Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Failure to Educate? Failure to Persuade.

Categories
'Junk DNA'
Intelligent Design
Share
Facebook
Twitter/X
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

Larry Moran replied to my latest post with an admission of failure. He thinks he has failed to educate, but I think rather he is confusing the word ‘persuade’ with the word ‘educate’.

He thinks I am rationalising junk DNA with a pile of ‘what-ifs’. But the fact is that most of my ‘what-ifs’ are already known to have some basis in reality. I am not denying any obvious reality. Indeed, the basic machinery of life looks like design, far more than when Paley was around. Yes, there could also be a great deal of junk. That’s why I have said a number of times that ID is not committed to the idea that there is no junk.

Yet, from my point of view, I see a whole pile of Darwinian/post-Darwinian materialists who have only partly explored the genome, working from an assumption that the genome was not designed, and thus are jumping the gun on the evidence. For example, Larry still seems to think that pseudogenes are of themselves ‘solid evidence’ of broken genes despite the fact that we know that at least some pseudogenes influence the rate of translation of real genes by competing with them; a simple design reason why there should be ‘false genes’ = pseudogenes. Who has explored the rest of them?

From his emotive response to my perfectly valid, albeit speculative suggestions (though they were not plucked out of the air either), I don’t trust this guy to think clearly and calmly about the possibility of design. That’s the real problem.

—-
Edit 12 May 2013:

Larry’s insistence that pseudogene = ‘broken gene’ comes from a particular way of thinking about biology: thinking of it in terms of a historical narrative rather than simply reporting the facts of what we see now. This affects much of what he talks about, but here I am choosing to focus on pseudogenes. The best way to talk science is to first state facts and provide an explanation, and then let the observer make up his mind, having been educated, and then let the observer attempt his own explanation of the facts. Being clear about what are facts, and what are interpretations, aids this, but Larry does not practice this when dealing with ID.

The facts are that we have many false genes (pseudogenes) that look like strikingly like particular real genes, and that some of them are known to be functional, and some of those are known to operate by regulating their corresponding real genes by generating competing transcripts. One possible history that would arrive at these observations is if a real gene was duplicated and then one copy was broken to make the pseudogene, and that some subsequently ‘discovered’ a function by chance. Larry believes this is the only possible explanation. He asserts ‘pseudogenes are broken genes’, as if true by definition. However, it is not the only explanation if one considers design. A designer might well make a false gene to regulate a real gene in this way. Why not? But Larry doesn’t consider design. He doesn’t even look at the possibility. That’s why he doesn’t understand that pseudogenes are not necessarily broken genes, and thus are not evidence for junk.

Larry was rather snide about computer scientists, as if they don’t understand the fundamentals of biology. Hmmm. I am more of a mathematical physicist than a computer scientist, and it seems to me that Larry doesn’t understand that stories/narratives about genes breaking and then discovering new function, are not enough for those looking for a natural (physical) explanation. I want to see hard probabilities. It seems that biologists are too happy with narrative and don’t realise the importance of probabilities. If you don’t know how to estimate probabilities, I am sure people like Doug Axe and the Biologic Institute could help you.

Comments
RDFish,
"If by “free” you mean “violating laws of physics” then you are merely begging the question, because nobody believes that computers violate the laws of physics[1]. If by “free” you mean “not coerced by outside influence”, then of course computers can make free choices[2]."
(my annotations) [1] Nope, I'm making no such claim. [2] I mean "free" as in not determined by outside influence. Computers are not coerced to make choices, they are programmed to produce reliable, determined behavior. And computers need programmers to make their choices for them, specifically because they make no choices themselves. They are not even selves. Again, computers do not make choices; programmers and engineers make choices, and the computers comply with machine-like precision.Chance Ratcliff
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
02:08 PM
2
02
08
PM
PDT
RDFish,
The notion that computers make choices is backwards to a regular accounting of reality.
But of course that is not true! Let’s say I program a computer to choose a number between one and ten in such a way that I have no inkling what number it will choose. If computers cannot make choices, why does everybody know exactly what it means to say the computer is choosing a number between one and ten? How else would you say it?
