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I, Robot

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(Photo of Asimo, a humanoid robot created by Honda. Wikipedia photo taken by Gnsin at Expo 2005.)

Over at Why Evolution Is True, Professor Coyne has suddenly woken up to the fact that for many people (including scientists), morality is a powerful reason for believing in God. Coyne thinks this is silly, and that the whole attempt to derive morality from God is doomed. But the arguments he puts forward for his point of view are rather facile, and he fails to address the central problem with his own position.

What might that problem be? Like most atheistic scientists, Professor Jerry Coyne doesn’t believe in free will. As he puts it:

Indeed, studies of the brain are pushing back notions of free will in precisely the way that studies of evolution have pushed back the idea of a creator-god.

We simply don’t like to think that we’re molecular automatons, and so we adopt a definition of free will that makes us think we’re free. But as far as I can see, I, like everyone else, am just a molecular puppet. I don’t like that much, but that’s how it is.

And again, here:

It seems to me that in view of physical determinism (plus fine-scale physical stochasticity involving quantum events), there is no way that we can make decisions that are truly free. Some, like [Humanities professor William] Egginton, simply finesse the question by redefining “free,” but I don’t think that these redefinitions of “free will” comport with how most of us understand the term, or with how it’s been historically (not philosophically) understood.
(Emphases and square brackets mine – VJT.)

So tell me, Professor Coyne: if we are not free, then (a) how are we supposed to be good, (b) why should we bother anyway, and (c) why should we blame those who refuse to make the effort, if their decisions aren’t really free?

Another inconsistency of atheists who share Professor Coyne’s views on freedom is that they are nearly always angry at someone – be it the Pope or former President George W. Bush or global warming deniers. I have to say that makes absolutely no sense to me. Look. If I’m just an automaton, whose behavior is determined by circumstances beyond my control, as Professor Coyne claims, then I can quite understand someone attempting to re-program me, re-educate me or condition me into behaving the “right” way, if they don’t like what I’m doing. I can even understand someone deciding to liquidate me because I’m a faulty piece of machinery that cannot be re-programmed. But please, spare me your moral outrage, your sermonizing, your finger-wagging lectures and your righteous indignation. That I cannot abide. You don’t lecture the PC on your desk when it doesn’t do what you want. If I’m just a glorified version of a desktop PC, then why lecture me?

Next, Professor Coyne invokes Plato’s Euthyphro argument in order to discredit all forms of morality that are based on belief in God:

Religious people have yet to come to grips with Plato’s Euthyphro argument (originally couched in terms of piety rather than morality, but the principle is the same): we would not follow God’s “morality” if God decreed that we perform acts like taking slaves or killing the wives and children of our enemies. That’s because we don’t really think that morality is equivalent to the dictates of God. Rather, we have a prior notion of what is moral. If you respond that God is good, and would never ask people to commit immoral acts, that too shows that you have a notion of morality that’s prior to God. (It also shows that you haven’t read the Bible.)

Here’s my answer to Professor Coyne:

Regarding the Bible, see my comments below. All that the Euthyphro argument proves is that our general notion of morality is prior to any revealed religion, and hence that morality cannot be based entirely on some alleged revelation from God, or some supposed set of commands from God. Our general notion of morality is grounded in the nature of things – hence the term, “natural law ethics.” A thing’s nature defines what is good for it. But a thing’s nature is in turn grounded in the reality of the uncaused, omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent Being who maintains the universe in existence and who gives things their natures. This is the God of natural theology, and the reason why we invoke such a Being in order to explain the cosmos is that no other being is capable of doing so. And in the absence of such a God, there is no satisfactory way in which an atheist can answer the meta-ethical question: why should I treat other individuals in accordance with their natures? Why should I want what is good for them?

“But isn’t the standard of good still something external to God?” I hear you object. My reply: that depends on what you mean by “external.” If you mean that living things (which have a good of their own) are by nature distinct from God, then of course the answer is yes. But if you mean that they are independent of God, then my answer is no.

“But why couldn’t God be omniscient and omni-malevolent by nature, instead of omni-benevolent?” I hear some readers ask. Because it is He who gives things their ends, which define what is good for them. For Him to will the wholesale frustration of ends that He had created would be a contradiction in terms. Nor could God be morally indifferent: that would mean that God had no desire to realize ends which He created in order to be realized – which is another contradiction.

I conclude that the Euthyphro argument can be easily answered, and in no way weakens belief in God.

Next, Professor Coyne asks why theists and atheists tend to reach similar moral conclusions, if morality is ultimately based on God:

If you derive morality from God, how come atheists and religious people give similar answers to moral dilemmas (the work of Marc Hauser and colleagues)?

