Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Guest Post: Continuity of Thought – A Disproof of Materialism

Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

Today’s guest post is from nkendall:

We have looked at the phenomena of dreams LINK: Are Dreams Incompatible With Materialism? and constancy of self through near death experiences LINK: Constancy of Self in Light of Near Death Experiences – A Disproof of Materialism as disproofs of materialism. Now I want to look at continuity of thought as a disproof of materialism.

 

Have you ever noticed that your mind is always presented with a continuous stream of related thoughts? There are seldom, if ever, any gaps where your mind is blank. There always seems to be a single, whole, intact thought present in our conscious awareness. I suppose there are exceptions such as seizures. Remarkably, barring interruption, each distinct thought in a sequence of thoughts is related to the adjacent thoughts in time; those before and after and in the context of one’s experiences. This is true whether we are rehashing a similar set of thoughts from memory, or when we are daydreaming or when our imaginations are heightened and presenting us with a novel, sequence of thoughts. Even more astounding is when these streams of thought are found to be creative and unique in human history and contribute to the advancement of human knowledge, human artifacts, artistic renderings and expressions of goodness in fundamental ways. Can these marvelous qualities of mind be reconciled with materialism which posits only the physical brain to account for human consciousness and intellect? No, they cannot; not even in principle.

 

Let’s first look briefly at materialist claims regarding consciousness and human intellect and then examine them in light of the qualities of mind that we all experience each moment of our lives.

 

MATERIALISM

It is not known how thoughts could arise in the brain, how they could be represented in the brain or how they could be rendered in our consciousness much less what consciousness is. For many people these intractable problems are enough to dismiss materialism from the start. But materialism’s grip on Western thought has conditioned the educated class into thinking that there are no plausible alternatives to a brain-only hypothesis of human consciousness and intellect. Only by thinking about the details of our conscious thoughts and about what would have to be the case for materialism to be true, does materialism’s brain-only theory fall apart.

 

Materialism’s reductionist accounting of human intellect requires strict adherence to bottom up causation. Bottom up causation means that it is the sequences of molecular neural events that give rise to one’s thoughts and directs them to our conscious awareness for rendering–somehow. Therefore, the thoughts that appear in our conscious awareness are entirely determined by the prior local causal chain of molecular neural events. But if our thoughts are produced and determined by the prior causal chain of neural events in the brain then they would not be expected or necessitated in any way to produce a coherent, continuous sequences of related thoughts that were recognizable to our conscious experience. There would be no expectation that adjacent brain states (similar configurations) would result in “adjacent” (tightly related) mental states. This decoupling of local causation at the physical level and information and meaning at the mental experience level is a fundamental fact that materialism is bound by. Simply put, physical processes in the brain cannot possibly have any way of knowing what set of physical sequences in the brain would give rise to coherent mental sequences of thought. Therefore, materialism is left with either blind chance or determinism neither of which could possibly produce the rich mental lives we all experience.

 

COMPLEX, SPECIFIED INFORMATION

The sequences of molecular neural events that materialism claims give rise to our thoughts would have to be precise and they would have to be specific. They would have to be precise and specific because there are an incalculable array of thoughts that can arise in our minds and these must then have an incalculable number of physical arrangements to underlie them. Imagine an insight that you have had or bit of knowledge that you have acquired. Then think of the innumerable ways in which it could be slightly modified even in very subtle ways. Each version of this insight would have–must have if materialism is true–a slightly different underlying neural signature otherwise they would not be distinguishable from thoughts which were slightly different. Also, since these physical processes–these sequences of molecular neural events–would have to interface with other putative physical processes, a predictable outcome could only result if the processes themselves, and the interface between them, were precise and specific.

 

Because thoughts and insights unfold over time, they would have underlying sequences of arrangements, not just static arrangements. Once the first thought in a stream of related thoughts were brought forth in our conscious awareness, the subsequent thoughts would be constrained by the content (the meaning) of the initial thought and increasingly so with each new thought as this collection of emerging thoughts matured into a complete insight. The underlying physical processes which materialism claims give rise to these thoughts would, therefore, also be increasingly constrained and more tightly specified as more thoughts were brought forth just as the configurations in my brain causing the movements of my hands and fingers would have to be increasingly constrained as I type out this sentence.

 

Therefore, under a materialist assumption, in order for a continuous, coherent stream of related thoughts to occur, an enormous number of molecular components in the brain would have to be continuously arranged in increasingly very precise and specific ways. The sheer number of molecular components involved betrays a very high degree of complexity. These streams of thought would exhibit extraordinary quantities of complex, specified information and constitute irreducibly complex configurations.

 

Especially noteworthy are the spontaneous emergence of unique and novel thoughts that lead to an expansion of human knowledge in profound and important ways. Although each of us have unique and novel thought streams each day, most are not significant in this regard. If materialism is true, its account of such unique and novel phenomena would entail that the underlying local causation in the brain results in a unique sequence of arrangements of components in the brain–arrangements that these components would have never assumed before. In and of itself that is not significant. By chance, local physical causation of components in the brain will almost always result in unique configurations. But what is special about the complexity here is the types of unique, complex sequences of arrangements of neural molecular components. These arrangements would be highly specified and convey information at the mental level that has meaning–important meaning–in human discourse. These sequences of arrangements would comprise an infinitesimally small set of possible dynamic configurations of the brain’s molecular components, the vast majority of which would convey absolutely no useful information at all in human discourse. (This all of course assumes that a sequence of arrangements of molecules can produce any thing at the mental level at all as materialism claims.)

