Is the Galton Board evidence for intelligent design of the universe?

_{Denyse O'Leary

January 16, 2023

Intelligent Design, Physics}

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Ken Francis writes: “Proof that God placed order out of chaos in the universe. Each ball has a 50-50 chance of bouncing right or left off of each peg as it traverses the board, but every time the result is a bell curve. More proof of Intelligent Design.”

The comments are interesting.

Hat tip: Ken Francis, co-author with Theodore Dalrymple of The Terror of Existence: From Ecclesiastes to Theatre of the Absurd

Comments

PM1, your opinion is not what counts, substance does. The point is even stronger in Crick, another well known spokesman:
. . . that "You", your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will [--> which would imply morally freighted choices], are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll's Alice might have phrased: "You're nothing but a pack of neurons." This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most people today that it can truly be called astonishing. [The Astonishing Hypothesis, 1994.]
Plato was specifically responding to ancient atomism and fellow traveller views (the sophists and Alcibiades) but we both know the substantial point is far wider than that. Atoms, molecules, fields etc are all ises and do not rise to either mind nor ought. Computationalism is categorically different from rational responsible self moved freedom, and relative opinions are not oughts; as Hawthorne pointed out in response to further spokesmen such as the well known Ruse and Wilson in a fairly well known essay, so, it remains the case that fundamentally materialistic systems are unable to account for ought. Emergentism beyond say interactions of Na and Cl ions in a salt crystal, is little more than something from nothing by poof magic. Turning to Carroll, it is a simple matter of the nature of science that sciences are after the fact of an observable cosmos. Which, by the logic of an infeasible supertask, cannot be past infinite; above and beyond the only actual observations, which point to 14 BYA. The q-foam is already speculative and so metaphysics. And, cosmology insofar as it is a science is within not beyond the span of observable reality. That's science 101. KFkairosfocus_{January 23, 2023
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@157
We all know that evolutionary materialist scientism is grossly inadequate to ground ought. Allow Provine’s summary [studiously sidelined] to speak for itself:
I don't even know who Provine is, and I don't really care. I didn't even refer to him in the course of elucidating my own views. I've referred in the past to Dewey and to Kropotkin, and in 149, I referred to Tomasello and to Philip Pettit. Other philosophers who have influenced my views on this issue would include Alastair MacIntyre (in Dependent Rational Animals), Philippa Foot (in Natural Goodness), and Philip Kitcher (in The Ethical Project). Now, if you want to know more about these views, you can feel free to ask. And I don't mind explaining why I think Provine is wrong. But I would prefer that you not dismiss my views by associating them with someone I haven't read or referred to. Likewise, I don't mind explaining why I think Plato's criticism of ancient Greek atomism don't apply to my views. With regard to your dismissal of Carroll: well, one you has made important contributions to cosmology and quantum field theory, and I'm not inclined to think it's you.PyrrhoManiac1_{January 23, 2023
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Those who enjoy coherent thinking ought to subscribe to philosopher W. F. Vallicella’s substack-page. I am pretty sure that Kairosfocus will like the following article:
The Ought-to-Be, the Ought-to-Do, and the Aporetics of "Be Ye Perfect" Could one be under a moral obligation to perfect oneself? [William F. Vallicella, Apr 19, 2021] Is there any justification for talk of the ought-to-be in cases where they are not cases of the ought-to-do? Let's begin by noting that if I ought to do X (pay my debts, feed my kids, keep my hands off my neighbor's wife, etc.) then my doing X ought to be. For example, given that I ought to pay my debts, then my paying a certain debt on a certain date is a state of affairs that ought to be, ought to exist, ought to obtain. So it is not as if the ought-to-do and the ought-to-be form disjoint classes. For every act X that an agent A ought to do, there is a state of affairs, A's doing X, that ought to be, and a state of affairs, A's failing to do X, that ought not be. The ought-to-do, therefore, is a case of the ought-to-be. My question, however, is whether there are states of affairs that ought to be even in situations in which there are no moral agents with power sufficient to bring them about, and states of affairs that ought not be even in situations in which there are no moral agents with power sufficient to prevent them. In other words, are there non-agential oughts? Does it make sense, and is it true, to say things like 'There ought to be fewer diseases than there are' or 'There ought to be no natural disasters' or 'There ought to be morally perfect people'? Or consider 0. I ought to be a better man that I am, indeed, I ought to be morally perfect. (0) expresses an axiological requirement but (arguably) not a moral obligation because it is simply not in my power to perfect myself, nor is it in any finite person's power or any group of finite person's power to perfect me. Now consider the following aporetic triad: 1. I ought to be morally perfect or at least better than I am in ways over which I have no control. 2. I lack the power to be what I ought to be, and this impotence is due to no specific fault of my own. (My impotence is 'original,' part and parcel of the 'fallen' human condition, not derived from any particular act or act-omission of mine.) 3. 'Ought' implies 'Can': one can be obliged to do X only if one is able to do X. The triad is inconsistent in that (1) & (3) entails ~(2). Indeed, any two limbs, taken together, entail the negation of the remaining one. How can the inconsistency be removed? A. One solution is simply to deny (1) by claiming that there is no sense of 'ought' in which one ought to be morally perfect or better than one is in ways over which one has no control. This strikes me as counterintuitive. For there does seems to me to be some sense in which I ought to be perfect. I feel the force of the New Testament verse, "Be ye perfect as your heavenly father is perfect." (Matthew 5:48) I have the strong intuition that I ought to be, if not perfect, at least better in respects where I simply lack the power to bring about the improvement. B. A second solution is to distinguish between agential and non-agential oughts. We can then maintain (1) as true by maintaining that the 'ought' in (1) is non-agential and expresses an axiological requirement as opposed to a moral obligation. So interpreted, (1) is consistent with (2) and (3). We can then transform the above triad into an argument: 4. (1)-(3) are all true. 5. (1)-(3) would not all be true if there were no distinction between agential and non-agential oughts. Therefore 6. There is a distinction between agential and non-agential oughts. C. A third solution is to maintain the truth of each of (1)-(3) while also maintaining that all oughts are agential. But then how avoid inconsistency? One might maintain that, when restricted to my own resources, I lack the power to do what I ought to do; yet I am morally obliged to perfect myself; and since 'ought' implies 'can,' the power that I need must be supplied in part from a Source external to myself. "And this all men call God." So God exists! In short, the inconsistency is avoided by bringing God into the picture as one who supplies individuals with the supplemental power to do what they are morally obliged to do when that power is insufficient from their own resources. This gives rise to an argument for the existence of an external source of moral assistance: 7. I am morally obliged (ought) to do things that I cannot do on my own. 8. 'Ought' implies 'can'. Therefore 9. I can do things that I cannot do on my own. Therefore 10. There is an external source of moral assistance that makes up the difference between what I can do on my own and what I cannot. Summary I have sketched two arguments which need closer scrutiny. The one based on the (B) response to the triad gives some, though not a conclusive or compelling, reason for accepting a distinction between agential and non-agential oughts. The argument based on the (C) response to the triad is also rationally uncompelling, useful though it may be in the articulation of the Christian position. For, with no breach of logical propriety, one could simply run the (7)-(10) argument in reverse by rejecting the conclusion, accepting (8) and then rejecting (7).
