Defining Methodological Naturalism

_{April 27, 2012

Intelligent Design}

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It’s been a while since we had a good discussion about Methodological Naturalism. This time around, I want to start out simple: I’m asking everyone, particularly those who believe methodological naturalism is essential to science (Matzke, I’m looking at you) to define it. More below.

I want to be clear here: my aim in this thread isn’t to argue against methodological naturalism, and certainly not for it. I do have an idea for a future post on the subject, of course. What I’m hoping for here are definitions – again, particularly definitions that its defenders accept. I’m likely going to ask any contributor here, particularly MN advocates, to further define some aspects of the definition. So if you tell me that methodological naturalism means limiting oneself to natural phenomena, I’m going to ask what makes a given phenomena natural.

Anyway, here’s hoping some MN advocates step up and provide what I’m asking for.

Comments

Well, this won't be technical, let alone thorough; but I'll propose a lay definition (& I probably qualify as one of those MN supporters): MN is a *working* assumption that observed phenomena have physical explanations. ...where "physical" is my substitute for the word "natural", and since since that cop out probably won't be allowed, I'll add that both of those words will invoke something of observational repeatability at least in principle. But sooner or later these definitions all have to circle back on themselves, and it will all become a tautology instead of anything prescriptively useful or provable. (courtesy of Godel!) But I don't think of MN as prescriptive anyway, but rather as descriptive. (& probably still just a tautology in that it ends up amounting to "what is, is".) Whenever a pedestrian puts one foot in front of the other, he's functioning as an MN assuming that his next foot had better be in place or he's going to fall forward. But his *working* MN assumption as he walks should in no way be construed as any kind of statement on his part that gravity will never fail or that God won't or can't suspend it or personally bear him up. His regular activity is just based on his regular experience, making him a generally successful walker. It does not require of him that he believe it never was otherwise or never could be otherwise; only that it ordinarily is. If one sees how this analogy extends to the scientific enterprise, then I would say they have a good understanding of MN. --Mervmerv_{April 28, 2012
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VJT, Nullasalus, thanks very much for putting up this post. Hey, looks like we're accidentally on the same page then. Glad this will be useful. Or possibly useful, anyway. Since I'm still waiting on Nick to offer up some reasonable clarifications. We've barely started picking up on a proper definition here. Hopefully Nick, or someone else, will step up and provide a more thorough definition of MN.nullasalus_{April 28, 2012
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Gregory @ 23: I was trying to answer your question, but was maybe too oblique. Now I'm confused about what you mean. Define a naturalist as someone who studies the secondary causes of that whose primary cause is not within the physical order, and of course as soon as he does anything else he's stopped being a naturalist. Everybody does that in the pub, but to what extent is it part of studying the natural world? It depends on whether the primary cause is open to any consideration, and whether one is prepared to consider it. At the very least, sans metaphysical priors, there is no scientific reason why one shouldn't come to the end of secondary causes and have to cry off or else stop doing naturalism. Medicine is a prime example of a pursuit where the distinction is useless or impossible. Three years of Nat Sci at Cambridge uni, because bodies and bugs are "natural". Yet surgery rearranges bodies artificially, as do artifical drugs, part of whose benefit is the placebo effect, which is psychological. Even the bugs have been modified by artificial antibiotics. Much disease is self-induced in one way or anther, so is artificial - as of course is much psychiatry. Overarching all is that dealing with patients is the main part of the job, and is purely non-natural - indeed it cannot but be spiritual in many situations. Does that make it comparable to biology, or an outlier?Jon Garvey_{April 28, 2012
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Gentlemen (Ladies?), I have nothing to add to a post I wrote at this site entitled, "Methodological Naturalism, Revisionist History, and Morphing Defitions, written on Jan 28, 2010. As we discovered by observing hundreds of responses, Methodological Naturalism cannot be defended because, among other things, it cannot be defined or articulated. Witness Nick's current non-response to a simple request for a definition and the way he punts by alluding to another author, who is equally powerless to meet the challenge. Also, As VJ points out, Methodological Naturalism does not have a long history. Ronald Numbers' account is provides no defense whatsoever for the proposition that earlier scientists embraced it. Anyone familiar with my take on the subject will know that I link my insistence on a definition of MN with two examples: Methodological naturalism characterizes all things that are not “supernatural” as natural, placing human cognition, human volition, earthquakes, and tornadoes in the same category. How, then, do we distinguish the humanly-produced cause of all the artifacts found in ancient Pompei from the cause of the volcano that buried them. The two kinds of causes are either substantially different or they are not. If they are different then those differences can be identified and the archeologist can declare that humans (one kind of cause) built the artifacts and a volcano (another kind of cause) buried them. If they are the same kind of cause (a natural cause as the MN proponents insist) then how does the archeologist detect human design? How does he know that wind, water, and erosion didn't produce the "artifacts" that the volcano buried? Or, again, we know that at least two different kinds of causes can create disorder in a home--a tornado and a burglar. We can easily distinguish the chaotic activity of the former as one kind of cause with the intelligent activity of the latter as another kind of cause. Even so, MN characterizes both events as the same kind of cause, that is, "natural causes," because they are not, as they put it, neither event was a "supernatural cause," and because both can be said to have occurred "in nature." So, after two years, I am still waiting to hear how methodological naturalists make sense out of these events? For ID, of course, there is no problem: A natural cause is defined as law and chance; an intelligent cause is defined as agency. Thus, an intelligent cause produced the artifacts; a natural cause buried them; an intelligent cause ransacked them room; an intelligent cause destroyed it.StephenB_{April 28, 2012
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So if you tell me that methodological naturalism means limiting oneself to natural phenomena, I’m going to ask what makes a given phenomena natural.