The short answer is that (i) atheists, like religious people, possess the use of reason; and (ii) atheists, like religious people, are capable of recognizing the nature of things – including human beings – and identifying what is good for them, up to a point. I say “up to a point,” because atheists and theists are likely to differ when it comes to ultimate human ends like religion, which includes the worship of God, as well as on our obligation not to alter our God-given natures (e.g. by having a sex change operation, or replacing part of your brain with a silicon chip).

I might add that citing Professor Marc Hauser as an authority for a scientific assertion might not be a good idea, at the present moment.

But Professor Jerry Coyne has more ammunition up his sleeve: why, he asks, if God is changeless, does morality change over time?

And if morality comes from God, why has what we view as “moral” changed so much in modern times? Most of us now feel that slavery and the subjugation of women, racial minorities and gays are immoral, but they weren’t seen that way a few centuries ago. Did God’s orders change?

First, morality isn’t based on God’s orders, but on the nature of things, which owe their being to God. Human beings possess reason and free will; hence slavery is contrary to their nature. Men and women alike possess reason and free will, and all races of human beings possess these faculties; hence there can be no grounds for subjugating one race or sex to another. And no-one, as far as I know, has ever argued that gays lack reason, so enslaving them is out of the question, regardless of how one views their behavior. The fact that many people in past ages failed to recognize these obvious conclusions doesn’t require us to assume that God has changed. It’s people who have changed, not God.

Second, the changes that Professor Coyne describes apply only to a relatively small sliver of human history. People have always favored their own tribe, but racism based on skin color is a relatively novel phenomenon; the Roman Empire, which had African Emperors (see here and here), a Senate that was one-third African at one point, and many Africans in prominent positions in society, was largely free from racism. And while the subjugation of women was pretty awful in ancient Greece, it was nowhere near as bad in ancient Sumer, let alone in prehistoric societies. My point here is that the “Whig view” of history as a long steady march towards liberty is flat-out wrong, and the notion that religion has held back morality is even more so. Atheists had little or nothing to do with most of the moral advances that have occurred in human history: the elimination of child sacrifice; the elimination of infanticide; the rule of law; habeas corpus; the adoption of international rules for warfare; the acceptance of international arbitration; the elimination of slavery; the elimination of torture; the recognition of women as men’s spiritual equals; and the elimination of racism. Atheists should stop claiming credit where credit is not due.

Third, I would invite readers to have a look at the following articles, which illustrate how religion has saved hundreds of millions of lives during the past 2,000 years:

A Global Perspective in the Epidemiology of Suicide by Associate Professor Jose Manoel Bertolote and Dr. Alexandra Fleischmann.
Bertolote and Fleischmann point out that in Muslim countries (e.g. Kuwait) where suicide is most strictly forbidden, the suicide rate is close to zero (0.1 per 100,000). The suicide rate is highest in atheist countries such as China, where it is 25.6 per 100,000. There are 1.5 billion Muslims in the world. If they were living under the atheistic regime of China, 450,000 of them would be killing themselves every year, or 45,000,000 per century. Anything that saves that many lives has got to be socially beneficial.

Live Longer, Healthier and Better: The Untold Benefits of Becoming a Christian in the ancient world by Professor Rodney Stark. In Christianity Today, Issue 57, January 1, 1998.
Reconstructing the Rise of Christianity: the Role of Women by Professor Rodney Stark. In Sociology of Religion, Vol. 56, Fall 1995.

The above articles by Professor Stark describe how the Christian teaching of the spiritual equality of men and women, coupled with its prohibition of abortion and infanticide, improved the lot of women in the Roman Empire, and how Christians saved millions of Romans’ lives by caring for the sick during plagues. In the Roman Empire, the male head of the household could order any female living in his household to have an abortion. What’s more, a married woman who gave birth had no legal right to keep her child unless the male head of the household picked it up and set it down on the family hearth. Otherwise the child had to be placed outside in the street, where it would either die of exposure or be picked up by some unscrupulous rogue and sold into slavery. Girls were exposed far more often than boys: research has shown that the ratio of men to women in the Roman Empire was at least 120:100.

“So what’s your point?” I hear you ask. Here’s my point. Population of the Roman Empire: about 60 million people. Annual number of births (assuming say, 40 births per 1000 people per year): about 2.4 million, or 1.2 million boys and 1.2 million girls, of whom 200,000 were killed. Enter Christianity: up to 200,000 girls’ lives saved per year, or 20 million per century, or 200 million over a period of a millennium. Still think religion doesn’t matter?

90 Million Missing Females, and a $45 Trillion Gap: The Fruits of Misguided Family Planning. Zenit Daily Dispatch, 24 July 2004.
Examines the social consequences of female infanticide in China and India, and of declining fertility rates around the world.