Origenes_{January 23, 2023
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F.N: Okay, first part got through, it is the link limit: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [continuing] >> so I’d like to know on what basis you do rule them out.>> 10: I didn't rule them out, personalisation and polarisation of a widely known challenge fails. Provine and others have said the quiet part out loud. The burden to ground oughtness and bridge the is-ought gap is unmet from your side, on balance of evidence. 11: It is relevant to further expose some underlying evolutionary materialistic thinking by highlighting Michael Ruse & E. O. Wilson in their notorious 1991 essay . . . readily available in the literature and presumably known to you, “The Evolution of Ethics” -- on, the precise line you are taking:
The time has come to take seriously the fact
[--> This is a gross error at the outset, as macro-evolution is a theory (an explanation) about the unobserved past of origins and so cannot be a fact on the level of the observed roundness of the earth or the orbiting of planets around the sun etc. and as the ideology of evolutionary materialistic scientism, which undergirds the perception of "fact" is an imposed, question-begging, self-refuting necessarily false assertion, not a fact]
that we humans are modified monkeys, not the favored Creation of a Benevolent God on the Sixth Day . . . We must think again [--> why, isn't that a disguised "OUGHT," the very thing being trashed?] especially about our so-called ‘ethical principles.’ [--> this speculation improperly dressed up as fact directly affects ethics, with implications for the first duties of reason] The question is not whether biology—specifically, our evolution—is connected with ethics, but how. As evolutionists, we see that no justification of the traditional kind is possible.
[--> as in, Provine, Crick, Rosenberg and a host of others are right.]
Morality, or more strictly our [--> by implication, delusional, ill founded] belief in morality, is merely [--> nothing but, nothing more than] an adaptation put in place to further our reproductive ends. Hence the basis of ethics does not lie in God’s will … In an important sense, ethics as we understand it is an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes to get us to cooperate. It is without external grounding [--> the grand delusion thesis] … Ethics is illusory inasmuch as it persuades us that it has an objective reference. This is the crux of the biological position. Once it is grasped, everything falls into place. [--> Yes, they are utterly unaware of how such undermines the credibility of reason thus their own rationality, by imposing grand delusion and undermining the moral government that drives how responsible rationality works] [Michael Ruse & E. O. Wilson, “The Evolution of Ethics,” Religion and the Natural Sciences: The Range of Engagement, , ed. J. E. Hutchingson, Orlando, Fl.:Harcourt and Brace, 1991.]
Will Hawthorne, in reply to such ideological imposition, is deservedly withering, echoing the concerns Plato raised in The Laws, Bk X 2360+ years ago, and obviously longstanding in and foundational to the literature, concerns that reflect lessons hard-bought with blood and tears in living memory, there is no excuse:
Assume (per impossibile) that atheistic naturalism [= evolutionary materialism] is true. Assume, furthermore, that one can't infer an 'ought' from an 'is' [the 'is' being in this context physicalist: matter-energy, space- time, chance and mechanical forces]. (Richard Dawkins and many other atheists should grant both of these assumptions.) Given our second assumption, there is no description of anything in the natural world from which we can infer an 'ought'. And given our first assumption, there is nothing that exists over and above the natural world; the natural world is all that there is. It follows logically that, for any action you care to pick, there's no description of anything in the natural world from which we can infer that one ought to refrain from performing that action. Add a further uncontroversial assumption: an action is permissible if and only if it's not the case that one ought to refrain from performing that action . . . [We see] therefore, for any action you care to pick, it's permissible to perform that action. If you'd like, you can take this as the meat behind the slogan 'if atheism is true, all things are permitted'. For example if atheism is true, every action Hitler performed was permissible. Many atheists don't like this [nihilistic, absurd] consequence of their worldview. But they cannot escape it and insist that they are being logical at the same time. Now, we all know that at least some actions are really not permissible (for example, racist actions). Since the conclusion of the argument denies this, there must be a problem somewhere in the argument. Could the argument be invalid? No. The argument has not violated a single rule of logic and all inferences were made explicit. Thus we are forced to deny the truth of one of the assumptions we started out with. That means we either deny atheistic naturalism or (the more intuitively appealing) principle that one can't infer 'ought' from [a material] 'is'.
12: Worse, this was known ahead of time, the same lesson was pointed out on the history of Athens' failure that put democracy in the shade for 2,000 years as a dubious form of government. Yes, this is not a mere academic exercise. Plato, warns:
Ath[enian Stranger, in The Laws, Bk X 2,360 ya]. . . .[The avant garde philosophers and poets, c. 360 BC] say that fire and water, and earth and air [i.e the classical "material" elements of the cosmos -- the natural order], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art . . . [such that] all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only [ --> that is, evolutionary materialism is ancient and would trace all things to blind chance and mechanical necessity; observe, too, the trichotomy: "nature" (here, mechanical, blind necessity), "chance" (similar to a tossed fair die), ART (the action of a mind, i.e. intelligently directed configuration)] . . . . [Thus, they hold] that the principles of justice have no existence at all[--> notice the reduction to zero] in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.-
[ --> Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT, leading to an effectively arbitrary foundation only for morality, ethics, so too justice, law and government: accident of personal preference, the ebbs and flows of power politics, accidents of history and and the shifting sands of manipulated community opinion driven by "winds and waves of doctrine and the cunning craftiness of men in their deceitful scheming . . . " cf a video on Plato's parable of the cave; from the perspective of pondering who set up the manipulative shadow-shows, why.]