I have never come across a need for methodological naturalism, and your question illustrates why. MN is vacuous unless one begins with an a priori characterization of what is natural. It has always seemed to me that science studies what science is able to study. Roughly speaking, it studies that for which there is evidence that is available and that can be reliably tested by independent investigators. If the science is successful, then the term "natural" will probably be applied to what the science showed.Neil Rickert_{April 28, 2012
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Hi everyone, I'd just like to say that I'll be putting up a post on methodological naturalism in the next few days. My post will have a lot to say about definitions, and also about the history of methodological naturalism. (Be prepared for a few eye-openers. If you think methodological naturalism has a long history, think again.) I'd also like to add that de Vries' original definition of methodological naturalism isn't tight enough to secure the autonomy of science as a discipline. To do that, a stronger definition is required, which stipulates that scientific explanations of natural phenomena are complete, thereby rendering them immune to supernatural interference. However, such a definition doesn't entail metaphysical naturalism, as it says nothing about explanations of the being, or existence, of things. A religious person could consistently claim that God is required to explain the being of things, without violating methodological naturalism. In my post, I'll be examining the arguments commonly put forward in defense of methodological naturalism, and I'll explain exactly why I find them wanting. Nullasalus, thanks very much for putting up this post.vjtorley_{April 28, 2012
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LoL! Hey Nick, your methodological naturalism fails due to the fact that natural processes only exist in nature and therefor cannot account for its origin, which science says it had. It is a non-starter. Nice job, ace...Joe_{April 28, 2012
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Gregory: Pardon an interjection. Start from Newton et al, taking in the way he gave the generic sci method in Optics Query 31 [insofar as an inductive method can be identified], and work on down through the likes of a Kelvin or a Planck or a Pasteur down to men like Fritz Schaeffer (chemistry) today, and not a few Nobel Prize holders. At least one such eminent scientist in and around biology -- inventor of the gene gun -- is an explicit creationist. Philosophies like naturalism have no grounds for insisting that to be an effective or even eminent scientist, one must adhere to such a view. In addition, insofar as such views embrace or entail a priori materialism or evolutionary materialism, they end up in self referential incoherence on the credibility of a mind free to know on reasoned warrant and free to reason logically [as opposed to merely carrying forth whatever conditioning has been imposed]. Indeed, as I linked earlier in 17 above, we typically have a major misunderstanding of the rise of modern science inculcated by enlightenment figures such as Voltaire et al. This misunderstanding of the history and nature of science is a material factor in debates over methodological naturalism. I think you will see from what I highlight in 16 above, where key points of concern on ideological warping by materialists and fellow travellers lie. KFkairosfocus_{April 28, 2012
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Hi Jon, There are other things to say about the primitive PoS known as MN vs. MN, of course (without getting too abstract, running off into philosophy of mind, philosophy of nature, etc.). But I wonder, are you willing to directly answer my question: "Is it possible for a (practising) ‘natural scientist’ to *not* be a ‘naturalist’? If you answer in the affirmative, could you please give an example or two using names (that is, without splitting the person and worker in half)? A trained medical doctor is not exactly a 'natural scientist,' but usually shares some overlapping educational background with what 'naturalists' study, does he or she not?Gregory_{April 28, 2012
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Null: Pardon miscommunication, but my main point is on the conceptual roots and worldview contexts of definition. In that context, issues of precising vs genus-difference, and of denotative vs ostensive take on significance, especially issues of key examples and even paradigms of Kuhnian sort. "Mine comes from vineyard X in year Y and is a better bottle than yours" so that locks up discussion on my terms is to be avoided. KFkairosfocus_{April 28, 2012
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Gregory The distinction naturalist (the occupation) v naturalist (the ideologue) seems to go back to nullasalus' question: what makes a natural phenomenon natural? Let's try a provocative one based on Nick's references to the origin of methodological naturalism: "a natural phenomenon is one whose primary cause does not exist within the physical order." One problem with that is that if one belives the human mind is immaterial, that might render artificial things natural too - but one gets around that, perhaps, by dealing with humans as a unity acting within the physical order. The interesting question for the metaphysical naturalists would be that, to them, nature would have no primary cause at all - not sure if that's philsophically robust (so the philosphy will have to go!)Jon Garvey_{April 28, 2012
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Let it be said that Dembski in 1999 wrote: “Naturalism is the disease. Intelligent Design is the cure.” A couple of things to note: 1) He makes no distinction between MN & MN in his 'disease-cure' analogy, and 2) A Big 'D' is used on the second term. The second point speaks similarly to those who capitalise 'N' for 'Nature' (which sometimes still does happen). I'd like to ask: Is it possible for a (practising) 'natural scientist' to *not* be a 'naturalist'? In other words, aren't all 'natural scientists' properly called 'naturalists' of one variety or another? Thus, Behe is a 'naturalist,' Axe and Gauger are 'naturalists,' Wells and Minnich are 'naturalists,' are they not? There seems to be necessary a distinction between someone who studies 'natural history' and an ideologue, i.e. one who promotes 'naturalism' as a worldview, to the exclusion of anything 'non-natural'.Gregory_{April 28, 2012
