How does the mind arise from the brain? Novel idea

_{Denyse O'Leary

January 25, 2015

Intelligent Design, Mind, Neuroscience, News}

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From hplus Magazine:

Abstract: Human behaviour is controlled not only by instincts but also by the mind. However, the relation of the mind to the brain has not been fully explained. In conventional interpretations, the mind is not believed to be located at any one spot in the brain, which, if true, suggests that we will remain forever unable to explain the mind completely, regardless of our understanding of the brain’s local functions. Brain development resembles the branching process of the cherry tree, in which the trunk branches off into limbs and limbs into twigs. As a novel method of understanding the mind, we compared the patterns of neural stem cell activity with the growth patterns of meristematic cells in the cherry tree. Studying plants in the natural world enables us to keep an open mind.

It’s okay, except for one thing: Ask the cherry tree for a comment and see what you get. Get back to us with the answer. World awaits with interest.

See also: Why naturalizing the mind will never work

and

What great physicists have said about immateriality and consciousness

Hat tip: Stephanie West Allen at Brains on Purpose

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Comments

gpuccio @ 69 I think you are laboring too much over a simple chemical phenomenon. It is known fact that intravenous Ketamine can induce emergence phenomena. All those experiences of tunnels and out of body experiences do occur in what ketamine users term the K-Hole. I believe we may find answers of consciousness and 'I' in the way N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor is blocked and unblocked and possibly by studying the P300 waves created in our brain. The problem, ofcourse, is we don't have enough healthy people willing to allow scientists to fiddle with their brains !Me_Think_{January 28, 2015
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RDFish: Thank you again for your answer. Your precise comments are a good starting point to detail some aspects of my views which were not clear in my previous post. a) You say:
I don’t really understand the “become” part in your definition, but this is fine.
OK, what I mean by "become" is more or less the following: 1) There are the objective contents, in some form (stimuli, neural activities, structured biochemical reactions, electrical states, quantum states, whatever else we don't know), but they are not yet represented. There is a moment/place/event where they become conscious representation. The I becomes "aware" of those contents. That difference is obvious in the simplest context: sensation. Let's say that a physical stimulus is in the form of a ray of light. That is not a representation. Then it interacts with cells in the retina, and it generates a nervous impulse. That is not a representation (we know that if the optical nerve is damaged, no representation takes place. Then the impulse travels to various paths in the central nervous system. Again, there is no representation (if any of those paths is interrupted, nothing is perceived). Then it reaches the visual cortex in the occipital brain. Again, if that area is damaged, there is no conscious representation. That's where we get with what we know at present. What happens there, in the cortex? The impulse is still in a similar form as it was in the retina or neural ways. But there is a moment when it becomes a representation of the I. There is no doubt that the visual cortex is the last physical reference where we can describe the impulse physically, as we could do in the retina and in the neural ways. So, whatever happens which is different, it takes place after the impulse reaches the cortex (for this specific context of sensation). That's what I mean with "becomes". You say:
I usually say it is that which we lose when we fall into a dreamless sleep and regain when we awaken.
This is an important point where we definitely differ. I don't think that in a dreamless sleep we are not conscious. Dreamless sleep is only a different state of consciousness, a deep and important state, where we are probably aware of less formal experiences, such as peace. In my view, we never "lose" consciousness. We "are" consciousness. Using "we" implies the existence of a subject, of an I. b) You say:
What do you make of split-brain patients? Are there two “I”s in there?
No. One I. And two (or more) different structured sets of contents, relatively disconnected one from the other. d) You say:
Ok, so you limit “physical reality” to only that which we can understand using science/physics. So the tertiary structure of protein (which we cannot explain) is not part of physical reality, nor are turbulent flows or dark matter part of physical reality. I wouldn’t say that, but… ok.
I did not mean exactly that. We understand the tertiary structure of a protein as deriving from known biochemical laws, although we cannot compute it. There is no hint that different laws are necessary to explain it. Dark energy (whatever it may be) is a good example of some observed phenomenon which apparently cannot be explained by our present physical map of reality. Physics today has a very strong belief that some set of assumptions and laws (the forces, the standard system, quantum mechanics, whatever) can potentially explain everything we can observe. I don't believe that is true. So, let's imagine that to explain the observed facts which have generated the term "dark energy" we need, at some point, to hypothesize a new component of reality, let's call it "X". At that point, "X" will be a part of our "physical" reality, but it could have properties which are completely different from matter and energy. Maybe minds can be explained in terms of "X". Maybe there is an "X" structure which interacts with the brain of matter and energy. Maybe NDEs happen at the "X" level, after the brain has stopped working. Now, there is a difference between the following two scenarios: 1) The physical brain, made of atoms and electrons and so on, is all that is necessary to explain mental processes. We just have to detail what physical processes correspond to the specific mental processes, but we can certainly do that, in time, by the known physical laws and concepts (the forces, particles, and so on). 2) Mental processes cannot be completely explained in that way, because they happen in part at other objective levels, which we cannot at present understand, because our map of objective reality is vastly incomplete. Please, note that I am still talking about "objective" reality. About that, you say:
Also, what does it mean to “objectively observe”? I thought our observations are by definition subjective perceptions, and science relies on intersubjective agreement to support the inference to objective reality.