These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might,
[ --> Evolutionary materialism -- having no IS that can properly ground OUGHT -- leads to the promotion of amorality on which the only basis for "OUGHT" is seen to be might (and manipulation: might in "spin"), opening the door to cynicism, hyperskepticism and nihilism . . . this is actually an infamous credo of nihilism . . . also, it reeks of cynically manipulative lawless oligarchy . . . ]
and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [ --> Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality "naturally" leads to continual contentions and power struggles influenced by that amorality at the hands of ruthless power hungry nihilistic agendas], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is,to live in real dominion over others [ --> such amoral and/or nihilistic factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless abuse and arbitrariness . . . they have not learned the habits nor accepted the principles of mutual respect, justice, fairness and keeping the civil peace of justice, so they will want to deceive, manipulate and crush -- as the consistent history of radical revolutions over the past 250 years so plainly shows again and again], and not in legal subjection to them [--> nihilistic will to power not the spirit of justice and lawfulness].
13: We can presume, prior knowledge of such in the literature, so the you prove it stance collapses. >>Secondly: whether or God is even possible depends on how one defines God.>> 14: Such is on the table, per logic of being requisites, as was laid out: we need a NB, finitely remote world root adequate to ground a cosmos and responsible, rational, significantly free creatures capable of credible reason in it. The explanatory alternative on the table multiple times above (and over the years) is the inherently good, utterly wise creator God, a necessary and maximally great being. >> I would not want to rule out a priori that there are some definitions of God which do entail logical contradictions and hence are impossible.>> 15: There is a specific understanding, why substitute a strawman by hints, especially in aftermath of Plantinga's discussion of the failure and collapse of the problem of evil. That's 50 years ago now. >>Thirdly, it doesn’t follow that if it is not logically impossible for God to exist, then God actually does exist.>> 16: Notice, what you side stepped, setting up a strawman target: serious candidate necessary being. This is not specific to God, this is a general result on logic of being in a world manifesting contingent entities from a pencil to us to, credibly, our whole cosmos commonly said to have begun a bit under 14 BYA. >> If it’s not logically impossible for God to exist, then it’s possible for God to exist. One would still need a separate argument to show that God must exist.>> 17: Strawman fallacy continues, studiously ignoring what is on the table. If you mean, God is not a serious candidate NB, in the face of thousands of years of thought, kindly give your reasons. Also, your half concession suggests that you cannot give a good argument that God as understood on ethical theism is an incoherent concept. 18: In short, Plantinga is the 800 lb gorilla standing next to the elephant in the middle of the room. His case has been made, the problem of evil is in forced semi retirement. >>In other words: supposing that there must be a necessary being sufficiently powerful to create a universe in which there are norm-governed beings such as ourselves*, and supposing that the God of classical theism is not a contradiction in terms**, >> 19: Having beat up the strawmen, you now act as though no case has been made. 20: Assuming, a NB? Nope, over the course of three years, it was hammered out here why a causal-temporal, thermodynamic world cannot reasonably have spanned a transfinite succession of years to now, as that is an infeasible supertask. Past finite, even going to a q-foam subcosmos with bubbling up subcosmi, indeed, there are fairly serious results on the point in contemporary physics. Recall, thermodynamics here is about stochastic behaviour of multiple particles in a world of energy, so it is in the end a mathematical constraint backed by well established empirical findings. 21: Similarly, the true nothing -- pace Krauss, Dawkins [populariser] et al -- is non being, which can have no causal capability. Were there ever the case that utter non being prevails, such would forever obtain, therefore. Likewise, circular retrocausation in whatever guise, appeals to the not yet as root cause and falls under the same stricture. 22: In short, we may freely hold that, if a world now is, something always was, the necessary being reality root. Which is a bill of requisites, serious candidates are invited to apply. Neither flying spaghetti monsters nor quantum foams qualify. >>one would still need some further argument as to why we ought to believe that the necessary being is the God of classical theism.>> 22: The no argument strawman continues. We can take it, that this stance implies there is no cogent answer to what is on the table. Where, "classical" implies knowledge of a longstanding framework for understanding God as serious candidate, >>* Sean Carroll has a nice paper arguing that the supposition of a necessary being existing independently of the universe is not supported by contemporary cosmology.>> 23: Cosmology is after the fact of a cosmos, insofar as it is a science rather than metaphysics dressed up in a lab coat. There is every good reason to hold that our cosmos and a prior q-foam etc are contingent, being inherently past finite. Further, fine tuning etc point to the same result, even were these past transfinite. So, Carroll is wrong on basic thermodynamics and the logic of transfinite traverse for a thermodynamically constrained order. >>** I”m on the fence about this — everything depends on the fine-grained details of what kind of being we imagine God to be.>> 24: There is a fairly specific and longstanding understanding on the table, one that say the ordinary Haitian so understands that it is explicit in his or her term for God: Le Bon Dieu. It would be reasonable for you to address this, especially on necessary and maximally great being. >> I do think that nothing could literally be an absolutely unlimited mind. >> 25: Strawman caricature of maximal greatness, which explicitly involves compossibility of core attributes. >>Briefly: the concept of mind that we know how to use, the concept that makes sense to us, always involves limited beings — organisms — that need to sense and respond to features of their environments.>> 26: Oh, we have limited, contingent, fallible minds so we doubt a maximal mind with compossible attributes. Doubt trumps all, we need not actually address a substantial case. Fail, strawman caricature. >> To speak of an unlimited mind is to use the word “mind” in a context where the usual meaning can no longer apply.