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I, Robot

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(Photo of Asimo, a humanoid robot created by Honda. Wikipedia photo taken by Gnsin at Expo 2005.)

Over at Why Evolution Is True, Professor Coyne has suddenly woken up to the fact that for many people (including scientists), morality is a powerful reason for believing in God. Coyne thinks this is silly, and that the whole attempt to derive morality from God is doomed. But the arguments he puts forward for his point of view are rather facile, and he fails to address the central problem with his own position.

What might that problem be? Like most atheistic scientists, Professor Jerry Coyne doesn’t believe in free will. As he puts it:

Indeed, studies of the brain are pushing back notions of free will in precisely the way that studies of evolution have pushed back the idea of a creator-god.

We simply don’t like to think that we’re molecular automatons, and so we adopt a definition of free will that makes us think we’re free. But as far as I can see, I, like everyone else, am just a molecular puppet. I don’t like that much, but that’s how it is.

And again, here:

It seems to me that in view of physical determinism (plus fine-scale physical stochasticity involving quantum events), there is no way that we can make decisions that are truly free. Some, like [Humanities professor William] Egginton, simply finesse the question by redefining “free,” but I don’t think that these redefinitions of “free will” comport with how most of us understand the term, or with how it’s been historically (not philosophically) understood.
(Emphases and square brackets mine – VJT.)

So tell me, Professor Coyne: if we are not free, then (a) how are we supposed to be good, (b) why should we bother anyway, and (c) why should we blame those who refuse to make the effort, if their decisions aren’t really free?

Another inconsistency of atheists who share Professor Coyne’s views on freedom is that they are nearly always angry at someone – be it the Pope or former President George W. Bush or global warming deniers. I have to say that makes absolutely no sense to me. Look. If I’m just an automaton, whose behavior is determined by circumstances beyond my control, as Professor Coyne claims, then I can quite understand someone attempting to re-program me, re-educate me or condition me into behaving the “right” way, if they don’t like what I’m doing. I can even understand someone deciding to liquidate me because I’m a faulty piece of machinery that cannot be re-programmed. But please, spare me your moral outrage, your sermonizing, your finger-wagging lectures and your righteous indignation. That I cannot abide. You don’t lecture the PC on your desk when it doesn’t do what you want. If I’m just a glorified version of a desktop PC, then why lecture me?

Next, Professor Coyne invokes Plato’s Euthyphro argument in order to discredit all forms of morality that are based on belief in God:

Religious people have yet to come to grips with Plato’s Euthyphro argument (originally couched in terms of piety rather than morality, but the principle is the same): we would not follow God’s “morality” if God decreed that we perform acts like taking slaves or killing the wives and children of our enemies. That’s because we don’t really think that morality is equivalent to the dictates of God. Rather, we have a prior notion of what is moral. If you respond that God is good, and would never ask people to commit immoral acts, that too shows that you have a notion of morality that’s prior to God. (It also shows that you haven’t read the Bible.)

Here’s my answer to Professor Coyne:

Regarding the Bible, see my comments below. All that the Euthyphro argument proves is that our general notion of morality is prior to any revealed religion, and hence that morality cannot be based entirely on some alleged revelation from God, or some supposed set of commands from God. Our general notion of morality is grounded in the nature of things – hence the term, “natural law ethics.” A thing’s nature defines what is good for it. But a thing’s nature is in turn grounded in the reality of the uncaused, omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent Being who maintains the universe in existence and who gives things their natures. This is the God of natural theology, and the reason why we invoke such a Being in order to explain the cosmos is that no other being is capable of doing so. And in the absence of such a God, there is no satisfactory way in which an atheist can answer the meta-ethical question: why should I treat other individuals in accordance with their natures? Why should I want what is good for them?

“But isn’t the standard of good still something external to God?” I hear you object. My reply: that depends on what you mean by “external.” If you mean that living things (which have a good of their own) are by nature distinct from God, then of course the answer is yes. But if you mean that they are independent of God, then my answer is no.

“But why couldn’t God be omniscient and omni-malevolent by nature, instead of omni-benevolent?” I hear some readers ask. Because it is He who gives things their ends, which define what is good for them. For Him to will the wholesale frustration of ends that He had created would be a contradiction in terms. Nor could God be morally indifferent: that would mean that God had no desire to realize ends which He created in order to be realized – which is another contradiction.

I conclude that the Euthyphro argument can be easily answered, and in no way weakens belief in God.

Next, Professor Coyne asks why theists and atheists tend to reach similar moral conclusions, if morality is ultimately based on God:

If you derive morality from God, how come atheists and religious people give similar answers to moral dilemmas (the work of Marc Hauser and colleagues)?

The short answer is that (i) atheists, like religious people, possess the use of reason; and (ii) atheists, like religious people, are capable of recognizing the nature of things – including human beings – and identifying what is good for them, up to a point. I say “up to a point,” because atheists and theists are likely to differ when it comes to ultimate human ends like religion, which includes the worship of God, as well as on our obligation not to alter our God-given natures (e.g. by having a sex change operation, or replacing part of your brain with a silicon chip).

I might add that citing Professor Marc Hauser as an authority for a scientific assertion might not be a good idea, at the present moment.

But Professor Jerry Coyne has more ammunition up his sleeve: why, he asks, if God is changeless, does morality change over time?

And if morality comes from God, why has what we view as “moral” changed so much in modern times? Most of us now feel that slavery and the subjugation of women, racial minorities and gays are immoral, but they weren’t seen that way a few centuries ago. Did God’s orders change?

First, morality isn’t based on God’s orders, but on the nature of things, which owe their being to God. Human beings possess reason and free will; hence slavery is contrary to their nature. Men and women alike possess reason and free will, and all races of human beings possess these faculties; hence there can be no grounds for subjugating one race or sex to another. And no-one, as far as I know, has ever argued that gays lack reason, so enslaving them is out of the question, regardless of how one views their behavior. The fact that many people in past ages failed to recognize these obvious conclusions doesn’t require us to assume that God has changed. It’s people who have changed, not God.