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I won't attempt a definition, but will comment on the apparent origins of MN in the "centuries-old distinction" between primary and secondary causes. In the first place, before a deterministic science developed, it wasn't necessarily a case of tracing 2ry cause back to the primary cause, but within it. The dichotomy between natural causation and "Goddidit" was not made in that way, and the important question was "How God did it." One could therefore view Newton's idea of "divine tinkering" with planetary bodies as a completely proper scientific hypothesis on the limits of secondary causation, later corrected by maths, as science should be. Science was not stopped by it. It was no more God-of-the-Gaps thinking than an error in deciding that a piece of software is a primary program rather than a subroutine. Secondly, the inclusion of both primary and secondary causation becomes important again in science as physical determinism has been weakened by most expressions of quantum theory, in which every event has a primary cause, not just the first. The primary/secondary distinction also becomes important as soon as chaos and/or probability, distinct from determinism, are admitted to science. To the guys who started that "centuries-old division", the statement "A causes B causes C" implies a primary cause at or before "A". But the statement "A might cause B or C" requires invoking a primary cause after A to explain the different outcomes. "Chance" would not have been a cause in itself, but a recourse to primary causation - an Act of God (a view maintained in our insurance policies until recently). So it is necessary to argue why that approach has been rendered invalid in modern science - assuming a freedom from metaphysical priors like naturalism.Jon Garvey_{April 28, 2012
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kf, Let us not get too caught up in definitionitis and who used what words (or phrases) when. Well, actually... that's exactly what I want to get caught up in. At least this time. I'd like to examine the claim that methodological naturalism is a commitment of science. The very first step is finding out just what methodological naturalism is, straight from the mouth (well, fingers) of an avid proponent. I've asked Nick for some clarifications, and I think what I'm asking of him is fair. Hopefully he'll continue to respond. I'll save greater concerns for when it looks like I've got a solid definition onhand.nullasalus_{April 28, 2012
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F/N: Following a suggestion by Plato in The Laws bk X we may be well advised to reflect on the contrast, natural vs ARTificial, rather than the ideologically loaded, natural vs supernatural. It should be patent that matters of art are subject to empirical investigation on characteristic traces. (Our court rooms, complete with scientists and engineers as expert witnesses, are more than enough proof for that. And, if someone looks at scientific investigation of phenomena in the cosmos as a forensic investigation writ large, does that undermine science? Or, did it -- pace ever so many ideologue-in-a-lab-coat rewrites of the history involved -- actually materially contribute to its founding?)kairosfocus_{April 28, 2012
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Null (et al): Let us not get too caught up in definitionitis and who used what words (or phrases) when. The key thing is the issue of the imposition of the ideas and agenda described by Lewontin all too revealingly in January 1997. Yes, Dr Matzke et al, I know I know, you all get hot under the collar -- and often make fallacious and toxic dismissals about alleged quote mining [cf here on on that for this case, for I do continue the quote at length, just I explain where that part goes seriously off the rails as anyone familiar with the concepts that "God is a God of order" or that "in him we live and move and have our being" or that "in him all things consist" would know . . . ] -- when this is exposed, but this is one of several linked examples here on so I think it is all too relevant context for what is really going on in and around the term "methodological naturalism":
. . . to put a correct view of the universe into people's heads we must first get an incorrect view out . . . the problem is to get them to reject irrational and supernatural explanations of the world, the demons that exist only in their imaginations, and to accept a social and intellectual apparatus, Science, as the only begetter of truth [[--> NB: this is a knowledge claim about knowledge and its possible sources, i.e. it is a claim in philosophy not science; it is thus self-refuting]. . . . To Sagan, as to all but a few other scientists, it is self-evident [[--> actually, science and its knowledge claims are plainly not immediately and necessarily true on pain of absurdity, to one who understands them; this is another logical error, begging the question , confused for real self-evidence; whereby a claim shows itself not just true but true on pain of patent absurdity if one tries to deny it . . ] that the practices of science provide the surest method of putting us in contact with physical reality, and that, in contrast, the demon-haunted world rests on a set of beliefs and behaviors that fail every reasonable test [[--> i.e. an assertion that tellingly reveals a hostile mindset, not a warranted claim] . . . . It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes [[--> another major begging of the question . . . ] to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute [[--> i.e. here we see the fallacious, indoctrinated, ideological, closed mind . . . ], for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door . . . [Billions and Billions of Demons, NYRB, Jan 1997]
Similarly, the US NAS and NSTA are on record
NAS: In science, explanations must be based on naturally occurring phenomena. Natural causes are, in principle, reproducible and therefore can be checked independently by others. If explanations are based on purported forces that are outside of nature, scientists have no way of either confirming or disproving those explanations. Any scientific explanation has to be testable — there must be possible observational consequences that could support the idea but also ones that could refute it. Unless a proposed explanation is framed in a way that some observational evidence could potentially count against it, that explanation cannot be subjected to scientific testing. [[Science, Evolution and Creationism, 2008, p. 10 Emphases added.] NSTA: The principal product of science is knowledge in the form of naturalistic concepts and the laws and theories related to those concepts . . . . [[S]cience, along with its methods, explanations and generalizations, must be the sole focus of instruction in science classes to the exclusion of all non-scientific or pseudoscientific methods, explanations, generalizations and products . . . . Although no single universal step-by-step scientific method captures the complexity of doing science, a number of shared values and perspectives characterize a scientific approach to understanding nature. Among these are a demand for naturalistic explanations supported by empirical evidence that are, at least in principle, testable against the natural world. Other shared elements include observations, rational argument, inference, skepticism, peer review and replicability of work . . . . Science, by definition, is limited to naturalistic methods and explanations and, as such, is precluded from using supernatural elements in the production of scientific knowledge. [[National Science teachers Association, Board of Directors, July 2000.]
