Is the Galton Board evidence for intelligent design of the universe?

_{Denyse O'Leary

January 16, 2023

Intelligent Design, Physics}

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Ken Francis writes: “Proof that God placed order out of chaos in the universe. Each ball has a 50-50 chance of bouncing right or left off of each peg as it traverses the board, but every time the result is a bell curve. More proof of Intelligent Design.”

The comments are interesting.

Hat tip: Ken Francis, co-author with Theodore Dalrymple of The Terror of Existence: From Ecclesiastes to Theatre of the Absurd

Comments

Ford “Just because I believe that it is ultimately in their best interest to tell the truth” Unless you believe they will ultimately be judged by an ultimate judge the above is false. Vividvividbleau_{January 21, 2023
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VB writes:
The very fact that you do reinforce to your children the need to tell the truth is evidence that you think they have a duty to tell the truth. Sheesh
Just because I believe that it is ultimately in their best interest to tell the truth does not mean, as KF claims, that they have a duty to do so that is derived from him “root of reality”.Ford Prefect_{January 21, 2023
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Ford “Then why do we have to reinforce to our children the need to tell the truth?” The very fact that you do reinforce to your children the need to tell the truth is evidence that you think they have a duty to tell the truth. Sheesh Vividvividbleau_{January 21, 2023
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Kairosfocus writes:
We have minds directed to soundness and truth,
Then why do we have to reinforce to our children the need to tell the truth? Something we have to do repeatedly, over several years, and impose punishments for not telling the truth. The propensity for most adults to tell the truth certainly acts like any number of our common learned/indoctrinated behaviours.
so we have duties towards those ends;
Self-imposed duties, not duties originating from your “root of reality”. And as we impose these “duties” on ourselves, we expect others to behave in a similar fashion.
we have neighbours as we are, we must respect them too, including fairness and justice.
Yes, we are a gregarious/communal species. As such, there are certain behaviours that enhance our experience in society and others that hinder it. We are taught these behaviours from the day we are born. The fact that some of these “expected” behaviours change over time and from culture to culture is strong evidence that they are not derived from your “root of reality” but rather from the vagaries and variations of societies.
The duties in question are built into our nature so they are natural to us,
You are entitled to your opinion, in spite of the mountains of evidence counter to it.
though as we are contingent creatures within a world their root does not come from us but from the root of reality.
Evidence suggests otherwise.Ford Prefect_{January 21, 2023
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Kairosfocus writes:
Origenes, it’s not opinions to agree/disagree, we are dealing with self evident truths that are knowable objectively.
You full well know that there are many who have a different opinion as to many of your “self-evident truths”.Ford Prefect_{January 21, 2023
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Origenes, it's not opinions to agree/disagree, we are dealing with self evident truths that are knowable objectively. Unfortunately, this is part of what our civilisation has largely lost, the ability to recognise that just as for any other reasonably definable field, there is -- actually, undeniably -- objective moral knowledge. We are free, not blindly programmed, so each of us is a first cause, a self moved agent. That is WHY we are morally governed rather than simply dynamic-stochastic mindless machines. Next, given ever so many agendas, ideas and attitudes out there we need to emphasise that the first duties are reasonable, intelligible, manifestly proper to our nature and its evident ends. We have minds directed to soundness and truth, so we have duties towards those ends; we have neighbours as we are, we must respect them too, including fairness and justice. The duties in question are built into our nature so they are natural to us, though as we are contingent creatures within a world their root does not come from us but from the root of reality. However, they are not arbitrary or oppressive impositions, again unlike the perceptions that too many have been led to. KFkairosfocus_{January 21, 2023
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Kairosfocus@
my argument has been first that there are pervasive, branch on which we sit, first principles and duties which are therefore self evident and generally knowable, objective. That is an epistemological case, not an ontological one.
There are first principles and moral rules. Let’s agree on that and go from there.
It then means our reason is governed by ought, duty, objective principles of moral character.
In my view, the person is his own master. So, I would say that a person can choose to apply the golden rule—treat others how you want to be treated. A lot of moral rules flow from the application: do not kill, do not abuse, do not impose restrictions on freedom of speech, do not make vaccination mandatory and so on.
Principles that are NOT alien, arbitrary, imposed, and external to us but instead are built into and pervade our nature, pointing to the need for a causally adequate source of such nature: responsible, rational freedom.
You say principles/moral laws are “built into” our nature. An alternative view is that principles/moral laws stem from human nature & the application of the golden rule. What precisely is the killer argument against the latter view? Or is there no specific argument?
Where too, we are contingent so not self explanatory.