Second, the changes that Professor Coyne describes apply only to a relatively small sliver of human history. People have always favored their own tribe, but racism based on skin color is a relatively novel phenomenon; the Roman Empire, which had African Emperors (see here and here), a Senate that was one-third African at one point, and many Africans in prominent positions in society, was largely free from racism. And while the subjugation of women was pretty awful in ancient Greece, it was nowhere near as bad in ancient Sumer, let alone in prehistoric societies. My point here is that the “Whig view” of history as a long steady march towards liberty is flat-out wrong, and the notion that religion has held back morality is even more so. Atheists had little or nothing to do with most of the moral advances that have occurred in human history: the elimination of child sacrifice; the elimination of infanticide; the rule of law; habeas corpus; the adoption of international rules for warfare; the acceptance of international arbitration; the elimination of slavery; the elimination of torture; the recognition of women as men’s spiritual equals; and the elimination of racism. Atheists should stop claiming credit where credit is not due.

Third, I would invite readers to have a look at the following articles, which illustrate how religion has saved hundreds of millions of lives during the past 2,000 years:

A Global Perspective in the Epidemiology of Suicide by Associate Professor Jose Manoel Bertolote and Dr. Alexandra Fleischmann.
Bertolote and Fleischmann point out that in Muslim countries (e.g. Kuwait) where suicide is most strictly forbidden, the suicide rate is close to zero (0.1 per 100,000). The suicide rate is highest in atheist countries such as China, where it is 25.6 per 100,000. There are 1.5 billion Muslims in the world. If they were living under the atheistic regime of China, 450,000 of them would be killing themselves every year, or 45,000,000 per century. Anything that saves that many lives has got to be socially beneficial.

Live Longer, Healthier and Better: The Untold Benefits of Becoming a Christian in the ancient world by Professor Rodney Stark. In Christianity Today, Issue 57, January 1, 1998.
Reconstructing the Rise of Christianity: the Role of Women by Professor Rodney Stark. In Sociology of Religion, Vol. 56, Fall 1995.

The above articles by Professor Stark describe how the Christian teaching of the spiritual equality of men and women, coupled with its prohibition of abortion and infanticide, improved the lot of women in the Roman Empire, and how Christians saved millions of Romans’ lives by caring for the sick during plagues. In the Roman Empire, the male head of the household could order any female living in his household to have an abortion. What’s more, a married woman who gave birth had no legal right to keep her child unless the male head of the household picked it up and set it down on the family hearth. Otherwise the child had to be placed outside in the street, where it would either die of exposure or be picked up by some unscrupulous rogue and sold into slavery. Girls were exposed far more often than boys: research has shown that the ratio of men to women in the Roman Empire was at least 120:100.

“So what’s your point?” I hear you ask. Here’s my point. Population of the Roman Empire: about 60 million people. Annual number of births (assuming say, 40 births per 1000 people per year): about 2.4 million, or 1.2 million boys and 1.2 million girls, of whom 200,000 were killed. Enter Christianity: up to 200,000 girls’ lives saved per year, or 20 million per century, or 200 million over a period of a millennium. Still think religion doesn’t matter?

90 Million Missing Females, and a $45 Trillion Gap: The Fruits of Misguided Family Planning. Zenit Daily Dispatch, 24 July 2004.
Examines the social consequences of female infanticide in China and India, and of declining fertility rates around the world.

Finally, Professor Coyne argues that the Bible illustrates the utter folly and futility of basing one’s morality upon belief in God:

And what about the “morality” of scripture? Clearly God once ordered all kinds of genocide and murder, including rape and (my favorite story) inducing a bear to murder forty-two youths for simply making fun of Elisha’s bald head (2 Kings 2:23-24).

But this objection is irrelevant to the key issue. Andrew Zak Williams’s article in the New Statesman, which Jerry Coyne is commenting on, asked public figures and scientists to explain why they believe in God, not why they believe in Judaism or Christianity. Many respondents nominated morality as a reason for believing in God. The issue we need to address is therefore whether morality requires God, in order to be rationally justifiable. Arguments based on allegedly immoral commands by God in Scripture are therefore beside the point. At most, they prove that the God of the Bible is not the true God. Such arguments leave classical theism – defined as the belief in a God who is transcendent, perfect, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent, immutable and incapable of being decomposed into parts – entirely intact. Logically speaking, one can accept classical theism without believing in any religion.

In any case, arguments based on allegedly immoral commands by God in Scripture are weak. The books of Scripture were written 2,000 to 3,000 years ago, in foreign tongues (mostly ancient Hebrew and Koine Greek), by people whose mindset and mental outlook was very different from our own. Using the story of Elisha and the bears, as Coyne does, to argue against revealed religion assumes that we know who the offenders were (Were they young men, teenagers or boys?), what their intentions were towards Elisha (Did they mean to harm him or merely to mock him?), what their offense was (Was it mockery, blasphemy, attempted assault or attempted murder?), and to what degree they were punished (Were they actually conscious and in pain while being mauled to pieces by the bears, or did God cause them to drop dead instantly of shock as soon as the bears appeared?) We can’t be certain of any of these things, for the story in question. There are too many unknowns.

Professor Coyne’s unfounded assertion that God orders rape in the Bible is also based on his own highly questionable interpretation of Scripture. The following articles may serve as a useful counter-balance: an article on the slaughter of the Midianites and another on Old Testament laws about rape and virginity by Christian apologist Glenn Miller; The Bible and Rape – A Response to Michael Martin by Matt and Madeleine Flanagan; and The Old Testament and Rape by Sam Shamoun.

In short: Professor Coyne appears to suffer from the naive delusion that there is such a thing as the “plain sense of Holy Scripture,” which an individual can discern for him/herself. The fact of the matter is that Scripture is never plain; it must be read in the context of the time and culture in which it was written, and the community to whom it was written.

I will conclude by asking Professor Coyne a question: how can he criticize scientists and public figures for grounding their morality in a belief in God, when his own brand of atheism offers no alternative, and even denies human freedom altogether?

