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Failure to Educate? Failure to Persuade.

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Larry Moran replied to my latest post with an admission of failure. He thinks he has failed to educate, but I think rather he is confusing the word ‘persuade’ with the word ‘educate’.

He thinks I am rationalising junk DNA with a pile of ‘what-ifs’. But the fact is that most of my ‘what-ifs’ are already known to have some basis in reality. I am not denying any obvious reality. Indeed, the basic machinery of life looks like design, far more than when Paley was around. Yes, there could also be a great deal of junk. That’s why I have said a number of times that ID is not committed to the idea that there is no junk.

Yet, from my point of view, I see a whole pile of Darwinian/post-Darwinian materialists who have only partly explored the genome, working from an assumption that the genome was not designed, and thus are jumping the gun on the evidence. For example, Larry still seems to think that pseudogenes are of themselves ‘solid evidence’ of broken genes despite the fact that we know that at least some pseudogenes influence the rate of translation of real genes by competing with them; a simple design reason why there should be ‘false genes’ = pseudogenes. Who has explored the rest of them?

From his emotive response to my perfectly valid, albeit speculative suggestions (though they were not plucked out of the air either), I don’t trust this guy to think clearly and calmly about the possibility of design. That’s the real problem.

—-
Edit 12 May 2013:

Larry’s insistence that pseudogene = ‘broken gene’ comes from a particular way of thinking about biology: thinking of it in terms of a historical narrative rather than simply reporting the facts of what we see now. This affects much of what he talks about, but here I am choosing to focus on pseudogenes. The best way to talk science is to first state facts and provide an explanation, and then let the observer make up his mind, having been educated, and then let the observer attempt his own explanation of the facts. Being clear about what are facts, and what are interpretations, aids this, but Larry does not practice this when dealing with ID.

The facts are that we have many false genes (pseudogenes) that look like strikingly like particular real genes, and that some of them are known to be functional, and some of those are known to operate by regulating their corresponding real genes by generating competing transcripts. One possible history that would arrive at these observations is if a real gene was duplicated and then one copy was broken to make the pseudogene, and that some subsequently ‘discovered’ a function by chance. Larry believes this is the only possible explanation. He asserts ‘pseudogenes are broken genes’, as if true by definition. However, it is not the only explanation if one considers design. A designer might well make a false gene to regulate a real gene in this way. Why not? But Larry doesn’t consider design. He doesn’t even look at the possibility. That’s why he doesn’t understand that pseudogenes are not necessarily broken genes, and thus are not evidence for junk.

Larry was rather snide about computer scientists, as if they don’t understand the fundamentals of biology. Hmmm. I am more of a mathematical physicist than a computer scientist, and it seems to me that Larry doesn’t understand that stories/narratives about genes breaking and then discovering new function, are not enough for those looking for a natural (physical) explanation. I want to see hard probabilities. It seems that biologists are too happy with narrative and don’t realise the importance of probabilities. If you don’t know how to estimate probabilities, I am sure people like Doug Axe and the Biologic Institute could help you.

Comments
F/N 2: This is based on an error:
We can make pronouncements like “Everything has a cause” but that is only a faith statement, it is not formally provable and it can lead to Godelian like incompleteness problems, i.e.:
everything has a cause, therefore there was an uncaused First Cause
This seems like an extremly naive assertion given what we know today about various logical paradoxes. This seems like a naive expression at best, and self-contradictory at worst.
No one seriously argues that everything has a cause, that is self refuting and a misrepresentation. One, often exploited by Dawkins et al. What is argued is that: that which BEGINS TO EXIST, MAY CEASE FROM BEING, OR THE LIKE, has a cause. That is, that which depends on enabling factors, plainly is causally linked, it is second or more, not first. A first cause in the relevant sense would be a necessary being, which was discussed in outline above. It is discussed in more details in context here on. KFkairosfocus
May 25, 2013
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F/N: here is Plato on the subject, in The Laws, BK X: ________ >> Ath. . . . when one thing changes another, and that another, of such will there be any primary changing element? How can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving principle? . . . . self-motion being the origin of all motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second. [[ . . . .] Ath. If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound-how should we describe it? Cle. You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving power life? Ath. I do. Cle. Certainly we should. Ath. And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same-must we not admit that this is life? [[ . . . . ] Cle. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul? Ath. Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things? Cle. Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things. Ath. And is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower number which you may prefer? Cle. Exactly. Ath. Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is the ruler? [[ . . . . ] Ath. If, my friend, we say that the whole path and movement of heaven, and of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path. [[Plato here explicitly sets up an inference to design (by a good soul) from the intelligible order of the cosmos.] >> _________ I t5rust this helps. KFkairosfocus
May 25, 2013
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SC: The issue of first cause does not arise per pulled out of thin air assumption, but per an observation of chains of cause and related contingency. This may be multiplied by an observation on the problem of traversing an infinite chain in succession to reach here, but the question on that side is not necessary, as the whole chain itself needs a support. [Think how one of those line of dominoes exercises requires a handy supportive floor, as an instructive analogy.] In brief summary, a credibly contingent cosmos requires a cause and a mechanical chain of cause-effect bonds cries out for a beginning cause. In that wider context, as is commonly realised, our observed cosmos credibly had a beginning. A multiverse with variable parameters, laws etc is even more radically contingent. That is, our experienced universe is credibly contingent. For, that which begins is dependent on enabling causal factors [think, how a match flame depends on heat, fuel, chain reaction and oxidiser], and is contingent. This brings up the issue highlighted much higher in this thread, that there is a credible class of beings that is not so constrained by enabling factors: necessary beings. Serious candidates to be such -- flying spaghetti monsters being composite entities are not serious, will be either impossible or possible. If impossible, that is because required attributes will stand in mutual contradiction, such as squareness and circularity so that a square circle is impossible. If possible, then there is no such block to existence. Such a being will exist in at least one possible world and as such beings are without beginning or cause, nor can they end, they will be in the actual world we experience as well. (Cf, S5 in logic.) As a simple example consider the truth in 2 + 3 = 5, a proposition. It has no beginning, depends on no physical antecedent to be so, and cannot cease. It is inherently mental and classically it is held to be eternally contemplated by an eternal mind. much more can be said, but at worldviews level which is where we are now, we are looking at overall explanatory constructs, not deductive proofs from axioms accepted by all. Factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power in a context of comparative difficulties provides a context in which one takes a responsible, reasonable view, or if you will, faith. Cf, discussion here on. KFkairosfocus
May 25, 2013
