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Guest Post: Continuity of Thought – A Disproof of Materialism

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Today’s guest post is from nkendall:

We have looked at the phenomena of dreams LINK: Are Dreams Incompatible With Materialism? and constancy of self through near death experiences LINK: Constancy of Self in Light of Near Death Experiences – A Disproof of Materialism as disproofs of materialism. Now I want to look at continuity of thought as a disproof of materialism.

 

Have you ever noticed that your mind is always presented with a continuous stream of related thoughts? There are seldom, if ever, any gaps where your mind is blank. There always seems to be a single, whole, intact thought present in our conscious awareness. I suppose there are exceptions such as seizures. Remarkably, barring interruption, each distinct thought in a sequence of thoughts is related to the adjacent thoughts in time; those before and after and in the context of one’s experiences. This is true whether we are rehashing a similar set of thoughts from memory, or when we are daydreaming or when our imaginations are heightened and presenting us with a novel, sequence of thoughts. Even more astounding is when these streams of thought are found to be creative and unique in human history and contribute to the advancement of human knowledge, human artifacts, artistic renderings and expressions of goodness in fundamental ways. Can these marvelous qualities of mind be reconciled with materialism which posits only the physical brain to account for human consciousness and intellect? No, they cannot; not even in principle.

 

Let’s first look briefly at materialist claims regarding consciousness and human intellect and then examine them in light of the qualities of mind that we all experience each moment of our lives.

 

MATERIALISM

It is not known how thoughts could arise in the brain, how they could be represented in the brain or how they could be rendered in our consciousness much less what consciousness is. For many people these intractable problems are enough to dismiss materialism from the start. But materialism’s grip on Western thought has conditioned the educated class into thinking that there are no plausible alternatives to a brain-only hypothesis of human consciousness and intellect. Only by thinking about the details of our conscious thoughts and about what would have to be the case for materialism to be true, does materialism’s brain-only theory fall apart.

 

Materialism’s reductionist accounting of human intellect requires strict adherence to bottom up causation. Bottom up causation means that it is the sequences of molecular neural events that give rise to one’s thoughts and directs them to our conscious awareness for rendering–somehow. Therefore, the thoughts that appear in our conscious awareness are entirely determined by the prior local causal chain of molecular neural events. But if our thoughts are produced and determined by the prior causal chain of neural events in the brain then they would not be expected or necessitated in any way to produce a coherent, continuous sequences of related thoughts that were recognizable to our conscious experience. There would be no expectation that adjacent brain states (similar configurations) would result in “adjacent” (tightly related) mental states. This decoupling of local causation at the physical level and information and meaning at the mental experience level is a fundamental fact that materialism is bound by. Simply put, physical processes in the brain cannot possibly have any way of knowing what set of physical sequences in the brain would give rise to coherent mental sequences of thought. Therefore, materialism is left with either blind chance or determinism neither of which could possibly produce the rich mental lives we all experience.

 

COMPLEX, SPECIFIED INFORMATION

The sequences of molecular neural events that materialism claims give rise to our thoughts would have to be precise and they would have to be specific. They would have to be precise and specific because there are an incalculable array of thoughts that can arise in our minds and these must then have an incalculable number of physical arrangements to underlie them. Imagine an insight that you have had or bit of knowledge that you have acquired. Then think of the innumerable ways in which it could be slightly modified even in very subtle ways. Each version of this insight would have–must have if materialism is true–a slightly different underlying neural signature otherwise they would not be distinguishable from thoughts which were slightly different. Also, since these physical processes–these sequences of molecular neural events–would have to interface with other putative physical processes, a predictable outcome could only result if the processes themselves, and the interface between them, were precise and specific.

 

Because thoughts and insights unfold over time, they would have underlying sequences of arrangements, not just static arrangements. Once the first thought in a stream of related thoughts were brought forth in our conscious awareness, the subsequent thoughts would be constrained by the content (the meaning) of the initial thought and increasingly so with each new thought as this collection of emerging thoughts matured into a complete insight. The underlying physical processes which materialism claims give rise to these thoughts would, therefore, also be increasingly constrained and more tightly specified as more thoughts were brought forth just as the configurations in my brain causing the movements of my hands and fingers would have to be increasingly constrained as I type out this sentence.

 

Therefore, under a materialist assumption, in order for a continuous, coherent stream of related thoughts to occur, an enormous number of molecular components in the brain would have to be continuously arranged in increasingly very precise and specific ways. The sheer number of molecular components involved betrays a very high degree of complexity. These streams of thought would exhibit extraordinary quantities of complex, specified information and constitute irreducibly complex configurations.

 

Especially noteworthy are the spontaneous emergence of unique and novel thoughts that lead to an expansion of human knowledge in profound and important ways. Although each of us have unique and novel thought streams each day, most are not significant in this regard. If materialism is true, its account of such unique and novel phenomena would entail that the underlying local causation in the brain results in a unique sequence of arrangements of components in the brain–arrangements that these components would have never assumed before. In and of itself that is not significant. By chance, local physical causation of components in the brain will almost always result in unique configurations. But what is special about the complexity here is the types of unique, complex sequences of arrangements of neural molecular components. These arrangements would be highly specified and convey information at the mental level that has meaning–important meaning–in human discourse. These sequences of arrangements would comprise an infinitesimally small set of possible dynamic configurations of the brain’s molecular components, the vast majority of which would convey absolutely no useful information at all in human discourse. (This all of course assumes that a sequence of arrangements of molecules can produce any thing at the mental level at all as materialism claims.)

 

FOREKNOWLEDGE

In addition to a material mechanism to account for the generation of continuous sequences of novel, complex, specified arrangements of physical brain components, there would have to be a physical process in the brain that would somehow know in advance either where those specific neural circuits were that were incubating a spontaneous emerging thought or whether the outcome of a physical process is producing a thought that is useful in an existing sequence of related thoughts. This physical process would also have to know how these thoughts were structured and how they were bounded within the neural circuits such that a whole, distinct, coherent thought could be captured, sequestered, transmitted and presented to our consciousness in a timely fashion. These physical processes in the brain would have to pass these distinct thoughts to another unknown physical process which would serialize them properly with other emerging thoughts and prepare them for rendering in our conscious experience. How these physical processes would know where and when these useful related thoughts were emerging, how they were structured and bounded, how they should be sequence and rendered in our consciousness are intractable mysteries.

