Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Failure to Educate? Failure to Persuade.

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Larry Moran replied to my latest post with an admission of failure. He thinks he has failed to educate, but I think rather he is confusing the word ‘persuade’ with the word ‘educate’.

He thinks I am rationalising junk DNA with a pile of ‘what-ifs’. But the fact is that most of my ‘what-ifs’ are already known to have some basis in reality. I am not denying any obvious reality. Indeed, the basic machinery of life looks like design, far more than when Paley was around. Yes, there could also be a great deal of junk. That’s why I have said a number of times that ID is not committed to the idea that there is no junk.

Yet, from my point of view, I see a whole pile of Darwinian/post-Darwinian materialists who have only partly explored the genome, working from an assumption that the genome was not designed, and thus are jumping the gun on the evidence. For example, Larry still seems to think that pseudogenes are of themselves ‘solid evidence’ of broken genes despite the fact that we know that at least some pseudogenes influence the rate of translation of real genes by competing with them; a simple design reason why there should be ‘false genes’ = pseudogenes. Who has explored the rest of them?

From his emotive response to my perfectly valid, albeit speculative suggestions (though they were not plucked out of the air either), I don’t trust this guy to think clearly and calmly about the possibility of design. That’s the real problem.

—-
Edit 12 May 2013:

Larry’s insistence that pseudogene = ‘broken gene’ comes from a particular way of thinking about biology: thinking of it in terms of a historical narrative rather than simply reporting the facts of what we see now. This affects much of what he talks about, but here I am choosing to focus on pseudogenes. The best way to talk science is to first state facts and provide an explanation, and then let the observer make up his mind, having been educated, and then let the observer attempt his own explanation of the facts. Being clear about what are facts, and what are interpretations, aids this, but Larry does not practice this when dealing with ID.

The facts are that we have many false genes (pseudogenes) that look like strikingly like particular real genes, and that some of them are known to be functional, and some of those are known to operate by regulating their corresponding real genes by generating competing transcripts. One possible history that would arrive at these observations is if a real gene was duplicated and then one copy was broken to make the pseudogene, and that some subsequently ‘discovered’ a function by chance. Larry believes this is the only possible explanation. He asserts ‘pseudogenes are broken genes’, as if true by definition. However, it is not the only explanation if one considers design. A designer might well make a false gene to regulate a real gene in this way. Why not? But Larry doesn’t consider design. He doesn’t even look at the possibility. That’s why he doesn’t understand that pseudogenes are not necessarily broken genes, and thus are not evidence for junk.

Larry was rather snide about computer scientists, as if they don’t understand the fundamentals of biology. Hmmm. I am more of a mathematical physicist than a computer scientist, and it seems to me that Larry doesn’t understand that stories/narratives about genes breaking and then discovering new function, are not enough for those looking for a natural (physical) explanation. I want to see hard probabilities. It seems that biologists are too happy with narrative and don’t realise the importance of probabilities. If you don’t know how to estimate probabilities, I am sure people like Doug Axe and the Biologic Institute could help you.

Comments
RDF:
PHINEHAS: Some people might know the answers to the Big Questions and others might not. RDFISH: If anyone had figured out these answers with sufficiently compelling justification, then there would be a general acceptance of the answers.
It is interesting that we keep coming back to this. Failure to justify? Or failure to persuade? I don't think your assertion above has been supported in the least. (I think the "sufficiently compelling" part could be seen as begging the question, so I'm going to ignore it.) I believe folks can choose to not be persuaded despite justification.
And that is why I say no one answer should be considered certain knowledge.
Except for the answer that says no one answer should be considered certain knowledge. It is with this exception that I take issue, since it purports to arrive at certainty through uncertainty. You've basically claimed that uncertainty about uncertainty cashes out to certainty about uncertainty, and I keep saying that, no, uncertainty about uncertainty is still just uncertainty about uncertainty.Phinehas
June 20, 2013
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Hi Phinehas, This is amusing: I used the example of the lottery number - something we all believe nobody knows the answer to. You objected, saying I was assuming my conclusion [that is, nobody could know this number]. So then you used the example of PI, and I complained that nobody doubted that we knew PI. So then you picked the example of somebody knowing who was on the grassy knoll - where it is very plausible that somebody might know and not want to tell the answer! We were both stacking the deck with our examples. So let's actually talk about these Big Questions rather than other things. PHINEHAS: Some people might know the answers to the Big Questions and others might not. RDFISH: If anyone had figured out these answers with sufficiently compelling justification, then there would be a general acceptance of the answers.
RDF: And the obvious point you refuse to acknowledge is this: If we do not know whether or not we can know X, then we do not know X. PHINEHAS: Of course! Provided the set of entities described by “we” is exactly the same in both places. But you keep wanting to make the second “we” universal while the first “we” may well be limited in scope. While it may be readily apparent that anyone who doesn’t know whether or not they can know X will also not know X (else they would know that X can be known), it does not follow that the set described by either formulation must be universal. You can only imply otherwise by equivocating on “we.” To recap… Granted: Nobody who doesn’t know whether or not they can know X knows X. Unsupported: Nobody knows X.
