Horrid doubt file: Reasons to think your mind is real

_{Denyse O'Leary

November 19, 2008

Intelligent Design}

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Was Darwin’s horrid doubt just horrid – or a reasonable fear?:

… the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?

I’d say that if his theory was true, horrid was a slam dunk (yes, you are an evolved monkey, no, your thoughts do not mean anything).

But very little in science turned out to be what Darwin or his contemporaries thought.

Non-materialist neuroscientists think that your mind is real and that it helps shape your brain. It is not a mere illusion created by the workings of the brain.

Here are some excerpts from the afternoon panel of the Beyond the Mind-Body Problem symposium (September 11, 2008), sponsored by the Nour Foundation, UN-DESA, and the Université de Montréal. The excerpts feature some interesting exchanges between a number of non-materialist neuroscientists.

Excerpts from the morning panel are here.

Both the morning and afternoon panels were televised and can be viewed here.

Comments

http://radicalacademy.com/adlerintellect1.htmcrow thrall_{November 23, 2008
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gpuccio, I'm doing my best to understand your arguments, but they're not always clear. You write:
So, I am not just declaring that it is “impossible” that the brain is the cause for consciousness. I am stating that such a, affirmation is just a theory, that the only structured formulation of that theory in a scientific form is strong AI theory, and that strong AI theory is a bad scientific theory for at least two different levels of motives.
You seem to be saying that because we have no successful theory of strong AI, it is therefore impossible for the physical brain to be the seat of consciousness. If so, you're making the same mistake as someone saying in 1700 that "The aurora borealis cannot have a physical cause because we have no theory to explain it." It simply doesn't follow. Take a look at consciousness. It goes away when our brains enter a state called sleep. A blow to the head can cause it to vanish, and particular brain injuries can cause it to vanish permanently, even though the rest of the brain and body continue to function correctly. Alcohol changes consciousness, and too much alcohol eliminates it entirely. Drugs affect it. The evidence is overwhelming that consciousness depends on the brain. Where is the evidence that it depends on some immaterial or transcendent component? Let me reiterate the points I made in an earlier comment, and add a couple: 1. While it's true that materialists haven't explained how the physical brain gives rise to the subjective experience of consciousness, it's also true that dualists haven't explained how souls or spirits give rise to consciousness. If it disqualifies one, it disqualifies the other. 2. The dualist must explain how the immaterial soul or spirit interacts with and controls the physical body. Materialists have no such problem. We already know how matter (the brain) interacts with matter (the body). 3. If the will is even partly dependent on the physical brain, and can be disrupted by damage to the brain, then in what sense can we continue to attribute moral responsibility to the soul? 4. Why have eyes and ears if NDEs and OBEs show that your soul can see and hear without them? 5. Why, in lab experiments, have OBE "experts" never been able to demonstrate the ability to travel to a remote location and read a message that has been left there? 6. In response to the question of why we have eyes and ears if the soul is capable of seeing and hearing, angryoldfatman writes:
Perhaps the body is a tool for the soul to complete a certain task that would otherwise be much more difficult.
Why, then, don't people who have experienced NDEs and OBEs report that their vision and hearing were impaired? To the contrary, they typically report that their senses were enhanced during the experience. 7. If cognition, emotions, memory, perception, and will all depend on the brain, and can be completely disrupted by changes or damage to the brain, then why do so many people believe in a separable soul that can go on experiencing all of those things when the body is dead?ribczynski_{November 23, 2008
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gpuccio, True, you haven't used the phrase "immaterial soul", but you have written this:
Let’s say that for me consciousness “is” spirit. It is a transcendental subject.
Perhaps you are drawing a distinction between "soul" and "spirit" that I am not. If so, then feel free to substitute "spirit" for "soul". In any case, the question remains the same: Is the physical brain capable of producing consciousness on its own, or does consciousness require the presence of an immaterial/transcendental component?ribczynski_{November 23, 2008
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ribczynski:: And, I forgot: in my posts I think I have never used the concept of "an immaterial soul", which is a philosophical, and not empirical concept. Why are you constantly referring to that?gpuccio_{November 22, 2008
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ribczynski: I am afraid that you really missed my points, but I cannot say it all again. If you like, please read again my post #20, which is detailed enough. Otherwise, we can stop it here. I am happy for the fruitful discussion with you. I just suggest that you consider that my five points are just the summary of a very long reasoning. My points 1 and 2 set the correct espistemological basis for the problem of consciousness. My point 3, for completeness, reminds that denying consciousness is not a possible escape, because it is an empirical fact (I know you don't deny consciousness, but many do, and so I felt I had to address that). My point 4 is just the summary of all the things I have said in my post. How can you say that it "simply declares it “impossible” without explaining why"? I have spent two hours writing my post, and you don't even address any of it, and still you affirm that I have not explained? I have explained. You are entitled to believe that my explanations are not good, and to state that, but for courtesy you could at least explain why you think that. Not necessarily spend two hours, but at least try. Finally, my point 5 sums up, for further clarity, the two levels of argumentation for point 4: AI theories are not empirically supported, and they are not theoretically satisfying. What else do you want? The details are in the post. And again with your liver: liver is not consciousness, the first 2 points don't apply to liver. Liver does not need an Artificial Liver theory to be explained: it is an object like the others, and its functions are, as far as we know, objective functions. If you cannot grasp this distinction, I don't know what else to say. Consciousness is completely different. It needs explanation, or it must be acknowledged as a distinctive substance or principle. That's why AI theories exist. My sentence: "And even if you want to believe that it is possible, you have to admit that it has not been done." referred to the generation of consciousness in a machine, which is what strong ID theory assumes as possible. It just stated that it has not been empirically done. Is that difficult to understand? Is that false? So, I am not just declaring that it is "impossible" that the brain is the cause for consciousness. I am stating that such a, affirmation is just a theory, that the only structured formulation of that theory in a scientific form is strong AI theory, and that strong AI theory is a bad scientific theory for at least two different levels of motives. Is that "just declaring"? I think it is arguing. Again, the details of the arguments are in the post.gpuccio_{November 22, 2008
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gpuccio, Four of your five points fail to even address the question of whether the physical brain can produce consciousness, and the fifth point (#4 above) simply declares it "impossible" without explaining why. Can you tell us specifically why it is impossible, in your opinion? You state:
And even if you want to believe that it is possible, you have to admit that it has not been done.
