Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Human Consciousness

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(From In the Beginning … ):

For the layman, it is the last step in evolution that is the most difficult to explain. You may be able to convince him that natural selection can explain the appearance of complicated robots, who walk the Earth and write books and build computers, but you will have a harder time convincing him that a mechanical process such as natural selection could cause those robots to become conscious. Human consciousness is in fact the biggest problem of all for Darwinism, but it is hard to say anything “scientific” about consciousness, since we don’t really know what it is, so it is also perhaps the least discussed.

Nevertheless, one way to appreciate the problem it poses for Darwinism or any other mechanical theory of evolution is to ask the question: is it possible that computers will someday experience consciousness? If you believe that a mechanical process such as natural selection could have produced consciousness once, it seems you can’t say it could never happen again, and it might happen faster now, with intelligent designers helping this time. In fact, most Darwinists probably do believe it could and will happen—not because they have a higher opinion of computers than I do: everyone knows that in their most impressive displays of “intelligence,” computers are just doing exactly what they are told to do, nothing more or less. They believe it will happen because they have a lower opinion of humans: they simply dumb down the definition of consciousness, and say that if a computer can pass a “Turing test,” and fool a human at the keyboard in the next room into thinking he is chatting with another human, then the computer has to be considered to be intelligent, or conscious. With the right software, my laptop may already be able to pass a Turing test, and convince me that I am Instant Messaging another human. If I type in “My cat died last week” and the computer responds “I am saddened by the death of your cat,” I’m pretty gullible, that might convince me that I’m talking to another human. But if I look at the software, I might find something like this:

if (verb == ‘died’)
fprintf(1,’I am saddened by the death of your %s’,noun)
end

I’m pretty sure there is more to human consciousness than this, and even if my laptop answers all my questions intelligently, I will still doubt there is “someone” inside my Intel processor who experiences the same consciousness that I do, and who is really saddened by the death of my cat, though I admit I can’t prove that there isn’t.

I really don’t know how to argue with people who believe computers could be conscious. About all I can say is: what about typewriters? Typewriters also do exactly what they are told to do, and have produced some magnificent works of literature. Do you believe that typewriters can also be conscious?

And if you don’t believe that intelligent engineers could ever cause machines to attain consciousness, how can you believe that random mutations could accomplish this?

Comments
---markf: "I am confused as to what is meant by “whole” , “part” and “greater than”. From the dictionary: Whole 1. comprising the full quantity, amount, extent, number, etc., without diminution or exception; entire, full, or total: He ate the whole pie. They ran the whole distance. 2. containing all the elements properly belonging; complete: We have a whole set of antique china. Part 1. A portion, division, piece, or segment of a whole. 2. Any of several equal portions or fractions that can constitute a whole or into which a whole can be divided: a mixture of two parts flour to one part sugar. ---"All this is to establish the existence of self-evident truths that are not true by definition. Perhaps you could propose a clearer example?" If you don't understand that an automobile is more than its crankcase, or its axles, or its frame, or its wheels, or its engine etc, I don't think I can help you. ---"There are plenty of physical objects where one part is the outer casing and thus the size of that part is the same as the size of the object. The system unit on my PC for example." If you don't understand that there is more to your computer than its system unit, I don't think I can help you.StephenB
September 18, 2010
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Third, on looking at your remarks just above, especially the crank-case example: pardon, but I must shake my head. A crank case is a proper part of an engine, and it is indeed less than the whole: a crank case by itself is nowhere near an engine. The case for an item of lab equipment will again be less than the whole, i.e the "guts" have to be added to get the whole. That is in both cases you have ignored the part-whole context and have in fact descended into precisely the sort of obvious absurdity that rejecting a self-evident truth will immediately precipitate. And so, the part-whole, less than- greater than distinctions make sense once one recognises that they are going to be generic because of that generality, and will have to be be fleshed out in various particular ways in particular cases, once one accepts that one is dealing with composite wholes. (Such experience is abundantly accessible for anyone with significant experience of a world that is full of composite wholes, starting with the letters, words, sentences and paragraphs used to make posts here.) So, sadly, the above objections come across as utterly strained and driven