Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Human Consciousness

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(From In the Beginning … ):

For the layman, it is the last step in evolution that is the most difficult to explain. You may be able to convince him that natural selection can explain the appearance of complicated robots, who walk the Earth and write books and build computers, but you will have a harder time convincing him that a mechanical process such as natural selection could cause those robots to become conscious. Human consciousness is in fact the biggest problem of all for Darwinism, but it is hard to say anything “scientific” about consciousness, since we don’t really know what it is, so it is also perhaps the least discussed.

Nevertheless, one way to appreciate the problem it poses for Darwinism or any other mechanical theory of evolution is to ask the question: is it possible that computers will someday experience consciousness? If you believe that a mechanical process such as natural selection could have produced consciousness once, it seems you can’t say it could never happen again, and it might happen faster now, with intelligent designers helping this time. In fact, most Darwinists probably do believe it could and will happen—not because they have a higher opinion of computers than I do: everyone knows that in their most impressive displays of “intelligence,” computers are just doing exactly what they are told to do, nothing more or less. They believe it will happen because they have a lower opinion of humans: they simply dumb down the definition of consciousness, and say that if a computer can pass a “Turing test,” and fool a human at the keyboard in the next room into thinking he is chatting with another human, then the computer has to be considered to be intelligent, or conscious. With the right software, my laptop may already be able to pass a Turing test, and convince me that I am Instant Messaging another human. If I type in “My cat died last week” and the computer responds “I am saddened by the death of your cat,” I’m pretty gullible, that might convince me that I’m talking to another human. But if I look at the software, I might find something like this:

if (verb == ‘died’)
fprintf(1,’I am saddened by the death of your %s’,noun)
end

I’m pretty sure there is more to human consciousness than this, and even if my laptop answers all my questions intelligently, I will still doubt there is “someone” inside my Intel processor who experiences the same consciousness that I do, and who is really saddened by the death of my cat, though I admit I can’t prove that there isn’t.

I really don’t know how to argue with people who believe computers could be conscious. About all I can say is: what about typewriters? Typewriters also do exactly what they are told to do, and have produced some magnificent works of literature. Do you believe that typewriters can also be conscious?

And if you don’t believe that intelligent engineers could ever cause machines to attain consciousness, how can you believe that random mutations could accomplish this?

Comments
Pardon, but the points you are making were discussed long since above, Is that your way of saying "run along little girl, the adults are talking?". I've read those comments and you are wrong. I can make 2 + 2 = 11 without changing the meaning of 2 or + or =. The point is that once we do properly understand the relevant symbols, 2 + 2 = 4 is SELF EVIDENTLY TRUE. It is not self evidently true to an alien that is unfamiliar with your unstated assumption of a base 10 system. If an alien used a base 3 system, it would be self-evidently true to him that 2 + 2 = 11. Furthermore, 2x + 2x = 0 (for a non-zero value of x) is self evidently true when talking to an alien only familiar with geometry about right angles. The issue is not that we must appreciate context. That, is a distractive red herring led away to a strawman. Yes, we must appreciate context, Mr. Smartypants. LOL.San Antonio Rose
September 19, 2010
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PS: Interpreting the Inclusive Or function: 1 --> true, and + means AND/OR. So, a compound statemment p + q means "P is true and/or q is true." the truth value of the composite statement will be true if at least one of p and q are so. For instance, "A guava is a fruit AND/OR the moon is made of green cheese" is true, as the first of these is true. Does not matter that the second is false, even ridiculously false.kairosfocus
September 19, 2010
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SAR: Pardon, but the points you are making were discussed long since above, e.g. cf 187 - 191 for about the fourth round of such explanation: 65, 74, 111, etc. Again, the precise point is that we are to understand the situation we deal with. As the simple illustration below suffices to show [try it with some matchsticks], 2 + 2 = 4 is not a mystery, nor is it to be dismissed by arbitrarily and contradictorily redefining + to make a point: {||} + {||} --> {||||} And that thus, with the usual symbols and meanings, we can see that: 2 + 2 --> 4 Thus, we can then go on to see that in that context, 2 + 2 = 4 is not only true in fact but must be so; given what 2, +, + and 4 normally mean. To come up with claims that 2 + 2 = 11 or that 2 + 2 = 147 etc, and assert that they are "just as true" requires unannounced injection of a contradiction into the system. Of course, I know of a very common situation where we use very similar symbols thusly: 0 + 0 = 0 0 + 1 = 1 1 + 0 = 1 1 + 1 = 1 But of course, how that comes to be underscores the point: + here symbolises a boolean operation of INCLUSIVE OR, and 1 is here a boolean variable that takes the values 1 or 0. [And BTW, the boolean algebra relationship here is self evident, once its symbols, meanings and relationships are understood. Self-evident is not the same as simplistic.] The issue is not that we must appreciate context. That, is a distractive red herring led away to a strawman. The point is that once we do properly understand the relevant symbols, 2 + 2 = 4 is SELF EVIDENTLY TRUE. That is: 1 --> we understand based on our experience of the world as minded creatures, i.e. this is not a definition we are making up out of the air. 2 --> on understanding, we see that the claim is true, and MUST be true, on pain of absurdity. And so it illustrates how self-evident truths are real. As does: "Error exists." As does: "a finite whole is greater than any of its parts." As does: "a given thing cannot both be and not be." The problem is not contexts of discussion -- any use of symbols to express meaning is inherently about contexts, conventions, and the like -- but about a reality that ever so many are loath to acknowledge: there are truths which on understanding what is being said we can see are so and must be so on pain of absurdity. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 19, 2010
