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Mark Frank poses an interesting thought experiment on free will

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In a comment on kairosfocus’ latest excellent post, Does ID ASSUME “contra-causal free will” and “intelligence” (and so injects questionable “assumptions”)?, Mark Frank proposes a thought experiment in support of his view that determinism is fully compatible with free will. It goes as follows:

Start with a dog. Dogs make choices in the sense that they may accept or reject a treat, may obey or disobey an order, may chase a rabbit or not. Suppose we advance our understanding of dogs’ brains and thought processes so that a genius vet can predict with 100% accuracy how a dog will choose in any given situation given its past history and current circumstances. Surely this is conceivable? If we manage this do we now say that dogs are making real choices? If it they are real choices then this is compatibilism in action. So I guess, in these circumstances, you would say that we have shown they do not really have free will.

Now extend it to infants – say two year olds. They make choices – eat or don’t eat, cry or don’t cry, hug or don’t hug. So let’s imagine we repeat the process with them. A genius paediatrician in this case (maybe you one day!). Are the infants also lacking free will? Either compatabilism is true or they haven’t got free will.

OK. Now apply it to an adult human. If it is conceivable for a dog and an infant then surely it is conceivable for an adult. A genius psychologist observes an adult and is able to predict all their decisions and explain why – exactly how each decision is determined by their genetics, personal history and current environment (it doesn’t have to be a materialist explanation). Has that adult got free will? Either compatabilism is true or they haven’t got free will.

And finally apply to yourself. Suppose it turns out a genius psychologist has been monitoring you all your life and has been able to correctly predict all your decisions and also how the decision making process worked in detail – how your different motivations were balanced and interacted with your perceptions and memories resulting in each decision (including any dithering and worrying about whether you got it right). Would that mean you thought you had free will but actually didn’t? Either compatabilism is true or you haven’t got free will.

As my computer is currently kaput, this will be a very short post. I’d like to suggest that what Mark Frank has left out of the equation is language, the capacity for which is what differentiates us from other animals. (Human infants possess this capacity but do not yet exercise it, partly because their brains, when they are newborn, are still too immature for language production, and also because they have yet to build up a linguistic databank that would enable them to express what they want to get across.)

Language is central to human rationality because rationality is not just a matter of selecting the appropriate means to realize a desired end: it is also a critical activity, in which agents are expected to be able to justify their choices and respond to questions like “Why did you do that?” People don’t just act rationally; they give reasons for their actions. In order to do that, you need a language in which you can generate an indefinitely large number of sentences, as the range of possible situations in which you might find yourself is potentially infinite – particularly when we factor in the little complicating circumstances that may arise.

What is distinctive about human language, as opposed to animal “language,” is precisely this ability to generate an infinite number of sentences. This uniquely human ability was the subject of a recent article in the Washington Post titled, Chirps, whistles, clicks: Do any animals have a true ‘language’?, which was discussed in a recent post by News (emphases are mine – VJT):

A new study on animal calls has found that the patterns of barks, whistles, and clicks from seven different species appear to be more complex than previously thought. The researchers used mathematical tests to see how well the sequences of sounds fit to models ranging in complexity…

“We’re still a very, very long way from understanding this transition from animal communication to human language, and it’s a huge mystery at the moment,” said study author and zoologist Arik Kershenbaum, who did the work at the National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis…

“What makes human language special is that there’s no finite limit as to what comes next,” he said….

But what separates language from communication? Why can’t we assume that whales, with their elaborate songs, are simply speaking “whale-ese”?

To be considered a true language, there are a few elements that are usually considered to be essential, says Kershenbaum. For one, it must be learned rather than instinctive — both whales and birds have this piece covered. For instance, killer whale calves learn a repertoire of calls from their mothers, and the sounds gradually evolve from erratic screams to adult-like pulsed calls and whistles.

What holds whales and other animals back from language is that there is a limit to what they can express. There are only so many calls that each may convey different emotions, but only we have an unlimited ability to express abstract ideas.

The problem for scientists is that no one knows how language evolved. Oddly enough, there don’t seem to be any transitional proto-languages between whale and bird songs — said to be the most sophisticated animal calls — and our own speech.

There are two conflicting theories of how language evolved in humans. The first is that human language evolved slowly and gradually, just as most traits evolved in the animal world. So perhaps it started with gestures, and then words and sentences. Or language may have started out more like bird song — with complex but meaningless sounds — and the last stage was attaching meaning to these sounds.