 

These seemingly omniscient and clairvoyant physical processes of engendering coherent, contextually relevant thoughts, locating and identifying them as they emerge, sequencing them and preparing them for rendering in our consciousness would have to be repeated continuously and unerringly throughout the entire life of a human such that our conscious awareness was continuously presented with a coherent stream of related thoughts. These putative physical processes of the brain would have to account for the seamless rendering of a continuous stream of thoughts despite interruptions from our senses. They would have to be able to continuously reassert prior thought streams and integrate them with our memories and with any new information presented through the senses.

 

PROBABILITIES

Despite the intuitive implausibility of materialist claims given the foregoing, it is not possible to adequately quantify the probabilities. There are at least two reasons for this. First, we cannot know the scope of the possible alternative brain states, within which any coherent continuous thought stream would reside, because materialism cannot tell us how thoughts are, or could be, generated in the brain or how many physical components would be required to produce them and represent them. But we do know that the super set of possible brain states is vast and the probabilities of landing on a specific sequence of brain states that might produce a specific series of coherent mental states would be very unkind to materialism’s brain-only hypothesis, if it could be done at all. Secondly, thoughts have no obvious material qualities at all and therefore cannot be quantified except by using a proxy calculation using symbolic language which would grossly understate the complexity involved and therefore be excessively charitable to materialism. But materialism would fail miserably nonetheless

 

NEO-DARWINISM

Absent an immaterial mind, materialism is left with the physical brain. The brain then has to account for everything we experience in our mental lives. This is an enormous burden. According to materialism, each quality of mind is underwritten by a physical process in the brain. The only explanation materialism has to offer as to how all these marvelous qualities of mind could have arisen (and arisen so quickly), is evolutionary theory–neo-darwinism. According to neo-darwinism each of these processes would have had to have been assembled piecemeal using the tandem mechanism of random mutation and natural selection. But there are serious problems with this that cannot be overcome, even in principle.

 

One obvious problem with an evolutionary accounting for the brain is that so many of the features and qualities of mind exhibit the signature of modern humanity. It is hard to accept that the brain could have been configured by evolution in the distant past to harbor a vast set of latent capabilities which when manifested would just happen to be useful in the context of 21st century humans. It is one thing to have the general capability for something but quite another thing to explain the specific causes that could bring forth vast quantities of novel, complex specified information spontaneously, continuously and near instantaneously and that offer value to modern humanity!

 

Secondly, in order for evolution to have produced a brain with the capabilities and qualities of mind we all experience, the physical processes which materialism purports gives rise to them in the brain would have to be encoded and stored in the DNA. These configurations might then be subject to “random mutational” changes such that they could be selected. However, the configurations for these processes cannot be identified or even inferred from the DNA. So where does all this complexity come from? And where is it stored? Think of it this way: If materialism is true and if science is the only pathway to truth, then it is reasonable to say that nature and in fact all reality is transparent to human reason. In effect, then, the brain could be said to have the capability of subsuming the complexity of all reality. Yet the complexity of the DNA–especially those more limited segments that produce the brain–is hopelessly insufficient to account for the total complexity of reality. Furthermore, this complexity would have had to have arisen throughout the lives of far too few individuals throughout the brief evolutionary period during which the descent of modern man is believed to have occurred.

 

SUMMARY

I have briefly sketched out the intractable difficulties of a materialist account involving the continuity of human thought. If any of this sounds at all plausible to you then let me suggest that you have been irreparably brainwashed by the scientism which has come to dominate Western academia.

 

If it is unreasonable to believe that these marvelous qualities of mind that we all experience continuously cannot be explained by an electro-chemical “machine” of sorts i.e. the brain, then we have to consider alternatives such as mind/brain dualism and dismiss materialism as a false hypothesis. And in fact it is unreasonable to believe that material processes in the brain could account for these qualities of mind. Setting aside the intractable difficulties in explaining how abstract thoughts are represented in the brain and rendered in consciousness or even what consciousness is, there is no reason to suspect that physical processes would have the foreknowledge to identify specific areas in the vastness of the brain that just happened to be readying themselves to produce a specific, coherent stream of thoughts that have meaning in human discourse. And there is also no reason to believe that it is likely or even possible for the brain–unaided by an immaterial mind–to arrange its components in such a way that it would generate a succession of complex, specified configurations continuously and unerringly throughout one’s life. These problems are fundamental and will not surrender to an entreaty to promissory materialism because foreknowledge and spontaneous generation of novel, continuous, complex, specified information is required and these cannot be accounted for by physical processes in the brain.

 

Let me close with a supreme example of human thought. To believe that the streams of thought Einstein must have experienced, as he sought the solution to the problems whose eventual resolution became a fundamental truth about reality–Relativity, happened as a result of continuous sequences of chance arrangements of molecular neural events, is such a draft on common sense that one would have to conclude–given the general acceptance of materialism–that any belief, no matter how foolish and no matter how contrary to direct human experience, could come to be accepted if wrapped in the sophistication of intellectualism and delivered with the full authority of science. One has to wonder at the irony as to how a method of inquiry–science–which has been spectacularly successful, with its intention to seek truth empirically through open rational inquiry, could lead us down a dead end path and become like that which it sought to counter–the tyranny of an overbearing institutional religion which itself had departed from its own charter.