That is a very general argument. We are contingent, so we are created, so, everything about us comes from an outside source. Why single out moral laws when you argue that everything comes from an external source?Origenes_{January 21, 2023
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F.N: More from Wikipedia, as outlining onward issues:
At least since Aristotle, philosophers have been greatly concerned with the logical statuses of propositions, e.g. necessity, contingency, and impossibility. In the twentieth century, possible worlds have been used to explicate these notions. In modal logic, a proposition is understood in terms of the worlds in which it is true and worlds in which it is false. Thus, equivalences like the following have been proposed: True propositions are those that are true in the [--> our?] actual [--> accessible] world (for example: "Richard Nixon became president in 1969"). False propositions are those that are false in the [--> our] actual world (for example: "Ronald Reagan became president in 1969"). [--> expanding the concepts] Possible propositions are those that are true in at least one possible world (for example: "Hubert Humphrey became president in 1969"). (Humphrey did run for president in 1968, and thus could have been elected.) This includes propositions which are necessarily true, in the sense below. Impossible propositions (or necessarily false propositions) are those that are true in no possible world (for example: "Melissa and Toby are taller than each other at the same time"). Necessarily true propositions (often simply called necessary propositions) are those that are true in all possible worlds (for example: "2 + 2 = 4"; "all bachelors are unmarried").[13] Contingent propositions are those that are true in some possible worlds and false in others (for example: "Richard Nixon became president in 1969" is contingently true and "Hubert Humphrey became president in 1969" is contingently false).
Of course, propositions assert what is claimed true or false, i.e. the state of affairs. So, we can ponder states of affairs, contingency and necessity of being. KFkairosfocus_{January 21, 2023
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Origenes, my argument has been first that there are pervasive, branch on which we sit, first principles and duties which are therefore self evident and generally knowable, objective. That is an epistemological case, not an ontological one. It then means our reason is governed by ought, duty, objective principles of moral character. Principles that are NOT alien, arbitrary, imposed and external to us but instead are built into and pervade our nature, pointing to the need for a causally adequate source of such nature: responsible, rational freedom. Without which, we have no credibility to argue, warrant or know -- a major challenge to worldviews that cannot ground that nature. Where too, we are contingent so not self explanatory. That points onward to the is ought gap and to how it can be bridged. That is addressed not as a deductive proof but as a comparative difficulties worldviews case that turns on the popular view the gap is unbridgeable. It turns out, this is because we have set aside or forgotten a major worldview frame that does bridge it, through the reality root candidate, the inherently good, utterly wise [so, just, loving and gracious] creator God, a necessary and maximally great being. As my Haitian brothers and sisters invariably refer, Le Bon Dieu. A serious candidate NB. Thus, our alternatives are to acknowledge this option or to refuse it, the latter fails as it is there, freely stated. Then, we may address comparative difficulties, is this feasible . . . is such a conception of God and summary of a PW coherent? Yes, as Plantinga showed. So, the real challenge is that those who reject this need to show the God of such generic ethical theism is impossible of being as a Euclidean Square circle is. They have not and post Plantinga likely cannot. KFkairosfocus_{January 21, 2023
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PPS, I find this from Wikipedia gives a point to start from:
A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. Possible worlds are widely used as a formal device in logic, philosophy, and linguistics in order to provide a semantics for intensional and modal logic. Their metaphysical status has been a subject of controversy in philosophy, with modal realists such as David Lewis arguing that they are literally existing alternate realities, and others such as Robert Stalnaker arguing that they are not . . . . Possible worlds are often regarded with suspicion, which is why their proponents have struggled to find arguments in their favor.[2] An often-cited argument is called the argument from ways. It defines possible worlds as "ways things could have been" and relies for its premises and inferences on assumptions from natural language . . . . The ontological status of possible worlds has provoked intense debate. David Lewis famously advocated for a position known as modal realism, which holds that possible worlds are real, concrete places which exist in the exact same sense that the actual world exists. On Lewis's account, the actual world is special only in that we live there. This doctrine is called the indexicality of actuality since it can be understood as claiming that the term "actual" is an indexical, like "now" and "here". Lewis gave a variety of arguments for this position. He argued that just as the reality of atoms is demonstrated by their explanatory power in physics, so too are possible worlds justified by their explanatory power in philosophy. He also argued that possible worlds must be real because they are simply "ways things could have been" and nobody doubts that such things exist. Finally, he argued that they could not be reduced to more "ontologically respectable" entities such as maximally consistent sets of propositions without rendering theories of modality circular. (He referred to these theories as "ersatz modal realism" which try to get the benefits of possible worlds semantics "on the cheap".)[8][9] Modal realism is controversial. W.V. Quine rejected it as "metaphysically extravagant".[10] Stalnaker responded to Lewis's arguments by pointing out that a way things could have been is not itself a world, but rather a property that such a world can have. Since properties can exist without them applying to any existing objects, there's no reason to conclude that other worlds like ours exist. Another of Stalnaker's arguments attacks Lewis's indexicality theory of actuality. Stalnaker argues that even if the English word "actual" is an indexical, that doesn't mean that other worlds exist. For comparison, one can use the indexical "I" without believing that other people actually exist.[11] Some philosophers instead endorse the view of possible worlds as maximally consistent sets of propositions or descriptions, while others such as Saul Kripke treat them as purely formal (i.e. mathematical) devices.
I think, a PW is a sufficiently complete description or scenario or model of how this world or another is or was or might have been or might be, is sufficient to be fruitful. Particularly, when joined to NBs. For we can construct a fairly minimal logic model world and then identify in it NB entities which then apply transworld. For other things we may abstract key aspects of our world and construct an empirically reliable enough model. Simulations then give us exploratory power. This extends to the fine tuning debate in cosmology, as in effect we take mathematical physical models and twiddle the knobs. Boom, our world is at a deeply isolated operating point in the configuration space.kairosfocus_{January 21, 2023
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KF @ How exactly is the argument made that the moral law must come from a realm external to us? I have read your text and I cannot find it. For instance, I cannot find it in Cicero. Let’s read:
True law is right reason in agreement with nature,
The law is in agreement with our nature, so, perhaps it can be explained by our nature.