by what you wish to reject rather than by any truly substantial point. By selective hyperskepticism, in short. And, they land you in precisely the sort of absurdities that such an incoherent rhetorical pattern leads to. I must therefore ask: have you seriously tried to understand instead of to object on any and every convenient excuse? [Do you not realise that Mortimer Adler was not exactly a philosophical novice who would make elementary mistakes?] I know your usual claim is that you refuse to look at what I write (which comes across more and more as a convenient evasion), but this one went utterly beyond the pale. You need to revise your "policy" -- which rather sounds like Wilson's cynical advice to evade inconvenient points, in his Arte of Rhetorique -- and you need to stop and re-examine what you have said many times above in this thread [starting with on 2 + 2 = 4], and what it is pointing to. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 18, 2010
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MarkF (and onlookers): RE: . . . All this is to establish the existence of self-evident truths that are not true by definition. Perhaps you could propose a clearer example? First, there has been a very simple case all along in this thread, on matchsticks and symbolisations of what is going on with cardinalities:
{ || } { || } --> { |||| } i.e. 2 + 2 = 4
Second, for many months, you have known or should have known of the simple but potent -- indeed, pivotal -- case of an undeniably true and self-evident claim from Josiah Royce, that I have repeatedly linked or cited [cf 6 - 7 here, and the following discussion here:
"Error exists"
This last is obviously not a tautology, nor a definition, and you cannot define the underlying concepts in isolation. It is undeniably true as to try a denial exemplifies its truth. And it immediately implies that truth exists, warranted credible truth -- i.e. knowledge exists -- and that we would be wise to have a humble epistemic stance. [ . . . ]kairosfocus
September 18, 2010
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#298 So, it isn’t clear to you that an automobile is greater than its crankcase, and that the automobile’s crankcase cannot be greater than the automobile?” By "greater than" do you mean "larger than"? The purpose of automobiles is such that I couldn't see how to make a working automobile that did not have some parts extraneous to the crankshaft - but I thought this was a necessary truth that applied to all "wholes". There are plenty of physical objects where one part is the outer casing and thus the size of that part is the same as the size of the object. The system unit on my PC for example. If you allow imaginary objects (after all we talking necessary truths which should be true in all conceivable universes) consider the Tardis in Doctor Who - open the door and inside it is full of components much larger than police box which contains them. —”I believe a nuclear reaction could mean that the whole had a mass less than any of the contributing components.” You are confusing a process with an entity or thing. —”Or perhaps the whole is not a physical object but say a sound? A combination of sounds may be less pleasant to the ear and under certain conditions less loud than any of the single elements.” First you describe the sound as a whole and then try to apply it as parts of a larger whole. I am confused as to what is meant by "whole" , "part" and "greater than". They are such vague generic words. So I am throwing out some examples to check my understanding. I can't say I am much the wiser yet. All this is to establish the existence of self-evident truths that are not true by definition. Perhaps you could propose a clearer example?markf
September 17, 2010
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CH I posed a direct question, and if you would answer it I think it would help me to understand your point of view. Please search the above for: "Why is the above impossible? Please be specific." Thanks.BarryR
September 17, 2010
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StephanB
I don’t normally wield my credentials around here because I think it is bad form. You will notice, for example, that I exposed Edmond’s ignorance of syllogisms and I explained the texture of his error without alluding to my own training in logic. (So tacky would that be) If you want to discuss his logical errors in greater detail, let me know.
I'd much prefer to formalize this conversation; no doubt I'm going to have some difficulty keeping up, but I promise to do my best. Just so I know we're on the same page, could I trouble you to solve this problem? Give the following in standard form: (Ex)(Ay)(Az)(Eu)(Av)(Ew)P(x,y,z,u,v,w) This is given as an example in the textbook I used for my first logic class. It's perfectly straightforward with the answer given after a short paragraph of discussion. Given your training in philosophy, I expect this will be trivial for you. But it will assure me you didn't google the answer. With that bit of administrivia out of the way, I'd like you to propose a solution to Edmonds's proof given in section 4 that does not rely on assuming the existence of universal truth. Please use formal notation. I look forward to your reply.BarryR
September 17, 2010
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StephanB@282
I am formally trained in philosophy at the graduate level, and I am also formally trained in applied communication at the graduate level, and yes, I did graduate with the highest honors.