 

Comments
Hi Silver Asiatic,
Once you assume your mind is sound (which you’ve done) then Plantinga’s argument is proven correct.
No it isn't. Why do you say that?
If your mind was unsound, you wouldn’t bother arguing with me and you wouldn’t be able to argue coherently.
No, that's not true. If your mind was unsound, you wouldn't know it, so you would continue to argue and you couldn't tell if your were arguing coherently or not.
So, your #3 doesn’t follow – you contradict it with your very attempt to make an argument, as below:
My #3 is this: 3) Otherwise, if our minds are unreliable, then we can’t rely on anything we think, including Plantinga’s argument. So Plantinga’s argument does not apply in this case either. If our minds are unreliable, then we can't trust anybody's arguments - not mine, not Plantinga's, not anyone's. So, in this case, Plantinga's argument should be ignored just like all others.
1. If RDFish’s mind is unreliable, then he couldn’t rely on anything he thinks 2. RDFish does, however, rely on what he thinks since he believes he has proven that Plantinga’s argument is specious (and he expects me to agree – thus thinking my mind is sound also) 3. Therefore, RDFish thinks his mind is reliable and he uses his mind to argue against Plantinga
No, I don't THINK our minds are reliable, I ASSUME it: I assume that your mind and my mind is reliable (in Plantinga's sense), because there is no way to discover if our minds are reliable or not (that is, if our minds are unreliable we could not make that assessment). If I don't make that assumption, however, there is no point arguing, so I simply do make that assumption - just like you do.
1. If evolution was true, RDFish would have no reason to think his mind is reliable
I actually disagree with this too, but my refutation of Plantinga does not hinge on it, so I agree arguendo.
2. Following from above however, RDFish does think his mind is reliable
As I just said, this isn't the case - it is an assumption we all make, not a reasoned conclusion.
3. Therefore, RDFish demonstrates that evolution is not true
Nope - your #2 is false. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 22, 2015
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Hi Box,
Again, I have no idea what you are talking about.
You have no idea what either of us are talking about.
One thing is for sure, you are not addressing my argument.
I've demolished it. And Re: #78: Valicella's point about responsibility is a different subject, and since you haven't undertsood compatibilism to begin with, we shouldn't delve into that. Let's say arguendo that he shows that compatibilism isn't compatible with responsibility. That doesn't mean people are not free in the compatibilist sense of the word that I've explained to you. (Now you tell me that my definitions aren't right, and that only yours are right, and that somehow means you've proven libertarianism, hahahaha) Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 22, 2015
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Excerpt from the article "The Consequence Argument Against Compatibilism" by Bill Vallicella:
1. If determinism is true, then all our actions and thoughts are consequences of events and laws of nature in the remote past before we were born. 2. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the remote past before we were born, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature. 3. If A causes B, and we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B. Therefore 4. If determinism is true, then we have no control over our own actions and thoughts. Therefore, assuming that responsibility requires control, 5. If determinism is true, then we are not responsible for anything we do or think. Therefore, assuming that freedom entails responsibility, 6. If determinism is true, then we are not free, which is to say that every form of compatibilism is false.
- - - - Obviously "determinism" can be replaced by "materialism". Moreover I would like to add that rationality cannot exist without freedom, control over thoughts and responsibility.Box
May 22, 2015
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Jerry
We had a discussion about a year ago on this. It is possible that the designer used natural processes to lead to an inevitable outcome. The original initial conditions and boundary conditions thus formed could have lead to life and eventually to us as part of a plan.
If the designer planned to "use" the process, and designed the process that was used, then the plan and the design preceded the process. Surely, you are not arguing that the designer did not design the process that He used.
The Darwinian process could have been designed into the universe’s initial conditions and we just never found out how. And then other boundary conditions could have led to higher forms of life, all directed from an exquisite formation of dominoes set loose at the Big Bang.
That would still mean that the evolutionary design, which is the product of, or part of, a larger cosmic design, preceded the evolutionary process. According to Darwinian evolution, the evolutionary process preceded the design (the illusion of design).StephenB
May 22, 2015
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Box
Similarly compatibilism cannot get us to real freedom, real responsibility, real decisions, real control, real personhood and real rationality. All it can do is assert that the illusion of those things is somehow possible within a materialistic framework.
Right. Real freedom means the capacity and the opportunity to make a variety of choices, all of which would produce different outcomes. Without the capacity and opportunity to have acted differently than one acted, freedom is just an illusion. Under those circumstances, there can be no such thing as moral responsibility. In a court of law, a convicted criminal is one who is understood to have done something he did not have to do and is being punished for it---that is---he is "guilty" because he chose the wrong course of action when he could have chosen the right course of action. According to the logic of the verdict, things could have been different.StephenB
May 22, 2015
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In the case of real design (also with Theism), the design precedes the evolutionary process. In the case of Darwinism (also with physicalism), the evolutionary process precedes the design (appearance of).
We had a discussion about a year ago on this. It is possible that the designer used natural processes to lead to an inevitable outcome. The original initial conditions and boundary conditions thus formed could have lead to life and eventually to us as part of a plan. I do not believe this because the forensic evidence says otherwise. But it always a possibility that this is how it was implemented but unlikely given the evidence. So it is a chicken or egg question. The Darwinian process could have been designed into the universe's initial conditions and we just never found out how. And then other boundary conditions could have led to higher forms of life, all directed from an exquisite formation of dominoes set loose at the Big Bang. Now I do not believe this but the omnipotent God could have done it this way. This is the belief among the Christian Darwinian thinkers. It certainly was my belief before poking into ID and the evolution debate.jerry
May 22, 2015