Resurrecting my liver/brain analogy from earlier in the thread: Suppose the liver performs a certain function, but that we don't know how it accomplishes this. I claim that the function in question cannot happen without the assistance of an immaterial "liver-spirit". You think that even though we do not understand it now, it will eventually turn out to have a purely physical explanation. I challenge you, saying that it is impossible for a physical liver to perform the function, and I add that even if you believe that it is possible, you have to admit that it has not been demonstrated. Would you find that argument persuasive? Would it cause you to change your mind and embrace the idea of the liver-spirit? If not, why should your equivalent argument persuade someone that consciousness cannot be produced by the brain alone, and that an immaterial soul is also required?ribczynski_{November 22, 2008
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ribczynski: Thank you for your comments, whic allow me to better elaborate and clarify. I think that most of your considerations about what I say derive from a single point: you do not accept my first and most important issue: that consciousnees certainly exists, and that in no way it can be a function of the brain. That simple consideration allows us to give consciousness at least the same "status" of "substance" which we usually give to matter, enrgy, laws of nature, and so on. Indeed, you say: "True enough, but I don’t see how that demonstrates that consciousness cannot be a function of the physical brain." Now, I am sure I will not convince you, but I will try just the same, because thus discussion is very statisying and pertinent. I am completely convinced that consciousness can never be a function of the physical brain, and that all the efforts developed by neuriscientists and other people to show the opposite are irremediably flawed at the beginning. In other words, I am completely convinced that the AI theory, in all its forms, is false at the beginning, and philosophically flawed (I will not say that it is scientifically flawed because, as I will try to debate, it has no scientific status at all). To be clear in what I will say, I have to state again that consciousness (our personal consciousness) is an "empirical" fact: it is perceived directly by each of us, although not by the senses, but in another way, which we can call from now on, for simplicity, "intuition" (just a name like another, with no special implication). So the facts, in their epistemological order, are as follows: 1) We have one primary empirical certainty, that we exist as consciousness. We perceive that by intuition, each one his own existence and consciousness. All further cognitons are based on that, and happen in that consciousness. 2) Then we have a lot of secondary cognitions. All of them are finally èperceived as modifications in our consciousness. There are at least two major classes of them: a) sensations, perceived through the sensory channels, and referred to an external world. That is usually called "objective" experience". b) various states of the consciousness, which are perceived through intuition: thoughts, feelings, pleasure and pain, emotions, reasonings, judgements. That is usually called "subjective" experience, but is has the same status of objactive existence we usually attribute to the external world, because, like the consciousness which perceives it, it is an observable, that is a "fact". Please notice that there is one external object, which we call our body, whic is part of bot a and b: it is certainly perceived through the senses (I can touch my arm), and is at the same time perceived by intuition (I have feelings about my body, like pain, pleasure, inner sensations, which, while having a specific connection with parts of the body, have not the formal property of the senses of "projecting" an outer reality. 3) Using "all" the cognitions available to us, we build maps of reality. We call them philosophies, religions, sciences, arts, and so on. All of these maps have some cognitive aspect, some of them more than others, and an experential aspect, some of them more than others. 4) Sciences are kinds of maps which utilize in a peculiar way some peculiar cognitions. They are limited but strong maps, if used correctly. But, as I have debated in these hours on another thread, sciences, like all other cognitions, have a primary purpose: to understand reality, or at least part of it. Science, in its modern form, uses many intuitional cognitive powers: logical deductive reasoning, mental inference, and so on, and applies them to empirical reality. Science makes great use of a very specific and powerful mental tool which is mathemathics, and that's one reason of its many strengths and successes. One interesting point is that mathematics is, among sciences, the least (or not at all) derived from sensory experiences of the external world, and has all the chracteristics of an innate, intuitive cognition of the mind: notwithstanding that, it has an extraordinary power to explain the external world. 5) It is perfectly natural to ask that science give its attention to "all" our cognitions: all of them exist and bear informations on reality, so all of them deserve to be explained as far as it is possible, or at least included in our maps. 6) The first, and most important, of all our cognitions, consciousness itself, requires explanation and/or inclusion. One problem for science is that "subjective" facts apparently have not the quantitative and measurable aspects so dear to the science of the external world, or at least they are not quantitative and measurable in the same way. 7) In front of that challenge, what has material scientistic philosophy (deterministic materialism), which is the prevailing philosophy today, done? It has made a few assumprions, and made them truth without demonstrating them: a) We know much of the laws of the external world. Therefore, they must be the laws of all reality. b) The laws we know are quantitative and wholly deterministic. Therefore all reality must have the same form. c) We understand almost nothing of consciousness and of the subjective world. Indeed, we understand much, but all that we understand is based on uncomfortable prinicples and forms, for which we have no explanations: individuality, will, feeedom, purpose, meaning. Therefore, to avoid confusion, we have to realize one of two things: c1: deny that consciousness and its implicit manifestations exist or c2: explain them away in terms of what we know about the external world. Those are the fundamental assumptions of materialistic philosophy, and of its ancillary servant, materialistic science. It is easy to see, in the light of what I have said until now, that they are not cognitively warranted. In particular: a) is an unwarranted inference. b) the same as for a c1) is an explicit lie, aginst all the empirical evidence c2), which is any form of AI theory, is at best a theoretical approach, acceptable as such, and not as the universal dogma which it has become. Moreover, it brings the important difficulty of a fundamental dualism, because it has to explain how the body, in its objective aspect of perceived sensory object, gives rise to conscious experiences, and we have seen that the two things are in origin in very different epistemological categories. In other words, if a true dualism exists in reality, it is the dualism of subjevtive and objective experience. AI theories are really trying to explain the second in the terms of the first, which is certainly the same kind of problem which you mentioned about the soul-body dualism. It is not impossible in principle, but it is a very serious task. Well, has AI succedeed? and what are the routes it has followed, or is following? To answer, we have to understand the inherent difficulties. Given the strong formal differences of the two realities which AI is trying to conflate, some reference model is badly needed. And the model for AI comes, as we all know, from computers, from the experiences in manipulating information. I have to specify, too, that for our purposes here we just have to consider strong AI, and in its complete form, including the property of consciousness. In other words, as our purpose here is to explain the fundamental empirical fact of the existence of consciousness, we are not so much interested in the fact that a machine may "behave" like a human (weak AI), or in the fact that it may behave intelligently (partial strong AI). What we need is that a machine becomes conscious, otherwise we have not reconnected our two fields of empirical experience. Just to start from the end: has strong AI been in some way proven? Certainly not. As far as I know, no machine has become comscious in the decades since strong AI became the leading theory in the scientific world. Obviously, that's not enough, but it's a start: there is still no empirical evidence, iether direct or indirect, of the occurring of consciousness in an artificial machine. At present, consciousness is still confined to living beings. But then, where do all the bold statements of strong AI supporters come from? It would be easy, and very true, to simply answer: from intellectual arrogance. But that's not my purpose here. So I will argue that AI arguments are of two kinds: 1) Evidence that there is a connection between the objective body (the body as perceived by the senses) and the sphere of consciousness. Said that