You are claiming that a subset of humanity has very compelling justifications for believing, say, mind/body dualism, while the rest of humanity does not believe their justification is good at all. Well, yes, that is exactly the situation I'm describing: There are actually dozens of different theories about mind/body ontology, and each of them has some subset of people that think that particular theory is well justified, but then somebody else writes a paper and trashes that theory and comes up with a new one, and so on. And that is why I say no one answer should be considered certain knowledge. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 19, 2013
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My point in picking the lottery is that nobody knows what that number might be, just as nobody knows if mental cause transcends physical cause or the answer to other metaphysical questions.
Right. You were assuming exactly what you were trying to demonstrate. I got that.
I’ve never met anyone who thinks that pi to 1000 digits is something we are not certain of. Have you? There is simply no disagreement about that at all.
Right. Of course, my point was all about pi. The following formulation isn't about pi at all. Alice: Somebody might know who was on the grassy knoll and somebody might not. Bob: Well, do you have a good justification for saying that somebody knows it? Alice: Not really, but you don’t have a good justification for saying that somebody doesn’t! Sorry for totally changing the subject on you like that.
And the obvious point you refuse to acknowledge is this: If we do not know whether or not we can know X, then we do not know X.
Of course! Provided the set of entities described by "we" is exactly the same in both places. But you keep wanting to make the second "we" universal while the first "we" may well be limited in scope. While it may be readily apparent that anyone who doesn't know whether or not they can know X will also not know X (else they would know that X can be known), it does not follow that the set described by either formulation must be universal. You can only imply otherwise by equivocating on "we." To recap... Granted: Nobody who doesn't know whether or not they can know X knows X. Unsupported: Nobody knows X.Phinehas
June 19, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
Of course, this has little to do with our discussion, since you are not merely making claims about what you know, but about what nobody knows.
My point in picking the lottery is that nobody knows what that number might be, just as nobody knows if mental cause transcends physical cause or the answer to other metaphysical questions.
Alice: Somebody might know pi to 1000 digits and somebody might not. Bob: Well, do you have a good justification for saying that somebody knows it? Alice: Not really, but you don’t have a good justification for saying that somebody doesn’t!
I've never met anyone who thinks that pi to 1000 digits is something we are not certain of. Have you? There is simply no disagreement about that at all. In stark contrast, there is a huge variety of opinions and speculations about what might be true when it comes to origins, mind/body ontology, and so on, and nobody has any idea how to demonstrate any of these things so that general acceptance of one answer or another is achieved.
I’ve never claimed that God (or libertarian free will, or whatever) exists just because nobody can show otherwise. I’ve only ever argued that if we don’t know the answers to the Big Questions then we also don’t know that we cannot know the answers to the Big Questions.
And the obvious point you refuse to acknowledge is this: If we do not know whether or not we can know X, then we do not know X. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 19, 2013
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Again: If I do not know whether or not I know X, then I do not know X. Alice: I might know the winning number of the New York Lottery, and I might not. Bob: Well, do you have a good justification for saying that you do know it? Alice: Not really, but you don’t have a good justification for saying that I don’t! I think we should agree that Alice has no good reason for claiming that just because Bob can’t show she does not know the answer, Alice has any reason to say she does.
Me too! Of course, this has little to do with our discussion, since you are not merely making claims about what you know, but about what nobody knows. Alice: Somebody might know pi to 1000 digits and somebody might not. Bob: Well, do you have a good justification for saying that somebody knows it? Alice: Not really, but you don’t have a good justification for saying that somebody doesn't!
Likewise with anyone’s claim that some particular God (or libertarian will or…) exists just because nobody can show it doesn’t.
Wow. This is such a misrepresentation of what I've been saying that I can't help but wonder whether you've been reading my posts at all. I've never claimed that God (or libertarian free will, or whatever) exists just because nobody can show otherwise. I've never come even close to making such an asinine argument (nor have I seen anyone else here make that argument). Why would you imply that I have? I've only ever argued that if we don't know the answers to the Big Questions then we also don't know that we cannot know the answers to the Big Questions.Phinehas
June 19, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
I’m afraid all this does is reveal your biases on the Big Questions. In other words, your (2) could just as easily be a matter of “We have been trying to figure out how to show that God doesn’t exist (or libertarianism isn’t true, or…) for thousands of years, and we still can’t.”
We do not normally look for reasons not to be believe in particular claims, but rather we require reasons to believe something. We have not shown that the Greek gods do not exist, nor that reincarnation is not true, nor that we will not each become gods of our own universe when we die, and so on, but that does not give us a good justification for any particular belief, right?
Your agnosticism and skepticism appear to lean consistently in one direction. If you were just as skeptical about God’s non-existence, I don’t think you would be getting hung up the way you are.
I have said that we have no good reasons to believe any particular answers to these questions, which means I have presented no bias at all. You of course are biased in favor of some particular understanding of God.