That's what I mean. Sensations tell us that some objective reality exists, and they have many aspects which allow us to share inferences about an objective reality out of us which is stable and obeys laws. That's what I mean. The point is: I believe that "mental processes", IOWs the objective events which structure the contents which will become representations of the I, are "objective". They can be observed (in part), or it will be possible to do so in the future. They can be understood scientifically. They are "the easy problem" of consciousness, because they relate to the contents of consciousness, not to consciousness itself. That's why I call them "formal": they have forms which can be described and understood in terms of mathematics, algorithms, IOWs, in terms of traditional science. WE can follow the path of a sensation stimulus up to the visual cortex. Maybe we will be able, in the future, to understand how the visual cortex interacts with some "X" structure. And so on. We can describe formal processes. The sum total of those formal processes, both those we know and those we still don't know, I call "the mind". Nothing of that becomes conscious representation unless an I represents them. e) You say:
I would say that physical and objective reality are the same, and that we don’t understand all of reality, but I understand this per your definitions.
and:
You’ve defined physical reality by excluding anything we don’t understand via physics, then you’ve said that mind is part of objective reality but not physical reality. What makes the mind objective?
and
What makes the mind “formal”? Do you mean formal as in a formal language or a formal logic?
I hope I have clarified better what I think in the previous point. Then you say:
By your definition it is obvious that the mind is not part of physical reality, simply because you have defined it that way (and because we obviously don’t understand the mind according to physics). So it’s not a question of belief about the world at all – it is merely a result of the way you’ve chosen to define “physical reality”.
Not exactly. If you look at my two possible scenarios, in the previous point: 1) The physical brain, made of atoms and electrons and so on, is all that is necessary to explain mental processes. We just have to detail what physical processes correspond to the specific mental processes, but we can certainly do that, in time, by the known physical laws and concepts (the forces, particles, and so on). 2) Mental processes cannot be completely explained in that way, because they happen in part at other objective levels, which we cannot at present understand, because our map of objective reality is vastly incomplete. You can see that there is a difference. In scenario 1) we cannot explain mental processes because we lack the details, but we completely understand the actors and the laws. IOWs, mental processes can be explained completely in terms of atoms, neural connections, synapses, and so on, but we cannot compute the details, exactly as we think (correctly, I believe) that the tertiary structure of a protein can be computed from known biochemical interactions, although the computation is still too complex for our resources. In scenario 2) we will never be able to describe correctly mental processes with out current actors and laws, because we need to discover completely new perspectives about objective outer reality before we can understand mental processes correctly (what I have called "X"). I firmly believe in the second scenario. but the first scenario is a possible option too. You say:
I would simply say that we do not understand how brains work, and we also do not understand how we think, and it is likely but not certain that if we understood the first we would understand the second. (However, by “think” here I am talking about the easy problem, not the hard problem of conscious awareness/sentience itself).
Well, that is probably what I mean. If scenario 1 is true, as soon as we understand how the brain works (according to our known physical laws) we will be able to understand how we think (in the sense of the easy problem). On the contrary, if scenario 2 is true, that will not happen. So, I appreciate that you say: "it is likely but not certain". Then you say:
Let’s say NDEs/OBEs present evidence that conscious thought can occur without brain activity. That would not mean that thought isn’t physical (by my definition) – it would mean that the brain is not necessary for conscious thought, but conscious thought may still be mediated (for lack of a better term) by some unknown physical process.
OK, let's make a distinction. If we accept for a moment that NDEs cannot be explained by brain activity, then they are evidence of two different things: a) That the I exists independently from the brain. Why? Because they are conscious experiences, and therefore they are represented in the I, and therefore they imply the hard problem of consciousness. The I, whatever it is, is the source of awareness. The I is aware of NDEs. b) That some mental processes happen independently from the brain. Why? beacuse NDEs are formal and objective. The I experiences outer realities, including outer physical realities (in OBEs). In deep NDEs, whole outer structures are experienced. That means that the conscious experiences during NDEs are formally structured, IOWs that some mental processes take place. So, if NDEs take place without the brain, they are evidence that both the hard problem and the easy problem of consciousness exist independently of the brain. That is a very important point. You say:
However, I do not believe that NDE/OBE evidence shows any such thing at present. I would very much like to see the most convincing evidence to date – any citations handy? For me, the a priori probability that conscious thought can occur without brain activity is extremely low, given all we know about reliable effects of brain changes/injury on mental processes.