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Ph: I see you are carrying on the good work of actually laying out facts and reasoning. Above, at 269, in light of a useful model by Derek Smith, I summarised a view on how we can have an embodied, minded agent, but decided not to give any particular model for influences beyond being informational and perceptual/sensory etc. The obvious answer is that of quantum level influences that bring up outcomes, joined to shared access to storage. There was a suggestion of microtubules as a viable site some years back, but I am not committed to that. You will observe that, after several times of pointing to such a model, predictably RDF has pointedly ignored it. Similarly, I see where, in the teeth of empirical evidence -- and his own experience of being an agent, and the observation on the difference of performance in creating FSCO/I between agency and what we can show through analysis -- per needles in haystacks and monkeys at keyboards -- that which blind chance and/or mechanical necessity can reasonably do, he still wants to say that the construct, agency is an "assumption." That speaks volumes. I also see how he continues to try to make out that a computer, driven by a deterministic sequence of instructions, executing say a case structure, is making a "choice." Sorry, a computer is just a label for a sophisticated programmable calculator that executes algorithms: blind, step by step sequences of machine actions shaped by a designer towards an end. In fact, that is how most modern serious calculators are built, as small computers. [In the old days, some were hard wired in gate logic etc.] The only genuine choices involved in computers, is in the design and programming involved. And that does not come from the computers. Indeed, where computers are self modifying, unless they are set up to crash, that is very carefully controlled by supervisory algorithms indeed. And, given GIGO, the quality of decision of computer behaviour is no better than the quality of decisions built in at the design and coding point. None of which is news. I must note that if we are simply robots, following programs, we cannot properly reason or responsibly decide we would just be executing algorithms dependent on specification of detailed step by step sequences. That brings up how rich human creativity is yet another sign of how we are not programmed. If that were not so, both art and rational discourse would be pointless, utterly predictable up to some blind stochastic distribution, and revealingly so. Here is a summary on the topic, again; by somebody who has rolled his own so to speak. (Which summary I predict he will either silently ignore yet again, or will find some excuse to run away from.) Of course, you may incorporate a genuinely random component in such a system, but all that does is it runs up against the FSCO/I limit. Agency is real as an experienced, observed factor in the world, one that has capabilities that are radically different from those of bland chance and/or mechanical necessity. Indeed the very act of composing a long post in English text is a manifestation of that difference;as such is a cap[ital instance of FSCO/I. This gets us back to the point that the design view is of fundamental importance and relevance in a current scientific worldview that is moving beyond scientism. Look, even Wiki on choice is illuminating:
Choice consists of the mental process of judging the merits of multiple options and selecting one or more of them. While a choice can be made between imagined options ("what would I do if ...?"), often a choice is made between real options and followed by the corresponding action. For example, a route for a journey is chosen based on the preference of arriving at a given destination as soon as possible. The preferred (and therefore chosen) route is then derived from information about how long each of the possible routes take. This can be done by a route planner. If the preference is more complex, such as involving the scenery of the route, cognition and feeling are more intertwined, and the choice is less easy to delegate to a computer program or assistant. More complex examples (often decisions that affect what a person thinks or their core beliefs) include choosing a lifestyle, religious affiliation, or political position. Most people regard having choices as a good thing, though a severely limited or artificially restricted choice can lead to discomfort with choosing and possibly, an unsatisfactory outcome.
In short, the basic concept involved in choice implies agency. Wiki on that -- testifying against ideological interest and known inclination -- is helpful too:
In philosophy and sociology, agency is the capacity of an agent (a person or other entity, human or any living being in general, or soul-consciousness in religion) to act in a world. The capacity to act does not at first imply a specific moral dimension to the ability to make the choice to act, and moral agency is therefore a distinct concept. In sociology, an agent is an individual engaging with the social structure. Notably, though, the primacy of social structure vs. individual capacity with regard to persons' actions is debated within sociology. This debate concerns, at least partly, the level of reflexivity an agent may possess. Agency may either be classified as unconscious, involuntary behavior, or purposeful, goal directed activity (intentional action). An agent typically has some sort of immediate awareness of his physical activity and the goals that the activity is aimed at realizing. In ‘goal directed action’ an agent implements a kind of direct control or guidance over their own behavior.
Wiki on mind, in a surprisingly balanced introduction on such a potentially loaded topic, also helps set a context:
A mind (pron.: /?ma?nd/) is the set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory—a characteristic of humans, but which also may apply to other life forms.[3][4] A long tradition of inquiries in philosophy, religion, psychology and cognitive science has sought to develop an understanding of what mind is and what are its distinguishing properties. The main questions regarding the nature of mind is its relation to the physical brain and nervous system – a question which is often framed as the Mind-body problem, which considers whether mind is somehow separate from physical existence (dualism and idealism[5]), deriving from and reducible to physical phenomena such as neurological processes (physicalism), or whether the mind is identical with the brain or some activity of the brain.[6] Another question concerns which types of beings are capable of having minds, for example whether mind is exclusive to humans, possessed also by some or all animals, by all living things, or whether mind can also be a property of some types of man-made machines. Whatever its relation to the physical body it is generally agreed that mind is that which enables a being to have subjective awareness and intentionality towards their environment, to perceive and respond to stimuli with some kind of agency, and to have consciousness, including thinking and feeling.[3][7]
So, the pretence that we have been talking in simplistic, unduly certain circles, is manifestly wrong to the point of being a strawmannish caricature. Notice, what we have seen above is an attempt to undermine first principles of right reason and now the very existence and reality of what we manifestly are, intelligent, choosing, purposeful designing, effecting agents. That speaks volumes on the want of credibility and soundness in the typical patterns of thought among those indoctrinated into the evolutionary materialist scheme of scientism. So, let us draw lessons form what we are seeing, and understand how important such is in breaking the bewitchment that has so much of our civilisation locked up in ideologically enforced absurdities. KFkairosfocus
May 25, 2013
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Regarding the question of first cause and causality note this entry regarding General Relativity:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmic_censorship_hypothesis Since the physical behavior of singularities is unknown, if singularities can be observed from the rest of spacetime, causality may break down, and physics may lose its predictive power. The issue cannot be avoided, since according to the Penrose-Hawking singularity theorems, singularities are inevitable in physically reasonable situations.
It's possible, based on our incomplete understanding of reality, that we can't make the argument from FIRST CAUSE completely airtight. I think it is a reasonable assumption, but assuming something is true is not a proof. Problematic, imho, is that if one invokes "free will" the absolute determinism required to defend the FIRST CAUSE argument starts to break down. It would superfically violate non-contradiction, or at least make the law of non-contradiction hard to apply. Finally the assumption that everyting has a cause is only an assumption, like the axioms of mathematics, they are only assumptions and only God knows if that assumption is ultimately true or whether our language can ultimately describe reality in such simplistic terms. There is meaning, and we can meaningfully communicate, but just not completely and exhaustively. We can make pronouncements like "Everything has a cause" but that is only a faith statement, it is not formally provable and it can lead to Godelian like incompleteness problems, i.e.:
everything has a cause, therefore there was an uncaused First Cause
This seems like an extremly naive assertion given what we know today about various logical paradoxes. This seems like a naive expression at best, and self-contradictory at worst. This is like the Russel Paradox
, the barber paradox supposes a barber who shaves all men who do not shave themselves and only men who do not shave themselves. When one thinks about whether the barber should shave himself or not, the paradox begins to emerge.