My, but that was worded carefully. I'm not quite sure what you meant to communicate, but what came across was: 1. No undergraduate philosophy classes, 2. No graduate philosophy classes, and 3. No graduate degree. In the interests of unambiguous communication, by classes I mean seat-of-the-pants-applied-to-the-seat-of-the-chair in an accredited university within a philosophy department. If you meant to communicate something else, please clarify if you think it's important. One of the many nice things about expertise is that it allows you to judge competence using criteria other than credentials. You're not making a competent argument, regardless of your credentials (and regardless of whether or not I agree with you). You don't qualify your statements, you don't handle counterexamples, you don't cite the literature, and you're not learning from your mistakes as they're pointed out. These are the kinds of things that students learn in the give-and-take of university philosophy classes. Perhaps you had a run of back luck and only experienced classes where this give and take wasn't encouraged. If so, you've been very ill-served by your "training". MarkF in 297 has the good sense to ask what you (and Adler) mean by a whole and a part. The fact that he has to ask is an excellent indication that the definitions are not self-evident. Your rejoinders are frankly childish.
So, it isn’t clear to you that an automobile is greater than its crankcase, and that the automobile’s crankcase cannot be greater than the automobile
If you needed to show a counterexample, that would suffice. However, you've painted yourself into a corner where you need to show not only that the rule is self-evident, but that it is universal. This is the difference between "there exists" and "for all", (something I became very familiar with in a couple of graduate logic classes). Even if I thought it was doable, you don't have the technical skill to build that proof (and Adler can't be bothered).
Notice how you completely ignore the main point of the argument.
It's really endearing how you put this right after the counterexamples I gave to invalidate the hypothesis. Here's the main point of my argument: Adler gave an example that is self-evident in certain contexts, self-evidently false in other contexts, and nonsensical everywhere else. Because he was writing for a popular audience, he didn't feel the need to point this out (which is the most charitable explanation I can give).
It is not a mistake on his part. He has already pointed out that the concepts themselves cannot be defined.
!?! Undefinable concepts can now be self-evident? Ok.... And what's so difficult about defining these? I can define a whole, in certain contexts, as that which is created by summing a predefined set of parts. In another context, I can define it as a concept greater than the sum of it's parts. And for some job applications, I can define the whole applicant as much less than sum of his parts on his resume. Universal definition might be impossible, but that's a strange way to get to self-evident.
BarryR
September 17, 2010
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---Markf: "The same objections arise. So, it isn't clear to you that an automobile is greater than its crankcase, and that the automobile's crankcase cannot be greater than the automobile?" ---"I believe a nuclear reaction could mean that the whole had a mass less than any of the contributing components." You are confusing a process with an entity or thing. ---"Or perhaps the whole is not a physical object but say a sound? A combination of sounds may be less pleasant to the ear and under certain conditions less loud than any of the single elements." First you describe the sound as a whole and then try to apply it as parts of a larger whole.StephenB
September 17, 2010
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#288 I apologise for misreading the quote, but I think my argument applies equally to the statement "the finite whole is greater than any one of its parts" The same objections arise. What kind of whole? What kind of parts? Greater in what respect? Are we talking about physical objects and mass or volume? I believe a nuclear reaction could mean that the whole had a mass less than any of the contributing components. Even if that is not possible it is not obviously absurd. Similarly for volume. Or perhaps the whole is not a physical object but say a sound? A combination of sounds may be less pleasant to the ear and under certain conditions less loud than any of the single elements.markf
September 17, 2010
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Steve: Strangely, in my own studies on organisations as sociotechnical systems, teamwork based synergies that give rise to unique competitive advantages that cannot be duplicated play a key role. (BTW, when the environment undergoes a catastrophic, butterfly-effect type change, that can come back to haunt. Hence issues on robustness and agility as opposed to optimisation for a given environment. And this is also one reason why I do not take the notion of thinking that sub-optimal designs are inferior, seriously. If you are over specialised and the world changes, you are dead, Fred.) Synergy is a powerful concept, and this is one way that we can get the magic of more out than was put in; thence one ground of profit making as a morally defensible activity. But, the misreadings that you describe falls under the head of strawman fallacies; which may be inadvertent, but lead to profound misunderstanding. Which is precisely one of the things Adler implicitly warned against; by stressing understanding rooted in our reflective experience of the world. Gkairosfocus
September 17, 2010