It should be obvious to all that a priori materialism and insisting on locking up the world and its explanations to "naturalISTIC" factors etc are philosophically loaded and biassing tothe point of being toxic and tendentious. Indeed, "skepticism," in that context takes on ideological colouring, as opposed to being critically aware and responding to reasonable questions of warrant per empirical testing. If science is allowed to be held captive to an ideological magiesterium in the holy lab coat, it will self destruct. It will simply become yet another form of political power games and impositions. Indeed,t eh ongoing self destruction of the climate alarmism that was triggered by the whistleblower-leaked Climategate papers from UEA from 2009 on, is a sign of what may well happen in much wider areas of science. So, we must do our own policing, or the angry public will come to clean up, and when they do, they will not be much inclined to make fine distinctions. (That is why I am glad to see something like the Tennessee law initiative, as it is so mild that it gives me a glimmer of hope that things will not go to the point of explosion. But the utter irrationality and scapegoating shrillness of the attempted rebuttals from the materialists in lab coats and their publicists make me even more concerned. Pressure is building up and cracks are appearing.) To this sort of stuff, Phil Johnson rightly replied, in November that year:
For scientific materialists the materialism comes first; the science comes thereafter. [[Emphasis original] We might more accurately term them "materialists employing science." And if materialism is true, then some materialistic theory of evolution has to be true simply as a matter of logical deduction, regardless of the evidence. That theory will necessarily be at least roughly like neo-Darwinism, in that it will have to involve some combination of random changes and law-like processes capable of producing complicated organisms that (in Dawkins’ words) "give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose." . . . . The debate about creation and evolution is not deadlocked . . . Biblical literalism is not the issue. The issue is whether materialism and rationality are the same thing. Darwinism is based on an a priori commitment to materialism, not on a philosophically neutral assessment of the evidence. Separate the philosophy from the science, and the proud tower collapses. [[Emphasis added.] [[The Unraveling of Scientific Materialism, First Things, 77 (Nov. 1997), pp. 22 – 25.]
For instance, in all of this the resort to demonising and scapegoating of "the supernatural" is a loaded and toxic side-tracking. As Nick knows or should know, right from the first ID technical book, TMLO (By Thaxton et al, 1984), the issue has been that intelligent, purposeful, knowledgeable and skillful causes are an empirical reality, and we have no good reason to infer that such must always be human (beavers exist and make dams adapted to the specifics of a given situation e.g. they go arch where that is needed but not always) or that they must even be embedded in bodies or material constructs. This last is linked to the point that the physics of our cosmos is suspiciously fine-tuned for C chemistry, aqueous medium molecular nanotech life. It also linked to the serious point that mind is not wholly explicable on -- i.e. reducible to -- matter, without self-referential absurdity. If we have the possibility of intelligent cause and we have characteristic signs of such causes at work that are subject to empirical investigation, then we have no epistemic right to insist that such causes be locked out when signs appear but an intelligent cause is inconvenient to the a priori materialists. Such Lewontinian a priori materialism is ideology, it is not sound science, it is not sound epistemology, it is not sound logic. And, the methods of science are inextricably rooted in precisely those major fields of philosophy, and so the onward connexions of the issues raised to ground science as methods, cannot be dismissed, if we are willing to retain the integrity of our thought life. Which of course, is exactly the problem with ideologues such as Lewontin has characerised (and, it seems, exemplified). GEM of TKI PS: I think it would be useful to look at the UD Weak Argument correctives 17 - 20 on this and related topics, here on.kairosfocus_{April 28, 2012
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I'm not a philosopher of science, but I've always just understood MN to be, simply, something like: "we assume naturalism in our investigation of the natural world". We do this just because it makes sense to do it that way - just as we need to assume supernaturalism to investigate the supernatural. But anyway, I'd also like to address some things that bornagain77 has said. First, Godel actually had *two* incompleteness theorems - and neither of them said anything about circles. His first is, "If P is ?-consistent, then there is a sentence which is neither provable nor refutable from P.", and his second is, "If P is consistent, then Con(P) is not provable from P." (you can check his proofs on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). He's also mistaken about the CMBR. Sure, the picture *looks* like a circle, but no more than a picture of a basketball does. Furthermore, his exegesis of Proverbs 8:26-27 is way off - it's not a science lesson. Proverbs is what's known as "wisdom literature". There's a constant theme of wisdom being contrasted with foolishness throughout the book, and here "Wisdom" is personified as a woman. If we take these verses to be a literal science lesson, then we're also forced to conclude that "wisdom" actually has a female body. And that's just silly. As for his mention of the ontological argument, I've addressed that on my blog: http://dubitodeus.wordpress.com/2012/04/28/possibly-necessarily-g/Metalogic42_{April 27, 2012
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I'd like to remind any onlooker here, btw, that I'd be glad to hear other definitions of methodological naturalism. I'm focusing on Nick because it's a known favorite topic of his, and he's a semi-regular here - so, he's the obvious first choice. Anyone else is free to offer up MN as they understand it. I'm hoping particularly for advocates here, but I don't mind other input as well (CY, BA, etc.)nullasalus_{April 27, 2012
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bornagain77 - Gödel’s Incompleteness: The #1 Mathematical Breakthrough of the 20th Century Excerpt: Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem says: “Anything you can draw a circle around cannot explain itself without referring to something outside the circle – something you have to assume to be true but cannot prove “mathematically” to be true." The IDvolution.org has a graphic you may like on the what is IDvolution page.buffalo_{April 27, 2012
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One further note, the randomness that naturalists presuppose as true for why all life came to be on earth actually can be traced to a source 'within the circle':
Blackholes- The neo-Darwinists ultimate ‘god of entropic randomness’ which can create all life in the universe (according to them) https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fxhJEGNeEQ_sn4ngQWmeBt1YuyOs8AQcUrzBRo7wISw/edit?hl=en_US