OK, that's where we differ. My apriori experiences (I would never call them "probabilities") tell me the opposite. I am convinced that the vast corpus of NDE information is a very strong argument in favour of my point. Of course, hyperskepticism can always ignore even the best evidence. However, NDEs are not the only argument. For me, mystic experiences and religious experiences in general are a much stronger fact. A final thought about what you call the "reliable effects of brain changes/injury on mental processes". I must say that I really don't understand all the fuss about that point. I will try to explain. I suppose we can agree that we have known for a long time that if I put my hand on a fire I feel pain. OK, isn't that a "reliable effect of body changes/injury on mental processes"? We also know that if I lose my eyes I cannot see. Not really a recent argument. Now we know that if I severe the optical nerve I cannot see any more. OK, and then? And if there is damage in my visual cortex I cannot see any more. OK, and then? And if I have some subtle imaging of my brain, I find states which correspond to specific mental processes. OK, and then? And if the brain is damaged in specific ways, I perceive specific things, or my mental functions are limited or changed in specific ways. OK, and then? All those things prove only one concept, which has been well known since humans exist: most of what we perceive (but maybe not all) is vastly influenced by our body and brain. IOWs, our consciousness, in our physical life, is very strongly connected to the workings of a body and a brain/CNS. Is that really a surprise? Maybe it changes your priors. It does not change mine.gpuccio_{January 28, 2015
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Hi gpuccio,
Thank you for your very beautiful post (#53). I must say that it was sort of a shock for me to agree with you on so many things! :)
Thanks. Yes, we tend to rush to put people into big buckets and infer their beliefs that way instead of actually listening to what they say about their own beliefs :-)
a) Consciousness: the process, which we can directly observe in ourselves (and infer in others) in which objective contents become subjective experiences.
I don't really understand the "become" part in your definition, but this is fine. "Consciousness" is hard to define - I usually say it is that which we lose when we fall into a dreamless sleep and regain when we awaken.
b) Subject: the single “observer” which refers to itself the contents defined in a) (and therefore makes them “subjective experiences”. I will call this subject “the I”.
What do you make of split-brain patients? Are there two "I"s in there?
c) Mind: the sum total of the processes which contribute to structure the contents defined in a).
OK
d) Physical reality: the sum total of what we can objectively observe and understand according to the known laws of science (especially physics).
Ok, so you limit "physical reality" to only that which we can understand using science/physics. So the tertiary structure of protein (which we cannot explain) is not part of physical reality, nor are turbulent flows or dark matter part of physical reality. I wouldn't say that, but... ok. Also, what does it mean to "objectively observe"? I thought our observations are by definition subjective perceptions, and science relies on intersubjective agreement to support the infernce to objective reality.
e) Body/Nervous system/Brain: the physical components of the mind
OK
First of all I don’t believe that our understanding of the objective reality is complete. Not at all. IOWs, what I call “the physical reality” must be considered a subset of the “objective reality”.
I would say that physical and objective reality are the same, and that we don't understand all of reality, but I understand this per your definitions.
Now, my point is that the “mind” is part of the “objective reality”, because it is the sum total of the processes which structure the contents which are represented by the I.
You've defined physical reality by excluding anything we don't understand via physics, then you've said that mind is part of objective reality but not physical reality. What makes the mind objective?
In that sense, the mind is formal and objective.
What makes the mind "formal"? Do you mean formal as in a formal language or a formal logic?
At the same time, there is no reason to believe that the mind is purely “physical”, in the sense of my definition.
By your definition it is obvious that the mind is not part of physical reality, simply because you have defined it that way (and because we obviously don't understand the mind according to physics). So it's not a question of belief about the world at all - it is merely a result of the way you've chosen to define "physical reality".
The brain is the physical part of the mind, but there is no reason that other components, not understood by our known laws of reality, may not be part of the mental process.
Again, it seems to me that you are stating tautologies determined by your particular definition of "physical reality". By your definition components that are not understood by our known laws are not physical, so by definition our mental processes are not entirely physical. I would simply say that we do not understand how brains work, and we also do not understand how we think, and it is likely but not certain that if we understood the first we would understand the second. (However, by "think" here I am talking about the easy problem, not the hard problem of conscious awareness/sentience itself).
For example, NDEs and OBEs are clues that the mind is not purely physical, and exists beyond the brain.