Computers don't make choices, programmers and engineers do. It's really no more complicated than that. The fact that it's convenient to impute the notion of "choice" to a computer picking a random number between one and ten is no more mystifying than understanding that when we say, "The sun will rise at 5:35 AM," we're really talking in terms of the earth's rotation, not the sun's revolution about the earth. "Choice" is a term of convenience, as is "sunrise". It doesn't mean that a computer actually chooses anything. All apparent "choices" that a computer makes are explicable in terms of the choices that the programmer makes when crafting the behavior of the program, i.e., how it maps inputs to outputs. Moreover, in most situations, the computer is using a PRNG, which means that the number it generates is entirely deterministic, and not random at all (iow, the number can be predicted with 100% certainty given knowledge of the starting conditions). It just appears random if a few layers of general ignorance can be inserted between the PRNG and the output of the program. It's a simulation of randomness, nothing more. If we switch gears and talk about TRNGs, the computer must still be programmed specifically in order for the programmer to restrict the results to integers between one and ten inclusive. All that's been accomplished in this case is to make sure that the output is "cryptographically secure." Computers don't decide how to harness randomly generated numbers, their programmers do. So the computer is not choosing anything. It's behaving deterministically. Introducing a non-deterministic component through a TRNG does not introduce a choice, it introduces a truly random component. And random does not imply free choice. Computers are no more able to make choices than adding machines and calculators are. Where computation is concerned, the same principles apply. The fact that we can conveniently classify decision trees which introduce random components as "choices" does not transform program execution into a series of free choices, any more than randomly yanking on a puppet's strings can produce dancing.Chance Ratcliff
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
02:02 PM
2
02
02
PM
PDT
Hi Chance,
The phrase, “The notion that computers make choices…” is better stated, “The notion that computers make free choices…” The latter is less equivocal.
If by "free" you mean "violating laws of physics" then you are merely begging the question, because nobody believes that computers violate the laws of physics. If by "free" you mean "not coerced by outside influence", then of course computers can make free choices. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
01:43 PM
1
01
43
PM
PDT
Hi Chance,
Pseudo random number generators are deterministic.
Uh yes, of course: That is where the "pseudo" comes in, of course ;-)
True random number generators are nondeterministic, but entirely random; they take their readings from something like radioactive decay or atmospheric noise.
If radioactive decay is not entirely random, then we needn't speak of randomness or chance at all. Fine with me! I don't believe that randomness or indeterminacy plays an interesting role in this discussion, which is why I said "But more importantly..." right after mentioning it!
The notion that computers make choices is backwards to a regular accounting of reality.
But of course that is not true! Let's say I program a computer to choose a number between one and ten in such a way that I have no inkling what number it will choose. If computers cannot make choices, why does everybody know exactly what it means to say the computer is choosing a number between one and ten? How else would you say it?
It comes from a need to reduce mind to a series of material interactions.
Actually no, I'm not a materialist, and I don't believe that mentality can be reduced to physics as we currently understand it.
It’s believed that, if we can just make these interactions complex enough, it’ll begin to behave like a mind. This is one of materialism’s articles of faith.
Sorry, I wouldn't know about that :-) Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
01:40 PM
1
01
40
PM
PDT
Hi WJM,
That’s a keeper, right there.
Hahaha - the irony is killing me. It is this that is the "keeper"! You obviously aren't very good at making and understanding arguments, but it seems your sarcasm is finely honed! Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
01:39 PM
1
01
39
PM
PDT
Hey Phinehas:
RDF: In my view, morality is intersubjectivity true: This does not mean that everybody makes up their own view; it refers to shared meaning and reasoning among all people that derive from our shared nature. PHIN: This seems very circular and muddled to me. Each person has a human nature that includes morality that is dependent upon all the other human natures that each also include morality, which is dependent upon all the other…???
No, I don't mean that our sense of morality is dependent upon all other humans. Rather, I believe that our sense of morality comes from our shared nature. We all generally see moral principles the same way because we are all generally similar in so many ways (we all feel pain, love our families, have physical needs, feel allegiance to groups, etc etc). Our thinking is therefore similar regarding a great number of things. We call some of this "common sense", and that which applies to ethics we call our moral sense. Yes there are differences among people, and likewise there are differences in our moral judgements. And some people are so different that we call them abnormal or pathological, because they lack this shared moral sense. But computers are very, very, very different obviously, and are thus are not bound to our moral standards.
If we ever make contact with sentient life elsewhere in the universe, must they also have the shared nature of humans (whatever that is) in order to be held accountable for their actions? If their shared alien nature is contrary to ours, what does this say about their morality? What does it say about ours?
Interesting questions. What do you think? First, I think sentience is a tricky concept - we might disagree, for example, if dogs are sentient (I'm certain they are) or rats or birds, so how might we decide if these aliens are sentient or not? In general, my view on their morality (and their sentience) is that it would all depend on how similar they are to us.
If physics (an unbroken chain of cause and effect by any other name) is ultimately responsible for your ability to, “learn, reason, and make moral judgements,” then these abilities themselves start to look like merely ad hoc labels for more of the same physics, and the resulting “moral agent” cashes out to something with no more ultimate meaning than atoms interacting within stars, no matter how much more sophisticated or complex the interactions in your mind or how many labels you invent or steal to try to describe them.