Comments
Onlookers:
MF: Why are we suddenly getting the philosophy of Jurisprudence? Anyhow my answer is I believe the process should be based on popular opinion – or more precisely a government elected by popular vote. This process may produce specific laws which I think are wrong. And I will try to influence popular opinion to my way of thinking.
Without the foundation of the natural moral law instructed by principles of right reason an the inherent dignity of the human being, this boils down to the radically relativist tyranny of the 51% manipulated by the Plato's Cave shadow-show puppet masters. And as my ancestors can vouch, the tyranny of a majority can be awful for the minority. And of course MF has not warranted why he can so ground his own views that he would wish the majority to bend to them. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
April 28, 2011
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#52 What if your views are at odds with the views of most people? [the consensus] In that case, whose views should be codified into law, yours or theirs? Theirs - although I may believe the resulting law to be wrong I would not override the process. But where is this all going? I don't see its relevance.markf
April 28, 2011
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#51 I am simply asking you to identify your standard for establishing civil and criminal laws, assuming that you have ruled out lawlessness as an option. 1) Laws based on a tyrant’s whim 2) Laws based on popular opinion or consensus 3) Laws based on Mark’s personal preferences 4) The natural moral law Why are we suddenly getting the philosophy of Jurisprudence? Anyhow my answer is I believe the process should be based on popular opinion - or more precisely a government elected by popular vote. This process may produce specific laws which I think are wrong. And I will try to influence popular opinion to my way of thinking. But one should operate within the process.markf
April 28, 2011
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---"mark: "I want laws that accord to my views of what is right and I think those are the ones that should be codified." What if your views are at odds with the views of most people? [the consensus] In that case, whose views should be codified into law, yours or theirs?StephenB
April 28, 2011
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[Assuming that is the case, which of our views should be codified into law and why? Or, are you saying that no laws should be passed on any aspect of either issue?] ---markf: "I want laws that accord to my views of what is right and I think those are the ones that should be codified. No doubt you have the opposite opinion. In the interests of living together I would abide by laws I thought were wrong on this topic (although campaigning against them) because I think the rule of law is even more important. I feel like you are looking for something more – but I am not sure what it is." I am asking you to think through the process. Eventually a decision will be made on which of our views will be codified into law. On what basis should that decision be made. Earlier, you argued that it should be based on a general consensus informed by your personal preferences, which itself is an impossible combination. Now, you say that you believe in the rule of law, but the rule of law was designed to protect the minority from the consensus decisions arrived at by a majority, or, what has been characterized as a "tyranny the majority." In fact, the rule of law, which you now claim to embrace, is based on the concept of the natural moral law, which you have already disavowed. The point of the natural moral law is that it must be respected by everyone, majority, minority, and leaders--not just the majority. That is the only way each group can be protected by the other. I am simply asking you to identify your standard for establishing civil and criminal laws, assuming that you have ruled out lawlessness as an option. 1) Laws based on a tyrant's whim 2) Laws based on popular opinion or consensus 3) Laws based on Mark's personal preferences 4) The natural moral lawStephenB
April 28, 2011
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#40 vj vj #40
What I’m saying is that my nature doesn’t merely consist of “is-es”; it also includes irreducible “oughts.” Indeed, these are the most fundamental features of any organism’s nature: they define what it is to be a creature of that kind. A sheep is a quadruped: this statement tells us that it ought to have four legs, and if it doesn’t, there’s something wrong with it. A wolf is a carnivore: eating flesh is good for it. Human beings are social animals: it is not good for them to be alone.
In what sense is it wrong for a sheep to have less than or more than four legs?  A sheep ought to have four legs if it going to live long and reproduce.  But this is a factual statement not a value statement.  In what sense ought a sheep have four legs over and above this? If there were a mutant strain of sheep with six legs that thrived and reproduced on what basis would you say it ought to have four legs?markf
April 28, 2011
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vj #39   – a response to your comments 1-6 Clearly there is an important difference between the decision making of a normal adult and that of a mentally defective adult, child, or animal and we usually regard this difference as essential for moral responsibility. ( I only point to the examples of animals etc to show that the beginnings of moral behaviour are to be found there.)  However, I don’t think this difference corresponds to the difference between subfree will and your subfree will plus (in fact I don’t know what the “plus” is).  To me the essential characteristics of moral responsibility include: * Appreciates what it is to be right or wrong (this does not entail an objective basis for their knowledge – as discussed elsewhere) * Can imagine what it is like to be another sentient being * Can plan ahead All of these things are compatible with subfree will. Yes humans can train themselves to resist certain short-term selfish desires.  But this is simply putting longer term and/or unselfish desires above short selfish ones.  The captive who does not give away their colleagues under torture is doing so because he doesn’t want to give them away and this desire is stronger than the desire for the pain to stop.  Someone with subfree will can do this.
1. I know that the psychopath has the same nature as I do – human nature. If it is not good for me and the other human beings I know to inflict suffering on others, then how can it be good for the psychopath?
How do you know? In fact what do you mean?  They are the same species.  But if you are assuming some kind of human essence then you are assuming the very thing we are discussing.markf
April 28, 2011
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Onlookers: Plato, The laws, Bk X, 2,350 years ago in the aftermath of Alcibiades and co, excerpted and annotated: ___________ >> [[The avant garde philosophers, teachers and artists c. 400 BC] say that the greatest and fairest things are the work of nature and of chance, the lesser of art [[ i.e. techne], which, receiving from nature the greater and primeval creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are generally termed artificial . . . They say that fire and water, and earth and air [[i.e the classical "material" elements of the cosmos], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in order-earth, and sun, and moon, and stars-they have been created by means of these absolutely inanimate existences. The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them-of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures of opposites which have been formed by necessity. After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only . . . . [[T]hese people would say that the Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- [[Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT. (Cf. here for Locke's views and sources on a very different base for grounding liberty as opposed to license and resulting