Is the Galton Board evidence for intelligent design of the universe?

_{Denyse O'Leary

January 16, 2023

Intelligent Design, Physics}

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Ken Francis writes: “Proof that God placed order out of chaos in the universe. Each ball has a 50-50 chance of bouncing right or left off of each peg as it traverses the board, but every time the result is a bell curve. More proof of Intelligent Design.”

The comments are interesting.

Hat tip: Ken Francis, co-author with Theodore Dalrymple of The Terror of Existence: From Ecclesiastes to Theatre of the Absurd

Comments

VL, PM1, I think you will agree that a self contradiction in a logical system that cannot be eliminated is a fatal flaw. Indeed, proof by self contradiction of an alternative assertion is a commonplace of argument, not least in Mathematics. Notice, too, the fate of Set Theory 1.0, often illustrated by the Barber paradox, which led to modern set theory, e.g. ZFC. When it comes to worldviews and ideologies, a major source of difficulties is that our claims strongly tend to be self-referential. That means due care is needed to avert inescapable self referential incoherence, which is a clear case of contradiction, thence falsification. That was the fate, for example of the verifiability thesis of logical positivism a bit over a half century ago. Similarly, atheists and the like used to run riot with accusations that theism was self contradictory over the problem of evil, and were decisively checked by Plantinga. So, I think some rethinking is in order. KF PS, I took a little time to look at what I could see from Slagle. I find some rather familiar concerns that I think, for cause and on bitter experience of my homeland, are of relevance:
[Skyhook, Ch 1:] . . . [I will inter alia address the argument that] two common philosophical positions are self-referentially incoherent: that is, by believing, arguing for, asserting, or just considering these positions as possibilities, one acquires a reason to withhold belief in them, a reason that can neither be rebutted nor counter- acted by other considerations. These two positions are purportedly reached via rational thought but render rational thought impossible, and therefore they are ultimately self-defeating. The two positions are determinism and naturalism . . . . The most basic form of the argument is used against those who try to explain away beliefs or arguments—particularly those with which they disagree—as motivated by some force(s) other than rationality. Freudianism and Marx- ism, at least in their more naïve expressions, are common targets. Freudians believe (allegedly) that all beliefs are the products of nonrational psycho- logical dysfunctions, or at least functions that do not reliably produce true beliefs. 1 And Marx himself wrote of his critics, “Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are determined by the economical conditions of existence of your class.” 2 Thus, his critics’ beliefs are brought about by social conditioning and their economic position in society and, as such, can be dismissed. 3 The obvious response to such claims is to apply it to the Freudian and the Marxist themselves, not to mention Freud and Marx: if all beliefs are the product of nonrational forces, and thus nonveracious in some way, then belief in Freudianism and Marxism is similarly produced and so just as nonveracious as any other. If all reasoning is hopelessly tainted, then the Freudian and the Marxist arrive at their doctrines by tainted processes too, and if this condition allows their critics to be discounted, as Marx seems to suggest, it allows Freudianism and Marxism to be discounted by the same token. More broadly, if all beliefs are produced by nonrational forces and are thus nonveracious, then the belief that “all beliefs are produced by non- rational forces and are thus nonveracious” is itself produced by nonrational forces and is thus nonveracious. This belief, and any position that leads to it, is therefore self-defeating: if it is true, we no longer have any reason for believing it to be true. It is hoist with its own petard. To put this another way, those who claim that all beliefs, acts of reason- ing, etc., are nonveracious are positing a closed circle in which no beliefs are produced by the proper methods by which beliefs can be said to be veracious or rational. Yet at the same time, they are arrogating to them- selves a position outside of this circle by which they can judge the beliefs of others, a move they deny to their opponents. Since the raison d’être of their thesis is that there is no outside of the circle, they do not have the epistemic right to assume a position independent of it, and so their beliefs about the nonveracity of beliefs or reasoning are just as nonveracious as those they criticize. If all of the beliefs inside the circle are suspect, we cannot judge between truth and falsity, since any such judgment would be just as suspect as what it seeks to adjudicate.
Now these are opening remarks for a book that will doubtless explore details, but they have a point. And the point extends to many other cases. Perhaps the best example is the way the story of six blind men and an elephant is often used by relativists to discredit objectivity, while implicitly the narrator implies his or her own objectivity. The real solution is to be aware of the issues, recognise that when worldview influenced issues are on the table, self referentiality is almost inescapable, and seek to avoid self referential incoherence. Easier said than done.kairosfocus_{January 24, 2023
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PM1@
Slagle is so deeply unsympathetic to naturalism that I would guess he would really struggle to understand why anyone would be a naturalist at all.
If you are right, then Slagle has been less than forthcoming. In the preface you have just read, he writes about his skyhook against determinism and naturalism:
Slagle: Indeed, in many ways, my philosophical pilgrimage has been my attempt to refute this argument. I have failed. Here I make the case that the argument, at least in some of its guises, is successful.

There’s something about how naturalists conceptualize their own cognitive and epistemic activity that he seems to struggle to comprehend.
You’ve just finished the first chapter you say?
And this is not necessarily his fault — I think very few naturalists have really put in the time to explain, to people basically unsympathetic to naturalism, why naturalism might even seem to be a reasonably attractive position.