Further, it is apparent that no matter how you try to reformulate your argument, you are still hoisted on your own petard as soon as we perform the dreaded substitution. 1) We have no way of knowing X 2) People have been trying for thousands of years to figure out a way to justify a belief that [we have no way of knowing X] without success 3) Thus we still have no way of justifying a belief that [we have no way of knowing X]
No matter how you try, you cannot take my simple statement of our ignorance and turn it around on me or make it contradictory, you cannot. You keep forgetting that if one is uncertain about one's certainty, then one is simply uncertain, period.
If the above is sufficient for warranting agnosticism regarding God’s existence, it is just as sufficient for warranting agnosticism regarding your epistemological stance.
Again: If I do not know whether or not I know X, then I do not know X. Alice: I might know the winning number of the New York Lottery, and I might not. Bob: Well, do you have a good justification for saying that you do know it? Alice: Not really, but you don't have a good justification for saying that I don't! I think we should agree that Alice has no good reason for claiming that just because Bob can't show she does not know the answer, Alice has any reason to say she does. Likewise with anyone's claim that some particular God (or libertarian will or...) exists just because nobody can show it doesn't. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 19, 2013
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P: Good work. Apparently, it has not dawned on many skeptics, that there are millions who have met and been transformed by God through personal relationship. That itself speaks volumes on the want of breadth of cross section of human experience of the world that they have embraced. KFkairosfocus
June 19, 2013
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RDF:
Phin: 1) We have no way of knowing X 2) [Whether or not we have a way of knowing X] is an instance of X 3) Thus we have no way of knowing [whether or not we have a way of knowing X] 4) Thus we have no warrant to be very certain that (1) is true, QED
RDF: Wow is this ever getting old. I’ve already explained mulitple times (along with everything else) that (2) is not a matter of “Maybe we really do know how to tell if God exists, and maybe we don’t”. Rather, (2) is a matter of “We have been trying to figure out how to show that God exists (or libertarianism is true, or…) for thousands of years, and we still can’t”. 1) We have no way of knowing X 2) People have been trying for thousands of years to figure out a way to justify a belief in X without success 3) Thus we still have no way of justifying a belief in X
I'm afraid all this does is reveal your biases on the Big Questions. In other words, your (2) could just as easily be a matter of "We have been trying to figure out how to show that God doesn't exist (or libertarianism isn't true, or...) for thousands of years, and we still can't." Your agnosticism and skepticism appear to lean consistently in one direction. If you were just as skeptical about God's non-existence, I don't think you would be getting hung up the way you are. Further, it is apparent that no matter how you try to reformulate your argument, you are still hoisted on your own petard as soon as we perform the dreaded substitution. 1) We have no way of knowing X 2) People have been trying for thousands of years to figure out a way to justify a belief that [we have no way of knowing X] without success 3) Thus we still have no way of justifying a belief that [we have no way of knowing X] If the above is sufficient for warranting agnosticism regarding God's existence, it is just as sufficient for warranting agnosticism regarding your epistemological stance.
Phin: Over those same thousands of years, millions upon millions would say they’ve figured out how to know that God exists...
RDF: I don’t actually think this is an accurate depiction of what has transpired. The sophistication of theological arguments has increased somewhat over the millenia (now we have a modal version of the ontological argument for example), but they really haven’t changed all that much at all.
I get the feeling you think your second sentence here justifies your first, but I can't see how it does in any more than a tangential way.Phinehas
June 19, 2013
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Headlined, here. (That may save load time too)kairosfocus
June 18, 2013
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F/N: let us remind ourselves of the context for the just above exchanges, by going back to Vivid at 619:
[RDF/AIG:] And once again I must remind you that you are mistaken. We cannot be absolutely certain of anything, and you will see that I have never said that we could be absolutely certain of anything. I don’t think this is a very difficult point, but you keep misquoting me. [Vivid, replying:} I apologize I did not intend to misquote you I now understand your position better. You are not absolutely certain that there is no such thing as absolute certainty but you want Stephen[B] to concede to that which you are not absolutely certain about. Got it.
Notice, this is what RDF has to defend, cited from his own mouth:
[RDF:] We cannot be absolutely certain of anything . . .