Let's say NDEs/OBEs present evidence that conscious thought can occur without brain activity. That would not mean that thought isn't physical (by my definition) - it would mean that the brain is not necessary for conscious thought, but conscious thought may still be mediated (for lack of a better term) by some unknown physical process. (For you, there is no such thing as an "unknown physical process", for by your definition if it is not currently known it is not physical). However, I do not believe that NDE/OBE evidence shows any such thing at present. I would very much like to see the most convincing evidence to date - any citations handy? For me, the a priori probability that conscious thought can occur without brain activity is extremely low, given all we know about reliable effects of brain changes/injury on mental processes. I'm going to stop here - before I add more confusion to our discussion, I'd like to understand your position more clearly. Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{January 27, 2015
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Hi Box, You refuse to say what it is you believe explains the relationship between mind and matter; instead you simply deny physicalism. Well, at least we agree that physicalism fails, but I think it's obvious that you have no answer either. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{January 27, 2015
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Hi Me_Think, I disagree with your assumption that explaining the relationship between conscious awareness and matter is not qualitatively different from any other problem we have ever solved in science. I will say that things look more promising vis-a-vis free will though (cf. Libet, Wegner, etc). Anyway, let me know when you think anyone has made one iota of progress toward understanding the genesis of phenomenological experience - I'd love it! Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{January 27, 2015
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Axel: Thank you for the comment. :)gpuccio_{January 27, 2015
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'a) Objective inputs structured by some objective mind (not necessarily “physical”, in the sense defined). b) An I which represents those contents and ascribes them to itself. So, in the final sense, it is always the I which generates the subjectivity, not the mind. So, in my view, the “complex mechanisms” which you refer to are part of the mind, not of the I. The I is simple, not complex. It interacts with complex contents (the mind), in both directions: representing them, and generating free outputs (“reactions”) to change them. The I is the source of both cognition and free will. ID theory states that only an I, interacting with complex contexts, can generate new original CSI. The whole process is usually called “design”.' A very subtle exposition, if I may say so, gpuccio, yet, of course, primordial to any understanding of the human mind in toto.Axel_{January 27, 2015
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'Every problem in science was a mystery till solution was discovered.' 'Fraid not, Me_Think. Many of the problems in science that were a mystery, but which were solvable, have indeed been solved. Very many more have not been solved, nor ever will be; certainly not those that are paradoxes, entirely repugnant to our logic, as RDF mentioned. The fact that some of the solvable 'mysteries' were solved is no indication that all mysteries will be. The promissory note remains a dud. There are mysteries; and there are mysteries; scientists and scientism's finest. You should be too bright to belong to the latter, M-T.Axel_{January 27, 2015
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RDFish #57, In #55 I have explained why your statement doesn't make sense. In #57 you fail to address my point. And I don't feel like explaining it again.Box_{January 27, 2015
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RDFish: Thank you for your very beautiful post (#53). I must say that it was sort of a shock for me to agree with you on so many things! :) Almost all, I would say. Maybe all. I will try to clarify better what I think about the only "controversial" point. You say: "The interesting point regarding mind and matter that very few people acknowledge is this: Complex mechanisms (including living things, or universal fine-tuning) do not seem to arise without the action of a conscious mind, and minds do not seem to arise without the action of complex mechanisms. We have no clue how exquisitely complex biological mechanisms (such as our brains) could arise by means of the physical forces and processes of which we’re currently aware, and we likewise have no clue how information – the content of conscious thought – could possibly be stored, retrieved, and processed without complex physical processes. Most people (such as gpuccio) ignore the latter observation, and decide (for whatever reason) that mind could exist prior to and independently of mechanism. Other people ignore the former observation and decide that abiogenesis and evolutionary theory can fully account for biological complexity, although there is no evidence that this is the case." Emphasis mine. Well, yes and no. mike1962 makes a thoughtful comment: "Excellent post. (Although I’m not sure gpuccio denies the latter observation.)" I think that, in a sense, he is right. But I must make some important distinctions. So, to make things easier, I will give some definitions of mine: a) Consciousness: the process, which we can directly observe in ourselves (and infer in others) in which objective contents become subjective experiences. b) Subject: the single "observer" which refers to itself the contents defined in a) (and therefore makes them "subjective experiences". I will call this subject "the I". c) Mind: the sum total of the processes which contribute to structure the contents defined in a). d) Physical reality: the sum total of what we can objectively observe and understand according to the known laws of science (especially physics). e) Body/Nervous system/Brain: the physical components of the mind Now, let me say that we have an objective reality (which can be in some way perceived and interpreted by the shared testimony of our senses) and the subjective reality of our consciousness (where all the representations and intepretations about the objective reality really take place). First of all I don't believe that our understanding of the objective reality is complete. Not at all. IOWs, what I call "the physical reality" must be considered a subset of the "objective reality". Now, my point is that the "mind" is part of the "objective reality", because it is the sum total of the processes which structure the contents which are represented by the I. In that sense, the mind is formal and objective. It can be understood as the sum of the processes which transform and structure the objective inputs which generate the final contents represented in the I. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that the mind is purely "physical", in the sense of my definition. The brain is the physical part of the mind, but there is no reason that other components, not understood by our known laws of reality, may not be part of the mental process. For example, NDEs and OBEs are clues that the mind is not purely physical, and exists beyond the brain. But the mind is still a sum of processes, therefore it is in some way "objective". It's only the I which transforms the contents of the mind into subjective representations. Therefore, all subjective representations need two component: a) Objective inputs structured by some objective mind (not necessarily "physical", in the sense defined). b) An I which represents those contents and ascribes them to itself. So, in the final sense, it is always the I which generates the subjectivity, not the mind. So, in my view, the "complex mechanisms" which you refer to are part of the mind, not of the I. The I is simple, not complex. It interacts with complex contents (the mind), in both directions: representing them, and generating free outputs ("reactions") to change them. The I is the source of both cognition and free will. ID theory states that only an I, interacting with complex contexts, can generate new original CSI. The whole process is usually called "design".gpuccio_{January 27, 2015
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RDFish @ 58
Well, no we don’t. We have identified various physiological correlates of consciousness, but that does not by any means suggest that any one of them is “responsible” for consciousness...... Still, imagine we come to understand every single detail about how neural activity maps to cognition, and the reverse. That would enable us to read people’s thoughts by instrumenting their brains, but it still wouldn’t answer the question here: Why don’t these physical processes simply proceed like all others..