Well, as I see it, naturalism has been completely debunked. Darwinian evolution fails spectacularly in explaining FSCO/I. Emergentism also offers no adequate mechanism. End of story. And even if we allow things to go further down the road, a few simple questions like the ones in posts #165 and #176 , make clear that emergentism is not a coherent concept. And then there are several arguments that on their own have the ability to defeat naturalism. Slagle’s skyhook is just one of many arguments. And then there are paranormal events, experienced by millions. Personally, I have witnessed a totally convincing communication with a human spirit. “A reasonably attractive position”, you say. The idea that we are just accidental beings and that never-ending death awaits us all has no attraction to me.Origenes_{January 24, 2023
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Tangent, sadly, for cause I have low expectations of TSZ. The clip from me is a matter of massively supported history, many have greatly profited from their evil and have died in comfort, as they have been powerful. That is, shielded from adverse consequences. Start, with the C17 invention of the slave labour based sugar plantation in the Caribbean, which was seen as in effect a licence to mint money, it was so lucrative. Generations lived and died on the fruit of the associated oppression and it took a huge effort to get reformation. On the specific matter of falsity, many have profited from and many continue to profit from deceit, while being shielded from the consequences of such evil by their power bases. Some would point to the marketing/advertising and public relations industry as case no 1, with much of what goes on in politics, government and courts running neck and neck behind. A fair amount of what happens in finance is troublingly close to deceit, fraud and profiting from same; where, I am by no means convinced that the repeated scandals such as the current one over the theft of $ 12 million from Usain Bolt's retirement fund, reportedly leaving just $12,000, come close to being a deterrent. Coming up behind are those who are part of the corruption of education systems. It may be that many (especially those who don't hold enough power and are not shielded by power classes) do get found out and that eventually things can crash if a critical mass of chaos pervades a society but that does not mean that many do not profit from deceit, fraud, evil and so forth with little consequence. Many of these die in great estate and are buried with high praise, pomp and circumstance. So, it is not a general case that telling the truth is an advantage. Indeed, it is proverbially dangerous to be right when the government is wrong and fighting city hall is often a recipe for defeat and attracting relentless attack backed by big money government coffers. The eternal audit with perfect justice, presumably, will bring a true balance, but ever so many scoff at such, until it is too late. But, all of this does not change one iota, that we are duty bound to truth and other first duties. It does mean that we must understand that doing the right thing is by no means a guaranteed road to comfort, prosperity and praise . . . KF PS, I took a glance, they are running true to sad form, totally missing the context I just amplified.kairosfocus_{January 24, 2023
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Kairosfocus, There is a thread over at The Skeptical Zone dedicated to a discussion of your statement that
In short, VB is right to highlight that without the eternal reckoning, it is simply not the case that truth telling is to one’s advantage, short or long term.
Just thought you might be interested.tangent_{January 24, 2023
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@186 Well, you're right that I spoke far too hastily. I've since read the first chapter of The Epistemological Skyhook (it was free on his webpage) and I found it much less objectionable than I was expecting to. I would still disagree (I expect) with Slagle about a few issues. 1. I concede that I was too hasty in my inference that Slagle excludes all teleology from naturalism. Nevertheless, it seems to me that if Slagle wants to maintain that naturalism cannot accommodate rationality, then I would expect for him to say that the concept of teleology that naturalism can accept (if it can accept any at all) is not the concept of teleology that rationality requires. And while I'm open to seeing that argument, I'm also skeptical: my inclination is to say that the concept of teleology that naturalism can accommodate is all the teleology that rationality requires. 2. I share with Slagle the Kantian thought that rationality must be presupposed in any inquiry in which we can meaningfully be engaged. But I disagree with him that naturalism as such is incompatible with Kant, although some forms of it are. I read Kant as specifying the kinds of purely formal functions that any system must have if it is to generate the kinds of cognitive experiences that we manifestly have. That is at least compatible with a reading of the relevant cognitive sciences as specifying the corresponding material structures that perform those functions and of evolutionary theory as specifying the historical processes that generated those functional structures. 3. The argument about Kant's ontological argument went by a bit too quickly for my taste (which is to be expected in an introduction!). Still I'd like to see a more developed argument for the conclusion (as it seems to be) that in denying the existence of God per se, naturalism therefore denies the existence of a necessary being and that presupposing a necessary being is required for rational thought. It seems at least an option for a naturalist to agree with Kant's ontological argument for the existence of a necessary being, but deny that such a being must be anything like the God of classical theism. 4. Finally -- and this is the big issue -- from the introduction I don't get the sense that Slagle really understands naturalism. I don't mean that he hasn't read X, Y, or Z -- that's not a fault, no one can read everything. I mean that he doesn't seem to engage in the kind of interpretative empathy needed to really understand how someone very different from them sees the world. This is far from easy -- in fact, it's extremely difficult, and very few people have ever managed it at all. Slagle is so deeply unsympathetic to naturalism that I would guess he would really struggle to understand why anyone would be a naturalist at all. There's something about how naturalists conceptualize their own cognitive and epistemic activity that he seems to struggle to comprehend. And this is not necessarily his fault -- I think very few naturalists have really put in the time to explain, to people basically unsympathetic to naturalism, why naturalism might even seem to be a reasonably attractive position.PyrrhoManiac1_{January 24, 2023
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PM1@ You can’t say that you are agreeing with Slagle about anything he says … that’s quite a statement. You quote Slagle and proceed with derisive ‘lecturing’ commentary:
Slagle: … naturalism involves, at some level, the denial of teleology, and teleology is necessary for the veracity or verisimilitudineity of thought.
The “at some level” is doing a lot of heavy lifting here. For one thing, it’s been argued at least since Kant that there’s more than one concept of teleology, and some concepts of teleology are more easily naturalized than others.
Now let’s look at the entire Slagle quote and especially the part you left out:
Slagle: The point here is complicated and will be addressed throughout this book and in detail in the final chapter. For now, we will just take Hasker’s broad point as our third criterion: naturalism involves, at some level, the denial of teleology, and teleology is necessary for the veracity or verisimilitudineity of thought.
Slagle stresses that the relation between naturalism and teleology is a complicated matter, points out that it will be addressed in the book and where specifically, and makes clear that what follows is a provisional (“for now”) definition; that is modestly formulated ("at some level"). You remove all of that and proceed with painting Slagle as an uninformed person. Not your finest moment.Origenes_{January 24, 2023
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@183 Thank you for that long quote! I can't say that I'm agreeing with Slagle about anything he says, but I'll always have some measure of respect for anyone who has the self-discipline for writing a philosophy book.
naturalism involves, at some level, the denial of teleology, and teleology is necessary for the veracity or verisimilitudineity of thought.