This absolute declaration of certainty that we cannot be certain of anything, aptly exposes the underlying incoherence of what RDF has been arguing. He has spent much time trying to ignore a sound worldviews foundait5on approach, and has sought to undermine first principles of right reason in order to advance an agenda that from its roots on up, is incoherent. So, let it be understood that when reason was in the balance, he was found wanting, decisively wanting. Again and again. In particular, observe his willful unresponsiveness to and "passive" resistance by that unresponsiveness, to the basic point that by direct case, Royce's Error exists, we can show that there are truths that are generally recongised, are accessible to our experiences, are factually grounded, and can be shown to be undeniably true and self evident, constituting certain knowledge of the world of things in themselves accessible to humans. Thus, his whole project of want of grounding for reasoning and building worldviews collapses from the foundations. In particular, observe as well that he has for hundreds of comments, waged an ideological talking point war against cause and effect, trying to poison the atmosphere to disguise the want of a good basis for rejecting it. For instance, observe how he has never seriously engaged the point that once a thing A exists, following Schopenhauer, we may freely ask, why and expect to find a reasonable, intelligible answer. (This is in part a major basis for science, and also for philosophy.) This principle, sufficient reason, is patently reasonable and self-evident: that if A is, there is a good explanatory reason for it. First, that A's attributes, unlike those of a square circle, are coherent. So, from this point on, the law of non-contradiction is inextricably entangled int he possibility of being. Consequently we see the antithesis: possibility vs impossibility of being. Next, by virtue of possible worlds analysis, we can distinguish another antithesis: contingent vs non-contingent (i.e. NECESSARY) beings. That is, we can have possible worlds in which certain things -- contingent beings, C -- could exist and others in which C does not exist. For instance, a horned horse is obviously a possible being but happens not to exist as of yet in the actual world we inhabit. But it is conceivable that within a century, through genetic engineering, one may well exist. (I am not so sure that they will be able to make a pink one, but a white one is very conceivable.) We are of course just such members of class C. (And this wider class C further opens the way to significant choice by humans, by which we can imagine possible futures, and by rational evaluation of the consequences of our ideas, models and plans, decide which to implement, e.g. by choosing a design of the building to replace the WTC buildings in NYC knocked down by Bin Laden and co on Sept 11, 2001 -- a date chosen by him on the probable grounds that it was the 318th anniversary less one day, from the great cavalry attack led by Jan III Sobieski of Poland and Lithuania, which broke the final Turkish siege of Vienna under the Caliph at that time in 1683. That is, by choosing the day, UBL was making a message to his fellow radicalised Muslims that he was taking over from the previous high-water mark of IslamIST expansionism. And that he was doing so in the general area of Khorasan would also be of significance to such Muslims, who would immediately recognise the significance and relevance of black flag armies from that general area. I give these examples, to underscore the significance of contingency and intelligent, willed choice in humans, something that RDF/AIG also wishes to undermine. he does not see the fatal self-referential incoherence that stems from that, and doubtless would dismiss the significance of incoherence as well. The circle of ideological irrationality driven by a priori evolutionary materialism and its fellow traveller ideas and agendas, closes.) But C has its antithesis in a world partition, class NOT-C; let us call it N. Necessary beings, such as the number two, 2 or the true proposition 2 + 3 = 5, etc. Members of C are marked by dependence on ON/OFF enabling factors, e.g. as we have frequently discussed, how a match flame depends on each of: heat, fuel, oxidiser and chain reaction. Such enabling factors are necessary causal factors, all of which must be present for a member of class C to be actualised. A sufficient condition for such a member will have at least all of the factors like this, met. We naturally and reasonably say that such a member of C is CAUSED when its conditions to exist are met by a sufficient cluster of factors, and that E is an effect; the cluster of factors being causes. So, even if we do not know the full set of causal factors for C, we can be confident that a contingent being, that has a beginning and may end or could conceivably not have been at all, is caused. However, not all things are like that. Some things have no such de[endence on causal factors, and are possible beings. These beings will be actual in all possible worlds, i.e. they are necessary beings. A serious candidate necessary being will be either impossible (blocked by having incoherent proposed attributes such as a square circle), or it will be possible and actual. As noted, S5, in modal logic, captures part of why. In effect we can see that such a being just is, inevitably, and its absence would be impossible. For example the number 2 just is. Even in an empty world, one can see that we have the empty set {} --> 0. Thence, we may form a set which collects the empty set: {0} --> 1. Then, in the next step, we simply collect both: {0,1} --> 2. For modern set theory, we simply continue the process to get 3, 4, 5 . . . , but this is enough for our purposes. Doing this abstract analytical exercise does not create 2, it simply recognises how inevitable it is. It is impossible for 2 not to exist. Similarly, the true proposition 2 + 3 = 5 is like that, and much more besides. We thus see that necessary beings exist and are knowable, even familiar in some cases. We see further that such beings are without beginning, or end. They are not caused, they hold being by necessity, which its their sufficient reason for existing. They have no dependence on external enabling causal factors. A serious candidate to be a necessary being will be i9ndependent of enabling factors, likewise (flying spaghetti monsters need not apply) and will not be composed of material parts. The abstract, thought-nature of cases like 2, 2 + 3 = 5 etc shows that such beings point to mind, and one way of accounting for such beings is that they are eternally contemplated by God. Where also God is regarded as an eternal, necessary, spiritual being who is minded and the root of all being in our world, the ultimate enabling factor for reality. BTW, this means that those who would dismiss God's existence do not merely need to establish that in their view God is improbable, but that God is impossible, as God is a serious candidate to be a necessary being. That is, since RDF is so hot to undermine the intellectual credibility of the existence of God, it is worth pausing to highlight a few points on this matter, connected to the logic of necessary beings and other relevant points. For, even before we run into other things that point like compass needles to God: the evident design of a fine tuned cosmos set up for C-chemistry, aqueous medium cell based life that makes an extra cosmic, intelligent agent with power to create a cosmos the explanation to beat, the significance of our being minded and characterised by reason, as well as the existence of a world of life in that context, the fact that we inescapably find ourselves under moral gogvernment by implanted law, and of course the direct encounter with God that millions report as having positively transformed their lives, and more. Nope, unlike the pretence of too many skeptics would lead us to naively believe, the acceptance of God's reality is a very reasonable position to hold. (Scroll back up and observe the studious silence of RDF et al on such matters.) So, never mind the ink-clouds of distractive or dismissive or confusing talking-points, we are back to the worldview level significance of first principles of right reason and pivotal first, self-evident truths. Prediction (do, prove me wrong RDF et al): this too will be studiously ignored in haste to push along with the talking point agenda. The price tag for such apparently habitual tactics, is willful neglect of duties of care to be reasonable, to seek and face truth, and to be fair in discussion. That is, it is "without excuse." (And yes, the allusion to Rom 1:19 - 25 and vv. 28 - 32 is quite deliberate.) KFkairosfocus
June 18, 2013
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P: Looks like our minds were running on the very same lines. KFkairosfocus
June 17, 2013
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RDF:
(2) is a matter of “We have been trying to figure out how to show that God exists (or libertarianism is true, or…) for thousands of years, and we still can’t”.