Reading the last paragraph in the passage quoted above brings to mind Nobel Laureate John Eccles’ derisive remarks about “promissory materialism.” The fact is that scientists haven’t got a clue how language evolved – and for a very good reason. The gap between the law-governed deterministic processes we observe in Nature and the infinite flexibility of human language is an unbridgeable one.

That is why no psychologist could ever, even in principle, predict everything that a rational adult human being will think, say and do. Language, which is fundamentally unpredictable, is part of the warp-and-woof of human life. Hence the antecedent in Mark Frank’s thought experiment – “What if a psychologist could predict every decision that you make?” – is impossible, by definition.

Back in 1957, behaviorist B. F. Skinner wrote a best-selling book with the amusing title, Verbal Behavior. I hope readers can see now why language is much more than mere behavior.

Thoughts?

Comments
Graham2: I have said very clearly that not all our outputs are controlled by free will. If you call decision any human output, many of those decisions will have no free will involved. Many decisions are automatic, effected by mental habits. I would say that we exercise free choice all the time in our mental states, but not all the components of our metal activity are equally controlled by free choice. Probably, we could day that one of the ways we choose is that we choose on what we intervene.gpuccio
September 5, 2014
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gp: where free choice is involved ... so it is possible for us to make a decision where free will is NOT involved ? Could you provide an example ?Graham2
September 5, 2014
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Mark #213: Maybe you intuitively recognized the mystic truth that we are just the two faces of the same reality (just a joke! ;) )gpuccio
September 5, 2014
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Mark: You say:
I do of course understand the grammatical difference – but it seems to me that while I am a subject from my point of view, I am an object from your point of view.
IT's not the grammatical different which is important. It's the essential difference. What I perceive is your behaviour and your body and your outputs, not your "I". I can perceive only my own subjective consciousness. It's not a question of grammar. An object can be the subject of a verb, as in "the stone hit the table". But thst's not the meaning of "subject" in my arguments. The meaning is "an identity which perceives and represents, which has subjective experiences". You say:
And yet it varies in an inherently unpredictable manner within the constraints of determinism. I need to understand what it is rather than what it is not.
It is unpredictable, but that does not mean that it is random. It is a "third way": a conscious free choice. It is an important part of what exists, maybe the most important. Can you understand what matter is? What energy is? What consciousness is? What pain or joy are? We cannot "understand" those things. We know they exists, and we can describe laws about how they interact, but that's all. I suspect that by "understanding" you just mean: "I must be able to explain consciousness, the I and free choices in terms of the only things that I believe to be real, that is matter and energy or you name it". That only means that you want to reduce reality to what you already accept. It's called "reductionism" and, IMO, it is not a good approach to knowledge.
Why not? Random is about what caused (or did not cause) the event to happen. It is not about its significance to people.
We both know that random has many meanings. If you just mean "unpredictable", well I can accept that. But that does not mean anything relevant, just that nobody can predict what the free choice will be (that's why we call it free). About significance, you equivocate. The significance of a free choice is not "to people". It's inherent to the choice itself, and that's why the choice influences in different ways the destiny of the individual who makes it. So, the moral significance of the choice is a property of the choice itself, like spin is a property of a particle (just a metaphor, don't take it literally) :).
The eruption of a volcano can bring about changes both good and bad which affect our personal destiny.I think what you are talking about is that these events with the added free will component make us morally responsible for those acts. But that is an effect of the added free will component. It doesn’t tell me what the component is and why it is not random.
I have more or less answered that. I will only specify that the eruption of a volcano can change our destiny, but is not under our free control, as far as I know. Our free choices can change our destiny because of the moral significance they have, therefore because of a specific property of the choice itself which originated from our I (we have control on what choice to make, either a good one or a bad one, before we do it). Of course, after we have made a choice, we have no more control on it, and it will influence our destiny as any other external factor.
That is evading the point. We both agree choices affect our personal destiny. I am asking what is the magic element about a choice that makes it different from a random event. To say the difference is that it is a real choice is hardly an answer.(If it is random then it is not the case that we must choose it. Random entails not determined by what preceded it).
In you view, choices affect our destiny, but they are not free. IOWs, you use "choice" as I use "decision". It is not important that a choice (intended as a deterministic/random pattern on which we have no control) influences us. In that sense, it is not different form a volcano, only it is a volcano erupting in our mind. We have no more control on it than we have on the volcano. I know, you will say that we have control because it happens in our mind, but that's exactly where I firmly believe that compatibilism is a trick. "Control", in our human meaning, means another thing. Of course, if you accept that you can say that a switch "controls" the light, then you can say anything.