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Frosty: One last point, pardon: a self evident truth is NOT a tautology. That is, it is not merely analytically true, simply restating the same thing in different terms. Adler rightly points out that there are statements whose truth is contingent on observation, e.g. that I am a Caribbean, male person. others are true by the sort of reiteration just described. But others are true on our understanding based on experience, where we also see that on pain of immediate reductio ad absurdum, they MUST be true. As you will recall, my favourite example of this is "Error exists," following Josiah Royce. [Onlookers, try the experiment of an attempted denial and you will immediately see why it is undeniably true.] Gkairosfocus
September 17, 2010
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[Once] self evident truths are denied, all things are possible--or rather, deemed to be possible.StephenB
September 17, 2010
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---kairosfocus: "I think many people are thinking of a common saying about systems, a reflection on synergies whereby the whole as a complex functional entitiy depends on the particular organisation of the parts." Precisely. The same phenomenon is often referred to in communication as the "assembly affect bonus" or "synergy," especially with respect to the creative faculty inherent in "brainstorming." Some appear to be reading that common understanding into Adler's words rather than extracting the intended meaning. This practice, by the way, is not unusual for postmodernist deconstructionists, who believe that readers can and should change [deconstruct] an author's intended meaning into something more congenial with their inclinations. One self-evident truths are denied, all things are possible--or rather, deemed to be possible.StephenB
September 17, 2010
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Steve: You are right to spot that point. I think many people are thinking of a common saying about systems, a reflection on synergies whereby the whole as a complex functional entitiy depends on the particular organisation of the parts. So the systemic whole is indeed greater than the MERE sum of the parts. (A pil4e of bricks, timbers, glass and cement a house do not make, nor will one get a house by stirring all with a tornado!) Gkairosfocus
September 17, 2010
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PS: You will see how I modified the sort of remark Adler made: a FINITE whole is greater than any of its PROPER parts.kairosfocus
September 17, 2010
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---Frost: "Firstly to say that a whole must be greater than the sum of its parts is to make a statement which is not tautologically certain." I don't understand why this continues to be misread. The self-evident truth is that the finite whole is greater than ANY ONE OF IS PARTS.StephenB
September 17, 2010
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Frosty: Hi mon. I am citing actually, Adler. But, he is right. He is talking about -- note the context -- complex entities and saying that once something is made of or has parts in it, the whole is more than any one of the individual parts; and that parts and wholes can only be understood on our experience of such complex entities and their complementarity. Of course, if you take him out of the context of complex unities, you may will THINK you have a counter-example, but you don't. As to the others, we are dealing with people who tried to deny that 2 + 2 = 4 is something that you can deny without tying yourself up in absurdities. To do so, they argued above that by changing he definition of + in midstream, we could also argue that 2 + 2 = 147. EEP! The absurdity here is injecting an equivocation that embeds a contradiction. Gkairosfocus
September 17, 2010
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---Markf:“The whole is greater than the sum of its parts” ---"This seems to me far from self-evident and very likely false, depending on what exactly it means." Of course it is far from self evident and, of course, it may well be false. The self evident truth is NOT that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. [That's BarryR's gig. Didn't you read the comment that I was responding to?] The self evident truth is that the finite whole is greater than any one of its parts. Please read for context.StephenB
September 17, 2010
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--DOUBLE correction above.. please remove post 286 if possible. What I meant is: "The value of a desire is DEPENDENT on its object." That is, a desire is ONLY good if its object is warrented. Pardon the double mistake above.Frost122585
September 17, 2010
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^Pardon me- a correction above- "The value of a desire is independent of ITS object"Frost122585
September 17, 2010
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KF, I must admit that I have to disagree with both examples you listed above of instructive yet tautological statements. While I agree with your assertion that such statements which can be both tautological and instructive can and probably do exist I see both of your examples as being totally flawed. Firstly to say that a whole must be greater than the sum of its parts is to make a statement which is not tautologically certain. If there was a substance which was composed of only one part which was objectively indivisible (such as God- or what the Atom was believed to be before its interior was elucidated) then in this case the sum of its part would be equal to whole- which negates the notion of the original statement- because it would still be true to say that the whole has at least some (one) parts. If however you admit