Frank Beckwith finally disowns ID

_{William Dembski

November 13, 2008

Intelligent Design}

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I’ve seen this a long time coming:

www.whatswrongwiththeworld.net/2008/11/…

Two quotes in particular stand out for me:

My reasons have to do with my philosophical opposition to the ID movement’s acquiescence to the modern idea that an Enlightenment view of science is the paradigm of knowledge. [Comment from WmAD: Showing that the Enlightenment view of science fails on its own terms is hardly the same as acquiescing to it.]

My point is to provide my reader with an intellectually respectable way to reject Dawkinian [sic] atheism without having to embrace ID. [Comment from WmAD: Why not simply present an intellectually respectable way to reject Dawkinsian–period? Why does he have to put his own preferred method of combating Dawkins explicitly in opposition to ID? Let’s see if Dawkins is shaking in his boots at Beckwith’s latest salvo.]

Comments

So here’s where we’re at (in my slightly demented opinion). Descartes was the antithesis (of Scholasticism, as he himself said); Kant represented an attempt at a new kind of synthesis; Nietzsche smashed this synthesis into oblivion with nihilism or nothingness. If the question is quo vadis, then the only way to go beyond the antithesis that is nihilism—the only way for philosophy to move forward—is to describe a new synthesis of nothingness and sense. Philosophy has only two ways of moving forward: synthesis and antithesis. Nihilism was the antithesis of philosophy itself and its pursuit of “the good.” By annihilating objective reality, it produced a highly theory-centered age. The antidote to pure theory and its nothingness, as we know from Aristotle and Kant, is to describe a way to overthrow its tyrannical resistance through a coming-together of itself and sense. A post-Modernist synthesis might, for example, attempt to make value judgments by regrounding the nothingness of nihilism in the fact that sense is undeniably something. But nothingness now presents perhaps insurmountable difficulties to the would-be synthesizer. The objective approach of Aristotle and “subjective” approach of Kant (to use Stephen’s terminology) both failed in the end. It is not possible to invoke “the good” as intellect and then describe a true coming-together of intellect and sense—nor is it possible to set aside “the good” and then describe a synthesis of our concepts of being and our consciousness of their potential nothingness without being overwhelmed by nothingness itself (which is just what happened). ID overthrows nothingness with the self-evident inference of design; but for that very reason it seems unlikely to be useful in the development of a new synthesis. The same self-evident quality that makes it a potent antidote to materialism also deprives it of possibility, which is necessary in order to make any new philosophical undertaking seem attractive (i.e., the possibility of the happiness of a new way of thinking and being). A modern Kant, looking for a way to describe a new synthesis, would probably say to himself, “ID says ‘this is designed’ and ends there.” It is fully self-realized. But although ID probably cannot become the basis of a movement as grandiose as Transcendental Idealism, it can certainly foster useful philosophical dialogue. Actually, ID makes philosophy possible again simply by overthrowing nothingness. Philosophy began with the pursuit of the good of happiness. Nihilism annihilated “the good,” but ID reinstates it. God exists. His fingerprint is everywhere in nature, and nature itself is "very good," remarkably well-made. ID makes it possible, then, to begin to rethink some of our modernist assumptions and tropes. Goodness is real, and this has profound implications for how we think about value and happiness. Such labors may not produce a cultural revolution in the way that Transcendental Idealism produced Romanticism, but it may provide a means of restoring culture itself and of the arts.allanius_{November 15, 2008
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Thanks for the Philosophy 101 review, Stephen, but I'm not arguing for a Kantian position. I think we live in a rational universe and are able to develop rational knowledge of it, and have done so. I don't believe that the existence of God is an obvious or necessary conclusion about that universe based on the evidence before us. I'm not arguing with Kant. I'm discussing your proposition that "good philosophy" inevitably leads to a belief in a God of some sort. To summarize: why is "the belief that we have rational minds, that there is a rational universe, and there is a “correspondence” between the two" particularly friendly to ID? One can rationally look at the universe, and accept its rational order, and draw other equally valid conclusions about the source and nature of that order and our ability to comprehend it. God is not a necessary hypothesis.hazel_{November 15, 2008