… it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting
Arguably, our nature is also unchanging and everlasting, so it can be true that the law can be explained by our nature.
… it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions.
Well, arguably our nature works that way.
And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked.
Ok, it works that way in good men only.
It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it.
We must act in accord with who we are, our nature. Ok.
And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times,
People are essentially the same everywhere. Ok.
… and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge.
Where does this come from? Where was the argument made that moral laws cannot be explained by human nature? So, I am asking you to elaborate on that particular part of the argument.Origenes_{January 21, 2023
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PM1, do you agree, per 98, that possible worlds can be conceived antecedent to set theory, now generally axiomatised per ZFC in answer to the Russell paradoxes? Where, the idea of sets as collections opened up issues on ill defined, contradictory claims illustrated by the village barber paradox. I presume so, and again highlight 11:
the Quincunx shows by striking demonstration the depth to which logic of structure and quantity pervades our world and points onward to the utter, eerie universality of core mathematics in any possible world as a necessary being structure; the very same issue Eugene Wigner highlighted. The world is so mathematically pervaded, indeed possible being is so mathematically pervaded that it is manifestly akin to mind rather than to utterly non rational chaos; indeed, in many cases, randomness reveals an underlying ordered structure, as this very case demonstrates. Onward, lieth statistical thermodynamics, via the classic case of 500 or 1,000 coins and their distribution, thence the threshold search space challenge at the core of ID, how to get to FSCO/I expressive bit patterns by the blind chance and mechanical necessity the Galton Board illustrates. That context is remarkable, not trivial and readily dismissible.
KF PS, do you further agre that we can use PW concepts to analyse being on what is impossible vs possible, then what is contingent vs necessary? Thus, to see that the contingent are caused [even, were they sustained forever in a given world] and the necessary are part of the fabric for any possible world? Can we agree that as Euclidean Geometry's 5th postulate can be varied to form other geometries, that axiomatisation is not as central as what we may explore on seeing that once we have a definably distinct W, dichotomy and 0,1,2 are already present opening up von Neumann's construction thence NZQRCR* etc as universal core math?kairosfocus_{January 21, 2023
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F.N2: My own argument:
We may readily identify at least seven branch- on- which- we- all- sit (so, inescapable, pervasive), readily knowable first principle . . .
first duties of reason and so too first universally binding laws written into our rational, responsible nature and forming morally driven governing principles of reason, high and low alike:
"Inescapable," as they are so antecedent to and pervasive in our reasoning that even the objector implicitly appeals to their legitimate authority; inescapable, so first truths of reason, i.e. they are self-evidently true and binding. Namely, Ciceronian first duties,
1st - to truth, 2nd - to right reason, 3rd - to prudence [including warrant], 4th - to sound conscience, 5th - to neighbour; so also, 6th - to fairness and 7th - to justice [ . . .] xth - etc.
Likewise, we observe again, that the objector to such duties cannot but appeal to them to give their objections rhetorical traction (i.e. s/he must imply or acknowledge what we are, morally governed, duty-bound creatures to gain any persuasive effect). While also those who try to prove such cannot but appeal to the said principles too. So, these principles are a branch on which we all must sit, including objectors and those who imagine they are to be proved and try. That is, these are manifestly first principles of rational, responsible, honest, conscience guided liberty and so too a built-in framework of law; yes, core natural law of human nature. Reason, inescapably, is morally governed. Of course, there is a linked but not equivalent pattern: bounded, error-prone rationality often tied to ill will and stubbornness or even closed mindedness; that’s why the study of right reason has a sub-study on fallacies and errors. That we sometimes seek to evade duties or may make inadvertent errors does not overthrow such first duties of reason, which instead help us to detect and correct errors, as well as to expose our follies. Perhaps, a negative form will help to clarify, for cause we find to be at best hopelessly error-riddled, those who are habitually untruthful, fallacious and/or irrational, imprudent, fail to soundly warrant claims, show a benumbed or dead conscience [i.e. sociopathy and/or highly machiavellian tendencies], dehumanise and abuse others, are unfair and unjust. At worst, such are utterly dangerous, destructive,or even ruthlessly, demonically lawless. Such built-in . . . thus, universal . . . law, then, is not invented by parliaments, kings or courts, nor can these principles and duties be abolished by such; they are recognised, often implicitly as an indelible part of our evident nature. Hence, "natural law," coeval with our humanity, famously phrased in terms of "self-evident . . . rights . . . endowed by our Creator" in the US Declaration of Independence, 1776. (Cf. Cicero in De Legibus, c. 50 BC.) Indeed, it is on this framework that we can set out to soundly understand and duly balance rights, freedoms and duties; which is justice, the pivot of law. The legitimate main task of government, then, is to uphold and defend the civil peace of justice through sound community order reflecting the built in, intelligible law of our nature. Where, as my right implies your duty a true right is a binding moral claim to be respected in life, liberty, honestly aquired property, innocent reputation etc. To so justly claim a right, one must therefore demonstrably be in the right. Likewise, Aristotle long since anticipated Pilate's cynical "what is truth?": truth says of what is, that it is; and of what is not, that it is not. [Metaphysics, 1011b, C4 BC.] Simple in concept, but hard to establish on the ground; hence -- in key part -- the duties to right reason, prudence, fairness etc. Thus, too, we may compose sound civil law informed by that built-in law of our responsibly, rationally free morally governed nature; from such, we may identify what is unsound or false thus to be reformed or replaced even though enacted under the colour and solemn ceremonies of law. The first duties, also, are a framework for understanding and articulating the corpus of built-in law of our morally governed nature, antecedent to civil laws and manifest our roots in the Supreme Law-giver, the inherently good, utterly wise and just creator-God, the necessary (so, eternal), maximally great being at the root of reality.
