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Failure to Educate? Failure to Persuade.

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'Junk DNA'
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Larry Moran replied to my latest post with an admission of failure. He thinks he has failed to educate, but I think rather he is confusing the word ‘persuade’ with the word ‘educate’.

He thinks I am rationalising junk DNA with a pile of ‘what-ifs’. But the fact is that most of my ‘what-ifs’ are already known to have some basis in reality. I am not denying any obvious reality. Indeed, the basic machinery of life looks like design, far more than when Paley was around. Yes, there could also be a great deal of junk. That’s why I have said a number of times that ID is not committed to the idea that there is no junk.

Yet, from my point of view, I see a whole pile of Darwinian/post-Darwinian materialists who have only partly explored the genome, working from an assumption that the genome was not designed, and thus are jumping the gun on the evidence. For example, Larry still seems to think that pseudogenes are of themselves ‘solid evidence’ of broken genes despite the fact that we know that at least some pseudogenes influence the rate of translation of real genes by competing with them; a simple design reason why there should be ‘false genes’ = pseudogenes. Who has explored the rest of them?

From his emotive response to my perfectly valid, albeit speculative suggestions (though they were not plucked out of the air either), I don’t trust this guy to think clearly and calmly about the possibility of design. That’s the real problem.

—-
Edit 12 May 2013:

Larry’s insistence that pseudogene = ‘broken gene’ comes from a particular way of thinking about biology: thinking of it in terms of a historical narrative rather than simply reporting the facts of what we see now. This affects much of what he talks about, but here I am choosing to focus on pseudogenes. The best way to talk science is to first state facts and provide an explanation, and then let the observer make up his mind, having been educated, and then let the observer attempt his own explanation of the facts. Being clear about what are facts, and what are interpretations, aids this, but Larry does not practice this when dealing with ID.

The facts are that we have many false genes (pseudogenes) that look like strikingly like particular real genes, and that some of them are known to be functional, and some of those are known to operate by regulating their corresponding real genes by generating competing transcripts. One possible history that would arrive at these observations is if a real gene was duplicated and then one copy was broken to make the pseudogene, and that some subsequently ‘discovered’ a function by chance. Larry believes this is the only possible explanation. He asserts ‘pseudogenes are broken genes’, as if true by definition. However, it is not the only explanation if one considers design. A designer might well make a false gene to regulate a real gene in this way. Why not? But Larry doesn’t consider design. He doesn’t even look at the possibility. That’s why he doesn’t understand that pseudogenes are not necessarily broken genes, and thus are not evidence for junk.

Larry was rather snide about computer scientists, as if they don’t understand the fundamentals of biology. Hmmm. I am more of a mathematical physicist than a computer scientist, and it seems to me that Larry doesn’t understand that stories/narratives about genes breaking and then discovering new function, are not enough for those looking for a natural (physical) explanation. I want to see hard probabilities. It seems that biologists are too happy with narrative and don’t realise the importance of probabilities. If you don’t know how to estimate probabilities, I am sure people like Doug Axe and the Biologic Institute could help you.

Comments
Hi Chance,
Can you tell me why your definition is more apt than mine?
No, I don't think mine are more apt - they are just different.
Does your definition entail chance, necessity, and neither?
No, my definitions do not entail that anything acts outside of chance and necessity. Your defintions don't actually entail such things either: You define "free" to mean "not determined or random", but you don't actually say that this sort of freedom exists in the world.
Since we’re agreed that “nobody knows for certain,” it would seem a definition of “free” that does not distinguish between random and nondeterministic is not very useful.
I guess it depends on how you are using the terminology in your assertions.
determined: neither impossible nor contingent. free: neither determined nor random. Free as per above entails neither random nor determined, and so it is actually applicable to this discussion.
Right, I agree.
Your definition of “free” isn’t free of ambiguity.
Why?
RDF: It might be that everything is determined, and neither pure randomness nor “free agency” is possible – nobody knows.” CR: Yes, it might be, as in the probability is not zero. Therefore, it’s just as likely as not?
We have no way to assign any sort of probability to the various answers. Nobody understands how minds work, and if they adhere to or transcend physical cause.
Your definitions need to encapsulate the various causal factors under discussion and make distinctions between chance, necessity, and free (neither chance nor necessity), since you agree these are all possible.
I think we're pretty clear here, actually. Yes it is possible that there is a different sort of cause that is not a physical cause, or maybe there is no such thing. We don't know.
You’ve already said my definitions were fine, and under those definitions, all three potentials exist.
You can't make something exist simply by defining it, obviously. I don't know what you mean by "potentials exist". I'd say you have a meaningful definition, but we don't know if what you have defined exists in the world.
Under my definitions, computers don’t make free choices but humans still might.
I agree.
Under my definitions, we can make the necessary distinctions. If this turns out not to be the case, they can be amended.
Again, I think your definitions are just fine. They imply that based on what we know, computers do not make free choices, but that humans still might - we don't know. I actually am not sure if we disagree on anything at all, once we clear up our terminology! Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 27, 2013
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RDFish @328,
"My definition of “free choice” was making a choice based on internal states, and obviously computers make free choices according to that definition."
Can you tell me why your definition is more apt than mine? Does your definition entail chance, necessity, and neither? Since we're agreed that "nobody knows for certain," it would seem a definition of "free" that does not distinguish between random and nondeterministic is not very useful. determined: neither impossible nor contingent. free: neither determined nor random. Free as per above entails neither random nor determined, and so it is actually applicable to this discussion. Your definition of "free" isn't free of ambiguity.
"I mean “not deterministically”. Whatever form of nondeterminism exists in the universe can result in nondeterminism in the program. It might be that everything is determined, and neither pure randomness nor “free agency” is possible – nobody knows."
Yes, it might be, as in the probability is not zero. Therefore, it's just as likely as not? determined: necessary. not determined: not necessary but not impossible; that is, contingent. contingent: neither impossible nor necessary; that is, random or free. Your definitions need to encapsulate the various causal factors under discussion and make distinctions between chance, necessity, and free (neither chance nor necessity), since you agree these are all possible. You've already said my definitions were fine, and under those definitions, all three potentials exist. Under my definitions, computers don't make free choices but humans still might. Under my definitions, we can make the necessary distinctions. If this turns out not to be the case, they can be amended.Chance Ratcliff
May 27, 2013
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Hi StephenB,
RDF: *—I am [responsible for my actions]. I choose my actions and initiate them, and I think this is just an obvious fact. The critical question is, What causes me to choose my actions? Your answer is nothing, and my answer is the totality of my experiences acting upon my inherent characteristics. *—What causes my actions? I do Who is responsible for my actions? I am What do I mean by I. I mean the totality of my experiences acting upon my inherent characteristics SB: Your second formulation seems to contradict the first formulation. In the first formulation you indicate that you and your choices ARE CAUSED BY the totality of your experiences acting upon your inherent characteristics.
Let T = "the totality of my experience acting upon inherent characteristics" Let C = "the cause of my actions" Let I = "me, my self" In my first formulation, I assert that C = T
IN the second formulation, you say that you ARE the totality of your experiences acting upon your inherent characteristics.
In my second formulation, I assert that C = I, and furthermore that I = T If C = I and I = T then by transitivity C = T, which is the assertion in my first formulation. So no, there is no contradiction.