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F/N: What we have lost . . . Webster's Dictionary, 1828, full definition set [from the copy in The Word software, too lazy to copy out my paper copy]: >> LIB'ERTY, n. [L. libertas, from liber, free.] 1. Freedom from restraint, in a general sense, and applicable to the body, or to the will or mind. The body is at liberty, when not confined; the will or mind is at liberty, when not checked or controlled. A man enjoys liberty, when no physical force operates to restrain his actions or volitions. [--> a programming force and/or a force that imposes a chance distribution that drives outcomes on the brain are precisely opposed to proper freedom] 2. Natural liberty, consists in the power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, except from the laws of nature. It is a state of exemption from the control of others, and from positive laws and the institutions of social life. This liberty is abridged by the establishment of government. 3. Civil liberty, is the liberty of men in a state of society, or natural liberty, so far only abridged and restrained, as is necessary and expedient for the safety and interest of the society, state or nation. A restraint of natural liberty, not necessary or expedient for the public, is tyranny or oppression. civil liberty is an exemption from the arbitrary will of others, which exemption is secured by established laws, which restrain every man from injuring or controlling another. Hence the restraints of law are essential to civil liberty. The liberty of one depends not so much on the removal of all restraint from him, as on the due restraint upon the liberty of others. In this sentence, the latter word liberty denotes natural liberty. 4. Political liberty, is sometimes used as synonymous with civil liberty. But it more properly designates the liberty of a nation, the freedom of a nation or state from all unjust abridgment of its rights and independence by another nation. Hence we often speak of the political liberties of Europe, or the nations of Europe. 5. Religious liberty, is the free right of adopting and enjoying opinions on religious subjects, and of worshiping the Supreme Being according to the dictates of conscience, without external control. 6. Liberty, in metaphysics, as opposed to necessity, is the power of an agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, by which either is preferred to the other. Freedom of the will; exemption from compulsion or restraint in willing or volition. 7. Privilege; exemption; immunity enjoyed by prescription or by grant; with a plural. Thus we speak of the liberties of the commercial cities of Europe. 8. Leave; permission granted. The witness obtained liberty to leave the court. 9. A space in which one is permitted to pass without restraint, and beyond which he may not lawfully pass; with a plural; as the liberties of a prison. 10. Freedom of action or speech beyond the ordinary bounds of civility or decorum. Females should repel all improper liberties. To take the liberty to do or say any thing, to use freedom not specially granted. To set at liberty, to deliver from confinement; to release from restraint. To be at liberty, to be free from restraint. Liberty of the press, is freedom from any restriction on the power to publish books; the free power of publishing what one pleases, subject only to punishment for abusing the privilege, or publishing what is mischievous to the public or injurious to individuals. >> Also: >> FREE'DOM, n. 1. A state of exemption from the power or control of another; liberty; exemption from slavery, servitude or confinement. Freedom is personal, civil, political, and religious. [See Liberty.] 2. Particular privileges; franchise; immunity; as the freedom of a city. 3. Power of enjoying franchises. 4. Exemption from fate, necessity, or any constraint in consequence of predetermination or otherwise; as the freedom of the will. 5. Any exemption from constraint or control. 6. Ease or facility of doing any thing. He speaks or acts with freedom. 7. Frankness; boldness. He addressed his audience with freedom. 8. License; improper familiarity; violation of the rules of decorum; with a plural. Beware of what are called innocent freedoms. >>kairosfocus
May 22, 2015
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Meanwhile it might be relevant to see what Plantinga actually says:
My claim was that naturalism and contemporary evolutionary theory are at serious odds with one another--and this despite the fact that the latter is ordinarily thought to be one of the main supporting beams in the edifice of the former.
Mung
May 22, 2015
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RDF, If your compatibilism is so, we are in the position of that Pentium chip, without responsible freedom but just computing on whatever happens to be the material substrate and software loaded in the system. Argument itself collapses, that is how absurd the redefinition is. And, compatibilism with it, for it is an argument, using an argumentative definition. BTW, robots are not free in any sense worth having. KF PS: Webster's 1828:
liberty LIB'ERTY, n. [L. libertas, from liber, free. ]1. Freedom from restraint, in a general sense, and applicable to the body, or to the will or mind.
If something is programmed in hardware or software, it is simply not free from restraint. That programming is the very opposite of freedom. We are looking at 1984 doublespeak here, freedom is slavery and slavery freedom. Absurd. Genuine, responsible freedom is a condition of rationality, and its denial, however effected is in oppositional to reason itself. That, in the end is how we know that any species of determinism on mind is irrational.kairosfocus
May 22, 2015
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Mung - exactly. He's trying to convince us that his mind is unreliable.Silver Asiatic
May 22, 2015
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StephenB #69, Excellent point Stephen. Similarly compatibilism cannot get us to real freedom, real responsibility, real decisions, real control, real personhood and real rationality. All it can do is assert that the illusion of those things is somehow possible within a materialistic framework.Box
May 22, 2015
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RDFish
All evolutionary biologists believe that organisms are designed, of course – they believe that they are designed by evolutionary processes.
Absolutely not. I didn’t want to get involved in the discussion, but this is a very serious error. In the case of real design (also with Theism), the design precedes the evolutionary process. In the case of Darwinism (also with physicalism), the evolutionary process precedes the design (appearance of). That is why the formal definition of the word “design” always relates to the plan behind the action and never implies that the plan could come out of the action: “Design is the creation of a plan or convention for the construction of an object or a system (as in architectural blueprints, engineering drawings,” And again, [Design is] the “purpose, planning, or intention that exists or is thought to exist behind an action, fact, or material object.” Accordingly, with physicalism or Darwinism, we get only the illusion of design after the fact. There can be no real design before the fact. Real design is a function of architecture; illusionary design is a function of history.StephenB
May 22, 2015
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Since RDFish's mind is completely unreliable at all times I think we should ignore anything he says.Mung
May 22, 2015
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RDFish
Once we assume our minds are sound, Plantinga’s argument doesn’t apply.
Once you assume your mind is sound (which you've done) then Plantinga's argument is proven correct. If your mind was unsound, you wouldn't bother arguing with me and you wouldn't be able to argue coherently.
If you want to defeat my argument, tell me which of these is false or doesn’t follow:
As above, you're using a logical demonstration to try to convince me of something. Therefore, you're making it clear that you think your mind is sound. So, your #3 doesn't follow - you contradict it with your very attempt to make an argument, as below: 1. If RDFish's mind is unreliable, then he couldn't rely on anything he thinks 2. RDFish does, however, rely on what he thinks since he believes he has proven that Plantinga's argument is specious (and he expects me to agree - thus thinking my mind is sound also) 3. Therefore, RDFish thinks his mind is reliable and he uses his mind to argue against Plantinga 1. If evolution was true, RDFish would have no reason to think his mind is reliable 2. Following from above however, RDFish does think his mind is reliable 3. Therefore, RDFish demonstrates that evolution is not trueSilver Asiatic
May 22, 2015
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RDFish:
If you want to defeat my argument, tell me which of these is false or doesn’t follow: 1) Either our minds are reliable or they are not
Let's start with your first premise. How are you defining reliable. Completely without error in all things at all times? So let's rephrase it: Either our minds are completely without error in all things at all times or our minds are not completely without error in all things at all times. Now what happens to your argument?Mung
May 22, 2015
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RDFish #63 Again, I have no idea what you are talking about. One thing is for sure, you are not addressing my argument. I have spelled it out and spelled it out and I'm not going to spell it out anymore. - - Thank you.Box
May 22, 2015
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Hi Silver Asiatic,
Implict in the argument is that you do know your mind is reliable.
Plantinga does not argue that we know our minds are reliable, nor do I.
But you do think it is sound – thus you think your mind is reliable.
Like you and everyone else, I can only assume my mind is sound; otherwise there's no point. We can't test to see if our minds are reliable, just as we can't test to see if there are any other minds (solipsism). Once we assume our minds are sound, Plantinga's argument doesn't apply.
Therefore, by your own belief system, evolutionary materialism must be false.
Huh? This doesn't follow at all. If you want to defeat my argument, tell me which of these is false or doesn't follow: 1) Either our minds are reliable or they are not 2) If our minds are reliable, then they are reliable no matter how minds came to exist, and no matter what is true of ontology. In this case Plantinga’s argument does not apply. 3) Otherwise, if our minds are unreliable, then we can’t rely on anything we think, including Plantinga’s argument. So Plantinga’s argument does not apply in this case either. 4) Therefore, we cannot use the reliability of minds to argue against materialism, and we cannot conclude that materialism entails (or makes likely) that our minds are unreliable. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 22, 2015
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Hi Box,
Because decisions that bypass consciousness are in conflict with what we assume to be a prerequisite of rationality: “a free person who is in control of her/his thoughts and who is responsible for the outcome.”
Making assumptions doesn't constitute an argument. You actually have to say why compatibilist freedom is incompatible with rationality. You haven't yet even tried. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 22, 2015
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Hi KF, Here are your mistakes:
This subtly loaded redefinition of freedom...
I didn't redefine "freedom"; libertarians do not own the definition any more than compatibilists do.
...boils down to once we reduce mind to computation...
Comptabilism does not entail functionalism. That is, compatibilists are not necessarily committed to the notion that mental states are computable.
No definition of freedom that directly or indirectly undermines responsible rational insight and contemplation...
There is no suggestion that compatibilist freedom does any such thing.
Those chips were not free...
You don't understand that in order to talk about these issues you really do need to stop equivocating on definitions. Robots can be free in a compatbilist sense but not in a libertarian sense. Instead of arguing about which definition we should use and declaring you are correct because everyone ought to use your definition, why don't you actually debate the issue and try and point why a compatibilist definition is actually incompatible with reason, rationality, and so on.
They blindly produced rubbish, and that had to be externally caught and corrected by modifying the design.
Good - you've attempted to actually make an argument here. Your argument fails because people also produce rubbish that has to be externally caught and corrected, quite obviously.
I keep saying that blindly mechanical computation like that is categorically distinct from responsibly free rational contemplation, insight, decision.
Repeating a declaration does not constitute an argument. You actually need to say why you think this is true. And again, only functionalists believe that minds are computation, not all materialists/compatibilists. If you want to argue against materialism, you have to argue against not just Dennett but also Searle.
Self referentially incoherent error must be seen for what it is and rejected. It is simply not sensible to stubbornly cling to absurdity that happens to be ideologically dominant in our day.
When you talk like this you sound like a paranoid neurotic. Stop being so dramatic, relax, and enjoy a debate about philosophy. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 22, 2015
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RDFish
I simply basically point out that if our minds are unreliable, we can’t know if Plantinga’s argument is sound either.
Implict in the argument is that you do know your mind is reliable. Otherwise, you wouldn't think your own argument against Plantinga is sound. But you do think it is sound - thus you think your mind is reliable. Therefore, by your own belief system, evolutionary materialism must be false.Silver Asiatic
May 22, 2015
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semi related: The Poison of Subjectivism by C.S. Lewis Doodle https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lgcd6jvsCFsbornagain77
May 22, 2015
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Box: Everyone who engages in rational inquiry assumes to be a free person who is in control of her/his thoughts and to be responsible for the outcome.
RDFish: I agree, (...)
Box: If we are to conclude, based on these experiments [Libet, Soon], that many (or all) of ‘our’ rational decisions are made without involvement of consciousness—if not consciousness but brain chemicals are behind the steering wheel of reason—then our axiomatic concept of rationality is in need of radical revision.
RDFish: Why?
Because decisions that bypass consciousness are in conflict with what we assume to be a prerequisite of rationality: "a free person who is in control of her/his thoughts and who is responsible for the outcome." Why on earth isn't that obvious?Box
May 22, 2015
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RDF:
we need to carefully define what we mean by “free” obviously. I mean “unfettered by external constraint”. What do you mean?
