were called philosophers of nature, so if you use that definition then clearly Hawking - and all scientists - are actually philosophers.nullasalus_{April 28, 2012
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So if I claim not to be an ID proponent, you’ll accept my definition? Uh, I am not an ID proponent. Don't make this personal, tragic. It's as reasonable to ask an actual proponent of MN to give a definition as it is to ask an ID proponent, and not Barbara Forrest, to define ID before discussing it. I'm giving Matzke and company ample time on this one. He in particular can't say he doesn't have ample interest in or doesn't consider himself well-informed about the topic.nullasalus_{April 28, 2012
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Jon @ 29 Well, perhaps my question was confusing (phrased negatively - 'to not be a naturalist'), but you still haven't addressed it. You broke it up into primary and secondary causes, following the generalisation made by Nick in #5: "Obviously everyone has known that the general idea [of MN] has been around for centuries, it traces back to the theological distinction between primary and secondary causes." For the moment, I'm not so interested in this dualistic speculation, nor is it 'obvious to everyone'. In fact, it is important on this topic not to retro-dict or speak anachronistically. What I asked was this: "Is it possible for a (practising) ‘natural scientist’ to *not* be a ‘naturalist’? In other words, aren’t all ‘natural scientists’ properly called ‘naturalists’ of one variety or another? Thus, Behe is a ‘naturalist,’ Axe and Gauger are ‘naturalists,’ Wells and Minnich are ‘naturalists,’ are they not?" What I'm looking for are examples of 'natural scientists' (e.g. biologists, ecologists, geologists, zoologists, etc.) who should *not* be called or labelled as 'naturalists.' I'm looking specifically for Names, please. Iow, don't *all* people (i.e. natural scientists) who study 'nature' qualify as 'naturalists?' That nobody in this thread has faced this question might indicate that it is an important one. Thus, distinguishing between 'natural scientists,' which nullasalus, StephenB, Cannuckian Yankee, BA77, tragic mishap, KF and others do not reject out of hand entirely (i.e. they welcome those 'natural scientists' Named above), and 'naturalists' generally, is a rather important feature of the basic theme of this thread in that it prepares the ground for the MN question to be asked. Or, to ask it another way: Are there *any* IDers, amongst the leaders of the IDM, who are 'naturalists'?Gregory_{April 28, 2012
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So if I claim not to be an ID proponent, you'll accept my definition? Uh, I am not an ID proponent. -_-tragic mishap_{April 28, 2012
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Neil, But I don’t want to pick an argument with Matzke, either. Unfortunately, it's not really up to you. If you say you reject methodological naturalism, you've got an argument with the people who accept it and regard it not only as essential to science, but who think it's a litmus test exactly to determine what is or isn't science at all, to say nothing of whether it's good or bad science. It doesn't mean you have to debate them. God knows I have no interest in talking to a lot of people I disagree with. But the difference - and the conflict - remains.nullasalus_{April 28, 2012
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But then your argument isn’t with me – it’s with Matzke and crew.
I agree that I don't have an argument with you. But I don't want to pick an argument with Matzke, either. If he and others want to believe that they need to assume MN, it isn't up to me to tell them what to believe or how they should do their science. What really matters, is whether they do good science.Neil Rickert_{April 28, 2012
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Neil, I don’t think we need a definition for supernatural, either. You may not, but you reject methodological naturalism and any talk of natural or supernatural, apparently. Matzke doesn't. Many/most ID opponents don't, and certainly many naturalists don't. So if you reject those things, that's fine. But then your argument isn't with me - it's with Matzke and crew.nullasalus_{April 28, 2012
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tragic mishap @31:
How about this: Nature is defined as that which can in principle be observed by human beings and upon which reproducible experiments can in principle be done.
That seems reasonable enough. But I wonder why we even need a definition of "nature." It's a common sense term from ordinary language, and we can use it as it is. I don't think science needs to make it into a technical term. Sure, "natural selection" is used as a technical term, but it's technical usage is well defined and does not depend on having a technical definition for "nature" or for "natural". nullasalus @38 asks: "Let’s hear what supernatural is." I don't think we need a definition for supernatural, either. If a researcher wants to investigate the efficacy of prayer, then he should not be deterred by the fact that prayer is said to have supernatural dependencies. If such research had turned up strong evidence of high efficacy, that would have been something that would have interested many scientists. Natural vs. supernatural might come up a lot in philosophical discussions about science, but I don't think it is anything that need concern the scientist designing an experiment for his research project.Neil Rickert_{April 28, 2012
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Fair enough; but I think many of us are so passionate about this issue that we are itching to get a word in here and there; or perhaps more than just a word. Or sure, by all means. I'm not saying 'No one else discuss this/be in the thread!', just explaining why those offering definitions who are ID proponents aren't my target and why I'm passing by their own definitions. Really, argue away about whatever. I'll wait on Nick, and I won't miss his reply if it comes in among other conversations. His or any other MN proponents'.nullasalus_{April 28, 2012
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Null, Fair enough; but I think many of us are so passionate about this issue that we are itching to get a word in here and there; or perhaps more than just a word. ;-)CannuckianYankee_{April 28, 2012
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CY,
So you’re not going to get a satisfactory definition of MN from Nick for the simple reason that there is no satisfactory definition. Nick is a garment sewn from the same threads as Barbara Forrest and as such, he’s going to give you the same definition if he gets to that point; which is a non-definition because it presents as a premise “supernatural” vs. “natural” causes without defining just what a “supernatural” cause or “intervention” might be.