I am certain that you do not know the answer to these Big Questions: 1) Why is there something rather than nothing? 2) How did life come to exist on Earth? 3) What is the nature of mind and its relationship to the brain? 4) Is mental causality ontologically distinct? Why did you bring these subjects up? I have said nothing about them and they are not relevant to the discussion, so there is no reason to introduce them. As I say, stop looking for strawmen.
Honestly it's too difficult to start searching this thread for how these long discussions get started, and perhaps it was Phinehas or Chance who challenged the validity (and even the coherence) of my assertion that I was certain these Big Questions had no certain answers. My sincere apologies if this does not reflect your position; I will assume you agree with me that none of these questions currently have certain answers.
Among other things, you have challenged the Law of Causality and you equivocate on the Law of Non-contradiction.
No, now you are mistaken again - I've said quite the opposite about a hundred times (that no reasonable person can doubt these rules).
In a way, I am sympathetic with your feelings even if not your position because I know that you have been steeped in an anti-intellectual culture and possibly a postmodernist academy. Perhaps my directness offends you, but lets’ face it, we have been dancing for two weeks. There comes a time when we have to put diplomacy aside and call things by their right name. The above paragraph is an equivocation, plain and simple.
I am neither anti-intellectual nor remotely postmodern :-) Would you say Alvin Plantinga is anti-intellectual or postmodernist? I sure wouldn't. Yet he writes book-length arguments that acknowledge that (whether or not one believes in naturalism) there is a finite chance that our minds are unreliable, in which case any belief at all may be false. Now, I'd like to ask you again to please clarify our central disagreement with regard to, as you say, who is driving the train: First, here is my position: 1) What causes my actions? I do. 2) Who is responsible for my actions? I am. 3) What do I mean by “I”? I mean “the totality of my experiences acting upon my inherent characteristics.” Now, what is your position? I’ve filled in the first two for you: 1) What causes my actions? I do. 2) Who is responsible for my actions? I am. 3) What do I mean by “I”? I mean ____________________________________. (please fill this in) Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 27, 2013
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Hi Chance,
RDF: Therefore, if the input is nondeterministic, the program itself can change nondeterministically CR: What do you mean by nondeterminstically: freely or randomly?
I mean "not deterministically". Whatever form of nondeterminism exists in the universe can result in nondeterminism in the program. It might be that everything is determined, and neither pure randomness nor "free agency" is possible - nobody knows.
Please explain how your program is nondeterministic,...
Just did!
...and how we can test this if it never terminates and runs a second time on the same input.
Where do you get this requirement from?
RDF: Of course by your definition computers do not make free choices! That is perfectly obvious! CR: Great! Contra your assertion at #211 and #218, it’s perfectly obvious that computers do not make free choices.
Hahahahaha - ooh, you'd just love to catch me contradicting myself! Too bad, you forgot about the part where I say Of course by your definition. Hahahahaha. As you can see, in 211 and 218 I was using my definitions. Better luck next time :-) My definition of "free choice" was making a choice based on internal states, and obviously computers make free choices according to that definition. Your definition of "free choice" is "neither random nor determined", and obviously computers do not make free choices according to that definition. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 27, 2013
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Hi WJM,
WJM: Isn’t “never” an absolute?
Take the most self-evident truth you can imagine - the LoC or modus ponens or the Peano axioms or anything else. Anyone can question any of these in any number of ways, including one way that is currently employed in a popular argument against naturalism: We cannot absolutely prove that our own minds are reliable. (Perhaps you've read Plantinga?) Well, it is true that nobody can prove that they are not deluded, because if one was sufficiently deluded, they would not be able to recognize their delusions, and this alone is sufficient to argue that nothing is immune to doubt. You might also be the only conscious being in existence, or even hallucinating all of reality, and you have no way of absolutely proving that this is not the case. Descartes famously travelled this path to hyper-skepticism, and sought to return by building the rest of his beliefs upon the undeniable fact of his own phenomenology. Philosophers have never managed to ground all of our beliefs merely on cogito, however, so we decide that there is a point where reasonable people simply must stop questioning self-evident truths, lest we become utterly paralyzed in our thoughts. As I've emphasized here many times, reasonable people can and do achieve certainty about any number of things - both self-evident truths and empirically-based truths - and so we all consider knowledge to be possible, even though our justifications can never be logically absolute. I hope this helps you understand the limits of knowledge and justification. If you'd like to know more, I would recommend reading a general introduction to epistemology. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 27, 2013
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RDFish @315,
So I assert that programs which do not incorporate true random number generation are deterministic.
Forget randomness. If input is nondeterministic, the program can change nondeterministically. Really.
What sot of non-random nondeterminism are you advocating?Chance Ratcliff
May 27, 2013
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"What do you mean by “agency”?"
Agency "In philosophy and sociology, agency is the capacity of an agent (a person or other entity, human or any living being in general, or soul-consciousness in religion) to act in a world." ... "Agency may either be classified as unconscious, involuntary behavior, or purposeful, goal directed activity (intentional action). An agent typically has some sort of immediate awareness of his physical activity and the goals that the activity is aimed at realizing. In ‘goal directed action’ an agent implements a kind of direct control or guidance over their own behavior." I see why you are confused. When I said that computers are the result of intelligent agency, you thought I might be referring to unconscious, involuntary behavior rather than purposeful, goal-directed activity (intentional action). I didn't mean to be so ambiguous.Chance Ratcliff
May 27, 2013
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RDFish
*---I am [responsible for my actions]. I choose my actions and initiate them, and I think this is just an obvious fact. The critical question is, What causes me to choose my actions? Your answer is nothing, and my answer is the totality of my experiences acting upon my inherent characteristics. *---What causes my actions? I do Who is responsible for my actions? I am What do I mean by I. I mean the totality of my experiences acting upon my inherent characteristics
Your second formulation seems to contradict the first formulation. In the first formulation you indicate that you and your choices ARE CAUSED BY the totality of your experiences acting upon your inherent characteristics. IN the second formulation, you say that you ARE the totality of your experiences acting upon your inherent characteristics.
I am certain that you do not know the answer to these Big Questions: 1) Why is there something rather than nothing? 2) How did life come to exist on Earth? 3) What is the nature of mind and its relationship to the brain? 4) Is mental causality ontologically distinct?
Why did you bring these subjects up? I have said nothing about them and they are not relevant to the discussion, so there is no reason to introduce them. As I say, stop looking for strawmen.
A “first cause” is certainly a theological concept, but obviously all theological concepts are also philosophical. In any event, for the third time I’m going to suggest we agree to disagree about the conflict between libertarianism and causality. You think that by introducing God into the topic you can eliminate the contradiction. I disagree.
You asked about antecedent causes, I identified them, and now you wonder why I "introduced" the topic. Maybe that works for you, but it doesn't work for me.
I’ve never disagreed with that! Not just your “rules of right reason” but all of logico-mathematical reasoning is epistemologically privileged.
Among other things, you have challenged the Law of Causality and you equivocate on the Law of Non-contradiction.
But that does not mean we can say even these things are absolutely certain for precisely the reason I said: We can always question everything. Maybe we have both been drugged by evil demons and our minds are deluded and we think the LNC is self-evident when it really isn’t! We can always question everything. Too bad, and I know you hate it, but it’s true. Reasonable people like us do not indulge in this sort of hyper-skepticism, but that is why nothing is 100% absolute in epistemology.
In a way, I am sympathetic with your feelings even if not your position because I know that you have been steeped in an anti-intellectual culture and possibly a postmodernist academy. Perhaps my directness offends you, but lets' face it, we have been dancing for two weeks. There comes a time when we have to put diplomacy aside and call things by their right name. The above paragraph is an equivocation, plain and simple.StephenB
May 27, 2013
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RDFish @315,
"Of course by your definition computers do not make free choices! That is perfectly obvious!"