This seems to be a common sentiment here, but it completely baffles me. My computer is definitely a material object, and it can be ultimately reduced to a collection of atoms. But that doesn't mean that the label "computer" is arbitrary, or illusory! It doesn't mean that we don't know what a computer is! It doesn't mean that a computer is basically the same thing as a rock just because both are nothing but collections of atoms!
Whether you were created for a purpose or are merely the product of mindless processes in an endless causal chain changes everything about who you are. It changes your entire perspective on life and your role and responsibility in it. How could it possibly not?
I honestly don't feel this one iota. I love life, I feel I am an engaged and happy person, I care deeply about humanity and all life, I feel I am moral and productive and content - I really do. I have absolutely no idea why there is something instead of nothing, why the universe exists the way it is, how life began, and so on - they are all exquisite mysteries that I love to think about.
If you don’t believe me, then I encourage you to try it! Choose right now to start living life as though you were created by God for a purpose. I guarantee it will alter who you are.
Well, I never judge people who believe that, but altering who I am would be the last thing I'd want to do! I'm certainly not perfect (nobody is, right?) but I don't feel I need to believe in a god in order to feel like my life is wondrous and meaningful. As far as I can see, I do live my life very much like people who profess to believe in God, except for the God part. And I literally could not choose to actually believe in a god no matter how much I tried. I think the take-away point here is this: Theists ought not imagine that because somebody does not believe in God they are nihilisitc or amoral or hiding from the truth Atheists ought not imagine that because somebody believes in God they are childish or delusional or weak Oh, and by the way:
PHIN: A choice is the uncaused effect of a causal agent. RDF: Really? Using your definition, what would you say is the meaning of the following sentence: “The computer was programmed to choose a number between one and ten” PHIN: (crickets...)
:-) Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
01:36 PM
1
01
36
PM
PDT
KF @234, no disagreement there. That's what I was getting at with #231. I just needed to clarify a bit, to make sure my statement wasn't misrepresented.Chance Ratcliff
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
01:17 PM
1
01
17
PM
PDT
CR: Even if a genuinely random number source like a zener noise source flattened out or sky noise etc are used, that is not a free choice. Genuinely free choices are not random, as even a common, garden variety decision tree analysis used in management will highlight. KFkairosfocus
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
01:10 PM
1
01
10
PM
PDT
Correction to my #231: The phrase, "The notion that computers make choices..." is better stated, "The notion that computers make free choices..." The latter is less equivocal.Chance Ratcliff
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
12:52 PM
12
12
52
PM
PDT
as to:
How, exactly, might this immaterial will of ours fire our physical neurons? Why aren’t libertarians doing laboratory experiments to detect these uncaused neural events? (hint: there are none)
actually: In The Wonder Of Being Human: Our Brain and Our Mind, Eccles and Robinson discussed the research of three groups of scientists (Robert Porter and Cobie Brinkman, Nils Lassen and Per Roland, and Hans Kornhuber and Luder Deeke), all of whom produced startling and undeniable evidence that a "mental intention" preceded an actual neuronal firing - thereby establishing that the mind is not the same thing as the brain, but is a separate entity altogether. http://books.google.com/books?id=J9pON9yB8HkC&pg=PT28&lpg=PT28 “We regard promissory materialism as superstition without a rational foundation. The more we discover about the brain, the more clearly do we distinguish between the brain events and the mental phenomena, and the more wonderful do both the brain events and the mental phenomena become. Promissory materialism is simply a religious belief held by dogmatic materialists . . . who often confuse their religion with their science.” ? John C. Eccles, The Wonder of Being Human: Our Brain and Our Mindbornagain77
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
12:47 PM
12
12
47
PM
PDT
Pseudo random number generators are deterministic. With the same seed, they'll replay the same sequence of "random" numbers. True random number generators are nondeterministic, but entirely random; they take their readings from something like radioactive decay or atmospheric noise. The notion that computers make choices is backwards to a regular accounting of reality. It comes from a need to reduce mind to a series of material interactions. It's believed that, if we can just make these interactions complex enough, it'll begin to behave like a mind. This is one of materialism's articles of faith.Chance Ratcliff
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
12:35 PM
12
12
35
PM
PDT
computers can make free choices
That's a keeper, right there.William J Murray
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
12:28 PM
12
12
28
PM
PDT
RDF:
computers can make free choices
NOPE. Computers are programed devices. At most, software may have a random element, but that is exactly what is not a free choice. And if otherwise they have something random happen, odds are things crash. Your conception of free is clearly seriously mistaken. KFkairosfocus
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
12:08 PM
12
12
08
PM
PDT
Hey RDF:
While both humans and computers can make free choices, computers lack the human concept of morality. In my view, morality is intersubjectivity true: This does not mean that everybody makes up their own view; it refers to shared meaning and reasoning among all people that derive from our shared nature. Computers do not share our human nature – they do not have common sense or a moral sense or reasoning the way people do – and so they lack morality.