that your statement does in fact presume that at least 2 parts must exist for it to be true- there are in fact examples in cosmology and non-euclidean geometry where the parts of an object could be greater than the whole which they comprise- though I admit my understanding is that these presupposed phenomena are purely speculative. However, the second example is totally false on its face as many people desire things which are not good. I surmise you are using a definition of "desire" which is loaded as meaning all but the same thing as "good"- or a definition of good which somehow implies that which is desireable- but in that case the value of the example is really not that instructive at all. A value of a desire is independent of object. Certainly in theology (which many people myself included see as the highest form of understanding) there exists desires which are not good but in fact its opposite- evil. However, we probably agree on the principle which your examples are directed at.Frost122585
September 17, 2010
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#282 "The whole is greater than the sum of its parts" This seems to me far from self-evident and very likely false, depending on what exactly it means. Greater in what respect? If we add matter to other matter the result may actually weigh less (that's one thing that happens in a nuclear reaction). I believe that under extreme conditions it is also possible that the result may take less volume - the additional matter causes the mass to collapse under the additional gravitional pull. In any case it is certainly imaginable that the result would take less volume.markf
September 17, 2010
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SB: Excellent. I only note that I tend to make it a little more specific: a finite whole is greater than any of its proper parts. Maybe, there is need to cite the key section in Adler in-thread: ____________________ >> The little error in the beginning, made by Locke and Leibniz, perpetuated by Kant, and leading to the repudiation of any non-verbal or non-tautological truth having incorrigible certitude, consists in starting with a dichotomy instead of a trichotomy — a twofold instead of a threefold distinction of types of truth. In addition to merely verbal statements which, as tautologies, are uninstructive and need no support beyond the rules of language, and in addition to instructive statements which need support and certification, either from experience or by reasoning, there is a third class of statements which are non-tautological or instructive, on the one hand, and are also indemonstrable or self-evidently true, on the other. These are the statements that Euclid called “common notions,” that Aristotle called “axioms” or “first principles,” and that mediaeval thinkers called “propositions per se nota.” One example will suffice to make this clear — the axiom or selfevident truth that a finite whole is greater than any of its parts. This proposition states our understanding of the relation between a finite whole and its parts. It is not a statement about the word “whole” or the word “part” but rather about our understanding of wholes and parts and their relation. All of the operative terms in the proposition are indefinable. We cannot express our understanding of a whole without reference to our understanding of its parts and our understanding that it is greater than any of its parts. We cannot express our understanding of parts without reference to our understanding of wholes and our understanding that a part is less than the whole of which it is a part. When our understanding of an object that is indefinable (e.g., a whole) involves our understanding of another object that is indefinable (e.g., a part), and of the relation between them, that understanding is expressed in a self-evident proposition which is not trifling, uninstructive, or analytic, in Locke’s sense or Kant’s, for no definitions are involved. Nor is it a synthetic a priori judgment in Kant’s sense, even though it has incorrigible certitude; and it is certainly not synthetic a posteriori since, being intrinsically indemonstrable, it cannot be supported by statements offering empirical evidence or reasons. The contemporary denial that there are any indisputable statements which are not merely verbal or tautological, together with the contemporary assertion that all non-tautological statements require extrinsic support or certification and that none has incorrigible certitude, is therefore falsified by the existence of a third type of statement, exemplified by the axiom or self-evident truth that a finite whole is greater than any of its parts, or that a part is less than the finite whole to which it belongs. It could as readily be exemplified by the self-evident truth that the good is the desirable, or that the desirable is the good — a statement that is known to be true entirely from an understanding of its terms, both of which are indefinables. One cannot say what the good is except by reference to desire, or what desire is except by reference to the good. The understanding of either involves the understanding of the other, and the understanding of both, each in relation to the other, is expressed in a proposition per se nota, i.e., self-evident or known to be true as soon as its terms are understood. Such propositions are neither analytic nor synthetic in the modern sense of that dichotomy; for the predicate is neither contained in the definition of the subject, nor does it lie entirely outside the meaning of the subject. Axioms or self-evident truths are, furthermore, truths about objects understood, objects that can have instantiation in reality, and so they are not merely verbal. They are not a priori because they are based on experience, as all our knowledge and understanding is; yet they are not empirical or a posteriori in the sense that they can be falsified by experience or require empirical investigation for their confirmation. The little error in the beginning, which consists in a non-exhaustive dichotomy mistakenly regarded as exhaustive, is corrected when we substitute for it a trichotomy that distinguishes (i) merely verbal tautologies, (ii) statements of fact that require empirical support and can be empirically falsified, (iii) axiomatic statements, expressing indemonstrable truths of understanding which, while based upon experience, do not require empirical support and cannot be empirically falsified.[6] >> ____________________ Gkairosfocus
