Origenes: “The Emergence of Emergentism: A Play for Two Actors”

_{kairosfocus

December 8, 2022

Intelligent Design}

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The stage is in darkness, with sombre mood music, then light rises . . .

Origenes, 226 in the Pregnancy thread:

<<Two desperate naturalists in a room.

A: “I feel completely desperate. There is no way we will ever be able to explain life and consciousness.”
B: “I feel the exact same way. The main issue is that we have nothing to work with. All we have is mindless particles in the void obeying mindless regularities. Starting from that, how can we possibly explain life, not to mention personhood, freedom, and rationality? There is simply no way forward.”
A: “Exactly right. Sometimes I feel like such a loser. The other day I heard that current science cannot even explain liquidity.”
B: “What did you just say?”

**POOF**>>

THE END.

Comments

More Kant, more questions ...
What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. [Kant]
Kant speaks with absolute certainty about all of us and I am wondering why it is that Kant thinks that he knows other people so well. Somehow he knows for certain that we all have the same way of perceiving. He knows for certain that the same limits ”pertain to every human being”, but do “not necessarily pertain to every being”. How does Kant know all that for a fact? Why is Kant so certain that no one can possibly perceive how things are in themselves? Did he check? Is he a mind reader of some sort? And if someone would be able to see things how they are in themselves, would Kant be able to confirm such? Why is how the other is 'in himself' not just as unknowable to Kant as the way objects in themselves are?Origenes_{December 20, 2022
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A little trip down memory lane,
BA77: “So AF (Alan Fox) holds that the ‘niche”, not AF himself, is responsible for the information that he himself is writing in his posts?” Alan Fox: “Yes, sort of, though I don’t know,,,,” https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/at-evolution-news-for-darwinism-pregnancy-is-the-mother-of-all-chicken-and-egg-problems/#comment-771084 Origenes: "Does rationality require a person who is in control of his thoughts?" PyrrhoManiac1: "No, I don’t think so." https://uncommondescent.com/mind/the-thought-that-stops-thought/#comment-771052 Game over. (1) rationality implies a thinker in control of thoughts. (2) under materialism a thinker is an effect caused by processes in the brain (determinism). (3) in order for materialism to ground rationality a thinker (an effect) must control processes in the brain (a cause). (1)&(2) (4) no effect can control its cause. Therefore materialism cannot ground rationality. per Box UD
bornagain77_{December 20, 2022
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Let's hear it from the master himself ...
Kant: We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us; ...
Here, Kant does not say “we may very well be mistaken about how things are in themselves”, no, he is telling us, that we are definitely mistaken. That we cannot be right. Ever. How can he possibly know this for sure? In order to know this for sure, he must have some transcendent position from which he can clearly see ‘how things appear’ and ‘how things really are.’ However, according to his own theory, whatever he believes reality to be he must be mistaken about it. Again Bradley, quoted by Kairosfocus in #67:
to urge that our knowledge is of a kind which must fail to transcend appearance, itself implies that transcendence.
Origenes_{December 20, 2022
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Kairosfocus @
The man who is ready to prove that metaphysical knowledge is wholly impossible . . . himself has, perhaps unknowingly, entered the arena . . . To say the reality is such that our knowledge cannot reach it, is a claim to know reality ; to urge that our knowledge is of a kind which must fail to transcend appearance, itself implies that transcendence. [–> this is the “ugly gulch” of the Kantians] For, if we had no idea of a beyond, we should assuredly not know how to talk about failure or success. And the test, by which we distinguish them, must obviously be some acquaintance with the nature of the goal.
I could not agree more.Origenes_{December 20, 2022
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PM1 @
Once again: no. The skeptic begins by accepting the metaphysician’s distinction between “appearance” and “reality”. This distinction was accepted by all of the post-Parmenidean philosophers of antiquity: Plato, Aristotle, Democritus, Epicurus, Epictetus, etc. They are disagreeing about what reality is, but they all accept the appearance/reality distinction.
If they, as you say, disagree on what reality is, and they do, based on their different doctrines of reality, then they also hold different appearance/reality distinctions. How does that work for the skeptic? He does not hold any doctrine about reality, so on what basis does he make his particular appearance/reality distinction?Origenes_{December 20, 2022
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@68
. However ‘reality’ is not a thing among other things. Reality encompasses all things, including “claims about reality” and “claims about claims about reality.” IOW you cannot draw an enclosed circle around reality and next find “claims about reality” (or whatever) to be outside of that circle. Unlike with a drawn circle around an apple, here, in the case of ‘reality’, there is no outside of the circle.