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Kairosfocus: And, we see why 2 + 2 = 4 is self-evident: once we understand the symbols, the operation of addition and the relationship of equality [typically, age 5 or so] we see that 2 + 2 = 4 [however we may label or symbolise] as a matter of brute fact, AND that it could not have been otherwise, on pain of confusion and gross error. I may just be a dumb high schooler, but I can see a situation where 2 + 2 = 11 and a situation where 2x + 2x = 0 for a non-zero value of x. Which I think is Mark's point about context.San Antonio Rose
September 19, 2010
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CY: Thanks, your input above was both helpful (cf how MF responded, however reluctantly) and encouraging. You are right that he seems to conflate perception [on evolutionary materialistic premises] and reality. Thus, he needs to appreciate that there are diverse worldviews held by intelligent, educated, thoughtful people, and that they are worthy of sitting down to the same serious table of comparative difficulties. Those who adhere to evolutionary materialism also need to realise that their own view is not privileged. For instance, observe MF's closing remark in his excerpt above: ". . . end up making up some abstract world of which it is true." These words reflect an extreme view, whereby the only "real" things are/"must be" physical/ natural (NB: to try to fully and exactly define those will land you in the most horrendous morass of complexities that make the objections on parts and wholes pale into insignificance . . .), and the meaning of abstractions lies in operations and observations on those things. But in fact, that begs the question of the central experience of the world we all have: our self-aware, conscious, thinking, enconscienced, unified selves. It is through that central fact that we interact with the external world and reflect in turn on it. In short, we are minded, indeed ensouled creatures. And to such creatures, love, good and evil, number, truth and the like are as much experiences as are the redness of a ball, or the velocity of the car in which we may be travelling. The issue is to coherently account for these, and that brings us tot he reality of self-evident truths starting with first principles of right reason. We may indeed understand and perceive such things as true, but their truth is not he product of our perception. Self evident first principles of right reason are true in the context that once we understand them, to try to reject them at once lands us in the shipwreck on the reefs of absurdities. (For instance, so soon as you utter a claim that something is the case, you entail that it cannot be not the case as well, in the same sense and at the same time and place. When someone tries that, as was done with the meaning of + above, the anchors start and we end on the reefs of absurdity in a moment.) Looking at remarks above on parts and wholes, one is left with the very strong impression of an utterly strained objection, one made in the teeth of commonplace concrete experience and concepts formed on such experience. Of course, it is probably felt that there must be some exceptions out there that allow us to doubt the specific and broader claims, so freighted with implications that seem to be unwelcome to materialists. But, we can unpack the claim that "a finite whole is greater than any of its parts." In context, we are talking of composite unities, things that have a unified identity, but which are made up from components. In such a case, it is -- or should be -- obvious that the part/component is not the same as the unified whole, and that as there must be at least two parts, no one part will be equivalent to, the same as, or as great as the whole. For components have to be joined together in organised ways and/or relationships to get to the whole. Letters are joined to make words, parts are joined to make engines, varieties of animals are organised in hierarchies to compose the Animal Kingdom, and lines of code are organised to yield a functioning program. But, if one is sufficiently determined not to acknowledge that, one can doubtless find and make objections that one would not ever have come to mind if one were open to the idea. Only to land in absurdities. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 19, 2010
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Onlookers (and MarkF): I must shake my head as I see the likes of:
[MF, 319:] I can’t read everyone’s response to everything. It is nothing personal against KF – I just think we have so little in common that there is no basis for an interesting discussion . . .
This is getting even more and more sadly threadbare. Evidently, MF -- a trained philosopher -- is unwilling to engage in comparative difficulties analysis on the issues that are at stake; which automatically locks him into worldview-level question-begging. (And the gobbet he snipped out of context shows why: he refused to address the point that the SET on whole-part relationships is an in-common claim, which is instantiated in particular cases in diverse ways, simply citing it as though that were enough to set it aside. But, any intelligent 6 year old will know that once we have a composite whole, the part is a component, not the whole. As we may see/understand in light of abundant experience from early childhood on.) Now, above, MF has had three cases of self-evident truths to deal with explicitly, and a fourth mentioned more or less in passing, of which he picks what he wants to deal with (and ducks the most directly evident one, of course):
1 --> "Error exists" (This has been brought up as an undeniably true case, for months; it is WCT no 1 in the list of 7 foundational principles of right reason here. Why it is undeniably true is that once we try to deny it, we directly entail that an error exists, i.e. we immediately exemplify what we try to deny.) 2 --> || + || --> ||||, i.e. 2 + 2 = 4 3 --> The whole is greater/more than the part. (The engine is more than the crankcase, the poem than the letter, the house than the brick, etc.) 4* --> The law of non-contradiction: A thing cannot at once be and not-be. (It is by trying to make + simultaneously mean two opposed things that the error on 2 + 2 = 4 has come about.) ___________________ * This has been mentioned but was not a focal point above.