>> 27: The doubt-strawman dismissive tactic again. Actually, self moved rational agency, what mind is about, has plenty of room at the top for a maximally rational, maximally wise, maximally good intelligence. There is no inherently alien conception involved, just perfection of what we have in part and see in part, darkly yes, but we do see. 28: Where, to credibly reason, warrant and know we have to be such agents, this is in the end an issue that mind is real to do science but evolutionary materialistic scientism undermines mind. J B S Haldane knew better 90 years ago. We must not saw off the branch on which we must sit. >> It is not a contradiction, >> 29: Quite the forced admission, given the history and Plantinga's argument, not to mention the significance of serious candidate necessary being. >>but>> 30: We are about to pull the hyperskeptical, dismissive rhetorical move. >> it may very well>> 31: Weasel words, that evade duty of warranting a claim, behind a shield of hyperskepticism. A move that is tantamount to a backhanded admission of want of a substantial case. >> be nonsense.>> 32: Meaningless, meaningless, they cry, triumphantly. However, stripped of the hyperskeptical tactic, we find a need to ask, why meaningless, given a longstanding established meaning and discussion at top level of our civilisation? 33: Is this a hint of the ghost of logical positivism that refuted itself by being self referentially incoherent in trying to stipulate that only the analytically presumed axiom or the empirically, operationally vindicated could be meaningful? 34: That points to, that this verifiability criterion failed its own test and died about 50 years ago, hence the ghost. Ontological discussion is meaningful. 35: Further, the discussion of mind, maximally great mind, goodness that is inherent and pure, utter wisdom and great making properties to maximal compossible degree are all meaningful and coherent; so, ethical theism is also meaningful as opposed to the dismissive, shielded gambit, "nonsense." 36: Still missing in action, a suitably laid out alternative reality root level necessary being causally adequate for our cosmos, one with morally governed creatures in it. A significant missing factor. KFkairosfocus_{January 23, 2023
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F/N, I think I went over the link limit, retry: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PM1: For record, in steps: >>Firstly: sure, maybe one could one get around the is-ought problem by stipulating that moral goodness is at the foundation of reality?>> 1: A half concession, about to be taken back rhetorically. 2: The actuality is, we have a longstanding worldview, ethical theism, in which both Hume's Guillotine on ungrounded ought and the Euthyphro dilemma are answered by first showing that we inherently have a finite past order [the thermodynamic, temporal causal succession of years cannot traverse a transfinite span] so we must have a causally adequate necessary being world root at finite remove. Where of course there is also a point that the contingency also obtains for our world on other grounds such that were its past indefinitely large, contingency still obtains. (For simple starters, look at fine tuning etc.) 3: Secondly, we observe that what my Haitian brothers and sisters call Le Bon Dieu, just taken as a serious candidate NB, would unify in one being both goodness with wisdom and a necessary being adequate to cause worlds. 4: Where, it is a general result that serious candidate NB's are either impossible of being (as a Euclidean space square circle is . . . incoherence of core characteristics), or is actual. 5: Given your stance on oh maybe but you must prove to arbitrarily skeptical satisfaction, another significant worldview alternative with that potential is distinctly scarce to absent. How do we know this? Were there such, it would be trumpeted far and wide, would be in million subscriber, million hit podcasts, would be all over this blog. That's the ghostly elephant in the middle of the room. >> Sure, maybe — though that would need serious scrutiny.>> 6: The hyperskeptical stance that doubt prevails over all and can be used to sideline is an inferior good substituting for duty to prudence. >> But before getting to that,>> 7: The rhetorical sidelining. >> I’d like to know why you think that accounting the emergence of rationality and morality in evolutionary terms is insufficient.>> 8: We all know that evolutionary materialist scientism is grossly inadequate to ground ought. Allow Provine's summary [studiously sidelined] to speak for itself:
Naturalistic evolution has clear consequences that Charles Darwin understood perfectly. 1) No gods worth having exist; 2) no life after death exists; 3) no ultimate foundation for ethics exists; 4) no ultimate meaning in life exists; and 5) human free will is nonexistent
[==> key theses of nihilism. Citing the just linked IEP: "Nihilism is the belief that all values are baseless and that nothing can be known or communicated. It is often associated with extreme pessimism and a radical skepticism that condemns existence. A true nihilist would believe in nothing, have no loyalties, and no purpose other than, perhaps, an impulse to destroy. While few philosophers would claim to be nihilists, nihilism is most often associated with Friedrich Nietzsche who argued that its corrosive effects would eventually destroy all moral, religious, and metaphysical convictions and precipitate the greatest crisis in human history." As without rational, responsible freedom, rationality collapses, Provine implies self referential incoherence. Similarly, ethical foundations include our self evident, pervasive first duties of reason: to truth, right reason, warrant and wider prudence, fairness and justice etc. Provine has given a recipe for gross (and all too common) intellectual irresponsibility.]
. . . . The first 4 implications are so obvious to modern naturalistic evolutionists that I will spend little time defending them. Human free will, however, is another matter. Even evolutionists have trouble swallowing that implication. I will argue that humans are locally determined systems that make choices. They have, however, no free will [--> without responsible freedom, mind, reason and morality alike disintegrate into grand delusion, hence self-referential incoherence and self-refutation. But that does not make such fallacies any less effective in the hands of clever manipulators] . . . [1998 Darwin Day Keynote Address, U of Tenn -- and yes, that is significant i/l/o the Scopes Trial, 1925]
>> At any rate, Hume’s own arguments don’t allow us to rule out that family of views,>> 9: Sez who, quoting Arthur Leff. We can review Provine and many others in excruciating detail, but the point is, this is a classic argument that runs is-is -- gap [and without roots] -- ought-ought. It reduces duty to delusion and manipulation, will to power crouching at the door. [cont'd]kairosfocus_{January 23, 2023
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[moderated out, ouch]kairosfocus_{January 23, 2023
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All good points, PM. I'll be interested to see which of them are addressed.Viola Lee_{January 22, 2023
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@151
why God would bridge the is-ought gap and would ground oughtness at reality root. That should be acknowledged. As God is at minimum a serious candidate NB, then God is either impossible of being or actual. I suggest, there are no good reasons to believe God is impossible of being and it is manifest that goodness and wisdom as well as world creating power are key attributes of God, so a demiurge or the like not at that level is not God.