Now with respect to absolute determinism, it was shocking that there were realms in mathematics that could not be decided deterministically. We call these undecidable statements which are the result of incompleteness. Curiously you are free to assert one statement as true or false according to your free will, and it will be so! Example from math:
Based on field axioms, objects within systems that satisfy Field Axioms have square roots that are within the system
This cannot be proven as true or false from the starting premises. You can assume the statement as true or false and create a truth out of the air. You can make the claim true, or false, or leave it undecided. Free will indeed where deterministic answers are not possible! Distressing also was that it was shown, even with an infinitely powerful computational engine, logic alone within a finitistic framework could not resolve certain questions (I gave examples above). NOTES: rational numbers form a field real numbers form a field The quesiton of square roots is true if one models a field by the real numbers and false if one models a field by rational numbers. The problem is one cannot begin with the premises of the field axioms and actually say which model is "right" with respect to the question of square roots. The problem is that you have to hypothesize (as in assume) something with or without the square-root properties of the real or rational numbers. Those assumptions are not deterministic consequences of the field axioms but are assumptions that are free-will independent of the field axioms.scordova
May 25, 2013
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Thanks, Chance.Phinehas
May 25, 2013
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Phinehas, RE your #294:
RDFish wrote, "But when I say the computer chose a number between one and ten, you understand what I mean just fine – so it really is not meaningless at all – it means “select from among options”. Phinehas replied, "Right. And when I hold up a big blue ball and say, “this is the earth,” and a ping pong ball next to it and say, “this is the moon,” you also understand what I mean just fine. We are all quite adept at both using and interpreting metaphors. Anthropomorphisms and reifications are part of our everyday conversations, but that doesn’t mean they’ll hold up as proper definitions in a real argument."
Very well said. Thanks.Chance Ratcliff
May 25, 2013
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Hey RDF:
But when I say the computer chose a number between one and ten, you understand what I mean just fine – so it really is not meaningless at all – it means “select from among options”.
Right. And when I hold up a big blue ball and say, "this is the earth," and a ping pong ball next to it and say, "this is the moon," you also understand what I mean just fine. We are all quite adept at both using and interpreting metaphors. Anthropomorphisms and reifications are part of our everyday conversations, but that doesn't mean they'll hold up as proper definitions in a real argument.
When you define the word such that your idea of volition is built into the definition, any further discussion of volition becomes hopelessly confused.
I get this. However, if the meaning of volition is at issue, it isn't question begging to explore and discover how one's definitions differ.
We might incarcerate both to keep them from harming others, but we do so punitively only with the former because we wish to alter both their future behavior and the behavior of others who see the result. Punishing mentally deficient people would not serve those goals.
How so? Are you conflating operant conditioning and punishment? Why? Or why not?
Phin: But what if they were these things? Now you are suddenly in need of more than excellent reasons for you not to be nihilistic and amoral. For the sake of your continued happiness, you require convincing reasons for them not to be nihilistic and amoral. Do you have any such reasons to offer them?
RDF: No, I don’t. I do not know if religious prostelytizing helps people act better or not – it’s a complicated sociological question that I don’t know has been answered conclusively.
Religious proselytizing? Where'd that come from? There is nothing in what I wrote that even hints at religious proselytization. It appears you've simply decided that where I said, "convincing reason," I must have meant,"religious proselytization," instead. Why would you do that? Do you consider it a pejorative? Did you suppose slipping it in would distract others from the fact that, if you'd stuck with the terms I used, your reply would make little sense? No, I don’t. I do not know if having a convincing reason to do so helps people act better or not.
This is merely a definition of causality, not a statement of the Law of Causality, which says that every event must be caused.
Where? Where does it say this? You keep asserting this while at the same time failing to provide any evidence that this is the case. What I am finding tends to contradict what you are saying.
[T]he key point where I think this line of reasoning seems to go astray lies in its faulty understanding of the law of causality, which does not state that “everything needs a cause” but only that “every finite (or contingent) thing needs a cause.” Another way of saying it is that everything does not need a cause, but only every effect needs a cause.
Or this:
The Law of Cause and Effect states that every material effect must have an adequate antecedent or simultaneous cause.
Even Merriam-Webster agrees that the Law of Causation only claims:
[E]very change in nature is produced by some cause (emphasis mine)
RDF: If immaterial causes make things happen in the material world, then the question arises, how can that possibly happen? PHIN: Yes, that is indeed an interesting question. On the other hand, the existence of the universe suggests the very possibility of this sort of thing, doesn’t it?
RDFI’m sure people here will call me a liar and a trickster and whatever else, but the honest truth is I have no idea how the universe came to exist... (emphasis in the original)
I believe you! What I find interesting, however, is that you seem perfectly content with your ignorance here while at the same time demanding answers as to how the immaterial could cause things to happen in the material world. Maybe you are just very, very, very skeptical.
...and I’m sure nobody else does either. (emphasis in the original)
Oops! Or maybe not! What happened to the skepticism? To paraphrase G. K. Chesterton, how is it that you know enough about what you don't know to know that no one else could possibly know it? You see, I don't really have any problem with your skepticism. It is your certainty that I find, well, amusing. Especially given that your main point in this thread seems to be to question certainty, and your main strategy seems to be to rely on it utterly.
My position is that when it comes to these Big Questions, it is ALL logically problematic!!!.
Are you certain?
Our common sense and intuitions and basic understand of space and time and material and causality just are not up to the task of dealing with the origin of the universe.
Are you certain?
Phin: Whence space-time if not from outside space-time? You can’t just drop back and do a logical punt at that point while at the same time insisting that I explain how the immaterial can be and antecedent cause the material. Tackle the problem of where the material came from in the first place and maybe you’ll have your answer!
RDF: Nobody can do this – we have no answer
Are you certain?Phinehas
May 25, 2013
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RDFish @283, sorry I'm on a roll:
Premise: For all X, if X is a computer, then X is the product of agency.
You are assuming without warrant that “agency” refers to something beyond chance and necessity.
No, I'm proposing that "agency" can produce computers, period. This is unassailable fact. Here's the part you left out: Falsification: There exists an X such that X is a computer and X is the verifiable result of chance and necessity. That's the part we're missing. Again, this is not impossible, it's just not in evidence, nor is any principle which could establish the falsification. This constitutes the warrant: 100% of cases in evidence are verifiable products of intentional design. 0.0% of cases are available to call it into question.Chance Ratcliff
May 25, 2013
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RDFish @283, I need to respond to this now so I don't forget:
Demonstrate that either: a) complex and specified systems such as computers and their programs can come about via chance and necessity; or b) the agents which produce them can come about via chance and necessity.