You have answered the second half of the question by talking about the moral implications but you haven’t told me what that additional element is. I am trying to understand how an event can be both non-determined and non-random and I cannot see an answer. I think that in the end you will say it comes down to some intuition. I don’t share that intuition. But the point I want to make is that it is a perfectly coherent view to say that I don’t have the intuition but these are still real choices with moral implications.
Again the random thing. Random means many things: a) Events which are fully deterministic, but that we cannot describe in a deterministic model, because we don't know all the variables or because it is too complex. "Random" means that we can describe them by a probability distribution of some kind. b) Events which (probably) obey only a probability distribution, but are not fully determined (like wave function collapse in QM). However, "random" always describes a pattern by which we describe the events: a probabilistic distribution. Choices can probably be described, on big numbers, by a probabilistic distribution. But I believe that this fact is explained by the many deterministic variables which influence them. IOWs they are like a), but with an error factor which can well not obey any deterministic or probabilistic rule (the free choice). Free choices, if they exist, would share with b) the fact that they are not deterministic. We have no idea if they obey any probabilistic distribution, because we cannot really observe the free choice itself. In a context of libertarian free will, they are characterized by a moral significance which is intrinsic to the choice and determines its effect on ourselves. (because making good or bad choices has different effect on the person who makes them). I know you say you don't share the intuitions on which the libertarian model is based. I am fine with that, because in my model it is a free choice, and must be respected. As you asked about details of how my model works, I tried to answer.gpuccio
September 5, 2014
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Graham2 #211: "So the ‘I’ is influencing the decisions we make. Have we established that much ?" Yes. At least, the decisions where free choice is involved. As I have said, it is possible that some "decisions" are mostly, or completely, automatic.gpuccio
September 5, 2014
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#210 GP Just seen that this was also addressed to me. It seems to be primarily about the hard problem of consciousness. Of course I accept that people (and indeed many species of animal) have subjective experiences and this makes them different from other objects that don't. I just think that makes them a special type of object. I think what confused me was the use of the word "subject" to refer to objects which have subjective experiences. I suspect this is only a semantic confusion.Mark Frank
September 4, 2014
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GP #212 was addressed to you but I accidentally began it with my own name! (I wonder if I did that out of free will or not?)Mark Frank
September 4, 2014
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Mark:
Not understanding the difference between an object and a subject is somewhat a problem for our discussion…
I do of course understand the grammatical difference – but it seems to me that while I am a subject from my point of view, I am an object from your point of view.
However: the additional element is that the act of choosing is not random.
And yet it varies in an inherently unpredictable manner within the constraints of determinism.  I need to understand what it is rather than what it is not.
What we choose is morally good or bad, it can be in tune with our deeper nature, or with more superficial parts of our being. IOWs, the representations that we choose to “help” or “discourage” have different moral meaning for our I and for its destiny. So, there is nothing random in that.
Why not? Random is about what caused (or did not cause) the event to happen. It is not about its significance to people.
There is the constant freedom of the I to choose what is “good” or choose what is “bad” (but can absolutely be more desirable if a more superficial context of representation is adopted). Choosing what is “good” has certain effects on our condition, choosing what is “bad” has different effects. the cumulative effect of our choices, both good and bad, changes what we are and our personal destiny.
The eruption of a volcano can bring about changes both good and bad which affect our personal destiny.I think what you are talking about is that these events with the added free will component make us morally responsible for those acts. But that is an effect of the added free will component. It doesn’t tell me what the component is and why it is not random.
The real difference is this: libertarian free will is the belief that our personal destiny can be changed by us. Really, not only because we seem to choose what we must choose anyway.
That is evading the point.  We both agree choices affect our personal destiny. I am asking what is the magic element about a choice that makes it different from a random event. To say the difference is that it is a real choice is hardly an answer.(If it is random then it is not the case that we must choose it. Random entails not determined by what preceded it).
You may ask how does the I know what representations are good and what are bad. That does not come from intellectual reasoning (although intellectual reasoning can be part of the representations). It comes from intuition of the fundamental values of our consciousness. That is what has been called, for millennia, “moral conscience”.
