“Meaning” vs. “MEANING”

_{Barry Arrington

November 9, 2014

Intelligent Design}

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Thank you to Aleta for taking up the opposing view of the nature of meaning in my Gotta Serve Somebody post. I started to write a response to his comment 34 and quickly realized that any response would be OP-sized and decided to start a new OP.

Some Definitions

“disagreement is not an easy thing to reach. Rather, we move into confusion.” John Courtney Murray

Part of the problem in the debate between Aleta and myself is that we use the word “meaning” in at least three different senses, (1) linguistic intention, (2) ultimate purpose, and (3) culturally-adapted belief system.

In an effort to see if we can actually reach disagreement as opposed to confusion, I propose to dispense with the word “meaning” altogether and to use in its stead the following:

Linguistic intention. Instead of “this word has the following meaning” I will use “this word has the following definition.”

Ultimate purpose. Instead of “the theist believes there is an ultimate meaning in the universe and the atheist denies that there is,” I will say “the theist believes there is Ultimate Purpose/Significance in the universe and the atheist denies that there is.”

Culturally adapted belief system. Aleta says that human belief and meaning systems are human inventions that are inculcated into members of a culture. Fair enough. I will use the phrase “Culturally Adopted Belief System” to refer to this type of “meaning.”

Barry’s Argument

The materialist believes there is no Ultimate Purpose/Significance. As Richard Dawkins says in the following famous quotation:

[In the universe there] is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference.

In my previous post I argued that the idea that our life is completely meaningless, that the universe is indifferent to our existence, that literally nothing we say, think or do has any ultimate significance, is unbearable. No one is able to stare into the abyss without flinching. I noted that even those that insist there is no Ultimate Purpose/Significance feel compelled to seek a kind of meaning as a substitute for Ultimate Purpose/Significance. Dawkins again:

The truly adult view, by contrast, is that our life is as meaningful, as full and as wonderful as we choose to make it.

In the first quote Dawkins stares into the abyss, and in the second he flinches away. Why? Because an intense longing for Ultimate Purpose/Significance is at the bottom of every human heart. Everyone, from fundamentalist Bible thumpers to militant atheists, searches for a greater context in which to situate their lives. For theists the explanation for this longing is easy:

You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.

Confessions, Augustine of Hippo

The honest materialist does not deny the longing. At that same time he cannot admit that when we long for Ultimate Purpose/Significance we are longing for something that actually exists. So how does the materialist explain a near universal longing for something that does not exist? He explains it like he explains a lot of things (consciousness, the overwhelming appearance of design in nature, libertarian free will) — the near universal human impulse to place our lives within the context of some Ultimate Purpose/Significance is an illusion foisted on us by our genes, which in turn resulted from some evolutionary adaptation.

Aleta’s Argument

Aleta disagrees that the universe’s indifference is unbearable and that no one is able to stare into the abyss without flinching. He does not agree that even those who insist there is no Ultimate Purpose/Significance feel compelled to seek Ultimate Purpose/Significance. He writes:

I do believe that humans do engage, and have engaged in “make believe” about some things that we really don’t know much, if anything about: I think most metaphysical religious beliefs fall into this category. But we have all sorts of other beliefs about how to treat our fellow man (or at least those that we include in our understanding of our community/society), about how to contribute to the well being of our society, how to spend our time in what various human activities are possible, and so on. Many of these beliefs are cultural: the fact that many people are brought up in them as children and that most of society supports them gives those beliefs a sense of being bigger than the individual. Human belief and meaning systems are human inventions. They are based on a mixture of empirical knowledge (confirmed beliefs) and agreements within the culture to see the world a certain way (affirmed beliefs). Calling then “make believe” devalues both them and the human beings for whom they are important.

Barry’s Response

Just like Dawkins Aleta wants to have it both ways. Consider again Dawkins’ first comment, which I will call the “Materialist Prime Directive.”

[In the universe there] is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference.