The "at some level" is doing a lot of heavy lifting here. For one thing, it's been argued at least since Kant that there's more than one concept of teleology, and some concepts of teleology are more easily naturalized than others. But, for another, there has been some scholarship in recent years arguing that teleology in some sense (that weasel phrase again!) can indeed be naturalized. These are somewhat technical articles, written by academics for other academics. But I think the abstracts at least will convey the flavor of what these people are doing. "What makes biological organisation teleological? "On the naturalisation of teleology: self-organisation, autopoiesis and teleodynamics" "Naturalized Teleology: Cybernetics, Organization, and Purpose"PyrrhoManiac1_{January 24, 2023
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to PM: 182 is excellent, on two points, and thanks to PM for being so clear. First, the distinction between external and internal criticism. Anti-naturalists (or anti-my position whenever I've tried to describe it) invariably judge by their own set of standards, and then say the other position fails for some reason (commonly, self-referentiality). Example: one will claim there are no objective moral standards and the critics will exclaim, but then you have no objective standards for judging morality. Aha, gotcha! :-) They want everything to be judged by their perspective. They seldom, if ever, seriously and genuinely want to know how morality is established by those who don't think the objective standards exist: they just go straight down the slippery slope to nihilism! (I know this is quite a rant, so I hope they just all ignore me.) The second point is that of course a naturalistic description of behavior, of all animals as well as humans, leads to reliability and truth, because otherwise they/we wouldn't survive. Of course, this is not Truth and Reliability as the critics would want it, but that's just another external criticism that assumes they are right about the existence of such. The question that needs to be asked is if the believers in objective Morals and Truth, and some cosmic root of reality supporting them are wrong, then how would one account for the presence of morality, truth, reliability etc. in an empirically accurate and consistent way. That’s the question that motivates me.Viola Lee_{January 24, 2023
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Slagle's definition of 'Naturalism':
~ Naturalism ~ Physicalism is broader than materialism. In a similar sense, naturalism is broader than physicalism. Naturalism takes the definition of physicalism and simply substitutes the word “natural” for “physical”: natural entities and processes are all that exist. In general, naturalism holds that “reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing ‘supernatural’, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality.” Other than that, however, it “has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy.” 15 This can lead to complications, since the definition of naturalism varies with whomever one is arguing with; refuting one person’s naturalism does not necessarily refute another’s. The editors of one collection critical of ontological naturalism left it to each individual contributor to define their target.16 Plantinga initially defines it as the rejection of the existence of God or any spiritual reality: essentially, as anti-supernaturalism. This is problematic because it leads to a sort of house of mirrors, where we can never find the original concept being reflected. 17 Like physicalism, however, it can be understood as minimally requiring the causal closure of the natural world, with the definition of “natural world” being left to science. So, just as there are different types of determinism, so there are different types of naturalism, based on what the ground level of reality is posited as being. This raises the question of what the common thread is between these views. I offer the following criteria as aspects of any type of naturalism or physicalism or materialism. These criteria are raised because of their ultimate relevance to the Skyhook and are by no means exhaustive. First, as mentioned above, is a concession that the physical sciences are the touchstone to reality. Since the physical sciences can investigate only certain types of things, such an accession will limit the possibilities of what can and cannot be examined. If science is the touchstone, then science’s limitations are limitations on reality. In other words, naturalism adopts an ontology based on the physical sciences. If science cannot see it, it does not exist: “in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not.” 18 Naturalists take this to entail the causal closure of the physical. The second criterion is best stated by Wilbur Marshall Urban in the lead-up to his version of the Skyhook: “the derivative status of mind is the characteristic feature of all forms of naturalism.”19 This is not necessarily a problem in and of itself, but becomes one only when this derivative nature takes on a specific implication. Urban elucidates this in his discussion of the perceived unity between naturalism and realism. The main issue then, from which this entire discussion started, and which is involved in the modern identification of realism with naturalism, is the contention that, since reality is prior to knowledge, mind must consequently (italics mine) have a status which is derivative and not pivotal. Why this, consequently, should ever have entered into modern thinking I am at a loss to see. It does not at all follow that, because the principle of being, or the postulate of antecedent reality, is dialectically necessary for an intelligible theory of knowledge, the mind that knows is causally derivative from this antecedent, being conceived as nature in the sense of modern science. This derivative status of mind and knowledge does not follow from the epistemological postulate of realism but is rather an inference, whether rightly or wrongly made, from a specific scientific theory, namely, that of Darwinian evolution. 20 Presumably it is this criterion that Dennett had in mind when he complained about explanations employing “a ‘mind-first’ force or power or process, an exception to the principle that all design, and apparent design, is ultimately the result of mindless, motiveless mechanicity.” 21 For the third criterion I turn to William Hasker. After noting some unsatisfactory definitions of naturalism and physicalism, he suggests that physical causality and explanation are inherently mechanistic. This, however, immediately raises the specter of quantum mechanics, which does not proceed according to predictable and quantifiable causes, so Hasker seeks to define “mechanistic” in such a way that would include quantum physics. (….) The point here is complicated and will be addressed throughout this book and in detail in the final chapter. For now, we will just take Hasker’s broad point as our third criterion: naturalism involves, at some level, the denial of teleology, and teleology is necessary for the veracity or verisimilitudineity of thought. 24
Origenes_{January 24, 2023
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The quotes provided above indicate to me that Pearcey and Slagle simply do not understand naturalism. The same is true of C. S. Lewis's "argument from reason" and Plantinga's "evolutionary argument against naturalism." The crux of their error is failing to understand how naturalists themselves conceptualize the very problem that they are interested in. The problem that interests naturalists, when they turn their attention to epistemology, is how to answer epistemological questions using cognitive science. (Churchland's quip, quoted by Slagle above, is from the first paragraph of her 1987 "Epistemology in the Age of Neuroscience".) One might, of course, argue against naturalists by claiming that one can't use cognitive science to do epistemology -- that one is empirical and the other is conceptual, or that is one is descriptive and the other is normative, etc. We can call that an external criticism: criticizing naturalism by standards that the naturalist need not accept. But that is not what Plantinga, Pearcey, or Slagle are claiming to do: they are claiming to show that naturalism is self-undermining. They are purporting to provide an internal criticism, and doing that requires actually understanding how naturalists themselves understand their project. As naturalists themselves understand their project, the starting-point is the idea of a cognitive system. The proper function of a cognitive system is perceptually guided control of behavior. This requires the ability to reliably map regularities of perceptual 'input' to regularities of behavioral 'output'. Perceptually guided control of behavior, if that behavior is to be conducive to achieving an animal's goals and satisfying its needs, requires that the perceptual component can reliably classify similarities and differences amongst perceptual regularities (and irregularities). It would not make sense as far as the naturalist is concerned to suppose that a cognitive system that is unable to reliably classify similarities and differences amongst perceptual regularities would be just as conducive to achieving organismal goals and satisfying needs as one that is able to do so. But that is precisely how the scenarios sketched by Pearcey and Slagle appear, when translated into the naturalist's preferred language. In other words, the premise
If naturalism is true, any given belief would be produced and sustained by processes that do not have the ultimate goal or purpose of believing truth.