??? I am not talking about how these “agents” come to exist. (BTW let’s call them “human beings”, OK? If not – what other “agents” are you talking about in our uniform and repeated experience?). I am taking about how we think.
I intended that ontological provision to allow another logical way to account for deterministic reduction. If intelligent agents can be begotten by chance and necessity, or if their unique effects can be accounted for by chance and necessity, then we can credit chance and necessity with the whole shebang. It's a twofer. ;)Chance Ratcliff
May 25, 2013
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RDFish @286,
"No, it most certainly does NOT need a halting condition, which is precisely why I said LOOP FOREVER."
If you have no halting condition, then you can't be reading the "same input" unless you're just iterating over identical values. This is not the same thing. Run program X with input Y. Observe output. Run program X again with input Y. Observe output. If the program is deterministic, the output for both runs will be the same. (Pseudorandom number generator notwithstanding.) If we should switch gears and talk about your "running forever" technicality, then it should be made clear that you're taking a single stream of input continuously, and not a single stream of input multiple times from an initial state. You're program needs to halt and restart in order to test for determinism. I supplied the definitions, but wiggle out of this if you can.
"You said a deterministic program will always give the same output for the same input, and you were 100% wrong."
Without any theoretical gymnastics about never-ending program execution, I am 100% right.
A human doesn’t reboot either, Chance!!"
Bingo. Computers reboot, people do not. How can you test for deterministic output if you never restart the program? Which computer programs never restart? And if they never restart, how can deterministic output be validated or refuted? Now you could say that a human person never reboots, so we could never in principle test for determinism. I agree with that techicality. So where does that leave us? It leaves us here: we cannot equate a computer program with human behavior because they are fundamentally incomparable.
"Good discussion all! Must go out for the remainder of the evening, but looking forward to continuing!"
OK, I need to break from this thread also. Best, ChanceChance Ratcliff
May 25, 2013
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RDFish
It isn’t a matter of me not liking these references; it is rather than libertarianism per se is not predicated on a First Cause.
Once a philosophical discussion about causality is on the table, a First Cause cannot be avoided. It is always relevant to and necessary for the topic. If you have a phobia about the First Cause, then you might be more at peace by avoiding discussions of causality altogether.
In my view, things that happen spontaneously without any cause violate causality, period, and you disagree. I suggest we leave it at that.
Who or what, in your judgment, is the cause of your actions? Why should people be held accountable for their actions if they are not the cause of those actions?
You mischaracterize my position completely.
How could I mischaracterize your position? You have no position (except the position that you should have no position).
I can list as many things we are certain about as you’d like.
If you are not certain that a brick wall cannot appear in front of your moving automobile without any reason (and you aren't), then you are wasting your certitude on the wrong things.
But nobody ought to be certain about why there is something rather than nothing, nor how the universe came to exist, nor how life came to exist on Earth, nor how brains are related to conscious minds, nor if mental causality is ontologically distinct, and so on.
Are you certain about that?StephenB
May 25, 2013
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RDFish @284,
"READ WHAT I WRITE. I did not say ALL pronouncements are uncertain. I said JUST THE OPPOSITE. READ WHAT I WRITE."
Well at least we know that the pronouncement "all pronouncements are uncertain" is uncertain. :PChance Ratcliff
May 25, 2013
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RDFish @283,
"You are assuming without warrant that “agency” refers to something beyond chance and necessity."
I supplied the warrant. What is your warrant that they do not? On what evidentiary grounds can we infer that chance and necessity beget agency, or that agency is reducible to such? By the way, there's nothing spooky about the term agency. You can take it for a synonym for human if you so choose.Chance Ratcliff
May 25, 2013
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RDFish,
"I am really trying to settle on a set of definitions that will be clear and allow us to discuss the issues without taking past each other because we mean different things by these terms."
That is appreciated.
My computer keeps trying to connect to the internet but can’t. The word processor keeps forgetting what I set my margins to. My car doesn’t want to start this morning. :)
Trying, forgetting, wanting: anthropomorphisms. :D
“Saying Deep Blue doesn’t think about chess is like saying airplanes can’t fly because they can’t flap their wings” – Drew McDermott
I have to say that equating thinking with calculating looks a lot like a category error. This type of thinking presumes material reductionism.
choice: selecting among multiple possibilities free choice: making a choice based on internal states libertarian freedom: the ability to act without antecedent cause; being an uncaused cause ... Yes, using my definitions the coin sorter makes choices. ... Using my definitions the choices are determined by the unchanging structure of the sorter and the coins, since the sorter has no internal states. So the coin sorter does not make free choices.
I think that "choices are determined" might be too much like a contradiction, but I won't nitpick too much. ;) However your "free choice" definition necessitates determinism, since the entity's internal state will determine the output predictably and reliably. You need nondeterministic state switching in order to produce nondeterministic output. In addition, the coin sorter does have an internal state, it's just constant, and so unarguably deterministic. Another coin sorter with a different internal state will produce different, but constant, output. In other words, it seems that coin sorters can make free choices by your definition. In the interest of fair engagement, let me try some variations to your definitions: choice: a selection among multiple possibilities determined: necessary -- neither impossible nor contingent free: not determined nor random I suspect you might take issue with those, but I thought I'd take a stab at it anyway. The above definitions allow nondeterministic causes that are not random, which is something I found lacking in your definitions. I suspect that your issue would be that it begs the question to call human choices "free", but that can be resolved by attributing no such qualifier to "choices". Now the term choice can be qualified as either determined or free.Chance Ratcliff
May 25, 2013
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Hi Chance, Ok one more quick point :-)
Yes I’m being serious. “Loop forever” sounds good, but your program needs a halting condition.
No, it most certainly does NOT need a halting condition, which is precisely why I said LOOP FOREVER.
If human behavior can be reduced to deterministic factors, either demonstrate the causal chain, the logical necessity, or that human behavior is constant given identical stimulus; otherwise you’re just being contrary.
I'm not being contrary, I'm being correct. You said a deterministic program will always give the same output for the same input, and you were 100% wrong. A human doesn't reboot either, Chance!! We start with our initial settings, and just keep experiencing and changing until we die! No "halting and restarting" No reset button! Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 25, 2013
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Good discussion all! Must go out for the remainder of the evening, but looking forward to continuing! Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 25, 2013
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That sure sounds dogmatic. Have you ever argued against that proposition, I mean, since you take issue with all such dogmatic pronouncements?