As was just pointed out, the best way to know God is real is to meet him in life transforming power. In my case, apart from that, I would have died as a sickly child decades ago. And I am hardly unique, there are millions across the years and in the world today. If you need warrant to moral certainty, Jesus of Nazareth is the best answer. And dismissive talking points about "apologetics" are no answer to the double challenge just given. Which, BTW is one reason why the sort of skepticism that is so rampant today will fail. Too many people know better, historically and directly. All you manage to do is sound blindly, hyperskeptically dismissive and too given to the tricks of debating. As to your second problem, you yourself provided your answer, if you would but look carefully enough, without ideological blinkers. Just the little snippet cited is 159 ASCII characters in English, at 128 possibilities per character. The resources of our solar system for its lifespan, could only -- on very generous terms -- be plausible up to maybe 70 or 72. Absent a reasoning, choosing mind, there is no good explanation for such FSCO/I. There is such a thing as a point where one candidate explanation so far excels others that they fall to the ground, leaving a moral certainty. KFkairosfocus
June 17, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
I’m not sure how we went from “know” to “show,” so I’ll address the “know” version.
I didn't mean any difference between show (that is, provide justification for) and know (that is, believe with justification).
Over those same thousands of years, millions upon millions would say they’ve figured out how to know that God exists...
I don't actually think this is an accurate depiction of what has transpired. The sophistication of theological arguments has increased somewhat over the millenia (now we have a modal version of the ontological argument for example), but they really haven't changed all that much at all. Compared to our understanding of other aspects of the world, philosophical and theological arguments intended to justify particular answers to the Big Questions are basically static. So it's not really true that over millenia new and improved justifications have been "figured out" and that accounts for millions of believers. People were at least as convinced of the existence of god or gods in ancient times before anyone was doing apologetics.
... and are living evidence against your assertion that “we” can’t.
You are at least living evidence that people are wont to believe in one set of answers or another, regardless of the strength of the justifications. If there was one set of well-justified answers to religious questions, then there would be far less disagreement about what is true. Not everyone believes in any gods; of those that do people have different ideas about these gods' nature and number and history; people disagree about the afterlife and reincarnation and intercessionary prayer and creation stories and moral commands and... every aspect of belief one can imagine. Likewise with other Big Questions: Five philosophers might have six different opnions regarding Free Will or moral theory or epistemology... after people have argued these matters for millenia. Think of a spectrum from "Very Certain" to "No Way of Knowing". A vast set of common sense and scientific propositions lie on the more certain part of the spectrum; candidate answers to the Big Questions are all in the "No Way of Knowing" area. Please don't forget that I don't believe there is any reason not to hold strong beliefs about the Big Questions, and there are likely benefits to doing so. I just think it's important to keep in mind that these beliefs are not justified in the way the rest of our knowledge is. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 17, 2013
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RDF:
“We have been trying to figure out how to [know?] that God exists (or libertarianism is true, or…) for thousands of years, and we still can’t”.
I'm not sure how we went from "know" to "show," so I'll address the "know" version. Over those same thousands of years, millions upon millions would say they've figured out how to know that God exists and are living evidence against your assertion that "we" can't.Phinehas
June 17, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
1) We have no way of knowing X 2) [Whether or not we have a way of knowing X] is an instance of X 3) Thus we have no way of knowing [whether or not we have a way of knowing X] 4) Thus we have no warrant to be very certain that (1) is true, QED
Wow is this ever getting old. I've already explained mulitple times (along with everything else) that (2) is not a matter of "Maybe we really do know how to tell if God exists, and maybe we don't". Rather, (2) is a matter of "We have been trying to figure out how to show that God exists (or libertarianism is true, or...) for thousands of years, and we still can't".
