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More Insane Denial

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If a man tells you he cannot know the truth, you can be sure he will probably act as if he has no obligation to tell the truth.

At this point our readers may be asking, why is Barry so focused on the issue of the materialist tactic of insane denial? It is a fair question. And the answer is I have a (possibly perverse) curiosity about whether there is any limit to how many times they will deny a truth in bad faith all the while knowing that everyone knows exactly what they are doing. Is there any limit to the earth they are willing to scorch? Will they go on saying the red pen is a flower pot forever?

I have to admit that I find the spectacle simultaneously revolting and fascinating. Like a train wreck one just can’t look away from. Here is yet another example:

For weeks Learned Hand insisted on a radical falliblism that denied the possibility of certainty about even the most basic truths. Finally, under the crushing weight of rationality, he budged just a tiny bit. Whereas, before he said, “I cannot therefore be logically, absolutely certain of anything—not even that A=A,” he finally had to admit that was not true. He grudgingly conceded, “Defining A as equal to A is defining A as equal to A; the proposition is not fallible if the only metric is its own definition.”

Amazingly, LH, Carpathian and eigenstate immediately turned around and said that LH had been right all along! They said the second statement was not a change in position but a clarification of his initial position. HeKS responded:

It’s plain as day that first holding the position that there is absolutely nothing we can know for certain and then holding the position that there’s at least one thing we can know for certain, however supposedly trivial, constitutes a change of position.

In response they went into full bore “insane denial” mode.

LH:

To take one sentence, cut it out of context and hold it up as a complete and total summary of my position is absurd.

Notice what LH is doing here. He is suggesting that HeKS misrepresented his prior argument by quoting him out of context when he previously denied that he could be certain A=A. The truth, of course, is exactly the opposite. Far from being a distortion of LH’s argument, the radical falliblism on display in that quote WAS HIS ARGUMENT for weeks, as is easily demonstrated by several more quotes:

I think that in practice I’m perfectly safe making some assumptions, and that I can’t really do much of anything without making assumptions like “A=A.” But I don’t know how I can be infallibly certain in the abstract.

And I have no way to check whether a slice can be greater than the whole other than by testing it, which can never prove absolutely as a logical matter that the proposition is true.

I cannot therefore be logically, absolutely certain of anything—not even that A=A.

I think the trickiest question here is whether I can be certain that “I think, therefore I am.” But even there, is the fact that I cannot imagine any reason to doubt it because it’s perfectly true, or because I have an imperfect and limited mind?

I reiterate that in practice I’d never doubt the basic mathematical principles at issue. The possibility of error is a logical formality

I cannot be certain about anything other than uncertainty.

I was sloppy when I wrote “I’m perfectly comfortable agreeing…”, because that can be read as a statement that I agree that I can be absolutely certain that p/slice can’t exceed p/whole. I didn’t mean that

That doesn’t mean that I expect future physicists to upset the “A=A” cart. But what’s the objective, infallible principle dividing “A=A” from “particle=particle”

I take the formal position that one cannot be logically certain of anything without an infallible perspective from which to assess it

This presupposes, for example, that the law of identity would be broken on a human scale if it weren’t absolute. It could be violated in ways that aren’t apparent to you, and thus not absurd.

You can’t measure all cases, to see whether A is literally always A

What we’re really talking about here are whether things like “A=A” are proven concepts or axioms that we just assume are true. I think most people take the latter approach, stymied by the obvious impossibility of a human being logically proving themselves to be infallible

I’ve never doubted that A=A in the real world, and I would never expect to find (nor can I conceive of) a counter-example. But to say that I’m infallibly certain would require taking the position that I’m infallible, and I can’t do that.

[LOI, LNC and LEM] are very effective axioms. . . .we assume they are true because we cannot imagine any way in which they could be false. But to say that our failure to imagine a counterexample means there cannot be a counterexample is to arrogate to ourselves infallibility.

Now that we’ve dispensed with that attempted misdirection, on to LH’s change of position. After all of the above, he finally grudgingly admitted:

Defining A as equal to A is defining A as equal to A; the proposition is not fallible if the only metric is its own definition.

The bottom line is that HeKS’s summary is perfectly apt. There really is no debate. That the speaker changed his position is not in question. The only issue is whether they will continue their insane denial indefinitely.

In response Carpathian wrote:

Barry Arrington:
There really is no debate. That the speaker changed his position is not in question.

Of course it’s in question.