way, it sounds trivial, doesn't it? And the truth is that it "is" trivial. We have always known that there is that connection. It is in both senses, and it has always been called "sensation" (inputs from the outer world to consciousness) and "willing action" (outputs from consciousness to the outer world). We have similarly always known the place of the body in that: it stays in the middle. I cannot see (the outer world) without my eye, I cannot grasp anything without my hand. Period. Has AI or neuroscience added anything to that knowledge. Essentially not. It has only added levels of sophistication. Today we know that, in order to see an external object, I don't need only my eye, but also the optical nerve, a buch of cerebral connection, and the occipital cortex. And so? Where is the difference? There is no difference. We still have physical structures of the body which are necessary for specific input or output functions. Period. But what about modern neuroscience, with its triumphs: neurotransmitters which can alter ous state of mind, electrical stimulations of the cortex which can evoke inner experiences, and so on? Impressing? No. Interesting certainly, but not impressing. There is nothing essentially new: we already know that the body is in the middle. Take neurotransmitters, or neuro drugs, for instance. They are certainly very powerful. And then? We have known for millennia that the simple assumption of alcohol can completely change our state of consciousness. A physical sensation can give plaisure or pain very effectively. We happen to know that, through personal experience. A brain insult can affect our cognitive functions. We know that. Where is the novelty? The body is in the middle. It has always been. Philosophers have always known that. Scientists have always known that. Religion founders have always known that. Where is the new evidence for AI? 2) The second "field" of arguments for AI comes form considerations about information theory and technology, starting from Turing on, and stronly influenced by the simulation power of modern computers. Here I have a very strong conviciton about the cognitive aspect of AI (simulating human intelligence), which comes essentially from my experience in ID: conscious beings are the only ones who can really produce CSI; machines can only transform it. That means that all AI is flawed, in other words no machine can be able or real intelligence. This is a very strong, and certainly controversial, approach to intelligence which I believe in, but luckily I have not to debate it here, because it is not pertinent here. Here, in fact, we are not interested in "intelligence", but in "consciousness", and the discussion is therefore much easier. It easy very easy, indeed, to realize that there is no reason to hypothesize, even without any evidence, that consciousness can come from the complexity of software, which is more or less the assumption of strong AI. Let's remember for a moment that we have no empirical evidence of that. That's simply the truth. But let's consider just the same the possible theoretical reasons. There are amny ways to show the utter impossibilities in that kind of theory. I will just illustrate some of them. We have to understand that, in AI, the results of operating a software are hardware independent. If I make a computation on an abacus or on a modern computer using the same algoritm, the same computational steps take place. The times are different, the modalities are different, but the "software" works in the same way. The software is, by definition, immaterial information. Moreover, acomputation is a linear sequence of simple computational steps. Each single step is not essentially different form the others. It the structure of the sequence which bears the computation and the result. The time employed, too, does not change the result or the computational procedure. Just a quick note here to remind that parallel computing, so boldly used by many AIers to support their theories, is in essence just a linear computing with different form. There is no essential difference. The computing has to be divided in separate tasks for seprate elaboration, and then reconnected. Nothing is essentially different. So I would like to understand what the essential hypothesis of AI is. It sounds like that: I have a simple computational step A. There is no consciousness in that event. I repeat it 10^10 times in various forms, and nothing happens (in the sense of: no consciousness arises). I repeat it 10^20 times, in similar but longer forms, and nothing happens. But in some way I believe that if I repeat it 10^100 times or more, in similar but even longer forms, at some moment consciousness arises. Is that it? But why should that be reasonable? Each computational step is not conscious. Why should 10^100 of them become conscious? By the sheer strngth of great numbers? But you may say: it is the computational structure which counts. Why? If I repeat 10^100 times the same addition it seems unlikely that the process becomes conscious. Ah, but if I do something more rephined... But something what? Do you know what computing is? Essentially a series of very simple operations, like addition. And the general form? But who is aware of the general form? The single computational events? I can see addition A which proudly "awakens" to the staqte where it finally "knows" that it is now part of a very sophisticated loop, a la Hofstadter, and not simply of some monetary report! "What" becomes conscious? The computational steps? The hardware which performs them? The "system"? Let's see. We can probably dismiss the case that the single computational step becomes conscious, although I had started to feel some affection for my addition A and its hopes of social improvement. Does teh hardwrae become conscious? Does that mean that, if I perform my Hofstadter loop on an abacus (it may take time, I know!) the abacus becomes a conscious being? Well, although the conscious abacus is again a fascinating model, I feel that such a solution is very unsatisfying. Maybe there are privileged hardawres? But why? Living cells could be a candidate, but then why are they different from an abacus? Some kind of vital force? That would be bad news for the materialists... Or what if only Macs could become conscious, and not PCs? Well, no more jokes. The fact is that there is no reason why the nature of the hardware, or the computing time, should be cause of creating the consciousness. After all, the software is independent from the hardware. And what about the complexity? But complexity is only a quantitative factor here. In a simple sense, 10^100 random additions are much more complex than 10^10, but always additions they are. And what about the specified complexity? What about the "meaning"? You see, I am even using ID concepts to help our poor AIers! But "who" perceives the meaning? Who is aware of the specification? Only consciousness. Specification is the way conscious intelligent beings recognize the mark of other conscious intelligent beings. Blind nature does not "recognize" specification and meaning, just like many darwinists :-) Moreover, if it were the "sophistication" of the structure to generate consciousness, it could well be that a very long, but not brilliant, software could never be conscious, while a short but very brilliant one could. After all, who says that a softwrae has to be 10^100 bits to be conscious? But again, who perceives the brillaint nature of the software? And I would not suggest to look for consciousness in your newest Microsoft program, by the way... Well, but what if it is the system which becomes conscious? But what is "the system"? I suppose the sum of hardware plus software. While that reminds me much of religious and mystical concepts, I would like to understand why, is the hardware is not conscious, and if the software is not conscious, the "system" should be conscious. An emerging property? But who perceives emerging properties, if not conscious beings? Blind nature knows nothing of emerging properties. And is the property "emerges" only for some specific properties of the software, then again it is a property of the software. And finally. a very important point. If we forget for a moment materialistic fantasies about consciousness, and do what any serious scientist or philosopher should do, that is "observe" it (it is an observable after all), and try to correctly describe its formal properties, we will see that the best way to describe conscious experiences is something like that: Conscious experiences are events where various modifications (perceptions, feelings, judgments etc.) are apparently referred to a single perceiver, which we call the subject of the experience. The important point is that the "subject", which we will call here the "perceiving I", or more simply the I, is always felt as simple. But the things it perceives can be extremely complex. I will try to explain better. The I perceives bothe modifications related to external objects and modifications related to internal functions. But evrything it perceives becomes an object for it, and the subject, the I, is always "abobe" the things perceived, in a meta position. The I is capable of infinite regress: it can observe anything inside its sphere of perception, including its own functions (reasoning, imagination, feeling, etc.). The I can observe its resoning process, but in that case the I is in meta position repsect to that process. That's why the I is essentially simple: because it can observe any complexity in itself, and make it an object, external to itself. In other words, the best empirical description of how we intuit our own I is: as a transcendental, single point of perception which refers to itself a continuosly fluctuating bundle of modifications (its objects of perception). Now you can perhaps see another reasons why the theories of AI are flawed: consciousness requires a single, constant subject of perception. No complex structure of objective events can create that. Objective events are objective. Strucutres are complex, and are a sum of parts. The I is not a sum of parts, although its perceptions, including its functions, can certainly be that way. To sum up: 1) Consciousness is an empirical fact, the most important of all, the first of all, both cronologically and epistemologically. 