anarchistic "every man does what is right in his own eyes" chaos leading to tyranny.)] These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might [[ Evolutionary materialism leads to the promotion of amorality], and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [[Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality "naturally" leads to continual contentions and power struggles; cf. dramatisation here], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others [[such amoral factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless tyranny; here, too, Plato hints at the career of Alcibiades], and not in legal subjection to them . . . >> ___________ Will Hawthorne, blogging at Atheism is Dead a few years ago: ____________ >> Assume (per impossibile) that atheistic naturalism [[= evolutionary materialism] is true. Assume, furthermore, that one can't infer an 'ought' from an 'is' [[the 'is' being in this context physicalist: matter-energy, space- time, chance and mechanical forces]. (Richard Dawkins and many other atheists should grant both of these assumptions.) Given our second assumption, there is no description of anything in the natural world from which we can infer an 'ought'. And given our first assumption, there is nothing that exists over and above the natural world; the natural world is all that there is. It follows logically that, for any action you care to pick, there's no description of anything in the natural world from which we can infer that one ought to refrain from performing that action. Add a further uncontroversial assumption: an action is permissible if and only if it's not the case that one ought to refrain from performing that action . . . [[We see] therefore, for any action you care to pick, it's permissible to perform that action. If you'd like, you can take this as the meat behind the slogan 'if atheism is true, all things are permitted'. For example if atheism is true, every action Hitler performed was permissible. Many atheists don't like this consequence of their worldview. But they cannot escape it and insist that they are being logical at the same time. Now, we all know that at least some actions are really not permissible (for example, racist actions). Since the conclusion of the argument denies this, there must be a problem somewhere in the argument. Could the argument be invalid? No. The argument has not violated a single rule of logic and all inferences were made explicit. Thus we are forced to deny the truth of one of the assumptions we started out with. That means we either deny atheistic naturalism or (the more intuitively appealing) principle that one can't infer 'ought' from [[a material] 'is'. >> _____________ That should give us a sobering context to evaluate the import of the exchange in this thread. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
April 28, 2011
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It was my understanding from your earlier comment that your concern is whether or not your moral philosophy is true. Are you now saying that there is no such thing as a true moral philosophy to concern yourself with?
A  moral philosophy is not the same as a moral code.  In my opinion there is no such thing as an objective universal moral code, that is my moral philosophy and I firmly believe it to be true.
Does it matter which things are considered to be permissible or not permissible? If so, what criteria should we use to make that determination?
Yes it matters.   Subjective does not mean trivial. People care deeply about moral issues even though there is no ultimate objective basis for it.  The criteria they use range widely – but luckily most people share most of the criteria so there is a basis for discussion.  Common criteria include: lengthening human life spans, increasing happiness and decreasing suffering, allocating resources fairly, keeping commitments, loyalty to others. 
On what basis does one decide whether or not a law is just or unjust?
See above for common criteria.
Assuming that is the case, which of our views should be codified into law and why? Or, are you saying that no laws should be passed on any aspect of either issue?
I want laws that accord to my views of what is right and I think those are the ones that should be codified.  No doubt you have the opposite opinion. In the interests of living together I would abide by laws I thought were wrong on this topic (although campaigning against them) because I think the rule of law is even more important.  I feel like you are looking for something more – but I am not sure what it is.markf
April 28, 2011
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---markf: "I don’t like my answer above." OK. ---"My concern is whether my philosophy is true not whether it is practical." Good. I like that response. Is there such a thing as a true moral philosophy? ---"However, you are right that practical decisions have to be made about what is permissible and what is not. And theoretically it might be easier to ignore the truth and pretend there is some universal moral code." It was my understanding from your earlier comment that your concern is whether or not your moral philosophy is true. Are you now saying that there is no such thing as a true moral philosophy to concern yourself with? ---"However, history suggests that it is extremely hard to get societies to agree on what is permissible, even when they theoretically share a moral code, and that it is getting more and more difficult." Does it matter which things are considered to be permissible or not permissible? If so, what criteria should we use to make that determination? --"I think it is just as practical to recognise that there are some moral issues on which there is substantial disagreement and no absolute right or wrong." On what basis does one decide whether or not a law is just or unjust? ---"For example, I am sure I do not share your views on abortion or homosexuality." Assuming that is the case, which of our views should be codified into law and why? Or, are you saying that no laws should be passed on any aspect of either issue?StephenB
April 28, 2011
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---markf: "I have no doubt we differ on our views on abortion. It is one issue on which I find people have fervently held opinions which are just opinions." What is your view on the subject. Is abortion a morally good act, a morally bad act, or a morally neutral act? ---"If you consider it to be almost equivalent to killing a baby I have no substantial evidence to fall back on to change your opinion. But likewise you have no substantial evidence to fall back on to prove your case (given that I am atheist)." What is my case, what evidence do you think I have to support it, and why do you think it fails to convince? ---markf: "That is what makes it such a hot issue. Because neither of us are happy with the other’s conclusion, but neither can prove the other wrong." How can I be happy or unhappy with a conclusion that you have not disclosed or the rationale behind it?StephenB
April 27, 2011
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#42 Stephenb I don't like my answer above. It was written in a rush. Here is a better attempt. My concern is whether my philosophy is true not whether it is practical. However, you are right that practical decisions have to be made about what is permissible and what is not. And theoretically it might be easier to ignore the truth and pretend there is some universal moral code. However, history suggests that it is extremely hard to get societies to agree on what is permissible, even when they theoretically share a moral code, and that it is getting more and more difficult. I think it is just as practical to recognise that there are some moral issues on which there is substantial disagreement and no absolute right or wrong. For example, I am sure I do not share your views on abortion or homosexuality. But I also recognise we have way of proving each other wrong. If we were in the same society I would campaign vigorously to change your mind but if the majority was of your view and it became law then I would reluctantly accept it (and continue to campaign). That seems quite practical and actually conforms to how we behave in democracies.markf