READ WHAT I WRITE. I did not say ALL pronouncements are uncertain. I said JUST THE OPPOSITE. READ WHAT I WRITE.RDFish
May 25, 2013
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Hi Chance,
I’m not speaking in terms of beliefs. I’m speaking in terms of evidence. I do not declare it categorically, I establish it based on warrant derived from direct observation.
I don't know what you mean. Please explain how one can demonstrate that human minds transcend physical cause.
Demonstrate that either: a) complex and specified systems such as computers and their programs can come about via chance and necessity; or b) the agents which produce them can come about via chance and necessity.
??? I am not talking about how these "agents" come to exist. (BTW let's call them "human beings", OK? If not - what other "agents" are you talking about in our uniform and repeated experience?). I am taking about how we think. You believe that when we think, our minds operate in a way that is not bound by physical law, i.e. it transcends chance and necessity. This has nothing to do with how humans came to exist in the first place. The point is, we have no way of demonstrating that intelligence is anything but chance and necessity! The point has been debated for a few thousand years so far, but nobody has found a way to answer it definitively.
Premise: For all X, if X is a computer, then X is the product of agency.
You are assuming without warrant that "agency" refers to something beyond chance and necessity. It may be that our minds operate according to something beyond chance and necessity, or maybe they don't. Nobody knows. Most neuroscientists believe that our minds operate only according to chance + necessity, but some disagree. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 25, 2013
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RDFish @277,
"But nobody ought to be certain about why there is something rather than nothing, nor how the universe came to exist, nor how life came to exist on Earth, nor how brains are related to conscious minds, nor if mental causality is ontologically distinct, and so on."
That sure sounds dogmatic. Have you ever argued against that proposition, I mean, since you take issue with all such dogmatic pronouncements? :)Chance Ratcliff
May 25, 2013
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RDFish @277,
Moreover, a program is deterministic if it will produce identical output on identical input. Barring actual randomness, this is true and demonstrable for computer programs.
You are being serious? I disprove your statement thus: X = 1 LOOP FOREVER { Y = input() Z = Y + X PRINT Z X = X + 1 } This is deterministic and always produces different output on identical input.
Yes I'm being serious. "Loop forever" sounds good, but your program needs a halting condition. And when it halts and restarts, it will produce the same output, given that the input read into Y is constant. Period. Deterministic Algorithm:
"In computer science, a deterministic algorithm is an algorithm which, given a particular input, will always produce the same output, with the underlying machine always passing through the same sequence of states. Deterministic algorithms are by far the most studied and familiar kind of algorithm, as well as one of the most practical, since they can be run on real machines efficiently. Formally, a deterministic algorithm computes a mathematical function; a function has a unique value for any given input, and the algorithm is a process that produces this particular value as output."
So real-world, non-theoretical, practical programs are deterministic, and by definition, cannot make "free choices" as long as "free" is defined to be nondeterministic. In the set of all nondeterministic phenomena (contingent phenomena, neither necessary nor impossible) we have elements produced by chance and elements produced by agency. It might sound enlightened to say, "Well we really don't know if agency is nondeterministic," except that by any definition of deterministic, it's clear that intelligent agents do not behave that way. If human behavior can be reduced to deterministic factors, either demonstrate the causal chain, the logical necessity, or that human behavior is constant given identical stimulus; otherwise you're just being contrary.Chance Ratcliff
May 25, 2013
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No. I think there are a set of Big Question that have been pondered and debated by the most intelligent human beings that have ever lived over thousands of years, without ever producing anything remotely resembling a consensus. I object to people who believe that whatever they happen to think might be the answers to these question are obviously and clearly and objectively correct, and anyone who disagrees must be hiding from the truth or irrational or stupid or lying.
But you wouldn't include the Law of Non-contradiction in those Big Questions, because it is obviously and clearly and objectively correct, correct? And the same would hold true for the basic Laws of Reason, correct? And it would also hold true for the notion that every effect has a cause, correct? Maybe you could clarify exactly what Big Questions you are talking about. And perhaps more to the point, why does the following not qualify as a Big Question? Is it possible for someone to be obviously and clearly and objectively correct about the Big Questions?Phinehas
May 25, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
RDF: A definition is not something one can agree with or not. PHIN: Of course it is! It is especially something with which you can agree with or not when you’ve asked my what my definition is.
Wow it really is hard to communicate sometimes, huh? My point was that definitions cannot be true or false. We might disagree about what definition is in most common usage perhaps, but it makes no sense to say a definition is right or wrong. You are perfectly free to define "dog" as a scaly worm that lives underwater, and your definition would not be false; it would simply be at odds with how everybody else uses the word "dog" to refer to that lovable species of furry quadrupeds.
Please think about what you are saying, RDF. You asked how I defined choice. I told you. For me, calling something a “choice” when it is merely the determined effect of some amalgamation of causes is meaningless.
But when I say the computer chose a number between one and ten, you understand what I mean just fine - so it really is not meaningless at all - it means "select from among options".
When you’ve asked me for how I define “choice,” it is not begging the question for me to give an honest answer.
Again, this has nothing to do with honesty or correctness! It has to do with crafting definitions so that we can discuss these issues without confusion. When you define the word such that your idea of volition is built into the definition, any further discussion of volition becomes hopelessly confused.
But I suppose an equally interesting question would be why we punish humans that are morally deficient but not ones that are mentally deficient.
We might incarcerate both to keep them from harming others, but we do so punitively only with the former because we wish to alter both their future behavior and the behavior of others who see the result. Punishing mentally deficient people would not serve those goals.
But what if they were these things? Now you are suddenly in need of more than excellent reasons for you not to be nihilistic and amoral. For the sake of your continued happiness, you require convincing reasons for them not to be nihilistic and amoral. Do you have any such reasons to offer them?
No, I don't. I do not know if religious prostelytizing helps people act better or not - it's a complicated sociological question that I don't know has been answered conclusively. It certainly may be true. None of this has anything to do with actually believing in God of course.
RDF (WIKI): Causality (also referred to as causation[1]) is the relation between an event (the cause) and a second event (the effect), where the second event is understood as a consequence of the first. PHIN: I do not think this definition says what you think it says. Maybe you should read it again more closely. You’ll find it supports my view and not yours. It may use the word “event,” but it is certainly not saying that every event has a cause.
No, Phin - I quoted this to show that causality had to do with events, because you said I kept using the word "events" rather than "effects". This is merely a definition of causality, not a statement of the Law of Causality, which says that every event must be caused.
In other words, every effect has a cause.
Again, this is true by definition: An effect is an event that occurs due to some cause. The Law of Causality simply says every event has a cause; in other words, the Law of Causality says that every event is an effect.