This subtly loaded redefinition of freedom boils down to once we reduce mind to computation, things come down to physically set up internal brain-CNS state determines response to inputs, perhaps with noise or some randomness. Such is unsatisfactory relative to what we experience and need as a requisite of rational discussion. No definition of freedom that directly or indirectly undermines responsible rational insight and contemplation then decision and action not driven and controlled by blind inherently non-rational mechanical factors and/or equally blind chance is acceptable. You are doubtless familiar with the recall of the old Pentium chips because of the math processor error. Those chips were not free, they were blind computational substrates doing exactly what was programmed, no more and no less. They blindly produced rubbish, and that had to be externally caught and corrected by modifying the design. I keep saying that blindly mechanical computation like that is categorically distinct from responsibly free rational contemplation, insight, decision. To try to get the second from the first is to try to get North by insisting on heading due West. Yes, our first fact is self-aware, reflexive, self-moved responsible freedom of mind. We may surrender that freedom to significant extent, but the underlying capacity remains. I insist, no redefinition that undermines or is inconsistent with this requisite of even having a responsible, rational, reasoned discussion can be accepted. On pain of letting grand delusion loose and ending in self-referential incoherence. Of course, this challenges the dominant evolutionary materialism out there. But that is demonstrably little more than the great, self-referentially incoherent delusion of our time. I conclude by pointing to Reppert:
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
No view of mindedness that has no room for responsible freedom and genuine reason, can be acceptable. Yes, that means we must wake up from the great, lab coat clad delusion of our times that tries to reduce mind to brain wetware and programming, but that is precisely the point. Self referentially incoherent error must be seen for what it is and rejected. It is simply not sensible to stubbornly cling to absurdity that happens to be ideologically dominant in our day. Instead, we ought to correct it. KFkairosfocus
May 22, 2015
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Hi nkendall,
I do not think we disagree as much as you suggest.
Well, let's see...
You are not a materialist – we agree on that.
Right. The reason I am not a materialist (aside from the ambiguities of meaning inherent in the term) is because nobody can even imagine what a materialist theory of consciousness would look like.
You do not believe that computers think in the same way we do – we agree on that. (I think you were playing a game of semantics on this issue but no big deal – do you agree?).
Yes I agree, and no semantic games at all. Nobody in AI believes that Deep Blue does anything like what human grandmasters do, and interesting experiments have been conducted which highlight a few observable differences. For example, a top chess champion can look at a game in progress for a few seconds and memorize the board, but if the pieces are placed randomly they are no better than non-chess-players at remembering the positions. This is not the case with chess-playing computers. Currently there is a well-publicized contest between a computer and top poker players in Las Vegas. (The humans are winning by a little bit). But just like with Deep Blue, the strategy of the computer strikes the human experts as being clever, intelligent, and alien.
You do not accept neo-Darwinism – we agree on that.
Right.
Who has falsified evolutionary theory in the manner you described above.
The evidence comes from a number of places. First, while Avida is supposed to provide a way to study evolution, I believe it actually demonstrates the limits of evolutionary algorithms in producing complex form and function. (Unpublished experiments I've performed myself have given me an intuitive understanding of what evo algorithms can and can't do as well). But more importantly, people like Michael Denton, Brian Goodwin, Stuart Kauffman, James Shapiro, and others have all published analyses showing evolutionary mechanisms to be insufficient to create complex species.
Not to belabor the point but would you agree that had science adopted an approach assuming that life was designed and formed hypothesis consistent with that assumption, that more progress would have been made?
Absolutely, positively not. All evolutionary biologists believe that organisms are designed, of course - they believe that they are designed by evolutionary processes. Evolutionary processes are learning systems that are implemented by large populations of organisms that reproduce semi-conservatively and compete for resources. The memory of the system is implemented by genetic resposities in each organism. The learning algorithm is very simple - the gene pool is altered in response to how well various genotypes enable the organism to reproduce. The problem-solving strategy is strictly trial-and-error, with no lookahead or backtracking, but it is problem solving nonetheless, which is why I find it perfectly reasonable to say that evolutionary algorithms implement a very limited form of intelligence. Now, these biologists believe this intelligent designer called "evolution" is capable of producing complex organisms, but you and I and the other folks I mentioned disagree. But those evo biologists don't deny "design" in biology, they only deny that the designer was conscious or used planning. And my position? I think we don't know what sort of thing was responsible. Maybe it has something to do with conscious mind, and maybe it doesn't. On one hand, humans are conscious and we invent complex mechanisms. On the other hand, as far as we can scientifically ascertain thus far, all conscious minds require complex mechanisms (functioning brains). How could this mutual dependency lead to the first complex organisms? We're missing something important, and nobody knows what.
You agree that the mind/brain puts forth complex specified information exhibited by our thoughts and I suppose you would agree images for example in dreams as well (although we can agree to disagree on some of the details as to gaps in thoughts and so forth) – so I think we agree on this.
Sure.
We agree that the phenomena of complex specified information produced by the brain/mind is unsolved, you refer to it as a mystery – so we sort of agree on this.
Great!!
You resist (does that capture your view?) attributing complex specified information to an immaterial mind – if so, okay that is fine.
More than resist - I have lots of problems with this, including: 1) Define "immaterial". Again - is a magnetic field material? Why? How about a quantum waveform? Is quantum entanglement a material phenomenon? 2) The term "mind" conveys no information beyond the claim of consciousness - it doesn't say how minds work, how they solve problems or design things, how they interact with matter, etc, so we learn nothing when ID claims an "immaterial mind" was responsible. 3) We do not understand the relationship between consciousness and mental abilities; in particular we don't know if consciousness is perceptual or causal.
You discount the notion that unprogrammed, local causation of brain components is a viable causal mechanism to account of the complex specified information that the brain/mind exhibits – we agree on that.
No, we disagree about this. We don't know how brains work, and we don't even know all of the physical effects involved. Various smart people think exotic physics must play a role, and so not all causation going on in the brain would necessarily be local. And even if the physics is all within what we already know, we just don't understand what is going on in the brain - just like you couldn't understand how Microsoft Word worked just by understanding the operation of transistors. So no, the brain may well be completely responsible for thinking and behavioral output (of CSI as you say). Plus, I don't know what you mean by "unprogrammed".
You do not seem to subscribe to the emergent physical mind model where a physical mind emerges from the brain and serves as a top down programmatic or computational controller over the components in the brain resulting in that which we experience as our consciousness, thoughts, memories, feeling, beliefs, etc, is that correct? – If so, we agree on that.