is not a premise that the naturalist themselves would accept.PyrrhoManiac1_{January 24, 2023
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Kairosfocus@ ~ Excerpts from ‘The Epistemological Skyhook’, by Jim Slagle:
If a world does not have the formation of true beliefs as the final cause of the forming of a particular belief, however, we can posit innumerable possible worlds physically identical to it in which belief contents and truth do not enter into the causal network. Since, ex hypothesi, the inhabitants of these worlds would have minds with all the same causes, they would qualify as nearby. Yet what is true of them is true of us: how do we know that we are not in one of these worlds?12 Indeed, some philosophers seem to think we are. Recall Patricia Churchland’s claim that “The principal chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive.… Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.”13 Or Dennett’s claim that “It is true that every belief state is what it is, and locally causes whatever it causes, independently of whether it is true or false.”14 If these views are correct, then the truth of a belief is irrelevant to one’s holding it, opening us up to the scenario envisaged above. (...) Similarly, a higher mediate purpose can trump a lower mediate purpose, and the ultimate purpose can trump the mediate purpose(s). Therefore, if the formation of true beliefs is only ever the proximate or a mediate purpose of the brain in the forming of a particular belief, then that belief could aspire to be only accidentally true if it is true at all. The lesson from this is that truth must be the ultimate goal or purpose of the mental processes that produce and sustain a belief. Truth must be the final cause of the belief. As long as the brain forms a true belief only in order to serve some other purpose, then that belief could be only accidentally true, since the ultimate purpose could have been served by some other mediate or proximate purpose in a nearby possible world. (…) So, if truth is not the ultimate purpose involved in a belief’s formation, then that belief could be only accidentally true at best, and thus could not be an item of knowledge. (…) The absence of such a connection leads to a virtually unlimited diversity regarding which belief contents can be associated with that neural configuration in physically identical worlds. Because of this unlimited diversity, the probability that any particular belief one forms is true is a crapshoot— (...) Therefore, if naturalism is true, one has a reason to refrain from believing naturalism. Moreover, this reason can never be overruled because the same considerations will apply to whatever reasoning one uses in attempting to nullify the reason itself. This makes it either an undefeatable defeater or an unresolvable defeater—in either case, a defeater that can never itself be ultimately defeated.17 We can now update our argument: 1.) If naturalism is true, any given belief would be produced and sustained by processes that do not have the ultimate goal or purpose of believing truth. 2.) If a belief is produced and sustained by processes that do not have the ultimate goal or purpose of believing truth, we have an undefeatable or unresolvable defeater for it. 3.) Naturalism is a belief. 4.) Therefore, if naturalism is true, belief in naturalism is produced and sustained by processes that do not have the ultimate goal or purpose of believing truth (from 1* and 3*). 5.) Therefore, if naturalism is true, we have an undefeatable or unresolvable defeater for naturalism (from 2. and 4.).
Origenes_{January 24, 2023
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F/N: going back to the Fourier series/integral case, if we take the math literally [as opposed to as a useful, empirically reliable model], we are looking at utter determinism. As, the sinusoids involved are eternal in past and future, any observation of a sinusoid composed signal, together with its spectrum can be taken as proof that from eternity past it was pre-programmed that at some t0, a CRO and Spectrum Analyser -- let's go old fashioned analogue, dynamic-stochastic so there is no escape through it is all an algorithmic calculation -- in a certain setup would happen, and then a trace on each screen would be seen [Fourier here, too] and the lot would be turned off at t1 etc. [Easy way to visualise, they are on a power strip, just cut the power to the lot with one flick of a switch, but of course, one should properly turn off instruments, transients from high power turn on/off can be damaging.] Now, extend: every transient vibration, every trajectory across time, by the magic of Fourier series and integrals, can be reduced to such chains of sinusoids. Where, in effect, we can say that a non repetitive pulse of any shape, is mathematically equivalent to a periodic waveform of infinite period, leading to the continuous spectrum. Where, that means the observation that for an observed sinusoid for a span t0 to t1, there is actually a band rather than a line on the spectrum analyser does not evade the issue but reinforces it. This is of course Laplace's demon on steroids. We can inject noise, it makes no practical difference. Does this force dynamic stochastic dynamism as conclusion, with the implied collapse of credibility of mind? No, we just need to use common sense about the difference between mathematical ideal logic model worlds and physical observable events. As one of my old High Schools had in its rules, a breach of common sense is a breach of the school rules. The mathematics, here, frames a model, we are not dealing with necessary entity core logic of being. This extends to Laplace's demon and other similar cases. As we saw in part above. KF PS, a lecture on Laplace's demon https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/A_Lecture_on_the_Limits_of_Human_Knowledgekairosfocus_{January 23, 2023
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JVL [and attn PM1 et al], are you convinced you are correct? Or, that at least O is incorrect or the like? See, the self referentiality involved? Across the history of science, math and ideas more generally, as a matter of simple record of fact many fruitful discussions were held between people of diverse convictions. The issue is, that our opinions are worth less than pocket change, but substance and warrant are treasures of great price. So, we should be highlighting merits of fact and logic, issues of assumptions and underlying worldviews further shaped by recognition of comparative difficulties and the vexed challenge of self referentiality. Where, self referential incoherence or broader absurdity is fatal to a claim. For example, while O's skeletal on determinism is strictly valid, it is limited. It does prove something that for cause has often been emphasised here at UD, any species of determinism is self referentially absurd, undermining credibility of mind. A sounder startpoint, then is to accept the face value of our experience, we are responsible, rational [though error prone] significantly free, morally governed creatures with knowable first principles and duties of reason. Now, expanding, let us use the general frame, that brains etc are dynamic-stochastic systems instead, expanding to include chance elements. As in, blind chance and/or mechanical necessity. Then:
1. If global physical, dynamic stochastic causal chaining [GPDSCaCh] is true, then all our actions and thoughts are consequences of events and laws of nature in the remote past before we were born. 2. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the remote past before we were born, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature. 3. If A causes B, and we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B. _______________________ Therefore 4. If [GPDSCaCh] is true, then we have no control over our own actions and thoughts ….