September 17, 2010
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---BarryR: "As I said, if you don’t have any great interest in philosophy, the book might be better than nothing." I am formally trained in philosophy at the graduate level, and I am also formally trained in applied communication at the graduate level, and yes, I did graduate with the highest honors. So, your implied ad hominem [that I have no interest in philosophy] simply falls flat. I don't normally wield my credentials around here because I think it is bad form. You will notice, for example, that I exposed Edmond's ignorance of syllogisms and I explained the texture of his error without alluding to my own training in logic. (So tacky would that be) If you want to discuss his logical errors in greater detail, let me know. The problem with your earlier readings of Adler, and thank you for sharing your experiences, is that you were not given very good guidance from your philosophy professors, which is quite common. Philosophy has been bitten with the postmodernist bug along with most other disciplines. Where, though, is the substance in your comments. What mistake is it that Adler alludes to that you claim is not a mistake? On this, the really important matter, you remain silent. ---"To make the error more clear:[Adler's essay, "Little Errors in the Beginning] I describe an object. Is it a whole? How do you know? Well, if its parts were summed and did not result in the whole, then we probably wouldn’t call it a whole in the first place. Do the set of integers form a whole? Does the empty set? The computer I’m using is certainly a whole, and certainly has a number of parts, yet I’d argue that the whole is certainly far greater than the sum of those parts>" There is no error here at all. [A] Adler is providing an example of a self-evident truth and explaining that self-evident truths comprise an important element in our pursuit of knowledge, arguing rightly, that analytic reasoning and synthetic reasoning are not our only mental tools. Notice how you completely ignore the main point of the argument. [B] If the whole is greater than any one of the parts, and if no one part can be greater than the whole, this fact ALONE, does not preclude the possibility that the whole could be greater than the sum of all the parts. In only rules out the possibility that one part cannot be greater than the whole. Thus, your final comment is irrelevant and reflects a lack of understanding of the obvious self evident truth. A part cannot be greater than the whole of which it is a part. Everyone understands this as a self evident truth, and that includes you, in spite of your protests. ---"By the time he gets to the end, I’ve been talked out of the idea that this concept is self-evident and instead believe that it follows from the definition of the word “whole”. Is that a mistake?" It is not a mistake on his part. He has already pointed out that the concepts themselves cannot be defined. It is the relationship between the two that must be understood as a self evident truth independent of any definitions at all. ---"Perhaps, or perhaps it’s just sloppy writing. No, just inattentive reading. Ask yourself the only real question that matters. Can a part of a whole [of which it is a part] be greater than the whole? You already know, as a self evident truth, that it cannot. On the other hand, you refuse to admit it because your entire materialist/secularist/hyperskepticiirrational framework crumbles with the admission. As Adler puts it, "We cannot express our understanding of parts without reference to our understanding of wholes and our understanding that a part is less than the whole of which it is a part." Again, I stress the significance of this point. Once it is understood that self evident truths exist, Kant's anti-metphysical skepticism (which was corrected by Reid in his own time) and Hegel's attempt to correct a problem that didn't exist, followed by each additional anti-intellectual domino toppling over for the next two hundred years all hearken back to the "Little Error in the Beginning."StephenB
September 17, 2010
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F/N: The live donkey kicking a dead lion ad hominem game above is just a little distateful. Why not summarise CSL's arguments, then actually show why -- on the merits -- you think they fail? (And for instance, CH has brought out the infinite regress implicit in any absolute assertion of skepticism. Practical skepticism is necessarily selective, and when that goes over into an inconsistent standard of warrant for what one wishes to accept vs reject, it then becomes self-refuting. The declaration of universal skepticism is inevitably self-referentially absurd.)kairosfocus
September 17, 2010
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kairosfocus,
“Self-evidence” is not a mere arbitrary and subjective declaration rooted in a perception. (That mistaken notion, itself already shows what C S Lewis so aptly called the poison of subjectivism at work.)