Great! Contra your assertion at #211 and #218, it's perfectly obvious that computers do not make free choices.Chance Ratcliff
May 27, 2013
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I don’t think this is controversial.
It’s not controversial. You are mistaken about this, and I’m right.
Please explain how your program is nondeterministic, and how we can test this if it never terminates and runs a second time on the same input.Chance Ratcliff
May 27, 2013
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RDFish @315,
"In your example, yes. However we’ve already established that programs can rewrite themselves, and they can do so differently depending on input. Therefore, if the input is nondeterministic, the program itself can change nondeterministically."
What do you mean by nondeterminstically: freely or randomly? choice: a selection from among multiple options. determined: necessary -- neither impossible nor contingent. free: neither determined nor random.Chance Ratcliff
May 27, 2013
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Certainty is never absolute.
Isn't "never" an absolute?
In other words, nobody knows if chance, necessity, and agency are three different things.
Isn't "nobody" an absolute?
all theological concepts are also philosophicaL
Isn't "all" an absolute?
No reasonable person would deny them
Isn't "No resonable person" an absolute?
Everyone is responsible for their own actions.
Isn't "Everyone" an absolute?
You cannot use rules of logic to determine that the sentence is meaningless!
Isn't "cannot" an absolute?William J Murray
May 27, 2013
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F/N: Just to see what happens, consider how RDF handles self evident truths on being confronted with no less than three that are absolutely certain and undeniable on pain of immediate incoherence and absurdity:
STEP 1, 316 above, but of course I affirm such: >> In my very last post I said There are innumerable things about which we can be certain and I also said That does NOT mean that we can’t be certain of things! How much more clear can I make it? >>
But the trick is that he has question-beggingly redefined "certainty" in a subjectivist frame, so a little later we see step 2:
STEP 2, the other show drops: >> self-evident truths are exactly like that. No reasonable person would deny them, even though we cannot ground them in empirical evidence . . . all of logico-mathematical reasoning is epistemologically privileged. But that does not mean we can say even these things are absolutely certain for precisely the reason I said: We can always question everything. Maybe we have both been drugged by evil demons and our minds are deluded and we think the LNC is self-evident when it really isn’t! We can always question everything. Too bad, and I know you hate it, but it’s true. Reasonable people like us do not indulge in this sort of hyper-skepticism, but that is why nothing is 100% absolute in epistemology. >>
Notice, he has in hands as one of the self evident truth, one that directly responds to the brains in vats, Plato's cave etc worlds. Royce's Error exists. This is not just true by consent of our experience (which BTW we always bring to the table, so to suggest that self evident truths have no empirical context is itself a game, a suggestion that they are a synonym for things true by definition, which is NOT the case), but the attempt to deny it leads immediately to an instantiation of its truth. Say, call the proposition E, then E can be inverted NOT-E. Put the two together, E AND not-E, that combination MUST be false so it is a case of the truth of E. And, what does RDF suggest by way of objection, well we could be deluded. Which would be, a case of E being true. See what happens when someone plays around, snipping, ignoring context and sniping, twisting and side-slipping, snidely accusing those who patiently have corrected him. And BTW, RDF, you have yet to apologise for falsely accusing me of greed in suggesting to you that you go to a summary on first principles. KFkairosfocus
May 27, 2013
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RDF: Stephen is exactly on target. Your twist about attempt to project a strawman fallacy fails. With one hand you put the principles of sound reasoning on the table, then you proceed with the other hand to take them off again, predictably. If such a sleight of hand is not spotted for what it is, incoherence, it will confuse the naive onlooker. SB has spotted it, as have others. KFkairosfocus
May 27, 2013
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Re RDF:
you really are missing the point. You are assuming that human beings are “agents” and that when “agents” do things they operate by means that are neither random nor determined. But that is just your assumption – nobody knows if that is true or not. In other words, nobody knows if chance, necessity, and agency are three different things.
Really, after experiencing yourself as an agent for decades? (In short, this is self referentially incoherent.) Also, as already pointed out but as usual ignored, mechanical necessity produces natural regularity. So it has a clear defining characteristic similar to F = m*a. Second, chance shows itself by stochastically distributed patterns, i.e. the familiar statistical scatter. Combining the two, we get a spectrum, from scatter on a strong tend, to trend in a broad scatter. Now, introduce what RDF et al are loathe to acknowledge as real: FSCO/I, including especially dFSCI. Where, the above clip is a case in point -- self referential again. Indeed, in the above, we have 339 ASCII characters, which come from a space of 2.21 * 10^714 possibilities. Across the credible lifespan of the observed cosmos and using its atomic resources running at chemical rxn speed, the needle in haystack blind search on chance and/or necessity, would with all but absolute certainty, not be able to find anything but straw with a 1-straw sized sample, with such a haystack superposed on our cosmos. That is because the vastly overwhelming bulk would be straw, not anything else. In short, one of the uses of the explanatory filter that RDF et al so despise and dismiss, is to help us understand the difference between what blind natural forces and intelligent design are capable of. But, ideological blindness does just that: it blinds. In short, we see here a case of -- despite already being corrected and having access to corrective resources -- willful clinging to absurdity. RDF is inadvertently making himself into a poster child. KF PS: RDF, if you are in a hole and need to climb out, stop digging in further.kairosfocus
May 27, 2013
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Hi StephenB,
If you are not afraid of a First Cause, then you should not bristle when the subject is broached in a relevant context.
Please show me the part where I bristled, Stephen - you'll see you are mistaken.
A first cause is not a theological concept, it is a philosophical concept. However, I am not surprised that you would, once again, try to obfuscate the matter with word manipulation.
You are such an angry guy! Always accusing me of lying or obfuscating or hiding something or some other bad behavior. Can't you just debate these things without getting all huffy and aggressive? What are you so angry about? A "first cause" is certainly a theological concept, but obviously all theological concepts are also philosophical. In any event, for the third time I'm going to suggest we agree to disagree about the conflict between libertarianism and causality. You think that by introducing God into the topic you can eliminate the contradiction. I disagree.
RDF: What causes me to choose my actions? Your answer is nothing, and my answer is the totality of my experiences acting upon my inherent characteristics. SB: If your experiences are the cause of you exercising you volitional capacities,...
Ok, here's a little test. Q: What did I say causes my choices? A: I said the totality of my experiences acting upon my inherent characteristics Q: What did you pretend that I said? A: You pretended that I said my experiences. Will you ever stop changing what I say? You've done this like ten times now. Now, actually look at what I'm saying instead of pretending I'm saying something else: My inherent characteristics - what I was born with, my senses, my reasoning faculties, my body... everything that I am... that is me. What causes my actions? The totality of my experiences acting upon my inherent characteristics.
If you are simply the effect of your experiences, then you cannot be the ultimate cause of your actions. Either your experiences are driving the train or you are driving the train. Which is it?
I am driving the train. I am the totality of my experiences acting upon my inherent characteristics.
Yes, but you have provided no rational justification given your view that the sum total of your experiences is driving the process.
Ok, let's try to clear this up and at least clarify exactly what we disagree on. First, here is my position: 1) What causes my actions? I do. 2) Who is responsible for my actions? I am. 3) What do I mean by "I"? I mean "the totality of my experiences acting upon my inherent characteristics." Now, what is your position? I've filled in the first two for you: 1) What causes my actions? I do. 2) Who is responsible for my actions? I am. 3) What do I mean by "I"? I mean ____________________________________. (please fill this in) That is what we disagree about, pure and simple.