This seems very circular and muddled to me. Each person has a human nature that includes morality that is dependent upon all the other human natures that each also include morality, which is dependent upon all the other...??? Obviously, one person couldn't pull on their own psychological bootstraps hard enough to become a moral creature, but if we each pull on everyone else's bootstraps, morality will emerge? That seems problematic to me. I can't imagine how one would go about supporting such a proposition. Psychopaths don't particularly share our moral sense or impute meaning or value the same way we do. Are they not included in the "all people" with our shared nature? Perhaps they are merely missing the appropriate software, like computers are? You tend to speak about human nature and "the way people [have]" these things as though there are not great, yawning, chasms separating the nature and actions of some from others. Evidently, many people do not have common sense or a moral sense or reasoning the way that other people do. I mean, how could one commit murder unless they lacked the shared meaning, common sense, moral sense, etc. of others who do not? Do these people lack morality? How then can they be accountable? If we ever make contact with sentient life elsewhere in the universe, must they also have the shared nature of humans (whatever that is) in order to be held accountable for their actions? If their shared alien nature is contrary to ours, what does this say about their morality? What does it say about ours?
I think the issue of what we are and how we got that way are separate. Thus, however it came to pass that I was born with the ability to learn, reason, and make moral judgements, those things are true of me now, and the result is that I am a moral agent.
If physics (an unbroken chain of cause and effect by any other name) is ultimately responsible for your ability to, "learn, reason, and make moral judgements," then these abilities themselves start to look like merely ad hoc labels for more of the same physics, and the resulting "moral agent" cashes out to something with no more ultimate meaning than atoms interacting within stars, no matter how much more sophisticated or complex the interactions in your mind or how many labels you invent or steal to try to describe them.
How you got to be you does not alter the fact that you are you. You have a particular personality, temperment, a set of beliefs and desires, a set of memories, physical traits, and on and on. Tracing the origin of any of those does not alter the fact of who you are.
Of course it does! Whether you were created for a purpose or are merely the product of mindless processes in an endless causal chain changes everything about who you are. It changes your entire perspective on life and your role and responsibility in it. How could it possibly not? If you don't believe me, then I encourage you to try it! Choose right now to start living life as though you were created by God for a purpose. I guarantee it will alter who you are.
If there was something that existed outside of space/time, then how could it “belong to” or “be a part of” each of us, since we exist in space/time?
That's a great question. Something must exist that has the power to reach out from eternity (outside/before space-time) such that space-time now exists. This something is able to bridge the gap between what is eternal and incorporeal and what is bound within space-time and corporeal. Further, this something has caused to exist in us a similar ability. Alternatively, it makes no sense to speak of such things and we should just accept the will's existence in the same way we except the existence of the universe.
How would we know if this thing existed?
Introspection? Revelation? A combination of the two? In any case, if we rule out its existence a priori because we don't want to let a divine foot in the door, that will certainly compromise our ability to know any thing at all about it.Phinehas
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
10:06 AM
10
10
06
AM
PDT
Hi StephenB,
RDFish, I am still waiting for you to tell exactly on which point you disagree with agent-causal libertarianism. Please be kind enough to provide that information.
Well, you can search every post I've written here and you'll never see that I've said I disagree with agent-causal libertarianism. I do understand how you could think that, however. For one thing, I've been arguing against it with WJM, but I've repeatedly made clear that I was adopting that position arguendo to counter his certainty on the matter. As I've told you very many times, I am agnostic regarding mind/body ontology, volition, and other ancient metaphysical conundrums. I think nobody knows the truth of these matters, and it's almost certain that we are framing the questions in such a way that there are no answers (like asking how far away the edge of the Earth is from London - there is no answer, because there is no edge of the Earth). What I do think about libertarianism is that it is not required in order to understand that human beings make choices, and I think that it is perfectly ridiculous to imagine that if libertarianism is false then human beings are merely inert objects driven to act by external forces, and I think that we are all morally responsible for our actions no matter what is true about our fundamental ontology. I also think that libertarianism faces very difficult issues (as all metaphysical stances do!!!). First, we've blithely spoken here about how our "free will" manages to activate our neural pathways in order to initiate action. I'm sure you're aware that this dualist/interactionist scheme is hard for most people to swallow: How, exactly, might this immaterial will of ours fire our physical neurons? Why aren't libertarians doing laboratory experiments to detect these uncaused neural events? (hint: there are none) Additionally, I think libertarianism has a problem with coherence, which I've tried to convey to you. Why did I stop smoking? My will chose to. Why did my will choose to? Either there was reason that accounts for my will overcoming my desires, or there wasn't. If there was, then my choice wasn't free, and if there wasn't, then it just happened for no reason at all. Neither is the sort of libertarian choice you imagine. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