Now consider again Dawkins’ second statement:

The truly adult view, by contrast, is that our life is as meaningful, as full and as wonderful as we choose to make it.

Dawkin’s second statement is radically irreconcilable with the Materialist Prime Directive, because if the Materialist Prime Directive is true, the words “meaningful,” “full,” and “wonderful” in the second statement are empty. Similarly, Aleta affirms the Materialist Prime Directive.* Then he says that “we have all sorts of other beliefs about how to treat our fellow man . . .” But if the Materialist Prime Directive is true, those beliefs about how to treat our fellow man are empty, mere evolutionary adaptations foisted upon us by our genes. Aleta chides me for calling them “make believe,” but they are indeed make believe in a very real sense of that phrase. If the Materialist Prime Directive is true, those beliefs are empty and arbitrary impulses that evolution “makes” us “believe.”

I argue that the human longing for “meaning” (i.e., Ultimate Purpose/Significance) is a very real phenomenon, and that longing is directed at something real. Aleta agrees there is a longing, but he dismisses that longing as a mere cultural adaptation. Here’s the problem with that. Once one realizes that “meaning” in Aleta’s sense of the word is empty and arbitrary, a mere evolutionary adaptation foisted upon us by our genes, the game is up. Because it is a truism that a meaning (cultural adaptation) that is meaningless (arbitrary/random) can have no meaning (ultimate significance).

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*Though he quibbles with whether he is actually a materialist. I think he prefers to consider himself an agnostic who accepts materialism provisionally. He can explain what he believes if I a wrong.