 

FOREKNOWLEDGE

In addition to a material mechanism to account for the generation of continuous sequences of novel, complex, specified arrangements of physical brain components, there would have to be a physical process in the brain that would somehow know in advance either where those specific neural circuits were that were incubating a spontaneous emerging thought or whether the outcome of a physical process is producing a thought that is useful in an existing sequence of related thoughts. This physical process would also have to know how these thoughts were structured and how they were bounded within the neural circuits such that a whole, distinct, coherent thought could be captured, sequestered, transmitted and presented to our consciousness in a timely fashion. These physical processes in the brain would have to pass these distinct thoughts to another unknown physical process which would serialize them properly with other emerging thoughts and prepare them for rendering in our conscious experience. How these physical processes would know where and when these useful related thoughts were emerging, how they were structured and bounded, how they should be sequence and rendered in our consciousness are intractable mysteries.

 

These seemingly omniscient and clairvoyant physical processes of engendering coherent, contextually relevant thoughts, locating and identifying them as they emerge, sequencing them and preparing them for rendering in our consciousness would have to be repeated continuously and unerringly throughout the entire life of a human such that our conscious awareness was continuously presented with a coherent stream of related thoughts. These putative physical processes of the brain would have to account for the seamless rendering of a continuous stream of thoughts despite interruptions from our senses. They would have to be able to continuously reassert prior thought streams and integrate them with our memories and with any new information presented through the senses.

 

PROBABILITIES

Despite the intuitive implausibility of materialist claims given the foregoing, it is not possible to adequately quantify the probabilities. There are at least two reasons for this. First, we cannot know the scope of the possible alternative brain states, within which any coherent continuous thought stream would reside, because materialism cannot tell us how thoughts are, or could be, generated in the brain or how many physical components would be required to produce them and represent them. But we do know that the super set of possible brain states is vast and the probabilities of landing on a specific sequence of brain states that might produce a specific series of coherent mental states would be very unkind to materialism’s brain-only hypothesis, if it could be done at all. Secondly, thoughts have no obvious material qualities at all and therefore cannot be quantified except by using a proxy calculation using symbolic language which would grossly understate the complexity involved and therefore be excessively charitable to materialism. But materialism would fail miserably nonetheless

 

NEO-DARWINISM

Absent an immaterial mind, materialism is left with the physical brain. The brain then has to account for everything we experience in our mental lives. This is an enormous burden. According to materialism, each quality of mind is underwritten by a physical process in the brain. The only explanation materialism has to offer as to how all these marvelous qualities of mind could have arisen (and arisen so quickly), is evolutionary theory–neo-darwinism. According to neo-darwinism each of these processes would have had to have been assembled piecemeal using the tandem mechanism of random mutation and natural selection. But there are serious problems with this that cannot be overcome, even in principle.

 

One obvious problem with an evolutionary accounting for the brain is that so many of the features and qualities of mind exhibit the signature of modern humanity. It is hard to accept that the brain could have been configured by evolution in the distant past to harbor a vast set of latent capabilities which when manifested would just happen to be useful in the context of 21st century humans. It is one thing to have the general capability for something but quite another thing to explain the specific causes that could bring forth vast quantities of novel, complex specified information spontaneously, continuously and near instantaneously and that offer value to modern humanity!

 

Secondly, in order for evolution to have produced a brain with the capabilities and qualities of mind we all experience, the physical processes which materialism purports gives rise to them in the brain would have to be encoded and stored in the DNA. These configurations might then be subject to “random mutational” changes such that they could be selected. However, the configurations for these processes cannot be identified or even inferred from the DNA. So where does all this complexity come from? And where is it stored? Think of it this way: If materialism is true and if science is the only pathway to truth, then it is reasonable to say that nature and in fact all reality is transparent to human reason. In effect, then, the brain could be said to have the capability of subsuming the complexity of all reality. Yet the complexity of the DNA–especially those more limited segments that produce the brain–is hopelessly insufficient to account for the total complexity of reality. Furthermore, this complexity would have had to have arisen throughout the lives of far too few individuals throughout the brief evolutionary period during which the descent of modern man is believed to have occurred.

 

SUMMARY

I have briefly sketched out the intractable difficulties of a materialist account involving the continuity of human thought. If any of this sounds at all plausible to you then let me suggest that you have been irreparably brainwashed by the scientism which has come to dominate Western academia.

 

If it is unreasonable to believe that these marvelous qualities of mind that we all experience continuously cannot be explained by an electro-chemical “machine” of sorts i.e. the brain, then we have to consider alternatives such as mind/brain dualism and dismiss materialism as a false hypothesis. And in fact it is unreasonable to believe that material processes in the brain could account for these qualities of mind. Setting aside the intractable difficulties in explaining how abstract thoughts are represented in the brain and rendered in consciousness or even what consciousness is, there is no reason to suspect that physical processes would have the foreknowledge to identify specific areas in the vastness of the brain that just happened to be readying themselves to produce a specific, coherent stream of thoughts that have meaning in human discourse. And there is also no reason to believe that it is likely or even possible for the brain–unaided by an immaterial mind–to arrange its components in such a way that it would generate a succession of complex, specified configurations continuously and unerringly throughout one’s life. These problems are fundamental and will not surrender to an entreaty to promissory materialism because foreknowledge and spontaneous generation of novel, continuous, complex, specified information is required and these cannot be accounted for by physical processes in the brain.