This does not require or imply that those who think the gap cannot be bridged are amoral or care nothing about truth and right. It points out that trying to deny the branch on which we sit pervasive nature of such first principles is as futile as trying to prove them -- for one and the same reason. As, so soon as we argue and appeal, we are already calling on these principles and duties. They are self evident and knowable. Pointing out that this happens in case after case of objections is merely highlighting facts open to inspection. What has happened is that we have turned away from and forgotten this frame of thought. For cause, that is an error. KFkairosfocus_{January 21, 2023
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F/N: The core argument I made these many moons ago now, starting with the better known of the two key texts from Cicero:
, On the Republic, Bk 3: {22.} [33] L . . . True law is right reason in agreement with [--> our morally governed] nature , it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it [--> as universally binding core of law], and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people [--> as binding, universal, coeval with our humanity], and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. [--> sound conscience- guided reason will point out the core] And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment. . . . – Marcus Tullius Cicero, c. 55 - 54 BC
Notice, he is here grounding the natural law perspective. That brings John Finnis' remark on legal positivism as a defective version of natural law thought to the fore:
[John Finnis on Natural Law Theories, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:] Natural law theory accepts that law can be considered and spoken of both as a sheer social fact of power and practice, and as a set of reasons for action that can be and often are sound as reasons and therefore normative for reasonable people addressed by them. This dual character of positive law is presupposed by the well-known slogan “Unjust laws are not laws.”
[--> that is, legal rules and rulings as issued are not merely social, observable facts of what has been issued under colour and ceremonies of "law"; cf. SEP on the now dominant Legal Positivism:
"Legal positivism is the thesis that the existence and content of law depends on social facts and not on its merits . . . [as] John Austin (1790–1859) formulated it . . . '[t]he existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another' . . . "
Instead, what is issued under colour and ceremonies of law is inherently, inextricably entangled with and accountable to prior canons of justice, which brings in the Ciceronian framework of first, built in duties and law of responsible reason; 1st - to truth, 2nd - to right reason, 3rd - to prudence [so, warrant], 4th - to sound conscience, 5th - to neighbour, thus (as corollaries) 6th - to fairness and 7th - to justice, [ . . . ] xth - etc. Where, the civil peace of justice is the due balance of rights, freedoms and duties.]
Properly understood, that slogan indicates why—unless based upon some skeptical denial that there are any sound reasons for action (a denial which can be set aside because defending it is self-refuting) [sic] —positivist opposition to natural law theories is pointless, that is redundant: what positivists characteristically see as realities to be affirmed are already affirmed by natural law theory, and what they characteristically see as illusions to be dispelled are no [proper] part of [sound] natural law theory . . . . The point . . . is made in another way by Orrego (Orrego 2007). When the accounts of adjudication and judicial reasoning proposed by contemporary mainstream legal theories are added to those theories’ accounts of (the concept of) law, it becomes clear that, at the level of propositions (as distinct from names, words and formulations), those theories share (though not always without self-contradiction) the principal theses about law which are proposed by classic natural law theorists such as Aquinas: (i) that law establishes reasons for action [--> echoing Cicero's "highest reason"], (ii) that its rules can and presumptively (defeasibly) do create moral obligations that did not as such exist prior to the positing of the rules, (iii) that that kind of legal-moral obligation is defeated by a posited rule’s serious immorality (injustice), and (iv) that judicial and other paradigmatically legal deliberation, reasoning and judgment includes, concurrently, both natural (moral) law and (purely) positive law. Contemporary “positivist” theories are, it seems, [--> inadvertently!] natural law theories, distinguished from the [historic] main body of natural law theory (a) by their denial that the theory of law (as distinct from the theory or theories of adjudication, judicial duty, citizens’ allegiance, etc.) necessarily or most appropriately tackles the related matters just listed [as i to iv], and accordingly (b) by the incompleteness of their theories of law, that is, the absence from them (and usually, though not always, from their accounts of those related matters) of systematic critical attention to the foundations of the moral and other normative claims that they make or presuppose. In short: a natural law theory of (the nature of) law seeks both to give an account of the facticity of law and to answer questions that remain central to understanding law. As listed by Green 2019 (having observed that “No legal philosopher can be only a legal positivist”), these further questions (which “legal positivism does not aspire to answer”) are: What kinds of things could possibly count as the merits of law? What role should law play in adjudication? What claim has law on our obedience? What laws should we have? And should we have law at all?