Now, in MF cites a rebuttal to GP on case 2, which I will remark on with arrow-points: ___________________ >>A really important insight comes from Wittgenstein. Often a statement will be true for a combination of different types of criteria and because they always or often coincide we never have to resolve which apply.
a --> "often a statement will be true" i.e. W is acknowledging that things may well be true, and b --> He also admits that it may be warranted as such. c --> Warrant, of course is not proof, and self-evident statements will be warranted by observing that to reject them [once understood], lands you in immediate and patent absurdity.
For example, an arithmetic statement such as 2+2=4 is mathematically true because it follows from the Peano axioms (I think those are the right ones).
d --> Actually, 2 + 2 = 4 is true because of what 2, +, - and 4 mean, as may be grasped immediately on inspection of a few concrete cases, by many persons who have never heard of Peano's Axioms nor how they lead to the conclusion that || + || --> ||||. e --> For good reason relating to joining sub-groups to form a whole, and by direct inspection of the cardinality of the subsets and the joint whole, we were sure of the conclusion as a fact, thousands of years befoe Dedekind et al came up with what we know as Peano's axioms. f --> Further, we were long since convinced for good reason that this MUST be so, in light of what 2, 4, + and = mean, on pain of absurdity. g --> Peano's axioms came along much later, and serve as a unifying principle that allows us to analyse the underlying structure and relationships of the facts of arithmetic. h --> In fact, if they did not lead to the conclusion that 2 + 2 = 4, that would have been regarded as reason to reject the axioms. Facts come before theories, and before unifying ideas.
Now the Peano axioms apply very accurately to a vast range of situations so it is also true that 2+2=4 for a vast range of situations.
i --> Putting the cart before the horse.
Unless we are pure mathematicians we are never called upon to decide whether 2+2=4 is true in the mathematical or the descriptive sense.
j --> Just the opposite of the truth. Every child studying mathematics is led to see for him or herself that || + || --> |||| k --> As already noted, if Peano's axioms got this wrong, they would have been rejected. l --> That is, we are not here dealing with proof on premises [no sane person doubts that 2 + 2 = 4, but axiom ssts are open to challenge and change to see what happens as a result], but an explanatory construct that is accepted as (i) it unifies important facts, and (ii) it exposes an inner structure that allows us to then infer to other interesting phenomena, and to see the relevant general structural patterns and contrasts [e.g. of groups, rings, fields, and algebras]. m --> So, what we have here is a categorical confusion between proof and explanation. (Of course, axiomatisation can be fruitful, leading to other results that are deduced and which may well have been unexpected. n --> But that should not fool us into thinking that we accept self-evident facts like 2 + 2 = 4 BECAUSE that is a consequence of Peano's axioms. That is precisely back ways around. o --> And, we see why 2 + 2 = 4 is self-evident: once we understand the symbols, the operation of addition and the relationship of equality [typically, age 5 or so] we see that 2 + 2 = 4 [however we may label or symbolise] as a matter of brute fact, AND that it could not have been otherwise, on pain of confusion and gross error.
And when challenged as to what makes it true we get confused
p --> An attempted turnabout accusation. q --> The evidence above is that those who are confused are those who injected a contradictory definition of "+" and so deduced a contradiction whereby they wished to assert that 2 + 2 = 4 and 2 + 2 = 147. r --> That is, we see the pernicious effect of rejecting the principle of non-contradiction.
and end up making up some abstract world of which it is true!
s --> Dismissal by ridicule, rather than addressing of substance. t --> Symbols, such as 2, 4, + and = are inherently non-concrete. Two-ness is a property that allows sets of discrete objects to be put in one-to-one correspondence with a standard 2-set. u --> To see this, we use counting and the standard ordered set of symbols {1, 2, 3, . . . } so that when we match members in succession, we exhaoust the set being counted at the appropriate symbol: {||} --> |:1, |:2, exhaustion --> {||} has cardinality 2. v --> So, abstractions here have a reality that is implied every time we use symbols, including verbal ones, to represent the ral world. w --> And truth, as has repeatedly been noted, is that situation where the meaning of certain claims [which will be exressed in symbols] matches accurtately to reality. x --> Nor is that particularly mysterious, as every child who has had to be swatted for fibbing over what happened to the cookies in the jar full well understands. (As in, the crumbs on the lips tell the truth more than the words coming out of the mouth.)