2) As such, it deserves a privileged place in our maps of reality. That's not what happens in current science. 3) Denying it is foolish: it means denying one of the most universal facts we know. 4) Explaining it away as a function of the brain is impossible. And even if you want to believe that ir is possible, you have to admit that it has not been done. 5) AI theories have no empirical support (no form of consciousness, even primijtive, has ever been generated that way) and no convincing logical or cognitive background. They are only an ineffective tool to justify a materialist map of reality, and try to cover up the immense holes in it. Well, I realize that I have only answered your first point (but it was the most important). Now I am tired. More on the other points later.gpuccio_{November 22, 2008
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"The speculation on the immaterial soul is science fiction until we start measuring it. ..... If the existence of an immaterial soul could be reliably proved and/or its material interface partially described, the balance would shift subtly and perhaps greatly from Darwinism. ....." Indeed. The usual materialist's blithe assertion that there is no credible evidence for anything like a "soul" as it is usually conceived - a mobile center of consciousness separate from the brain but interacting with it (interactive dualism). They obstinately refuse to examine the validity of the mountain of evidence for psychical or paranormal phenomena, much of which clearly points in that direction. They blithely assert that thousands of witnesses, experiencers and research investigators over the last century and more have been deluded or lying. They must have been - it simply can't exist. Unfortunately many proponents of ID also are kneejerk skeptics of the paranormal, even though it really does pull the rug out from under Darwinist reductionist materialism. Usually the participants in these debates ignore the issue of the paranormal, even though the evidence for it is a fundamental weak spot in Scientistic Darwinism. A large subset of psychical phenomena demonstrate the action of discrete discarnate self-aware personalities, clearly trying to communicate. Other psychical phenomena like NDEs usually involve reporting a self of some sort leaving the body and experiencing the apparent initial stages of physical death. Other data like reincarnation birthmark evidence clearly makes a link between the deceased and the present person. All of these phenomena and more involve a lot of "veridical information", information that is found to be correct. Survival of the personality is the simplest and most reasonable explanation for that data, and that would imply the existence of some sort of "soul". The only apparent alternative to survival of some sort to explain this data seems to be the so-called "super-psi" hypothesis. This is not very satisfactory because all of these phenomena and more have to be accounted for by an almost unlimited psi and data integration capacity, invented or imagined ad hoc with every type of case to explain the particular phenomenon. The Occam's Razor principle of parsimony would seem to point to survival as being the more likely model. We still can't take the survival hypothesis as being close to certainty, because we can't totally rule out the "super psi" hypothesis and because there is large array of other psychical phenomena that don't point unequivocally in that direction. Like the odd past life remembrances (different individuals remembering being the same past personality), and a large array of other parapsychological phenomena (mostly termed "automatisms") that don't seem to fit into that mold. These appear to demonstrate that waking consciousness is just the tip of the iceberg. If the evidence for survival is only apparent, then whatever the true cause may be it seems to be perpetrating a vast deception. No one to my knowledge has come up with a plausible overall model from the standpoint of either psychology, parapsychology or metaphysics that can encompass the large body of evidence implying interactive dualism and survival along with the vast body of other psychical phenomena, while at the same time accommodating the fact that practically during life we are indeed the function of our brains. We need well operating brains to exist. Ultimately I think we have to accept living in ambiguity and uncertainty, forced to live with a very large cognitive dissonance. What is really indefensible is taking the attitude of the dominant intellectual elite of our society and closed-mindedly dismissing the evidence for some form of interactive dualism entirely because it doesn't fit a materialist world view.magnan_{November 22, 2008
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The speculation on the immaterial soul is science fiction until we start measuring it. I think about how it could be done every day. I have some thoughts about how "time" may in some situation be a variable with a known limit, but I don't know where to go from there. If the existence of an immaterial soul could be reliably proved and/or its material interface partially described, the balance would shift subtly and perhaps greatly from Darwinism. Although Darwinism would be even creepier as religion if it were adapted to immaterial traits.Designed Jacob_{November 22, 2008
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"In a nutshell: why have eyes if your soul can see without them?" Why have hammers when you can drive nails into wood with your bare hands? Perhaps the body is a tool for the soul to complete a certain task that would otherwise be much more difficult. By the way, that's the most insightful question I've seen any atheist post here.angryoldfatman_{November 22, 2008
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gpuccio, In a previous comment I drew an analogy between the liver and the brain, arguing that the idea of an immaterial soul is as superfluous as the idea of a "liver-spirit". You agreed that the liver-spirit is unnecessary but argued that the immaterial soul/spirit/mind is not. Yet I could not understand your argument in favor of this position. As far as I can tell, your argument consists of pointing out that consciousness is primary and is the lens through which we perceive the rest of reality, including livers and brains. True enough, but I don't see how that demonstrates that consciousness cannot be a function of the physical brain. Could you elaborate? I went on to point out that both materialists and dualists have a problem explaining consciousness. The materialist has to explain how physical matter arranged in a certain way (the brain, that is) can give rise to conscious experience. The dualist has the problem of explaining how the soul gives rise to conscious experience. To simply assume that souls are conscious is no more permissible than assuming that brains are. You argued that this is not a problem for the dualist, stating:
Let’s say that for me consciousness “is” spirit. It is a transcendental subject. It is. An immaterial spirit is a concept, a very indirect and sophisticated inference. But our consciousness is there, perceivable and near, more real than anything else. And it has at least two fundamental properties, that nobody can deny: it exists, and it perceives.
I agree that consciousness exists, but how does that solve the dualist's problem of explaining how a soul can give rise to conscious experience? My next point was that while the materialist can easily explain the interaction between mind and matter as an interaction between the brain and matter, the dualist has to come up with an entirely new mechanism to explain how the immaterial mind influences the physical world. Again, your response does not appear to answer the challenge:
There is no doubt that consciousness recieves inputs from the physical world, and sends outputs to the physical world. That’s called perception and action. We did not need modern neurophysiologists to understand that.
I agree that the mind does perceive the physical world and act on it, but you've left unanswered the question of how. On the issue of whether the dualist can regard the soul as being morally responsible, given that the will is known to be (at the very least) largely a function of the brain, you wrote:
We are not totally free (we cannot do things in a completely free context, independent of our environment, of our body, of our brain, of our mind), but we are never totally slave. Because our consciousness is transcendental, and is endowed with free will. That’s also the origin of responsibility.