Finally, Professor Coyne argues that the Bible illustrates the utter folly and futility of basing one’s morality upon belief in God:

And what about the “morality” of scripture? Clearly God once ordered all kinds of genocide and murder, including rape and (my favorite story) inducing a bear to murder forty-two youths for simply making fun of Elisha’s bald head (2 Kings 2:23-24).

But this objection is irrelevant to the key issue. Andrew Zak Williams’s article in the New Statesman, which Jerry Coyne is commenting on, asked public figures and scientists to explain why they believe in God, not why they believe in Judaism or Christianity. Many respondents nominated morality as a reason for believing in God. The issue we need to address is therefore whether morality requires God, in order to be rationally justifiable. Arguments based on allegedly immoral commands by God in Scripture are therefore beside the point. At most, they prove that the God of the Bible is not the true God. Such arguments leave classical theism – defined as the belief in a God who is transcendent, perfect, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent, immutable and incapable of being decomposed into parts – entirely intact. Logically speaking, one can accept classical theism without believing in any religion.

In any case, arguments based on allegedly immoral commands by God in Scripture are weak. The books of Scripture were written 2,000 to 3,000 years ago, in foreign tongues (mostly ancient Hebrew and Koine Greek), by people whose mindset and mental outlook was very different from our own. Using the story of Elisha and the bears, as Coyne does, to argue against revealed religion assumes that we know who the offenders were (Were they young men, teenagers or boys?), what their intentions were towards Elisha (Did they mean to harm him or merely to mock him?), what their offense was (Was it mockery, blasphemy, attempted assault or attempted murder?), and to what degree they were punished (Were they actually conscious and in pain while being mauled to pieces by the bears, or did God cause them to drop dead instantly of shock as soon as the bears appeared?) We can’t be certain of any of these things, for the story in question. There are too many unknowns.

Professor Coyne’s unfounded assertion that God orders rape in the Bible is also based on his own highly questionable interpretation of Scripture. The following articles may serve as a useful counter-balance: an article on the slaughter of the Midianites and another on Old Testament laws about rape and virginity by Christian apologist Glenn Miller; The Bible and Rape – A Response to Michael Martin by Matt and Madeleine Flanagan; and The Old Testament and Rape by Sam Shamoun.

In short: Professor Coyne appears to suffer from the naive delusion that there is such a thing as the “plain sense of Holy Scripture,” which an individual can discern for him/herself. The fact of the matter is that Scripture is never plain; it must be read in the context of the time and culture in which it was written, and the community to whom it was written.

I will conclude by asking Professor Coyne a question: how can he criticize scientists and public figures for grounding their morality in a belief in God, when his own brand of atheism offers no alternative, and even denies human freedom altogether?