The question is, how can you change the direction of the sum total your experiences if your experiences are the cause of you and your actions?
Because if you hadn't changed what I said, you'd know that your experiences are not the cause of you and your actions.
RDF: 2) Certainty is never absolute simply because epistemology is not solved. This is not controversial; SB: Does this mean that, contrary to your earlier claim that you are certain about the Law of Non-Contradiction, you are now going to withhold judgment on the matter until the problem of epistemology is solved?
And once again, you can't seem to argue against what I actually say, and so you pretend that I say something else which is stupid, so you can pretend that you have caught me in some error. That is a waste of time, and it is irritating, and it makes you look desperate to score some sort of points here. As any fair reader of our posts can tell, I have never said we need to withold any judgements until the problem of epistemology is solved, much less a judgement about a principle of formal logic! In fact, I have said the opposite, over and over and over again. In my very last post I said There are innumerable things about which we can be certain and I also said That does NOT mean that we can’t be certain of things! How much more clear can I make it? This is actually pathetic.
That is exactly what I have been telling you for two weeks and a point that you have been resisting mightily. The Law of Non-Contradiction and the Law of Causality are so certain that no reasonable person would refuse to accept them. The findings of science are only relatively certain. They might be refuted tomorrow. All empirical knowledge is like that. Most things are like that.
Breathe... deeply... relax... it's only an internet debate... no reason to get angry... Ok, I'm better now. Steven, I have been telling you that for two weeks. It's too late and these threads are too long to go look for our quotes, but I have said dozens of times that no reasonable person (and certainly never me) ever doubts laws of logic, and that empirical facts are provisional.
Self-evident truths ARE NOT LIKE THAT.
Yes, self-evident truths are exactly like that. No reasonable person would deny them, even though we cannot ground them in empirical evidence.
The Rules of right reason belong at the top. The number of moons that orbit a planet ranks high, but not at the very top. That information is provisional, and changeable, the rules of right reason are not.
I've never disagreed with that! Not just your "rules of right reason" but all of logico-mathematical reasoning is epistemologically privileged. But that does not mean we can say even these things are absolutely certain for precisely the reason I said: We can always question everything. Maybe we have both been drugged by evil demons and our minds are deluded and we think the LNC is self-evident when it really isn't! We can always question everything. Too bad, and I know you hate it, but it's true. Reasonable people like us do not indulge in this sort of hyper-skepticism, but that is why nothing is 100% absolute in epistemology.
SB: I am certain that I don’t know them either. Give your strawman a vacation. RDF: And I am equally convinced that you don’t know why there is something rather than nothing, or if mental causality is ontologically distinct, or any of several other Big Questions. SB: Those examples are irrelevant to the Rules of right reason.
Talk about strawman arguments! Unbelievable! I am very, very clearly arguing that you do not know the answer to the questions I listed, and you turn around and pretend that I'm telling you that you don't know the Rules of Right Reason! What is wrong with you? I am certain that you do not know the answer to these Big Questions: 1) Why is there something rather than nothing? 2) How did life come to exist on Earth? 3) What is the nature of mind and its relationship to the brain? 4) Is mental causality ontologically distinct? Don't change the subject and start talking about logic rules. I'm talking about the fact that I am certain that neither you nor anyone else knows the answers to the questions I just listed.
RDF: I’m very certain about is that we have no good reason to think we understand any of these ancient conundrums. SB: And I am very certain that I just refuted you with two self-evident truths that cannot be rationally disavowed.
One last time: I said I was certain you don't know the answers to the Big Questions. You changed the subject to talk about self-evident truths of logic. You can't win a debate by beating straw men, Stephen. Please respond to what I'm actually saying. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 27, 2013
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Hi Chance,
The above program is deterministic....However if getX() has a nondeterministic source, then the pattern of true and false outputs will be nondeterministic. This doesn’t change the fact that the program itself is deterministic. Inputs are mapped to outputs deterministically. Once the program is written and compiled, it will behave exactly the same way, outputting “True” if X is true and “False” otherwise.
In your example, yes. However we've already established that programs can rewrite themselves, and they can do so differently depending on input. Therefore, if the input is nondeterministic, the program itself can change nondeterministically.
So I assert that programs which do not incorporate true random number generation are deterministic.
Forget randomness. If input is nondeterministic, the program can change nondeterministically. Really.
I don’t think this is controversial.
It's not controversial. You are mistaken about this, and I'm right.
The question now shifts to whether any nondeterministic inputs exist. For the sake of argument, and to avoid any possible question begging, we should exclude biological phenomena. That being the case, do any nondeterministic events exist from the big bang onward?...So at best we can have nondeterministic input which is not “free” as per my definition.
You have just said that aside from biological systems, there is no such thing as a process that is neither random nor determined. OK.
Since no “free” inputs exist, no “choice” that a computer makes can be free.
Given your definitions, this is true, yes.
Given all this, the inputs can be no more than the product of chance and necessity; and since the input is filtered through the program, which is itself deterministic, the output can be no more than the product of chance and necessity.
Yes.
RDF: My definition says “internal states” (plural), but to clear up any confusion, I could add that unchanging structure does not constitute “states”. CR: But why bother?
Because my definitions said that systems that make choices based on internal states (plural) are said to make free choices. A system that cannot change state cannot make free choices in my terminology.
However we may have some warrant to reasonably infer that humans make free choices. I’ll revisit this.
People have been revisiting this for a few thousand years now, and nobody has come up with a way to resolve it. But good luck with it!
RDF: To be clear, you should use something like “conscious mind” instead of “agency”.” CF: I think the term agency is acceptable, philosophical terminology.
The question is not whether it is "acceptable" - it is whether it is well-defined. We all know (from subjective experience) what a conscious mind is. "Agency" can mean different things, however.
According to Wikipedia, “In philosophy and sociology, agency is the capacity of an agent (a person or other entity, human or any living being in general, or soul-consciousness in religion) to act in a world.”
From the very same Wiki article:
Agency may either be classified as unconscious, involuntary behavior, or purposeful, goal directed activity (intentional action).
This is only one of many possible variations on the notion of agency. If you want to use the term that's fine, but you'll need to define it in order to enable us to discuss it without talking past each other.
If a computer program runs from state zero on the same input, it will produce the same output.
Yes.
Your program is still deterministic on this condition, which is the only criteria available for evaluation.
Why? If you just let it run, the program is still deterministic, but it produces different output given the same input.
RDF: You said a deterministic program will always give the same output for the same input. You didn’t say anything about halting the program or restarting it!!! CR: If you have another way to evaluate whether a program is deterministic, please lay it out plainly. If your program has the same output on identical input, from the initial starting state, then it is deterministic.
I really don't understand what the point is here. I've argued that (1) computer programs can produce different output given the same input, even without randomizers, and that (2) programs can be rewritten dynamically based on different input, and that (3) if the input is non-deterministic, then the program can be non-deterministic, again without random number generation. In any event, here is what is true with regard to human thought vs. computer thought: 1) Humans are conscious, and computers are certainly not 2) Computers can outperform humans in some areas of mental ability, but there really is no comparison between machine intelligence and human intelligence 3) Even though computers operate stricly according to deterministic causality, the output of programs can be indetermistic depending upon what input is received 3) It might be that human minds operate strictly according to deterministic causality, or it might be that humans have a special sort of causation (viz. mental causation). Nobody knows the answer to this.