Hey, I've had my own experiences and discussions with Nick in the past. But I'm in no rush here. He's a regular around here, and it's the weekend I'm going to give him until mid next week before I decide, okay, he's not coming back for whatever reason. For the record, I'm enjoying reading your thoughts and others' on this subject. But I just want to hit a point where, if I move ahead on this, I can point out I made an honest attempt at letting advocates of MN state what it is and how to define it before I analyze it. If he or anyone else wants to come to me later and say 'That's not what MN says!', I'll point to this thread as evidence that I made a sincere effort to get the definition straight from them. And at that point they can start complaining about the definitions as I've seen it, if they so choose.nullasalus_{April 28, 2012
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Null, I think Nick has already done the best that he can or is willing to do in this discussion. He wants to push the discussion back to appeals to authority and while that might be insightful, he apparently won't allow a reasonable critique of that authority coming from IDists: "The three key works are De Vries’s article which coined the modern term, Numbers’s article which reviews the history of the concept, and Pennock’s article in Synthese. There’s not much point in having a scholarly discussion if these works are not addressed. At least, I won’t be participating without those in the mix." So you're not going to get a satisfactory definition of MN from Nick for the simple reason that there is no satisfactory definition. Nick is a garment sewn from the same threads as Barbara Forrest and as such, he's going to give you the same definition if he gets to that point; which is a non-definition because it presents as a premise "supernatural" vs. "natural" causes without defining just what a "supernatural" cause or "intervention" might be. See here: "Poe, at least, is pretty clearly just an ID fan who wants to include supernatural intervention within science. So of course I disagree with most of the points in the article." This was in response to my posting this link: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7049/is_3_59/ai_n28451457/ His recourse appears to be ad hominem and not argument. The best you really could do here; which is actually significant, is to pick apart his 3 authorities. Not for Nick, but the onlookers. I'm guessing that Dr. Torley is already at work on that task? And KF has already done some significant preparation on the issues above. But I think one thing we should keep in mind is not the significance of whatever definition there is for MN, but how the term MN is utilized by radical Darwinian materialists. I already cited this, but see here: "The value of understanding how the word ‘nature’ came to be used by scientists and others when speaking of the physical realm comes in appreciating that it brings with it a subliminal connotation that tends to think and speak of nature as doing things. Nature as the physical world, however, does nothing. It just is. Things happen within the realm of nature, but nature takes no initiative. It just is.” This I think captures the heart of the "natural" vs. "supernatural" problem. In that the naturalist sees nature as doing things, rather than simply being and "behaving" according to law, the obvious extrapolation then is that the "supernatural" , if we allow it to exist at all, also does things. And you cannot have two movers involved in the world of cause and effect; otherwise you can't do science. And herein lies the assumption that nature is the entity doing the moving as opposed to a designer doing the only moving and nature falling in line. For the one who accepts "supernatural" events, the only mover is the designer. So one can still do science, because there is nothing that nature "does" that the designer is not doing. The reason nature does what we expect is because behind it all is a rational and necessary primary cause. It's actually without a rational and necessary primary cause where nature gets out of whack, and we can have more than one mover. If nature itself does things, then all parts of nature do things as well. We can't rule out that assumption. And as BA has already pointed out, what's to distinguish a miracle of nature acting on it's own and a miracle from a prime mover acting on it's own apart from the "will of nature?"CannuckianYankee_{April 28, 2012
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CY, But Barbara Forrest further complicates the issue in that she doesn’t even seem to know what she means by “supernatural.” It would be difficult to discount certain evidence if you don’t even know what that evidence may look like. This is part of why I'm trying to run through this project. This is supposed to be the simplest part of what I'd like to discuss: mere definitions. We hear about 'methodological naturalism', pro and con, ad nauseum in these discussions. So, step one: let's hear what this is. Let's hear what methodological naturalism is. Let's hear what natural is. Let's hear what supernatural is. And we can move on from there.nullasalus_{April 28, 2012
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Something I (and perhaps others here?) should read (although it's pricey): http://www.amazon.com/World-without-Design-Ontological-Consequences/dp/0199247617/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1335658283&sr=1-1 Rae in '05 wrote a rebuttal to a review of the book here...: http://nd.edu/~mrea/papers/Reply%20to%20Jacquette.pdf ...in which he lays out his basic premises in outline form: "The Argument of World Without Design The main argument of World Without Design can be summed up as follows: (1)Naturalism is not a philosophical thesis, but a research program. The program consists of a disposition (or set of dispositions) to treat the methods of science and those methods alone as basic sources of evidence. (2)Research programs cannot be adopted on the basis of evidence; and what counts as evidence from the point of view of one research program might not count as evidence from the point of view of another. (C1) Therefore: There is no rational basis for declaring categorically that one particular research program is rationally to be preferred over every