April 27, 2011
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#42 Not all personal behaviour is based on a moral code. Few people look up in a book of rules as to whether something is right or wrong - you may be an exception. One reason (among many) for having law (do you mean civil or criminal?) is because there is not universal agreement on what is right or wrong and society needs to arbitrate. There are many cases of laws that many people think are immoral and others do not. Is abortion a morally good practice, a morally bad practice, or a morally neutral practice? I have no doubt we differ on our views on abortion. It is one issue on which I find people have fervently held opinions which are just opinions. If you consider it to be almost equivalent to killing a baby I have no substantial evidence to fall back on to change your opinion. But likewise you have no substantial evidence to fall back on to prove your case (given that I am atheist). That is what makes it such a hot issue. Because neither of us are happy with the other's conclusion, but neither can prove the other wrong. You may counter by defining "good" as "confirming to nature" or some such thing. I will say I don't accept that definition. But we are clearly disagreeing on more than definitions. Or why would we care?markf
April 27, 2011
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[On the standards for morality] ---markf: "I should have been a bit more explicit. It is easiest to explain it with the analogy of “funny”. If I say a play is funny I don’t mean that majority of audiences laugh at it at the moment or indeed that the majority of audiences laughed at it in the past. Indeed you can imagine coming out of a performance and saying “that was really funny but the audience didn’t seem to get it”. But I do mean that I believe that the majority of people will laugh at it if they see it as I see it and this will supersede their previous view. Funny is one of a large number of many words that bridge the gap between subjective and objective – others are interesting, frightening, exciting etc. They are subjective in they express a personal reaction but they also have an objective element in they express a believe that the object has the potential to produce the same reaction in the majority of other people (although it may not do so at the moment). Indeed without this belief we would not be justified in describing the object as frightening, exciting or whatever. We would have to qualify our description as something like “I found it exciting but I am not sure others would”. Can you apply your philosophy in any meaningful way? Both civil law and personal behavior are based on someone's moral philosophy, which means that practical decisions have to be made about what is permissible and what is not. Is abortion a morally good practice, a morally bad practice, or a morally neutral practice? Is racism a morally good practice, a morally bad practice, or a morally neutral practice? Are current laws on abortion and racism just or unjust? Why?StephenB
April 27, 2011
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Markf (#38) I thought you made a number of good points about the objectivity of moral judgments in your latest post. I don't disagree with them; I would just say they don't go far enough. To resolve differences about whether something is a human being, for instance, we need to do some metaphysics - which means going "back to nature."vjtorley
April 27, 2011
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Markf I'd like to return to an earlier remark of yours:
[T]o put it simply – you can’t derive an “ought” from an “is” – even when the “is” is “part of my human nature”.
What I'm saying is that my nature doesn't merely consist of "is-es"; it also includes irreducible "oughts." Indeed, these are the most fundamental features of any organism's nature: they define what it is to be a creature of that kind. A sheep is a quadruped: this statement tells us that it ought to have four legs, and if it doesn't, there's something wrong with it. A wolf is a carnivore: eating flesh is good for it. Human beings are social animals: it is not good for them to be alone. I'd also like to comment on StephenB's assertion that a thing is good if it does what it's designed to do. This kind of finality is extrinsic, rather than immanent. Now, there is nothing to prevent a living creature from possessing both kinds of finality: an organism can be designed by God, and have a good of its own. However, I would still say that its proper good is intelligible, even to someone who does not believe in God. I would add, however, that God is the only answer to the meta-question: why should I pursue (or at least, respect) the built-in ends which define me, as a human being? God, of course, was not designed to do anything. Yet there is a very real sense in which God is good. God's nature is to know and love Himself perfectly, but because He is generous, He also makes finite beings, willing different ends for various kinds of creatures. Of course, some individual creatures may fail to reach these ends, but this failure only reflects God's will to the extent that it contributes to the good of the cosmos as a whole. Thus I would not say that God can do whatever He likes, vis-a-vis creatures. He is constrained by His own nature, for He cannot fail to be good.vjtorley
April 27, 2011
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Markf Thank you for your posts. I've got a bit of free time now, so I'll try to address your points. Let's begin with free will. You write:
Let us define something called subfree will which corresponds to my feelings about free will. Very roughly subfree will is the ability to act according to desires and motives. Subfree is compatible with determinism. The motives and desires which are the internal state of the organism plus the environment determine how it will act. One can even imagine a robot programmed to have subfree will. Now I would argue that subfree will is compatible with morality. So the presence or otherwise of true free will, whatever that means, is irrelevant to presence of morality.... [S]uppose laptops were programmed to react to anger. They were programmed to change things like update patterns according to praise and blame. Now it would make perfectly good sense to be angry with it. I wonder what you mean by “natural"? If my dog steals from the table then it certainly could have done otherwise. A dog has subfree will and even a limited moral sense. Like us dogs know rules, often want to obey them, sometimes fall for rival desires and motives, and may feel subsequent guilt. Clearly this is very limited. They are not able to imagine what it is like to be another creature – which is what gives us the basis for being indignant – “how could he be so thoughtless!”. But the ability to imagine what it is like to be someone else only requires subfree will. It does not require some other mysterious kind of free will.