>> ______________________ So, it becomes ever more plain how rejection of self-evident first principles of right reason leads us ever deeper into a morass of error. And, we then see the turnabout, where plunging into the morass of ever deepening errors, is held to be the epitome of intelligence, knowledge and wisdom. [The inadvertent echo of Rom 1 is ever so richly ironic.) It is time to cut the Gordian knot with one clean stroke. And Adler shows us just how: identify and correct the little error at the beginning. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 19, 2010
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CH The more I think about it, the more I think that I'm more Chestertonian than Chesterton.
First, I found the whole modern world talking scientific fatalism; saying that everything is as it must always have been, being unfolded without fault from the beginning. The leaf on the tree is green because it could never have been anything else. Now, the fairy-tale philosopher is glad that the leaf is green precisely because it might have been scarlet. He feels as if it had turned green an instant before he looked at it. He is pleased that snow is white on the strictly reasonable ground that it might have been black. Every colour has in it a bold quality as of choice; the red of garden roses is not only decisive but dramatic, like suddenly spilt blood. He feels that something has been DONE.
That's a tolerably good definition of mathematics, and I regret that Chesterton didn't know any or he might have written a much more interesting essay. I'm glad that 1+1=2 because I understand that 1+1 could have been 147, and the decision is not one that can be appealed to the real world, only to the storyteller (the mathematician). If the internal logic of the story (theorem) is sound, the story rings true, and it doesn't matter if the (real or metaphorical) snow is black or white or plaid. Thank you for reminding me to revisit that.BarryR
September 18, 2010
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CH Backing up a bit and reading Chesterton in context, I now realize that he's writing polemic, not philosophy, and the style he has chosen in a perfectly reasonable one for polemic. Here's the nub:
You cannot IMAGINE two and one not making three. But you can easily imagine trees not growing fruit;
That's a textbook argument from incredulity. I have no difficulty imagining either (and I work with expensive machines where the arithmetic is far stranger than 1+1=3). This passage may be more telling:
It is a dreadful thing to say that Mr. W.B.Yeats does not understand fairyland. But I do say it. He is an ironical Irishman, full of intellectual reactions. He is not stupid enough to understand fairyland. Fairies prefer people of the yokel type like myself; people who gape and grin and do as they are told.
I don't believe he's intending either passage to be read literally, or, perhaps I should say that I don't think either passage reflects what he actually believes. This is emphatically written for an audience, an audience who wants to be reassured. But no, I don't think there's an English professor or philosopher who would mistake this for philosophy.BarryR
September 18, 2010
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CH@309 As to absolute skepticism --- this simply isn't a problem. [At this point my posting here has been reduced to trying to find ways of restating the same five or six points over and over again. It becomes tedious.] A naive formulation of absolute skepticism (like that used by Lewis) might lead to a logical impossibility. This is naive because Lewis only admits true and false. This makes for easy but not very convincing philosophizing. My personal skepticism is of the more useful scientific variety. I don't have any certainty about truth or falsity, and this easily extends to "the idea that I don't have any certainty about truth and falsity". However, I do have a continuum of certainty, and it's no great loss that the extremes aren't available to me. I can have near-certainty about the truth of some proposition and near-certainty about the falsity of others, but I spend most of my time somewhere closer to the middle where I'm constantly revising what I believe as I continue to experience new things. Could this approach be wrong? Sure. And with that admission I remove the possibility of contradiction. All I've given up is certainty, and that's made me a much nicer person (as well as a better scientist).BarryR
September 18, 2010
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CH@310
Because things are self evident doesn’t mean that everyone realizes them just yet, just as counting numbers up to twenty aren’t always realized by tribes people, that doesn’t mean they are nothing.
I think you're starting to see the morass that "self-evident" becomes. Is the integer 20 self-evident? I think you'd say yes, even though many native societies never ran across the concept. Is zero also self-evident? Here we have many European societies not figuring this out until relatively recently (9th Century India). Is infinity self-evident? The mathematical world's reaction to Cantor's formulation of it ranged from skeptical to hostile. Are quarternions self-evident? Tensors? Lie groups? They don't appear to be. But mathematically, there's nothing that distinguishes some of these concepts as being self-evident and others not. Given the right selection of (non-obvious) axioms, I can derive any of these ideas. As a term of art, I just don't see where "self-evident" adds anything.BarryR
September 18, 2010
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StephanB@323 Thank you for settling the issue of your qualifications. The textbook I used is _Symbolic Logic and Automated Theorem Proving_, although any standard textbook should cover Skolem normal form. Thank you for providing the list of topics you're still unsure about. [A] Mathematical laws exist and depend on context, specifically the initial selection of axioms. No context-free laws have been observed, and we know of no way to accurately perceive any that may exist. When speaking informally, I shorten the above to "mathematical laws do not exist". [B] Peer-reviewed literature relies on a shared body of knowledge between the author and the reader. Edmonds' idea of truth is clear enough to his intended audience: those who are [actually] trained in philosophy. I can understand your frustration --- I go through the same thing when I start reading up in a new field --- but it's usually safe to assume the fault is your lack of knowledge, not the author's lack of clarity. [C] Syllogisms haven't been relevant in philosophy for, oh, 150 years? No, that's an overestimate:
The syllogism was superseded by first-order predicate logic following the work of Gottlob Frege, in particular his Begriffsschrift (1879) Syllogism dominated Western philosophical thought until The Age of Enlightenment in the 17th Century. At that time, Sir Francis Bacon rejected the idea of syllogism and deductive reasoning by asserting that it was fallible and illogical.