Firstly: sure, maybe one could one get around the is-ought problem by stipulating that moral goodness is at the foundation of reality? Sure, maybe -- though that would need serious scrutiny. But before getting to that, I'd like to know why you think that accounting the emergence of rationality and morality in evolutionary terms is insufficient. At any rate, Hume's own arguments don't allow us to rule out that family of views, so I'd like to know on what basis you do rule them out. Secondly: whether or God is even possible depends on how one defines God. I would not want to rule out a priori that there are some definitions of God which do entail logical contradictions and hence are impossible. Thirdly, it doesn't follow that if it is not logically impossible for God to exist, then God actually does exist. If it's not logically impossible for God to exist, then it's possible for God to exist. One would still need a separate argument to show that God must exist. In other words: supposing that there must be a necessary being sufficiently powerful to create a universe in which there are norm-governed beings such as ourselves*, and supposing that the God of classical theism is not a contradiction in terms**, one would still need some further argument as to why we ought to believe that the necessary being is the God of classical theism. * Sean Carroll has a nice paper arguing that the supposition of a necessary being existing independently of the universe is not supported by contemporary cosmology. ** I"m on the fence about this -- everything depends on the fine-grained details of what kind of being we imagine God to be. I do think that nothing could literally be an absolutely unlimited mind. Briefly: the concept of mind that we know how to use, the concept that makes sense to us, always involves limited beings -- organisms -- that need to sense and respond to features of their environments. To speak of an unlimited mind is to use the word "mind" in a context where the usual meaning can no longer apply. It is not a contradiction, but it may very well be nonsense.PyrrhoManiac1_{January 22, 2023
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KF @
… absent distinct identity, language would fail. Distinct identity has as close corollaries non contradiction and the excluded middle.
I agree wholeheartedly. As an aside, as you noted elsewhere, logic is about being. I would like to add the following idea: it points to self-aware being, to consciousness. I would argue that only a conscious being can produce the laws of identity, distinct identity, and so on. I believe these laws must be abstractions based on the notions “I” and “not-I.”
Ori: You speak of “duty” to right reason. Perhaps I should ask you this: are you saying that it is self-evident that we are dealing with a “duty”?
2: Yes, and your questions echo the force of that duty. You sense truth is pivotal and that failing to attain it (especially through taking wrong turns in thought) is less than we ought to be.
Perhaps a duty can only be sensed when one has a tendency to do otherwise. When “I ought to do” differs from “I want to do.” But when there is no light between them, the ought is not drawing attention. This disharmony between “I want” and “I ought” can be explained, as you do, by a moral law imposed on the person. You draw a circle around the person and his want, and say (paraphrasing): “that is the whole person, the ought must come from elsewhere.” However, we often experience disharmony in ourselves, sometimes we want to stay and go home at the same time. For the sake of harmonious existence, I want to apply the golden rule to (most) people. The implicit agreement between them and me is: I treat you well, and you treat me well. For one thing, the application of the golden rule explains my behavioral rule: allow people to finish their sentences and listen to them attentively. Again, this I do because that is how I want them to treat me and also because I want to be liked. However, sometimes the impulse to interrupt what I perceive as nonsense or untruth is very strong. That brings me into conflict with myself: I want to apply the golden rule by allowing others to finish their sentences and listen attentively to what they say (which can be interpreted as an ‘ought’) and I ‘want’ (strong impulse) to interrupt. Both at the same time. So, like you I have the experience of disharmony between ‘ought’ and ‘want’, but, unlike you, I explain both of them as originating from myself. I draw the circle of identity around me, my want and my ought.Origenes_{January 22, 2023
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Origenes, in steps of thought: >>There are principles of reason that no one can coherently reason without. I agree.>> 1: Yes, for example absent distinct identity, language would fail. Distinct identity has as close corollaries non contradiction and the excluded middle. >>You speak of “duty” to right reason. Perhaps I should ask you this: are you saying that it is self-evident that we are dealing with a “duty”?>> 2: Yes, and your questions echo the force of that duty. You sense truth is pivotal and that failing to attain it (especially through taking wrong turns in thought) is less than we ought to be. >> For instance, do we all have a duty to hold coherent beliefs? Do we have a duty to make sense?>> 3: Yes, often failed. We must be aware that a key contradiction breaks a system through turning it into meaninglessness, and that we must be willing to give it up if we detect such. 4: This becomes especially tricky as on big questions, there is normally a lot of self referentiality so we need to avoid incoherence and other errors of thought. Their name is legion, there are big books on just fallacies. >>A friend of mine holds the belief that God determines our every move, that everything is set in stone from the outset, but that, nonetheless, each human being bears full responsibility for his own actions.>> 5: We live in a day where our education has been sadly negligent on sound reasoning and have been taught to doubt and dismiss the need for coherence. 6: The theology here seems defective. This is not a theology forum, but it does seem that he is in self referential incoherence. If we are not sufficiently free to be rational, we are not free enough to be responsible. We do not blame a tiger for what it does. >> His long-held belief is based on his interpretation of the writings of Martin Luther. He told me that he is long aware of the contradiction, but accepts it anyway because it “captures the enigmatic nature of reality.” To him, it makes sense somehow.>> 7: Ex falso, quodlibet. Principle of explosion, incoherence undermines our ability to discern truth and falsity. >>I told him that he is , of course, free to believe anything he wants, but I also informed him that his belief doesn’t make any sense to me.>> 8: And, responsible for it too. >> Would you disagree with me and say that my friend is neglecting his “duty” to right reason?>> 9: Would he treat instructions on a medical prescription or the terms of a contract or his annual income tax returns in the same way? KFkairosfocus_{January 22, 2023