But please note this 'inside the circle' source of entropic randomness, i.e. 'natural randomness', besides being shown to be the primary source for degenerative chaos in the universe, is also shown to be bounded by a transcendent universal constant. A transcendent universal constant governing the second law which originated 'outside the circle';
The Austrian physicist Ludwig Boltzmann first linked entropy and probability in 1877. However, the equation as shown, involving a specific constant, was first written down by Max Planck, the father of quantum mechanics in 1900. In his 1918 Nobel Prize lecture, Planck said:This constant is often referred to as Boltzmann's constant, although, to my knowledge, Boltzmann himself never introduced it – a peculiar state of affairs, which can be explained by the fact that Boltzmann, as appears from his occasional utterances, never gave thought to the possibility of carrying out an exact measurement of the constant. Nothing can better illustrate the positive and hectic pace of progress which the art of experimenters has made over the past twenty years, than the fact that since that time, not only one, but a great number of methods have been discovered for measuring the mass of a molecule with practically the same accuracy as that attained for a planet. http://www.daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/B/Boltzmann_equation.html
Thus the 'naturalist', according to 'methodological naturalism' itself, has no cause within the circle that he can appeal so as to explain life, and he is forced to be completely silent on the origination of its governing constant!!! Verse and Music:
Romans 8:18-21 I consider that our present sufferings are not worth comparing with the glory that will be revealed in us. The creation waits in eager expectation for the sons of God to be revealed. For the creation was subjected to frustration, not by its own choice, but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the glorious freedom of the children of God. Mandisa - Waiting for Tomorrow - (lyrics) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ezrFxWjyZQ
bornagain77_{April 27, 2012
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Nick, and everyone else, It appears that BA has touched on a very important point. Nick mentioned the theological distinction between primary and secondary causes as the beginning of what we now call methodological naturalism, or as some others call simply the scientific method. It seems that in all of this there is the "desire" in looking at nature, of discounting miracles. The "naturalist" defines the miracle as being in the realm of the "supernatural," while the non-naturalist would define miracles in much broader terms; as that which either falls outside of secondary causes and into the realm of primary causes, or that which currently has no explanation within the realm of secondary causes. The non-naturalist does not rule out the realm of primary causes. Since the "naturalist" limits science to "secondary causes," he/she leaves out the question of "primary causes." But the "naturalist," in so doing, does not address the issue of what appear to be miracles in the realm of secondary causes (i.e., "nature"); assuming that there is an explanation not currently known, which is itself a secondary cause or a series of secondary or contingent causes. There is nothing in the realm of nature that allows the "naturalist" to make that assumption; it is at best a guess. It is by all accounts, a pretty good guess - one that the non-naturalist is also likely to make, but it is no less a guess. The naturalist has thus made the assumption that all secondary causes must be intrinsically divorced from whatever may be their primary cause. The non-naturalist, while operating under some of the same assumptions as the naturalist, is not willing to intrinsically divorce whatever may be behind a secondary cause; be it another secondary cause, or ultimately a primary cause. The naturalist calls this "supernaturalism," while the non-naturalist would call it a necessary metaphysical assumption if we're going to talk about causes in any meaningful way, whether scientifically or otherwise. The naturalist assumes that we (the non-naturalists) are invoking the "supernatural," while the non-naturalist looks at it in an entirely different way as in recognizing that at the end (or beginning) of the "rope" of causation there is a necessary primary cause, and that we don't know how far down the rope we are at any given time in our examination of causes. Either of these requires certain metaphysical assumptions. The naturalist assumption is that while there may be primary causes, they are unimportant in examining secondary causes. The non-naturalist assumption is that if there are primary causes, they may be important in examining secondary causes, or they may not. I think the naturalist assumption goes much farther out of line with what can be reasonably allowed than the non-naturalist assumption.CannuckianYankee_{April 27, 2012
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Moreover, the success of modern science itself, since it was born out of the presupposed (outside the circle; Godel) truthfulness of Christian Theism, and no other (outside the circle) presupposition, and that reality itself is found to conform to this Christian Theistic presupposition, is what further, and dramatically, testifies that the Christian presupposition is true;
Why should the human mind be able to comprehend reality so deeply? - referenced article https://docs.google.com/document/d/1qGvbg_212biTtvMschSGZ_9kYSqhooRN4OUW_Pw-w0E/edit Jerry Coyne on the Scientific Method and Religion - Michael Egnor - June 2011 Excerpt: The scientific method -- the empirical systematic theory-based study of nature -- has nothing to so with some religious inspirations -- Animism, Paganism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Shintoism, Islam, and, well, atheism. The scientific method has everything to do with Christian (and Jewish) inspiration. Judeo-Christian culture is the only culture that has given rise to organized theoretical science. Many cultures (e.g. China) have produced excellent technology and engineering, but only Christian culture has given rise to a conceptual understanding of nature. http://www.evolutionnews.org/2011/06/jerry_coyne_on_the_scientific_047431.html
Moreover, many modern physicists seem to have forgotten the lesson that was clearly born out by Godel, that you can't have a 'complete' mathematical theory of everything without assuming God as true, for they are vainly trying to unify Quantum Mechanics (QM) and General Relativity (GR), into a mathematical 'theory of everything'. Yet when one allows God into the picture, then a very credible, empirically backed, reconciliation between QM and GR readily emerges:
The God of the Mathematicians – Goldman Excerpt: As Gödel told Hao Wang, “Einstein’s religion [was] more abstract, like Spinoza and Indian philosophy. Spinoza’s god is less than a person; mine is more than a person; because God can play the role of a person.” – Kurt Gödel – (Gödel is considered by many to be the greatest mathematician of the 20th century) http://www.firstthings.com/article/2010/07/the-god-of-the-mathematicians Centrality of Each Individual Observer In The Universe and Christ’s Very Credible Reconciliation Of General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics https://docs.google.com/document/d/17SDgYPHPcrl1XX39EXhaQzk7M0zmANKdYIetpZ-WB5Y/edit?hl=en_US General Relativity, Quantum Mechanics, Entropy, and The Shroud Of Turin - updated video http://vimeo.com/34084462
Of Related Note. This following proof came out a few days ago.