fide wikipedia. That's probably why I kept running into first-order predicate logic in philosophy classes. Syllogisms were mentioned as an historical artifact, if that. There's just no way to make them rigorous. [D] As I said before, Adler errs in identifying legitimate differences as errors. That makes for a very marketable book that's easy to read. It also makes for lousy philosophy. [E] Repeating my earlier comments, Adler defines a whole in terms of parts and then calls his definition self-evident. To get around this problem, you've had to introduce qualifiers like "finite" wholes and disambiguating dictionary definitions --- that wouldn't be necessary for something universal and self-evident. [F] You did not argue that truth must be unified to be truth. You stated it, without defining truth, no less. I can just as easily say that truth must be contextual. I have the advantage of a citation from someone who does philosophy for a living. [G] You did not argue that it is impossible to do science without the law of causation. You stated it (without stating the law). I get paid to do science. I somehow manage to do it pretty well without any such universal law. Your opinion as to how science is done carries even less weight with me than your philosophical opinions. You can improve this defect by providing a citation to the peer-reviewed literature for someone else who thinks this way. Then, I'm not only disagreeing with you, I'm also disagreeing with someone who has a presumption of competence. But around here, asking for citations is seen as an evasive tactic. It doesn't have to be that way --- assuming you knew how to do a literature search and that your opinion was sane enough to be held by someone who published. I don't have a great deal of confidence that either of those conditions hold. So I think that's where things will remain. My expertise in science and philosophy exceeds yours; I can buttress my opinions from the professional literature and you either cannot or will not.BarryR
September 18, 2010
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---BarryR: "With that bit of administrivia out of the way, I’d like you to propose a solution to Edmonds’s proof given in section 4 that does not rely on assuming the existence of universal truth. Please use formal notation." I appreciate the creativity involved in your latest attempt at a distraction, I really do. However, this is the umpteenth time that you have ignored a refutation, changed the subject, and asked me to solve an irrelevant riddle. As I pointed out earlier, you will be more persuasive if you advance cogent arguments and ask/answer relevant questions. Here are a few items of unfinished business: [A] First, you claimed that there are no mathematical laws, followed by an acknowledgement that there are, indeed, mathematical laws. I asked you to take one position or the other. You remained silent. [B] Next, Edmond’s presented no definition of truth. That point still stands and you have not addressed it. [C] Further, Edmonds used an inappropriate example in order to argue, wrongly, that syllogisms are unreliable and may produce conclusions at variance with their major and minor premises. You did not respond. [D] Further, you have yet to tell me which philosophical errors that Adler alluded to are not really errors and why you think so. [E] Further, you have not addressed the current theme about the self evident truth concerning the relationship between the whole and its parts. [F] Further, I argued that truth must be unified in order to be truth, and I explained why. You have not explained how a contextual truth, which could conflict with other contextual truths, could be true in any case. How, for example, can a mathematical "truth" be true if it contradicts a scientific "truth?" [G] Further, I argued that it is impossible to do science without acknowledging the law of causation. Given that all evidence must be interpreted through the first principles of right reason, how does one track down causes if some effects can occur without them?StephenB
September 18, 2010
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markf, I perceive that your difficulty is that you equate our perception and explanation of truth as the truth itself. The problem is that we have to perceive and explain in order to understand truth, but the truth exists apart from our perception or explanation of it. Therefore 2+2=4 is merely our way of quantifying a truth. The truth expressed by the equation lies outside the equation itself. This is why the argument that if you change the value and meaning of the +, you can change the truth represented by the equation. This is bizarre. It's like saying that if I multiply the figure representing the balance of my bank account by two, this increases the amount of money I have in my bank account (I think this example has been used before). The self evident truth that the whole is greater than the parts lies outside the physical examples we use - such as crank shafts and automobiles; however it applies to them, in the same way that two apples added to two apples gives us 4 apples. It's true that our perception and quantifying representations of truth are limited, but our inadequacies in this regard do not affect the truth itself. 2+2=4 represents an abstract that is true. That abstract is applied to physicality, demonstrating that it is true. However, we don't require the physicality for it to be true. This is why mathematics works. Allow me to repeat then what has in my view been sufficiently explained by KF and StephenB: We know of wholes only in reference to parts, and we know of parts only in reference to wholes. A whole is not equal to, but is greater than its parts, and a part is not equal to but is less than the whole. To say that you have a crank shaft does not mean that you have an automobile. However, to say that you have an automobile IS to say that you have a crank shaft and all the other component parts that make up an automobile - given that a crank shaft is a part of an automobile. While this perception of the truth is limited, it does not limit the truth itself. That I can draw a complete automobile as part of a crank shaft does not change the truth; it only changes the perception to a false representation of the reality of automobiles.CannuckianYankee
September 18, 2010