09:31 AM
9
09
31
AM
PDT
Hi WJM,
Without any significant difference, as someone else pointed out, your causal chain boils down to arbitrarily applying labels to: physics > physics > more physics > even more physics > effect
If you'd read this post you ought to have seen my response to this sort of mistake. This is like looking at the computer in front of you and saying that "computer" is nothing but an arbitrary label for the collection of atoms on your desk! No, William, computers really do exist, whether or not they are merely collections of atoms. Likewise, human beings do exist, whether or not we can be reduced to physics. There is nothing arbitrary about calling some collection of atoms a "chair" or an "apple" or a "human being". To pretend otherwise is awfully silly, really. Now I have a question for you: You believe that human beings transcend physical cause (or at least our will does so). Do you believe the same is true for amoebas? How about dogs? Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
09:30 AM
9
09
30
AM
PDT
RDFish, I am still waiting for you to tell exactly on which point you disagree with agent-causal libertarianism. Please be kind enough to provide that information.StephenB
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
06:32 AM
6
06
32
AM
PDT
RDFish, You offer nothing but reiterated terminology that lacks any conceptual basis whatsoever. Without any significant difference, as someone else pointed out, your causal chain boils down to arbitrarily applying labels to: physics > physics > more physics > even more physics > effect "Person" = physical computation. "Choice" = physical computation. (Your unsupported definition of "computation" earlier notwithstanding). "Necessary", "moral", "responsibility" = computed agreements of computed entities drawing arbitrary lines in the sand of causal sequences going back to the origin of the universe.William J Murray
May 23, 2013
May
05
May
23
23
2013
04:19 AM
4
04
19
AM
PDT
F/N 2: It does matter, greatly, whether we can be reduced to blind mechanism and programming, as has just now again been outlined and linked on, but RDF has been busily ignoring the reason for that. Sad, and sadly revealing. KFkairosfocus
May 22, 2013
May
05
May
22
22
2013
11:21 PM
11
11
21
PM
PDT
F/N: Notice the dismissal that if morality were objective there would be uniform agreement on it. Actually, there pretty much is on pivotal points, such as "you unfair me!" -- as CS Lewis pointed out. That is, the universal fact of quarrelling (trying to show the other party in the wrong and/or to justify or excuse oneself as in the right) shows that we acknowledge a universal standard in the end. With all that this implies. And in a world where "error exists" as demonstrated by arithmetic classes etc, and where we have selfish motivations etc, that we would disagree on particular cases only shows that objectivity and subjectivity are both involved. Hence why ethics starts with the descriptive then goes to the issue of validation of codes per reason and core principles, then concludes with systems. Why the fact of disagreement is often taken as somehow a proof that there is no objectivity in moral thought, when the phenomenon of quarrelling exists, is a sign of just how often we fail to think through what a phenomenon is really pointing to. I this case: global moral accountability, as even the terrorists on the streets of London yesterday (having committed a horrific murder and being literally red handed) were implying. In the end, by the fact of quarrelling, we acknowledge ourselves to be under an underlying global law, and that each of us has duties of care to truth, right, fairness and more. KFkairosfocus
May 22, 2013
May
05
May
22
22
2013
11:19 PM
11
11
19
PM
PDT
WJM & P: RDF has managed to duck an actual in-thread summary on cause, contingency and necessity, here at 200 above (which pivots on the lighted match case I have used, following Copi . . . ) -- that he used as his occasion for playing his I don't like your style card. Similarly, he has ducked a specific discussion of choice, freedom, chance and determinism here at 181 above overnight (which inter alia traces the discussion to its historic roots in Plato and Aristotle, and sets up genuinely free choice and agents as causes in these terms: Agent-Causality is the idea that agents can start new causal chains that are not pre-determined by the events of the immediate or distant past and the physical laws of nature.. Plato, in The Laws, BK X, as cited -- I believe a second time in this thread in extenso -- speaks about the self-moved initiating cause; which takes in reflexivity, and initiation as opposed to determination solely by blind mechanical necessity, physical or programmed and/or by impacts of chance: we actually have genuine alternatives and may select based on our conscious awareness, ability to reason and decision, not some stochastic distribution and mechanism irrelevant to truth, right, logic, knowledge, values, etc. Systems that try to reduce our freedom to choose end up in self referential incoherence because they undermine our ability to reason and rise above genetic, environmental, psycho-social and cultural programming or chance circumstances. So, even the words of such speculations are subject to the conclusion, is that you or your programing or meds or demon rum or the bit of cheese from last night or whatever. In short, such notions in the end boil down to there is no you. The evidence on balance, sadly, is that RDF is not really interested in anything more than playing out a talking points game, ignoring or dismissing anything too pointed and substantial, snipping and sniping, and then burying any substantial response in onwards tangential commentary. KFkairosfocus
May 22, 2013
May
05
May
22
22
2013
11:09 PM
11
11
09
PM
PDT
Hi WJM,
RDFish, it appears you have contradicted yourself. You said:
Once again, my argument never had anything to do with “motive”. And I see no way to truncate causal chains in a way that is not arbitrary. Under my argument, the individual is necessarily responsible, and I agree that is how we must act.