That is a different debate which applies even if you accept determinism and/or compatabilism. In summary – I asked:
So what is the additional element  that differentiates it from a random outcome, and why does this additional element matter?
You have answered the second half of the question by talking about the moral implications but you haven’t told me what that additional element is. I am trying to understand how an event can be both non-determined and non-random and I cannot see an answer. I think that in the end you will say it comes down to some intuition. I don’t share that intuition. But the point I want to make is that it is a perfectly coherent view to say that I don’t have the intuition but these are still real choices with moral implications.Mark Frank
September 4, 2014
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Gp: I don't know about mark, but Im not too fussed about what 'I' is, or how it behaves at a detailed level, all Im trying to get is some idea of whether it is involved in making decisions or not. You say: ...it (I) is very active in choice... So the 'I' is influencing the decisions we make. Have we established that much ?Graham2
September 4, 2014
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Graham2 (and Mark): I have tried to explain a possible model of how the I interacts and contributes to decisions in mt post #200 to Mark. I paste the relevant part here: "Certainly, the I interacts with the body, mainly through the brain interface. A possible model is that the I is constantly connected to brain activities, probably at quantum level. The “choice” could express itself by modifying the quantum state of critical brain events, maybe at the wave function collapse level. Psychologically, the choice can be seen for example in this way: different representations are perceived by the I, corresponding to different possible feelings or actions. The I can interact with brain events so that some representations gain strength and others lose it. The following interaction between different neural networks, which expresses itself as an observable decision, is therefore changed. So, I believe that the I does something. You will never understand or accept this model because you insist in considering the I as an object, made of parts and subject to the same laws as material objects. But that is not the case. The I is a subject, a transcendental subject. Perceiving and willing are its natural properties, and its perceptions are conditioned by its inputs, while the I itself conditions its outputs. So, I am not sure of why you call the I “a passive enabler”. The I is never passive. It is “passive” in perception because that is the meaning of perception itself: let the forms of outer events “enter” consciousness (be represented). And it is very active in choice, because that is the meaning of choice: shaping reality so that it may be different from what it would be if our choices were absent, or simply different." Moreover, I am not "pushing back" anything. The I is obviously the origin of choices, if free choices exist (that is what we are debating). I will just mention here some of the strange statements that you and Mark have been making in the last few posts (certainly, in perfect good faith). Mark (post #202). "I don’t think it makes any difference to this specific argument whether the “I” is an object or a subject (not that I understand the difference)" (Emphasis mine). You (post #206): "All the moral issues are a distraction," (in a debate about free will) You (post #209, to Mung): "What is the ‘I’: This is your problem, not mine." Now, I am perplexed. Are you and Mark denying the existence of subjectivity and of conscious experiences? Are those things just ad hoc inventions of creationists? Have you already solved the hard problem of consciousness deciding that it does not exist? I quote Chalmers here, for reference: "It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does."gpuccio
September 4, 2014
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Mung: Yes, Ive eaten when not hungry (eg: for politeness) How do I decide: Its a physiological process, the usual stuff. Why do I decide: Not really a sensible question. There is no 'why'. What is the 'I': This is your problem, not mine.Graham2
September 4, 2014
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Mark, You seriously can't think of any good reason someone could have for believing in a necessary being? And you don't think that appealing to things popping into and out of existence willy nilly with no reason or cause is not "invoking some kind of mystical mumbo jumbo"? If what you describe is actually going on in our world, how on earth does science work? Magic?Mung
September 4, 2014
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Graham2, have you ever eaten even though you were not hungry? Also, how and why do you decide that you are hungry? Lastly, who or what is this "I" that "you" are trying to feed?Mung
September 4, 2014
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gp: scarce or no contribution of free will That's an odd statement. If free will 'contributes' to the decision, then we are exactly back to the starting question: How does 'free will' 'contribute'?. The agent making the decision is constantly being pushed back to the soul, the 'I', free will, etc etc. My point (and I think MF) is: How does this agent contribute to the decision?. Its exactly the same question we have been chasing all along. All the moral issues are a distraction, just concentrate on a simple example. (like a sandwich).Graham2
September 4, 2014