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#312 Stephenb Thanks for the Adler passage. I had already read it but you weren't to know that. I think you (and Adler) are saying that the sense in which a whole is greater than its parts is indefinable. This is surprising - because in any other context I can think of the phrase "greater than" is definable. There is the rather obvious sense that a whole object like a car is comprised of one or more parts. But this follows from the definition of "part" that you give: 1. A portion, division, piece, or segment of a whole and is just an analytic statement. I think we have to give up on the whole and parts bit. I promise you I am not being deliberately obtuse. I really think that if you break down the loose phrase "a whole is greater than its parts" into all the things it might mean they will either be analytic or not necessarily true.markf
September 18, 2010
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StephenB, One of my favorite movies is "The Adventures of Baron Munschausen," in which all kinds of bizarre explanations end up being true. I also like Mel Gibson's "Conspiracy Theory," in which a paranoid delusion ends up being true. I was also a big fan of "The X-Files." Chris Carter's scepticism of conspiracy theories was what inspired the show. Of course, these are all works of fiction, intended to poke fun at bizarre beliefs. None of them are serious. But the Darwinists making arguments here are DEAD serious; which is scary.CannuckianYankee
September 18, 2010
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#313 It appears you completely ignored KFs responses at 300 and 301. I can't read everyone's response to everything. It is nothing personal against KF - I just think we have so little in common that there is no basis for an interesting discussion. However, you asked me to look at them so I have. I have to say paragraphs such as: And so the part-whole, less than- greater than distinctions make sense once one recognises that they are going to be generic because of that generality, and will have to be be fleshed out in various particular ways in particular cases, once one accepts that one is dealing with composite wholes. (Such experience is abundantly accessible for anyone with significant experience of a world that is full of composite wholes, starting with the letters, words, sentences and paragraphs used to make posts here.) confirm to me that my decision is the best for both of us. KF does offer 2+2=4 as another example of a self-evident truth. I thought we dealt with that but this is what I said above in a response to Gpuccio - I stick by it. A really important insight comes from Wittgenstein. Often a statement will be true for a combination of different types of criteria and because they always or often coincide we never have to resolve which apply. For example, an arithmetic statement such as 2+2=4 is mathematically true because it follows from the Peano axioms (I think those are the right ones). Now the Peano axioms apply very accurately to a vast range of situations so it is also true that 2+2=4 for a vast range of situations. Unless we are pure mathematicians we are never called upon to decide whether 2+2=4 is true in the mathematical or the descriptive sense. And when challenged as to what makes it true we get confused and end up making up some abstract world of which it is true!markf
September 18, 2010
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KF, others Another observation here is that Darwinists are fond of the argument that modern medicine owes it's development to methodological naturalism in science, and that it would not have advanced apart from it. What they fail to understand is that modern medicine is founded upon the value of human life - that it developed because people understood that they "ought" to care for people. Methodological naturalism had nothing to do with it. If you study the history of the care and treatment of various disorders, and the institution of hospitals, nursing homes, clinics, etc., there exists a trend towards more humane treatment based on the philosophy that humans are valuable. Darwinism does not offer this kind of insight. If we founded our values on a faulty understanding of truth; i.e., if relative truth were the only operating paradigm in this world among humans, we would not have developed an understanding that morality and values are intrinsic to certain absolutes. In other words, it matters that there are self-evident truths in establishing that there are absolutes. Without absolutes there can be no morality, because we could not distinguish what is good from what is evil. These concepts would be meaningless. Consciousness must therefore be something that is separate from the "is" of our physical makeup; for it is through consciousness that we distinguish what is an "ought." Of course there are other arguments for why consciousness is of this nature.CannuckianYankee
September 18, 2010
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KF, I always look forward to reading you posts, because you could not be more clear. I admit that I had trouble with your unique use of the English language when I first encountered your writing several years ago, but it's something I've become accostomed to now. Your use of the best examples, references and input are quite compelling. I don't know why anyone would not want to gain someting from your insight. I look forward to getting to the end of this debate, however, as it's getting tiresome. We know of parts only in reference to wholes, and we know of wholes only in reference to parts. wholes are not equal to but are greater than the parts. Attempts to object that this is self-evident is simply an exercise in evasion in order to maintain a relativistic outlook on truth. What's interesting here is that if you hold to truth as relative, you are then not committed to being truthful. You can evade, change the subject, equivocate, supplant and use all kinds of other trickery in order to avoid what is inconvenient, because your morals and values are relative to your need to please the self, rather than to make commitments to love and to serve others. The Darwinist does not believe that truth has anything to do with morality. This is a huge mistake.CannuckianYankee
September 18, 2010