1) We have no way of knowing X 2) People have been trying for thousands of years to figure out a way to justify a belief in X without success 3) Thus we still have no way of justifying a belief in X
I'm a patient guy, but I'll ask to try just a little bit to understand what I've been saying here. Once again:
RDF: I’ve explained reasons I am certain that (1) is true many times now, comparing these Big Questions to other questions where we have successfully justified our knowledge. If you want to argue that (1) is false, you will need to actually address what I’ve written.
Thank you for the apology. I choose to believe it is a better representation of who you are
Thank you. Clearly you were compelled to do so; after everything you've read and thought about, how could you have done otherwise? :-) Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 17, 2013
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RDFishguy:
So If I were an Intelligent Design enthusiast, I would point to me and say, “Here’s somebody who thinks Intelligent Design Theory is a scientifically vacuous mess and religious apologetics fail completely, but even he doesn’t believe that Richard Dawkins is right!
That's strange because ID doesn't have anything to do with religion and even Richard Dawkins understands that it makes a huge difference whether or not living organisms are designed. I am an Intelligent Design enthusiast but I just point at you and shake my head. I think you and Gregory are best left alone.Joe
June 17, 2013
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P: you should draw out the reductio in 732 a little more explicitly. The confident declaration in claim 1 leads to the opposite in point 4. So, this is a case similar to the "ugly gulch" between the phenomenal world and that of things in themselves, often dressed up with discussions on how error prone our senses and reasoning are. But, as F H Bradley long since pointed out, he that claims to know that the world of things in themselves are unknowable in that sense, has made a claim to know a pivotal claim about things in themselves. Locke's point (cited above and studiously ignored as usual) that we have candlelight enough to do what we ought and should not use want of daylight as an excuse not to do what we can and should, is apt. KFkairosfocus
June 17, 2013
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F/N: Let's do a little test case, on Royce's proposition, Error exists. 1: Now, clearly, that truth that is certainly known exists would be a case of addressing "big questions." So, let us take up RDF above:
Let “X” be “Big Questions” . . . . If I do not know if I know the answer to a question, it simply means that I do not know the answer to the question. To “know” means to hold a justified true belief. If I could justify my belief in something, then I would know it, and I would also know that I know it. If I can’t justify my belief, then I do not know that belief. And if I do not know if I can justify my belief, then likewise I do not know that belief. Here is the correct argument: 1) We do not know X 2) Whether we can know X is part of X 3) Thus we cannot know if we know X 4) Thus we do not know X, QED
2: BTW, justification as presented above is internalist, this lands one in Gettier counter examples and is a strawman. Better to refer to warrant, which is objective, and does not fall into the trap. 3: Now, Error exists is self-referential, as is its denial. Let's use E and ~ E. 4: Form a conjunction, C = {E AND ~E}, which joins opposed, exhaustve claims and MUST BE FALSE. 5: So, we know C to be false, an error. 6: By instantiation, we know now that E is not only true but is undeniably true as its denial leads directly to demonstrating a case of E. 7: So, we have a case of warranted, true belief, strong form, undeniably certain knowledge, knowledge of truth. This entails further that systems of thought that deny or doubt such, are overturned by counter-example. 8: We have a "big question" and we can know its answer to be so to undeniable, self-evident certainty. (As has been on the table all along.) KF PS: RDF has an evident obsession to undermine possibility of confident knowledge of God. Indeed, from remarks above, this is a major motive for what he has been doing. This intention of his will be a bit surprising to the millions who have come to know God across the ages and today, by personal, life-transforming experience, similar to how they are confident for good reason that they know that other people are minded, not zombies merely driven by blind genetics and brain chemistry with a dash of psycho-social conditioning and maybe some chance events in CNS neurons. For those seeking a grounding for the gospel-based Christian Faith in that context, I suggest a look here on as a start, noting the significance of the 55 AD summary testimony in 1 Cor 15:1 - 11 and the fulfillment of Isa 53 in it. I suggest on fair comment, that such an historic anchorage is something that can be grounded to moral certainty, as many have done, and that in too many cases the rejection of this evidence has come at the cost of falling to selective hyperskepticism. In the case of RDF, the predictable response is that he will continue to try to ignore inconvenient evidence and will drum on with long since corrected talking points as though they have not passed discard by date. But then, if one is resistant to direct proofs, that should be -- sadly -- no surprise.kairosfocus
June 17, 2013
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Onlookers, And of course to trot out his talking points line, RDF/AIG is busily studiously ignoring a relevant case of certain knowledge on just such big questions that has been on the table from the beginning. That underscores the manipulative agenda he is playing out. Similarly, we should note, per reductio, that evolutionary materialism -- by whatever name -- is a commonly imposed a priori (per Lewontin) that decisively undermines responsible freedom and rationality, thus self-refutes. So, it should be no great surprise to see other absurdities popping up in the field from the same spreading roots. Bottomline, we are limited and error-prone in our investigations, but to leap from that to the notion that on pivotal matters we cannot have any solid answers, such as self-evident truths and first principles of right reason is the one step too far from truth into absurdity that does not follow from truth. P is right to underscore the point, and the studious ignoring of relevant supportive evidence simply underscores that we are dealing with ideology and debate games. Which -- sad to have to note but we need it -- are all that are left when one undermines responsible reason. KFkairosfocus
June 17, 2013
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RDF: You've characterized my argument this way:
1) We do not know X 2) Whether we can know X is part of X 3) Thus we cannot know if we know X 4) Thus (1) must be false
I've never claimed that (1) must be logically false. However, neither do I believe the following is the correct argument.