One of the hallmarks of advanced Alzheimer's disease is a tendency toward inappropriate sexual behavior. Suppose that an Alzheimer's victim molests a fellow patient. How can you hold the soul responsible for behavior that was caused by the deterioration of the brain? Lastly, I would direct your attention back to the point I raised in my previous comment regarding NDEs and OBEs, which I summarized thus:
In a nutshell: why have eyes if your soul can see without them?
ribczynski_{November 22, 2008
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GP: A word of encouragement: Some very good work here and in other threads! I underscore that we are here dealing with not just scientific but also philosophical questions, and so it would be wise to use comparative difficulties across live options. In short, that approach points out:
1 --> ALL live option alternatives trace to core presuppositions and face difficluties with evidence. [here: [a] hard core mechanistic plus chance process evolutionary materialism, [b] emergentist materialism/ naturalism(s), [c] dualism[s], [d] idealism(s)] 2 --> It is therefore generally inadequate to point out perceived difficulties in positions one objects to and then dismiss them; for one's own position may face even worse difficulties. (Though of course balancing remarks as you made are very well taken.) 3 --> Your highlighting of the problem of materialists having to use their own consciousness as fact no 1 is an apt instance of a balancing remark too often overlooked by eager materialistic reductionists. (I recall here Charles Finney's notes on theology, which highlight that proofs by appeal to consciousness [as an ultimate fact] are the very strongest. Summed up: if your world model and mind model lead you to doubt that you are conscious and are able to think and decide for yourself, you are in a mare's nest of fatal self referential inconsistencies. Starting with: is your argument a real argument or just a product of lucky noise acting on an arbitrary cluster of material entities shaped by forces utterly irrelevant to truth and logic.) 3 --> In so seeking the best explanation across competing models of reality -- as opposed to "proof" in any final sense -- one needs to address comparative factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power and elegance [as opposed to being ad hoc or simplistic]. 4 --> Further to this, we may tie back into the key theme of the blog. For, minds design, and we reliably discern -- per a multitude of instances -- that such designs have characteristic features: high contingency, with functionality that specifies the particular outcome towards a purpose: directed contingency. This is the root of the idea of functionally specified complex information [FSCI], which is an empirically observed, tested, and proved reliable marker of design; a subset of Dembski's CSI that was first highlighted by Orgel et al in their carrying out of OOl research dating to the turn of the 1970s. (It is NOT a product of the ID movement; in fact it helped to spark it a decade later . . . cf Thaxton et al in the 1984 work, The Mystery of Life's Origin. This is now accessible on line in toto.) 5 --> The alternative for generating high contingency outcomes is "chance" however interpreted; i.e. arbitrarily "free" outcomes that -- up to some level of bias that may obtain (think bell shaped curve, not loaded dice, as the latter is design) -- may as well be one as another. 6 --> Thence, the issue soon becomes that islands of functionality may very well be so isolated in a sea of contingencies that no plausible search on the scope of our observed cosmos is credibly able to arrive at the functionality by chance conditions acting on the necessary laws/forces and materials we observe. (This brings us back to the issue over chance, necessity and agency as alternative, and partly interacting causal factors. the last link discusses that in the context of origin of life.) 7 --> However, OOL and OO body-plan level biodiversity are not the only contexts in which that obtains. For, part of the hard problem of materialistic thought on consciousness is that they have to account for origin of mind out of genetic code [70% or less on Chimp code per Denyse's last summary . . .] plus selective environmental forces. 8 --> That brings us right back to Denyse's telling quote on self referential incoherence of materialistic theories of the origin of our own minds, from Darwin: … the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind? 9 --> I also suggest that the Derek Smith cybernetic model that thinks in terms of a two tier processor network with the brain as a front-end I/O processor has a lot of potential in it,including it allows us to see that brain damage or interface damage can warp processing of information, leading to warped personality and distorted dysfunctional expressions of will.
Okay, back to lurking. Enjoy the weekend . . . GEM of TKI PS: the links above will give updates on my thinking; for those who want such.kairosfocus_{November 22, 2008
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Ribczynski, On your statement about "abulia": I do not find it a problem for dualism that certain people, due to brain injuries, cannot formulate the will to do something. I look at the "will" of a person as something that is formed by either internal or external forces. For instance, if I see ice cream on my kitchen table I may wish, or "will" to eat it. Generally in such a instance I will process information, and think about whether or not I should eat it. Perhaps I also will not to eat it. Thus I formulate two options in my mind, and therefore have two feelings. I have a part of me that wants to eat the ice cream, and I a part of me that doesn't want to eat the ice cream. Where my free will comes into play is when I choose which of my "wills" to follow. I believe that consciousness, while in the body, perceives information via the brain. Thus it seems to me, perfectly reasonable that if somebody were to receive a brain injury they may no longer be able to process data and therefore have no reason, or "will" to do something. Because for instance, say that I saw the ice cream on my table and really wanted to eat it. But perhaps I could not process anything else and no other feelings arose, other than my want to eat that ice cream, then I would be limited to only being able to will myself to eating the ice cream. If the feeling of not wanting to eat the ice cream does not even pop into my thought process, then of course I won't have any other "will" or "desire". It seems then, that those with "abulia" really lack the ability to process information, or form feelings or desires. They might not even realize they cannot do this, and so it seems like they simply do not have the "will" to do something. Essentially then these people have completely, or at least partly, lost their free will. They cannot choose between certain "feelings" or "wills" because these people have received brain damage and cannot formulate or process thoughts and feelings. That is what seems to be the case to me anyway. In a normal situation, a person does have a brain that works properly, and it can form thoughts and feelings, thus giving the person the ability to choose (aka this person has free will). Think of it like a broken car. If the car has a broken gas pedal it cannot formulate the insistence within the motor to turn the wheels. If a brain cannot process information then it cannot formulate information or feelings to be relayed to the consciousness so that it may choose to do something. Therefore "abulia" doesn't really form any hindrance against the concept of dualism and a consciousness that is at least partly different from the brain. As to why the question on why have eyes if the consciousness can see just as well, I cannot give any clear cut answer. I imagine though, that without the consciousness, nobody could even see through their eyes. I look at it similar to a man driving a car. He can see through the windows of the car, but there are certain parts that are blocked off to his view. For instance, he cannot see through the floor. Yet if you were to take the man out of the car, the car itself could not see. The man in this example is like our consciousness, able to see through a certain "body" or "design" given to it. It is limited though because of this body, as it can only see through the eyes. (Unless it's out of its body.) Why though? I see reasoning behind this as really up to the designer of mankind. If mankind really does each have a consciousness that works apart from the body, yet controls a specific body, then it does. Why it does, I cannot answer for sure. Based off of my believes I could see it being that the Designer simply wanted us to live this way. Even perhaps knowing full well we would perish. But knowing that because we lived a limited life in our bodies, after our bodies die our conscious-self would now fully relish in a life that is not constrained by physical bodies. One person that had an NDE was in surgery with the blood drained from her head, her eyes were taped shut, she had clickers within her ears, and she was completely brain-dead. But while having this surgery she felt herself come out of her head, and see and hear things that could be later verified by doctors and witnesses of the surgery. For instance, she saw tools that the doctors had used, as well as heard things they had said while she was physically brain-dead. Another example of a NDE experiencer was somebody who was blind from birth (she said she cannot even see black, she simply sees nothing). Yet while having an NDE she could see for the first time. Another thing to consider