If “truncating” the causal chain at “the individual” or their motives is, as you say, arbitrary, how can an “individual” (as an arbitrary truncation) have necessary responsibility for any effect?
My point about arbitrary truncation was with regard to violating the Law of Causality:
RDF: We ask, what caused that the human being to press the button, and your answer is that there is something unobservable (that you call “the will”) inside this human being that caused them to press the button, and that nothing at all caused this unobservable thing in turn to make that happen. So you are truncating the causal chain simply by positing something inside a human being that can cause things to happen without any antecedent cause, which clearly violates the LoC.
An arbitrary assignment of causal responsibility is the opposite of a necessary assignment of causal responsibility. You have said that “the individual” is both an arbitrary, and a necessary, placement of causal responsibility for the effect in question.
No, not at all. Humans are moral agents because they are capable of making choices and share an inherent moral sense. Our cells are not moral agents, and our atoms are not moral agents, and our experiences or memories or any other component or aspect of us are not moral agents. We as human beings are moral agents, necessarily. It simply doesn't matter whether or not we can be reduced entirely to physics, or whether our minds transcend physical causality (as we currently understand it) - none of that changes our moral duty at all. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 22, 2013
May
05
May
22
22
2013
10:42 PM
10
10
42
PM
PDT
Hi Chance,
Your definition of person is circular, and your definition of moral responsibility depends on your definition of person.
If you claim not to know what a human being is, then I assume you are not discussing this in good faith.
WRT the rest, there are three causal phenomena in nature: necessity (natural regularities describable by physical law), chance, and agency.
Here you declare one particular metaphysical view as though it was a proven fact. You have no way to demonstrate that agency operates outside of chance and necessity; you are merely speculating that it does.
If instead agency is not its own causal force, then it is illusory, and the result of the interplay between the other two forces.
You use the word "force" inadvisably; neither "chance" or "necessity" are "forces". Moreover, agency is only "illusory" if you insist on your original conception of it; agency conceived as the ability to make choices is not illusory in the least.
In my world, personhood can be understood as pure being rooted in an indivisible self, whose will is its primary way of moving, deciding, and interacting with the world. Your definition of personhood remains elusive.
Hardly! Every normal person knows what a human being is, and knows that humans make their own choices, and that is all you need to know in order to hold human beings morally responsible. Your view is metaphysical and speculative, and mine is rooted in common sense and perception.
You know my position: we cannot make sense of free will or moral responsibility without first recognizing that personhood is not an emergent property of chance and necessity, but something entirely different.
I have never spoken of "emergent properties", and I don't know what you are talking about, really. You are delving into metaphysics, and I reject that any of that is relevant.
As a corollary, we must also acknowledge the objective nature of morality, as being something outside of ourselves, and outside of collective humanity and society.
We disagree entirely. If that were true, I would expect humans to agree about morality uniformally, but that is not the case. People have a general agreement about morality, and form a consensus about the vast majority of moral questions, but there are still many that divide people - even among devout Christians! That is more consistent with the idea that our moral sense is like our common sense. It is not individually invented, nor is it relative, but neither does it exist objectively and outside of humanity and society.
You can take the last word. As we already agreed, this won’t really go any further.
Ok, I'm fine with that :-) Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 22, 2013
May
05
May
22
22
2013
10:38 PM
10
10
38
PM
PDT
Hi Phinehas,
What is “that which gives us moral accountability?” Why must it be absent from computers? Why can it not be added to computers?
I explained this in my last post to you; I'll repeat it here but more slowly and louder :-) While both humans and computers can make free choices, computers lack the human concept of morality. In my view, morality is intersubjectivity true: This does not mean that everybody makes up their own view; it refers to shared meaning and reasoning among all people that derive from our shared nature. Computers do not share our human nature - they do not have common sense or a moral sense or reasoning the way people do - and so they lack morality. If you're asking if we could ever create a computer that did have these things - common sense, human-like reasoning, moral sense, and so on - I do not know the answer to that, but if we did manage to build such a thing, it would be very different from what we know as computers today.
Do not our “inherent characteristics” originate outside of us? Do they not have a cause?