Where, we can give the usual formulation of such GPDSCaCh, as evolutionary materialism, in Plato's day, as philosophy; in ours, as an aspect of scientism. Which is itself a further error; science, strictly, cannot monopolise knowledge. This broader result clearly follows from the logic and exposes the fatal self referentiality of such schemes. Nor is this a particularly unusual finding, it is part of what Plato pointed to in The Laws Bk X, and it is what lies behind J B S Haldane, here, as skeletonised and augmented:
[JBSH, REFACTORED AS SKELETAL, AUGMENTED PROPOSITIONS:] "It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For
if [p:] my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain [–> taking in DNA, epigenetics and matters of computer organisation, programming and dynamic-stochastic processes; notice, "my brain," i.e. self referential] ______________________________ [ THEN] [q:] I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. [--> indeed, blindly mechanical computation is not in itself a rational process, the only rationality is the canned rationality of the programmer, where survival-filtered lucky noise is not a credible programmer, note the functionally specific, highly complex organised information rich code and algorithms in D/RNA, i.e. language and goal directed stepwise process . . . an observationally validated adequate source for such is _____ ?] [Corollary 1:] They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence [Corollary 2:] I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. [--> grand, self-referential delusion, utterly absurd self-falsifying incoherence] [Implied, Corollary 3: Reason and rationality collapse in a grand delusion, including of course general, philosophical, logical, ontological and moral knowledge; reductio ad absurdum, a FAILED, and FALSE, intellectually futile and bankrupt, ruinously absurd system of thought.]
In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” ["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209. Cf. here on (and esp here) on the self-refutation by self-falsifying self referential incoherence and on linked amorality.]
This issue lurks behind much of what goes on above and should be borne in mind. KF PS, Nancy Pearcey:
A major way to test a philosophy or worldview is to ask: Is it logically consistent? Internal contradictions are fatal to any worldview because contradictory statements are necessarily false. “This circle is square” is contradictory, so it has to be false. An especially damaging form of contradiction is self-referential absurdity — which means a theory sets up a definition of truth that it itself fails to meet. Therefore it refutes itself . . . . An example of self-referential absurdity is a theory called evolutionary epistemology, a naturalistic approach that applies evolution to the process of knowing. The theory proposes that the human mind is a product of natural selection. The implication is that the ideas in our minds were selected for their survival value, not for their truth-value. But what if we apply that theory to itself? Then it, too, was selected for survival, not truth — which discredits its own claim to truth. Evolutionary epistemology commits suicide. Astonishingly, many prominent thinkers have embraced the theory without detecting the logical contradiction. Philosopher John Gray writes, “If Darwin’s theory of natural selection is true,… the human mind serves evolutionary success, not truth.” What is the contradiction in that statement? Gray has essentially said, if Darwin’s theory is true, then it “serves evolutionary success, not truth.” In other words, if Darwin’s theory is true, then it is not true. Self-referential absurdity is akin to the well-known liar’s paradox: “This statement is a lie.” If the statement is true, then (as it says) it is not true, but a lie. Another example comes from Francis Crick. In The Astonishing Hypothesis, he writes, “Our highly developed brains, after all, were not evolved under the pressure of discovering scientific truths but only to enable us to be clever enough to survive.” But that means Crick’s own theory is not a “scientific truth.” Applied to itself, the theory commits suicide. Of course, the sheer pressure to survive is likely to produce some correct ideas. A zebra that thinks lions are friendly will not live long. But false ideas may be useful for survival. Evolutionists admit as much: Eric Baum says, “Sometimes you are more likely to survive and propagate if you believe a falsehood than if you believe the truth.” Steven Pinker writes, “Our brains were shaped for fitness, not for truth. Sometimes the truth is adaptive, but sometimes it is not.” The upshot is that survival is no guarantee of truth. If survival is the only standard, we can never know which ideas are true and which are adaptive but false. To make the dilemma even more puzzling, evolutionists tell us that natural selection has produced all sorts of false concepts in the human mind. Many evolutionary materialists maintain that free will is an illusion, consciousness is an illusion, even our sense of self is an illusion — and that all these false ideas were selected for their survival value.