is this: all of these NDE experiences generally have very common similarities. Such as a dark tunnel leading to a light, seeing dead relatives, having a life review, and the meeting with a being of light. Unless a materialist is to say that all of these similarities are a result of the brain functioning abnormally, then they have a serious problem. I could understand a few things happening, such as the dark tunnel (that could arise due to lack of oxygen), as well as a buzzing noise that some NDEers experience. Yet to suggest that they also have dead-relatives, a life review, and a being of light, all in common because of a brain disfunction, seems extremely far fetched. Especially when the idea of a Creator is much more in-line with the evidence, as apposed to all these people having uncanny similarities due to brain abnormalities. There's my thoughts then, for what their worth. Keep it cool! One further note: seeing as I believe, or at least find most likely, that our consciousness controls our body via our brain, I would also like to mention what I think about people who lack bodily control. Think of a person driving a car. If this car is damaged, say the gas peddle gets stuck, then this person has lost control of his car. He may want to stop his car, but because he cannot fix the gas peddle he cannot stop the car. Similarly I see a person that has a damaged brain, as somebody who has got their "gas peddle" stuck, or their "brakes" broken. Therefore I see no problem with people that while having a consciousness to control their body, have lost that control because their brain has been damaged. As always I may change my views, but this is essentially my theory I have formulated. It could change, but it is what I currently hold to.Domoman_{November 22, 2008
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ribczynski: I will wait for your complete answer, and then comment on all.gpuccio_{November 22, 2008
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gpuccio, There's much to respond to in your comment, and I hope to do so tonight when I have more time. For now, let me point out an odd aspect of near-death experiences and out-of-body experiences that dualists typically ignore. Human perception depends on an elaborate and expensive sensory apparatus. Our visual system, for example, encompasses a number of complicated structures from the eye at one end to the visual cortex at the other. These structures are costly (in terms of energy intake) to build and maintain, but they are worth the expenditure because they help us to navigate our world successfully. Those who have experienced NDEs and OBEs report that their visual and auditory perception continues during the experience. Yet dualists claim that the brain is no longer functioning (at least in some of these cases) during NDEs. And in the case of OBEs, the subject often "travels" to a different location or vantage point and allegedly perceives things that could not be perceived from the place where the body is located. In both of these cases, perception continues even though our physical sensory apparatus is inoperative. My point is this: If the spirit (or soul, or whatever you want to call it) is capable of perceiving the physical world without the assistance of the body; and if each of us has such a spirit inhabiting his or her body; then we should be able to see and hear without the need for eyes, ears, and sensory processing areas in the brain. Dualists who accept the reality of NDEs and OBEs need to explain why our bodies include such expensive sensory systems if they are redundant, serving no purpose that is not already served by the soul itself. In a nutshell: why have eyes if your soul can see without them?ribczynski_{November 21, 2008
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ribczynski: You raise very interesting points. I will try to answer according to my personal views and beliefs, but I admit immediately that others may (and will) have different models. Obviously, the model I am suggesting is partly scientific and partly philosophical, given the nature of many of your points, nwhich go definitely beyion what can be approached in a purely scientific way. I will try as much as possible to distinguish between what is empirical and what is only a personal assumption. First of all, I am probably less of a dualist than you assume. I have tried to focus the discussion on consciousness, because I do believe that is the best way to stay empirical. Indeed, many (including in part you) seem to forget the empirical nature of consciousness. So, let's start from the basics. Consciousness is neither a function nor a concept. It is an experienced fact. I will not use the word "observable", because it could generate confusion, but let's say that it is a "perceivable". Obviously, I am speaking here of one's personal consciousness, which is perceived, and not of other's consciousness, which is inferred. More than that: our personal consciousness is the basic experience, the supreme fact where all others observables or perceivables happen. So, in a logical ladder of priorities, our consciousness is more "real" than the external world, including our bodies (which, being perceived and cognized in our consciousness, are in some way "external" to it). That's where your liver example is inappropriate for consciousness, as it is inappropriate for consciousness' functions, like will (more on that later). Indeed, the liver is defined as an object: we perceive it bu the senses, we analyze it by senses and inference. The same word "liver" has been made to define an object, an observable. So. to assume the existence of a "liver spirit" is possible but, as you correctly state, not necessary. Not the same with consciousness. It is perceived from the beginning, and its name was created exactly to define that experience. Here exactly the contrary is true: the assumption that consciousness "has a strict relationship with the brain" is a later inference, certainly correct, but extremely indirect. And the assumption that consciousness "is produced by the brain", which is all another thing, is a much more imaginative and bold hypothesis, and definitely a wrong one. So, when I say that my consciousness is certainly existing, while the external world is probably existing, I am not at all exaggerating. But what of the functions of consciousness? The problem is the same. The functions of consciousness are defined in terms of the consciousness itself, that is in a "subjective" way, and please notice that here I am using "subjective" in a very objective way, in other words as a primary modality of what exists. Let's take the example of will. How can you define will objectively? You can't. Will is the faculty by which a consciousness initiates an output towards the external world. A computer produces outputs, but it has not a will, because it is not conscious. You can't apply the term "will" to non conscious objects. The same is true for other functions of consciousness, like "feeling", "pain", "pleasure", and so on. That said, let's go to some of your more specific affirmations. You say: "The materialist has the problem of explaining how a physical brain can give rise to consciousness. The dualist has the problem of explaining how an immaterial spirit (or whatever term you wish to use) can give rise to consciousness." I certainly agree with the first part, not with the second. Let's say that for me consciousness "is" spirit. It is a transcendental subject. It is. An immaterial spirit is a concept, a very indirect and sophisticated inference. But our consciousness is there, perceivable and near, more real than anything else. And it has at least two fundamental properties, that nobody can deny: it exists, and it perceives. You ask: "how does an immaterial soul/spirit/consciousness interact with the physical world? If the physical and the transcendental are really two separate realms, how can an immaterial mind direct or influence the physical body?" I never said that the physical and the transcendental are two "separate" realms. I just say that they are two "different" realms. Two different things can well communicate. Moreover, IMO, they are two "partially different" things, so they can communicate even more easily. There is no doubt that consciousness recieves inputs from the physical world, and sends outputs to the physical world. That's called perception and action. We did not need modern neurophysiologists to understand that. You ask: "many dualists, because of their religious convictions, want to see the soul as something that is responsible for our ethical decisions. If the will is even partly dependent on the physical brain, and can be disrupted by damage to the brain, then in what sense can we continue to attribute moral responsibility to the soul?" Wow, that's a very big issue! But a brief answer is due. For me, "will" and "free will" are two different concepts. Will is the general faculty of consciousness to initiate outputs. But those outputs are not necessarily "free". They are often influenced by many external conditions, and by many internal conditions (including conditions of the brain and mind). The concept of "free will" is that, even if our consciousness is always influenced by many things, it is never completely "conditioned" by them (in a totally determinist way). There is always some space for freedom, even if, in many contexts, it may appear really small. So, the outputs of consciousness (will) are never totally deterministic, even if they are heavily influenced by other conditions. We are not totally free (we cannot do things in a completely free context, independent of our environment, of our body, of our brain, of