Comments
---MarkF: "The root cause of the problem is that to describe something as good is to encapsulate your attitude to it and so every attempt to define it objectively will allow for the further response – why should I have that attitude to property X? Or to put it simply – you can’t derive an “ought” from an “is” – even when the “is” is “part of my human nature”. A thing is “good” if it does well what it was designed and intended to do. A good toaster produces quality toast. A good coffee maker produces quality coffee. Can a toaster be a good coffee maker? No, and if tries to become one, it will fail to make coffee, destroy itself, and likely harm anyone associated with the process. A good person is one who does well what he/she was designed and intended to do--one who is advancing toward his/her end, which is love God and practice virtue. A “bad” person is bad insofar as he lacks virtue, that is, insofar as he fails to act in accordance with the purpose of his existence. Can a person be a good animal or a good God? No, and if he tries to do either, he will destroy himself, compromise his capacity to reason, and do violence to the social order. If he tries to become a good animal, he will be consumed by his appetites and become a slave; if he tries to become a good God, he will be consumed by his pride and try to enslave others. In either case, he will hurt society. There is no such thing as a private vice. If, on the other hand, a person was not designed and intended for any particular purpose, then he cannot be either good or bad, because there is no standard of good to violate--no moral objective that he can fail to meet. He can only be what he is and nothing more. That also means that he cannot help or harm society because if there is no moral standard for individuals, then there can be no moral standard for a society comprised of individuals. What is a good society? A good society is one that makes it easy to be good and hard to be bad. What is a bad society? A bad society is one that makes it easy to be bad and hard to be good.StephenB
April 25, 2011
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MF: Randomness is not freedom, especially freedom to think, reason, decide and act aright. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
April 25, 2011
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#21 and #22 I agree that: People (and indeed animals) have free will. Determinism is false. There are events whose description is not totally determined by the conditions that are sufficient for them to happen. I just think that (A) Free will is adequately described by what I call "subfree will" above. Indeed I don't understand what people mean when they reject that in favour of some other concept of free will. (B) Events are to some extent determined by sufficient conditions and to some extent there is a "random" element. (A) and (B) are compatible with each other and with morality and don't require a deity.markf
April 25, 2011
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Another Chicago scientist, the Nobel Laureate Arthur Compton, thought that science itself would be impossible without genuine human freedom: if the scientist can't genuinely decide how to respond to an unprecedented result in the laboratory, then how would science be possible of making genuine discoveries? Compton was also among the earlier to use QM in order to argue against determinism in human behavior--not necessarily to argue *for* quantum uncertainties as the locus of free action (though he might have thought this was so), but definitively *against* determinism in behavior that claimed a basis in physics. Anyone interested in this is invited to download "part 2" of my article (there are 3 parts in all) about Compton's religious life and beliefs, published sequentially in the ASA journal in 2009. Part 2 is at http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/2009/PSCF9-09dyn.htmlTed Davis
April 25, 2011
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MF, On free will: Ever since Heisenberg's discovery of the uncertainty principle, determinism has been dead. At the most fundamental level of physics we never know exactly how things behave or will behave. What Coyne and all the rest of these atheists do is put up a Strawman of the argument for free will. No one in their right mind thinks that man's will is totally free- that is, that we can will ourselves to do anything any time we want to. I would like to be in the Caribbean right now, but no amount of will is going to transport me there without getting on a plane or boat and actually traveling to that place. The world around us puts certain quantum physical limits on what we can cannot do. However, as Heisenberg showed, there is a certain amount of freedom in every event in nature and that is where the exercising of our will takes place. Every person is faced with decisions every day and each of us will decide differently even on the same kinds of decisions. Free-will, therefore, is just the concept of the reality of our will and the limited freedom that God allows us together acting as one. We all have free will because we all have a certain amount of freedom, and we all have a will. To suggest that free will does not exist because our will is not totally liberated is a simply a straw man argument. Further, when one believes they have free will they are more likely to exercise the depth of their freedom because they are aware of the possibility of choice. This is also true the other way around, that if one thinks they have no free will they will he less likely to exercise the fullness of their potential. Hence, this is where the illusion can become the reality and the reality an illusion. On Morality: Similarly, on morality and ethics, it is certainly true that if God does not exist then anything is permissible but not anything is possible. In a world where there is a divinely revealed law that is recognized, people are far more likely to act altruistically. And in a world where there is no absolute moral law recognized, people are far more likely to act only in their own self interests. This is the difference between man obeying their God and man thinking he himself is God. It has long been recognized by many intellectuals, philosophers and Theologians that the belief in a benevolent just God offers a moderating influence on society. That is, people are more likely to behave themselves and help one another if they believe that their good selfless deeds will not be in vain and will not go unnoticed. But this is also a self fulfilling and reinforcing phenomena, that a belief in God is intrinsically good for society also provides clear evidence for the Truth of God's reality. That is, the fact that this system of divine morality works is itself clear evidence that it is ontologically true and real because the fact that it works is exactly what you would expect if it was real. Just so, on the other hand if we choose to believe in a world where the only truth is that men should seek for themselves, in whatever way best accommodates their wants and needs, then we have a society that does not function in a way that most people would consider preferable. So the need for objective morality is built into the souls of people and the need for it is also built into the world in which they live. And this is evidence for the ontological truth of an absolute divine natural law of morality because nothing other than a supreme moral intellect could make the functional harmony of this system of natural moral laws necessary.Frost122585