1) We do not know X 2) Whether we can know X is part of X 3) Thus we cannot know if we know X 4) Thus we do not know X, QED
Rather, this is what I am arguing: 1) We have no way of knowing X 2) [Whether or not we have a way of knowing X] is an instance of X 3) Thus we have no way of knowing [whether or not we have a way of knowing X] 4) Thus we have no warrant to be very certain that (1) is true, QED Thank you for the apology. I choose to believe it is a better representation of who you are. :)Phinehas
June 17, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
If we read into your response the implicit admission to being human, how can the following two statements be true at the same time without violating the self-evident LNC? 1. Humans have no way of being very certain about the Big Questions. 2. RDF is very certain about a Big Question.
I'm finding it hard to believe you don't understand this, but can't think of why you'd pursue it if you did. 1. There is a set of existential questions that people have been pondering for millenia without managing to find certain answers. 2. Among these questions are those of origins, free will, mind/body ontology, and foundations of epistemology. 3. This last category, epistemology, is what I was referring to when I said that thinking about the ways people might answer these questions is itself a big question. 4. I am certain that the foundational questions of epistemology have not been answered and well-justified, just as I am certain that these other Big Questions have not been answered and well-justified. What you are trying to do is ignore these points by playing a little word game: Let "X" be "Big Questions": 1) We do not know X 2) Whether we can know X is part of X 3) Thus we cannot know if we know X 4) Thus (1) must be false I've explained the problem with your trick already, and so has Faded Glory, but you seem very entralled with it, so I will explain it one last time. If I do not know if I know the answer to a question, it simply means that I do not know the answer to the question. To "know" means to hold a justified true belief. If I could justify my belief in something, then I would know it, and I would also know that I know it. If I can't justify my belief, then I do not know that belief. And if I do not know if I can justify my belief, then likewise I do not know that belief. Here is the correct argument: 1) We do not know X 2) Whether we can know X is part of X 3) Thus we cannot know if we know X 4) Thus we do not know X, QED I've explained reasons I am certain that (1) is true many times now, comparing these Big Questions to other questions where we have successfully justified our knowledge. If you want to argue that (1) is false, you will need to actually address what I've written.
RDF: I suppose you’re still upset that theology does not actually rest on bedrock? PHIN: I think this sort of comment is beneath you.
My sincere apologies for saying you are upset - that was inappropriate, you're right. By way of explanation, your insistence on trying to use a goofy little trick to prove me wrong rather than engage the topic substantively has been annoying. Yes we all understand Godel sentences and paradoxes of self-reference, but it is patently obvious what I am saying here and I would say that playing this game to "prove me wrong" this way is beneath you. Again, this really is the simplest and most obviously true point I've made here: Nobody can say with any certainty if libertarianism, theism, dualism, or other positions regarding the Big Questions are true. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 17, 2013
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RDF:
Having already agreed that the following is a Big Question: Can a human be very certain that humans have no way of being very certain about the Big Questions?
Yes of course – I myself represent an existence proof that this is possible.
If we read into your response the implicit admission to being human, how can the following two statements be true at the same time without violating the self-evident LNC? 1. Humans have no way of being very certain about the Big Questions. 2. RDF is very certain about a Big Question.
I suppose you’re still upset that theology does not actually rest on bedrock?
I think this sort of comment is beneath you. I'm not particularly upset about anything at all in this conversation, let alone about things that you've yet to demonstrate. I am merely continuing to point out that your assertion that theology does not actually rest on bedrock does not actually rest on bedrock.Phinehas
June 17, 2013
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Hi Phinehas, Sorry, missed your post:
Can a human be very certain that humans have no way of being very certain about the Big Questions?
Yes of course - I myself represent an existence proof that this is possible. I am baffled by your monotonic fascination with this question. Here is how it started (in @679):
PHIN: And whether or not humans have any way of telling whether God exists must be yet another Little Question. RDF: Actually no, I think this is one of the things that great thinkers have indeed thought and written about extensively through the ages.
...and in all that time, nobody has come up with any way to justify any particular set of beliefs on these issues. Apparently you are afraid to answer my questions (you can start with those in @679)? Too bad! I suppose you're still upset that theology does not actually rest on bedrock? Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 17, 2013
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To My Hosts at UD, I don't think I've broken any stated policy by registering under one fake name rather than another, but apologies if so. Last time I was banned here was because I repeated - just repeated! - some contradiction in one of Barry A's posts with a smiley face :-) Anyway, I would think you would like having somebody like me here. Although my friends don't mention it and my opponents don't believe me, I have always believed that evolutionary theory is fundamentally incomplete; in other words, yes, I am skeptical of claims for the ability of random mutation and natural selection to account for the complexity of life.. And what is missing, in my estimation, is much more fundamental than drift or neutral selection or whatnot. I'm much more aligned with James Shapiro or Stuart Kauffman or Thomas Nagel than I am with Dawkins or Dennett or the Darwin Defenders on the net. So If I were an Intelligent Design enthusiast, I would point to me and say, "Here's somebody who thinks Intelligent Design Theory is a scientifically vacuous mess and religious apologetics fail completely, but even he doesn't believe that Richard Dawkins is right! Cheers, aiguyRDFish
June 17, 2013
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Hi Sal,
AiGuy? Nice to see we could be on the same side of an issue for a change. Nice to see you.