Comments

Aleta said:
You seem to be saying that whether there are objective standards or not – the truth of that is irrelevant – you must act as if there are because the alternative, might makes right, is untenable to you.
I'm saying that all sane people must act as if there are objective moral standards. Any that profess subjectivism are either ignorant of the logic, unable to process the logic, lying, or are self-deluded.
First, the fact that you see a fairly, or completely, black-and-white choice between acting as if objective standards exist and the amoral subjectivist alternative doesn’t mean that all others must feel those are the only two alternatives.
What they feel is entirely irrelevant to this argument, which is about the rational conclusions that necssarily follow from the premise. Of course, few self-described moral subjectivists understand or are even aware of the logical consequences to their intellectually held beliefs.
Like all logic applied to things which don’t have empirical referents, your sense that logic compels you to “employ the premise of an objective morality” is really a reflection of your belief in the abyss you see between believing in objective standards and the amoral, “might makes right” alternative. Other people, me for instance, don’t see that abyss, and therefore draw different logical conclusions.
The existence or lack of an abyss that may be emotionally troublesome doesn't change whether or not a conclusion is logically valid. One's statements and actions are either logically consistent with their premises, or they are not. There is no special consideration given one's particular psychology.
And irrespective of the ways in which my post at#84 might be irrelevant, as you don’t know whether objective standards exist or not, how do you decide what is right or wrong in any given circumstance?
In most cases, I begin with conscience and then apply logic and, where necessary, refer to self-evident truths or necessary truths. The main difference between a subjectivist and myself0 is that the subjectivist believes that conscience is an entirely subjective set of feelings, while I consider the conscience to be a sensory capacity similar to eyesight or hearing.
Do you just do the best you can, the same way a subjectivist would,
When I do the best I can, it is in reference to an assumed standard by which my actions can be judged on a gradient from bad to good, which is where "best" has significant meaning. Also,such behavior is assumed to have necessary consequences (good or bad). If I fail to do my best, I cannot simply redefine "best" or "good" as a subjectivist could. Logically-consistent subjectivists can simply call anything they do the "best" they can because they are the presumed sole arbiter of what is good and bad, and there are no necessary consequences. Why even bother rating your behavior in such a manner?
and then choose to believe that you are acting in accordance with objective standards?
Choosing to believe that such standards exist in the first place, and that there are necessary consequences, is the only reason I have for trying to be good. Please not that there is a difference between self-described subjectivists and logically consistent subjectivists. IMO, there are very, very few logically consistent subjectivists around, and I doubt anyone here is one.William J Murray_{November 14, 2014
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Barry, I have shown you that if subjective morality is a mere "preference", then so is yours:
What Barry doesn’t realize is that if he defines “preference” broadly enough to encompass a subjectivist’s moral judgments, it is broad enough to include the objectivist’s moral judgments as well. After all, the objectivist prefers that others adhere to his or her morality just as the subjectivist does. The only difference is that the objectivist thinks that his or her subjective morality matches up with some absolute, binding, external standard.
You subjectively prefer that others conform to what you subjectively consider to be an absolute, objective morality. Yet even if we assume that God exists and that we understand his morality, a question remains: Why should God's subjective morality be considered objective? Why should it be binding on us? I look forward to your answers.keith s_{November 14, 2014
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William, that is very interesting, and not what I have understood you to be saying up to this point. What I say in the following is with all due respect for the fact that your position, and how you reached it, is obviously important to you and well thought out. You seem to be saying that whether there are objective standards or not - the truth of that is irrelevant – you must act as if there are because the alternative, might makes right, is untenable to you. I have several responses. First, the fact that you see a fairly, or completely, black-and-white choice between acting as if objective standards exist and the amoral subjectivist alternative doesn't mean that all others must feel those are the only two alternatives. You seem to make it clear that acting as if objective standards exist is in fact a choice on your part. The fact that you think this is the only logical option is a subjective judgment - you can't escape that you are in the same boat as the subjectivist even though that is what you strongly want to do. Like all logic applied to things which don't have empirical referents, your sense that logic compels you to "employ the premise of an objective morality" is really a reflection of your belief in the abyss you see between believing in objective standards and the amoral, "might makes right" alternative. Other people, me for instance, don't see that abyss, and therefore draw different logical conclusions. And irrespective of the ways in which my post at#84 might be irrelevant, as you don't know whether objective standards exist or not, how do you decide what is right or wrong in any given circumstance? Do you just do the best you can, the same way a subjectivist would, and then choose to believe that you are acting in accordance with objective standards? I guess I really can't understand how you think your position allows you to be in any different position than I am. Believing in something because it makes life seem to be easier to live, even if it might not be true, is a metaphysical choice (a subjective one at that), but not the kind of choice I would make. As I often have said, I would rather live with uncertainty than believe things that are not true. I would rather live with the human dilemma of needing to choose about right and wrong without knowing that there might be some "right" answer that I am accountable to than do what you have done and escaped that dilemma by choosing to act as if something were true even though you don't know if it is or not.Aleta_{November 14, 2014