A few comments. 1. I can understand your definition of subfree will, when applied to organisms. Organisms can be meaningfully credited with desires and motives. Artifacts such as robots and laptop PCs have no built-in ends; they lack a "good of their own." So I don't know what it would mean to credit them with desires and motives. 2. If laptops were programmed to learn from their users' anger, then it would certainly make sense to get angry when a laptop did not perform in the way you wanted it to. But getting angry when a laptop makes an error is one thing; getting angry at the laptop for making an error is a completely different language game, which presupposes an "I-thou" relationship between me and my PC - which, I would suggest, is inappropriate. 3. The dog represents a case where the language game can be played, to a point: it acts on its desires and motives, and is capable of learning rules. In these respects, it resembles human beings. However, a dog has no notion of "ought." All it knows is "will." It knows that if it takes the meat on the table, it will suffer adverse consequences; but the smell of the meat may be an overpowering one, which over-rides its normal tendency to behave as its master trained it to do. In such a situation, a wise master, knowing what causal factors govern the dog's behavior, may display anger, in order to deter the dog from similar acts in the future; but he/she would be silly to actually get angry at the dog. When the dog took the meat from the table, there is a very real sense in which it could not have done otherwise; its desires were just too strong for it. 4. Could people be like that, all the time? Some people are; but we don't try these people in a court of law. Such people are deemed incapable of distinguishing right from wrong - which is quite different from distinguishing pleasant from adverse consequences. 5. Metaphysics aside, to say that everyone is the (willing) slave of their desires (and hence only subfree) seems to be empirically false. There doesn't seem to be any desire that humans cannot train themselves to conquer - although some are much better at doing so than others, of course. Fears are not as easily manageable; but even here, some are capable of extraordinary feats of bravery, even under torture. 6. On top of this, we are capable of reflecting on the propriety of having the desires we do, and attempting to change them. (A glutton may attempt to discipline himself.) A dog lacks these higher-order desires. That is one reason why it is not free. Now let's get back to the meaning of "natural." You cite the case of the psychopath who feels fulfilled by making other people suffer. Two comments are appropriate here. 1. I know that the psychopath has the same nature as I do - human nature. If it is not good for me and the other human beings I know to inflict suffering on others, then how can it be good for the psychopath? 2. Even if the psychopath were from Mars, I'd still be certain that his desire was a perverted one. I could understand it if his natural inclination were merely to kill and eat me. The flesh of an organism certainly is the sort of thing that can benefit another organism: ask any carnivore. But there is no meaningful sense in which the suffering of organism A can be said to be good for organism B, per se. Hence I am sure that a Martian sadist would be acting according to an unnatural desire. A Martian cannibal would be another matter; but a believer in a personal God would not expect God to make a universe like that, where one race of intelligent beings had the built-in inclination to cannibalize another.vjtorley
April 27, 2011
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But the majority opinion can change. Racism in the United States, which was once supported by the majority, is now supported only by a small minority. Which majority opinion do you agree with—the first or the second. What is your rationale for rejecting the other option?
I should have been a bit more explicit.  It is easiest to explain it with the analogy of “funny”. If I say a play is funny I don’t mean that majority of audiences laugh at it at the moment or indeed that the majority of audiences laughed at it in the past.  Indeed you can imagine coming out of a performance and saying “that was really funny but the audience didn’t seem to get it”. But I do mean that I believe that the majority of people will laugh at it if they see it as I see it and this will supersede their previous view.    Funny is one of a large number of many words that bridge the gap between subjective and objective – others are interesting, frightening, exciting etc.  They are subjective in they express a personal reaction but they also have an objective element in they express a believe that the object has the potential to produce the same reaction in the majority of other people (although it may not do so at the moment).  Indeed without this belief we would not be justified in describing the object as frightening, exciting or whatever.  We would have to qualify our description as something like “I found it exciting but I am not sure others would”.   Ethical judgements are like these but have an additional element. Not only are we expressing our reaction and our belief others will have the same reaction – but that reaction includes a strong desire that others will treat the object/action in the same way.  If I think something is funny it is not of prime importance that others think it funny, although I believe they will.  If I think something is ethically wrong it is of prime importance that others share the same view.  I want this activity stopped.   I have tried to explain this a bit more fully here.  
—“Actually it is frequently people with strong beliefs that they know what is objectively right who do the worst things.” How do you know these are the morally “worst” things when you do not acknowledge that there are morally “better” things?
When I say they are the worst things I am expressing my belief as above.   Whatever our definition of right and wrong, in practice both condemn mass murder and the fact remains that mass murder is mostly done by people with either strong moral opinions or who are very frightened – not by those without strong moral codes.
That raises the obvious question: What about those, like these environmentalists, who disagree with you and would like to persuade you to their position? Is their sense of the good on par with yours? If not, why not? If so, whose morality should we accept if you end up disagreeing with them?
If there is an ethical dispute then both parties must mean the same thing by right and wrong  (otherwise it would be a dispute about semantics to be settled by defining terms).    The parties will may differ about facts.  This can in theory be settled by empirical  investigation. There may also be differences of values (because people share a lot of values but by no means all) – e.g. some people value freedom higher than life. It is possible that we may have a dispute e.g. over abortion where we can only say “X thinks it is murder” and “Y thinks it is not murder”.  At this point there is no obvious way of deciding who is “correct”.  But it doesn’t either party is happy to sit back and accept it as a difference of opinion.  That is what is distinctive about moral issues.  There may not be an objective way of settling it but I will still look for that additional fact or comparison or perspective that will bring you round to my way of thinking.  
It always reduces to one of two alternatives: Either we conform our behavior to THE moral code, which is my position, or we find A moral code that conforms to our behavior, which is your position.
But there are many moral codes to choose from!  Utilitarianism was just one.
Psychologists have known for years that helping other people increases happiness. For some, it is the first line of therapy.
Let’s hope they are right – otherwise you have no reason for doing what is good. If it turns out they are wrong what will you get up to?markf
April 26, 2011
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As for the story of Elisha and the "youffs" ... I think they weren't really mocking his lack of hair, but his lack of foreskin. That is, they were mocking the state of being one of the Covenant ... which is to say, they were mocking God himself.Ilion
April 26, 2011
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"... At most, they prove that the God of the Bible is not the true God. Such arguments leave classical theism – defined as the belief in a God who is transcendent, perfect, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent, immutable and incapable of being decomposed into parts – entirely intact. Logically speaking, one can accept classical theism without believing in any religion." So, just as I had long believed, this so-called "classical theism" *isn't* Christianity.Ilion
April 26, 2011