This brings out that the Ciceronian first duties of reason are also first law, law being understood, per Intro to De Legibus:
—Marcus [in de Legibus, introductory remarks,. C1 BC, being Cicero himself]: . . . we shall have to explain the true nature of moral justice, which is congenial and correspondent [36]with the true nature of man [--> we are seeing the root vision of natural law, coeval with our humanity] . . . . With respect to the true principle of justice, many learned men have maintained that it springs from Law. I hardly know if their opinion be not correct, at least, according to their own definition; for . “Law (say they) is the highest reason, implanted in nature, which prescribes those things which ought to be done, and forbids the contrary” . . . . They therefore conceive that the voice of conscience is a law, that moral prudence is a law [--> a key remark] , whose operation is to urge us to good actions, and restrain us from evil ones . . . . According to the Greeks, therefore, the name of law implies an equitable distribution of goods: according to the Romans [--> esp. Cicero, speaking as a leading statesman], an equitable discrimination between good and evil. The true definition of law should, however, include both these characteristics. And this being granted as an almost self–evident proposition, the origin of justice is to be sought in the divine law of eternal and immutable morality. This indeed is the true energy of nature, the very soul and essence of wisdom, the test of virtue and vice.
[--> this points to the wellsprings of reality, the only place where is and ought can be bridged; bridged, through the inherently good utterly wise, maximally great necessary being, the creator God, which adequately answers the Euthyphro dilemma and Hume's guillotine argument surprise on seeing reasoning is-is then suddenly a leap to ought-ought. IS and OUGHT are fused from the root]
This indeed is the true energy of nature, the very soul and essence of wisdom, the test of virtue and vice.
Notice, “Law (say they) is the highest reason, implanted in nature, which prescribes those things which ought to be done, and forbids the contrary.” So, the is-ought gap must be addressed, which raises ontological, root reality questions.kairosfocus_{January 21, 2023
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Origenes, that is a significant argument, but it is significantly different. I will lay out my actual argument regarding first duties, as a F/N. I think it is highly unfair to project to me that I am arguing religion, or am saying others are unconcerned about truth, duty, good, right etc [as I noted overnight, my point pivots on the branch on which we sit character of first duties, even when we try to object]. My point is that Cicero put his finger on something when he summarised the classical deposit, that there are certain built-in first duties of lawful character. I noticed, that the attempt to object to them or to their binding nature itself appeals to them, revealing branch on which we sit, pervasive first principle, self evident character. Our responsible, rational freedom is morally governed through these first duties. Which, are knowable and coeval with our nature. That undermines radical relativism, subjectivism, emotivism etc and it is plain from many such as Provine, Crick and Rosenberg etc, that evolutionary materialistic scientism does open the door to nihilism thus lawlessness. That is underscored by the history of C20. Going beyond, as we operate on both sides of is-ought, it is reasonable to seek a bridge. That points to root reality and there is a serious candidate necessary being root of reality that does bridge the gap, the inherently good, utterly wise creator God, a necessary and maximally great being. That is a significant feature of ethical theism, which it is only fair to have on the table. It is also fair comment to note that such a serious candidate NB either is impossible of being or is actual, which points a way back to the proper focus for the thread. KFkairosfocus_{January 21, 2023
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Kairosfocus @
… what could be clearer than that the first duties and principles of reason are a branch on which we all sit, so that when we see attempts to object to their self evident character [it seems, therefore placing them in a relativist or subjectivist context etc . . . ], we consistently see appeals to the same duties and principles? As in, sawing off the branch on which we all sit.
KF, is the following a correct breakdown of your argument in premises and conclusion? 1.) There are moral & logical rules for all of us. 2.) We humans are all subjective and very different from each other. From (2.) 3.) We, on our own, would never arrive at shared moral & logical rules. Therefore, from (1.) and (3.) 4.) Shared moral & logical rules must come from an external source.Origenes_{January 21, 2023
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VL “I really appreciate your post, Vivid,” You and I are never going to agree on many things but over the years I have grown to appreciate you. You are an extremely intelligent individual and a whiz at math, an area I suck at. God bless PS: KF has some legitimate beefs as well. Vividvividbleau_{January 20, 2023
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KF Yes I understand you must get frustrated as well. You gotta know by now that I agree with your views wholeheartedly. I am just trying to bridge the gap. I want to thank you for being the warrior you are. Vividvividbleau_{January 20, 2023