 

Let me close with a supreme example of human thought. To believe that the streams of thought Einstein must have experienced, as he sought the solution to the problems whose eventual resolution became a fundamental truth about reality–Relativity, happened as a result of continuous sequences of chance arrangements of molecular neural events, is such a draft on common sense that one would have to conclude–given the general acceptance of materialism–that any belief, no matter how foolish and no matter how contrary to direct human experience, could come to be accepted if wrapped in the sophistication of intellectualism and delivered with the full authority of science. One has to wonder at the irony as to how a method of inquiry–science–which has been spectacularly successful, with its intention to seek truth empirically through open rational inquiry, could lead us down a dead end path and become like that which it sought to counter–the tyranny of an overbearing institutional religion which itself had departed from its own charter.

 

Comments
Interesting ... If I said, "I know with absolute certainty that my mind is 100% reliable", then RDFish would have no argument against that. I win every argument that way. If you disagree with me, it's because your mind is unreliable and you have no way of telling the difference between truth or falsehood. His only response would be an insult, like this one given to WJM:
Oh good grief, you are much, much scarier and more deluded than I ever imagined.
Who knows, RDFish might be scared by teddy bears and chocolate chip cookies. He thinks a perfectly rational argument is "deluded" ... why not? If he can't assess the quality of his own mind, he can imagine all sorts of scary things. Certain chemical processes create brain states which cause him to write things. No truth or falsehood, no logical demonstrations are needed. Hilariously, he'll also reference freshman epistemology courses as if they're an unimpeachable source of truth. Having it both ways (arguing from both sides of the fence) is the secret to RDFish's worldview. It's the basic materialist model -- use the theistic/rational intellectual structure to argue in favor of nihilism. But then have a nihilism which is identical to theism except there's no worship of God and certain moral norms are 'optional'. I notice how RDFish deals with it:
If you’d like to succumb to epistemological nihilism, then be my guest – wallow in it to your heart’s content, as some freshmen do when they first glimpse the abyss.
A rational argument won't work for him here so he appeals to emotion. He argues for nihilism, but if we accept the consequences of it, we're 'succumbing'? Once again, he's having it both ways. Supposedly, there's something 'bad' about the 'abyss' here and we should fight against it? Again, stealing from theism always seems to work in these cases. Express outrage that people actually take materalist-nihilism seriously. But that's cheating. RDFish's physicalist atheism is nihilistic. It's irrational and purposeless. There is no truth, no direction and it is amoral. It's nothing. Life is not better than death. Monism is a continuity of material particles - distinctions between life and non-life are unnecessary and arbitrary. RDFish speaks of an 'abyss' because he knows his worldview is false.Silver Asiatic
May 25, 2015
May
05
May
25
25
2015
07:41 AM
7
07
41
AM
PDT
RDFish
Now, you understand that you have no way of assessing if your mind is reliable or not.
Asserts the man who said that he doesn't think his mind is reliable. Hate to tell you, but if you can't assess the reliability of your own mind, then you don't know if what you just said makes any sense. But instead, you insist that it's a valid argument. If you can't assess the reliablity of your mind, then you don't know if you made an assumption, or on what basis you made it.
SB: If you assume that our minds are reliable, it is only because you think it is reasonable to do so. RDFish: No, you are wrong right off the bat.
Ok, got it. You assume your mind is reliable because it's unreasonable to do so. You've some personal insults in these recent replies. It's always a sign that you're getting a little defensive when that happens.Silver Asiatic
May 25, 2015
May
05
May
25
25
2015
07:01 AM
7
07
01
AM
PDT
RDFish (#130) comments on my argument against materialism (#107). // quantum randomness and determinism //
Box: Correct, but it [quantum randomness] doesn’t pose a serious problem for my argument.
RDFish: Yes, I already said that in my previous post – that it doesn’t really matter in this argument (…).
So, we agree that it doesn’t matter in this argument. IOW this objection can be discarded. BTW the jury is not out on the question of whether or not quantum mechanics implies indeterminism:
At the microscopic level the world is ultimately mysterious and chancy. So goes the story; but like much popular wisdom, it is partly mistaken and/or misleading. Ironically, quantum mechanics is one of the best prospects for a genuinely deterministic theory in modern times! Even more than in the case of GTR and the whole argument, everything hinges on what interpretational and philosophical decisions one adopts. The fundamental law at the heart of non-relativistic QM is the Schrödinger equation. The evolution of a wavefunction describing a physical system under this equation is normally taken to be perfectly deterministic. [Stanford.edu]
// on the definitions of “cause” and “control” //
RDFish: You don’t have to follow a regress of causes into the past in order to identify what causes something. (…) Even if antecedent events in the distant past do determine everything that we do, that would not mean that we do not cause things or control things ourselves.
The essential difference between being pushed under a train and jumping under a train by one’s own choice, without coercion, is the location of “control”. When you argue for the synonimity of “ultimate cause” and “cause”—or even “cause” and “control”— you lump these two scenarios together.
RDFish: Again, as I anticipated, you are assuming that the word “control” implies that the controller must be an uncaused cause – that is nothing but begging the question.
I don’t need to argue for an uncaused cause; my argument is very straightforward and simple: X is can only be said to be in “control” of its actions, if those actions are not the outcomes of prior conditions guaranteeing them. IOW one cannot be said to be in control when one is being pushed under a train. I don’t see how this is begging the question. // on the assumption that rationality requires “control” //