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Thanks, GP: Hazel: I allude to the unfortunate problem that Kant foisted upon the world when he began his inquiry about how can we know truth? Kant saw both the "dogmatism" of Rationalism and the skepticism of Empiricism as unacceptable, and tried to find a new way. As it turns out, there was such a third theory already available, discovered by Aristotle and developed by Aquinas. It was the common sense philosophy of Realism. Realism holds that we can know truth through both the intellect and the senses when they work together. (At one extreme, Rationalism accepts only the role of the intellect; at the other extreme, Empiricism accepts only the role of the senses). Rather than return to realism, Kant invented a whole new theory of knowledge. In effect, he reduced objective truth to the realm of the subjective. All previous philosophers had understood that truth was objective. That is what common-sense philosophy is all about. That is what knowing is all about---conforming the mind to objective reality. It is the “correspondence” between the mind and the rational universe that supports the life of the mind. Nevertheless, Kant denied that correspondence and claimed that all knowledge is subjective. In the process, he split the union of faith and reason which had built up western civilization and provided the metaphysical foundations for science and law. In effect, he compromised reason itself. Both modern philosophy and science have been fatally corrupted as a result of his error. One of Kant’s best friends had to stop reading “The Critique of Pure Reason” out of fear of going insane. Kant’s destructive epistemology was refuted by Thomas Reid in his own day and has been exposed by Mortimer Adler in the twentieth century. See Adler’s essay, “Little Errors In The Beginning,” which can be easily Googled. For most academics, though, the truth doesn’t matter. They prefer hyper-skepticism because it allows them to revel in their own fantasies rather than submit their intellect and will to objective truth. Many of their unfortunate students contracted the atheism by osmosis without even knowing what hit them.StephenB_{November 14, 2008
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StephenB (#12): Well said!gpuccio_{November 14, 2008
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That's a well-written post, Stephen. However I'm puzzled by one thing: You say that "Without good philosophy, (the belief that we have rational minds, that there is a rational universe, and there is a “correspondence” between the two), ID science will never have the foundation that it needs." I'm an atheist and I believe we live in a rational universe and that our rational minds can comprehend significant parts of that universe, so I don't see why what you describe as good philosophy is especially useful for ID. Many people who don't accept ID and don't believe there is a God who has designed the universe and various parts of it would agree with you and me that we live in a rational universe etc.hazel_{November 14, 2008
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Beckwith’s analysis does not capture the reality of the situation. Darwinian ideology is passed forth as science because science is worshipped and because philosophy has fallen into disfavor. It hasn’t always been that way, and it shouldn’t be that way. In happier times, sound philosophy was the order of the day, and it understood its proper role, which is to inform science with reason’s first principles and provide a solid metaphysical foundation. In fact, Aquinas made the point a long time ago that philosophy can prove (beyond a reasonable doubt) the presence of a designer, and that should had been enough. But the intellectual skepticism of the late middle ages led to the anti-intellectual skepticism of Hume and Kant, who successfully peddled the idea that we can’t really know anything about the real world except that which our senses tell us. Soon afterward, the Darwinists came along and aggravated this perversion by suggesting that only naturalistic science can give us the truth about design, which in their small minds, was that it was only an illusion. Science, in their judgment refuted the evidence of God’s handiwork and that was that. Philosophy, which should have come to the rescue, was already too corrupt to do its job. (Bad philosophy is even more destructive than bad science [“the corruption of the best is the worst”]. As a result, only science mattered, and the Darwinists were its gatekeepers. Since science is worshipped, therefore, and since good philosophy (Aristotelian/Thomism) has been taken off the table, only good science can rescue bad science. The way back to intellectual sanity is twofold: [A] ID science must refute Darwinist pseudo science on its own terms, and [B] Sound philosophy must be restored in parallel fashion and its reputation must be restored. Without good philosophy, (the belief that we have rational minds, that there is a rational universe, and there is a “correspondence” between the two), ID science will never have the foundation that it needs. Without ID science (empirical evidence that design is real), good philosophy will never again be accepted as valid. This is a dual problem that requires a dual solution. To retire into philosophy as Beckwith proposes is the equivalent of trying to survive on good food without maintaining the requisite input of oxygen.StephenB_{November 14, 2008