I think the issue of what we are and how we got that way are separate. Thus, however it came to pass that I was born with the ability to learn, reason, and make moral judgements, those things are true of me now, and the result is that I am a moral agent. Likewise, however it came to pass that I was born with the personality, proclivities, mental skills and deficencies I have now, that is who I am. The fact that everything I am pre-existed me doesn't alter that. The fact that the atoms in my body were once in a star doesn't make them any less part of my body.
If they [inherent characteristics] do not have a cause, can we just lump them together and call them our “will?”
I don't get this. Our inherent characteristics as acted upon by the totality of our experience is what we are - not just one component of us or another. It is not my will, it is me.
But if everything we are and everything we experience is ultimately caused by something outside of us, we still end up with our acts being merely one more link in the causal chain.
Again: How you got to be you does not alter the fact that you are you. You have a particular personality, temperment, a set of beliefs and desires, a set of memories, physical traits, and on and on. Tracing the origin of any of those does not alter the fact of who you are. It's like asking an ID proponent "Who Designed the Designer?" - it isn't germaine to the claim that there is a Designer.
Physics -> Environment -> Me -> Gun -> Bullet -> Death Why should “me” in the causal chain be singled out in any particular way for accountability? In fact, why can’t the causal chain be just as easily understood as: Physics -> Physics -> More Physics -> Still More Physics ->…
Why would you deny that people existed? Even if reductionism were true (and I don't believe either of us think that is necessarily true), why would you refuse to acknowledge that the world can be understood (and can only be understood) by parsing the physics at various levels of abstraction? It's like saying these characters you are reading on your screen aren't really characters, they're just collections of dark pixels, so you can't be reading these words. People are people, and we act in the world, and however that came to be, that is the way things are. When I hold you responsible for your actions, I'm talking about you, and I'm not talking about your causes or your will or beliefs or desires or...
A choice is the uncaused effect of a causal agent.
Really? Using your definition, what would you say is the meaning of the following sentence: "The computer was programmed to choose a number between one and ten" Your definition obviously begs the question, assuming that choices are uncaused by simply defining the word that way. And BTW, an uncaused effect violates the Law of Causality, right? I actually think you might have meant "The effect of an uncaused causal agency" or something, but if this is what you meant, that's fine.
Setting aside the conundrum of how there can be a “before there was time and space,” suppose each of us has as an inherent characteristic that we call the “will” that exists outside of time and space.
If there was something that existed outside of space/time, then how could it "belong to" or "be a part of" each of us, since we exist in space/time? How would we know if this thing existed? Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 22, 2013
May
05
May
22
22
2013
10:37 PM
10
10
37
PM
PDT
As to my definition of choice: A choice is the uncaused effect of a causal agent.
Actually, no, that's not quite right. A choice is something that ultimately originates in a chooser as the outworking of the chooser's will.Phinehas
May 22, 2013
May
05
May
22
22
2013
09:07 PM
9
09
07
PM
PDT
RDFish, it appears you have contradicted yourself. You said:
Once again, my argument never had anything to do with “motive”. And I see no way to truncate causal chains in a way that is not arbitrary. Under my argument, the individual is necessarily responsible, and I agree that is how we must act.
If "truncating" the causal chain at "the individual" or their motives is, as you say, arbitrary, how can an "individual" (as an arbitrary truncation) have necessary responsibility for any effect? An arbitrary assignment of causal responsibility is the opposite of a necessary assignment of causal responsibility. You have said that "the individual" is both an arbitrary, and a necessary, placement of causal responsibility for the effect in question.William J Murray
May 22, 2013
May
05
May
22
22
2013
07:29 PM
7
07
29
PM
PDT
As to my definition of choice: A choice is the uncaused effect of a causal agent.
I don’t think it makes sense to talk about cause before there was time and space, so I don’t think it makes sense to speak about a cause of the universe.
Right. Setting aside the conundrum of how there can be a "before there was time and space," suppose each of us has as an inherent characteristic that we call the "will" that exists outside of time and space. Obviously, it makes no more sense to speak of a "cause" for our will than it does to speak about a cause for the universe. Hence, free will and we are now all on the same page!Phinehas
May 22, 2013
May
05
May
22
22
2013
07:21 PM
7
07
21
PM
PDT
RDFish @208,
"Right – I’d say there are only very weird, sci-fi-movie type circumstances where there is absolutely no choice at all, involving the overtaking of neural or muscular control of someone so that even if they attempt to perform X they end up performing Y instead. To a practical approximation, then, all of our choices are free in this sense."
I think I agree. :)
"“person” or “human”: a human being in the most ordinary usage of that term, no more problematic than a term like “apple” or “chair” or “dog” “moral responsibility”: being obliged to follow moral duties. Only human beings can be held morally responsible for their actions, and they are always responsible for their actions (save for the unlikely scenarios discussed above)."