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I really appreciate your post, Vivid, trying to mediate some understanding between two different points of view and different people. Although addressed to JVL, I think I’m referenced enough that I can respond for myself. First, yes, I am quite concerned with truth and morality, and think I have some good, valid views on those subjects. You write, “ It can be irksome if you get the sense from KF that you are not concerned about them. Or because you don’t agree with his metaphysics you are neither moral or concerned about truth. I think you are misreading him. I think he is talking about “grounding” issues not the former.” I think it is clear that KF does think that because I don’t agree with his metaphysics I have no grounding to talk about morals or truth, and that is irksome. I don’t think I’m misreading him on that. And I’m not sure what you mean by grounding issues, but I think the key difference is that he thinks his metaphysics concerning these topics are self-evidently true, and thus dismisses those of us who disagree. I think it’s obvious that we are not going to resolve our differences by coming to fundamental agreement, and for that reason perhaps (or maybe more than perhaps) I should quit getting in this recurring discussion. And yes, he does come across as “lecturing” those of us who are wrong, and that is also irksome. I will admit that I may be driven more by being irked by a number of things about KF than by more positive feelings about the value of the discussions. There is no sense in my continuing to respond to things he says again and again when I know my response will have no effect. I will try to learn my lesson.Viola Lee_{January 20, 2023
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VB (& attn others above), what could be clearer than that the first duties and principles of reason are a branch on which we all sit, so that when we see attempts to object to their self evident character [it seems, therefore placing them in a relativist or subjectivist context etc . . . ], we consistently see appeals to the same duties and principles? As in, sawing off the branch on which we all sit. The point here, is there is an epistemic warrant that it is self evidently the case that our reasoning is morally governed: inescapable, so pervasive binding first principles and duties. And if one does mean, one is NOT appealing to duties to truth, right reason or warrant, on what basis do they expect us to respond? Whatever arguments move people emotively? Habits? Social conventions that happen to say that valid arguments are important and so is cooperation? Why? No, I think the problem I see is that there is abundant evidence of the branch on which we sit first principles and duties, but that evidence is pointing in directions that the dominant worldviews and cultural agendas do not want to go. Towards the roots of reality and the is ought gap thence the bridging challenge that would unify our reasoning. Further, from the beginning I pointed to the inescapability of such moral government of reason. Time after time, objecting arguments imply the very appeals and so provide evidence of their branch on which we sit nature. Epictetus' approach on first principles of logic applies:
DISCOURSES CHAPTER XXV How is logic necessary? When someone in [Epictetus'] audience said, Convince me that logic is necessary, he answered: Do you wish me to demonstrate this to you?—Yes.—Well, then, must I use a demonstrative argument?—And when the questioner had agreed to that, Epictetus asked him. How, then, will you know if I impose upon you?—As the man had no answer to give, Epictetus said: Do you see how you yourself admit that all this instruction is necessary, if, without it, you cannot so much as know whether it is necessary or not? [ --> Notice, inescapable, thus self evidently true and antecedent to the inferential reasoning that provides deductive proofs and frameworks, including axiomatic systems and propositional calculus etc. We here see the first principles of right reason in action. Cf J. C. Wright]
How do you think the man who challenged him felt? I must point out, then, that my arguments TURN ON highlighting the fact of our sense of duty to truth, right reason, right conduct etc. They do not imply that we lack such concerns, but go on to how do we ground them, post Hume and his guillotine. How, then could I imply or invite that objectors are not concerned regarding duty to truth or to do the right etc? When, I am arguing by pointing to how their objections appeal to these very principles, just as predicted? No, again, the issue is grounding at source of reality level, given that there is an is-ought gap, that there are worldviews that assert there is no grounding for morality, or even for objective knowledge or responsible rational freedom. Crick, Provine and many more show that, Dawkins too. Provine, for reference:
Naturalistic evolution has clear consequences that Charles Darwin understood perfectly. 1) No gods worth having exist; 2) no life after death exists; 3) no ultimate foundation for ethics exists; 4) no ultimate meaning in life exists; and 5) human free will is nonexistent
[==> key theses of nihilism. Citing the just linked IEP: "Nihilism is the belief that all values are baseless and that nothing can be known or communicated. It is often associated with extreme pessimism and a radical skepticism that condemns existence. A true nihilist would believe in nothing, have no loyalties, and no purpose other than, perhaps, an impulse to destroy. While few philosophers would claim to be nihilists, nihilism is most often associated with Friedrich Nietzsche who argued that its corrosive effects would eventually destroy all moral, religious, and metaphysical convictions and precipitate the greatest crisis in human history." As without rational, responsible freedom, rationality collapses, Provine implies self referential incoherence. Similarly, ethical foundations include our self evident, pervasive first duties of reason: to truth, right reason, warrant and wider prudence, fairness and justice etc. Provine has given a recipe for gross (and all too common) intellectual irresponsibility.]