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Graham2: As I have tried to explain, making a sandwich is a decision, not necessarily a relevant choice. Now, making a sandwich (or not making it) when we feel that it will bad for us to eat it (but still we desire to eat it) is more probably a context where free choice could have an important role. IOWs, some decisions are trivial, and do not have a great relevance. Many of them could be automatic, with scarce of no contribution of free will. However, it is always a good use of free will trying to live not too automatically. Cultivating the habit of living in serene but deep awareness of higher values, for instance, is a spiritual discipline which, if willingly embraced, will help to change our destiny. Asking a person why he has decided something is not always the best way to analyze free will in action. Persons are frequently intellectually confused about what they do or will, often because they lie to themselves and others about that (I am not being haughty here, I willingly put myself in the bunch!). What I mean is that I do believe in free will, but I don't believe that we really know how we use it. We often believe that we are free in things where we have been completely constrained, and viceversa. I believe that we have the intuition that we are choosing freely many important things. And that intuition is perfectly true. Being aware of what we are really choosing or not choosing, on the other hand, is a very difficult art.gpuccio
September 4, 2014
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Mark: Not understanding the difference between an object and a subject is somewhat a problem for our discussion... However: the additional element is that the act of choosing is not random. What we choose is morally good or bad, it can be in tune with our deeper nature, or with more superficial parts of our being. IOWs, the representations that we choose to "help" or "discourage" have different moral meaning for our I and for its destiny. So, there is nothing random in that. There is the constant freedom of the I to choose what is "good" or choose what is "bad" (but can absolutely be more desirable if a more superficial context of representation is adopted). Choosing what is "good" has certain effects on our condition, choosing what is "bad" has different effects. the cumulative effect of our choices, both good and bad, changes what we are and our personal destiny. The real difference is this: libertarian free will is the belief that our personal destiny can be changed by us. Really, not only because we seem to choose what we must choose anyway. You may ask how does the I know what representations are good and what are bad. That does not come from intellectual reasoning (although intellectual reasoning can be part of the representations). It comes from intuition of the fundamental values of our consciousness. That is what has been called, for millennia, "moral conscience". So, a good use of free choice consists in adhering to that deep intuition. A bad use of free choice consists in denying it. But the intuition is the same, both in those who choose good and in those who choose evil. It's the choice that is different.gpuccio
September 4, 2014
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GP: Another way of looking at this is to ask the 'I' (or whatever) why did it choose an option AFTER it has chosen the option. Say the choice was to make a sandwich, the question (addressed to the agent 'I') would be: Why did you choose to make a sandwich ? Now, could you supply a possible answer to that question ?Graham2
September 4, 2014
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GP thanks.   I had not appreciated the distinction you are making between choice and decision. So it looks like the model is:   Stimuli => Perception => Choice => Decision
So, I believe that the I does something. You will never understand or accept this model because you insist in considering the I as an object, made of parts and subject to the same laws as material objects. But that is not the case. The I is a subject, a transcendental subject. Perceiving and willing are its natural properties, and its perceptions are conditioned by its inputs, while the I itself conditions its outputs.
I don’t think it makes any difference to this specific argument whether the “I” is an object or a subject (not that I understand the difference) it is still presumably something and either changes or it doesn’t.   I think you are saying that while perceptions may constrain and increase the likelihood of certain choices and cause a choice to happen at a particular time the only other relevant thing is the act of choosing.  So far that is compatible with compatibilism (if you see what I mean). So what is the additional element  that differentiates it from a random outcome, and why does this additional element matter?Mark Frank
September 4, 2014
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OT gpuccio, Did you see this? https://uncommondescent.com/evolution/a-third-way-of-evolution/#comment-513063 Taken from here: http://www.jointbscbbs.org/Dionisio
September 4, 2014
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Mark (#194):
Is that reaction the decision or is there some change within the I which then leads to the decision? Does it go like this: Stimuli combined with “I” => Decision or more like this Stimuli => Reaction of “I” => Decision The second case doesn’t help much as it is just pushes the question back to the reaction of the “I”. So I guess it is the first case.
I guess too. But I would like to clarify, to avoid misunderstandings, that I would say "choice" rather than decision. "Decision" is usually the final result that we observe. "Choice" is the free event which takes place in our consciousness, and contributes to our "decisions". So, our choices are free, but our decisions are strongly constrained.
So what is the contribution of the “I”. It can’t be actively doing anything or that would become the second case. So it has to be a passive enabler – a condition which has to be present but does not provide the impulse for things to happen.