[--> that is, responsible, rational freedom is undermined. Cf here William Provine in his 1998 U Tenn Darwin Day keynote:
Naturalistic evolution has clear consequences that Charles Darwin understood perfectly. 1) No gods worth having exist; 2) no life after death exists; 3) no ultimate foundation for ethics exists; 4) no ultimate meaning in life exists; and 5) human free will is nonexistent . . . . The first 4 implications are so obvious to modern naturalistic evolutionists that I will spend little time defending them. Human free will, however, is another matter. Even evolutionists have trouble swallowing that implication. I will argue that humans are locally determined systems that make choices. They have, however, no free will [--> without responsible freedom, mind, reason and morality alike disintegrate into grand delusion, hence self-referential incoherence and self-refutation. But that does not make such fallacies any less effective in the hands of clever manipulators] . . . [1998 Darwin Day Keynote Address, U of Tenn -- and yes, that is significant i/l/o the Scopes Trial, 1925]

So how can we know whether the theory of evolution itself is one of those false ideas? The theory undercuts itself. A few thinkers, to their credit, recognize the problem. Literary critic Leon Wieseltier writes, “If reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? … Evolutionary biology cannot invoke the power of reason even as it destroys it.” On a similar note, philosopher Thomas Nagel asks, “Is the [evolutionary] hypothesis really compatible with the continued confidence in reason as a source of knowledge?” His answer is no: “I have to be able to believe … that I follow the rules of logic because they are correct — not merely because I am biologically programmed to do so.” Hence, “insofar as the evolutionary hypothesis itself depends on reason, it would be self-undermining.” [ENV excerpt, Finding Truth (David C. Cook, 2015) by Nancy Pearcey.]
I trust, the above will help us rebalance and refocus. PPS, clearly, as morality is a reasonably identifiable domain, this also extends to knowledge of morality. Where, I again note:
Objective, so know-able moral truth is widely denied in our day, for many it isn't even a remotely plausible possibility. And yet, as we will shortly see, it is undeniably true; as is so for other reasonably identifiable fields of discussion. This marginalisation of moral knowledge, in extreme form, is a key thesis of the nihilism that haunts our civilisation, which we must detect, expose to the light of day, correct and dispel, in defence of civilisation and human dignity. Let a proposition be represented by x M = x is a proposition asserting that some state of affairs regarding right conduct, duty/ought, virtue/honour, good/evil etc (i.e. the subject is morality) is the case [--> truth claim] O = x is objective and generally knowable, being adequately warranted as credibly true [--> notice, generally knowable per adequate warrant, as opposed to widely acknowledged] It is claimed, cultural relativism thesis: S= ~[O*M] = 1
[ NB: Plato, The Laws, Bk X, c 360 BC, in the voice of Athenian Stranger: "[Thus, the Sophists and other opinion leaders etc -- c 430 BC on, hold] that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made." This IMPLIES the Cultural Relativism Thesis, by highlighting disputes (among an error-prone and quarrelsome race!), changing/varied opinions, suggesting that dominance of a view in a place/time is a matter of balance of factions/rulings, and denying that there is an intelligible, warranted natural law. Of course, subjectivism then reduces the scale of "community" to one individual. He continues, "These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might . . . " [--> door opened to nihilistic factionalism]]
However, the subject of S is M, it therefore claims to be objectively true, O, and is about M where it forbids O-status to any claim of type-M so, ~[O*M] cannot be true per self referential incoherence [--> reductio ad absurdum] ++++++++++ ~[O*M] = 0 [as self referential and incoherent cf above] ~[~[O*M]] = 1 [the negation is therefore true] __________ O*M = 1 [condensing not of not] where, M [moral truth claim] So too, O [if an AND is true, each sub proposition is separately true] That is, there UNDENIABLY are objective moral truths; and a first, self-evident one is that ~[O*M] is false. The set is non empty, it is not vacuous and we cannot play empty set square of opposition games with it. That’s important.
kairosfocus_{January 23, 2023
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F/N: Let me clip from another Arxiv paper (by Magain and Hauret) to illustrate issues about time and its import, again, to document here a factor needed to appreciate the significance of "a causal-temporal, thermodynamically constrained world":
When applying GR to the whole Universe in order to de- rive the ?CDM model, one assumes that the Universe is homogeneous on large scales and that the small scale inho- mogeneities have no impact on the evolution of the Universe as a whole. One also assumes that the 4-dimentional space- time can be sliced into 3-dimensional space-like hypersur- faces labeled with a time parameter t. This time parame- ter is usually taken as the time measured by fundamental, comoving, clocks (Hobson et al. 2006). The time t is then identified with the proper time of fundamental observers. It is generally taken for granted that, if the Universe is homo- geneous, this proper time flows at the same rate all along the history of the Universe. When Einstein derived the ba- sic theory of GR, the Universe was believed to be essentially static and there was no reason to question that hypothe- sis. However, in the framework of an evolving Universe, one might ask whether the rate at which time flows could not depend on the dynamical state of the Universe itself. We thus propose to distinguish between two different times: (1) the (conventional) coordinate time parameter t, which is the one measured by our present clocks and is assumed to flow at a constant rate and (2) the cosmological time ? , which is the one measured by fundamental clocks at any times, may depend on the state of the Universe and controls all phys- ical processes. When building our cosmological model, this proper time ? may not be used as an independent coordi- nate, as it is a function of other parameters and, thus, an emergent property. It is often argued that the direction of time flow, the arrow of time, is dictated by the second law of thermo- dynamics: the direction of time flow is the one for which the entropy of an isolated system increases. Let us consider fundamental observers in the Universe. The largest system possibly interacting with such observers is the region of the Universe that is causally connected to them. That region is bounded by the particle horizon, defined by the distance a light signal could travel from the beginning of time to the observers. From their very point of view, that system can be considered isolated since no interaction can happen with ob- jects located further than the particle horizon. A very simple assumption we could thus make is that the proper time ? measured by such observers is proportional to the entropy of the region of the Universe which is causally connected to them
This is itself sufficient to underscore that time is itself a complex matter and that it is deeply connected to thermodynamics and to cause. KFkairosfocus_{January 23, 2023
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(double post removed)Origenes_{January 23, 2023
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PM1@
The global features of the brain aren’t a separate entity that controls the neurons: the whole constrains what the parts are able to do.