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CY @13, you would have been entertained by a recent blogger who insisted that a crankcase could, indeed, be greater than an automobile, asking us to conceive of an artist's conception in which an automobile was situated inside a giant crankcase. I am not joking. Obviously, he missed the point about the finte whole being greater than any one of ITS parts, but it was a wild ride which featured a number of Darwinists taking up for the irrational side of the argument.StephenB
September 18, 2010
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---BarryR: "If you need a dictionary to explain a concept, I think that’s a pretty strong hint that it’s not a universal self-evident truth." As it turns out, the terms, whole, part, and greater cannot be defined as elemts of a self evident truth--which is the whole point under discussion. However, as a tribute to those pretend not to know what I mean when I say that the "whole" of an automobile is "greater" than its crankcase, the dictionary is a handy tool for such low level responses.StephenB
September 18, 2010
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CY: Thanks. Maybe MF will wake up now that his gambit of persistently ignoring what I have said -- on the pretence that what I say is garbled, or incomprehensible or takes too long to process, etc -- is plainly getting threadbare. Gkairosfocus
September 18, 2010
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markf "But why not choose a different, clearer, example of a self-evident truth?" It appears you completely ignored KFs responses at 300 and 301. Why are you trying to make this more complicated than it is? I think KF and StephenB have been quite clear on the issue of "a whole is greater than any of its parts." Your feigned incomprehension of this (causing KF to shake his head) is nothing short of absurd. However, your evasive maneuvers are quite entertaining at times. Of course I am often amused by bizarre things, like this: "There are plenty of physical objects where one part is the outer casing and thus the size of that part is the same as the size of the object." In that you have created a miracle. Let's see, the outer body of a car is pretty much the same size as the car itself, so it must be equal to the car. Right? The miracle is that we can now drive around in the bodies of our cars without the engine and few other important parts like whieels and such. Right? The body is not equal to the whole car. The body is a part of the whole. The whole is greater than the parts. The outer casing of a computer is not equal to the computer itself. The whole is greater than the parts. A banana peel is not equal to a banana. The whole is greater than the parts. A facade is not equal to the whole building. The whole is greater than the parts. Do you require any more examples?CannuckianYankee
September 18, 2010
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---Markf: "You don’t clarify what is meant by “greater than” Although I provided dictionary definitions of the words "part" and "whole," the terms [insofar as they refer to the self-evident nature of the fact] cannot be defined. From Adler: "One example will suffice to make this clear -- the axiom or selfevident truth that a finite whole is greater than any of its parts. This proposition states our understanding of the relation between a finite whole and its parts. It is not a statement about the word "whole" or the word "part" but rather about our understanding of wholes and parts and their relation. All of the operative terms in the proposition are indefinable. We cannot express our understanding of a whole without reference to our understanding of its parts and our understanding that it is greater than any of its parts. We cannot express our understanding of parts without reference to our understanding of wholes and our understanding that a part is less than the whole of which it is a part. When our understanding of an object that is indefinable (e.g., a whole) involves our understanding of another object that is indefinable (e.g., a part), and of the relation between them, that understanding is expressed in a self-evident proposition which is not trifling, uninstructive, or analytic, in Locke's sense or Kant's, for no definitions are involved. Nor is it a synthetic a priori judgment in Kant's sense, even though it has incorrigible certitude; and it is certainly not synthetic a posteriori since, being intrinsically indemonstrable, it cannot be supported by statements offering empirical evidence or reasons. The contemporary denial that there are any indisputable statements which are not merely verbal or tautological, together with the contemporary assertion that all non-tautological statements require extrinsic support or certification and that none has incorrigible certitude, is therefore falsified by the existence of a third type of statement, exemplified by the axiom or self-evident truth that a finite whole is greater than any of its parts, or that a part is less than the finite whole to which it belongs. It could as readily be exemplified by the self-evident truth that the good is the desirable, or that the desirable is the good -- a statement that is known to be true entirely from an understanding of its terms, both of which are indefinables. One cannot say what the good is except by reference to desire, or what desire is except by reference to the good. The understanding of either involves the understanding of the other, and the understanding of both, each in relation to the other, is expressed in a proposition per se nota, i.e., self-evident or known to be true as soon as its terms are understood." Thus, you understand as a self evident truth, that any finite whole is greater than any one of its parts--just as you understood that an automobile is greater than its crankcase. In this case, greater means more parts, greater volume, weight etc. In other cases, it could mean more of something else. Thus, the word "greater" cannot be defined the way you are asking except to say that there is "more to" the whole than any one of its parts. To the question more "what," the answer depends on which "whole" is in question. A paragraph may not weigh more than one of its sentences, but it contains more words.StephenB
September 18, 2010