RDF: If immaterial causes make things happen in the material world, then the question arises, how can that possibly happen? PHIN: Yes, that is indeed an interesting question. On the other hand, the existence of the universe suggests the very possibility of this sort of thing, doesn’t it?
I'm sure people here will call me a liar and a trickster and whatever else, but the honest truth is I have no idea how the universe came to exist, and I'm sure nobody else does either.
Maybe when we figure out how the material world can emerge from no-material, we’ll better understand how no-material might cause material things to happen.
Indeed yes. Or maybe our minds can't actually understand these things - who knows? Mice can't understand calculus no matter how long they study.
Phin: If willful choices are outside space-time, it makes no sense to talk about them having a cause. RDF: Nor does it make sense to talk about them being antecdent causes for anything else! Phin: Of course it does! What makes no sense is ignoring the fact that everything inside space-time does have an antecedent cause and pretending like an infinite regress of antecedent causes isn’t logically problematic!
My position is that when it comes to these Big Questions, it is ALL logically problematic!!!. Our common sense and intuitions and basic understand of space and time and material and causality just are not up to the task of dealing with the origin of the universe. They aren't even adequate to understand what happens when a beam of light shines through two slits in a physics lab!
Whence space-time if not from outside space-time? You can’t just drop back and do a logical punt at that point while at the same time insisting that I explain how the immaterial can be and antecedent cause the material. Tackle the problem of where the material came from in the first place and maybe you’ll have your answer!
Nobody can do this - we have no answer.
RDF: I disagree. [When] something performs an arithmetic calculation like calculators and adding machines do, there is no selecting from among multiple options. The machine comes up with the one correct answer (if it is functioning correctly!). In contrast, a computer can choose from among multiple options. PHIN: No it can’t! In a switch{} statement, there is only one correct execution path to the exact same degree as in a calculator.
You are missing the critical difference: A Turing machine (a stored-program computer) has internal states that can affect processing; an adding machine does not).
Out of curiosity, what would you say is the difference between a computer that is malfunctioning and one that is choosing?
Using my definitions, a computer makes choices whether or not is is malfunctioning - as long as the selection among options is based on internal state.
Put another way, if a computer can choose, how can it be said to be malfunctioning? It just chose to do something unexpected, right?
Interesting question, and at the heart of the discipline of automated software testing. My point though was about calculators/adding machines, which can easily be tested against the rules of arithmetic. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 25, 2013
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RDFish,
CR: We should be clear on this point. Humans design and construct things that are categorically distinct from what material cause and effect is known to accomplish.
You have begged the question yet again. One of the controversial issues we’re discussing is whether or not human mentality transcends material cause and effect. You believe it does; most neuroscientists actually believe it does not. I believe that the question is open. However, you simply declare categorically that human abilities transcend material cause and effect. You may be right and you may be wrong, but it is certainly not a known fact either way.
I'm not speaking in terms of beliefs. I'm speaking in terms of evidence. I do not declare it categorically, I establish it based on warrant derived from direct observation. Demonstrate that either: a) complex and specified systems such as computers and their programs can come about via chance and necessity; or b) the agents which produce them can come about via chance and necessity. If the above cannot be demonstrated empirically (or logically for that matter), then it cannot be presumed true. This is straightforward. Warrant exists via uniform and repeated experience to reject both a and b provisionally. Let me be clear. I'm not claiming that either proposition is logically impossible. I'm saying that the truth of propositions a and b can be rejected on evidence. Premise: For all X, if X is a computer, then X is the product of agency. Falsification: There exists an X such that X is a computer and X is the verifiable result of chance and necessity. Replace "computer" above with airplane, automobile, machine tools, smart phones, or any other form of technology specifically associated with human creative activity and you'll get the same result. It becomes quite apparent, not on logical impossibility but based on evidentiary warrant that a category of effects exists which are not amenable to material necessity. The assumption that physical causal chains can account for all observed phenomena is a supposition which is not warranted by evidence. Please explain why this should take precedence over uniform and repeated experience, i.e., direct observation. Explain why physical necessity should be the default assumption until it is proved impossible. If you cannot establish the truth of a and b, then you have no cause to presume that agency is not a unique causal force apart from physical law.Chance Ratcliff
May 25, 2013
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Hi Chance,
RDF: The problem of free will is this: Are the choices that humans make determined or are they not? By definining the word “choice” to mean “not determined”, you are begging the question by assuming your position in the wording of the question. CR: Aren’t we talking about “free” choices? That was the claim I objected to (not that I’m sure there’s a distinction).
I am really trying to settle on a set of definitions that will be clear and allow us to discuss the issues without taking past each other because we mean different things by these terms. Here is what I propose: choice: selecting among multiple possibilities free choice: making a choice based on internal states libertarian freedom: the ability to act without antecedent cause; being an uncaused cause I am not wed to these particular definitions. However, by insisting that the word "choice" already mean "libertarian free choice", you assume your position (libertarianism) in your definition.
In this case, how can a choice be both free and determined? As a matter of fact, how can a choice be determined at all, and still be called a choice? I’d like you to be clear about what you’re claiming. You said computers make free choices. Yet if a choice is determined, it isn’t free.
Just look how confused your definition makes this conversation: You say Yet if a choice is determined, it isn’t free. But by your own definition, if a choice is determined then it can't even be called a choice, much less a free choice. Using my definitions, we would agree that computers make free choices, but not libertarian choices. If you would like to propose a different set of definitions, please do, but make sure we can consistently express things that actually do happen, as when a computer chooses a number based on internal states and incoming data.
RDF: Computer programs are not entirely determined unless you can show that input from the rest of the world is entirely determined as well. (I’m sure you know that said input can dynamically change the computer’s programming as well as its output). CR: This is simply not the case. Computers don’t take their input from any-and-every source in the world. Programs typically...
Eh? We are talking about foundational issues regarding causality and volition, and you respond by talking about how programs are typically constructed and used? That is utterly irrelevant. What is relevant is what we know to be true in principle, and in principle, computers (like people) may well receive input from anything at all!
Programs map inputs to outputs. They do this deterministically.
If the universe is deterministic, then this is true; otherwise it is false.
If you’re claiming that programs which execute on computer systems are generally not deterministic, it’s a claim you’ll need to provide evidence for.
It is utterly irrelevant what computer systems are generally. We are discussing what computer systems are fundamentally, theoretically, in principle.
Moreover, a program is deterministic if it will produce identical output on identical input. Barring actual randomness, this is true and demonstrable for computer programs.
You are being serious? I disprove your statement thus: X = 1 LOOP FOREVER { Y = input() Z = Y + X PRINT Z X = X + 1 } This is deterministic and always produces different output on identical input.
I think you need to be more clear on what constitutes “free” in the context of determinism, and whether there is any distinction to be made between choices and free choices.