other-i.e., naturalism's status as orthodoxy is without rational foundation. (3)Furthermore, the methods of science alone provide no justification for accepting realism about material objects (RMO)-the thesis that there exist material objects with intrinsic modal properties. (4)If premises (1) and (3) are true, then naturalists cannot rationally accept RMO. (5)If naturalists cannot rationally accept RMO, then they are committed to mind-body dualism and will have a hard time avoiding solipsism. (C2) Therefore: Naturalists cannot rationally accept RMO, they are committed to mind-body dualism, and they will have a hard time avoiding solipsism." Rae does not distinguish between MN and MN. But I think he's clearly talking about Methodological Naturalism. What I found interesting about this argument, which relates to our discussion on the term "nature" is premise 2: "Research programs cannot be adopted on the basis of evidence; and what counts as evidence from the point of view of one research program might not count as evidence from the point of view of another." I.e., the naturalist discounts what is termed "supernatural" as evidence, as Barbara Forrest does here: "...the methodology of science is the only viable method of acquiring reliable knowledge about the cosmos. Given this fact, if there is no workable method for acquiring knowledge of the supernatural, then it is procedurally impossible to have knowledge of either a supernatural dimension or entity. In the absence of any alternative methodology, the metaphysical claims one is entitled to make are very strictly limited. The philosophical naturalist, without making any metaphysical claims over and above those warranted by science, can demand from supernaturalists the method that legitimizes their metaphysical claims. In the absence of such a method, philosophical naturalists can not only justifiably refuse assent to such claims, but can deny--tentatively, not categorically--the existence of the supernatural, and for the same reason they deny the existence of less exalted supernatural entities like fairies and ghosts: the absence of evidence." http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/barbara_forrest/naturalism.html So Forrest is in effect discounting evidence and calling it "absence of evidence," simply because any methodology other than MN is presumed to be outside of scientific methodology. To clarify what Rae means by premise 2, a research program does not begin by gathering evidence, but by setting up a "disposition" for how to treat whatever evidence will be allowed. Evidence becomes meaningful once that "disposition" is in place. Therefore, to discount "supernatural" evidence in a research program prior to evaluating a methodology; or as in what Forrest does, to a priori discount "supernatural" may be a decision that is acceptable within a particular research program if you're trying to answer specific questions, and provided that you are clear by what you mean by "supernatural." However, to say that whatever evidence may prove to be "supernatural" cannot answer ANY scientific question, is to jump the gun on the formation of a legitimate research program. Researchers don't begin by stating that they are going to arbitrarily discount a certain form of evidence without reason, and without having a clue as to what that discounted evidence might look like. Naturalism lacks a legitimate reason to discount "supernatural" evidence in instances where they are attempting to answer questions of ultimate importance, such as questions concerned with mind-body dualism. But Barbara Forrest further complicates the issue in that she doesn't even seem to know what she means by "supernatural." It would be difficult to discount certain evidence if you don't even know what that evidence may look like.CannuckianYankee_{April 28, 2012
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F/N: Link to SB's 2010 thread on MN and morphing definitions. Notice, 514 comments. KFkairosfocus_{April 28, 2012
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Sorry, wrong thread. KFkairosfocus_{April 28, 2012
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F/N: Sewell, in his ENV rebuttal, skewers the nasty game that has been playing out well:
So the AML article was not worthy of publication, even after it was accepted, an article slamming the unpublished article is worth publishing, but not any response to that. Well, now you have an illustration of how the scientific "consensus" on certain controversial issues is maintained. And if you watch the video you will understand why, on this issue at least, suppression of all opposing viewpoints is so necessary to maintain the consensus.
See why that Tennessee law on protecting teachers who discuss controversies and limitations of science is necessary? KFkairosfocus_{April 28, 2012
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I've seen some suggestions for what would qualify as natural - but I'll still hold out for Nick Matzke to return and offer his own. I'm going to privilege definitions of nature and methodological naturalism given by actual adherents to it and proponents of it, rather than ID proponents or critics of it. Doing my best to be fair here in the analysis.nullasalus_{April 28, 2012
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By the way, the obvious way to rule out miraculous influence in the data is the same way scientists routinely rule out outliers in their data: statistical analysis. Of course if God chose to make the same miracle recurring such that it could not be ruled out by statistical analysis, then we no longer have a miracle. We have a natural law.tragic mishap_{April 28, 2012
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Neil:
It has always seemed to me that science studies what science is able to study. Roughly speaking, it studies that for which there is evidence that is available and that can be reliably tested by independent investigators.
I agree, Neil. I think the most helpful definition of "nature" in this case should be a reference to the scientific method. How about this: Nature is defined as that which can in principle be observed by human beings and upon which reproducible experiments can in principle be done.tragic mishap_{April 28, 2012
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