Mathematics of Eternity Prove The Universe Must Have Had A Beginning - April 2012 Excerpt: Cosmologists use the mathematical properties of eternity to show that although universe may last forever, it must have had a beginning.,,, They go on to show that cyclical universes and universes of eternal inflation both expand in this way. So they cannot be eternal in the past and must therefore have had a beginning. "Although inflation may be eternal in the future, it cannot be extended indefinitely to the past," they say. They treat the emergent model of the universe differently, showing that although it may seem stable from a classical point of view, it is unstable from a quantum mechanical point of view. "A simple emergent universe model...cannot escape quantum collapse," they say. The conclusion is inescapable. "None of these scenarios can actually be past-eternal," say Mithani and Vilenkin. Since the observational evidence is that our universe is expanding, then it must also have been born in the past. A profound conclusion (albeit the same one that lead to the idea of the big bang in the first place). http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/arxiv/27793/
Verse and music:
Psalm 119:89-91 Your eternal word, O Lord, stands firm in heaven. Your faithfulness extends to every generation, as enduring as the earth you created. Your regulations remain true to this day, for everything serves your plans. Alter Bridge – Rise Today http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZYG3BPvFOgs
bornagain77_{April 27, 2012
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Nick, I had a atheist on another blog explain to me the reason why methodological naturalism is imposed a-priori onto the scientific method was to prevent this:
'But notice that to do any of this (scientific reasoning) you must discount the possibility of miracles. Because if you don't, then you cannot discount the possibility that a miracle happened to interfere with your experiments.'
Yet there is a stunning, fatal, flaw in this reasoning for 'naturalists': Since atheistic naturalists presuppose randomness as the 'miracle' that created the whole universe, and even all life within it, how in blue blazes are they going to discount the possibility a 'random' miracle happening to interfere with their experiments? Let me flesh the fatal problem out for you; Godel has shown;
THE GOD OF THE MATHEMATICIANS - DAVID P. GOLDMAN - August 2010 Excerpt: we cannot construct an ontology that makes God dispensable. Secularists can dismiss this as a mere exercise within predefined rules of the game of mathematical logic, but that is sour grapes, for it was the secular side that hoped to substitute logic for God in the first place. Gödel's critique of the continuum hypothesis has the same implication as his incompleteness theorems: Mathematics never will create the sort of closed system that sorts reality into neat boxes. http://www.firstthings.com/article/2010/07/the-god-of-the-mathematicians Gödel’s Incompleteness: The #1 Mathematical Breakthrough of the 20th Century Excerpt: Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem says: “Anything you can draw a circle around cannot explain itself without referring to something outside the circle - something you have to assume to be true but cannot prove "mathematically" to be true.” http://www.cosmicfingerprints.com/blog/incompleteness/
And please note 'the circle' formed by the Cosmic Background Radiation:
Picture of CMBR https://webspace.utexas.edu/reyesr/SolarSystem/cmbr.jpg Proverbs 8:26-27 While as yet He had not made the earth or the fields, or the primeval dust of the world. When He prepared the heavens, I was there, when He drew a circle on the face of the deep,
Moreover, atheists assume that 'randomness' as true (outside the circle) for the ultimate explanation for the origination of the universe, whereas Christian Theists presuppose God as true (outside the circle) for the origination of the universe. Yet insisting on randomness as the ultimate explanation for why the universe came into being leads to the epistemological failure of science:
The End Of Materialism? - Dr. Bruce Gordon * In the multiverse, anything can happen for no reason at all. * In other words, the materialist is forced to believe in random miracles as a explanatory principle. * In a Theistic universe, nothing happens without a reason. Miracles are therefore intelligently directed deviations from divinely maintained regularities, and are thus expressions of rational purpose. * Scientific materialism is (therefore) epistemically self defeating: it makes scientific rationality impossible. The Absurdity of Inflation, String Theory & The Multiverse - Dr. Bruce Gordon - video http://vimeo.com/34468027
In fact, in a stunning twist of irony, presupposing 'infinite randomness', as atheists do with the multiverse, actually concedes the necessary premise to make the ontological argument, for God's existence, complete;
Ontological Argument For God From The Many Worlds/Multiverse Hypothesis - William Lane Craig - video http://www.metacafe.com/watch/4784641 God Is Not Dead Yet – William Lane Craig – Page 4 The ontological argument. Anselm’s famous argument has been reformulated and defended by Alvin Plantinga, Robert Maydole, Brian Leftow, and others. God, Anselm observes, is by definition the greatest being conceivable. If you could conceive of anything greater than God, then that would be God. Thus, God is the greatest conceivable being, a maximally great being. So what would such a being be like? He would be all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good, and he would exist in every logically possible world. But then we can argue: 1. It is possible that a maximally great being (God) exists. 2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. 3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. 4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world. 5. Therefore, a maximally great being exists in the actual world. 6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists. 7. Therefore, God exists. Now it might be a surprise to learn that steps 2–7 of this argument are relatively uncontroversial. Most philosophers would agree that if God’s existence is even possible, then he must exist. So the whole question is: Is God’s existence possible? The atheist has to maintain that it’s impossible that God exists. He has to say that the concept of God is incoherent, like the concept of a married bachelor or a round square. But the problem is that the concept of God just doesn’t appear to be incoherent in that way. The idea of a being which is all-powerful, all knowing, and all-good in every possible world seems perfectly coherent. And so long as God’s existence is even possible, it follows that God must exist. http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2008/july/13.22.html?start=4
Moreover presupposing randomness, 'random miracles', as to the reason why humans exist, as Darwinism does, leads to epistemological failure of humans to have confidence in their reasoning:
Should You Trust the Monkey Mind? - Joe Carter Excerpt: Evolutionary naturalism assumes that our noetic equipment developed as it did because it had some survival value or reproductive advantage. Unguided evolution does not select for belief except insofar as the belief improves the chances of survival. The truth of a belief is irrelevant, as long as it produces an evolutionary advantage. This equipment could have developed at least four different kinds of belief that are compatible with evolutionary naturalism, none of which necessarily produce true and trustworthy cognitive faculties. http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2010/09/should-you-trust-the-monkey-mind The following interview is sadly comical as a evolutionary psychologist realizes that neo-Darwinism can offer no guarantee that our faculties of reasoning will correspond to the truth, not even for the truth that he is purporting to give in the interview, (which begs the question of how was he able to come to that particular truthful realization, in the first place, if neo-Darwinian evolution were actually true?); Evolutionary guru: Don't believe everything you think - October 2011 Interviewer: You could be deceiving yourself about that.(?) Evolutionary Psychologist: Absolutely. http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21128335.300-evolutionary-guru-dont-believe-everything-you-think.html
Further notes:
Evolution and the Illusion of Randomness - Talbott - Fall 2011 Excerpt: The situation calls to mind a widely circulated cartoon by Sidney Harris, which shows two scientists in front of a blackboard on which a body of theory has been traced out with the usual tangle of symbols, arrows, equations, and so on. But there’s a gap in the reasoning at one point, filled by the words, “Then a miracle occurs.” And the one scientist is saying to the other, “I think you should be more explicit here in step two.” In the case of evolution, I picture Dennett and Dawkins filling the blackboard with their vivid descriptions of living, highly regulated, coordinated, integrated, and intensely meaningful biological processes, and then inserting a small, mysterious gap in the middle, along with the words, “Here something random occurs.” This “something random” looks every bit as wishful as the appeal to a miracle. It is the central miracle in a gospel of meaninglessness, a “Randomness of the gaps,” demanding an extraordinarily blind faith. At the very least, we have a right to ask, “Can you be a little more explicit here?” http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/evolution-and-the-illusion-of-randomness Nobel Prize-Winning Physicist Wolfgang Pauli on the Empirical Problems with Neo-Darwinism - Casey Luskin - February 27, 2012 Excerpt: "In discussions with biologists I met large difficulties when they apply the concept of 'natural selection' in a rather wide field, without being able to estimate the probability of the occurrence in a empirically given time of just those events, which have been important for the biological evolution. Treating the empirical time scale of the evolution theoretically as infinity they have then an easy game, apparently to avoid the concept of purposesiveness. While they pretend to stay in this way completely 'scientific' and 'rational,' they become actually very irrational, particularly because they use the word 'chance', not any longer combined with estimations of a mathematically defined probability, in its application to very rare single events more or less synonymous with the old word 'miracle.'" Wolfgang Pauli (pp. 27-28) -
bornagain77_{April 27, 2012
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Nick, Perhaps I'm getting a little ahead of where Null wishes to lead this discussion. I too am interested in how you define methodological naturalism and more importantly its metaphysical limits. Maybe from there we can discuss your objections to Poe & Mytyk?CannuckianYankee_{April 27, 2012
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Nick, This seems to be deVries' summary.
The natural sciences are limited by method to naturalistic foci. By method they must seek answers to their questions within nature, within the non-personal and contingent created order, and not anywhere else. Thus, the natural sciences are limited by what I call methodological naturalism.
As I said in the post, this leads me to ask some obvious followup questions. 1) What is "within nature" or outside of nature? A better way to put this is: what makes something 'natural' and something else 'not natural'? This seems essential to DeVries' definition. 2) What should we take "non-personal" to mean here? The SETI example comes to mind: can science infer that a given signal came from or likely came from a person? Or even use a more mundane example: can science determine that the Empire State Building was built by humans? Or is that known by a method other than science?nullasalus_{April 27, 2012
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I wouldn't guess that it was necessarily news to him at the time, but that due to contemporary discussion, it came to mind. But that's beside the point. The post assumes that IDists are ignorant of its origin, and assumes furthermore that IDists believe it to be an invention of Darwinists. No, ID's objection is not so much in the term or use itself, but in its use and connection to metaphysical naturalism among a select group.CannuckianYankee_{April 27, 2012
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Better link to the Poe & Mytyk (2007) PCSF article: http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/2007/PSCF9-07dyn.html Poe, at least, is pretty clearly just an ID fan who wants to include supernatural intervention within science. So of course I disagree with most of the points in the article.NickMatzke_UD_{April 27, 2012
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Looks like the origin of the term was news to Dembski then, actually. Obviously everyone has known that the general idea has been around for centuries, it traces back to the theological distinction between primary and secondary causes.NickMatzke_UD_{April 27, 2012
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Nick, First off, the article you cited, which has it's good points, starts off the bat identifying ID as being ignorant of the origins of Methodological Naturalism. This would appear to be true except when you realize that as early as 2006 (and probably much earlier), William Dembski produced pretty much the same information (while much more condensed) as in the link. See here: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/who-coined-the-term-methodological-naturalism/ In fact, as "discussions" between opposing positions tend to occur around the same time, Dembski's post occurred precisely 6 days after the Panda post. I'll assume that Dembski either read that particular post, or that the information contained in the post was part of a larger "quasi" discussion between IDists and opponents at the time. Given that, I would assume that Dembski picked up on this little tidbit from the post or from subsequent discussions: "ID violates the centuries-old ground rules of science by invoking and permitting supernatural causation." While I disagree with the "invoking" part, I will grant the "permitting" part of that sentence. Furthermore, if that's true, then none other than Paul deVries, who coined the term Methodological Naturalism is also guilty of violating the "centuries old rule." See here: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7049/is_3_59/ai_n28451457/ "De Vries goes on to warn us not to get caught up in 'language games' and reminds us that contradictions or semantics should not detract from the essence of the idea. He insists that Christians need to be 'enthusiastic supporters of the naturalistic methodology of the natural sciences.' (11) Through this methodology, we can uncover many of God's mysteries and give him praise. However, de Vries cautions that while