. . . . The first 4 implications are so obvious to modern naturalistic evolutionists that I will spend little time defending them. Human free will, however, is another matter. Even evolutionists have trouble swallowing that implication. I will argue that humans are locally determined systems that make choices. They have, however, no free will [--> without responsible freedom, mind, reason and morality alike disintegrate into grand delusion, hence self-referential incoherence and self-refutation. But that does not make such fallacies any less effective in the hands of clever manipulators] . . . [1998 Darwin Day Keynote Address, U of Tenn -- and yes, that is significant i/l/o the Scopes Trial, 1925]
That, I point out that such expresses or invites nihilism is simple fair comment. Wikipedia's confession:
Nihilism (/?na?(h)?l?z?m, ?ni?-/; from Latin nihil 'nothing') is a philosophy, or family of views within philosophy, that rejects generally accepted or fundamental aspects of human existence,[1][2] such as objective truth, knowledge, morality, values, or meaning.[3][4] The term was popularized by Ivan Turgenev, and more specifically by his character Bazarov in the novel Fathers and Sons. There have been different nihilist positions, including that human values are baseless, that life is meaningless, that knowledge is impossible, or that some set of entities do not exist or are meaningless or pointless.[5][6]
I think I am seeing attempts to dismiss that self evidence rooted in repeatedly shown branch on which we sit pervasive first principle status, multiplied by distractive polarising projections: condescending etc. (What could be more "condescending" than asserting away a whole class of arguments made for a long time, as though they don't exist then setting up and knocking over a strawman as I had to point out earlier today?) Next, what could be clearer that I am focussing on ontological roots, than speaking to the roots of reality? Further, I have put on the table a candidate for that root, noting that that candidate would both exist and would exist as inherently good and utterly wise. Thus, the is-ought gap, on this worldview option would be bridged from the root, securing a clean framework in which everything stemming from the root can freely access that bridge. Going on, that candidate is a serious candidate necessary being. That entails, either impossible of being as described, or actual. One could call an entity God and suggest no relevance to goodness etc, but that would be a massively question begging redefinition. One that would rightly be rejected. So, if one is serious about truth, right, good, virtue, duty, etc, why, why fundamentally. KFkairosfocus_{January 20, 2023
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JVL “Don’t you think the point is that Kairosfocus asks us to use logic and reason but when we do he tells us we’re doing it wrong?” A couple of thoughts.Tell me where I am missing the boat. I think both you and VL get frustrated with KF for a number of reasons. 1) No one likes to be lectured too and as much as I love the guy he can come off as a lecturer not a hearer. I don’t think that is true but I can see why one could feel that way 2) Although I don’t know what you or VL ‘s metaphysical positional starting points are ( I wish I did) they definitely are not KF’s starting point. So until that disagreement gets resolved it is understandable by both you and VL that he is not listening to what you have to say. You are talking past each other.. 3) Although I don’t know either of you personally from your writings I think the both of you are very much concerned about morality, in short you are moral people. You both are very much concerned about truth and it can be irksome if you get the sense from KF that you are not concerned about them. Or because you don’t agree with his metaphysics you are neither moral or concerned about truth. I think you are misreading him. I think he is talking about “grounding” issues not the former. Anyway may I have change for my two cents? Vividvividbleau_{January 20, 2023
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Kairosfocus@11 I think this post is the quintessence of the most comprehensive answer to the OP question, "Is The Galton Board Evidence For Intelligent Design Of The Universe?", which is a positive and certain Yes. The Galton Board and its statistics are merely one of countless examples of the intricate intelligent mathematical organization of the Universe and our reality. I had a similar thought , but couldn't immediately come up with a good formulation.doubter_{January 20, 2023
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Origenes: Here you are simply whining about the fact that Kairosfocus does not agree with you. HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!JVL_{January 20, 2023
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KK, it is condescending to start a sentence with, "Ahem, do you not see ..." Just say what you want to say, but don't imply some level of blindness on the part of the person you are addressing.Viola Lee_{January 20, 2023
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KJ writes, "1: Naked denial of a case on the table that does bridge the gap and at root level of reality." Explain. Be more specific. What case are you talking about? KF writes, "2: Our sense of oughtness is a fact, indeed. Yes, it is a fact. That doesn't mean it comes from the root of reality. Explain how you know our sense of oughtness from the root of reality. This is the crux of the matter. I don't think the root of reality cares at all how humans behave. A sense of oughtness is a contingent fact about human beings, as are many other qualities, but that doesn't mean they come from the root of reality. That's the key issue.Viola Lee_{January 20, 2023
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VL, pointing out a frequently side stepped fact, which you just put on the table again by sitting on the branch you are trying to saw off, is not "condescending," which by now is just a way to poison the well. I have already answered substantially and FP et al can answer for themselves. KFkairosfocus_{January 20, 2023
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VL: I respond in steps of thought: >>As I said above, “There is no bridge across the is-ought gap. “Is” is about reality. “Ought” is about judgments people make about how to behave. There is always a gap that is filled in by individual choice.”>> 1: Naked denial of a case on the table that does bridge the gap and at root level of reality. 2: Our sense of oughtness is a fact, indeed, your argument turns on the binding nature of first duties to truth, right reason etc that you think I am in breach of. 3: Arthur Holmes is on point:
However we may define the good, however well we may calculate consequences, to whatever extent we may or may not desire certain consequences, none of this of itself implies any obligation of command. That something is or will be does not imply that we ought to seek it. We can never derive an “ought” from a premised “is” unless the ought is somehow already contained in the premise . . . . R. M. Hare . . . raises the same point. Most theories, he argues, simply fail to account for the ought that commands us: subjectivism reduces imperatives to statements about subjective states, egoism and utilitarianism reduce them to statements about consequences, emotivism simply rejects them because they are not empirically verifiable, and determinism reduces them to causes rather than commands . . . . Elizabeth Anscombe’s point is well made. We have a problem introducing the ought into ethics unless, as she argues, we are morally obligated by law – not a socially imposed law, ultimately, but divine law . . . . This is precisely the problem with modern ethical theory in the West . . . it has lost the binding force of divine commandments . . . . [For instance,] If we admit that we all equally have the right to be treated as persons, then it follows that we have the duty to respect one another accordingly. Rights bring correlative duties: my rights . . . imply that you ought to respect these rights. [Arthur F. Holmes, Ethics, (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1984), p. 81.]