RDF: we cannot equate a computer program with human behavior because they are fundamentally incomparable.They are radically different and incommensurable for sure. Whether there is an ontological distinction, nobody knows. CF: No, we can’t be absolutely certain about it, just as we cannot be absolutely certain that the sun will rise tomorrow as it always has, but I think it’s more reasonable than the alternative.
No, no, no. There is not one single shred of evidence that any process in the universe, including those that occur in the brains of human beings, operates neither deterministically nor randomly. In contrast, there is a gigantic body of evidence that suggests the sun will rise tomorrow.
Falsifying the premise falsifies the universal claim, that any instance of a computer implies agency.
What do you mean by "agency"?
I’m certainly concluding that humans have a special kind of power. I’m not just assuming it. I think that this inference is warranted by observation — by uniform and repeated experience.
No, you are just assuming it, even though you think you are inferring it.
We have numerous instances of technology being produced by humans, and no instances of technology being produced by chance and necessity.
No, you've just done it again: You have assumed, and not inferred, that "being produced by a human" is not the same as "being produced by chance and necessity". Do you understand this point?
This constitutes a reliable warrant that humans can cause technology, and that material processes cannot.
And you have once again assumed your conclusion. How do you know that humans are not material?
This warrant can be nullified by either a) demonstrating that chance and necessity can produce technology; or b) demonstrating that chance and necessity can produce humans.
All of this is irrelevant, because you first need to demonstrate that humans do not operate according to chance and necessity.
When “agents” do things that cannot be accounted for by chance and necessity, they are performing a unique causal action.
Nobody knows if anything can do anything that cannot be accounted for by chance and necessity. When we play chess, or design a car, or write a poem, it might be due to nothing but our neurons firing in our brains according to fixed law.
Recall my definition of free: neither determined nor random. This equates to: neither necessity nor chance.
Right. We have no evidence at all that anything in the uninverse is "free" according to your definition.
Remember, this isn’t formal proof, it’s evidentiary proof. In other words, I think it constitutes sufficient evidence.
You have no evidence whatsoever that human beings do not operate according to chance and necessity. I hope by now you get the idea :-)
But I think I have shown that by my definition of free, computers do not make free choices.
???? Of course by your definition computers do not make free choices! That is perfectly obvious! Computers act deterministically (even though the output of programs may be indeterministic).
I think I’ve also shown that it’s more reasonable to conclude that humans do make free choices, than that they do not.
What you are trying to justify is called libertarian free will. There is no evidence whatsoever that libertarian free will is true. There is no evidence that anything happens anywhere except according to chance and necessity. That doesn't mean it doesn't - it just means we do not know. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 27, 2013
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Certainty is never absolute I'm sending that one to snorg tees. http://www.snorgtees.com/
William J Murray
May 26, 2013
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kairosfocus @310. I like your clarification. Thank you.StephenB
May 26, 2013
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Chance @ 308, thank you for commenting. I am pleased to know that my examples resonate with you.StephenB
May 26, 2013
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RDF: That makes at least three self evident truths you need to face. KFkairosfocus
May 26, 2013
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SB: I would only add as a clarification that finite wholes and parts are implied in the discussion; the usual case. KFkairosfocus
May 26, 2013
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RDF:
2) Certainty is never absolute simply because epistemology is not solved. This is not controversial; it simply means that we can always question anything. That does NOT mean that we can’t be certain of things, it only means that certainty is a continuum rather than absolute.
Are you ABSOLUTELY sure of that, or only relatively sure? (In short, self referential incoherence.) I would suggest to you that the same things you keep on refusing to examine on excuses, would help you fix a lot of basic blunders. Royce's error exists is actually undeniably and absolutely true. Not just by universal consensus -- starting with the first math class with all those red X's -- but by the implications of attempted denial. To try to deny in the context where we have both E and NOT-E, implies instantiation of E. Self-evident truth, certain, absolutely certain knowledge, and a case where our experience of the world and our perceptions speak truly. Schemes of thought that deny such therefore are in error. But at the same time, E means we must be aware of our limits. yes, many kinds of knowledge claim are weak form: warranted, credibly true. Not all, some are plain out justified and true beliefs. IT would help if you were to drop excuses or accusations and simply read. Not that at this stage, on sad track record, I expect you to be willing to climb down off that high horse. KFkairosfocus
May 26, 2013
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Stephen @307,
"With respect to the Law of Causality, I am absolutely certain that an effect cannot contain more than its cause. To be more precise, I am absolutely certain that you cannot get a two by four piece of wood from a splinter. With respect to the Law that the whole can never be less than any one of its constituent parts, I am absolutely certain that the city of Detroit can never have more people than the entire state of Michigan. I have absolute 100% ontological certitude on these matters."
Thanks, that was helpful to me with regard to self-evident truths.Chance Ratcliff
May 26, 2013
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RDFish
No phobia here, thanks. You? What are you afraid of?
If you are not afraid of a First Cause, then you should not bristle when the subject is broached in a relevant context.
So can we agree that you can reconcile libertarianism with causality, but only in a theological framework? I’m happy to agree with that.
A first cause is not a theological concept, it is a philosophical concept. However, I am not surprised that you would, once again, try to obfuscate the matter with word manipulation. "Who or what, in your judgment, is the cause of your actions?"
I am. I choose my actions and initiate them, and I think this is just an obvious fact. The critical question is, What causes me to choose my actions? Your answer is nothing, and my answer is the totality of my experiences acting upon my inherent characteristics.
If your experiences are the cause of you exercising you volitional capacities, then you are not the cause, your experiences are. If you are simply the effect of your experiences, then you cannot be the ultimate cause of your actions. Either your experiences are driving the train or you are driving the train. Which is it?
Everyone is responsible for their own actions. I think I’ve said this about 100 times so far.
Yes, but you have provided no rational justification given your view that the sum total of your experiences is driving the process. The question is, how can you change the direction of the sum total your experiences if your experiences are the cause of you and your actions?
Please don’t pretend I’m stupid, it’s annoying.
Well, being stupid is not exactly the same thing as being irrational. As a general rule, people do not have too much say about their intelligence. They either have the gift or they don't. Rationality is a choice. You have chosen to be irrational by denying reason's rules.
2) Certainty is never absolute simply because epistemology is not solved. This is not controversial;
Does this mean that, contrary to your earlier claim that you are certain about the Law of Non-Contradiction, you are now going to withhold judgment on the matter until the problem of epistemology is solved?
it simply means that we can always question anything.> That does NOT mean that we can’t be certain of things, it only means that certainty is a continuum rather than absolute. We can say that there are things that are so certain that all reasonable people ought to believe them.
That is exactly what I have been telling you for two weeks and a point that you have been resisting mightily. The Law of Non-Contradiction and the Law of Causality are so certain that no reasonable person would refuse to accept them. The findings of science are only relatively certain. They might be refuted tomorrow. All empirical knowledge is like that. Most things are like that. Self-evident truths ARE NOT LIKE THAT.
3) There is nothing contradictory about trying to assess how certain one is about something. We do it all the time.
OF course. So do I.
I am very certain about how many moons orbit Mars, and yet I’m positive that I have no idea where Jimmy Hoffa is buried. And there is nothing contradictory about me assessing your certainty, either.
The problem is that you do not place the right items at the high end of the continuum. The Rules of right reason belong at the top. The number of moons that orbit a planet ranks high, but not at the very top. That information is provisional, and changeable, the rules of right reason are not.