Correlations are the first step towards Causality. It can be discovered only after various correlations are found ,Structural Equation Models created; direct,indirect and hidden effects are analyzed,and then among those models, you will find the answer. Every problem in science was a mystery till solution was discovered.Me_Think_{January 27, 2015
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Out of body experiences is unbiblical. Absent from the body is present with the lord. I see them as simply misfunctions of the memory during stress. Pete townsend said he had one on a plane while under drugs. What does gOD say about the mind. clearly he says the mind is just a tool for the soul/heart to use in thinking. SO its only a material tool. SO i say its clearly just a memory operation. The mind is a memory middleman between our soul and our body. There is no brain.! by the way there are great youtube things about this showing non creationist 'scientists" are becoming aware the mind is not the brain etc.Robert Byers_{January 26, 2015
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Hi Me_Think,
We know P300 waves in brain are responsible for consciousness.
Well, no we don't. We have identified various physiological correlates of consciousness, but that does not by any means suggest that any one of them is "responsible" for consciousness.
Infants EEG studies have shown consciousness begins at 5 months.
For one thing, consciousness does not appear to be a binary property. What do EEG studies tell us about when fish consciousness begins? (hint: nothing, because we have no idea how EEGs causally relate to conscious experience)
The slow progress in consciousness research is not because there is no theory,...
Actually, I am saying the reverse is the case :-)
...it is because not many healthy people allow scientists to fiddle with their brains :-)
It certainly would be faster that way, yes. Still, imagine we come to understand every single detail about how neural activity maps to cognition, and the reverse. That would enable us to read people's thoughts by instrumenting their brains, but it still wouldn't answer the question here: Why don't these physical processes simply proceed like all others, without phenomenal experience? Why couldn't they produce the same mental behaviors and abilities, but without the inner light of conscious awareness? Why aren't we philosophical zombies? Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{January 26, 2015
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Hi Box,
Quite the contrary: we do have a clue.
Ok, then, please tell us what is the clue? How can information be stored and processed without physical mechanism? We know a tremendous amount about how information can be stored and processed with physical mechanism of course - so much, in fact, that we can build machines that do it all by themselves.
IOW if blind physical processes are behind the steering wheel how can we possibly have – as J.Eccles termed it – a unity of conscious experience?
Dr. Eccles didn't come up with that, I'm afraid - Kant talked about it just that way (or "unity of apperception") about 150 years earlier, and many others (like Descsartes and Leibniz) before him. In any event, as I said, the origin and nature of conscious experience is fully mysterious, and Eccle's stab at dualism didn't help matters any. I have a feeling you believe dualism does solve the problem; if that's the case, perhaps you could just say which flavor of dualism you favor? Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{January 26, 2015
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RDFish @ 53
I agree with gpuccio, rather than Piotr, regarding the hard problem. Not only do we lack a theory of consciousness, but we can’t begin to imagine what such a theory would look like.
We know P300 waves in brain are responsible for consciousness. Infants EEG studies have shown consciousness begins at 5 months. The slow progress in consciousness research is not because there is no theory, it is because not many healthy people allow scientists to fiddle with their brains :-)Me_Think_{January 26, 2015
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RDFIsh: (...) and we likewise have no clue how information – the content of conscious thought – could possibly be stored, retrieved, and processed without complex physical processes.
Quite the contrary: we do have a clue. In fact, we have don't have clue how physical processes - which don't give a damn about coherency, logic, overview, wisdom etc. - could possibly be responsible for storing, retrieving and processing information – the content of conscious thought. IOW if blind physical processes are behind the steering wheel how can we possibly have - as J.Eccles termed it - a unity of conscious experience?Box_{January 26, 2015
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RDFish @ 53, Excellent post. (Although I'm not sure gpuccio denies the latter observation.)