Let's skip this one. I'll say I agree with you arguendo.
You agree that a verifiable near death experience case with an out of body component where the subject is able to disclose information that he/she could not have known otherwise (because he was floating around above) would demonstrate that an immaterial mind plays an essential role in that which we experience as human consciousness and thought, etc. – So I think we agree on that.
Not exactly. Another explanation could be ESP of some sort. ESP does not require "immaterial minds" - again we're stymied by the unclear meaning of "immaterial" - brains that utilized exotic physical phenomenon for remote viewing would also be consistent with those results.
(By the way, some would say that that criterion has been met in at least several cases – read for example Pim Van Lommel’s book.)
I actually follow the research, including the more recent work of Sam Parnia, etc. Let's not debate the merits of the evidence, but instead would you just agree clear that this represents the best/only empirical evidence for dualism in existence?
Would you agree that it is either the case that: A) a pre-existent intelligent agent – let’s not mince words here, a God or some intelligent agent/being empowered by God, has played a creative and/or sustaining causal role in that which we experience in human consciousness and thought, or B) that there was no pre-existent intelligent agent involved? Simple binary proposition. Either A or B has to be correct, right?
Yes, I do indeed believe in the law of the excluded middle.
So if all that is the case, then there are 4 possibilities to account for the complex specified information exhibited by the brain/mind: 1. Materialism – Random alignment of brain components (we both discount this).
I think everyone discounts this - who thinks the brain operates randomly???
2. Materialism – Emergent physical mind with computational control of brain components (we both discount this).
This is a long discussion - I'm just agreeing with you here to keep us from getting bogged down.
3. Materialism – Unknown physical cause that is not related to an immaterial interaction (I believe this is your position?).
You have to tell me how you decide if some new sort of physical cause is "immaterial" or not, and answer my questions about why magnetic fields or quantum phenomena, etc, are "material".
4. Immaterial mind that somehow interacts with the brain (this is my position).
Curious: What causes the immaterial mind to decide one thing or another?
Would you agree that these are the 4 options? Any others I missed?
Well, yes - there are almost as many solutions to the mind/body problem as there are philosophers of mind :-) But these will do for here.
I understand that your choice would be 3 – Unknown material cause. Is that correct?
No, my choice would be "we don't know".
And with respect this unknown cause, you are reserving judgement and expect that some phenomena will or may be discovered as to the cause of this complex specified information that lends itself to empirical proof, is that correct?
No, again, my best guess is that we are not capable of understanding how our own minds work, just as a mouse is not able to understand how a computer works.
Important: Here is a hypothetical – Would you say that it is the case that for the same exact thought or the same exact image to be represented in our consciousness, that at least some subset (probably a large subset) of underlying brain components would have to be in essentially the same exact sequence of configurations? I know you are going to say that we do not know how the brain works so you cannot answer that.
Not sure what you mean by brain components having to be in the same sequence of configuration. You mean the same 3D positions in the brain? The same number and types of neurons with the same neural connections? Functionalists (like Dennett) would answer no, mind states can be implemented by multiple physical states. Biological naturalists (like Searle) might answer differently.
But give me your best hunch here and provide some sort of level of assurance you have for your position on this.
It's like asking me to guess what dark matter is. I don't know, and nobody else does either.
Best regards my friend.
And to you! Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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Hello Mr. RDFish, back at you here. I hope you are well. Yes it has been fun. Glad you are enjoying it as much as I am. So...I do not think we disagree as much as you suggest. You are not a materialist - we agree on that. (Yes I understand the complexities of materialism and am acquainted with Quantum Mechanics but pretty much every one else uses these terms in any discussion such as this. I am sure you will cite some exceptions.) You do not believe that computers think in the same way we do - we agree on that. (I think you were playing a game of semantics on this issue but no big deal - do you agree?). You do not accept neo-Darwinism - we agree on that. Regarding Intelligent Design and falsification you say, "For example, evolutionary theory is falsifiable: If we discover that mutations are correlated with reproductive needs of organisms, then evolutionary theory would be falsified. Or if it could be shown that random mutations fixed by natural selection can’t possibly give rise to the sorts of complex mechanisms we observe in the time and populations available, then evolutionary theory is falsified. (I believe evolutionary theory has indeed been falsified by the latter test)." Who has falsified evolutionary theory in the manner you described above. Not to belabor the point but would you agree that had science adopted an approach assuming that life was designed and formed hypothesis consistent with that assumption, that more progress would have been made? You agree that the mind/brain puts forth complex specified information exhibited by our thoughts and I suppose you would agree images for example in dreams as well (although we can agree to disagree on some of the details as to gaps in thoughts and so forth) - so I think we agree on this. We agree that the phenomena of complex specified information produced by the brain/mind is unsolved, you refer to it as a mystery - so we sort of agree on this. You resist (does that capture your view?) attributing complex specified information to an immaterial mind - if so, okay that is fine. You discount the notion that unprogrammed, local causation of brain components is a viable causal mechanism to account of the complex specified information that the brain/mind exhibits - we agree on that. You do not seem to subscribe to the emergent physical mind model where a physical mind emerges from the brain and serves as a top down programmatic or computational controller over the components in the brain resulting in that which we experience as our consciousness, thoughts, memories, feeling, beliefs, etc, is that correct? - If so, we agree on that. You agree that a verifiable near death experience case with an out of body component where the subject is able to disclose information that he/she could not have known otherwise (because he was floating around above) would demonstrate that an immaterial mind plays an essential role in that which we experience as human consciousness and thought, etc. - So I think we agree on that. (By the way, some would say that that criterion has been met in at least several cases - read for example Pim Van Lommel's book.) Would you agree that it is either the case that: A) a pre-existent intelligent agent - let's not mince words here, a God or some intelligent agent/being empowered by God, has played a creative and/or sustaining causal role in that which we experience in human consciousness and thought, or B) that there was no pre-existent intelligent agent involved? Simple binary proposition. Either A or B has to be correct, right? So if all that is the case, then there are 4 possibilities to account for the complex specified information exhibited by the brain/mind: 1. Materialism - Random alignment of brain components (we both discount this). 