Box: For one thing, by “control” is meant the ability to do otherwise (and especially choose otherwise).
RDFish: Rationality doesn’t require this. If there is a rational thought or act performed by somebody, then it is of course rational, period, whether or not you “could have done otherwise”.
Rationality implies the ability to choose between alternatives, from a top-down perspective—regulative control. This activity makes rationality an ordering force. Without choices from a top-down perspective ordering is not possible.
“In the broadest sense, rationality is order. What is rational cannot be fundamentally unorganized (…)” [‘Roads to Reason’, Richard E. Hartwig, p.30]
For me it is self-evident that I’m choosing words while writing these sentences and it’s equally self-evident that I could have chosen other words—IOW that I have the ability to do otherwise. Also it's obvious that this ability is crucial to perform this (rational) task.Box
May 25, 2015
May
05
May
25
25
2015
05:05 AM
5
05
05
AM
PDT
RDFish: [Plantinga's] argument accepts that our minds may not be reliable... Thank you.Mung
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
10:33 PM
10
10
33
PM
PDT
Hi StephenB,
[a] If you assume that our minds are reliable, it is only because you think it is reasonable to do so.
No, you are wrong right off the bat. You still don't get. Here it is again - now take your time: You have no way of determining that your mind is reliable, for the simple fact that if your mind is not reliable, you would not be able to know it. Get it? Read that a few times until you understand it. Now, you understand that you have no way of assessing if your mind is reliable or not. What shall you do? You could give up thinking and arguing because you can't be sure it's not just a bunch of nonsense that you mistake for reason, or you could assume that your mind is reliable and continue living your life. Anyone who grasps this simple point (that is, anyone who has taken a freshman course in epistemology) realizes that we can only assume our minds are not a mess of irrational nonsense, and carry on.
Thus, by that very act, you are confessing that you believe your mind is reliable. Otherwise, you would not depend on it to judge the reasonableness of your assumption. You have not answered this point.
I've answered all of your points, over and over again: We all ASSUME our minds are reliable whenever we argue anything. Again, read it a few more times so you don't keep making the same mistake. My argument stands absolutely untouched: 1) Either our minds are reliable or they are not 2) If our minds are reliable, then they are reliable no matter how minds came to exist, and no matter what is true of ontology. In this case Plantinga’s argument does not apply. 3) Otherwise, if our minds are unreliable, then we can’t rely on anything we think, including Plantinga’s argument. So Plantinga’s argument does not apply in this case either. 4) Therefore, we cannot use the reliability of minds to argue against materialism, and we cannot conclude that materialism entails (or makes likely) that our minds are unreliable. If you'd like to succumb to epistemological nihilism, then be my guest - wallow in it to your heart's content, as some freshmen do when they first glimpse the abyss. The rest of us will assume that our minds are in fact reliable, and carry on making arguments and having a nice time debating. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
10:31 PM
10
10
31
PM
PDT
Hi WJM,
What on earth is “rationality” under materialism,
What is "rationality" under non-materialism? Once you answer that question, you'll have your answer.
There is simply no way to engage in an argument without the implicit assumption that both parties have access to a universal, objective means of arbiting correct reasoning from flawed reasoning and true statements from false.
Huh????? Do you actually believe this? So you think your reasoning is always flawless and correct because you access this universal objective truth-finding "means"? Oh good grief, you are much, much scarier and more deluded than I ever imagined. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
10:29 PM
10
10
29
PM
PDT
Hi Silver Asiatic,
You have already stated that you don’t think your mind is reliable.
You are clueless - I've explained this endlessly and you're playing with words and quote mining. TEDIOUS! Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
10:28 PM
10
10
28
PM
PDT
Hi nkendall,
If idealism is true then I have a greater assurance that our minds are reliable for understanding abstract truths because they would, in this case, be an endowment by an intelligent source.
No, that really isn't idealism per se - that is a theological version of idealism, like Berkeley's.
If materialism is true, then I would be inclined to believe that our brains are reliable for functions related to survival but not things related to comprehending abstract truths.
No, you mean "evolutionary theory" rather than "materialism" here.
Our minds appear to be reliable for comprehending abstract truths because multiple minds converge on these abstract truths.
But if your mind was not reliable (in Plantinga's sense) then you could be wrong about even this of course. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
10:26 PM
10
10
26
PM
PDT
RDF: What is so free and so rational about decisions that are caused by nothing at all? LoL. Given that RDFish’s mind is unreliable, why should we bother trying to disabuse him of the notion that free and rational decisions are caused by nothing at all?Mung
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
10:26 PM
10
10
26
PM
PDT
Hi drc466,
1 is self-evidently true.
Yes (if you accept the law of the excluded middle)
Therefore, we’ll consider 3 true as well.
Right- I'm using Plantinga's sense of "reliable" here.
This leaves point 2 as the arguable, and objectionable point of your argument. Is it true, and logical, to say that if our minds are reliable (capable of sound thought), then they are reliable no matter how minds came to exist?
Self-evidently, as you'd say: Once you assert that R is true, then R is true!
To rephrase: given just an outcome, is it impossible to make any statement about the process followed to achieve that outcome?
You can theorize all like you'd like, but the 2nd premise of my argument considers the case in which minds are reliable.