"I believe that both observations are true, and important, and that together they illuminate a profound mystery that we are incapable of understanding."
Indeed. In my view, the mystery must be as profound as existence itself, which necessarily must transcend temporality. That makes it beyond reason. The foundation of reality on which all we know and can describe rationality cannot itself be something that can be described rationality.mike1962_{January 26, 2015
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I agree with gpuccio, rather than Piotr, regarding the hard problem. Not only do we lack a theory of consciousness, but we can't begin to imagine what such a theory would look like. That isn't true for many other mysteries: We still don't understand how proteins fold, but we've made steady progress on that, and there are candidate mechanisms that could turn out to be responsible. We don't understand how life could arise from non-life, but there are plenty of scenarios that we could vaguely imagine to account for it. In contrast, nobody has the ability to even imagine how neural activity - or anything else - could "give rise to" conscious experience. The interesting point regarding mind and matter that very few people acknowledge is this: Complex mechanisms (including living things, or universal fine-tuning) do not seem to arise without the action of a conscious mind, and minds do not seem to arise without the action of complex mechanisms. We have no clue how exquisitely complex biological mechanisms (such as our brains) could arise by means of the physical forces and processes of which we're currently aware, and we likewise have no clue how information - the content of conscious thought - could possibly be stored, retrieved, and processed without complex physical processes. Most people (such as gpuccio) ignore the latter observation, and decide (for whatever reason) that mind could exist prior to and independently of mechanism. Other people ignore the former observation and decide that abiogenesis and evolutionary theory can fully account for biological complexity, although there is no evidence that this is the case. I believe that both observations are true, and important, and that together they present a profound mystery that we are incapable of understanding. There are other deep mysteries that may remain incomprehensible to us: In particular, we cannot understand how a fermion or a boson can be both a particle and a wave, which means we cannot understand what it is the world is made up of. Our minds can parse the universe that we can sense, and abstract from that in many ways too, but at some point we're like squirrels trying to make sense of quantum physics: Our brains just aren't up to it. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{January 26, 2015
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Piotr: OK, let's disagree politely. :) If I were not afraid to steal your time, I would say that the problem is not "the direct inaccessibility of (other people’s) consciousness", but rather "the direct accessibility of our consciousness, and its contents, to ourselves as subjects". That's the "hard problem of consciousness" that Chalmers refers to: why do subjective experiences exist, what is a subject? That is rather special, I would say... But OK, please go back to your duties. It has always been a pleasure for me to discuss with you, and always will be. But I am not greedy! :)gpuccio_{January 26, 2015
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gpuccio, I have work to do right now, so I'll probably have to limit my participation in this discussion. I'll just remark that a lot of, arguably most, scientific observation is of an indirect, inferential nature. We don't, in general, directly observe elementary particles, chemical bonds, gravitational fields, the Earth's core, extrasolar planets, chemical elements in the Sun's atmosphere, supermassive black holes in galactic nuclei, etc. We observe their effects (the physical evidence) and make reasonable inferences. I don't understand what's so special about the direct inaccessibility of (other people's) consciousness. But as I said, I'm a little busy at the moment, so let's simply agree to disagree politely. If I find the time, I may return to this thread later on.Piotr_{January 26, 2015
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Piotr: I respect your opinions, but: a) Observable behaviour is not "consciousness as a phenomen". It is behaviour, from which we may infer consciousness (or not). b) By definition consciousness is observed only as "an introspective experience". c) We must be clear in distinguishing between observation and inference: - a behaviour is observed. We never know directly if that behaviour is derived from conscious experiences or not, but we can make inferences about that. - our personal conscious experiences are directly observed by ourselves. That's how we know that consciousness exists, that it is a fact. - the personal experiences of others (other human beings, animals, and so on) are inferred. Although that inference is very strong and reliable (certainly for other humans), it is an inference just the same. An inference by analogy, on which all our map of reality is built. - our personal experience of consciousness is a precious source of information about consciousness itself. Moreover, if we accept the basic inference that other humans are conscious too (and I certainly do), we can use a lot of information coming from the subjective experiences of others. So, observables about consciousness, either directly perceived by ourselves or derived for others'perceptions, are many and important. - therefore, observables about consciousness are not limited to the esxistence of subjective experiences, but they include precious information about many different conscious states and experiences. - in that sense, the fact that one has not experienced all those states does not mean that one cannot get information about those states, which were observed by others. So, NDEs, for example, make up a very important body of information about well documanted conscious experiences, and only hyperskeptics like Seversky can easily dismiss them without serious consideration. - many religious experiences, shared by many people, give important information about the nature and laws of consciousness. The simple fact that some people are not interested in those facts does not in any way limit the importance and relevance of that information. However, as I have said, you are perfectly entitled to decide what is likely or unlikely for you. I believe that our world view is a personal choice, strongly dependent on our free will. We choose our map, in the end, and that choice is so personal and precious that we must always wholly respect it in all.gpuccio_{January 26, 2015