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PM1, our perceptions, opinions, doubts, skepticism, etc are worth less than the change in our pockets at the end of the day. The question, always, ever, is warrant. Pruss is responding to various debates and I find his thoughts give useful side lights. He has shown that modal issues are inextricably intertwined with our thinking, are therefore part of the fabric of reasoned thoughts. In that context, we may freely ponder how this world and items in it or that may be in it or that cannot be in it, may be or not be, logic of being. Where, we can ponder worlds or models or frameworks equally freely, as ways other worlds might be etc, and we can identify what is impossible vs possible of being and of the latter, contingent [and caused] vs necessary as fabric to any possible world. We are here already addressing on reason ways of being and non being, thus logic of being or more technically ontology. We are contingent and not self explanatory, as are fires. Two-ness as already discussed is inherent in there being any distinct possible world, and directly connected, NZQRCR* etc, with linked relationships properties and transworld power that answers to Wigner's wonder on the power of mathematics. It turns out that mathematical systems turning on axioms specify logic model worlds, which can be possible worlds, an irretrievable contradiction in a system would make that an impossible world. As to God, as was already outlined, we know a transfinite span of finite stages [years for convenience] cannot be traversed in steps, so our world and quasi-physical antecedents that are causal-temporal and thermodynamic are inherently finite in the past. We need a finitely remote necessary being world -- and wider reality -- root. That root must be capable of a fine tuned cosmos as we inhabit, and will also need to be adequate to ground rational, responsible, morally governed creatures such as we are. God is highly relevant to such, as was already outlined. KF PS, enough has been said to show why God would bridge the is-ought gap and would ground oughtness at reality root. That should be acknowledged. As God is at minimum a serious candidate NB, then God is either impossible of being or actual. I suggest, there are no good reasons to believe God is impossible of being and it is manifest that goodness and wisdom as well as world creating power are key attributes of God, so a demiurge or the like not at that level is not God.kairosfocus_{January 22, 2023
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Origenes, I would suggest that FSCO/I, whether in Paley's watch of Ch 1 or the self replicating one in Ch 2, or the even more evident case of the self replicating, metabolising, code using cell, is adequate and even compelling evidence that warrants the inference, best explained as designed, with no serious alternative. So much so, that arguments of resistance and dismissal of inference to design on such signs are manifestly strained and weak. It is a second level of inference, to observe that design comes from intelligent agents, with adequate capability. In the case of cell based life, that evidence can be accounted for on a molecular nanotech lab some generations beyond Venter, Tour et al. The latter suggests, we are 500 years behind the curve, I am a little more optimistic and suggest, across this century or a little beyond. Turning to the cosmos, the fine tuning evidence points to intelligent design, raising pretty serious questions of a designer of that level of capability, especially as a causal temporal, thermodynamic order is inherently past finite. We need a necessary being world root capable of designing and effecting a universe. The resistance to that one is even weaker on the merits. KFkairosfocus_{January 22, 2023
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@146 I have no objection at all to Pruss's point that modal discourse is ineliminable from our conceptual framework, and that a purely non-modal discourse could not be used by beings with minds like ours. (This is one way of understanding the significance of Kant's response to Hume.) But, I don't see how it bears on the question of ontology. Modal discourse is necessary for us to cope with the world, regardless of whether we are committed to modal realism (all possible worlds are real in the exact same sense that the actual world is real) or modal actualism (modal discourse represents different ways that the actual world could be). And I don't see how that debate, interesting as it is, has any bearing on whether or not God exists. Likewise, I still don't understand the argument that we need to posit moral oughtness at the very foundation of our ontology in order to circumvent Hume's "guillotine". It seems pretty clear to me that accounts of the evolution of cooperation* (e.g. recent work by Tomasello or Pettit) are not endangered by Hume's guillotine, yet it would seem that you think that such accounts are somehow insufficient. I'd be curious to know why you think that. * I'm very excited about this new book by Hamilton, Natural Citizens: Ethical Formation as Biological Development!PyrrhoManiac1_{January 22, 2023
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KF@
... as for God as self evidently real, that may be so for some of sufficient purity, reflection and experience to see more clearly than we do today; we are not in such a state of grace, perhaps the angels are.
When I reflect on the undeniable presence of FSCO/I in life and the fabric of the universe, the existence of an intelligent designer is as self-evident as it is in the case of Paley's watch.Origenes_{January 22, 2023
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KF@
If one tries to object, one is claiming or implying failed duty to truth, right reason, warrant and wider prudence, etc, thus defeating the attempted defeater.
There are principles of reason that no one can coherently reason without. I agree. You speak of “duty” to right reason. Perhaps I should ask you this: are you saying that it is self-evident that we are dealing with a “duty”? For instance, do we all have a duty to hold coherent beliefs? Do we have a duty to make sense? A friend of mine holds the belief that God determines our every move, that everything is set in stone from the outset, but that, nonetheless, each human being bears full responsibility for his own actions. His long-held belief is based on his interpretation of the writings of Martin Luther. He told me that he is long aware of the contradiction, but accepts it anyway because it “captures the enigmatic nature of reality.” To him, it makes sense somehow. I told him that he is , of course, free to believe anything he wants, but I also informed him that his belief doesn’t make any sense to me. Would you disagree with me and say that my friend is neglecting his “duty” to right reason?Origenes_{January 22, 2023
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F/N (attn PM1, VL, JVL etc): I find these remarks by Alexander Pruss, interesting:
M odal assertions involving possibility and necessity are not only a part of our ordinary languages, but also a part of our philosophical patrimony. There are many things we could not say if we confined ourselves to non-modal language. We could not mark the difference between a unicorn,1 which could exist, and a square circle, which could not. M odality is a natural way of marking the difference between, on the one hand, the relation of Smith being a bachelor to Smith being unmarried, and, on the other hand, the relation of Smith being 50 feet tall to Smith not being a mammal. Someone could not fail to be unmarried if he is a bachelor, but he could be a mam m al even if he were 50 feet tall — though in fact no mammal is that tall. It is important for ethical purposes to say what could have been done but was left undone, and what would have happened had it been done. It is plausible that a human being can only be held responsible for an act if it was at least logically possible that he avoid it . . . . Each world corresponds to or represents a way the cosmos could have been. In what way this representation works is one of the central questions for our investigation. One of the worlds shall be distinguished as “ the actual world,” i.e. the world that represents the way our cosmos in fact, or actually, is. An individual “exists in ” a world w if, were that world actual, that individual w ould exist, or, equivalently, if w represents the cosmos as containing that individual. A proposition is “true at” a world w if, were that world actual, that proposition would be true, or, equivalently, if «/represents the cosmos as described by that proposition. [Actuality, Possibility and Worlds, (Continuum) 2011.]