Analogy: If I have a car, can I state reasonably that the probability that the car (reliable mind) is the result of random forces of nature on raw materials (N&E) is significantly lower, essentially zero, compared to the probability that the car was designed and built by a human (~N&E)?
That is not what Plantinga's argument is saying. You seem to think Plantinga is arguing this: 1) N&E probably could not give rise to a reliable mind 2) Our minds are reliable 3) Therefore N&E is probably false. That is not at all Plantinga's argument. Rather, he argues that since P(R | N&E) is low, then if we accept N&E, P( R ) must be low, which is a defeater of N&E. In other words, his argument accepts that our minds may not be reliable, but argues that if that is the case, our reason for believing N&E in the first place is defeated.
Your point #2 sucks. Logic fail.
Uh, no - it is undeniably true. If minds are reliable, then minds are reliable, self-evidently.
You may disagree with Platinga’s point that N&E provides no impetus to form a reliable mind,
Actually I agree with that point. Where he goes wrong is that he treats (R | N&E) as a normal symbolic disjunction, and does not understand that ~R negates the entire implication (because if R is false then his entire argument can't be used in the first place). Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
10:23 PM
10
10
23
PM
PDT
Hi Box,
Correct, but it [quantum randomness] doesn’t pose a serious problem for my argument.
Yes, I already said that in my previous post - that it doesn't really matter in this argument - just pointing out that determinism isn't what you think.
RDF: You don’t have to follow a regress of causes into the past in order to identify what causes something. BOX: I’m not sure what you mean here—to which point are you objecting?
I'm pointing out that what you are arguing is mistaken: Even if antecedent events in the distant past do determine everything that we do, that would not mean that we do not cause things or control things ourselves.
For one thing, by “control” is meant the ability to do otherwise (and especially choose otherwise).
Rationality doesn't require this. If there is a rational thought or act performed by somebody, then it is of course rational, period, whether or not you "could have done otherwise". and @120
When the four ball is an ultimate source of its action, some condition necessary for its action originates with the four ball itself. It cannot be located in places and times prior to the four ball’s action.
Why are you talking about "ultimate sources"? I already anticipated and countered this - we do not follow causal chains to their ultimate source in order to assign causality. Otherwise the Grand Canyon was caused by the Big Bang and not the Colorado River.
Maybe RDFish wishes to argue that the four ball “controls” its actions wrt the eight ball, but if the four ball’s actions are the outcomes of prior conditions guaranteeing them, how can it be said to control those actions?
Again, as I anticipated, you are assuming that the word "control" implies that the controller must be an uncaused cause - that is nothing but begging the question. Moreover, I keep asking this of various people, but nobody ever answers: RDF: What causes the decisions that you make? ID person: My mind. RDF: And what causes your mind to make these decisions? ID person: Nothing at all, because what our minds do is not caused by antecedent events. RDF: What is so free and so rational about decisions that are caused by nothing at all? Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
10:16 PM
10
10
16
PM
PDT
//follow-up #107, #118, #120 // WRT RDFish's 'randomness objection' (post #114) I find the following line of reasoning by Van Inwagen very insightful, it shows rigorously why we don't get to control by randomness:
“Let us look carefully at the consequences of supposing that human behavior is undetermined ... Let us suppose that there is a certain current-pulse that is proceeding along one of the neural pathways in Jane’s brain and that it is about to come to a fork. And let us suppose that if it goes to the left, she will make her confession;, and that if it goes to the right, she will remain silent. And let us suppose that it is undetermined which way the pulse goes when it comes to the fork: even an omniscient being with a complete knowledge of the state of Jane’s brain and a complete knowledge of the laws of physics and unlimited powers of calculation could say no more than: ‘The laws and present state of her brain would allow the pulse to go either way; consequently, no prediction of what the pulse will do when it comes to the fork is possible; it might go to the left, and it might go to the right, and that’s all there is to be said.’ Now let us ask: does Jane have any choice about whether the pulse goes to the left or to the right? If we think about this question for a moment, we shall see that it is very hard to see how she could have any choice about that. ...There is no way for her to make it go one way rather than the other. Or, at least, there is no way for her to make it go one way rather than the other and leave the ‘choice’ it makes an undetermined event.” [Van Inwagen]
Box
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
04:41 PM
4
04
41
PM
PDT
Jerry, Yes, agreed. (Assuming arguendo that Macro-evolution is true).StephenB
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
03:54 PM
3
03
54
PM
PDT
StephenB
Neo-Darwinism says this: first the evolutionary process, then the design; ID says this: first the design, then the process.
Yes, the design preceded the process. We still do not know the process. It is highly unlikely it is anything resembling the process proposed by Neo Darwinians. But even if it was, this process must have been designed by some intelligence who then set up the dominoes. However, as I pointed out, I believe it was something else.jerry
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
10:51 AM
10
10
51
AM
PDT
I have not followed much of this thread but from what little of it I have read, it is nonsense logically. There is no such thing as a reliable mind whatever definition one uses. So to make the distinction of reliable and not reliable is a red herring. If we can find some definition we all agree on then at best we will find gradations of the quality whatever it is. It usually means measuring something and getting the same answer repeatedly. An attempted definition is