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Seversky, Please, I beg of you stop making comments which are not well thought out. I don't understand why you can't see how self-contradictory or inane they are. Are you deliberately trying to look like you are not that smart? 1. Wallstreeter43 presents a story whose whole point is that the mind existed when the material brain ( to our best understanding ) could NOT be functioning ). You're response is: "Find an example of a mind existing independent of any physical substrate like a brain" To make it clearer - Wallstreeter43 said, "Here is evidence of A". And you're supposed negative show stopping response was "Find an example of A". Do you understand how foolish that seems to me? You can choose to disagree with the evidence and the conclusions - but don't say there is no evidence. Then someone points that the given experiment was, evidence for, "a mind existing independent of any physical substrate like a brain". Your response was: "NDE/OBEs are anecdotal at best. They cannot be replicated reliably." What the hell do you mean by this statement? Do you mean that we should conduct controlled NDE experiments???? How do you propose to do this? There are many, many things in life that preclude a scientific experiment. If you choose to only believe evidence which comes from controlled experiments, you are walling yourself off from much of life.JDH_{January 26, 2015
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gpuccio:
But the problem is exactly: do our maps “adequately describe and explain” the territory, for our cognitive purposes? There are good maps and bad maps. Distinguishing between them is the basic “epistemological problem” of human cognition. My point is simple: trying to explain consciousness as a result of the configuration of matter, IOWs as an “emergent property” of the objective structure, is a very bad way to build a map of that specific territory.
Consciousness as a phenomenon (observable behaviour), or consciousness as an introspective experience? They may be different sides of the same coin, but it's bad epistemology to conflate them. I can't see why the phenomenon of consciousness shouldn't turn out to be an emergent product of the physical activity of a sufficiently complex nervous system. As for introspection, I can only speak for myself, but my own subjective consciousness has never, as far as I'm aware, been out of my body; I have never shared anyone else's consciousness; I can't communicate with other people telepathetically without using some material medium; I have no memories older than myself. All that makes mind/matter dualism and the possibility of disembodied consciousness unlikely to me.Piotr_{January 26, 2015
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Piotr: I am afraid I am losing you. You say: "It’s still an epistemological problem. It’s about how we learn things about the universe. But the universe existed without us and will continue to exists when we are gone. Most of it is not being observed by anybody anyway, and it’s existence doesn’t depend on whether we (or other conscious beings) observe it, let alone how we do it." Of course it is an epistemological problem. I thought we were discussing explanations. Explanations are cognitive entities. I was trying to say what is, IMO, a good epistemology, and what is not. That the universe exists even if we do not observe it is rather obvious. I am not a solipsist. And so? What has that to do with our epistemological problem (explaining consciousness)? "So it may be a pseudo-problem resulting from mixing up different categories." That is exactly my point. But it is not a "pseudo-problem". Materialists are trying all the time to explain consciousness as the result of configurations of non conscious matter, as an "emergent property" of a material structure. It's them who are mixing up different categories. Not I. You say: "Our models of consciousness (whatever they might be) will always be different from consciousness itself, even if they are correct (that is, if they adequately describe and explain the objectively observable aspects of consciousness)." Sure. The map is not the territory. It never is. We agree. But the problem is exactly: do our maps "adequately describe and explain" the territory, for our cognitive purposes? There are good maps and bad maps. Distinguishing between them is the basic "epistemological problem" of human cognition. My point is simple: trying to explain consciousness as a result of the configuration of matter, IOWs as an "emergent property" of the objective structure, is a very bad way to build a map of that specific territory. You say: "We have no “ultimate” knowledge of what spacetime is, what the electric charge is, what mass and energy “really” are, but we have operational models plus ways and means to make them better." We have no "ultimate" knowledge of anything. I absolutely agree. But sometimes we can explain some things in terms of other things. That's what we do in science. That's what materialists try to do with reductionist theories of consciousness. The problem is, some explanations "in terms of" are correct, others are not. You know my opinion about the explanations we have been discussing here ("emergent property", and so on). You say: "I can live with that." I say: I can live with good epistemology, I like it a lot, even if it gives me no "ultimate" knowledge, indeed because of that. Maybe I will look for "ultimates" in other places. But, definitely, I cannot live with bad epistemology. Not well, anyway.gpuccio_{January 26, 2015
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Folks, Computation is not contemplation and to try to get from the first to the second by material mechanisms under chance and necessity is to try to get North by heading West; cf. my argument here. KFkairosfocus_{January 26, 2015
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My point is: we observe consciousness in ourselves. We infer it in others. Instead, we observe matter through our consciousness, and others (if e accept the basic inference that they are conscious) seem to observe it in a generally shared modality.