I am not sure I understand what you mean. First of all the I is not an object, but a subject. Second, the I interact with reality through representations of inputs and free choices (outputs). I would not say that the I "is not doing anything". It continuously does two things: perceives and chooses (represents and acts). Understanding what perception means and what choice means in terms of intellectual reasoning is difficult. Can you say what subjective perception is? No. We just know because we perceive. The same is true of free choice. Certainly, the I interacts with the body, mainly through the brain interface. A possible model is that the I is constantly connected to brain activities, probably at quantum level. The "choice" could express itself by modifying the quantum state of critical brain events, maybe at the wave function collapse level. Psychologically, the choice can be seen for example in this way: different representations are perceived by the I, corresponding to different possible feelings or actions. The I can interact with brain events so that some representations gain strength and others lose it. The following interaction between different neural networks, which expresses itself as an observable decision, is therefore changed. So, I believe that the I does something. You will never understand or accept this model because you insist in considering the I as an object, made of parts and subject to the same laws as material objects. But that is not the case. The I is a subject, a transcendental subject. Perceiving and willing are its natural properties, and its perceptions are conditioned by its inputs, while the I itself conditions its outputs. So, I am not sure of why you call the I "a passive enabler". The I is never passive. It is "passive" in perception because that is the meaning of perception itself: let the forms of outer events "enter" consciousness (be represented). And it is very active in choice, because that is the meaning of choice: shaping reality so that it may be different from what it would be if our choices were absent, or simply different.gpuccio
September 4, 2014
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“I” refers to an object which exists for an extended period.
What kind of "object" is "I"? Where is it? What are its dimensions?
A decision is an event. So what causes the event to happen at that particular moment? It is a change in the “I”? Or an external change?
As above, "I is an object", but what are its mechanisms? What are its parts? If we agree that "I" exists, we might also wonder why we don't have answers about the physical nature of "I". We can't observe physical changes to "I" and therefore cannot measure them.
And if it is a change in the “I” what causes that to happen at that moment?
We have to establish that "I" is a physical object first. If it is, then some other thing will cause it to move or change. If "I" is not a physical object, then that's a different discussion.Silver Asiatic
September 4, 2014
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If I get hungry and decide to eat, its my soul deciding I should have a sandwitch.
In the US we have what is called soul food - which kind of goes along with soul music. Have you ever thought about why you choose one kind of food rather than another? Why not eat exactly the same thing every day? Cows eat grass every day - the same thing. Why do you choose something different? I am hungry, so I choose to eat. I am hungry, so I choose a sandwich or a burger or pizza or pasta or a taco. Why? Answer: Because I like pizza. Q: Why? A: That's my favorite Q: Why? A: I like it Q: Why? A: That's just the way I am Q: So "I" makes the choice, and unseen, unobservable characteristics of "I" want one thing versus another for no other reason than "that's the way I" is, right? A: ...Silver Asiatic
September 4, 2014
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PPS: To see what G2 would dismiss without serious response -- having demanded expansion of earlier brief comments on decision making (and by implication of a reference, Decision Theory) -- kindly cf 124.kairosfocus
September 4, 2014
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PS: Let me give Plato his due place at the table, from The Laws Bk X . . . >> Ath. . . . when one thing changes another, and that another, of such will there be any primary changing element? How can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving principle? . . . . self-motion being the origin of all motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second. [[ . . . .] Ath. If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound-how should we describe it? Cle. You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving power life? Ath. I do. Cle. Certainly we should. Ath. And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same-must we not admit that this is life? [[ . . . . ] Cle. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul? Ath. Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things? Cle. Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things. Ath. And is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower number which you may prefer? Cle. Exactly. Ath. Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is the ruler? [[ . . . . ] Ath. If, my friend, we say that the whole path and movement of heaven, and of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path. [[Plato here explicitly sets up an inference to design (by a good soul) from the intelligible order of the cosmos.] >>kairosfocus
September 4, 2014
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G2: I notice, a dodge of the issue on the merits:
There is a huge flurry of words (KF Im looking at you!) but in the end the religious believe morals, decisions, mathematics (BA77!) all spring from the soul, the ‘I’, the ‘mind’, or some other spirit. Theres not much that can be done here.