This of course fits well with my remarks above on possible worlds, save he emphasises this world. As I noted, I view a mathematical axiomatisation or model or linked simulation as laying out an abstract, logic model world. Then, there are scenarios used in say decision theory and related games [often, war games, and IIRC, war game orders in 1940 were transferred to the real world after the May 10, 1940 attack]. Then, there is the literary side, where a literary world can act as a simulation. Similarly, actual history can lay out relevant patterns, serving as a sort of microcosm, a very useful one being the ill fated voyage and shipwreck in Ac 27. This too shows that adequacy for relevant purposes can involve something far less elaborate than the sort of comprehensive cosmological discussion hinted at. Models seek to capture the material essence of a situation, and can be plugged into a wider environment taken as a given. Where, too, with abstract mathematical worlds, identification of necessary elements then allows confident transfers to any actual or possible world. I identify NZQRCR* as key to that core, broader even than ZFC which is an axiomatisation in that context. Also, of course, broader than the Euclidean axiomatisation. Where I again note that we actually use Euclidean AND non Euclidean frames for different things in our day to day world, sometimes simultaneously, e.g. spherical geometry for navigation and projective geometry for perspective or even for map making and use. Mercator is a Cylindrical, highly distorting projection but it makes lines of longitude and latitude into a rectangular grid. And more. KF PS, The quincunx or Galton Board, then comes back into focus as a mechanical simulation of a probability distribution. As I noted in 11 above, which still stands:
the Quincunx shows by striking demonstration the depth to which logic of structure and quantity pervades our world and points onward to the utter, eerie universality of core mathematics in any possible world as a necessary being structure; the very same issue Eugene Wigner highlighted. The world is so mathematically pervaded, indeed possible being is so mathematically pervaded that it is manifestly akin to mind rather than to utterly non rational chaos; indeed, in many cases, randomness reveals an underlying ordered structure, as this very case demonstrates. Onward, lieth statistical thermodynamics, via the classic case of 500 or 1,000 coins and their distribution, thence the threshold search space challenge at the core of ID, how to get to FSCO/I expressive bit patterns by the blind chance and mechanical necessity the Galton Board illustrates. That context is remarkable, not trivial and readily dismissible.
kairosfocus_{January 22, 2023
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FP, all I note is, many of those I have seen directly or note from history etc have all the love, respect etc they want; I recall one whose wife even encouraged him in bedding and impregnating other women, IIRC he was an SS commandant of a concentration camp, the idea was there was need for more and more of suitable aryan stock. The claim is irrelevant to the focal point as VB has raised. And, notice, again the underlying appeals to branch on which we sit principles. Meanwhile, of course the focal matter I answered from 11 is still on the table. KFkairosfocus_{January 22, 2023
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FB BTW what you believe is in one’s self interest is irrelevant. People lie all the time because it is in their self interest to do so. Vividvividbleau_{January 21, 2023
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KF re 141 Don’t get goaded into responding to FB’ irrelevant comments, the questions posed to you have nothing to do with the topic on the table. The word that comes to mind is “chaff” Vividvividbleau_{January 21, 2023
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FB “VB, if your entire argument is over my sloppy use of the word “ultimate”, I think our discussion is over.” You’re blaming me for addressing what you wrote? This is pathetic. Regardless I am happy to eliminate the words you wrote ( ultimately) FB “Just because I believe that it is xxxxx in their best interest to tell the truth” Now not only is your response to me pathetic but in 141 you double down on stupid and affirm what I said originally that the above is false! Hint, you agreed that I am correct in my assessment. Let’s see if you can identify where you did so? Vividvividbleau_{January 21, 2023
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Kairosfocus writes:
FP, do you not see many who gain much by lies and fraud, and die in full benefit of ill gotten gains?
And what do they gain? Money? Possessions? Power over others? Sure. But what about love, respect, friendship, trust, true happiness, self respect, etc? You don’t gain those by lying to others.
In short, VB is right to highlight that without the eternal reckoning, it is simply not the case that truth telling is to one’s advantage, short or long term.
If you need the threat of an eternal reconning to be truthful then I pity you.Ford Prefect_{January 21, 2023
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VB, if your entire argument is over my sloppy use of the word “ultimate”, I think our discussion is over. I am not interested in wasting my time with someone who plays word games.Ford Prefect_{January 21, 2023
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Ford “I’m confused.” What else is new? “Is the only reason you tell the truth the fear of God’s judgment?” Irrelevant . “Personally, I have found that being truthful has benefited me far more than it has caused me harm. “ Irrelevant “Why wouldn’t I want to pass this experience on to my kids?” Irrelevant, try again with something that is not irrelevant Unless you believe they will ultimately be judged by an ultimate judge the above ,telling the truth is ultimately in their best interest , is false. Vividvividbleau_{January 21, 2023
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FP, do you not see many who gain much by lies and fraud, and die in full benefit of ill gotten gains? Is that not a commonplace? In short, VB is right to highlight that without the eternal reckoning, it is simply not the case that truth telling is to one's advantage, short or long term. More to the point, kids have to be taught is a fallacy in this context, as was noted. KFkairosfocus_{January 21, 2023
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Origenes, I am saying, with explanation given and repeated illustration from attempted objection, that certain first duties and principles of reason -- and first law [the highest reason . . . ] -- put on the table by Cicero in summarising the classical deposit, are self evident and knowable. They are branch on which we all sit, pervasive first principles. They are so pervasive that we cannot but appeal to them, first, if one attempts to prove them, one already appeals to them at the outset. If one tries to object, one is claiming or implying failed duty to truth, right reason, warrant and wider prudence, etc, thus defeating the attempted defeater. In short, these are part of the antecedent frame in which we address facts, evidence, argument, proof decisions, etc. However, it is clear that these cut across the paradigms we have been taught in and it will take a struggle to see them for what they are. KF PS, as for God as self evidently real, that may be so for some of sufficient purity, reflection and experience to see more clearly than we do today; we are not in such a state of grace, perhaps the angels are. But for us, what is self evident is the systematic and manifestly indefensible, civilisation wide power backed suppression of whatever might just invite in him who so many clearly resent and even despise. That raises questions of less than innocent ignorance and tainted skepticism.kairosfocus_{January 21, 2023
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VB writes:
Unless you believe they will ultimately be judged by an ultimate judge the above [telling the truth is ultimately in their best interest] is false.