Are you taking the position that I haven’t been arguing with you about it?

I don’t think I have ever seen a more pristine example of the phenomenon Robert L. Kocher described when he wrote:

But, observable basic reality does not make a dent in countering the psychotic arguments underwriting the chaotic consequences which are occurring. No matter how airtight the refutation, the talk continues. No matter how inane the talk, the issue is still considered unresolved. Capacity to continue speaking has become looked upon as a form of refutation of absolute real-world evidence.

Earth to Carpathian: The ability to keep typing is NOT the same as the ability to make a rational argument.

UPDATE

In comment 72 below, HeKS makes a very cogent observation:

Barry & LH,

The thing I don’t get about this conflict is expressed in my original comment in the other thread, partially quoted in this OP. I went on to say:

LH should be commended for simply recognizing that he had overlooked something in his initial formulation of his position. The problem stems from the subsequent fact that everyone wants to insist that the positions are identical

Again, it’s plain as day that there was an adjustment to LH’s position, and precisely the one Barry has identified. As far as I can tell, Barry highlighted it simply because it took so long to get LH to recognize that the adjustment, however minor some may think it is, was quite obviously necessary. But the fact is, sometimes obvious stuff can elude us. It could elude us just because we don’t understand the ultimate point the other person is making and when we do, then it becomes obvious. It’s not shameful to adjust or reformulate your position when you realize it’s necessary, and LH could have just been commended for making the adjustment if the issue had been left there so the overall discussion could continue. The big problem is that it wasn’t left there. Instead, there has been a push from those more or less on LH’s side of the debate to insist that the two formulations of LH’s position are identical, when they quite plainly are not. This is made all the more noteworthy by the fact that the people claiming the formulations are identical are precisely the people who insist we don’t know that the Laws of Identity or Non-Contradiction actually apply to the external world. On the one hand, then, they are merely being consistent by refusing to acknowledge the distinct identities of the formulations. On the other hand, however, they are showing precisely what happens to rational discussion in the real world once you refuse to accept that it is necessarily consistent with the Laws of Identity, Non-Contradiction and the Excluded Middle.