our mind), but we are never totally slave. Because our consciousness is transcendental, and is endowed with free will. That's also the origin of responsibility. You say: "The near-death experiences that Domoman alluded to are claimed to happen in the absence of brain activity. If so, then the soul/spirit/consciousness is capable of seeing, hearing, thinking, remembering, deciding, and feeling without help from the brain." And that's correct. But then you add: "Yet all of the neuroscientific evidence to date suggests that this is not the case, and that all of these functions depend, at least to some extent, on the brain." That's not correct. All you can say is that all of these functions are expressed, in the normal condition where life is expressed through the body, and consciousness is tied to the brain and body, through the brain itself, and certainly "only to some extent". we have no proof that they "depend" on the brain. Again, the example of videogames will be useful. If I am playing a very realistic videogame, and that's all I am doing at the moment, than my conscousness is expressing itself through that videogame, but it does not depend" on it. As soon as I stop playing, my consciousness is always there, and is free to do other things. Well, NDEs are exactly that. The consciousness is no more expressing itself mainly through the body, due to specific organic conditions which never happen in normal life (cardiac arrest, brain arrest). And NDEs happen, demonstrating that consciousness (and mind) do not "depend" on body and brain. You say: "None of these objections apply to the materialist viewpoint." The materialist viewpoint is so full of contradictions and objections that I will not even start enumerating them here. "The evidence really is overwhelmingly against the existence of a soul as most people envision it." You are obviously entitled to your viewpoint, which I respect, but that's exactly the kind of unsupported and irrational statement which make me very happy of not being a materialist. I should not be surprised, given that materialists not only do not believe in God or the soul (which I still can understand), but in many cases do not believe even in the existence of their own consciousness and free will (which they clearly perceive in themselves). And still they go on being conscious, and making very free (and often arrogant) decisions in their lives (this is not directed to you, obviously: you seem a very reasonable and fine person: let's say it refers to some extreme materialists who are very "active" in denigrating others who don't believe in what they want others to believe).gpuccio_{November 21, 2008
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Patrick, For many Christians, the existence of genuine free will is of paramount importance because: a) they use it to justify the presence of evil in a world created by a perfect, benevolent God (the so-called 'free will defense'), and b) absent free will, it seems unjust for God to punish us for our sins. It becomes harder to argue that the will is free, in a morally meaningful sense, if it is dependent (even partially) on a physical mechanism. Furthermore, many Christians -- judging by the number who accept near-death experiences as veridical -- think that the soul continues to perceive, think, feel, decide, will and remember after the body has died. For them, it is important that the will continue to function correctly without physical assistance.ribczynski_{November 21, 2008
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Personally I don't see why many Christians insist that the "soul" or whatever must be the sole seat of the will. Why cannot it be a hybrid system where interlocking functionality is dispersed between the physical and the immaterial? After all the Christian God is a hybrid system: a trinity. In any case I personally don't have a solid conviction on how our mind is generated. I'm just interested in any research on the matter.Patrick_{November 21, 2008
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William Jennings Bryan wrote about Darwin's horrid doubt. This is from Bryan's essay "The Origin of Man"... The Logical Result of a Belief in Evolution The objection to evolution, however, as an explanation of life is not, primarily, that it is not true--many things that are false are scarcely deserving of attention. Neither is the ridiculousness of the explanations of evolutionists the chief reason for rejecting it, although there is more unintentional humour in these explanations than in any intended fun. The principal objection to evolution is that it is highly harmful to those who accept it and attempt to conform their thought to it. Evolution does not ruin all who accept it, neither does smallpox kill all who take it In fact, only five per cent. of those who take smallpox die of it. The spiritual mortality among evolutionists is greater than that. Bishop Candler says that a man can be both an evolutionist and a Christian, if he is not much of either. Darwin furnishes a convincing illustration of the logical result of evolution upon man's thought and life. He began life a Christian, but in order to hold to his hypothesis he found it necessary to discard every vital truth of the Christian religion. In a letter written in his old age and published in his Life and Letters he tells the whole story. He declares that, at the time he wrote this letter, he did not believe there had ever been any revelation, thus rejecting the Bible as the inspired Word of God and Christ as Son and Saviour. But he says in the letter that when (as a young man) he went south on the Beagle he was laughed at and called orthodox because he quoted the Bible as "an unanswerable authority on a question of morality.' Note the change. In the same letter he also declared himself an Agnostic, adding that "the beginning of all things is a mystery insoluble by us," but he explains that about the time he wrote the Origin of Species he believed in a First Great Cause. In this letter he asks a question which throws some light upon the pathway that he followed in his journey from Christianity to Agnosticism. He inquires: "Can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions [in regard to God and Immortality]?" He drags man down to a brute level; then he judges man by brute standards and shuts the door of heaven against him. When he first announced his hypothesis he gave God credit for placing the first germs of life upon our planet; later, when he became an Agnostic, he apologized for yielding too much to public sentiment, omitted the word "God" and changed the word "placed" to the word "appeared,"--a word which suits the atheistic evolutionist as well as the theistic evolutionist.Vladimir Krondan_{November 21, 2008
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B is a lark, and conflates two distinct issues - consciousness and free will. Yes, many people whose views tend towards dualism also typically believe in the moral/ethical culpability of persons. But arguments that amount to 'we can be held responsible for our actions because we have souls!' are few and far between. Further, dualists are exactly that - dualists. They see human agents as a mix of two distinct substances, material and immaterial. Arguing that dualists must attribute any and all senses to only one half of this duality (the non-material) is a common error, but exactly that: An error. A is an issue worth investigating, and various dualists have their own responses. Some, like Henry Stapp, favor quantum mechanical interactions as a place for a kind of irreducible mind to 'interact'. I've seen one philosopher argue (Jeremy Pierce, I believe) that just as it was discovered that matter has an equivalency with energy, it may be the case that psychological properties, while distinct in the way matter is from energy, necessarily has a similar equivalency. Other replies are around, but in this case the dualists are no worse off than the materialists. Add in quantum-level interactions and the materialist may seem to be in a worse case than the dualist and both may be in an inferior case compared to an idealist. It depends on who you ask. C has some of B's confusion in play. Dualists are not in the business of denying that there is a dependency on the brain to some, or even to a great extent, when it comes to mind/consciousness. Even full-blown theologians like Aquinas viewed the physical self as downright essential for a tremendous number of mental experiences. And arguing that there's no scientific evidence to support the claims of NDE experiences, when NDE experiences themselves are being cited as evidence, is an interesting way to handle things. Finally - where's the data on how 'most people view the soul'? Most people in my experience have only vague ideas about such things - and at the same time are well aware of the importance of the brain and physical body both. Most people, amateur materialist or not, seem to have only a vague grasp on how we know the brain certainly seems to work - it could therefore follow that 'the brain, as most people envision it, does not exist'. But putting it that way exaggerates the situation as it is.nullasalus_{November 20, 2008
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ribczynski wrote:
c) The near-death experiences that Domoman alluded to are claimed to happen in the absence of brain activity. If so, then the soul/spirit/consciousness is capable of seeing, hearing, thinking, remembering, deciding, and feeling without help from the brain. Yet all of the neuroscientific evidence to date suggests that this is not the case, and that all of these functions depend, at least to some extent, on the brain.