We need to be clear, yes, which is why I have been attempting to settle on terminology that is clear and non-question-begging. RDF: My definition of “choice” is: A selection from among options that is determined by factors internal to the choosing entity SB: If actual choices can be made deterministically, then there are other entities which fit the above definition. For instance, a coin sorter, which takes multiple types of coins as input and sorts them into stacks of like type, makes choices under your definition. Yes, using my definitions the coin sorter makes choices.
Are these free choices or determined outcomes?
Using my definitions the choices are determined by the unchanging structure of the sorter and the coins, since the sorter has no internal states. So the coin sorter does not make free choices.
The problem with abandoning randomness is that it’s the only way to simulate something akin to capriciousness, which is a component of human choices.
Not at all. Look at my program above. Instead of a single state variable, X, imagine immense multi-dimensional data structures dynamically interacting with the environment, where the environment is so complex we don't even know if it is deterministic or not. We don't need randomness, no.
RDF: This whole burden of proof thing arises from this: We all know that such a thing as deterministic causality happens, and we can demonstrate and observe it (unless you’d like to bring Hume’s critique of causality in at this point here – but I’d rather not). You are claiming that human beings (and perhaps dogs? or dolphins?) have some special form of causality that is ontologically distinct from all other causes we can observe. So it is up to you do support this claim.” CR: We should be clear on this point. Humans design and construct things that are categorically distinct from what material cause and effect is known to accomplish.
You have begged the question yet again. One of the controversial issues we're discussing is whether or not human mentality transcends material cause and effect. You believe it does; most neuroscientists actually believe it does not. I believe that the question is open. However, you simply declare categorically that human abilities transcend material cause and effect. You may be right and you may be wrong, but it is certainly not a known fact either way.
Again, you’re attempting to offload the burden of proof inappropriately. It is you who needs to show that either a) necessity (physical law) and/or chance is just as capable of building things as humans are; or b) that the activity of human beings is reducible to describable physical laws. You can do neither. Your blanket skepticism is not a substitute for the observable evidence.
1) I do not have "blanket skepticism" 2) We can demonstrate the operation of physical law 3) We cannot demonstrate the operation of immaterial, contra-causal mental causation 4) Thus, The burden of proof is on one who claims that humans transcend physical cause This renders incoherent your arguments regarding the insufficiency of chance + necessity to produce complex form and function. We know that humans produce complex machines, and we do not know how we do it. Perhaps our brains work entirely according to physical law, just like most neuroscientists say they do. In that case, complex machines are indeed the result of nothing except chance + necessity. Alternatively, perhaps you are correct, and human minds transcend chance + necessity. You, however, simply assume that your view is correct, and proceed to argue from that assumption as though you are arguing from fact.
Programs can rewrite data files (or even their own code) which will modify subsequent program behavior, but this too is deterministic.
It is only deterministic if the rest of the universe is deterministic. If the input that affects program rewrites is non-deterministic, then the dynamic programming is also deterministic.
RDF: Their programming at any given time is the result of their initial state, their experiences, and all of the changes and learning they have undergone… just like people. CR: So much for skepticism You said so yourself, “Of course computers do not operate anything remotely like humans do!”
Yes, that is correct (but you can leave out the comments about skepticism - they are irrelevant). Computers do not operate like humans - obviously on a physical level they are radically disimilar, and it is clear from cognitive psychological data that humans do not reason anything like computers, at least for the tasks that computers currently can do. My point was just as I said: With regard to being the result of initial state + experience + dynamic changes, they are just like people.
Computer don’t experience, they don’t perceive, and they don’t learn.
There you go again using question-begging definitions for your words! How can you say computers don't learn, when graduate degrees are granted in the discipline of machine learning?!?! I guess you are trying to say that if computers are not conscious of what they perceive and learn then it doesn't count. I agree computers are not conscious. But stop defining these words in such a way that we can't even ask the interesting questions!!
Never write software that anthropomorphizes the machine. They hate that. — Unknown
"Saying Deep Blue doesn't think about chess is like saying airplanes can't fly because they can't flap their wings" - Drew McDermott My computer keeps trying to connect to the internet but can't. The word processor keeps forgetting what I set my margins to. My car doesn't want to start this morning. :-)
So your problem is that people hold beliefs for what they consider to be good reasons, and argue as if those beliefs are true?
No. I think there are a set of Big Question that have been pondered and debated by the most intelligent human beings that have ever lived over thousands of years, without ever producing anything remotely resembling a consensus. I object to people who believe that whatever they happen to think might be the answers to these question are obviously and clearly and objectively correct, and anyone who disagrees must be hiding from the truth or irrational or stupid or lying.
And if so, are you ever openly skeptical of the proposition that nobody can be sure about anything? I assert that it’s dogmatic of you to claim that we cannot be reasonably certain about what we profess and believe.
I never claim that we cannot be reasonably certain about all sorts of things of course! We are all very certain about an infinite number of things. We ought not pretend to be certain about these difficult, complex questions (origins, volition, ontology, etc) that have been debated endlessly thoughout history without ever reaching resolution. Even theists dramatically disagree with each other on these issues!
It sounds like you’re strongly agnostic, in which case you should be defending strong agnosticism, not just any ol’ proposition which suggests itself to be a true description of some aspect of reality.
Yes, on these Big Questions I am strongly agnostic (or, often more accurately, I believe the questions are not framed in such a way that there is a possible true answer). And so I argue against people who believe they know the answers to these questions. Go ahead and try me - argue that evolutionary biology explains the existence of eyeballs and the immune system, and I'll show you I am an equal opportunity criticizer of unfounded dogma.
It’s easier to poke holes then to plug them; it’s easier to cast doubt than to inspire confidence; and it’s easier to destroy something than to construct it.
I never claimed to be doing anything hard! I just claim to be saying something true: Nobody knows the answers to these Big Questions.
You should try plugging some holes, and tell us why it’s more reasonable to doubt everything than affirm anything.
You mischaracterize my position completely. I can list as many things we are certain about as you'd like. But nobody ought to be certain about why there is something rather than nothing, nor how the universe came to exist, nor how life came to exist on Earth, nor how brains are related to conscious minds, nor if mental causality is ontologically distinct, and so on. We just don't know the answers to those particular questions, and I think it is really important to admit that to ourselves and each other. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 25, 2013
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Hi StephenB,
If you don’t like references about God, we can simply refer to the First Cause. The argument is the same.
It isn't a matter of me not liking these references; it is rather than libertarianism per se is not predicated on a First Cause. Your particular view that God somehow rescues libertarianism from contradicting causality is thus an extension of the debate: Rather than arguing that libertarianism per se does not contradict causality, you are arguing that libertarianism plus God does not contradict it.
RDF: You argue that God made human beings and gave them the power of free will. People then live their lives, doing all sorts of things without any cause. SB: It would be better to say that they do thing without being caused to do so.