April 25, 2011
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Onlookers: Observe what MF willfully ignored, here at 13 above (or so -- mod). GEM of TKIkairosfocus
April 25, 2011
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markf:
I wonder what you mean by “natural"?
Eating- do you think the desire to eat is supernatural?
If my dog steals from the table then it certainly could have done otherwise.
Maybe, maybe not.
A dog has subfree will and even a limited moral sense.
evidence?
Like us dogs know rules, often want to obey them, sometimes fall for rival desires and motives, and may feel subsequent guilt.
Do they also spew unsupportable nonsense?
They are not able to imagine what it is like to be another creature -
How do you know?Joseph
April 25, 2011
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vj And there is the free will bit:
Perhaps an even better one would be a pet which is prone to occasionally misbehave by stealing food from the table. The pet’s owner might shout at it in order to deter it from getting up on the table, and might even give it a mild negative reinforcement if it does so. But in the midst of all this, the owner, if he/she is humane, remembers that the pet can’t help doing what it does. Anger directed at the pet might be appropriate; but indignation, never. It’s just doing what’s natural for it.
I wonder what you mean by “natural"? If my dog steals from the table then it certainly could have done otherwise.  A dog has subfree will and even a limited moral sense. Like us dogs know rules, often want to obey them, sometimes fall for rival desires and motives, and may feel subsequent guilt. Clearly this is very limited.  They are not able to imagine what it is like to be another creature – which is what gives us the basis for being indignant - “how could he be so thoughtless!”.  But the ability to imagine what it is like to be someone else only requires subfree will.  It does not require some other mysterious kind of free will. markf
April 25, 2011
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markf:
What if someone asserts that it is morally good to deny your human nature if that leads to greater happiness for others?
Then it is up to them to make their case.Joseph
April 25, 2011
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vj I do believe that what is moral has to be good for me, in the sense that doing it somehow fulfils or completes me as a person. It need not accrue to my financial gain, of course; and it may even materially disadvantage me. But if it is good, then in some sense, my life must be more genuinely human for doing it. But that doesn't answer the essential point. What if someone asserts that it is morally good to deny your human nature if that leads to greater happiness for others? There are two ways you can go: 1) You could get into an argument of contingent fact which shows that in practice denying your nature never leads to greater happiness for others in the long run. But now you have abandoned the case which says that the definition of morally good is being true to your nature. 2) Or you could argue that “good” means being true to your nature and not greatest happiness for greatest number. But in that case he can respond that what he means by “good” is greatest happiness for the greatest number and you are talking about different things! SO there is no dispute. The root cause of the problem is that to describe something as good is to encapsulate your attitude to it and so every attempt to define it objectively will allow for the further response – why should I have that attitude to property X? Or to put it simply - you can't derive an "ought" from an "is" - even when the "is" is "part of my human nature". To illustrate this - suppose a psychopath says he is in "some sense fulfilled and completed" as a person by making others suffer. How do you disprove this? More deeply - why do you feel a need to disprove it? Why do you not accept that is part of his nature just as it is part of a cat's nature to play with a mouse before killing it? God made plenty of creatures whose nature was to inflict cruelty - why not some human beings? That's Euthrypro - now onto the free will bit ....markf
April 25, 2011
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H'mm: Is seven links the current upper limit?kairosfocus
April 25, 2011
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Part 2: 8 --> It is no secret that evolutionary materialism, since the days of Plato in The Laws, Bk X, reduces all to matter and energy moving under forces of chance and necessity, and so has in it no IS strong enough to ground OUGHT. Thence its inescapable amorality and irrationality. 9 --> The second leg of that reduction to absurdity, irrationality [cf. here], was aptly summed up by Haldane in his longstanding remark:
"It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms." ["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209.]
10 --> There is no easy, responsible, cogent reply to that dilemma, on an evolutionary materialistic footing. Indeed, evo mat boils down to establishing the premise of being deluded -- cultural relativism is the polite way of putting that -- as the core of mentality. (Hence the sort of issues being highlighted by Nancy Pearcey in the current interviews with Mrs O'Leary, e.g. here in no 3.) 11 --> But if our minds are so pervasively delusional, we have no reason to be confident in thought at all. Hence a lot of the chaotic forces at work ripping apart our visibly collapsing civilisation. Evo mat, having flown in on the promise of rationality, and turned it into the ideology or rationalism, ends in irrational absurdity. 12 --> By utter contrast contrast, let us see how Locke grounded liberty in his foundational second Essay on Government in Ch 2 S 5, by making a pivotal cite from Richard Hooker in the classic, Ecclesiastical Polity:
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant . . . [[Hooker then continues, citing Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 8:] as namely, That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That since we would not be in any thing extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain, with such-like . . . ] [[Eccl. Polity,preface, Bk I, "ch." 8, p.80, cf. here.]