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---markf: “If others express their approv[al] of something by saying it is good then the chances are I will also approve of it.” What happens when the vote is split? Is abortion a good thing or a bad thing? ---“I am not just describing my reaction. I am also expressing my belief that others will have the same reaction. If others say a play is funny that is a reason for me to believe I may also find it funny.” But the majority opinion can change. Racism in the United States, which was once supported by the majority, is now supported only by a small minority. Which majority opinion do you agree with—the first or the second. What is your rationale for rejecting the other option? ---“Not so clear to me I am afraid At one moment you say something is good if it fufils the purpose for which it is designed. But then you say “it can remain good only if its designer is using it for a good purpose”. But what if it were designed for a bad purpose? I am not talking about using a toaster as torturing device. I am talking about using a rack as torturing device.” Good does not necessary mean morally good because the latter applies only to people, not things, which are, in themselves, morally neutral. Only intelligent agents can be morally good or morally bad because only intelligent agents have wills. A good person is one that uses his intellect and will in ways that the creator planned and intended, that is, in conformity with his nature [ten commandments, beatitudes, sermon on the mount, natural moral law etc]. However, I agree with your point that a “thing” or device cannot be inherently good and then be made bad. So, I should not have said that it can “remain” good as long as it is being used properly. It is always good “for” something, even if it be for something perverse, and even if its user is using it immorally. ---“Actually it is frequently people with strong beliefs that they know what is objectively right who do the worst things.” How do you know these are the morally “worst” things when you do not acknowledge that there are morally “better” things? ---“I can say that I passionately disapprove it and that I believe that virtually anyone else would agree.” Part of your premise is that everyone, or almost everyone, will agree with you. Yet there are plenty of people who think that the wholesale execution of “unnecessary” people is a good thing. Many environmentalists seek to reduce the population by 90%. That raises the obvious question: What about those, like these environmentalists, who disagree with you and would like to persuade you to their position? Is their sense of the good on par with yours? If not, why not? If so, whose morality should we accept if you end up disagreeing with them? --“But you have the same problem. I can say “why is it good to behave as the God designed you?”. And you can only get out of it by saying that it what you mean by good. Likewise a utilitarian can say that what they mean by “good” is greatest happiness for the greatest number.” It always reduces to one of two alternatives: Either we conform our behavior to THE moral code, which is my position, or we find A moral code that conforms to our behavior, which is your position. In any case, Utilitarianism is not based on happiness. It is based on the pleasure/pain principle, which is not at all the same thing. According to utilitarianism, if ten-thousand people in a Roman Colosseum experience pleasure as they watch the pain of ten Christians being eaten by lions, and if the sum total of their pleasure surpasses the sum total of pain experienced by the Christians, they have had a morally edifying day. Also, you may be assured that the majority of Roman citizens present at that site had personally approved of the morality of murder for fun and had arrived at a consensus on the matter. They based their morality on the same standard as yours--personal preference and solidarity wherever you can find it. ---“Nevertheless, it is a matter of empirical investigation as to whether helping others does lead to your own happiness.” Psychologists have known for years that helping other people increases happiness. For some, it is the first line of therapy. ---“Or suppose someone mistakenly believes that helping others will not increase their happiness now or in any future life e.g. an atheist who sacrifices her life for another person. Is this an irrational act because they didn’t act to promote their self-interest?” I can see how they might think so, but then, operating from the wrong assumption can cause all manner of difficulties. That is why it is important to know the truth.StephenB
April 26, 2011
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Wouldn't it be strange to find that we live in a a universe which allows freedom of choice only to discover that we don't actually have freedom of choice?Mung
April 26, 2011
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Onlookers: Observe how Euthryphro has silently slipped away; without acknowledgement that it was overturned. And, how the inescapable amorality of materialistic atheism drives the questions and talking points being posed. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
April 26, 2011
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stephenb: So, for you, “good” is that which you approve of, but the things that others approve of are irrelevant?
Not irrelevant. If others express their approve of something by saying it is good then the chances are I will also approve of it.  Compare it to a word like “funny”. If I say a play is funny  I am not just describing my reaction.  I am also expressing my belief that others will have the same reaction.  If others say a play is funny that is a reason for me to believe I may also find it funny.   
Any good thing can be used for an evil purpose, and it can remain good only if its designer is using it for a good purpose. Returning to my examples of a good toaster and a good coffee maker, a bad person could use either as a torturing device. A good thing that is not being used properly becomes a bad thing, as my previous examples make clear.
Not so clear to me I am afraid At one moment you say something is good if it fufils the purpose for which it is designed.  But then you say “it can remain good only if its designer is using it for a good purpose”.  But what if it were designed for a bad purpose?  I am not talking about using a toaster as torturing device.  I am talking about using a rack as torturing device. 
On the other hand, some men, who believed as you do, i.e. men who think that good is whatever they approve of, used gas chambers on helpless people.
Actually it is frequently people with strong beliefs that they know what is objectively right who do the worst things. (The other great motivator to do horrific things is fear). They may base these beliefs on religion or national socialism or communism – but what they have in common is an unshakeable belief that they know what is right and it is not a matter of opinion. Those who think it is a matter of opinion may be dithering, lax, and perhaps more inclined to be selfish. But this does not lead to mass murder. There is little personal gain in instigating mass murder or genocide. That takes a much stronger passion – such as a firm conviction that God is on your side, or that the class war justifies everything, or that the other guys are going to murder you in your bed.
Unfortunately, your ethical perspective does not allow you to say that what they did was objectively, absolutely, and universally wrong. You can only say that you do not approve of it, and even then, you cannot say why?
I can say that I passionately disapprove it and that I believe that virtually anyone else would agree.  This is not a trivial claim. And I can say why – it inflicts tremendous suffering and is grossly unfair. Of course you can continue to ask “why"?”.  You can say why is it wrong to inflict tremendous suffering? But you have the same problem.  I can say “why is it good to behave as the God designed you?”. And you can only get out of it by saying that it what you mean by good. Likewise a utilitarian can say that what they mean by “good” is greatest happiness for the greatest number.   The interesting question is why when the debate gets to this point  there still a disagreement.  Having established different definitions of “good” you would think the rest was a matter of semantics to be solved with a good dictionary or by making up two new words – one to mean “fit for purpose” and another to mean “minimises suffering”.  But we don’t feel satisfied because in fact morally  “good” doesn’t just mean “fit for purpose” or “minimises suffering”.  It implies something about your attitude to the object.  A desire to promote it. 