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Beckwith isn't getting much support by the commenters in the linked article. I think Beckwith fears ID is too entangled with religion and because it is formally an empiric, materialist study of matter in motion and probabilistic outcomes it is thus rendered falsifiable by empiric, materialist study of matter in motion and probabilistic outcomes. He doesn't want falsifiable tenets of faith getting mixed into Christian theology.DaveScot_{November 14, 2008
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Certainly such people have some kind of deep problem, though I am not sure it is a scientific one. But they are running the show. You raise a point though. Their motives are not scientific despite their claims. What Dembski's ID does is attempt to bring science back to the center and end the quasi-religious cult-like philosophy that now takes its name.tribune7_{November 14, 2008
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tribune7: "Those who control the scientific and cultural establishments demand that it be dogmatically accepted that it is blitheringly obvious that hands etc. are not designed." Certainly such people have some kind of deep problem, though I am not sure it is a scientific one.Vladimir Krondan_{November 14, 2008
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Isn’t it blitheringly obvious they were given to you for a purpose, and hence that is proof of intelligent intention? Well, that sort of gets to the point as to the necessity of ID and why Beckworth is probably on the wrong path. Those who control the scientific and cultural establishments demand that it be dogmatically accepted that it is blitheringly obvious that hands etc. are not designed. BTW, the Beckworth footnote you provided is reasonable.tribune7_{November 14, 2008
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Vladimir Krondan: It seems that Beckwith cannot understand, or appreciate, the difference between a scientific theory and a philosophy. Now, I am not saying that one or the other is better, or that both are not necessary. Beckwith is saying that. I am just saying that they are two different things. ID is a scientific theory, not a philosophy. What Beckwith is speaking of, instead, is design philosophies. Both are necessary. But we have always had design philosophies. A scientific theory of design, instead, with strong and detailed arguments, is rather new. So, I think Beckwith is a little bit confused. He is dismissing a solid and fundamental scientific theory, just because he prefers philosophy. It is as though I dismissed Einstein's relativity just because I think that Schopenauer is cooler. Or is Beckwith suggesting that science is useless, or frivolous?gpuccio_{November 14, 2008
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Beckwith puts it much clearer (in my view) in a subsequent post... "What my footnote was suggesting is that the attempt to isolate a portion of nature to detect design empirically (ala Behe) is not where the action is. It is in the overarching assumption that its all a matter of empirical detection. If Behe's argument works, then more power to him. But what I want to argue is that the degree to which the mind is able to extract patterns, know universals, and make judgments about normative ends is itself "evidence" of design. But it is not empirically detectable, i.e., scientific, but rather, a philosophical claim on which the entire scientific enterprise depends. In my judgment, that's a much stronger way to go. " - Beckwith. It seems then, that he is not really a dissenter against ID, but rather against weak forms of it. Think of it this way. You can argue all day about the design of molecular nano-machinery in the cell, or about the information in DNA, or countless other biological contrivances, and you can use all sorts of arguments about probability and information to make your point. But all that would seem rather strange to me... I mean, look at the obvious for a change. Look at your hands and what they can do... play piano and write and so on. Isn't it blitheringly obvious they were given to you for a purpose, and hence that is proof of intelligent intention? Is it not clear that the usual Darwinian fairytale -- that we aquired hands somehow in the distant past which just happened to be so accidentally providential that we could we put them to future use writing and playing piano... well, isn't that story absurd on the face of it? Or better yet one need only observe a beautiful landscape, and note that beauty implies purposive intention... It seems odd to always argue about probabilities and molecules and so on when design in nature is perfectly obvious and irrefutable even to a child.Vladimir Krondan_{November 14, 2008