I’m confused. Is the only reason you tell the truth the fear of God’s judgment? Personally, I have found that being truthful has benefited me far more than it has caused me harm. Why wouldn’t I want to pass this experience on to my kids?Ford Prefect_{January 21, 2023
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PPPS, I should also note that kids have to be taught it is a fallacy when used to try to dismiss a SET. Do kids have to be taught that 2 + 3 = 5? Does that mean that such is not self evident and even independent of us and our views? Which, does not mean, it is obvious. It means that, for one of adequate experience, such a truth is seen as so, and as necessarily so on pain of immediate, patent absurdity. By contrast 3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2 is necessarily true as is the wider theorem and the onward Apollonius' theorem, but the why of it is not of self evident character. Similarly, the denial of objective moral truth is self evidently false for one aware that such is by implication a claimed objective truth about duty, ought, virtue, honour, justice etc. So, it is instantly self defeating by exemplifying what it denies.kairosfocus_{January 21, 2023
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KF @
it is always possible to reject a self evident truth; the problem is not the truth or its self evident state but that for another reason one rejects it.
To be clear, are you saying that the existence of moral laws is self-evident, that the source of the moral laws is self-evident, or both?Origenes_{January 21, 2023
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PPS, we notice your dismissiveness on the root of ought, but can also notice that you have evaded addressing the substance on the point. Meanwhile, yet again you appeal to the duties you object to. Let me pause and give an outline on where relativism and/or subjectivism and/or emotivism . . . they are tangled together . . . goes wrong:
Excerpted chapter summary, on Subjectivism, Relativism, and Emotivism, in Doing Ethics 3rd Edn, by Lewis Vaughn, W W Norton, 2012. [Also see here and here.] Clipping: . . . Subjective relativism is the view that an action is morally right if one approves of it. A person’s approval makes the action right. This doctrine (as well as cultural relativism) is in stark contrast to moral objectivism, the view that some moral principles are valid for everyone.. Subjective relativism, though, has some troubling implications. It implies that each person is morally infallible and that individuals can never have a genuine moral disagreement Cultural relativism is the view that an action is morally right if one’s culture approves of it. The argument for this doctrine is based on the diversity of moral judgments among cultures: because people’s judgments about right and wrong differ from culture to culture, right and wrong must be relative to culture, and there are no objective moral principles. This argument is defective, however, because the diversity of moral views does not imply that morality is relative to cultures. In addition, the alleged diversity of basic moral standards among cultures may be only apparent, not real. Societies whose moral judgments conflict may be differing not over moral principles but over nonmoral facts. Some think that tolerance is entailed by cultural relativism. But there is no necessary connection between tolerance and the doctrine. Indeed, the cultural relativist cannot consistently advocate tolerance while maintaining his relativist standpoint. To advocate tolerance is to advocate an objective moral value. But if tolerance is an objective moral value, then cultural relativism must be false, because it says that there are no objective moral values. Like subjective relativism, cultural relativism has some disturbing consequences. It implies that cultures are morally infallible, that social reformers can never be morally right, that moral disagreements between individuals in the same culture amount to arguments over whether they disagree with their culture, that other cultures cannot be legitimately criticized, and that moral progress is impossible. Emotivism is the view that moral utterances are neither true nor false but are expressions of emotions or attitudes. It leads to the conclusion that people can disagree only in attitude, not in beliefs. People cannot disagree over the moral facts, because there are no moral facts. Emotivism also implies that presenting reasons in support of a moral utterance is a matter of offering nonmoral facts that can influence someone’s attitude. It seems that any nonmoral facts will do, as long as they affect attitudes. Perhaps the most far-reaching implication of emotivism is that nothing is actually good or bad. There simply are no properties of goodness and badness. There is only the expression of favorable or unfavorable emotions or attitudes toward something.
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FP, it is always possible to reject a self evident truth; the problem is not the truth or its self evident state but that for another reason one rejects it. In this case you are implicitly appealing to duties to truth, right reason and warrant; yet again underscoring the point that we see here branch on which we all sit pervasive first principles and duties. Inescapable, the attempt to object keeps on exemplifying inadvertent appeals to said duties, this just shows the branch on which we sit first principle character. Of course, precisely because lying can parasite off truth and confer a short term advantage [getting away with the indefensible], one is tempted to violate the principles. As Kant long ago pointed out, that is like passing counterfeit money, once enough is in circulation it will be ruinous, revealing the true character of deceit -- categorical imperative. But more basically, moral government regulates freedom, these principles are oughts not musts. We may freely breach them, just as we breach, do not shed innocent blood; does that mean there is no natural duty to respect the life of others? No, just that we can do evil, lying, slandering, defrauding, character assassination, physical assassination. . Politicians, ad men and propagandists regularly exploit simple and subtle fallacies to gain power. Ask the ghost of Dr Goebbels where that ends up. This is not appeal to consequences, it is pointing to the ruinous nature of evil. And again, notice the actual issue not the strawman you are knocking over: your objection is implicitly appealing to the duties you try to object to. And, the natural end of a mind is to apprehend truth through right reason. Evil perverts what is a good capability out of alignment with its due end and is chaotic as a result. And more. KF PS, as for the notion that on evidence -- again appealing to first duties -- we make up duties, such relativism, subjectivism and emotivism is self defeating. We cannot by majority vote or whatever make murder right or fraud or racism, or any number of things. It also opens the door to nihilistic will to power as we have seen. Again, notice what you refuse to see, you are appealing to the principles you try to object to.kairosfocus_{January 21, 2023
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