I am very certain that you don’t know any of these things: 1) If Julius Caesar was alergic to cillantro 2) How many quarters I currently have in my pockets 3) Angelina Jolie’s social security number
I am certain that I don't know them either. Give your strawman a vacation.
And I am equally convinced that you don’t know why there is something rather than nothing, or if mental causality is ontologically distinct, or any of several other Big Questions.
Those examples are irrelevant to the Rules of right reason. With respect to the Law of Causality, I am absolutely certain that an effect cannot contain more than its cause. To be more precise, I am absolutely certain that you cannot get a two by four piece of wood from a splinter. With respect to the Law that the whole can never be less than any one of its constituent parts, I am absolutely certain that the city of Detroit can never have more people than the entire state of Michigan. I have absolute 100% ontological certitude on these matters. If you would be honest with yourself and with me, you would admit that you also have that same degree of certainty on these self-evident truths. If you cannot bring yourself to that point, then you are not a rational person.
I’m very certain about is that we have no good reason to think we understand any of these ancient conundrums.
And I am very certain that I just refuted you with two self-evident truths that cannot be rationally disavowed.StephenB
May 26, 2013
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RDFish @305,
"The internal states are only set deterministically if the universe is deterministic. Otherwise, the internal states can be changed non-deterministically."
Let me try and get to the crux of the issue, as I see it. boolean X = getX(); if (X) {   print("True"); } else {   print("False"); } The above program is deterministic. That which occurs does so by necessity. This is analogous to other necessity conditions, such as the temperature at which water begins to freeze. If the sufficient temperature condition occurs, then the water will freeze. If X is true, "True" will be output. If X is not true, "False" will be output. This happens by necessity, like water freezing. However if getX() has a nondeterministic source, then the pattern of true and false outputs will be nondeterministic. This doesn't change the fact that the program itself is deterministic. Inputs are mapped to outputs deterministically. Once the program is written and compiled, it will behave exactly the same way, outputting "True" if X is true and "False" otherwise. So I assert that programs which do not incorporate true random number generation are deterministic. I don't think this is controversial. The question now shifts to whether any nondeterministic inputs exist. For the sake of argument, and to avoid any possible question begging, we should exclude biological phenomena. That being the case, do any nondeterministic events exist from the big bang onward? Is there anything in the laws of physics that is truly nondeterministic? Perhaps. Quantum events may be truly random. So at best we can have nondeterministic input which is not "free" as per my definition. Since no "free" inputs exist, no "choice" that a computer makes can be free. Given all this, the inputs can be no more than the product of chance and necessity; and since the input is filtered through the program, which is itself deterministic, the output can be no more than the product of chance and necessity. Here are the definitions again: choice: a selection among multiple possibilities determined: necessary — neither impossible nor contingent free: not determined nor random
I suspect you might take issue with those, but I thought I’d take a stab at it anyway.
I think they’re perfectly clear.
Thank you, that's appreciated.
You need nondeterministic state switching in order to produce nondeterministic output.
No, you don’t.
I think this was addressed above. The variable X represents state. If it's input is deterministic, so is the program's output.
In addition, the coin sorter does have an internal state, it’s just constant, and so unarguably deterministic.
My definition says “internal states” (plural), but to clear up any confusion, I could add that unchanging structure does not constitute “states”.
But why bother? A coin sorter has a single, constant state. This is analogous to the following program: constant boolean X = True; print(X); Constant state is still state.
"1) humans, coin sorters, and computers make choices 2) coin sorters and computers make determined choices 3) nobody knows if there is any such a thing as a free choice (it can’t be demonstrated to exist)"
OK I think this is progress at least. And it may be that we won't resolve #3, at least with apodictic certainty. However we may have some warrant to reasonably infer that humans make free choices. I'll revisit this.
"To be clear, you should use something like “conscious mind” instead of “agency”."
I think the term agency is acceptable, philosophical terminology. According to Wikipedia, "In philosophy and sociology, agency is the capacity of an agent (a person or other entity, human or any living being in general, or soul-consciousness in religion) to act in a world."
"How you intend to support your claim that mental causes are neither random nor determined? It’s just not possible."
I think this is an important point. I agree that it may not be possible to prove that mental causes are free. However I think it can be supported by the evidence. More later.
Run program X with input Y. Observe output. Run program X again with input Y. Observe output. If the program is deterministic, the output for both runs will be the same. (Pseudorandom number generator notwithstanding.)
Do you think we reboot humans each time they make a choice???? Hello???? Human beings accumulate experience all through their lives – they don’t reset their internal state to some initial condition! Well, neither does my computer program – it just keeps running, and keeps giving different outputs when given the same input. Oh – and it’s only a few lines of code :)
I think you're failing to connect the dots here. My example was for computer programs. If a computer program runs from state zero on the same input, it will produce the same output. Never mind humans for a moment. Your program is still deterministic on this condition, which is the only criteria available for evaluation. If the input is constant, so will the output be, from the starting state. Each time your program is run on the same input, it will produce the same output.
If we should switch gears and talk about your “running forever” technicality, then it should be made clear that you’re taking a single stream of input continuously, and not a single stream of input multiple times from an initial state. You’re program needs to halt and restart in order to test for determinism. I supplied the definitions, but wiggle out of this if you can.
What????? Do we have to halt human beings and restart them in order to test for determinism?
Again I think you're missing the point. Never mind humans for a moment. The point has been made that your program is deterministic, since its output will be the same when executed multiple times from state zero on constant input. My point about humans was exactly this: they cannot be rebooted to an initial starting state, so we cannot use this same criteria for evaluating whether human behavior is deterministic. For this reason alone we cannot evaluate computer systems on the same basis that we evaluate human behavior.
"You said a deterministic program will always give the same output for the same input. You didn’t say anything about halting the program or restarting it!!!"
If you have another way to evaluate whether a program is deterministic, please lay it out plainly. If your program has the same output on identical input, from the initial starting state, then it is deterministic.
we cannot equate a computer program with human behavior because they are fundamentally incomparable.
They are radically different and incommensurable for sure. Whether there is an ontological distinction, nobody knows.
No, we can't be absolutely certain about it, just as we cannot be absolutely certain that the sun will rise tomorrow as it always has, but I think it's more reasonable than the alternative.
Here’s the part you left out: Falsification: There exists an X such that X is a computer and X is the verifiable result of chance and necessity.
I don’t get it. You are saying that if the computer is caused by chance and necessity, then it can’t be caused by a human being. Again, you are simply assuming that human beings have some special kind of power that is not random and not determined. If X results from chance and necessity, that does not falsify the claim that it is the product of agency unless you are assuming your conclusion.
Not exactly, although the confusion is understandable. I had to think through it again carefully, but I don't think there's a logical problem. Falsifying the premise falsifies the universal claim, that any instance of a computer implies agency. To find a computer that was not the result of a deliberate intelligent act would just mean that not all computers are produced by agents; it would not mean that no computer was. But closer to the point, here's your objection: "Again, you are simply assuming that human beings have some special kind of power that is not random and not determined." I'm certainly concluding that humans have a special kind of power. I'm not just assuming it. I think that this inference is warranted by observation -- by uniform and repeated experience. We have numerous instances of technology being produced by humans, and no instances of technology being produced by chance and necessity. This constitutes a reliable warrant that humans can cause technology, and that material processes cannot. This warrant can be nullified by either a) demonstrating that chance and necessity can produce technology; or b) demonstrating that chance and necessity can produce humans. Again, I cannot prove this to be so, but it is supported by direct observation -- by evidence taken in the context of uniform and repeated experience. That being the case, we have warrant to presume that humans can do things which material processes cannot. All that's needed to nullify the warrant is evidence to the contrary.