Comments
KF & BA: I'm of a similar view, but I was hoping to get an answer from Popperian's perspective on why he/she picked (or why anyone else should pick) a non-justification means of developing knowledge.William J Murray
September 21, 2015
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WJM
What is the point of dispensing with justificationism in the first place?
The point of the person attempting to dispense with justification is to deceive himself into believing that nothing, absolutely nothing, is indisputably true. And what is the point of that? Well, if something is indisputably true, I might not be able to assert my unfettered autonomous will to do whatever the hell I want, like killing little boys and girls, chopping their tiny bodies into pieces, and selling the pieces like so much meat in the marketplace. It is no coincidence that Popperian wants to dispense with the justification of truth and that he also does not believe the killers are doing anything wrong.Barry Arrington
September 21, 2015
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Popperian
If I got it wrong, in that you do not think identifying something entails induction, then what is your view and how does it differ? Please be specific.
To identify a horse as a horse is an intellectual exercise in abstraction. What we experience through our senses, namely this or that individual thing made of matter, tells us nothing about what that thing is. In the case of a horse, for example, the senses allow us only to experience individual features, such its color, size, smell, etc. Accordingly, the senses do not provide any kind of understanding or conceptual knowledge about the horse. The mind abstracts from this concrete sensible input and informs us about "what" it is that the senses have experienced, that is, what this thing has in common with other things in its class. We don't understand anything of our experience until we know what it is we are experiencing. There is no reasoning involved in identifying a horse as a horse. It is the mind abstracting the universal category of things form the individual thing being experienced. If we don't know what a thing is, i.e., a horse or a saddle, then we don't have any knowledge--we are simply having an experience. There is no way to arrive at knowledge about the what or the essence of a thing through induction. Deductive or inductive reasoning are possible only if the "what" is already known. Self evident truths, much like the abstraction process, do not involve any kind of a reasoning process. We come to know that a saddle is a saddle the same way we come to know that a horse is a horse. If we know that a certain object is a horse, then we also know that it is not a saddle. We don't have to reason our way to that knowledge in the form of premise followed by a conclusion. On the contrary, reasoning begins at that point, and if we don't acknowledge that fact, explicitly or implicitly, we can't reason.StephenB
September 21, 2015
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WJM, Note, there is a difference on internalist vs externalist views, i/l/o Gettier. I would not speak in terms of an X-ism, but of the condition that knowledge requires adequate and reliable warrant to rise above hoping on luck to discover truth, and to move beyond merely strongly held opinion. As IEP in its article on Epistemology outlines, many informed thinkers hold that to constitute knowledge, a belief must be true and justified, and there must not be any defeaters to the justification of that belief. Lack of defeaters to the frame of warrant on doing due diligence is linked to the concept of objective, adequate and reliable warrant. Where of course we see a range of degrees of accessible warrant depending on the matter in view. Ideological impositions on fields of study undermine the quality of what is seen as knowledge by imposing dubious or outright falsified criteria backed up by censorship or lock-out tactics directed against otherwise reasonable challenges. KFkairosfocus
September 21, 2015
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What is the point of dispensing with justificationism in the first place?William J Murray
September 21, 2015
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Popperian:
there is lack of a good expansion for why, if the truth is manifest, that there is often disagreement over it.
Before anything else, not all truth is manifest. Second, self-evident truth is first not equivalent to obviousness, as there may be a pons asinorum that blocks understanding. That is why in the classic definition there is a proviso regarding being in a position to understand. Linked, just because the sun is obvious in the sky does not mean that we see it. Some are blind through no fault of their own, others put on ideological blindfolds that make darkness seem light and light darkness. Particularly, there is the fallacy of the agenda-driven, ideologised, often polarised and angry, closed mind. The point, as has been repeatedly explained is that a SET is such that:
I: Once one is able to understand what is asserted i/l/o broad and deep enough experience of the world as a conscious agent, II: one will see that the SET (e.g. error exists) is so from simply understanding what is claimed, and III: one will also see that it is necessarily so, on pain of patent absurdity (e.g. denying that error exists immediately means, it is an error to hold that error exists, oops).
Now, this has been explained any number of times, so there is no good grounds for acting as though it is not on the table. Where also, ideologies may well lead people to cling to absurdities, with all too many cases in point to illustrate. In the case in view, a young child can be led to examine a bright red ball -- say, A -- on the table, and upon seeing such, will recognise that it has a distinct identity that simply by sitting there instantiates a world partition: W = {A| ~A} From this it is further readily apparent that this is a typical, instructive case, and that the following follows instantly:
LOI: A is itself, i.e. (A => A) = 1 or A = A LNC: A cannot also in the same sense, time and circumstances be also ~A, i.e. (A AND ~A) = 0 LEM: Any x in W will, by the dichotomy, be A or else ~A (so, nothing in W will be both or neither), i.e. (A XOR ~A) = 1