Not all.
angryoldfatman_{November 20, 2008
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Hi gpuccio, If I understand your comment, you're suggesting that while the will may not be completely independent of the physical brain, contra Domoman, there is still room for an immaterial component of the will. I see a problem with that approach which I will try to illustrate via an analogy. Imagine that you and I are physiologists trying to figure out exactly how the liver works. We both acknowledge that the liver carries out certain essential metabolic functions. Where we differ is that you believe (correctly, in the opinion of most scientists) that the liver is a purely physical organ, and that its functions can ultimately be explained in purely physical terms. I, on the other hand, insist that a physical liver alone is incapable of fulfilling these functions, and that an immaterial "liver-spirit" must also be present for the liver to work properly. You point out that all the liver functions we've studied to date have had physical explanations. I concede the truth of your statement, but I counter by insisting that the liver-spirit is responsible for some of the so-far unexplained functions of the liver. In terms of sheer logic, my position is unassailable. It truly is logically possible that there is an immaterial liver-spirit, responsible for some of the more esoteric liver functions that have not yet been explained. Yet I suspect you would be unhappy with my position. Why? Because it is essentially a "liver-spirit of the gaps" argument. An immaterial liver-spirit is being invoked not because of any positive evidence for its existence, but merely to fill in the gaps in our understanding of physical liver function. I believe that by invoking an immaterial component of the will, you make the same mistake vis-à-vis the brain as I, in our fictitious scenario, am making about the liver. Where is the positive evidence that the will is not purely a function of the physical brain? You also point out that materialists have not solved the "hard problem" of consciousness -- the problem of how a purely physical system can give rise to subjective experience. True enough, but I would point out that as a dualist, you are in an even worse position. The materialist has the problem of explaining how a physical brain can give rise to consciousness. The dualist has the problem of explaining how an immaterial spirit (or whatever term you wish to use) can give rise to consciousness. The only explanation of this I've ever heard from a dualist is "It just does. That's the nature of spirits." Not very persuasive. Beyond that, the dualist faces some additional problems that leave the materialist unscathed: a) how does an immaterial soul/spirit/consciousness interact with the physical world? If the physical and the transcendental are really two separate realms, how can an immaterial mind direct or influence the physical body? b) many dualists, because of their religious convictions, want to see the soul as something that is responsible for our ethical decisions. If the will is even partly dependent on the physical brain, and can be disrupted by damage to the brain, then in what sense can we continue to attribute moral responsibility to the soul? c) The near-death experiences that Domoman alluded to are claimed to happen in the absence of brain activity. If so, then the soul/spirit/consciousness is capable of seeing, hearing, thinking, remembering, deciding, and feeling without help from the brain. Yet all of the neuroscientific evidence to date suggests that this is not the case, and that all of these functions depend, at least to some extent, on the brain. None of these objections apply to the materialist viewpoint. The evidence really is overwhelmingly against the existence of a soul as most people envision it.ribczynski_{November 20, 2008
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ribczynski: "If there were an immaterial mind “driving” the brain according to its will, then the will itself should be unaffected by damage to the brain." Let's try it this way: There is an immaterial consciousness, a transcendantal subject, interecting with the phenomenal world through the interface of mind and brain. Mind and brain are strongly interrelated, and perception and will are functions depending on that interaction, which, when everything works fine, goes both senses. The mind is probably more than the physical brain, in the sense that we cannot at present understand it completely. But it is amways the transcendental consciousness which "perceives" everything and "interacts" through the instruments of body, brain and mind. If something in the body-mind complex does not work fine, the representations of the mind, perceived by consciousness, are consequently influenced. Where is the problem in that? Just try to explain what consciousness is, and how it can explained by a physical model. In case you don't know, that is usually called, even by many materialist neuroscientists, the "hard problem of consciousness", the easy problem being how the mind works. If you really have a good solution for that hard problem, please let us know. The last time I checked, the newest fairy tale was that consciousness arises from informational loops (Hofstadter, I think). That's even worse than the previous silliness about parallel computing...gpuccio_{November 20, 2008
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Domoman, For a skeptical look at near-death experiences, including Pim van Lommel's study, see this article. Regarding your second point, the idea that the immaterial mind "drives" the brain is not supported by clinical and experimental evidence (Jeffrey Schwartz's claims notwithstanding). For example, there are disorders of the brain that leave victims without the desire to do things as simple as getting out of bed or brushing their teeth (technical term abulia). It's not that they're depressed; they simply can't form the desire to do these things. If there were an immaterial mind "driving" the brain according to its will, then the will itself should be unaffected by damage to the brain. There might be cases where the brain failed to respond to the demands of the will, but the will itself should be unimpaired. We do see impairment of the will, however, which shows that the will is not independent of the brain.ribczynski_{November 20, 2008
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O'Leary, Have you ever heard of Pim van Lommel? There is an article of his about the survival of consciousness after death, that I found extremely interesting. It seems more likely, from what I gather, that the brain is more like a steering-wheel of sorts for the body, and the mind/consciousness drives. Here's the article if you haven't read it already: http://www.iands.org/research/important_studies/dr._pim_van_lommel_m.d._continuity_of_consciousness.htmlDomoman_{November 20, 2008
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Interesting links. I always enjoy hearing the subject of consciousness debated. It generally progresses to (from the morning session) "... how do thoughts arise?" [~27:00] The speaker mentions brain area activations and asks, " ... how do they generate thoughts?" No scientific explanations have been validated, although consensus opinions are that it is based on synaptic activity alone. But at this point [32:26], he cites Prof. Henry Stapp, who has a quantum physics view of consciousness, and I assume a dualist viewpoint as well. My view is that the brain colors thoughts, adds human subjectivism, and subjectivism based on prior temporal experiences, but is not the end point (producer) of consciousness itself. OOB experiences are common, and I've had a few myself (early 20's). I'm looking forward to hearing Prof. Stapp on the podium as a speaker, but later for that. It's 4 am, yawn.LeeBowman_{November 20, 2008
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