________________ If we would rescue our civilisation from the forces of chaos, we must needs listen to the counsel of that wise old Canon. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
April 25, 2011
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LET's try again: PART 1: ++++++ MF All you have done is to restate the self-referentially incoherent amorality and irrationality that lie at the heart of evolutionary materialist atheism:
[MF, 9:] The heart of the Euthypro dilemma is that morality is in the end a matter of opinion – deeply held opinions shared by most people on a wide range of subjects – but nevertheless a matter of opinion . . . . Whatever you use to “ground” morality whether it be nature, God’s word, or utilitarianism, it is always logically possible to ask “why is that good?” It is never true by definition. [Notice the subtle insinuation and projection of circularity; when there is the issue of self-evident truth that we can only reject on pain of patent absurdity to be addressed.]
1 --> Try telling this -- pardon directness, but this is a monstrous claim -- fallacious, absurd and bankrupt talking point to a weeping, critically injured gang rape victim: "morality is in the end a matter of opinion" . . . 2 --> The fact is we have an undeniable intuitive knowledge of our dignity as human beings, and we properly find ourselves outraged at its violation. Nor is that outrage a mere shrug shoulders matter of "might makes 'right'." Rape victims know better than that. 3 --> Ever since Plato in The Laws, Bk X, the absurdity of atheistical, evolutionary materialist amorality has been publicly exposed as absurd and bankrupt:
[[The avant garde philosophers, teachers and artists c. 400 BC] say that the greatest and fairest things are the work of nature and of chance, the lesser of art [[ i.e. techne], which, receiving from nature the greater and primeval creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are generally termed artificial [i.e. evo mat was already well known in the days of Plato] . . . . [[T]hese people would say that the Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature [radical amorality and relativism, rooted in having no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT], but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might . . . and hence arise factions [ruthless ideologues manipulate the public and vie for raw power, as might makes right on such evo mat views], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others [[such amoral factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless tyranny; here, too, Plato hints at the career of Alcibiades], and not in legal subjection to them . . .
4 --> When it comes to the grounding of morality and its roots in God, the IOSE course section on the Euthryphro dilemma, so-called points out the core fallacy in it as addressed to Judaeo- Christian Theism. 5 --> First, courtesy Wikipedia, the "dilemma" in a nutshell -- and notice, dilemmas are primarily a rhetorical device:
In essence: Does God command the good which is separate from himself, or is “good” just the arbitrary whim of God? If the first, God does not ground the good, and if the second, “good” is little more than the arbitrary whim of God.
6 --> The point of this dilemma in modern times is to try to suggest that theism or the like has no real answer to the is-ought gap that leads to atheism's inherent amorality, either. So in effect, we have to shrug, take moral feelings as a brute given, and try to work out the best compromise we can. 7 --> The longstanding and never adequately countered reply pivots on the inherent character of the good God, who is the ground of our existence as creatures made in his image and living in a world replete with signs pointing to its Creator. So, God and goodness CANNOT be separated, and lie at the root of our being:
the fatal defect of the dilemma argument lies in its pagan roots: the Greek gods in view in Socrates' original argument were not the true root of being; so, they could not ground reality. But the God of theism is the ground of reality, so it is a classic theistic answer that the inherently good Creator of the cosmos made a world that -- in accordance with his unchangeably good character -- not only is replete with reliable, compelling signs pointing to his eternal power and Deity as the root of our being, but also builds in a real, reasonable, intelligible moral principle into that world. That intelligible moral principle is implanted inextricably in our very nature as human beings, so that for instance by our nature as creatures made in God's image with ability to know, reason and choose, we have a known duty of mutual respect.
[ . . . ]kairosfocus
April 25, 2011
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OOPS: I seem to have triggered the mod pile just now, was it too many links?kairosfocus
April 25, 2011
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MF All you have done is to restate the self-referentially incoherent amorality and irrationality that lie at the heart of evolutionary materialist atheism:
[MF, 9:] The heart of the Euthypro dilemma is that morality is in the end a matter of opinion – deeply held opinions shared by most people on a wide range of subjects – but nevertheless a matter of opinion . . . . Whatever you use to “ground” morality whether it be nature, God’s word, or utilitarianism, it is always logically possible to ask “why is that good?” It is never true by definition. [Notice the subtle insinuation and projection of circularity; when there is the issue of self-evident truth that we can only reject on pain of patent absurdity to be addressed.]
1 --> Try telling this -- pardon directness, but this is a monstrous claim -- fallacious, absurd and bankrupt talking point to a weeping, critically injured gang rape victim: "morality is in the end a matter of opinion" . . . 2 --> The fact is we have an undeniable intuitive knowledge of our dignity as human beings, and we properly find ourselves outraged at its violation. Nor is that outrage a mere shrug shoulders matter of "might makes 'right'." Rape victims know better than that. 3 --> Ever since Plato in The Laws, Bk X, the absurdity of atheistical, evolutionary materialist amorality has been publicly exposed as absurd and bankrupt:
[[The avant garde philosophers, teachers and artists c. 400 BC] say that the greatest and fairest things are the work of nature and of chance, the lesser of art [[ i.e. techne], which, receiving from nature the greater and primeval creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are generally termed artificial [i.e. evo mat was already well known in the days of Plato] . . . . [[T]hese people would say that the Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature [radical amorality and relativism, rooted in having no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT], but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might . . . and hence arise factions [ruthless ideologues manipulate the public and vie for raw power, as might makes right on such evo mat views], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others [[such amoral factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless tyranny; here, too, Plato hints at the career of Alcibiades], and not in legal subjection to them . . .