>>Your belief that there must be such a bridge at the root of reality is a faith-based belief,>> 4: Them's fighting words, given the widespread subtext of contempt towards "faith" and "religion," which by writing in this way, you invite in the door. 5: In fact, I showed a serious candidate, well known in the history of ideas and discussed on worldviews level abductive inference to the best explanation, informed by logic of necessary being. 6: Further, I highlighted something we can warrant to self evident certainty, we all sit on the branch together where even the objector must appeal to known first duties of reason, i.e. we can know and should acknowledge that our responsible rational freedom is morally governed. Branch on which we all sit inevitability of reason, so, pervasive, self evident first principles and duties that govern reason, indeed also our first built in law the root of just and prudent government and governance more broadly. To wit, following Cicero:
1st – to truth, 2nd – to right reason, 3rd – to prudence [including warrant], 4th – to sound conscience, 5th – to neighbour; so also, 6th – to fairness and 7th – to justice [ . . .] xth – etc.
7: But, that is obviously, a bitter pill to swallow and so objectors repeatedly, predictably demonstrate further cases of how it governs argument and reason. >> but as I have repeatedly said, the only arguments for such that you seem to offer is one of consequences:>> 8: Why do you keep acting as if the above line of worldviews level inference to best explanation i/l/o self evident first duties and law does not exist? You may disagree, with due reason . . . oops! . . . but there it is, has been for some time now. 9: That denial is so striking it calls for explanation and invites cognitive dissonance by projection to the other analysis. This is the key and main argument, ponder closely why you have repeatedly acted as though it were not there, the better to pounce on what you imagine is a weak argument. >> that if such does not exist and is not believed in, then nihilism follows.>> 10: Actually, a strawman. My actual argument on this point is first, objectors sit on the same branch with the rest of us and so we find a cluster of self evident truths on first duties, first principles and first law of responsible rational freedom. 11: This is epistemological, an argument drawing out self evidence, building on say this from Epictetus:
DISCOURSES CHAPTER XXV How is logic necessary? When someone in [Epictetus'] audience said, Convince me that logic is necessary, he answered: Do you wish me to demonstrate this to you?—Yes.—Well, then, must I use a demonstrative argument?—And when the questioner had agreed to that, Epictetus asked him. How, then, will you know if I impose upon you?—As the man had no answer to give, Epictetus said: Do you see how you yourself admit that all this instruction is necessary, if, without it, you cannot so much as know whether it is necessary or not? [ --> Notice, inescapable, thus self evidently true and antecedent to the inferential reasoning that provides deductive proofs and frameworks, including axiomatic systems and propositional calculus etc. We here see the first principles of right reason in action. Cf J. C. Wright]
12: The attempt to deny and dismiss such self evident truth is hopelessly self referentially incoherent as one is trying to saw off the branch on which one is sitting on. Further, denial of such first logical, moral and epistemological principles undermines rationality, prudence and knowledge, which does by its nature invite nihilism, denial and dismissal of knowledge, principle, reason etc. 13: Which is a manifest fact on recent centuries of history, too, with terrible consequences. 14: In this context, logic of being issues obtain. They point to the root of reality and highlight the need for an adequate cause for such an objective state of knowledge and duty. 15: There is a serious candidate, the inherently good, utterly wise creator God, a necessary and maximally great being. God as candidate would be one unified entity so uniting inextricably goodness and being, in the very root of all worlds. That bridges is and ought. 16: Further, utter wisdom and power to create worlds gives ability to effect domains in which responsible, rational creatures with freedom can know and live by sound principles and duties of self evident character. 17: Maximal greatness implies that such a candidate -- notice, CANDIDATE, not assumption or naked assertion -- would have good attributes to maximal compossible degree. 18: Serious candidate NECESSARY being, implies either impossible of being [as a Euclidean plane square circle is, incoherent core characteristics], or actual as possible and framework to worlds. 19: To dismiss, perhaps not serious, but the history of ideas of our civilisation is undeniable, not a promising approach. Likewise, the argument from evil self defeats and is dead post Plantinga. So, there is no good reason to hold impossible of being, either. KFkairosfocus_{January 20, 2023
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JVL@
Kairosfocus asks us to use logic and reason but when we do he tells us we’re doing it wrong?
Here you are simply whining about the fact that Kairosfocus does not agree with you. **Newsflash**: that won't happen any time soon.Origenes_{January 20, 2023
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Vividbleau: Does he have any duty to address the issues? Don't you think the point is that Kairosfocus asks us to use logic and reason but when we do he tells us we're doing it wrong? That he will always object to any point made if it disagrees with his pre-held beliefs and biases? That he's not really carrying on a dialogue at all? He's just pushing his agenda which he clearly states is an attempt to 'correct' our invalid views.JVL_{January 20, 2023
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VL “Address the issues: don’t shoo me away by condescendingly saying,…” Why not? Does KF have a duty to not be condescending? Does he have any duty to address the issues? I’m confused as to why you are objecting as if he should not be doing what you personally don’t want him to do. Does he have some kind of duty to you? That’s the only way I can make sense of your objection. Vividvividbleau_{January 19, 2023
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