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markf
#105 BA I note that you ducked the question. Do you believe there are important differences?
I thought I answered the question. Perhaps you will understand the answer better if I phrase it this way: As someone who believes in the existence of an objective transcendent standard of morality, it goes without saying that I believe there are “important” differences between a choice that implicates no moral issue and a choice that implicates a substantial moral issue. If no such objective transcendent moral standard exists, who is to say whether there is an “important” difference between the two choices. Indeed, if an objective transcendent moral standard does not exist, the word “important” in your question has no meaning except “that which I consider to be important.”Barry Arrington_{November 14, 2014
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It would be useful to provide an example. However, please don’t continue to use torturing babies. I have a two year old granddaughter and a new grandchild on the way and it pains me deeply to think about that example. I picked a middle-of-the-road example for the physical world, and I would hope you would also.
There's a reason I use that example. If morality is ultimately a matter of personal preference, and if what is right for an individual can only be determined by that individual, then such an act can in fact be good as much as any other act can be good; and you have no foundation by which to call it wrong for that person other than "because I say so", and no grounds to intervene other than "because I can". Which reduces your morality to "might makes right", the same morality the other person uses to justify his horrible act as "good". If you are okay with a morality that boils down, essentially, to "might makes right", then I have no further case to make.William J Murray_{November 14, 2014
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Aleta, Your #84 attempts to paint the debate as being about how we come to know things about the world, and whether or not we can "know" that there is an objective basis to morality. That is utterly irrelevant to my current argument. My argument is one of logic, not evidence, in the form of "IF we postulate morality refers to an objective source, THEN ..." and "IF we postulate morality refers to a subjective source, THEN..." If one is willing to follow the inferences to the necessary conclusion, it becomes clear that the two premises lead to entirely different moral structures. Anyone who is not a sociopath lives as if morality refers to an objective commodity, even if they intellectually believe and claim otherwise. IOW, you might claim to be a moral subjectivist; you might believe in moral subjectivism; you phrase things and live, however, like a moral objectivist.William J Murray_{November 14, 2014
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Aleta said:
William, your objections only have weight if there are in fact objective standards of right and wrong. Can you show me why you think I should believe that is the case, as I outlined in #84?
No, my objections are valid whether or not there is inf act an objective source of right or wrong. Just because there is no objective source of right and wrong doesn't mean you get to employ terms and concepts that require the premise of an objective right and wrong. You have no logical right to them regardless, because your premise is that of a subjective right and wrong.William J Murray_{November 14, 2014
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Aleta said:
To you, everything is knowledge in the sense that one needs to know about something that exists outside of oneself.
I would be really careful about assuming things about me. The only kind of thing I consider to be "knowledge" is that which I personally experience. I don't consider anything else knowledge, but rather opinion, speculation, assumption or belief. My arguments about subjectivist morality stand or fail regardless of my own personal beliefs. I will tell you this: I don't know if an objective standard for morality exists, but if I want my metaphysical beliefs to be consonant with how I must live and behave in the world, I must employ the premise of an objective morality or else my morality boils down to "because I say so" and "because I can". I can't live like that - I know, I've tried. The only principle that can prevent morality from boiling down to "might makes right" is the premise of a natural law, necessary, objective source of "right" and "wrong". I looked really hard to avoid that and to find some other way of being "good", but there's no alternative. As others here say, ultimately, if there is no objective good, then good is really nothing more than a trivial, rhetorcial device used to manipulate others and justify what we already prefer.William J Murray_{November 14, 2014
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#105 BA I note that you ducked the question. Do you believe there are important differences?markf_{November 14, 2014
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Markf:
Do you accept there are important differences between the two?
Mark, I understand your need to believe that there is an “important” difference between your subjective evaluation of ice cream and your subjective evaluation of whether you should steal. The conclusions compelled by your premises are, to say the least, bleak, and I don’t blame you for averting your gaze from them.Barry Arrington_{November 14, 2014
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William, your objections only have weight if there are in fact objective standards of right and wrong. Can you show me why you think I should believe that is the case, as I outlined in #84?Aleta_{November 14, 2014
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BA #100
Indeed there are, and you outline some of them. But they are both subjective opinions. A synonym for “subjective opinion” is “preference.” They are both preferences. I don’t know why you fight so hard against such an obvious conclusion that is absolutely compelled by your own premises.
As I have said repeatedly I really don't care how you want to define "preference" - I don't think of it as a synonym for "subjective opinion" but who cares, it is only semantics. We both accept that there is a subjective element in both. My concern is that you want to ignore the substantial differences as when you wrote in #86 to Aleta:
You seem to believe that your preference for vanilla ice cream is somehow different from your preference not to commit murder.