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Onlookers: Observe again, how MF, with his attention already drawn to an example he has been corrected on above [2 + 2 = 4], and one he has ignored for months ["error exists"], proceeds -- predictably -- to ignore inconvenient evidence yet again. In addition, he now wishes to belabour the concepts whole-part and greater-lesser, as though he has no experience of whole-part relationships (which BTW play a very important role in information systems, e.g. the structure of a program). The precise ways in which parts and wholes interact or relate differ from one case to the other, but there is a common conceptual core that we may legitimately extract and address: the part-whole relationship, and the part is always a component, making it less than the complex whole. In turn, that complex whole is made up from the parts, their specific organisation/ relationships, and the interactions that are associated with that organisation. One feature of such is of course that we come to understand that a part is a component of a whole. Consequently, the whole not only is, but must be, more than the part. On pain of absurdity; which may of course be disguised by the claim that one does not understand. (But if you have worked with software systems as a career, as MF acknowledges, then such a plea looks very suspiciously evasive indeed.) In the case of a star undergoing supernova [cf section a esp point 17 on here], the Iron core that forms and stops fusion from releasing further energy (as Fe is at the peak of the binding energy per nucleon curve), and the imploding and bouncing envelope (for want of radiation pressure etc to keep it from imploding) are both parts, and the star is a whole. In the case of a sentence or a poem, the letter is a part and the composition is a whole. In the case of say a 4G63 Mitsubishi automobile engine, the pistons, the engine blocks, and the crank case are parts. And so on. Reductio ad absurdum, right before our eyes. If this were not so saddening, it would be funny. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 18, 2010
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CH@308 The direct answer to the question: "Are there no universal truths? Is that statement itself universal and true.?" For the fourth time, I think. "We don't know any universal truths" is simply an observation. "We can't know any universal truths" is an epistemic argument that can be made from observations. I see nothing controversial with either statement. "There are no universal truths" is an ontological statement that, as Edmonds discusses, requires assuming universal truth exist in order to prove. (He makes this argument using formal notation; if you disagree, please point out which step you disagree with.) I don't see where that statement can be justified. Likewise, "There are universal truths" also requires assuming universal truths exist in order to prove that it's the case. I don't find this justified either. (The universal and existential qualifiers in logic are usually limited to a well-defined context, and as such are perfectly fine. The trouble comes in when trying to map that system onto a poorly-defined concept like "everything".)BarryR
September 18, 2010
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BarryR,
If you need a dictionary to explain a concept, I think that’s a pretty strong hint that it’s not a universal self-evident truth.
Why? No truth can be written down? Because things are self evident doesn't mean that everyone realizes them just yet, just as counting numbers up to twenty aren't always realized by tribes people, that doesn't mean they are nothing.Clive Hayden
September 18, 2010
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BarryR, My point of view is in my last comment to you, articulated by pointing out your confusion pertaining to skepticism and how you think it can be absolute and yet not. I noticed that you haven't responded to Chesterton, and your response to Lewis was short (but thank you for responding nevertheless), but answered by me, and I've yet to see any more response.Clive Hayden
September 18, 2010
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BarryR,
If you need a dictionary to explain a concept, I think that’s a pretty strong hint that it’s not a universal self-evident truth.
Are there no universal truths? Is that statement itself universal and true? Please answer me directly, with a yes or a no, and explain how it isn't (if you claim it's not), and explain how your affirmation or negation is not itself a universal truth if there are no universal truths.Clive Hayden
September 18, 2010
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#302 Stephenb Of course I understand the meaning of the English words "whole" and "part". I am trying to understand what they mean in this context. They are very broad words that can be used all sorts of ways and this is a most unusual statement. Does the statement apply to anything which can have components of any kind? e.g. musical chords, poems, business processes, supernovae? You don't clarify what is meant by "greater than" - although I think the sentence: If you don’t understand that an automobile is more than its crankcase, or its axles, or its frame, or its wheels, or its engine etc, I don’t think I can help you. is meant to throw some light on this. I do understand that an automobile comprises many components in addition to a crankshaft. If by "greater than" you simply mean "comprises more than" then "X is greater than one of its parts" simply follows from the definition of "part". Normally if you say X is greater than Y there is some implicit or explicit dimension in which it is greater - mass, volume, artistic merit, decibels whatever. But the dimension is not clear to me in this case. In the example of the system unit I was treating the system unit as the whole and trying to point out that it was no larger than its case which is one of its parts (others being things such as motherboard). I should have made myself clearer. But why not choose a different, clearer, example of a self-evident truth?markf
September 18, 2010
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StephanB@305 If you need a dictionary to explain a concept, I think that's a pretty strong hint that it's not a universal self-evident truth.BarryR
September 18, 2010
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