Thanks, Sal - nice to see you too. I really did find your comments here very well stated, and I truly commend you for following the evidence where it leads rather than starting with your conclusions. Cheers, aiguyRDFish
June 17, 2013
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Hi Alan!
Well, I should have guessed. It’ll be interesting to see whether you begin to have problems commenting now, Mr Fish. I’m blaming you for the demise of ARN forum and Telic Thoughts, BTW.
It is very nice to see you here too! Yes, I take full responsibility for the demise of those venerable fora. I wish smart sociologist would write an analysis of the rise and fall of these things. Anyway, if the powers that be here again decide my ideas are too subversive and anxiety-producing to allow, at least I had the pleasure of debating again for a couple of weeks :-) Cheers, aiguyRDFish
June 17, 2013
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5for:
Ok, so all you are saying is that some things (like square circles) logically can’t exist.
Well, I wasn't really trying to make a point at all, but merely suggesting what KF might be saying. I didn't read anything particularly earth-shattering into his use of the phrase, "potential existence," so I can't really be blamed for how mundane my interpretation is, can I? :)Phinehas
June 17, 2013
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RDF:
Really? I think I’ve been crystal clear. Which part did you have trouble with?
The part that I asked you to clarify by answering the following Big Question: Can a human be very certain that humans have no way of being very certain about the Big Questions? I say, no. What say you?Phinehas
June 17, 2013
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RDFish, AiGuy? Nice to see we could be on the same side of an issue for a change. Nice to see you. Salscordova
June 17, 2013
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F/n: This wiki clip from its possible worlds article may be a helpful 101: _______ >> theorists who use the concept of possible worlds consider the actual world to be one of the many possible worlds. For each distinct way the world could have been, there is said to be a distinct possible world; the actual world is the one we in fact live in. Among such theorists there is disagreement about the nature of possible worlds; their precise ontological status is disputed, and especially the difference, if any, in ontological status between the actual world and all the other possible worlds. One position on these matters is set forth in David Lewis's modal realism (see below). There is a close relation between propositions and possible worlds. We note that every proposition is either true or false at any given possible world; then the modal status of a proposition is understood in terms of the worlds in which it is true and worlds in which it is false. The following are among the assertions we may now usefully make: True propositions are those that are true in the actual world (for example: "Richard Nixon became President in 1969"). False propositions are those that are false in the actual world (for example: "Ronald Reagan became President in 1969"). (Reagan did not run for President in 1969, and thus couldn't possibly have been elected.) Possible propositions are those that are true in at least one possible world (for example: "Hubert Humphrey became President in 1969"). (Humphrey did run for President in 1969, and thus could have been elected.) Note: This includes propositions which are necessarily true, in the sense below. Impossible propositions (or necessarily false propositions) are those that are true in no possible world (for example: "Melissa and Toby are taller than each other at the same time"). Necessarily true propositions (often simply called necessary propositions) are those that are true in all possible worlds (for example: "2 + 2 = 4"; "all bachelors are unmarried").[1] Contingent propositions are those that are true in some possible worlds and false in others (for example: "Richard Nixon became President in 1969" is contingently true and "Hubert Humphrey became President in 1969" is contingently false) . . . . when we discuss what would have happened if some set of conditions were the case, the truth of our claims is determined by what is true at the nearest possible world (or the set of nearest possible worlds) where the conditions obtain. (A possible world W1 is said to be near to another possible world W2 in respect of R to the degree that the same things happen in W1 and W2 in respect of R; the more different something happens in two possible worlds in a certain respect, the "further" they are from one another in that respect.) Consider this conditional sentence: "If George W. Bush hadn't become president of the U.S. in 2001, Al Gore would have." The sentence would be taken to express a claim that could be reformulated as follows: "In all nearest worlds to our actual world (nearest in relevant respects) where George W. Bush didn't become president of the U.S. in 2001, Al Gore became president of the U.S. then instead." And on this interpretation of the sentence, if there is some nearest world to the actual world (nearest in relevant respects) where George W. Bush didn't become president but Al Gore didn't either, then the claim expressed by this counterfactual would be false. Today, possible worlds play a central role in many debates in philosophy, including especially debates over the Zombie Argument, and physicalism and supervenience in the philosophy of mind. Many debates in the philosophy of religion have been reawakened by the use of possible worlds >> _________ Notice how central these issues and approaches are. KFkairosfocus
June 17, 2013
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