Do you accept there are important differences between the two?markf_{November 14, 2014
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Re 100: Hi Barry. Given (my position) that there are no objective standards, calling every judgment that one makes a "preference" without any way to differentiate different types of preferences is not very useful. Perhaps you would like to respond to my post at #84? My claim is that your belief that objective standards exist is in fact a subjective belief - a metaphysical "preference", if you will, not an objectively verifiable belief. If I am right, then the distinction you are making between valid judgments based on objective standards and subjective preferences is a non-issue: everything is a subjective "preference". In that case, those of you who believe (erroneously) that there are objective standards need to accept that you don't have some superior foundation for your moral beliefs - you're just like everyone else in the world who has their "subjective" ideas about right and wrong.Aleta_{November 14, 2014
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Aleta @98 said:
This has been your position from the beginning: that since you believe in an objective nature of right and wrong, any belief which doesn’t accept that can’t legitimately talk about right or wrong. I reject your premise concerning the objective nature of right or wrong, so of course I reject your conclusion. I think we’ve probably established this disagreement about as thoroughly as we can.
You have no logical right to use the terms "right" and "wrong" if you use them as if they refer to an objective standard, and if you do so, it is not "legitimate" under subjectivism. In order to have a logical right to use "right" and "is" and "wrong" in a certain way, they must be defined as and employed as something consonant with and derivable from your subjectivist premises. Yet, you seem resistant to define those terms, and characterize the concepts, in a manner consonant with subjectivism. Ultimately, under subjectivism, "right" and "wrong" are matters of personal preference, even if it is deeply felt personal preference. The term "is wrong" doesn't indicate an implied claim of objective reailty, but under subjectivism is a short form version of saying, and is essentially synonymous with, "is something I dislike". Those are logically legitimate ways of speaking about right and wrong under subjectivism, and those characterizations are what your premises give you a logical right to. You cannot have your cake and eat it too; you cannot logically abandon objective morality yet still demand to be able to use terms and phrases in ways that require that premise.William J Murray_{November 14, 2014
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Markf @ 99:
But there are substantial differences between my subjective opinion that vanilla ice-cream is nicer than chocolate and my subjective opinion that it is wrong to steal stationary from the office.
Indeed there are, and you outline some of them. But they are both subjective opinions. A synonym for “subjective opinion” is “preference.” They are both preferences. I don’t know why you fight so hard against such an obvious conclusion that is absolutely compelled by your own premises.Barry Arrington_{November 14, 2014
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BA #95
You seem to believe that a preference you hold with extreme intensity shouldn’t be called a “preference,” but you give no reason why this should be the case.
As I hope I said – I am not concerned with the definition of the word “preference”. But there are substantial differences between my subjective opinion that vanilla ice-cream is nicer than chocolate and my subjective opinion that it is wrong to steal stationary from the office. It is nothing to do with the intensity of the feeling. Someone might be absolutely obsessed with getting the right flavour of ice-cream and, while they belief it is wrong to steal office stationary, feel it is nothing to get worked up about. Some of the key differences are: 1) My opinion about stealing stationary is based on evidence and reasons e.g. it is a slippery slope to more serious crimes, companies actually lose $x million a year through theft like this, the shareholders that suffer are not just rich business men etc etc. You would be hard put to give reasons or evidence for your opinion on the flavour of ice-cream. 2) My opinion about stealing stationary is based on very widely shared values the vast majority of people accept that theft is wrong, I imagine opinions are pretty much divided on ice-cream 3) My opinion about stealing stationary affects others in the sense that if I think stealing office stationary is wrong then I don’t just think I should not do it – I think everyone should not do it – and other things being equal I will try to prevent them doing it as well as abstaining myself (I might not try very hard given the minor nature of the offence). If I prefer vanilla ice-cream that usually has no implications for anyone else (excepting odd circumstances when I am choosing food for a dinner party or such like) There are probably other significant differences but the important point is that lumping all opinions with a subjective element together is a gross over-simplification.markf_{November 14, 2014
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This is is response to #94 - I haven't read the posts that have come in after that, but I'll finish this post anyway. William, you write,
You believe that the nature of right and wrong is subjective; I believe it is objective. It is my contention here and going forward that the premise of the subjective nature of “right and wrong” is (1) irreconcilable with how you employ moral terminology and attempt to justify your moral views/system, that you use concepts only reconcilable with the objective premise.
This has been your position from the beginning: that since you believe in an objective nature of right and wrong, any belief which doesn't accept that can't legitimately talk about right or wrong. I reject your premise concerning the objective nature of right or wrong, so of course I reject your conclusion. I think we've probably established this disagreement about as thoroughly as we can. You write,
You believe that the nature of right and wrong is subjective; I believe it is objective.
And I've said that your belief about the objective nature of right and wrong is itself subjective. So I think the next step here, which is what you may be working on, is for you to respond to my post at #84 about explaining in what way the nature of right is wrong is objective, and how one might be convinced of that.Aleta_{November 14, 2014