That does not seem to address my concerns. Because the whole must ‘constrain’ the parts in such a way, that they get involved in free choices, reasoning, world view, intentionality, typing sentences, and so on … So, that must be a very flexible and precise constraint. So, the same questions return. For instance, how does the whole ‘constrain’ neurons in such a way that they get involved in, let’s say, the issue of morality? Another concern of mine is the following. We are talking about top-down causation. The ‘whole’, you say, constrains the neurons, it steers the neurons rather than the neurons steering the whole. Top-down causation. Ok. But to have top-down causation, there must be a top level that exerts its power downwards onto the lower (chemical) levels of the brain. My question is: what level is exactly independent of the lower chemical levels of the brain? Is there a mental level independent from the brain chemistry (the ‘whole’ perhaps) where thoughts, feelings, and intentions are? A level that can be said to have top-down causation from a certain independence of chemistry? And if there is no such level, then what is doing the top-down causation? If there is no such thing as a person with all its attributes that is independent of the brain, then what is it that exerts top-down causation?Origenes_{January 23, 2023
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@165 The global features of the brain aren't a separate entity that controls the neurons: the whole constrains what the parts are able to do. @172
Physical determinism does not allow for a rational person who is in control of his thoughts. Dualism has to be true, or we are not rational.
You make things just a little too convenient for yourself by dismissing every alternative to "determinism or dualism" as irrational, meaningless, gibberish, magic, etc. My main objection to determinism is that it's based on comparatively simple systems governed by linear equations. I don't think it's plausible to think that the physical world is deterministic once we take into account what complexity theory is showing us about the world, forcing us to abandon simple models and easy calculations.PyrrhoManiac1_{January 23, 2023
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Origenes, your "ironclad proof" ends with
4. If physical determinism is true, then we have no control over our own actions and thoughts ….
That's a common error. Without realizing it, you are implicitly assuming dualism. Your statement is equivalent to "If physical determinism is true, then I (this entity separate from the body) have no control over the body, which is out of my control and following the deterministic laws of physics." But under physicalism, you aren't separate from your body. You are your body. Your body isn't some separate rogue element of you that is dragging around the real you. When your body picks up an object, you are picking up the object. You -- the body -- are in control of your action.tangent_{January 23, 2023
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Origenes: Here is the ironclad proof: So, your appearance of trying to have a dialogue is just a feint? I have no interest in having a discussion with someone who is already convinced they are correct. I have strong convictions and beliefs but, because of what some of the contributors here have said, I have changed some of my stances. I think that's a good and honest approach. And indicative of my wanting to explore areas of disagreement. You seem to lack that interest in this area. So I won't be pursuing the topic any further. And I'd ask you to cease trying to lure people in with the pretence that you have an open mind.JVL_{January 23, 2023
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JVL @
Conceivable? But you have no idea how that would work. I’m not sure that IS conceivable. That sounds more like wishful thinking.
I am a rational person. Physical determinism does not allow for a rational person. So, it is not wishful thinking at all. It has to be the case that I steer the brain, or I am not rational.
AND, remember, there is a lot of research that has been done and is being done and will be done regarding how the brain interacts with the body to produce movements and reactions. What can you test in a lab to check out your, admittedly, non-existent theory of how dualism physically works?
Physical determinism does not allow for a rational person who is in control of his thoughts. Dualism has to be true, or we are not rational. Here is the ironclad proof: 1. If physical determinism is true, then all our actions and thoughts are consequences of events and laws of nature in the remote past before we were born. 2. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the remote past before we were born, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature. 3. If A causes B, and we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B. Therefore 4. If physical determinism is true, then we have no control over our own actions and thoughts ….Origenes_{January 23, 2023
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Origenes: I can argue that it is conceivable that an intelligent ‘system architect and a programmer, as KF calls it, can make things work. Conceivable? But you have no idea how that would work. I'm not sure that IS conceivable. That sounds more like wishful thinking. AND, remember, there is a lot of research that has been done and is being done and will be done regarding how the brain interacts with the body to produce movements and reactions. What can you test in a lab to check out your, admittedly, non-existent theory of how dualism physically works?JVL_{January 23, 2023
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JVL@
But let’s hear how you think it all works from your dualist point of view . . . how does a disembodied mind influences nerves when, for example, playing football? How does the immaterial trigger the right neurones to fire when throwing a forward pass? Or, if you prefer, how does an immaterial mind figure out how to paint a picture, from memory, of the artist’s childhood home? Or, if you prefer, how does an immaterial mind trigger the blink reflex when an object approaches an eye quickly?
Good question to which I do not know the answer. I don’t even understand how a microbe functions, let alone a human being. However (and this is a huge ‘however’), unlike you, I am allowed to refer to an intelligent cause. I can argue that it is conceivable that an intelligent 'system architect / programmer, as KF calls it, can make things work. You are forced to explain things from blind unmotivated particles in the void.Origenes_{January 23, 2023
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Origenes: How does “a feature of the embodied brain” know which neurons to manipulate and how? Does it have a map of the brain and an instruction manual? If not, how does it know what to do? It doesn't intentionally manipulate neurone. Even my dog can have a memory of a past event and react accordingly when a similar situation occurs. Which tool(s) are available for “a feature of the embodied brain” to steer the neurons in the direction that it wants? IOW how does the manipulation of neurons work? No biological system is focused on manipulating particular neurones. If that were true then each human would have to have a different schematic because everyone's brain is wired a bit differently. But let's hear how you think it all works from your dualist point of view . . . how does a disembodied mind influences nerves when, for example, playing football? How does the immaterial trigger the right neurones to fire when throwing a forward pass? Or, if you prefer, how does an immaterial mind figure out how to paint a picture, from memory, of the artist's childhood home? Or, if you prefer, how does an immaterial mind trigger the blink reflex when an object approaches an eye quickly? It seems to me that the dualist view is much, much more complicated and fraught with error than the materialist view. If all thinking and reactions and responses have to be generated by a non-physical . . . entity then conveyed to the physical body/brain then carried out (along with feedback from any physical interaction having to come back up the pipe, get processed and then a reaction pushed out) why isn't there a larger lag between input and reaction? How can the communication between the brain and the mind be instantaneous? No science fiction answers please; either you have an answer or you don't. If you want to have a competing explanation then please provide that explanation.JVL_{January 23, 2023
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KF@
... you need a system architect and a programmer.