however, we will assume the simplest definition where “reliable” means “capable of sound thought”
Whatever "sound thought" means, there will always be levels of gradation in this with no one we know having a truly reliable mind. My guess is that if we pool reliable minds we will usually get a more reliable thought process. But we all know that great minds will differ dramatically on the same issue. I find it amazing that those with supposedly more reliable minds than others cannot find a coherent explanation of evolution even though they are mostly in agreement on the basics of biology. What's that say about their reliability?jerry
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
10:43 AM
10
10
43
AM
PDT
Given that RDFish's mind is unreliable, why should we bother trying to convince him that our minds are reliable?Mung
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
09:08 AM
9
09
08
AM
PDT
RDFish
See my response to Silver Asiatic – you made the same mistake.
You are not following the arguments. Here they are again: [a] If you assume that our minds are reliable, it is only because you think it is reasonable to do so. Thus, by that very act, you are confessing that you believe your mind is reliable. Otherwise, you would not depend on it to judge the reasonableness of your assumption. You have not answered this point. [b] Clearly, you are trying to have it both ways. When someone presents Plantinga’s argument, you challenge his claim that our minds are reliable, but when you are arguing against Plantinga, you become supremely confident about the reliability of your own mind. You have not answered this point. [c] It’s very simple, really. When you need to believe that our minds are reliable, you believe it; when you need to believe that our minds are not reliable, you believe that as well. So, we are left with your silly line of demarcation between assuming and thinking–as if one had nothing to do with the other. Remarkable. You have not answered this point.StephenB
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
08:27 AM
8
08
27
AM
PDT
Yeah I agree William @122. That is what I meant by my comment about minds converging on abstract thoughts. The common human quality to comprehend abstract truths (among other things), for me makes for a very strong inference of an immaterial mind--an endowment by a superior and pre-existent mind. I don't know how one can reconcile this unexpected and extraordinary ability with materialism.nkendall
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
07:39 AM
7
07
39
AM
PDT
What on earth is "rationality" under materialism, other than a local configuration of molecular interactions that refers to itself as "rational"? Under materialism, logic/reason is nothing more than a hollow label a material system happens to put on some aspect of itself which has no external/presumed objective validating/verifying logic-calibrating referent. Reason is whatever any individual system says it is. Under materialism, logic and reason are nothing but labels that a system can slap on any aspect of itself whatsoever. There is no means of oversight or verification. It's an entirely closed, self-referent process. There is simply no way to engage in an argument without the implicit assumption that both parties have access to a universal, objective means of arbiting correct reasoning from flawed reasoning and true statements from false. Such an argument also implicitly assumes both parties are capable of independently imposing correct reasoning and new, rational conclusions on their system in a top-down manner regardless of prior brain-state configurations. Rational argument depends on these implicit assumptions whether either party admits it or not.William J Murray
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
06:52 AM
6
06
52
AM
PDT
RDFish
You can’t show that your mind is any more reliable than mine, so if you claim that my mind is unreliable, so is yours.
You have already stated that you don't think your mind is reliable. However, my mind is reliable. With your unreliable mind, you have no means of judging what I just said. You're trying to claim that I can't show you something. Unfortunately, you don't know if I can or can't show you anything. You've destroyed the basis of any argument or discussion you propose. You can't attack the reliability of my mind because you don't have the means to do it. I however, affirm that my mind is reliable. Unfortunately, you can't evaluate that statement.
You almost have understood the problem, but you’re missing one piece – that everything you say about unreliable minds undermines anything you say just as it does mine, and Plantinga’s, as well: If our minds are not reliable, then no belief can be assumed to be true, and no argument valid.
You've said that you don't think your mind is reliable. Of course, that undermines everything you say. It destroys your argument against Plantinga, for the reasons you give. For me, however, I see clearly that my mind is reliable and my arguments are sound. But that would not happen if materialism was true. My mind would not be reliable.
Plantinga argues that if we assume N&E then P( R ) is low (or inscrutable), and says that undermines our assumption in N&E.
Yes, and since R is high, then N&E is false. IF R then N&E false If ~R then no argument valid You claim your argument is valid Therefore, R N&E is falseSilver Asiatic
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
06:15 AM
6
06
15
AM
PDT
// follow-up post #118 // The argument against materialism under discussion can be found in post #107. In post #114 offers the following objection to the argument:
RDF: You go wrong here. If I hit the cue ball and it hits the four ball and that hits the eight ball, then what causes the eight ball to move? The four ball does. You don’t have to follow a regress of causes into the past in order to identify what causes something.
Maybe RDFish’s objection stems from failing to distinguish between ultimate source and just a source. Allow me to elaborate on what an "ultimate source" is: When the four ball is an ultimate source of its action, some condition necessary for its action originates with the four ball itself. It cannot be located in places and times prior to the four ball's action. If the four ball is not the ultimate source of its actions—as is the case in RDFish's example—, then its actions do not originate in it. Maybe RDFish wishes to argue that the four ball “controls” its actions wrt the eight ball, but if the four ball’s actions are the outcomes of prior conditions guaranteeing them, how can it be said to control those actions?Box