These are utterly certain and undeniable on pain of absurdity, once we have cases of distinct identity effecting a world-partition. For instance, to make your objection as cited, we see a sequence of partitions (at word level, letter level also shows the same):
{there| there} + {is | is} + {lack | lack} + . . .
That is, to try to deny, dismiss or studiously ignore the core three first principles of right reason in an argument necessarily, patently necessarily relies on these same principles just to state the objection. The objector refutes himself by simply speaking or typing. And if the objector instead keeps silent, there is no objection on the table. However, just to think of the objection requires the same action of world partition to have distinct concepts in mind. That is conscious, conceptual thought is inextricably intertwined with the action of these laws of thought. The LOI, LNC and LEM are undeniably, self-evidently true on pain of absurdity. Such has of course been pointed out repeatedly, but still objectors brush aside and cling to absurdity. Of course, the case that error exists and this, that distinct identity effects world partition and instantly presents the cluster of laws, LOI, LNC and LEM, manifest cases of truth as referring accurately to reality. They show cases of warrant to undeniable certainty, and so those who rightly believe such have knowledge as objective, well-warranted, credibly true (indeed, undeniably true here . . . ) belief. So, we have cases of knowledge that are prior to any theoretic framework; indeed, they are manifestly the basis for such frameworks and for deductive reasoning as well as inductive reasoning. Yes, there are weaker, softer, more common senses of knowledge. Cases that are probably best described as provisionally but reliably warranted, credibly true (or at least reliable to the point of reasonably trustworthy or even possibly morally certain) belief. And in so discussing, the warrant is generally objective, not merely subjective and subject to the idiosyncrasies, errors and biases etc of any particular individual. In the particular case of Science, c 1704 Newton went on record in Opticks, Query 31:
As in Mathematicks, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of difficult Things by the Method of Analysis, ought ever to precede the Method of Composition. This Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths. For Hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental Philosophy. And although the arguing from Experiments and Observations by Induction be no Demonstration of general Conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing which the Nature of Things admits of, and may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how much the Induction is more general. And if no Exception occur from Phaenomena, the Conclusion may be pronounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any Exception shall occur from Experiments, it may then begin to be pronounced with such Exceptions as occur. By this way of Analysis we may proceed from Compounds to Ingredients, and from Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general, from Effects to their Causes, and from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most general. This is the Method of Analysis: And the Synthesis consists in assuming the Causes discover'd, and establish'd as Principles, and by them explaining the Phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Explanations. [Emphases added.]
This is of course the likely basis of the commonly given "scientific method" as has been classically taught in schools. While there is no unique, one size fits all and only scientific investigations, the summary is enough to highlight a general, glorified common sense inductive approach that relies on the implicit premise that there is a general (not necessarily absolute) orderly and at least partially intelligible course of the world amenable to inductive exploration. Where in the modern sense, inductive conclusions or explanations are supported by bodies of empirical evidence to some reasonable degree of confidence, rather than being merely generalisations. So, merely being able to keep typing or talking objections does not suffice to make it reasonable to set first principles of right reason, or other SETs aside, or to redefine truth and knowledge to suit whatever ideological agendas are being touted. KFkairosfocus
September 21, 2015
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StephanB
Just so that you will know, identifying a saddle as a saddle and a horse as a horse is not an exercise in induction.
If I got it wrong, in that you do not think identifying something entails induction, then what is your view and how does it differ? Please be specific.Popperian
September 20, 2015
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F/N: As much of this thread has become an exchange with someone locked into certain views of Popper, it is helpful to gain a little balance from SEP:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/ There are various kinds of knowledge: knowing how to do something (for example, how to ride a bicycle), knowing someone in person, and knowing a place or a city. Although such knowledge is of epistemological interest as well, we shall focus on knowledge of propositions and refer to such knowledge using the schema ‘S knows that p’, where ‘S’ stands for the subject who has knowledge and ‘p’ for the proposition that is known.[1] Our question will be: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for S to know that p? We may distinguish, broadly, between a traditional and a non-traditional approach to answering this question. We shall refer to them as ‘TK’ and ‘NTK’. According to TK, knowledge that p is, at least approximately, justified true belief (JTB). False propositions cannot be known. Therefore, knowledge requires truth. A proposition S doesn't even believe can't be a proposition that S knows. Therefore, knowledge requires belief. Finally, S's being correct in believing that p might merely be a matter of luck.[2] Therefore, knowledge requires a third element, traditionally identified as justification. Thus we arrive at a tripartite analysis of knowledge as JTB: S knows that p if and only if p is true and S is justified in believing that p. According to this analysis, the three conditions — truth, belief, and justification — are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge.[3] Initially, we may say that the role of justification is to ensure that S's belief is not true merely because of luck. On that, TK and NTK are in agreement. They diverge, however, as soon as we proceed to be more specific about exactly how justification is to fulfill this role. According to TK, S's belief that p is true not merely because of luck when it is reasonable or rational, from S's own point of view, to take p to be true. According to evidentialism, what makes a belief justified in this sense is the possession of evidence. The basic idea is that a belief is justified to the degree it fits S's evidence. NTK, on the other hand, conceives of the role of justification differently. Its job is to ensure that S's belief has a high objective probability of truth and therefore, if true, is not true merely because of luck. One prominent idea is that this is accomplished if, and only if, a belief originates in reliable cognitive processes or faculties. This view is known as reliabilism.[4] . . . . In contemporary epistemology, there has been an extensive debate on whether justification is internal or external. Internalists claim that it is internal; externalists deny it. How are we to understand these claims? To understand what the internal-external distinction amounts to, we need to bear in mind that, when a belief is justified, there is something that makes it justified. Likewise, if a belief is unjustified, there is something that makes it unjustified. Let's call the things that make a belief justified or unjustified J-factors. The dispute over whether justification is internal or external is a dispute about what the J-factors are. Among those who think that justification is internal, there is no unanimity on how to understand the concept of internality. We can distinguish between two approaches. According to the first, justification is internal because we enjoy a special kind of access to J-factors: they are always recognizable on reflection.[20] Hence, assuming certain further premises (which will be mentioned momentarily), justification itself is always recognizable on reflection.[21] According to the second approach, justification is internal because J-factors are always mental states.[22] Let's call the former accessibility internalism and the latter mentalist internalism. Externalists deny that J-factors meet either one of these conditions. Evidentialism is typically associated with internalism, and reliabilism with externalism.[23] . . .
Now, obviously, there is much more there that would be beneficial, especially Gettier. But what we need to realise is that serious discussion of epistemology can proceed without orbiting around Popper, and even using the classic formulation on justified, true belief with some reservation for weak forms and distinction between being subjectively and objectively warranted. As my tendency to speak in terms of warranted, credibly true belief shows, my inclinations are to reasonable reliability and acknowledging that knowledge is often appropriately used in a soft provisional sense. One where for instance moral certainty and prudence as well as intellectual virtues and linked duties of care play a part. I trust that these will help P find a broadening, and will help reduce the almost obsessive side tracking of thread after thread here at UD. P needs to ask himself for instance why the linked SEP page from my search feature does not use the name Popper once, but has a significant section on Gettier. KFkairosfocus
September 20, 2015
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Popperian &47, Thank you for your answer. Just so that you will know, identifying a saddle as a saddle and a horse as a horse is not an exercise in induction. There is no reasoning involved. So your entire post, while appreciated, was inappropriate.StephenB
September 20, 2015
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Popperian, you need to take a few steps back and see again: Popper is neither THE peak nor the end of the story. There have always been alternatives on any major philosophical topic. And in this case, the pivotal issue is that self evident, certain truths such as error exists show that under particular conditions actual indubitable knowledge exists; knowledge here as warranted certainly true claims accepted for good and sufficient reason as true, accurately describing reality. Which shows that some knowledge is warranted to incorrigible certainty and is infallible. Linked, just to communicate you have had to rely on distinct identity starting with letters and keys, so any absolutisting of fallibilism that tries to undermine LOI, LNC and LEM becomes self referentially incoherent. As touching scientific, soft form knowledge claims, since Newton in Opticks Query 31, their provisional nature subject to correction on further investigation has been a commonplace. Some things are self-evidently knowable, others are a weaker degree, and the former includes the first principles of right reason that you cannot even post an objection without implicitly using. It is time for you to strike a reasonable balance. KFkairosfocus
September 20, 2015
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Epistemology did not peak with Popper, nor has it stopped at Popper.
You seem determined to reveal just how much you do not understand my position with your comments. First, I said "current, best theory", not "final true theory." If things are open to criticism, why would I think it had peaked or stopped? Second, David Deutsch has and brought Popper's epistemology into fundamental physics with Constructor Theory. So, I would agree. Epistemology has not stopped with Popper. Nor has it peaked with Popper.Popperian
September 20, 2015
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How it works is, materialists / atheists are devoted to a facts only approach on the intellectual level, to the exclusion of any and all opinion. It means intellectually they have no accommodation for expression of emotion, forming a true opinion. That sucks, so then they put opinion inside fact as it were. That is why they cannot be certain of anything, like A=A, because they need to have subjectivity inside objectivity, or else they are emotionally deceased. The subjectivity inside their objectivity is what makes it all uncertain. As different from creationism where fact and opinion are categorically distinct from each other.mohammadnursyamsu
September 20, 2015
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Popperian Everything is subject to critism.Andre