4 --> When it comes to the grounding of morality and its roots in God, the IOSE course section on the Euthryphro dilemma, so-called points out the core fallacy in it as addressed to Judaeo- Christian Theism. 5 --> First, courtesy Wikipedia, the "dilemma" in a nutshell -- and notice, dilemmas are primarily a rhetorical device:
In essence: Does God command the good which is separate from himself, or is “good” just the arbitrary whim of God? If the first, God does not ground the good, and if the second, “good” is little more than the arbitrary whim of God.
6 --> The point of this dilemma in modern times is to try to suggest that theism or the like has no real answer to the is-ought gap that leads to atheism's inherent amorality, either. So in effect, we have to shrug, take moral feelings as a brute given, and try to work out the best compromise we can. 7 --> The longstanding and never adequately countered reply pivots on the inherent character of the good God, who is the ground of our existence as creatures made in his image and living in a world replete with signs pointing to its Creator. So, God and goodness CANNOT be separated, and lie at the root of our being:
the fatal defect of the dilemma argument lies in its pagan roots: the Greek gods in view in Socrates' original argument were not the true root of being; so, they could not ground reality. But the God of theism is the ground of reality, so it is a classic theistic answer that the inherently good Creator of the cosmos made a world that -- in accordance with his unchangeably good character -- not only is replete with reliable, compelling signs pointing to his eternal power and Deity as the root of our being, but also builds in a real, reasonable, intelligible moral principle into that world. That intelligible moral principle is implanted inextricably in our very nature as human beings, so that for instance by our nature as creatures made in God's image with ability to know, reason and choose, we have a known duty of mutual respect.
8 --> It is no secret that evolutionary materialism, since the days of Plato in The Laws, Bk X, reduces all to matter and energy moving under forces of chance and necessity, and so has in it no IS strong enough to ground OUGHT. Thence its inescapable amorality and irrationality. 9 --> The second leg of that reduction to absurdity, irrationality [cf. here], was aptly summed up by Haldane in his longstanding remark:
"It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms." ["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209.]
10 --> There is no easy, responsible, cogent reply to that dilemma, on an evolutionary materialistic footing. Indeed, evo mat boils down to establishing the premise of being deluded -- cultural relativism is the polite way of putting that -- as the core of mentality. (Hence the sort of issues being highlighted by Nancy Pearcey in the current interviews with Mrs O'Leary, e.g. here in no 3.) 11 --> But if our minds are so pervasively delusional, we have no reason to be confident in thought at all. Hence a lot of the chaotic forces at work ripping apart our visibly collapsing civilisation. Evo mat, having flown in on the promise of rationality, and turned it into the ideology or rationalism, ends in irrational absurdity. 12 --> By utter contrast contrast, let us see how Locke grounded liberty in his foundational second Essay on Government in Ch 2 S 5, by making a pivotal cite from Richard Hooker in the classic, Ecclesiastical Polity:
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant . . . [[Hooker then continues, citing Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 8:] as namely, That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That since we would not be in any thing extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain, with such-like . . . ] [[Eccl. Polity,preface, Bk I, "ch." 8, p.80, cf. here.]
________________ If we would rescue our civilisation from the forces of chaos, we must needs listen to the counsel of that wise old Canon. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
April 25, 2011
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markf (#8, 9) Thank you for your posts. I'll discuss them in reverse order. When I say that “A thing's nature defines what is good for it”, I do mean that a thing's nature defines the conditions under which it will thrive, and what it must do in order to thrive. In other words, I meant good as in "beneficial", and I would view moral good as a subset of that, since not all organisms that are capable of thriving are moral agents, and even moral agents have various non-moral goods - e.g. nutrition - in addition to their moral goods. The goods of different living creatures inevitably come into conflict with one another. What's good for the wolf might be bad for the sheep. As for viruses, they are not properly alive, but might be said to thrive in a derivative sense, and what's good for them is often fatal for us. Obviously, it's good for us to eliminate life-threatening viruses, such as smallpox. The goods of most creatures are non-moral goods. A virus has no choice about killing millions of people, when it does so, and a wolf has no choice about killing sheep. Regarding morality: I do believe that what is moral has to be good for me, in the sense that doing it somehow fulfils or completes me as a person. It need not accrue to my financial gain, of course; and it may even materially disadvantage me. But if it is good, then in some sense, my life must be more genuinely human for doing it. In that limited sense, at least, morality and self-interest must coincide. I liked your illustration involving the PC. Perhaps an even better one would be a pet which is prone to occasionally misbehave by stealing food from the table. The pet's owner might shout at it in order to deter it from getting up on the table, and might even give it a mild negative reinforcement if it does so. But in the midst of all this, the owner, if he/she is humane, remembers that the pet can't help doing what it does. Anger directed at the pet might be appropriate; but indignation, never. It's just doing what's natural for it. Someone who believes that humans have no more free will than pets, should (if he/she is logical) endeavor to control other people's actions through behavior therapy. I find it somewhat amusing that hard determinists sometimes forget themselves when people don't behave as they would like them to. It's as if they feel a deep-seated need to blame something. I wonder why.vjtorley