Your definition of person is circular, and your definition of moral responsibility depends on your definition of person. WRT the rest, there are three causal phenomena in nature: necessity (natural regularities describable by physical law), chance, and agency. Each of these are generally distinguishable from the others in their characteristics. If instead agency is not its own causal force, then it is illusory, and the result of the interplay between the other two forces. Neither of those separately nor together entails the ability to freely choose between alternatives. In my world, personhood can be understood as pure being rooted in an indivisible self, whose will is its primary way of moving, deciding, and interacting with the world. Your definition of personhood remains elusive. You know my position: we cannot make sense of free will or moral responsibility without first recognizing that personhood is not an emergent property of chance and necessity, but something entirely different. As a corollary, we must also acknowledge the objective nature of morality, as being something outside of ourselves, and outside of collective humanity and society. You can take the last word. As we already agreed, this won't really go any further. :) Best, ChanceChance Ratcliff
May 22, 2013
May
05
May
22
22
2013
07:12 PM
7
07
12
PM
PDT
My point was that no computer can be morally responsible for anything, because that which gives us moral accountability is absent from computers.
What is "that which gives us moral accountability?" Why must it be absent from computers? Why can it not be added to computers?
First, even a determinist doesn’t deny that we are born with inherent characteristics, so it’s not the case that our acts originate outside of us. Our acts result from a combination of everything we are and everything we experience.
Do not our "inherent characteristics" originate outside of us? Do they not have a cause? If they do not have a cause, can we just lump them together and call them our "will?"
Our acts result from a combination of everything we are and everything we experience.
But if everything we are and everything we experience is ultimately caused by something outside of us, we still end up with our acts being merely one more link in the causal chain. Physics -> Environment -> Me -> Gun -> Bullet -> Death Why should "me" in the causal chain be singled out in any particular way for accountability? In fact, why can't the causal chain be just as easily understood as: Physics -> Physics -> More Physics -> Still More Physics ->... I didn't kill that person any more than the bullet did, or the gun did, or the environment did, or physics did.Phinehas
May 22, 2013
May
05
May
22
22
2013
07:09 PM
7
07
09
PM
PDT
Hi WJM,
IF humans possess the causeless cause agency of free will, they can cause effects without violating the principle of causation, which says all effects have a cause. Free will is not taken to be an “effect” of anything else.
To say that the will is not an "effect" is exactly the same as saying there is no cause for what the will does. The will causes the person do X, but nothing causes the will to cause the person to do X - it just happens without any cause at all. In my view this violates causality, but in your view it doesn't. Let's agree to disagree about that.
And if, as you imply, that “free will” is an arbitrary “truncating” of the causal chain, then if you do not “truncate” it there, where would you “truncate it”, and what, ultimately, is the cause of any choice? How far back must you trace the sequence of causation? Before, you stepped the causal chain back from will to motive, but is that not also “truncating” the causal chain at an arbitrary point?
If you recall, I did NOT introduce "motive" into the conversation - that was StephenB, not me. Now that I've cleared up that confusion for the second time with you, let me address your question. I do not know if there are causeless causes - or causeless effects - in the universe. I do know that in our uniform and repeated experience nothing happens without an antecedent cause, but that doesn't mean it is impossible. If the universe was deterministic, the causal chains would ultimately lead to the initial conditions and laws of the universe. I don't think it makes sense to talk about cause before there was time and space, so I don't think it makes sense to speak about a cause of the universe.
This is why we posit that humans have libertarian free will, and posit a first cause, or causeless cause: to escape infinite regress...
I don't see why causality would lead to infinite regress unless the universe was eternal. But it appears the universe is not eternal, so even under determinism no causal chain would be infinite.
...and to provide necessary moral responsibility.
I do not understand why there has to be an ontologically distinct sort of cause in order to identify humans as moral agents. The fact that humans have the ability to make choices (and we agree that we do) and that we are bound by moral duty (and we agree that we are) makes humans morally responsible no matter what else we happen to believe about physics or metaphysics.
Under your argument, there is no more reason to stop at “motive” in our backtracking of cause than there is anywhere else.
Once again, my argument never had anything to do with "motive". And I see no way to truncate causal chains in a way that is not arbitrary.
Under my argument, the individual is necessarily responsible – which is how we must act in every day life anyway.
Under my argument, the individual is necessarily responsible, and I agree that is how we must act. But under your argument, it seems it is not really the individual person per se that is responsible, but rather this internal component of people called the "will" that you posit, which is in control of the person. If I was arrested, I suppose under your argument I could plead innocent on account of the fact that it wasn't me who decided to commit the crime... it was my will! :-) Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 22, 2013
May
05
May
22
22
2013
06:42 PM
6
06
42
PM
PDT
1 16 17 18 19 20 26

Leave a Reply