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
06:14 AM
6
06
14
AM
PDT
Regarding reliability of mind... If idealism is true then I have a greater assurance that our minds are reliable for understanding abstract truths because they would, in this case, be an endowment by an intelligent source. If materialism is true, then I would be inclined to believe that our brains are reliable for functions related to survival but not things related to comprehending abstract truths. Our minds appear to be reliable for comprehending abstract truths because multiple minds converge on these abstract truths. Therefore, the inference for idealism is stronger. That's the way I see it anyway. Mr. RD Fish I will be back at you tomorrow with some followup. Be well all.nkendall
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
05:20 AM
5
05
20
AM
PDT
RDFish comments on my argument (see #117) against materialism:
1. If materialism is true, then determinism is true.
RDF: Not really – there is a randomness inherent in quantum physics that undermines strict determinism.
Correct, but it doesn’t pose a serious problem for my argument. Kairosfocus has already made this point in post #108. Unlike you, he notices that such randomness is “non-rational”, by which he implies that it is not a problem for my argument. I agree with Kairosfocus’ assessment. So, unless one wishes to argue that quantum randomness is somehow an explanandum for rationality, it isn’t really a problem for my argument.
2. If determinism is true, then all our actions and thoughts are consequences of events and laws of nature in the remote past before we were born. 3. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the remote past before we were born, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature. 4. If A causes B, and we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B. Therefore 5. If determinism is true, then we have no control over our own actions and thoughts.
RDF: You go wrong here. If I hit the cue ball and it hits the four ball and that hits the eight ball, then what causes the eight ball to move? The four ball does. You don’t have to follow a regress of causes into the past in order to identify what causes something.
I’m not sure what you mean here—to which point are you objecting?
Therefore, assuming that rationality requires control,
RDF: “Rationality requires control” doesn’t really mean anything that I can figure. What sort of “control” exactly are you talking about?
For one thing, by “control” is meant the ability to do otherwise (and especially choose otherwise).
6. If determinism is true, we are not rational. 7. We are rational.
RDF: How do you know?
I say we are rational. You are free to argue that we are not.Box
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
02:53 AM
2
02
53
AM
PDT
RDFish, I do love a logic-based argument.
1) Either our minds are reliable or they are not 2) If our minds are reliable, then they are reliable no matter how minds came to exist, and no matter what is true of ontology. In this case Plantinga’s argument does not apply. 3) Otherwise, if our minds are unreliable, then we can’t rely on anything we think, including Plantinga’s argument. So Plantinga’s argument does not apply in this case either. 4) Therefore, we cannot use the reliability of minds to argue against materialism, and we cannot conclude that materialism entails (or makes likely) that our minds are unreliable.
4 is a logical conclusion based on the truth of 1, 2 and 3, so refuting it depends on refuting 1, 2, or 3. 1 is self-evidently true. 3 is also conditionally true, but it assumes an absoluteness to reliability - that the mind is unreliable in all cases. For example, it is possible that the mind could be reliable when it comes to simple math and straightforward logic, but unreliable when it comes to moral judgment, tactical planning, etc. For the sake of argument, however, we will assume the simplest definition where "reliable" means "capable of sound thought", and "not reliable" means "completely incapable of sound thought". Therefore, we'll consider 3 true as well. This leaves point 2 as the arguable, and objectionable point of your argument. Is it true, and logical, to say that if our minds are reliable (capable of sound thought), then they are reliable no matter how minds came to exist? To rephrase: given just an outcome, is it impossible to make any statement about the process followed to achieve that outcome? Specifically, the probability of a given process to achieve that outcome? Analogy: If I have a car, can I state reasonably that the probability that the car (reliable mind) is the result of random forces of nature on raw materials (N&E) is significantly lower, essentially zero, compared to the probability that the car was designed and built by a human (~N&E)? Your point #2 sucks. Logic fail. You may disagree with Platinga's point that N&E provides no impetus to form a reliable mind, but then you would be contradicting your assumption that if our minds are reliable, we can't determine anything about how they came to be that way. In either case, to say that because our minds are reliable, we can't really say anything about how they got that way is indefensible. Unless, of course, your mind is unreliable. (Edit: On re-reading your logic, one possible interpretation is that your logic is correct, but is simply not applicable to Platinga's argument, e.g. it is true to say that the car is the car whether created by whirlwind or Honda, but Platinga isn't arguing the car isn't a car if it is a car - he's arguing that it is more likely a Honda than a whirlwind-brand. Thus, your logic error is in saying that Platinga's argument doesn't apply).drc466
May 24, 2015
May
05
May
24
24
2015
02:30 AM
2
02
30
AM
PDT
Hi StephenB, See my response to Silver Asiatic - you made the same mistake. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 23, 2015
May
05
May
23
23
2015
11:03 PM
11
11
03
PM
PDT