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My thoughts about right and wrong, and to varying degrees all peoples, are not merely “a preference”. To lump together everything a person believes, from what kind of ice cream they like to what kind of deepest, most heartfelt basic principles they have about how to live into one big category called “preferences” really misunderstands, or misrepresents, the reality and complexity of human beings.
But that's not what I'm doing. I'm only "lumping together" those beliefs that are held as referring exclusively to subjective commodities as "preferences"; I'm not including beliefs one considers to be about objective commodities because stating that one believes that John is 32 years old is not the same as saying that one believes it is wrong for John to spank their children; one belief is about something held to be an objectively true fact, which can be ultimately verified or disproved; the other belief is held as a personal view ultimately determined by entirely subjective considerations. They are categorically different kinds of beliefs/views. Now, others have made this same case - that beliefs about right and wrong cannot be compared to preferences about ice cream; the question I have is: why not? How are the two qualitatively different? It seems to me that, under subjectivism, what one personally likes and dislikes plays the essential role in developing a list of what is right and what is wrong; "I don't like slavery" or "I like the idea that everyone should be treated equally" or "I really, really dislike the idea of torturing children." It seems to me that morality cannot ultimately be quantified by the subjectivist as anything other than, at its root, something determined by personal preference. It might carry much more intense emotional attachment; it might be attached to a larger moral framework and justified via various moral systems (but then, how did one choose that framework or system except by personal preference), but at the end of the day, if the subjectivist's preference changes, that is all that is necessary for a wrong to become a right. IOW, if a subjectivists who was formerly against homosexuality realizes they're gay and prefer homosexuality to be a right thing instead of a wrong thing, there is nothing stopping them from from simply changing a wrong thing to a right thing based on their personal preference. It may be more complex than that, it may be harder than that, but in principle all that is required to turn a wrong into a right, under subjectivism, is personal preference. When a subjectivist says that such a line of thought "trivializes" the term's "right" and "wrong" by characterizing them as "nothing more" than personal preferences, my response is that a right or wrong that is ultimately determined by personal preference is trivial. Don't blame me for pointing it out. All I've done (IMO) is properly characterize what the terms "right" and "wrong" and "is" necessarily mean under subjectivism, and what the necessary logical ramifications are. I can understand that you object to having such deeply held, complex beliefs simply and trivially characterized, but that's really the point; the manner in which you hold your "rights" and "wrongs" and respond to moral events/challnges is incongruent with your claim that they are subjective in nature. More to come.William J Murray_{November 14, 2014
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BA #86: These two statements cannot be reconciled logically. You seem like a person of intelligence and good will. So to me it is fascinating that you seem unable to grasp this obvious conclusion.
Aleta is obviously a very intelligent person. However I fully share Barry's amazement. For some unknown reason, there are highly intelligent ppl who are unable to connect the dots. Simple fact: 'materialism entails that there is no such thing as a person, free will, morality, consciousness and so forth.'
The physical facts fix all the facts. The mind is the brain. It has to be physical and it can’t be anything else, since thinking, feeling, and perceiving are physical process—in particular, input/output processes—going on in the brain. We can be sure of a great deal about how the brain works because the physical facts fix all the facts about the brain. The fact that the mind is the brain guarantees that there is no free will. It rules out any purposes or designs organizing our actions or our lives. It excludes the very possibility of enduring persons, selves, or souls that exist after death or for that matter while we live. Not that there was ever much doubt about mortality anyway. [Rosenberg]
Yet the forum is filled with 'materialists' who are unaware of the unavoidable consequences of the theory.Box_{November 14, 2014
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markf
Barry – you can extend the word “preference” to cover everything that is not a cast iron fact if you like but some “preferences” are based on reasons and evidence and deeply held common (but not universal) values while others are trivial whims
. Straw man. I never said that all of your preferences were held with the same intensity of feeling. Certainly that is not the case. Let us say that your preference A is held with extreme intensity (e.g., I prefer not to hurt children) and preference B is held on a trivial whim (e.g., I like vanilla ice cream). What is the same about preference A and preference B? They are both preferences of course. You seem to believe that a preference you hold with extreme intensity shouldn’t be called a “preference,” but you give no reason why this should be the case.Barry Arrington_{November 14, 2014
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I asked:
Is “what an individual believes” ultimately the final arbiter of what is right and wrong for that individual?
Aleta said:
I have spent some time trying to flesh out my answer to this question, but it seems like a truism to say that yes, what a person believes is right or wrong is what a person believes is right or wrong. A person will have assimilated and integrated input from many different sources in building those beliefs, but how can someone act upon anything other than their beliefs?”
What do you mean by "act upon" their beliefs? Do you mean in accordance with their conscious beliefs? Their subconscious, more intractable, deep assumptions they may not even be aware of? People can believe X is wrong and do X anyway; they can believe X is right and not do it; people can have behavioral compulsions they apparently cannot control; people can become emotional and do all sorts of things that are not reconcilable with their conscious beliefs. My line of questioning here is to get a commitment on your part about what final or true arbiter is in determining "what is right" for the individual under subjectivism. You have apparently made such a commitment when you said:
There is no“final arbiter” of what is right or wrong, in the sense of being an objective standard, so all a person can do is make the best determination for themself both in terms of general principles and individual situations.
You reiterated:
ultimately a person has the final responsibility to determine what is right or wrong for them . . . all a person can do is make the best determination for themself both in terms of general principles and individual situations.
Note: I didn't say "final arbiter" in any objective sense, but rather simply said that the final arbiter, under subjectivism, for what an individual refers to as "right and wrong", is themselves - however they make such determinations.
You seem to think that only people who believe in some objective source of standards have the right to talk about right and wrong, but that is not true, and really circularly assumes that you are correct that such standards exist, which I don’t believe.
Not at all. What I've claimed is that when you talk about right and wrong, it necessarily means and implies different things because we have entirely different concepts about the nature of right and wrong. Our views on what acts are right and which are wrong may be identical; our behavior may be identical; but our concept of the nature of right and wrong couldn't be more different. You believe that the nature of right and wrong is subjective; I believe it is objective. It is my contention here and going forward that the premise of the subjective nature of "right and wrong" is (1) irreconcilable with how you employ moral terminology and attempt to justify your moral views/system, that you use concepts only reconcilable with the objective premise, and (2)that your premise is irreconcilable with how you and any other non-sociopath actually behaves in the world. Note: I'm not claiming that any subjectivist behaves worse than objectivists, or that objectivists as a group behave better, my point is only that moral subjectivism is rationally unsupportable as anything other than "beause I say so" and "because I can" (hereafter referred to as "might makes right"). To be continued.William J Murray_{November 14, 2014
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Barry, I think MarkF's response to you in 87 is appropriate. Here's what I wrote in #82:
My thoughts about right and wrong, and to varying degrees all peoples, are not merely “a preference”. To lump together everything a person believes, from what kind of ice cream they like to what kind of deepest, most heartfelt basic principles they have about how to live into one big category called “preferences” really misunderstands, or misrepresents, the reality and complexity of human beings.
It is not realistic or accurate to not have a more nuanced or sophisticated view than "everything's a preference." And, referring back to 84, given that I believe that objective standards don't exist, and have solicited some defense about why one should be convinced they do, then the belief that they exist is actually just a subjective belief also - a preference for a certain metaphysical perspective. Would you accept that preferring Christianity over Buddhism is equivalent to preferring vanilla over chocolate?Aleta_{November 14, 2014
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keith s:
1. If God exists, his morality is subjective, just like ours.
That is your opinion and given your track record it is most likely wrong.Joe_{November 14, 2014
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Who is to say that Aleta's definition of "wrong" is correct? (68) And who determines if the definition actually was in effect?Joe_{November 14, 2014
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#89 keith s My preference for toilet paper unrolling over the top is far from trivial. If it unrolls from the bottom it gets out of control. This is objectively wrong.markf_{November 14, 2014
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markf:
Barry – you can extend the word “preference” to cover everything that is not a cast iron fact if you like but some “preferences” are based on reasons and evidence and deeply held common (but not universal) values while others are trivial whims. To lump them together is little more than an orator’s trick.
I agree. The usual technique is to compare a subjectivist's moral judgments to something trivial like a preference for chocolate over vanilla ice cream, or for the toilet paper unrolling over the top vs the bottom. What Barry doesn't realize is that if he defines "preference" broadly enough to encompass a subjectivist's moral judgments, it is broad enough to include the objectivist's moral judgments as well. After all, the objectivist prefers that others adhere to his or her morality just as the subjectivist does. The only difference is that the objectivist thinks that his or her subjective morality matches up with some absolute, binding, external standard. Some points: 1. If God exists, his morality is subjective, just like ours. 2. Subjective morality is the only kind of morality that has an impact on the world. 3. I have yet to encounter a theist who could satisfactorily explain why God's morality should be considered objectively binding on us. 4. Our consciences are clearly not a trustworthy indicator of objective morality. I'll justify those claims in response to the inevitable pushback.keith s_{November 14, 2014
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Well done Aleta. You explain things very nicely. I fear you are about to repeat a debate that has been had a thousand times on this forum with no one changing their mind about anything. But you never know.markf_{November 13, 2014
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If there is no objective standard, the standard is subjective. If the standard subjective it is based on subjective choices. A synonym for that phrase is “preference.”
Barry - you can extend the word "preference" to cover everything that is not a cast iron fact if you like but some "preferences" are based on reasons and evidence and deeply held common (but not universal) values while others are trivial whims. To lump them together is little more than an orator's trick.markf_{November 13, 2014
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Aleta @ 82:
ultimately a person has the final responsibility to determine what is right or wrong for them . . . all a person can do is make the best determination for themself both in terms of general principles and individual situations.