September 20, 2015
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Popperian: Epistemology did not peak with Popper, nor has it stopped at Popper. KFkairosfocus
September 20, 2015
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Lesia:
i have a suggestion: all the mess is because, at the core, LH and Co are still insisting that they cannot be certain that “A = A” is true, which implies that they’re not at all certain that a change in position is a change in position (perhaps it is not… a change in position)! Hence they were insisting they’ve not changed their position… Very complicated logic…
See my response to KF Above. Yes, this is a mess because it's entangled in with justificationist ideas about knowledge, which you do not seem to recognize as an idea or that it is subject to criticism.Popperian
September 20, 2015
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I notice first, S that you have shifted the issue from the general denial of knowledge....
We're still playing wack-a-mole. This is why we will not make progress. I have not denied knowledge. I'm suggesting that you're confused about what knowledge is and how it grows. Again, if you don't want to take the theory seriously, for the purpose of criticism, why bother asking? From Popper's lecture..
The fundamental mistake made by the philosophical theory of the ultimate sources of our knowledge is that it does not distinguish clearly enough between questions of origin and questions of validity. Admit­tedly’ in the case of historiography, these two questions may some­times coincide. The question of the validity of an historical assertion may be testable only, or mainly, in the light of the origin of certain sources. But in general the two questions are different; and in general we do not test the validity of an assertion or information by tracing its sources or its origin, but we test it, much more directly, by a critical examination of what has been asserted-of the asserted facts themselves. Thus the empiricist’s questions ‘How do you know? What is the source of your assertion?’ are wrongly put. They are not formulated in an inexact or slovenly manner, but they are entirely misconceived: they are questions that beg for an authoritarian answer.
Popperian
September 20, 2015
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Stephan, There are a number of competing theories of knowledge that one could try to explain having identified horses and distinguishing them from saddles. However, I have adopted the theory that has best withstood criticism. IOW, our current, best theory is Popper’s universal theory of knowledge. As for criticism, I have summarized aspects of that criticism, referenced and entire lecture from Popper and even quoted from in here in comments. For example, criticism of the idea that one could use induction as an infallible source to identify a horse is explained in detail in my comment about Goodwin’s new problem of induction. So, the question is, even if there were such a thing as an infallible source, how could one identify it infallibly and interpret it infallibly? No explanation has been provided. As such, the end result would have been equivalent to the explanation of what someone would have done had they not believed in the infallible source. IOW, it’s unclear how it adds anything or actually provides guidance, in practice. Other competing theories of knowledge include the current crop of intelligent design, with it’s abstract designer that has no limitations, and creationism. In these theories, the origin of knowledge is either absent, irrational or supernatural. None of which are good explanations. They also present the philosophical view that knowledge comes from authoritative sources, which theism is a special case of. Criticism of that philosophical view is also criticism of theism, without any sort of predigest. And there is lack of a good expansion for why, if the truth is manifest, that there is often disagreement over it. This is addressed in lecture and a quote above. “We’re not pure” or “sin” or “conspiracy” are bad explanations. Empiricism arose at a time before we developed theories about our senses worked. However, modern day theories tell us we do not experience anything as it really is. As such, observations are theory laden. Note, that's not good criticism that I, in particular, am infallible about identifying horses, as apposed to everyone else. I'm taking our current, best theory of knowledge seriously. However, why would I be an exception? Some being just decided to endow me, or some group of people, with infallible knowledge? Why those people? Why at that time? Why not everyone else? One might appeal to the idea of some good reason that we cannot comprehend, but that’s a bad explanation as well. This is why I keep suggesting that different philosophical views on epistemology are fundamental to the conflict on evolution.Popperian
September 20, 2015
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Lesia, sadly you are right, this is how absurd all of this is. KFkairosfocus
September 20, 2015
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Seversky and Popperian, I notice first, S that you have shifted the issue from the general denial of knowledge (claiming or implying the claim that we cannot have warranted credibly true belief on the external world) to how much we may be in error. Drastically different things. I still put before you both, error exists as undeniably, self-evidently true and a point of certain knowledge of certain truth. Truth, saying of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. As for the rest, one of the problems with believing errors true on foundational things is it warps perception and leads to resisting truth as it appears wrong. Sometimes so much so that such a one is led to cling to patent absurdities. But, that is likely still the best point to open eyes as realising something is absurd then often leads to the oops effect. Now, you both have been typing comments for days. Do you acknowledge that letters, computer keys etc have distinct identity, e.g. the QWERTY keys? If so, then immediately LOI (a thing Q is itself), LNC (Q is not also ~Q), and LEM (any distinct x is Q or ~Q but not both or neither) apply. You cannot even criticise these laws without using them. They are not merely arbitrary assumptions, they are connected inextricably to there being a world with distinct things. If not, how can you be pretending to be having a rational communication using letters and keys etc? Do, explain: _______________ KFkairosfocus