Great point, and that is a great essay.Clive Hayden
September 17, 2010
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Onlookers (and MF . . . ): "Self-evidence" is not a mere arbitrary and subjective declaration rooted in a perception. (That mistaken notion, itself already shows what C S Lewis so aptly called the poison of subjectivism at work.) Instead, it is a claim, that, once a particular claim is truly understood, it is at once plain that its denial will directly lead to reductio ad absurdum. In the case of 2 + 2 = 4, it is plain by simple observation that this is indeed a self-evident claim. And, duly, the attempt to substitute unannounced a new "definition" of + that makes 2 + 2 = 147 instead or something else, immediately lands in hopeless contradictions. Lesson: one may not blithely disregard the principle of non-contradiction in reasoning, including elementary mathematical reasoning. And, those who do and then try to stoutly "dance wrong but strong" simply show ever more and more, how absurd the position of rejecting LNC is. Sad . . . GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 17, 2010
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BarryR,
and to me it meas that he either never read Descartes or (more likely) didn’t read deeply.
The years intervening were devoted to what Sayer calls the “immense amount of reading” that Lewis did because (unlike many reviewers) he “refused to give an opinion on a book he had not read.”6 Gene Edward Veith reports that when Charles Huttar was working in the Magdalen College library he saw the register of books Lewis had checked out during the late 1940’s and early 1950’s. It appears that Lewis had “essentially checked out the entire sixteenth-century collection.”7 What was too obscure for either Magdalen or his own personal library to have, he read in the Bodleian’s magnificent Duke Humphrey library—basically what an American library would call its rare book room. Some of it must have been dull going, but he plowed ahead until he had mastered the entire preserved literary output of the century. At the end of some of the books from his own library he marked the date on which he had finished them, and in a few, the added annotation “Never again." This is an excerpt of an essay that is a draft of an article for Lion and Logos: The Life and Legacy of C. S. Lewis, ed. Bruce L. Edwards, Jr., 4 vols. (Greenwood/Praeger, 2007)Clive Hayden
September 17, 2010
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BarryR,
This is trivially false, and to me it meas that he either never read Descartes or (more likely) didn’t read deeply. The counterexample that refutes Lewis is “I am skeptical of everything, including the correctness of my own skepticism.” Descartes’ formulation was much stronger: “Cogito ergo sum”.
I don't see how this refutes Lewis's claim that "“We are always prevented from accepting total skepticism because it can be formulated only by making a tacit exception in favor of the thought we are thinking…”. I see your statement "“I am skeptical of everything, including the correctness of my own skepticism.” as one more removed, that you're not skeptical of the skepticism of the correctness of your skepticism. You cannot be assured in your skepticism of skepticism without making a contradiction. No matter how many time you may remove the assured-ness behind layers of skepticism, in the end you're not skeptical of at least one thing. This doesn't, of course, refute Lewis. Your argument by substituting evolution for inference never even leaves the ground, because we already know evolution is false :). We cannot say that inference is false in every sense and in every case without contradicting ourselves. It doesn't matter how trivial it is to point out that inference is true, it is true, and to say otherwise is, as I said, a contradiction. And yes, Lewis mentions Descartes, I'll have to look up where, but I do remember coming across it. I don't think you've read very deeply Barry. As I said before, Lewis read in 7 different languages, so from everything from Plato to Ptolemy, Dante to Dryden, Aristotle to Aquinas, he read in the original language. Lewis wrote the textbook on 16th Century English literature for Oxford's English literature series, he had a chair invented for him at Cambridge. You should read his book Studies in Words, and The Discarded Image (which deals with the origination of the scientific method and the mental atmosphere of the medieval and renaissance time period), and Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature, and The Allegory of Love, before you would presume to know his reading background.Clive Hayden
September 17, 2010
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F/N: The self-evidently true mathematical fact that 2 + 2 = 4 is conceptually prior to Peano's axioms, which serve more as an explanatory construct than as a foundation for arithmetic. We may then indeed go on to infer interesting theories about arithmetic on said axioms, but had the axioms entailed that 2 + 2 does not equal 4, then they would have been rejected as fatally flawed.kairosfocus
September 17, 2010
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