It's still an epistemological problem. It's about how we learn things about the universe. But the universe existed without us and will continue to exists when we are gone. Most of it is not being observed by anybody anyway, and it's existence doesn't depend on whether we (or other conscious beings) observe it, let alone how we do it.
My point is simple: explaining consciousness as a configuration of non conscious elements (IOWs as the result of am objective structure) is a false argument, a fallacy doomed from the beginning. It is no explanation, and never will be.
So it may be a pseudo-problem resulting from mixing up different categories. Our models of physical phenomena are not the phenomena themselves. Our models of consciousness (whetever they might be) will always be different from consciousness itself, even if they are correct (that is, if they adequately describe and explain the objectively observable aspects of consciousness). We have no "ultimate" knowledge of what spacetime is, what the electic charge is, what mass and energy "really" are, but we have operational models plus ways and means to make them better. I can live with that.Piotr_{January 26, 2015
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Piotr: "I’m pretty sure other animals are conscious too, and experience emotions." I agree.I prefer cats, but I can accept that dogs are conscious too! :) "In all cases known to me, however, observable manifestations of consciousness require the presence of a functioning physical brain." This is not really an argument. First of all it is compatible with physical brains being interfaces for the manifestation of consciousness at the physical level. Second, many manifestations of consciousness can be at other levels. I would remind you that NDEs are, at least, controversial. The same could be said for mystical experiences. And so on. "But to observe is not the same as to experience. We can measure the spin of an electron, but does anyone ask what it feels to have a spin of 1/2? " My point is: we observe consciousness in ourselves. We infer it in others. Instead, we observe matter through our consciousness, and others (if we accept the basic inference that they are conscious) seem to observe it in a generally shared modality. The only direct observation of consciousness is our personal one. Maybe the electron is conscious too. There are models of that kind, but they are different from the so called "materialistic" explanations of consciousness as the result of a special configuration of objective, non conscious matter. My point is simple: explaining consciousness as a configuration of non conscious elements (IOWs as the result of am objective structure) is a false argument, a fallacy doomed from the beginning. It is no explanation, and never will be.gpuccio_{January 26, 2015
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gpuccio:
I would like to add some thoughts about the problem of “explaining” consciousness as an “emergent property” of matter. The problem is, IMO, that it’s no explanation at all.
Of course it isn't. It isn't the explanation of redness, wetness, solidity, etc., either. It's only a constatation you can make after the fact: once you know what solidity is and where it comes from, in physical terms, you can show that it is not a property of atoms. I'm not saying or implying I can explain consciousness; I merely point out that you can't rule out a naturalistic origin of consciousness using Timmy's naive argument in #7. Difficulties resulting from circular self-reference (conscious beings having "direct" access only to their own consciousness, including the awareness of being aware) don't demonstrate that consciousness must be extraphysical. They only reflect our epistemological limitations. But to observe is not the same as to experience. We can measure the spin of an electron, but does anyone ask what it feels to have a spin of 1/2? (If consciousness is a fundamental component of the Universe, as Whitehead would have had it, perhaps this kind of experience is important for the electron.) I can observe effects which I ascribe to other people's consciousness. I'm pretty sure other animals are conscious too, and experience emotions. Right now I'm watching my dog exhibiting immense joy at the news (communicated to her verbally, and evidently understood in her possibly limited canine way) that she's gonna be taken out for a walk. It all cases known to me, however, observable manifestations of consciousness require the presence of a functioning physical brain.Piotr_{January 26, 2015
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Seversky said ""NDE/OBEs are anecdotal at best. They cannot be replicated reliably. There is no way to verify the experience took place during the time when there was no detectable brain activity. How do we no it didn’t happen during the periods immediately before or immediately after the period of no brain function when the patient was unconscious? And if EEGs are not sensitive enough to detect deep brain function how do we know there was no brain activity when they were flatlined? You people are way too credulous."" Seversky I even gave you the deep brain surge . The problem here is even if it can somehow account for conscious activity we do know that they last for only 30 seconds , then bye bye function. Parnia knew about the 2013 find of deep brain surge and probably accounted for this when he said in his study that they now know that after the heart stops functioning the brain active stops 30 seconds after . You see my friend we aren't being credulous . Your choosing to ignore the fact that I even gave u the deep brain surge . Again your ignoring this point . The problem is going to keep getting worse for materialist/atheists. I still recall a well known atheist site (not gonna name names ) whose followers were in a frenzy . The article writer told them to calm down because this example doesn't prove life after death, it only shows that a person can have conscious awareness without a functioning brain . To that I can only shake my head and say lololololololololololololwallstreeter43_{January 26, 2015
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Gcuppio said ""Seversky: There are certainly many hallmarks of a dogmatic biased selective hyperskeptic. You probably exhibit them all."" Bingo , and David Koresh would be supremely proud at how Seversky has selectively approached the evidence ;)wallstreeter43_{January 26, 2015
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