September 20, 2015
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i have a suggestion: all the mess is because, at the core, LH and Co are still insisting that they cannot be certain that "A = A" is true, which implies that they're not at all certain that a change in position is a change in position (perhaps it is not... a change in position)! Hence they were insisting they've not changed their position... Very complicated logic...Lesia
September 20, 2015
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Popperian So basically you are indecisive but you're not so sure about it?Andre
September 20, 2015
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How do you know that you don’t know?
How do I know I'm not infallible about fallibilism? I don't know. That is, I might be infallible about fallibilism.
So knowledge is objective? Wonder what it’s source is? Don’t you?
fallibilism, like all knowledge, started out as a guess. This is opposed to coming from an authoritative source that could not lead me, or anyone else, into error. Objectivity in this sense, means being independent of a knowing subject. It solves a problem, even if I am mistaken about that belief. If I order plans for a car, but am accidentally shipped plans for a boat instead, does my belief that following the instructions will build a car somehow prevent the result from being a boat? No, it will not. My intent or belief or who sent them to me does not change this. From Popper's Objective Knowledge...
"Let me repeat one of my standard arguments for the (more or less) independent existence of world 3. I consider two thought experiments: Experiment (1). All our machines and tools are destroyed, and all our subjective learning, including our subjective knowledge of machines and tools, and how to use them. But libraries and our capacity to learn from them survive. Clearly, after much suffering, our world may get going again. Experiment (2). As before, machines and tools are destroyed, and our subjective learning, including our subjective knowledge of machines and tools, and how to use them. But this time, all libraries are destroyed also, so that our capacity to learn from books becomes useless." Knowledge: Subjective Versus Objective, page 59
Popperian
September 20, 2015
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SB: Can you identify a saddle and distinguish it from a horse? If you can answer this question, I have just one more. After that, I don’t plan to bother you any more. Popperian
Have I adopted the ideas that some things are horses, others are saddles and employ those ideas to solve problems? Yes. However, that anything is a horse starts out as a guess, to which we apply criticism. Being a fallibilist, I do not think there are any sources that might not lead us into error. This includes our senses or even reason, which we would employ to identify a horse, which are themselves theory laden as they are based on theories, such as how our senses work, logic works. IOW, I have good criticism of the idea that I can infallibly identify a saddle and distinguish it from a horse. However, being a fallibilist means being fallible about the idea that I may have infallibly identified a saddle and saddle and distinguish it from a horse. But I have no explanation as to how I might have done so.
Thank you for you answer. I appreciate it. I have one last question. What is your good criticism of the idea that you can infallibly iddentify a saddle and distinguish it from a horse?StephenB
September 20, 2015
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It is obvious that the first principles of reason must be dealing with creation, because the creation of anything, including reason, is the first appearance of it. And the 2 elements of reasoning are fact and opinion, or objectivity and subjectivity. Fact applies to the creation. Objectivity has a logic of cause and effect, of being forced. The fact is forced by what the fact is about, the fact is a model of it. If what the fact is about changes, then, if we are not dealing with historical fact, then the fact is forced to change with it. And subjectivity is to choose about what it is that chooses, resulting in an opinion. Therefore opinion only applies to the creator domain. Those are the fundamentals of reasoning, and the rest may also apply to reasoning, but is certainly not the fundamentals of reasoning. It's quite apparent that the law of identity applies in mathematics, and not to matters of opinion. What is most fundamental in mathematics is 0. Conceived of as an arbitrary starting symbol, from which the rest of maths can be derived.mohammadnursyamsu
September 20, 2015
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Popperian So knowledge is objective? Wonder what it's source is? Don't you?Andre
September 20, 2015
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Popperian So are you using reason against reason? I don't care how fallible you are bit do you not see the error here?Andre
September 20, 2015
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Popperian Word salad (I read your post twice) but no answer to my question..... How do you know that you don't know?Andre
September 20, 2015
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I wrote:
First, I’m looking for an explanation as to how you can identify something infallibly by which the LOI could provide guidance, in practice, as an authoritative source.
StephanB:
Can you identify a saddle and distinguish it from a horse? If you can answer this question, I have just one more. After that, I don’t plan to bother you any more.
Have I adopted the ideas that some things are horses, others are saddles and employ those ideas to solve problems? Yes. However, that anything is a horse starts out as a guess, to which we apply criticism. Being a fallibilist, I do not think there are any sources that might not lead us into error. This includes our senses or even reason, which we would employ to identify a horse, which are themselves theory laden as they are based on theories, such as how our senses work, logic works. IOW, I have good criticism of the idea that I can infallibly identify a saddle and distinguish it from a horse. However, being a fallibilist means being fallible about the idea that I may have infallibly identified a saddle and saddle and distinguish it from a horse. But I have no explanation as to how I might have done so.Popperian