Again, this is not impossible, it’s just not in evidence, nor is any principle which could establish the falsification. This constitutes the warrant: 100% of cases in evidence are verifiable products of intentional design. 0.0% of cases are available to call it into question.
No, you really are missing the point. You are assuming that human beings are “agents” and that when “agents” do things they operate by means that are neither random nor determined. But that is just your assumption – nobody knows if that is true or not. In other words, nobody knows if chance, necessity, and agency are three different things. It could be that agency is nothing but chance and necessity at work.
When "agents" do things that cannot be accounted for by chance and necessity, they are performing a unique causal action. All that is needed to refute this warrant is to produce evidence to the contrary. Recall my definition of free: neither determined nor random. This equates to: neither necessity nor chance. If I have established warrant that humans can do things that neither chance nor necessity can accomplish, then by implication we have warrant to reasonably conclude that humans make free choices. Remember, this isn't formal proof, it's evidentiary proof. In other words, I think it constitutes sufficient evidence. I'm certain that our disagreement will not end there. But I think I have shown that by my definition of free, computers do not make free choices. I think I've also shown that it's more reasonable to conclude that humans do make free choices, than that they do not. My apologies for the length of this post. I wanted to try and be thorough and address most of your major objections.Chance Ratcliff
May 26, 2013
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Hi Chance,
However your “free choice” definition [ making a choice based on internal states] necessitates determinism, since the entity’s internal state will determine the output predictably and reliably.
The internal states are only set deterministically if the universe is deterministic. Otherwise, the internal states can be changed non-deterministically.
You need nondeterministic state switching in order to produce nondeterministic output.
No, you don't.
In addition, the coin sorter does have an internal state, it’s just constant, and so unarguably deterministic.
My definition says "internal states" (plural), but to clear up any confusion, I could add that unchanging structure does not constitute "states".
Another coin sorter with a different internal state will produce different, but constant, output. In other words, it seems that coin sorters can make free choices by your definition.
No, each sorter lacks internal states, so it makes choices but not freely.
In the interest of fair engagement, let me try some variations to your definitions: choice: a selection among multiple possibilities determined: necessary — neither impossible nor contingent free: not determined nor random
Ok, those are fine.
I suspect you might take issue with those, but I thought I’d take a stab at it anyway.
I think they're perfectly clear.
The above definitions allow nondeterministic causes that are not random, which is something I found lacking in your definitions. I suspect that your issue would be that it begs the question to call human choices “free”, but that can be resolved by attributing no such qualifier to “choices”. Now the term choice can be qualified as either determined or free.
Yes, exactly. You're not begging any questions. Using your definitions, I would say this: 1) humans, coin sorters, and computers make choices 2) coin sorters and computers make determined choices 3) nobody knows if there is any such a thing as a free choice (it can't be demonstrated to exist)
RDF: “You are assuming without warrant that “agency” refers to something beyond chance and necessity.” CR: I supplied the warrant.
You have never done any such thing of course. What are you talking about? I'm saying that we can observe physical cause and effect, but we cannot observe mental cause and effect. How you intend to support your claim that mental causes are neither random nor determined? It's just not possible.
What is your warrant that they do not?
I never claimed to have evidence that mental cause does not exist. I don't know whether it does or not.
On what evidentiary grounds can we infer that chance and necessity beget agency, or that agency is reducible to such?
To be clear, you should use something like "conscious mind" instead of "agency". Anyway, we do not have evidentiary grounds to infer that conscious minds are reducible to chance and necessity. We don't know if they are or not.
By the way, there’s nothing spooky about the term agency. You can take it for a synonym for human if you so choose.
Actually the word really is pretty loaded with connotation. I suggest using "human" for "agent", and "conscious mind" for "agency".
Well at least we know that the pronouncement “all pronouncements are uncertain” is uncertain.
I never said anything like that, so this is just dopey.
If you have no halting condition, then you can’t be reading the “same input” unless you’re just iterating over identical values. This is not the same thing.
Of course it is exactly the same thing. Keep entering the same value ("4") and observe that the output will be different each time.
Run program X with input Y. Observe output. Run program X again with input Y. Observe output. If the program is deterministic, the output for both runs will be the same. (Pseudorandom number generator notwithstanding.)
Do you think we reboot humans each time they make a choice???? Hello???? Human beings accumulate experience all through their lives - they don't reset their internal state to some initial condition! Well, neither does my computer program - it just keeps running, and keeps giving different outputs when given the same input. Oh - and it's only a few lines of code :-)
If we should switch gears and talk about your “running forever” technicality, then it should be made clear that you’re taking a single stream of input continuously, and not a single stream of input multiple times from an initial state. You’re program needs to halt and restart in order to test for determinism. I supplied the definitions, but wiggle out of this if you can.
What????? Do we have to halt human beings and restart them in order to test for determinism? You said a deterministic program will always give the same output for the same input. You didn't say anything about halting the program or restarting it!!!
we cannot equate a computer program with human behavior because they are fundamentally incomparable.
They are radically different and incommensurable for sure. Whether there is an ontological distinction, nobody knows.
If intelligent agents can be begotten by chance and necessity, or if their unique effects can be accounted for by chance and necessity, then we can credit chance and necessity with the whole shebang. It’s a twofer.
Ah - ok I understand.
Premise: For all X, if X is a computer, then X is the product of agency. RDF: You are assuming without warrant that “agency” refers to something beyond chance and necessity. No, I’m proposing that “agency” can produce computers, period. This is unassailable fact.
Ah, ok - you mean (per your comment above) that human beings can produce computers - yes, quite right, we can.
Here’s the part you left out: Falsification: There exists an X such that X is a computer and X is the verifiable result of chance and necessity.
I don't get it. You are saying that if the computer is caused by chance and necessity, then it can't be caused by a human being. Again, you are simply assuming that human beings have some special kind of power that is not random and not determined. If X results from chance and necessity, that does not falsify the claim that it is the product of agency unless you are assuming your conclusion.
Again, this is not impossible, it’s just not in evidence, nor is any principle which could establish the falsification. This constitutes the warrant: 100% of cases in evidence are verifiable products of intentional design. 0.0% of cases are available to call it into question.
No, you really are missing the point. You are assuming that human beings are "agents" and that when "agents" do things they operate by means that are neither random nor determined. But that is just your assumption - nobody knows if that is true or not. In other words, nobody knows if chance, necessity, and agency are three different things. It could be that agency is nothing but chance and necessity at work. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 26, 2013
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Hi StephenB,
Once a philosophical discussion about causality is on the table, a First Cause cannot be avoided. It is always relevant to and necessary for the topic. If you have a phobia about the First Cause, then you might be more at peace by avoiding discussions of causality altogether.
No phobia here, thanks. You? What are you afraid of? Anyway, philosophical discussions of causality are carried out all the time with no reference to a First Cause! There is a sizable scientific literature surrounding experiments in free will, for example, and none of it refers to a First Cause at all. So can we agree that you can reconcile libertarianism with causality, but only in a theological framework? I'm happy to agree with that.
Who or what, in your judgment, is the cause of your actions?
I am. I choose my actions and initiate them, and I think this is just an obvious fact. The critical question is, What causes me to choose my actions? Your answer is nothing, and my answer is the totality of my experiences acting upon my inherent characteristics.