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I don't understand why people who are supposedly smart insist that ID is somehow a "proof" of God. ID is simply a case for design. I also don't understand why people who supposedly believe life to be self-evidently designed feel it is unbecomingly lowbrow be present evidence for this design. Now, I accept that ID is falsifiable. If Beckworth wants to say ID is wrong because he can falsify, go for it man! Or if he wants to say that he thinks ID may one day be falsified, and feels uncomfortable about signing on, fine, but with this he would have to concede it is a pretty good idea for the time being. Beckworth appears to be simply dismissing it because he thinks it's uncool.tribune7_{November 14, 2008
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Modern writings on intelligent design seem to follow Payley, in the sense that they are sharply focused on living organisms and their adaptations. Despite his brilliance, Payley's neglect (a result of Anglican attitudes) of the prior art in natual theology from Cicero to Aquinas led to a narrow view. One need only dispense with Payley, and one can dispense with God, the Church of England, etc. Which was the whole point of Darwin's work. There is very little exploration of stronger forms of natural theology in the writings of intelligent design proponents. Post-enlightenment natural theology was in some ways a doorstep to atheism. Witness some of the work that appeared in the Bridgewater Treatises. Brilliant as they were, they are theologically shot full of holes. One wonders if some (not all) of these works were supposed to bolster faith or poison it. Some natural theology books of that time were truly execrable. There is much more to natural theology than arguments about complexity and adaptation of organisms. Alas, the trend is to ignore all that, as Payley and the post-enlightenment British intelligent design writiers did. We should take what is good from Payley and also take what is good from classic natural theology. In some ways though, modern ID is hard to reconcile with the classics and the scholastics. For example, natural forces and things like atoms are considered to be designed in classic natural theology, along with beauty in nature, etc, yet some IDers seem to say that, while life is designed, the other things are not. They make a distinction which introduces a weakness similar to post-enlightenment British writers on natural theology. Try this natural theology book (in the classic vein) and see what the similarities and differences are from modern ID: Principles of Natural TheologyVladimir Krondan_{November 14, 2008
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Beckwith seems to have a fundamental disagreement with the ID perspective. But that doesn't make him into some kind of enemy - he's admitting that ID raises important questions. He agrees with the larger project of opposing materialism, certainly atheism, and such presuppositions in the sciences. He does, however, feel that ID by its nature makes a strategic concession (or at least a strategic decision to, for arguing purposes, take a certain naturalist presumption as a given) that he can't square with his own philosophical perspective/approach. And he seems to be spelling this out graciously. Edward Feser is making statements along the same lines. I'd also respectfully point out that neither of them are basing their disagreements with ID on engineering, mathematics, or the hard sciences. Their problem is rooted in philosophy, at least by what they're saying here. This sort of thing always breaks my heart, as I find myself with strong ID sympathies, but still in the TE corner. Considering that Beckwith, Feser, and others are manifestly in agreement with many ID proponents on a wide range of questions, and that their differences don't have nearly the hostility so often seen with others, I hope their decision can be respected - and cooperation/dialogue maintained on the bigger picture. One thing that I do think would have Dawkins 'shaking in his boots' is a cessation of hostility between differing intellectual factions on this point. If the day comes where Ken Miller is willing to disagree with ID on science, yet find common ground to support other issues (non-materialistic neuroscience comes to mind as a good example), the playing field will be shaken up in a major way - and to the increased disadvantage of Dawkins and company. Anyway, just my two cents.nullasalus_{November 14, 2008
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Too bad. I used to greatly respect Beckwith. No longer. The only conclusion I can reach is that he is insufficiently knowledgeable concerning engineering, mathematics, and the hard sciences in general, in order to appreciate the ID thesis.GilDodgen_{November 13, 2008
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Beckwith offers no real reason for his rejection of ID except a philosophical preference. I think we who hold to ID are looking at physical evidence, not at either an attractive philosophy or a way to secretly promote religious agendas. "I have doubts about whether ID's answers can offer an attractive alternative to the inadequacies of the Enlightenment for the rationality of religious belief."idnet.com.au_{November 13, 2008
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