September 20, 2015
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KF and Andre, I've already addressed this question. The assumption that I have not suggests you're confused or unable or unwilling to see beyond justificationism.
One can be fallible about fallibilism, which means being fallible as to whether one is infallible about knowledge in some spheres.
Many people are confused about Popper because they do not take his entire epistemology seriously, as a whole, when criticizing it. So you end up going in a circle, pointing out errors. It's like a game of wack-a-mole in that people keep referencing the same mistaken ideas when objecting to some other aspect of his epistemology. When you point out how that one aspect is mistaken, they point out how some other previous misrepresentation doesn't "fit" with it, etc. For example, Popper's criticism goes beyond the mere naive aspects of induction. He argues that the actual contents of theories are not derived from observations either. So all ideas start out as guesses. That would include fallibilism. Knowledge is objective in that it is independent of any knowing subject.
To demonstrate the existence and significance of objective knowledge, Popper considers two thought experiments. Firstly, he asks us to imagine that "all our machines and tools are destroyed and all our subjective learning, including our subjective knowledge of machines and tools, and how to use them. But libraries and our capacity to learn from them survive. Clearly, after much suffering, our world may get going again." Secondly, he asks us to imagine the same situation, except that "this time, all our libraries are destroyed also, so that our capacity to learn from books becomes useless." It can be seen that the existence of information in books makes a crucial difference. This is a clever and beautifully simple argument on the distinction between subjective and objective knowledge, and the singular importance of the latter.
knowledge is not true belief because they contain errors to some degree. As Popper put it in the referenced lecture.
8. Neither observation nor reason is an authority. Intellectual in­tuition and imagination are most important, but they are not reliable: they may show us things very clearly, and yet they may mislead us. They are indispensable as the main sources of our theories; but most of our theories are false anyway. The most important function of observa­tion and reasoning, and even of intuition and imagination, is to help us in the critical examination of those bold conjectures which are the means by which we probe into the unknown.
Deutsch improved on Popper in that Knowledge is information that plays a casual role in being retained when embedded in a storage medium, this includes book, brains and even genomes. The source of the knowledge does not matter in that it is knowledge because it solves a problem. So, when you ask, “how do you know”, we’re not even using the same terms. We do not even have the same goals and are approaching the problem from opposite directions. You want to use sources to show an idea is true or more probable. I want to find errors in our ideas, and possibly even replace them with another that not only solves the same problem just as well, but explains even more phenomena. You see paradoxes and consider my view “crazy” because the truth is not manifest. Read the transcript of the entire lecture, then get back to me with questions. Then again, I’ve already quoted key aspects, which no one has addressed.Popperian
September 20, 2015
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Andre @ 32
Popperian Let me ask you…. How do you know that you don’t know? I’ve asked you guys this question a few times with no response. Please can you let me know; How do you know that you don’t know?
Popperian can answer for himself but, in my view, the question as stated is absurd on its face. None of us can know how much we don’t know. To paraphrase a comment from Karl Popper, we all know different amounts about different things but we are all alike in our infinite ignorance. The real question is how much confidence can we have in the things we believe we do know. For example, I have a very high degree of confidence that the Sun will rise in the east and set in the west tomorrow. That is what I have always seen it do in the past and, as far as I can tell, that is what everyone has ever seen it do. On the other hand, I have very little confidence in the story of St Joseph of Cupertino’s levitations. I have never seen such a thing happen that was not a stage illusionist’s trick, no one else has seen such a thing happen since that was not explicable as a stage magician’s trick and it violates the known laws of physics. I cannot rule it out with absolute certainty but I judge it as highly improbable. Are there things we can know with certainty? You can argue that, in formal systems such as logic or mathematics, there are statements that are true by definition, such as 1+1=2 or A=A. But that calls into question what is meant by truth. In the correspondence theory of truth, which was the version adopted by Josiah Royce as I understand it, a statement is held to be true to the extent to which corresponds to what we can observe of whatever it purports to describe or explain. So A=A is just a pair of symbols conjoined by an operator. It is neither true nor false unless we know what it is intended to refer to. If we are told it is intended to represent the Law of Identity - the principle or axiom in reasoning which holds that a thing cannot be both itself and something else at the same time - then we have a claim we can test against observed reality. At first glance it appears to be accurate, at least insofar as it applies to the macro world we inhabit. On the other hand we are told that there are sub-atomic entities which can be both a particle and a wave at the same time. At least, they exhibit the properties of both as far as we can observe them. That appears to call into question whether we can be certain that A=A is true in all cases. Of course, the obverse of the original question is how can you know that you know what you know, if by “know” you are implying an absolute certainty?Seversky
September 20, 2015
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