immersed in the natural sciences, we should not be distracted by 'theological or philosophical speculation.' (12) He emphasizes that, 'a naturalism that is a matter of method still leaves all the philosophical and theological questions completely unanswered.' (13) Methodological naturalism has its limits and will always fail to answer the big 'Why?' questions, while it more readily answers the 'How?' questions." So if we're going to discuss MN in any meaningful terms, we must try to identify just what "centuries old rule" is violated by permitting "supernatural" causation, while not necessarily invoking it. And I think Null introduces a very important point by asking "what makes a given phenomena natural?" - An issue discussed at length in the above linked article, and which appears to conclude that the very term "natural" is one that cannot be separated from its own metaphysical assumptions. For example - from the 2nd page we read: "Of course, Wittgenstein has taught us that the meaning of a word comes from how it is used rather than from how a dictionary may define it. The value of understanding how the word 'nature' came to be used by scientists and others when speaking of the physical realm comes in appreciating that it brings with it a subliminal connotation that tends to think and speak of nature as doing things. Nature as the physical world, however, does nothing. It just is. Things happen within the realm of nature, but nature takes no initiative. It just is." However warranted, I would like to see this discussion lead to something other than the typical Darwinian invokation of nature as doing apparently purposeful things as opposed to just being whatever essence it is. What caused nature to produce whatever it produces in being what it is, is quite another issue. If that's what we mean by MN, then I'm in. Just don't invoke the scientific method as an explanation for the "why," or as discounting the "why" altogether. I.e., don't assume that since nature offers no answer to "why," that there are no answers. If there is behind all of nature a "why;" then we cannot rule out that nature (and therefore science) itself touches on the "why," while ultimately not answering it. That's what I see as the basic objection among IDists to the use of MN among atheistic Darwinists. In all my understandings of how MN is used among atheistic Darwinists; while there seems to be a creed among them that one should never invoke one's metaphysical assumptions into science, I always seem to be able to detect the invokation of metaphysical naturalism as being no different than Methodological Naturalism. And I think the above article has touched on just how the two become linked. It's in the "subliminal connotation" of "nature."CannuckianYankee_{April 27, 2012
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The three key works are De Vries's article which coined the modern term, Numbers's article which reviews the history of the concept, and Pennock's article in Synthese. There's not much point in having a scholarly discussion if these works are not addressed. At least, I won't be participating without those in the mix. The De Vries article is really hard to get though, so here's a quote of the key bit: Paul de Vries (1986). Naturalism in the Natural Sciences: A Christian Perspective. Christian Scholars Review, 15(4), 388-396.
[p. 389] I let go of my pencil and it immediately falls to the floor. Why? It would not be scientifically enlightening to say, "God made it that way." Similarly, scientists would not explain a particular rainstorm in terms of an Indian's rain dance or a farmer's prayers. Rainstorms are explained in terms of natural factors, such as air pressure and temperature -- factors that themselves depend on other natural factors. In brief, explanations in the natural sciences are given in terms of contingent, non-personal factors within the creation. If I put two charged electrodes in water, the hydrogen and oxygen will begin to separate. If I were writing a lab report (even at a Christian College!), it would be unacceptable to write that God stepped in and made these elements separate. A "God Hypothesis" is both unnecessary and out of place within natural scientific explanations. The naturalistic focus of the natural sciences is simply a matter of disciplinary method. It is certainly not that some scientists have discovered that God did not make phenomena occur the way they do. The original causes or ultimate sources of the patterns of natural are not proper concerns within any of the natural sciences -- though they remain a wholesome and legitimate concern of many natural scientists. The natural sciences are limited by method to naturalistic foci. By method they must seek answers to their questions within nature, within the non-personal and contingent created order, and not anywhere else. Thus, the natural sciences are limited by what I call methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism is quite different from metaphysical naturalism. Metaphysical naturalism is a philosophical perspective that denies the existence of a transcendent God. Methodological naturalism does not deny the existence of God because this scientific methodology does not even raise the question of God's existence. Unfortunately, these two kinds of naturalism have often been confused. As a result, it has seemed to the philosophically careless as if the natural sciences under the guidance of methodological naturalism have provided evidence for metaphysical naturalism. This confusion is regrettable and certainly inexcusable. [...] [p. 390] It is fascinating that at the present time there are two notable groups of people that seek to violate the natural sciences: the devotees of evolutionistic scientism on the one had and the devotees of creationistic biblicism on the other -- groups represented by Carl Sagan and Henry Morris, respectively. To suit their own purposes, these groups seek to lead natural science away from its methodological naturalism, away from its commitment to systematic analysis of matter and energy. If we respect the proper role of the natural sciences, we will protest both the biblicists' and evolutionists' proposals. Whether they are conscious of this or not, both of these groups are exploiting the good name of the natural sciences for their own ideological purposes. In contrast, the success of methodological naturalism provides no threat to Christian truth. (italics original)
De Vries's definition is basically what people understand by the term, including me. Here's the references to the other key works: 1. Ronald L. Numbers (2003). "Science without God: Natural Laws and Christian Beliefs." In: When Science and Christianity Meet, edited by David C. Lindberg, Ronald L. Numbers. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, pp. 265-285. Book link: http://books.google.com/books?id=ViweK1jfFi4C&lpg=PP8&ots=7K_XxrvnyG&dq=When%20Science%20and%20Christianity%20Meet&lr&pg=PP8#v=onepage&q=When%20Science%20and%20Christianity%20Meet&f=false On the Origins of Methodological Naturalism http://www.pandasthumb.org/archives/2006/03/on-the-origins.html 2. Robert T. Pennock (2009, 2011). Can't philosophers tell the difference between science and religion?: Demarcation revisited. Synthese 178(2), 177-206. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9547-3 Everyone read the Pennock article in Synthese http://pandasthumb.org/archives/2010/12/everyone-read-t.htmlNickMatzke_UD_{April 27, 2012
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