Hi Silver Asiatic, You can't show that your mind is any more reliable than mine, so if you claim that my mind is unreliable, so is yours. Welcome to epistemology 1A. You almost have understood the problem, but you're missing one piece - that everything you say about unreliable minds undermines anything you say just as it does mine, and Plantinga's, as well: If our minds are not reliable, then no belief can be assumed to be true, and no argument valid. Plantinga argues that if we assume N&E then P( R ) is low (or inscrutable), and says that undermines our assumption in N&E. My argument again: Either R OR ~R If R: Then P( R ) is not low, even if N&E is true. Otherwise if ~R: then no arguments apply, including Plantinga's So in both possible cases Plantinga's argument fails. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 23, 2015
May
05
May
23
23
2015
11:03 PM
11
11
03
PM
PDT
Hi Box
1. If materialism is true, then determinism is true.
Not really - there is a randomness inherent in quantum physics that undermines strict determinism
2. If determinism is true, then all our actions and thoughts are consequences of events and laws of nature in the remote past before we were born.
Again this isn't exactly the case, but it doesn't really matter here
3. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the remote past before we were born, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature.
This one is true
4. If A causes B, and we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B. Therefore 5. If determinism is true, then we have no control over our own actions and thoughts.
You go wrong here. If I hit the cue ball and it hits the four ball and that hits the eight ball, then what causes the eight ball to move? The four ball does. You don't have to follow a regress of causes into the past in order to identify what causes something. EDIT TO ADD: I'll try to save time by anticipating your objection: The four ball may cause the eight ball to move, but it doesn't control it. If that is what you're going to say, it is question-begging, since you're defining "control" as involving some uncaused cause to begin with. Otherwise, why stop with the human pool player?
Therefore, assuming that rationality requires control,
You've already blown your argument, but "rationality requires control" doesn't really mean anything that I can figure. What sort of "control" exactly are you talking about?
6. If determinism is true, we are not rational.
Nope - see above
7. We are rational.
How do you know? At least you tried! Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 23, 2015
May
05
May
23
23
2015
11:00 PM
11
11
00
PM
PDT
RDFish
I don't think our minds our reliable, I assume it.
You have refuted yourself yet again. If you assume that our minds are reliable, it is only because you think it is reasonable to do so. Thus, by that very act, you are confessing that you believe your mind is reliable. Otherwise, you would not depend on it to judge the reasonableness of your assumption. Clearly, you are trying to have it both ways. When someone presents Plantinga's argument, you challenge his claim that our minds are reliable, but when you are arguing against Plantinga, you become supremely confident about the reliability of your own mind. It's very simple, really. When you need to believe that our minds are reliable, you believe it; when you need to believe that our minds are not reliable, you believe that as well. So, we are left with your silly line of demarcation between assuming and thinking--as if one had nothing to do with the other. Remarkable.StephenB
May 23, 2015
May
05
May
23
23
2015
10:17 AM
10
10
17
AM
PDT
RDFish
Stop quote mining – include the rest of the quote.
You don't think your mind is reliable - you made that clear. Now you want me to include something about the rest of your thoughts. But you've already discounted the value of them. But ok, on the basis that you don't think your mind is reliable, you "think you assumed" something. So, an unreliable mind claims to have assumed something. Whatever you think you assume or whatever your argument claims to be -- we know that you don't think your mind is sound enough to make an argument. You don't know if you assumed something or not.
Good grief, man – everybody can read what I said on this very page!!
Yes, and you explained the value of everything you said. You don't THINK your mind is reliable. You're trying to have it both ways.Silver Asiatic
May 23, 2015
May
05
May
23
23
2015
08:16 AM
8
08
16
AM
PDT
Jerry, I very much appreciate your response since no one else has been willing to take up this issue. It is, in fact, my argument against BioLogos. I am not clear how your statement, which I agree with, bears on my argument, which is this: If the designer fashioned a Darwinian-like process to unfold via cosmic design, then the design of evolution preceded the process of evolution. If, on the other hand, as the Darwinists say, the designer did not front load a Darwin-like process via cosmic design, then the evolutionary process preceded the (appearance of) design. These two propositions are not compatible, i. e.. Design precedes process vs. Process precedes design.
I am calling Darwinism the claim that this complex machinery just arose out of basic chemical reactions and the environment and then this complex machinery accounted for all life we see. Neither claim is justifiable. But there is a process, and its origin is unknown that produces changes in life forms. But they are all minor.
Right. If the complex machinery just arose out of basic chemical reactions and the environment, then that same machinery (the process) had to precede the (appearance of) design. Either the design precedes the process (some form of front loaded ID perhaps with preplanned Darwin-like processes) or the process precedes the appearance of design (Darwinism with no ID front loading). It can't be both. Either the design precedes the process (ID) or the process precedes the design (Neo-Darwinism).
Could an omnipotent creator have designed a process that flowed from the initial conditions of the universe that then produced the machinery in a cell that leads to the Darwinian process? I would think the answer is yes.
Agreed. This, again, though, is an example of the design preceding the process. Neo-Darwinism does not allow for “a designed process that flows from the initial conditions of the universe” It says that the process emerged from undesigned cosmic conditions. That is another way of saying that Neo-Darwinism does not allow for the design to precede the process. It rules out all design, including the design that you just described. Neo-Darwinism says this: first the evolutionary process, then the design; ID says this: first the design, then the process.StephenB
May 23, 2015
May
05
May
23
23
2015
05:58 AM
5
05
58
AM
PDT
1 2 3 4 6

Leave a Reply