I think it is very important to clarify this distinction. I do not know why you think these statements mean different things.
The ability to be an operational first cause does not violate causality.
In my view, things that happen spontaneously without any cause violate causality, period, and you disagree. I suggest we leave it at that.
[followed by three paragraphs that do not address my statement]
I did indeed address your accusations of my bad faith, but apparently you are uninterested. That's fine with me too.
I am referring to your word games and the claim that you didn’t explicitly say you disagree with libertarian free will when we both know that you have been arguing against it. There is nothing sincere about that obfuscation.
I could not possibly have been more consistent and clear. I am not attacking you for holding your views, and yet you can't refrain from attacking me. I find libertarianism to be problematic both conceptually and empirically. But I also find the metaphysical alternatives to be equally problematic. There is nothing confusing or misleading or insincere about that stance, and it quite genuinely reflects my beliefs. You can accuse me of insincerity all you wish, but you are simply wrong, and it just reflects badly on you, as you are incapable of respecting other people who do not share your views.
Anyone can say, “I’m not convinced” even when the arguments put forward are compelling and well-articulated.
I can see you are highly impressed by your own arguments, but I think you are deeply confused, just as you think I am. You think your arguments are so compelling and well-articulated that any rational human simply must believe them - and yet agent-causal libertarianism is hardly taking the scholarly world by storm. And so instead of admitting that these issues are far too complex to claim that your own position is obviously complete and correct, you simply attack the motives and rationality of anyone who disagrees. This is dogma at its worst: You are so certain and self-satisfied that you refuse to believe that anyone else might genuinely believe that they don't know what the answers are! Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 25, 2013
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RDF: Out of curiosity, what would you say is the difference between a computer that is malfunctioning and one that is choosing? Put another way, if a computer can choose, how can it be said to be malfunctioning? It just chose to do something unexpected, right?Phinehas
May 25, 2013
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RDF:
A definition is not something one can agree with or not.
Of course it is! It is especially something with which you can agree with or not when you've asked my what my definition is.
I wanted to point out that if we are talking about whether or not people can make choices that are free in the libertarian sense, it isn’t helpful to define the word “choice” such that it precludes further discussion of the question by simply defining the word that way.
Please think about what you are saying, RDF. You asked how I defined choice. I told you. For me, calling something a "choice" when it is merely the determined effect of some amalgamation of causes is meaningless. It doesn't make any more sense to me than picking a color for a Ford Model T where I have the "choice" between black and black. When you've asked me for how I define "choice," it is not begging the question for me to give an honest answer. If my answer isn't particularly convenient for whatever point you are trying to make, I'm sorry, but it is still my answer.
Besides, humans who are very mentally deficient often lack moral sense, and we don’t punish them for the same reason, right?
Good point! What I'm asking is more pointed toward why we punish humans that are morally deficient, and not computers that are, similarly, morally deficient. But I suppose an equally interesting question would be why we punish humans that are morally deficient but not ones that are mentally deficient.
I’d like to say that I have excellent reasons not to be nihilistic and amoral, and I am indeed neither of things, but even if there was no reason at all for people not to be nihilistic and amoral, as long as they were not these things, I’d be happy.
OK. But what if they were these things? Now you are suddenly in need of more than excellent reasons for you not to be nihilistic and amoral. For the sake of your continued happiness, you require convincing reasons for them not to be nihilistic and amoral. Do you have any such reasons to offer them?
Causality (also referred to as causation[1]) is the relation between an event (the cause) and a second event (the effect), where the second event is understood as a consequence of the first.
I do not think this definition says what you think it says. Maybe you should read it again more closely. You'll find it supports my view and not yours. It may use the word "event," but it is certainly not saying that every event has a cause. It only says that the second event (the one we call an "effect") is understood as a consequence of the first (the one we call a "cause"). In other words, every effect has a cause. That you would think it says otherwise makes me question whether you are really understanding the distinction. Nothing in what you've presented states that every event requires a previous cause or that every cause must also be an effect. They merely set up the relationship between two events such that every effect has a cause.
And what it is saying is that nothing happens all by itself without any cause, just “poof”.
This may be what it says in your head, but it certainly isn't what is being said in your quotes. Again, I suggest you read them over with greater care instead of merely seizing on the word "event" without giving thought to what is actually being claimed.
Phin: If willful choices are incorporeal, it makes no sense to talk about them in terms of the corporeal laws of physics.
RDF: If immaterial causes make things happen in the material world, then the question arises, how can that possibly happen?
Yes, that is indeed an interesting question. On the other hand, the existence of the universe suggests the very possibility of this sort of thing, doesn't it? Maybe when we figure out how the material world can emerge from no-material, we'll better understand how no-material might cause material things to happen.
Phin: If willful choices are outside space-time, it makes no sense to talk about them having a cause.
RDF: Nor does it make sense to talk about them being antecdent causes for anything else!
Of course it does! What makes no sense is ignoring the fact that everything inside space-time does have an antecedent cause and pretending like an infinite regress of antecedent causes isn't logically problematic! Whence space-time if not from outside space-time? You can't just drop back and do a logical punt at that point while at the same time insisting that I explain how the immaterial can be and antecedent cause the material. Tackle the problem of where the material came from in the first place and maybe you'll have your answer!
I disagree. [When] something performs an arithmetic calculation like calculators and adding machines do, there is no selecting from among multiple options. The machine comes up with the one correct answer (if it is functioning correctly!). In contrast, a computer can choose from among multiple options.
No it can't! In a switch{} statement, there is only one correct execution path to the exact same degree as in a calculator. Any supposition otherwise is just plain wrong-headed. Further, solar activity or other types of interference could randomly flip a bit in a calculator just as it can in a computer, but in neither case would either device be "choosing" the incorrect answer.Phinehas
May 25, 2013
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Stephen @272, I had similar thoughts. We usually hear about everything our interlocutors are not, and scarcely what they are. They generally favor denial over affirmation. And they consider selective skepticism to be a virtue. I don't find this praiseworthy, and I think it reflects an underlying world view that, all truths are elusive, except that one.Chance Ratcliff
May 25, 2013
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RD
I’m just arguing against whatever anybody is overly certain about!
That's the easy part. Anyone can say, "I'm not convinced" even when the arguments put forward are compelling and well-articulated. It requires no intellectual exertion at all. We have witnessed these kinds of tactics many times in the past. Anti-ID partisans tell us what that are "not," but they conveniently withhold any information about what they "are." When they have been refuted, they claim not to "understand" the argument that refuted them. They never illuminate anything, but they always challenge illumination when it appears. All the while, the take no position of their own so that they will never have to defend it. In other words, they take your approach. There is nothing original or sophisticated about it.StephenB
May 25, 2013
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