That speaks, volumes. Do, tell me, when you do a complex Math derivation, such as a cumbersome Integration, for which there is no standard one size fits all rule, is there an exercise of perception, reasoning, reference to ways you can refactor the expression to get a standard form etc etc, or is there not? Do tell me if there is or is not a self-aware, insight based process that makes logical inferences driven by meaning, deciding to refactor towards a specific form, then another if that doesn't work, then finally, aha, yes, here it is. Tell me that this is blind algorithms written by incremental blind chance and mechanical necessity. No, don't tell me, tell any virtuoso mathematician. And, he will laugh in your face, for he has doubtless struggled with head-buster problems for years and decades. Go ask any serious designer of a complex entity that has to work based on intricate interaction of parts about what s/he goes through, and try to suggest there is no insightful I there, no carefully nurtured creative mind, no soul with a determination towards excellence. Hey, go ask Reginald Mitchell's ghost about why he worked himself to death while fighting cancer to design the Spitfire. Then, ask the remaining survivors of the Blitz in 1940, what they think of Mitchell's brain-child, the Supermarine Spitfire. What I see here is ideological dismissiveness on your part, not a serious grappling. Let me summarise a note or two. On the evo mat view and that of its fellow travellers, we are blindly programmed by a process that -- in the teeth of evidence on the source of FSCO/I -- somehow wrote our language using programming. Somehow, that resulting blind cause-effect chain and statistical noise system is not seriously challenged by the GIGO problem that, say, haunted the Pentium when it would happily churn out incorrect answers to fl pt ops, as the debugging did not catch key errors. Sorry, I will not buy that and anyone who understands how hard it is to get a computational system to come together in a reliably working config won't either. And that does not even touch fact no 1: we are self-aware, insight based reasoning, contemplative, purposeful, conscious beings. Somehow, conscious, insightful mindedness, reasoning resting on this and knowledge resting on this are to be accepted as what MUST have emerged from a blind non-rational incremental survival process, as that is the only thing permitted since evo mat ideologues dominate in key institutions. And, the Haldane challenge, why, let's just ignore it and try to drown it out with our own talking points. So, I give the key clip to Haldane, as I get back to the over-brimming slate of issues on the table:
"It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” [["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209. ]
Your problem is not me, it is with the issue Haldane highlighted so long ago now, and for which the dodge, duck and slip-slide away eighty five or so years later speaks louder than any repetition of the argument you have yet to squarely face. KFkairosfocus
September 4, 2014
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GP
So, the answer to your questions is simple: the choice happens at specific times because it is a free reaction of the I to specific representations, which are obviously caused by different external or internal events on which the I has no special control.
Is that reaction the decision or is there some change within the I which then leads to the decision? Does it go like this:
Stimuli combined with “I” => Decision
or more like this
Stimuli => Reaction of “I” => Decision
The second case doesn’t help much as it is just pushes the question back to the reaction of the “I”. So I guess it is the first case. So what is the contribution of the “I”. It can’t be actively doing anything or that would become the second case. So it has to be a passive enabler – a condition which has to be present but does not provide the impulse for things to happen. Mark Frank
September 4, 2014
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Mark: First of all, you know that I consider the "I" as the subject which refers to itself all the different representations, including the mental states. You know also that I consider free choice as the inherent ability of the I of reacting differently to those representations. So, the answer to your questions is simple: the choice happens at specific times because it is a free reaction of the I to specific representations, which are obviously caused by different external or internal events on which the I has no special control. As I have said many times, at each moment there are two different factors: the representations of the internal and external stimuli with which the I comes in contact (the deterministic/random part), and the I (the subject which represents those things) which can freely react to those representations. Of course, the results of the free choices modify the following events, so they become part of what the I experiences at successive times.gpuccio
September 4, 2014
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In free will, I would say that my I is the cause of the decision, and the decision the effect.
"I" refers to an object which exists for an extended period. A decision is an event. So what causes the event to happen at that particular moment? It is a change in the "I"? Or an external change? And if it is a change in the "I" what causes that to happen at that moment?Mark Frank
September 4, 2014
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Box (#179): I don't think so. The subject, the object and the process of perception are essential components of being a perceiving I. They are the I's nature.gpuccio
September 3, 2014
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G2 I really don't have time to waste discussing with you this stuff here. You may ask someone else if you want to. If you want to discuss with me, see my over 250 posts in the thread about "the third way" in this same blog and feel free to comment on any of them, but no philosophical chat, stick to pure science. Got it this time buddy?Dionisio
September 3, 2014
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