Self interest is not the same as selfishness. To love one’s neighbor as one’s self is a virtue, a good thing. That is self interest. To love one’s self more than one’s neighbor is a vice, a bad thing. That is selfishness.
Self interest considers the neighbor’s happiness as being of equal value to one’s own happiness, which, as it turns out, produces happiness; Selfishness considers only its own happiness, which ultimately brings misery.
Call it self-interest if you like.  Nevertheless, it is a matter of empirical investigation as to whether helping others does lead to your own happiness.  It may that we observe that for some people under some conditions this is not true.  Would such people have any reason for being good?  Or suppose someone mistakenly believes that helping others will not increase their happiness now or in any future life e.g. an atheist who sacrifices her life for another person. Is this an irrational act because they didn’t act to promote their self-interest?markf
April 26, 2011
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[Define good] ---markf: "good "(ethical use) – when I say something is good I express my approval of it and my belief that I could bring others to approve of it. This approval may arise for a wide variety of reasons (e.g. utilitarian, sense of fairness)" So, for you, "good" is that which you approve of, but the things that others approve of are irrelevant? ---"Gas chambers are a good way of killing large numbers of people but ethically bad." Any good thing can be used for an evil purpose, and it can remain good only if its designer is using it for a good purpose. Returning to my examples of a good toaster and a good coffee maker, a bad person could use either as a torturing device. A good thing that is not being used properly becomes a bad thing, as my previous examples make clear. A good person is one who practices virtue consistent with the purpose of his nature, which means that he will not use gas chambers, whether they are efficient or inefficient ways of serving some perverse end. On the other hand, some men, who believed as you do, i.e. men who think that good is whatever they approve of, used gas chambers on helpless people. Unfortunately, your ethical perspective does not allow you to say that what they did was objectively, absolutely, and universally wrong. You can only say that you do not approve of it, and even then, you cannot say why? ---"You seem to only recognise the one use of the word. Given your use the the corollary applies." I acknowledge multiple uses of the word, but I recognize only one formal definition. Such is the requirement for a rational discussion. [Practicing virtue for the sake of happiness] ---"This seems like selfishness to me – be good because it brings me happiness." Self interest is not the same as selfishness. To love one's neighbor as one's self is a virtue, a good thing. That is self interest. To love one's self more than one's neighbor is a vice, a bad thing. That is selfishness. Self interest considers the neighbor's happiness as being of equal value to one's own happiness, which, as it turns out, produces happiness; Selfishness considers only its own happiness, which ultimately brings misery.StephenB
April 26, 2011
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Stephenb
—markf: “I happen to believe that it is good for people to help others…” -stephenb Define “help.” Define “good.”
help – to increase the happiness or relieve the suffering of others good (ethical use) – when I say something is good I express my approval of it and my belief that I could bring others to approve of it.  This approval may arise for a wide variety of reasons (e.g. utilitarian, sense of fairness)
- markf —”Are we using the word “good” to mean the same thing?” - Stephenb Apparenly not. I defined “good,” you did not, and yet you disagree with my definition.
Then we don’t disagree about anything of substance – just semantics.  I am a bit surprised by your definition. Like most English speaking people, I sometimes use “good” to mean “fit for purpose” but this is different from the ethical use.  Gas chambers are a good way of killing large numbers of people but ethically bad. You seem to only recognise the one use of the word.  Given your use the  the corollary applies.
—markf: —”Corollary – if good means to act as designed then what reason is there to do good i.e. act as designed.” -stephenb: It is more likely to produce temporal [not to mention eternal] happiness for yourself and others.
This seems like selfishness to me – be good because it brings me happiness.  But also this is a contingent statement subject to empirical enquiry.  Suppose it turns out not to be true under certain circumstances?  Then there is no longer any reason to be good?. markf
April 25, 2011
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---markf: "I happen to believe that it is good for people to help others..." Define "help." Define "good." ---"Are we using the word “good” to mean the same thing?" Apparenly not. I defined "good," you did not, and yet you disagree with my definition. ---"Corollary – if good means to act as designed then what reason is there to do good i.e. act as designed." It is more likely to produce temporal [not to mention eternal] happiness for yourself and others. ---What if I happen to prefer act not as designed? So what?" Back to my examples @25 (Here abbreviated): Toaster, which is made for one thing, tries to become a Coffee Maker, which is made for something else = destruction Man, who is made for one thing allows himself to become something that he is not [an animal] or tries to make himself something he is not [his own God] = destruction.StephenB
April 25, 2011
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Mark @ 26, No. Your "sub-free will" misses the point that there still is a "right and wrong" answer or decision to be made even if the situation is indeed limited by sufficient and or necessary constraints. So, the point is that there must be a fundamental natural moral order that could only have originated from the mind of a moral designer. In other words, just because you "limit" free will to within a certain context, that does not remove free will altogether. You just have a more specific context in which free will is being exercised and investigated.Frost122585
April 25, 2011
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I happen to believe that it is good for people to help others even though I don’t believe people are designed. Are we using the word “good” to mean the same thing? Probably not. You're probably not even using the word "help" the same. If no, why do we feel we are disagreeing when we are talking about different things. Probably because for people who believe all talk of "good" or "help" comes down to subjective preferences which in turn have no basis, words like "good" and "help" are not only largely devoid of meaning, but parasitically deceptive in the process. What if I happen to prefer act not as designed? So what? What if your computer, instead of turning on when you press the on button, sputters and does nothing? Is it broken?nullasalus
April 25, 2011
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StephenB I happen to believe that it is good for people to help others even though I don't believe people are designed. Are we using the word "good" to mean the same thing? a) If yes, then clearly to be good doesn't mean to act as designed because I am applying to something which I don't believe is designed. b) If no, why do we feel we are disagreeing when we are talking about different things. Corollary - if good means to act as designed then what reason is there to do good i.e. act as designed. What if I happen to prefer act not as designed? So what?markf
April 25, 2011
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