My thoughts about right and wrong, and to varying degrees all peoples, are not merely “a preference”.
These two statements cannot be reconciled logically. You seem like a person of intelligence and good will. So to me it is fascinating that you seem unable to grasp this obvious conclusion.
To lump together everything a person believes, from what kind of ice cream they like to what kind of deepest, most heartfelt basic principles they have about how to live into one big category called “preferences” really misunderstands, or misrepresents, the reality and complexity of human beings.
But you are the one who says that “ultimately a person has the final responsibility to determine what is right or wrong.” And you also say that there is no objective standard upon which to base those choices and that a person has to make the determination himself. If there is no objective standard, the standard is subjective. If the standard subjective it is based on subjective choices. A synonym for that phrase is “preference.” You seem to believe that your preference for vanilla ice cream is somehow different from your preference not to commit murder. But they are both preferences.
You seem to think that only people who believe in some objective source of standards have the right to talk about right and wrong,
WJM never said that. WJM is saying they have no right to talk about “right and wrong” as if those words mean anything other than “what I prefer” and “what I do not prefer.” Your logic, Aleta, leads to that conclusion.
but that is not true, and really circularly assumes that you are correct that such standards exist, which I don’t believe.
WJM does need not to assume that an objective standard exists to conclude that to a subjectivist the words “right and wrong” mean “what I prefer” and “what I do not prefer.” That statement is true even if an objective standard does not exist.Barry Arrington_{November 13, 2014
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I like the way you have set this out Aleta. I am looking forward to Williams response.5for_{November 13, 2014
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