April 25, 2011
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OK. I have a moment so I will have a go at Euthyphro as well. The Euthyrpo argument is not at all easy to answer. The heart of the Euthypro dilemma is that morality is in the end a matter of opinion – deeply held opinions shared by most people on a wide range of subjects - but nevertheless a matter of opinion. Whatever you use to “ground” morality whether it be nature, God’s word, or utilitarianism, it is always logically possible to ask “why is that good?” It is never true by definition. Morality does not require God as an ultimate grounding because there is no ultimate grounding. For example, you write “A thing’s nature defines what is good for it.” This needs clarifying. Do you literally mean what is good for that thing? In the sense that it will benefit that thing? This seems to be a definition of selfishness not of morality. More likely you mean something like “a thing’s nature defines how it ought to behave or what it is for that thing to be morally good”. The nature of the smallpox virus is to kill and disfigure millions of people. I dare say it is possible to argue that is not the true nature of the smallpox virus – but the very fact that it is possible to argue about this makes the case. If the nature of the smallpox virus defined what it is for a smallpox virus to be good then there would be no desire or need to argue that it is not in its nature to kill millions of people – killing millions of people would be true by definition. The fact that someone can reasonably argue that nature of things is not always good for that thing shows there are alternative grounds for deciding that something is good – and this is true of any grounds that may be proposed.markf
April 25, 2011
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vj I think it is several months since there was a meta-ethics debate on UD so it might be entertaining to go over some of this ground again. You deal with several topics. I will only do the bit on free will in this comment. As you may remember, I disagree with Coyne and agree with Egginton. I think what we mean by free will is compatible with determinism (plus quantum uncertainty). You and Coyne think there is something else, “true free will”, but I think we can duck that issue when it comes to ethics. Let us define something called subfree will which corresponds to my feelings about free will. Very roughly subfree will is the ability to act according to desires and motives. Subfree is compatible with determinism. The motives and desires which are the internal state of the organism plus the environment determine how it will act. One can even imagine a robot programmed to have subfree will. Now I would argue that subfree will is compatible with morality. So the presence or otherwise of true free will, whatever that means, is irrelevant to presence of morality. How come subfree will is sufficient for morality? Well let’s get back to being angry with your PC. The fact is that many people are angry with their PCs when they do not do what they want (one of my clients just broke his laptop by throwing the mouse at it when it starting updating in the middle of a video). You say it makes no sense to you. But suppose laptops were programmed to react to anger. They were programmed to change things like update patterns according to praise and blame. Now it would make perfectly good sense to be angry with it. To take your three specific questions. With only subfree will: (a) how are we supposed to be good? By following our evolved desire to be good. (b) why should be bother anyway? Because we like being good. (c) why should we blame those who refuse to make the effort Because that may change their behaviour. I might have a go at Euthrypro in another comment ...markf
April 25, 2011
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You are the proof that God is. Each and every human being is the proof that atheism/materialism is false and offers only a false view of the nature of reality.Ilion
April 24, 2011
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"So tell me, Professor Coyne: if we are not free, then (a) how are we supposed to be good, (b) why should we bother anyway, and (c) why should we blame those who refuse to make the effort, if their decisions aren’t really free?" Even more to the point, if we are not free, then how can we *know* that we are not free. For, we cannot know *anything* if we are not free. One must eliminate all meaning from the concept of 'knowledge' (and really, of all concepts) in order to simultaneously claim that we are not free and that one may know this to be true.Ilion
April 24, 2011
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"Next thing you know, people will be doubting Darwin. GASP!" Yeah, and I don't appear to have the free will to believe Darwin anymore. I cannot help it. My genes made me. Btw, for the philosophers out there, how does this work re the diad and the triad? Are those who accept the diad forced to reject free-will? Do those who accept the triad separate mind from brain? I guess JP Moreland is the man to answer this question.NZer
April 24, 2011
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"The fact of the matter is that Scripture is never plain; it must be read in the context of the time and culture in which it was written, and the community to whom it was written." Scripture is never plain? All Scripture? Everywhere?NZer
April 24, 2011
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If there is no kernel of freedom within our minds, how did we come up with the very idea of "freedom?" Automatons with no freedom would never conceive of such an idea.mike1962
April 24, 2011
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I've always believed I have free will, from the simple fact that I never had to pay anything for it.
It’s incumbent on us to learn about these arguments, for the morality card is fast becoming the most popular rationale for faith.
NO WAI! I thought faith was always blind and could by definition have no rationale. Next thing you know, people will be doubting Darwin. GASP!Mung
April 24, 2011
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Just claiming that humans have "free will" seems to give credibility to the atheist determinist. 'Free will' should be unpacked and broken down beyond the general term. It is absolutely certain that humans are limited to choices, we don't have an ultimate free will to do anything, we are limited depending on the total knowledge at any given time. A child doesn't have the free will to know certain things that only adults know. So, free will is really an individual choice between the set of options available.jgray2
April 24, 2011
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