2. Materialism - Emergent physical mind with computational control of brain components (we both discount this). 3. Materialism - Unknown physical cause that is not related to an immaterial interaction (I believe this is your position?). 4. Immaterial mind that somehow interacts with the brain (this is my position). Would you agree that these are the 4 options? Any others I missed? I understand that your choice would be 3 - Unknown material cause. Is that correct? And with respect this unknown cause, you are reserving judgement and expect that some phenomena will or may be discovered as to the cause of this complex specified information that lends itself to empirical proof, is that correct? Important: Here is a hypothetical - Would you say that it is the case that for the same exact thought or the same exact image to be represented in our consciousness, that at least some subset (probably a large subset) of underlying brain components would have to be in essentially the same exact sequence of configurations? I know you are going to say that we do not know how the brain works so you cannot answer that. But give me your best hunch here and provide some sort of level of assurance you have for your position on this. I will stop there for now. Best regards my friend.nkendall
May 21, 2015
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Hi Box,
Everyone who engages in rational inquiry assumes to be a free person who is in control of her/his thoughts and to be responsible for the outcome.
I agree, however we need to carefully define what we mean by "free" obviously. I mean "unfettered by external constraint". What do you mean?
Everyone assumes rationality to be a process during which data and thoughts are ordered in an overarching context under supervision and control of an agent.
I might agree with this too, but obviously we need to carefully define what we mean by "agent". I would say in order for me to agree with this, that term would have to mean something general like "entity" or "being" or "organism". What do you mean by this term?
Everyone assumes to be a person who controls, weighs and orders data and thoughts—top-down.
I could possibly agree with this, but it would depend on what you mean by "top-down". For me it would have to mean something like "in a manner explicable on multiple levels of abstraction". What do you mean by that term?
This axiomatic concept of rationality is foundational to any rational inquiry—science included.
I completely disagree with this. Science can be - and is - conducted without any reference to the nature of free will, agency, top-down causation, and so on. (The only exception would be science that is investigating free will of course, such as Libet, Haggard, Wegner, and so on - and they do not assume their conclusions, they attempt to empirically discover them).
If materialism is true then rationality as we understand it—in which we have put our hopes and trust—can only be an illusion.
This is pure nonsense - just a rhetorical flourish with no explanation or justification at all.
If materialism is true, then rationality is not a top-down process, but a bottom-up process determined by natural law.
Are there any bottom-up processes that are not determined by natural law? Are there any processes reducible to natural laws that are top-down? If the answer is "no" to both questions, I don't understand what significance this "top-down/bottom-up" distinction has over the primary question of materialism vs. dualism.
If chemicals, instead of persons,...
Materialists don't think people are chemicals, so what are you talking about?
If we are to conclude, based on these experiments, that many (or all) of ‘our’ rational decisions are made without involvement of consciousness—if not consciousness but brain chemicals are behind the steering wheel of reason—then our axiomatic concept of rationality is in need of radical revision.
Why? Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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My first post (#17) in this thread, makes perfectly clear what I mean by an “axiomatic” concept of rationality:
Box: Everyone who engages in rational inquiry assumes to be a free person who is in control of her/his thoughts and to be responsible for the outcome. Everyone assumes rationality to be a process during which data and thoughts are ordered in an overarching context under supervision and control of an agent. Everyone assumes to be a person who controls, weighs and orders data and thoughts—top-down. This axiomatic concept of rationality is foundational to any rational inquiry—science included.
I also make my point:
Box: If materialism is true then rationality as we understand it—in which we have put our hopes and trust—can only be an illusion. If materialism is true, then rationality is not a top-down process, but a bottom-up process determined by natural law. If chemicals, instead of persons, are behind the steering wheel of reason, we have to arrive at a fully revised understanding of rationality
IOW my point is simple: under materialism, rationality as we know it goes out the window. In post #27 I make my point again:
Box: If we are to conclude, based on these experiments, that many (or all) of ‘our’ rational decisions are made without involvement of consciousness—if not consciousness but brain chemicals are behind the steering wheel of reason—then our axiomatic concept of rationality is in need of radical revision.
RDF: Your only point is that materialism is false because it is “axiomatic” (whatever you mean by that) that mind is immaterial.
Box: In fact I have no idea what you are talking about
RDF: I will gladly leave it to the fair reader to decide which of us has been willing to engage in sincere debate here.
Same here.Box
May 21, 2015
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You know, I see a great number of supposed dualists argue that mind is immaterial. Why do you call yourself dualists then? A true dualist knows without any doubt that mind is both material and spiritual. There is a need for both causal processing by a physical mechanism and intentional agency by a spritual entity. I am a dualist through and through and unabashedly so. I see no real difference between the immaterialist argument and the materialist argument. You are both monists at heart, unwittingly suffering from one of two particularly powerful forms of the malady.Mapou
May 21, 2015
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Hi Box,
BOX: what I did assert is that our axiomatic concept of rationality is non-materialistic in nature. RDF: Your only point is that materialism is false because it is “axiomatic” (whatever you mean by that) that mind is immaterial. BOX: In fact I have no idea what you are talking about
I will gladly leave it to the fair reader to decide which of us has been willing to engage in sincere debate here. You might take a lesson from Mr. Kendall, author of the OP here, with whom I've enjoyed an interesting, productive, and good-natured debate despite our diametrically opposed views on the topic. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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RDFish: Your only point is that materialism is false because it is “axiomatic” (whatever you mean by that) that mind is immaterial.
Thank you, for your effort. This discussion has been as fruitful as our previous encounters. BTW needless to say that this isn't my point at all. In fact I have no idea what you are talking about, it is as if you are having a discussion with someone else.Box
May 21, 2015
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