Why should people be held accountable for their actions if they are not the cause of those actions?
Everyone is responsible for their own actions. I think I've said this about 100 times so far.
RDF: You mischaracterize my position completely. SB: How could I mischaracterize your position? You have no position (except the position that you should have no position).
I am certain regarding the fact that the Big Questions that I've enumerated have no certain answers. That isn't that hard to understand, but you really want to pretend that I'm saying nobody can be certain about anything or something stupid like that. Please don't pretend I'm stupid, it's annoying.
RDF: But nobody ought to be certain about why there is something rather than nothing, nor how the universe came to exist, nor how life came to exist on Earth, nor how brains are related to conscious minds, nor if mental causality is ontologically distinct, and so on. SB: Are you certain about that?
Yes I am. Why is this so hard for you to understand? Please try and concentrate; here is what I am saying: 1) There are innumerable things about which we can be certain 2) Certainty is never absolute simply because epistemology is not solved. This is not controversial; it simply means that we can always question anything. That does NOT mean that we can't be certain of things, it only means that certainty is a continuum rather than absolute. We can say that there are things that are so certain that all reasonable people ought to believe them. 3) There is nothing contradictory about trying to assess how certain one is about something. We do it all the time. I am very certain about how many moons orbit Mars, and yet I'm positive that I have no idea where Jimmy Hoffa is buried. And there is nothing contradictory about me assessing your certainty, either. I am very certain that you don't know any of these things: 1) If Julius Caesar was alergic to cillantro 2) How many quarters I currently have in my pockets 3) Angelina Jolie's social security number And I am equally convinced that you don't know why there is something rather than nothing, or if mental causality is ontologically distinct, or any of several other Big Questions. Sorry, but your "You can't be certain that I'm not certain" gimmick is just nonsense. I can be very certain of any number of things, just as you can, and one of the things I'm very certain about is that we have no good reason to think we understand any of these ancient conundrums. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 26, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
RDF: No. I think there are a set of Big Question that have been pondered and debated by the most intelligent human beings that have ever lived over thousands of years, without ever producing anything remotely resembling a consensus. I object to people who believe that whatever they happen to think might be the answers to these question are obviously and clearly and objectively correct, and anyone who disagrees must be hiding from the truth or irrational or stupid or lying. PHIN: But you wouldn’t include the Law of Non-contradiction in those Big Questions, because it is obviously and clearly and objectively correct, correct?
That's right. I've never known anyone to doubt it.
And the same would hold true for the basic Laws of Reason, correct?
Formal logic and mathematics, right.
And it would also hold true for the notion that every effect has a cause, correct?
Let's be careful with our vocabulary: As far as I'm concerned, an effect has a cause by definition. But I do not think that it is clear that every event - everything that happens - has a cause, because causality in quantum physics seems pretty controversial.
Maybe you could clarify exactly what Big Questions you are talking about.
Again, these are questions that have been debated by philsophers for millenia, including -Why is there something instead of nothing? -What is the relationship between mind and body? -How did the universe begin and why does it have the characteristics it does? -How did life come to exist in the universe?
And perhaps more to the point, why does the following not qualify as a Big Question? Is it possible for someone to be obviously and clearly and objectively correct about the Big Questions?
Nope, sorry. I think it is patently obvious that our beliefs about these questions are nowhere near as well justified as the huge body of well-established knowledge that we have tested and confirmed by consensus that spans cultures and ideologies. No reasonable person doubts the LNC. No reasonable person doubts that the Earth orbits the Sun, or the germ theory of disease, or the Pythagorean theorem, or... But huge numbers of reasonable people doubt that the God of Abraham created the Universe in six days, and huge numbers of reasonable people doubt that the Multiverse successfully explains fine-tuning.
RDF: When you define the word such that your idea of volition is built into the definition, any further discussion of volition becomes hopelessly confused. PHIN: I get this. However, if the meaning of volition is at issue, it isn’t question begging to explore and discover how one’s definitions differ.
Defining "choice" as something that is not determined by prior cause and then concluding that human choice is free is like defining "movie star" as "popular film actor with blond hair" and then concluding that all movie stars are blond. Here are the definitions I propose, as I said to Chance: choice: selecting among multiple possibilities free choice: making a choice based on internal states libertarian freedom: the ability to act without antecedent cause; being an uncaused cause I am not wed to these particular definitions, and again there is no such thing as a definition that is right or wrong. However, if you'd like to actually discuss free will, you'll need definitions that do not assume your answer in the definition.
[T]he key point where I think this line of reasoning seems to go astray lies in its faulty understanding of the law of causality, which does not state that “everything needs a cause” but only that “every finite (or contingent) thing needs a cause.” Another way of saying it is that everything does not need a cause, but only every effect needs a cause. Or this: The Law of Cause and Effect states that every material effect must have an adequate antecedent or simultaneous cause.
Yes, this is how theologians (at least the Christian ones I've seen) phrase it, but as I've said this is true merely by definition: What the word "effect" means is something that follows from a cause.
Even Merriam-Webster agrees that the Law of Causation only claims: [E]very change in nature is produced by some cause (emphasis mine)
Yes, this is how I interpret the LoC. What is a "change in nature" if not an event? Instead of arguing over definitions, here is what I have been arguing vis-a-vis free will and causality, as clear as I can make it: Either everything that happens is caused, or some things happen without any cause at all - they just happen sponaneously. Libertarian free will holds that something can happen (namely, a human being can choose to do something) without any cause at all. That's all - you can play around with definitions all you'd like, but in the end libertarianism posits that some things can happen without being caused to happen.
What I find interesting, however, is that you seem perfectly content with your ignorance here while at the same time demanding answers as to how the immaterial could cause things to happen in the material world.
Huh???? Yes I am perfectly content with my ignorance regarding these Big Questions, because I believe admitting ignorance is the most reasonable position in these matters. If you argue for particular answers to these questions, of course I challenge your reasoning, since I think we have no good reasons to believe in any particular answer. I'm not "demanding" you answer, but obviously I'm going to question why you think you can defend your position, right?
To paraphrase G. K. Chesterton, how is it that you know enough about what you don’t know to know that no one else could possibly know it?
Precisely how many protons are in Alpha Centauri? Guess what? I'm sure I don't know, and I'm sure you don't know either! Poor Mr. Chesterton didn't think that one through very well, did he?
It is your certainty that I find, well, amusing. Especially given that your main point in this thread seems to be to question certainty, and your main strategy seems to be to rely on it utterly.
Glad you're amused, but I think it arises from your own persistent confusion. I've said over and over again that I think we are certain about all sorts of things. I have never said anything that challenges the existence of knowledge (justified true belief). I have been extremely clear in saying that there are some Big Questions (and I've listed them repeatedly) that we have no good reason to believe we've answered, and yes, I feel very certain about that. You really wish there was some logical error there, like that my certainty undermined my own conclusion. It's just not the case. In fact, I'm certain that you don't know all sorts of things: 1) If Julius Caesar was alergic to cillantro 2) How many quarters I currently have in my pockets 3) Angelina Jolie's social security number Now, how is it that I can be so sure you don't know these things? How can I possibly be certain of your uncertainty regarding these matters? Isn't that a logical contradiction or something? Uh, no. I'm just very, very certain that you don't know these things. And I'm certain that you don't know the answers to the Big Questions too. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 26, 2013
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scordova, All very well stated and supported - thank you!RDFish
May 26, 2013
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