Yes, also here right? An emergent consciousness (arguendo assuming that such exists) is in need of vast amounts of information in order to steer 86 billion neurons in the brain. This information has to **emerge** simultaneously with the emergent consciousness, otherwise, it doesn't know what to do. BTW how does emergent consciousness process this information? And. of course, the emergence of manipulation tools is also required. Perhaps PM1@ can tell us what those tools look like.Origenes_{January 23, 2023
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Origenes you need a system architect and a programmer. We keep on seeing models that try to get complex information rich organisation fine tuned to function, from grossly inadequate causal sources. KFkairosfocus_{January 23, 2023
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PM1, again, insubstantial. Arguments do start from givens, and for one, sciences study the going concern world in ways that are empirically accountable. They do not go beyond that, there is a slipping across a border into metaphysics when they do. Next, while I do not wish to critique Carroll's hinted at rather than substantiated argument in detail, let's take a snippet from this 2018 Arxiv paper:
The Schr ?odinger equation has an immediate, profound consequence: almost all quantum states evolve eternally toward both the past and the future. Unlike classical models such as spacetime in general relativity, which can hit singularities beyond which evolution cannot be extended, quantum evolution is very simple. Any state can be written as a superposition of states of definite energy (eigenstates), in terms of which the Schr ?odinger equation implies that the magnitude of each coefficient remains constant, while the phase orbits at a fixed velocity (at least for time-independent Hamiltonians). In Hilbert space, the entire evolution of the universe simply describes eternal motion in a straight line within some high-dimensional space that is topologically a torus [34]. If this setup describes the real world, there is no beginning nor end to time. This is not to say that there is no Big Bang in the usual sense; only that it is not a true physical singularity as it would be in classical general relativity, nor does it represent the first moment of the universe. As far as physics is concerned, such a universe would be completely self-contained, existing perpetually without any external cause. One can still question whether or not an uncaused eternal universe is intellectually satisfying, but there is no physical or cosmological obstacle to its existence.
That's reification of a mathematical property. To compare, ponder a simple and familiar exercise, turning on an oscilloscope to ponder a waveform, e.g. a sinusoid, and also turning on a spectrum analyser in parallel. By mathematical definition, a sinusoid is past and future eternal, the trace on screen will look pretty much as the familiar graph and the signal analyser will have a peak. Extend to more complex forms such as a square wave, we will see multiple peaks at periodic intervals on the spectrum analyser. Fourier analysis will tell us an arbitrary periodic waveform is made up of a sum of related sinusoids, each being past and future eternal. Now, feed in an impulse, say through a microphone picking up a drum. We now see a pulse, usually of complex shape and an envelope on the spectum analyser, i.e. the Fourier prediction of a continuous spectrum, per fourier integral. (You can try this by downloading say, Real Time Analyser and looking at time domain and frequency domain panes, especially the waterfall view.) So, have we just proved that the physical world is past and future infinite, as the Fourier equations say so? No. We are simply up against a familiar border, the gap between physicality and mathematical, abstract logic-model worlds. A similar case is the Newtonian particle, which strictly is a mathematical point of infinite density. And there are others. In short, Mathematical models do not "prove" past infinities any more than they prove future infinities long after the oscilloscope, spectrum analyser and signal sources would have been turned off. Much less, crumbled into dust as the cosmos moves to heat death. Far more relevant would be the thermodynamics hinted at, which point onward to heat death, and applied backward, would have arrived there long since on a long enough past. That's before the absurdities of a claimed transfinite past traversal of years would have been accomplished. Especially, as time on cosmological scope is bound up in thermodynamically constrained energy processes. Time is the dimension in which energy concentrations are dissipated, driven by pretty inexorable stochastic, molecular scale processes. So, we must mark a distinction between the logic-model and the physical. I hope that helps to clarify why I insist on the understanding that sciences address the going concern, empirically accountable world. There is a lot of lab coat clad speculation, but that is beyond science. This applies to the onward jumps to IF, then we have poof an eternal, causeless universe. Not an adequate model thermodynamically, absent an infinite energy source beyond the system boundary. Which defeats the causelessness. And more. KFkairosfocus_{January 23, 2023
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PM1@
I would rather say that consciousness is a feature of the embodied brain, which exerts top-down control over the rest of the organism.
The same questions apply: So, how does a "feature of the embodied brain" exert its top-down control over the brain? 1. How does "a feature of the embodied brain" know which neurons to manipulate and how? Does it have a map of the brain and an instruction manual? If not, how does it know what to do? 2. Which tool(s) are available for "a feature of the embodied brain" to steer the neurons in the direction that it wants? IOW how does the manipulation of neurons work?Origenes_{January 23, 2023
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@163
Suppose that emergentism is real. Suppose that from a physical substrate, consciousness emerges with real top-down mental powers. That is, the emerged consciousness can steer the neurons in the brain in order to have the thoughts that it wants, rather than thoughts that arise from the level of blind particles in the void.
I would not want to say that consciousness is a wholly immaterial entity or thing that controls the brain. I would rather say that consciousness is a feature of the embodied brain, which exerts top-down control over the rest of the organism.PyrrhoManiac1_{January 23, 2023
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PM1@ Two questions about emergent consciousness: Suppose that emergentism is real. Suppose that from the physical brain substrate, consciousness emerges with real top-down mental powers. That is, the emergent consciousness can steer the neurons in the brain in order to have the thoughts that it wants, rather than the "thoughts" that arise from the level of blind particles in the void. Two questions about this scenario: 1. How does the emergent consciousness know which neurons to manipulate and how? Does it have a map of the brain and an instruction manual? If not, how does it know what to do? 2. Which tool(s) are available for consciousness to steer the neurons in the direction that it wants? IOW how does the manipulation of neurons work?Origenes_{January 23, 2023
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@161 It seems evident that you want to conduct the conversation on the basis of what you already know and aren't interested in where I'm actually coming from. Adieu.PyrrhoManiac1_{January 23, 2023
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