The problem here is that you're not seeing how the skeptics are working within the conceptual space of ancient Greek and Roman thought. It is crucial to that whole way of thinking that there's a distinction between "appearance" and "reality": how things seem to be (opinion, doxa) and how things really are (truth, episteme). All of the debates between the rival schools of antiquity were about different conceptions of how things are. Is reality atoms and void, as the Epicureans taught? Is realty transcendent ideas, as the Platonists taught? Do we perceive forms through our senses (Aristotle) or by turning away from the senses (Plato)? Is the world a result of chance and necessity (Epicureanism) or is there an intelligence at work in the world which constantly strives to bring about what is best for all (Stoicism)? The Skeptic is accepting what the metaphysicians insist upon: the intelligibility of a distinction between appearance and reality. Their point is that no account of reality, as distinct from appearance, according to the metaphysicians's own insistence, can be rationally defended. This is why the Skeptic is not self-referentially incoherent: because all he's doing to accepting what the metaphysician is demanding, and showing that metaphysical truth as the metaphysician understands it is impossible.PyrrhoManiac1_{December 20, 2022
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@67
if discussion of reality is reduced to discussion of appearances in general, that includes the skeptic’s claim.
Once again: no. The skeptic begins by accepting the metaphysician's distinction between "appearance" and "reality". This distinction was accepted by all of the post-Parmenidean philosophers of antiquity: Plato, Aristotle, Democritus, Epicurus, Epictetus, etc. They are disagreeing about what reality is, but they all accept the appearance/reality distinction. The Skeptical point is that once we accept the appearance/reality distinction, then no account of reality can be rationally defended, because they all run into the Dilemma of the Criterion.
It is self referential and self defeating, as say Bradley pointed out for the Kantians.
I'm not sure Bradley understands Kant, or Hegel's critique of Kant. It is no part of Kant's view that we can know that noumena are unknowable. That's clearly absurd and not at all what Kant actually says. Kant's position is far more subtle than that, and much harder to refute (though I believe Hegel succeeds). Kant's claim is that we must restrict objectively valid judgments to what we can possibly experience. An objectively valid judgment is an assertion with a truth value (either true or false) that can be determined independently of what we hope, believe, desire, assume, etc. (The propositions of math and science are Kant's exemplars of objectively valid judgments.) The reason we need to do this, Kant says, is to salvage morality and faith from the onslaught of materialism (or what we today would call naturalism or scientism). If reality in itself conforms to the requirements of Newtonian physics, then free will is impossible and so is personal immortality. So Kant restricts the whole domain of scientific investigation to how we experience the world, leaving open the conceivability of things in themselves being not determined by mechanistic physics, and thus allowing us the right to believe that we are free, that God exists, and that some aspect of ourselves survives our death. As Kant sees it, if we had scientific knowledge of noumena, then we would be obligated to be Spinozists: deny a transcendent personal God, deny free will, and deny personal immortality. Hegel's brilliance is multi-faceted, and has nothing to do with accusing Kant of such a basic error as Bradley does. Hegel first points out that assuming a total separation of being and thought (as Kant does) is just as dogmatic as assuming a total unity of being and thought. The unity of being and thought must itself be demonstrated, and that demonstration must proceed without any presuppositions at all. Hegel undertakes this in the Science of Logic, which is probably the most difficult text of the entire Western canon. Hegel also points out that while Kant was right to argue for the distinction between intrinsic purposiveness and extrinsic purposiveness, Kant erred in assuming that the former can be no more than a subjective heuristic owing to our own limitations. Instead Hegel, who knew biology much better than Kant did (though Kant had a far better grasp of physics), argued for the reality of teleology and that nothing could be a rational being without being a rational animal. (One can see lots of Aristotle being deployed here.) As Hegel sees it, Kant was right to claim that traditional metaphysics dogmatically assumed the unity of being and thought, he himself dogmatically neglected the possibility and necessity of demonstrating the unity of being and thought -- beginning with a completely presuppositionless starting point. And one of the consequences of that demonstration, Hegel thinks, is the reality of biological purposiveness and that purposiveness is required for rational cognition. I also think that Hegel's transformation of dialectics into the method for doing philosophy is also what's necessary for overcoming the Dilemma of the Criterion, but that's a separate issue.PyrrhoManiac1_{December 20, 2022
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PM1
Yes, that was Origenes’s mistake as well. The mistake rests on a conflation between claims about reality and claims about claims about reality.
A claim about an apple is not an apple itself. This is true because an apple is a thing among other things. However 'reality' is not a thing among other things. Reality encompasses all things, including "claims about reality" and "claims about claims about reality." IOW you cannot draw an enclosed circle around reality and next find "claims about reality" (or whatever) to be outside of that circle. Unlike with a drawn circle around an apple, here, in the case of 'reality', there is no outside of the circle.Origenes_{December 20, 2022
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PM1, if discussion of reality is reduced to discussion of appearances in general, that includes the skeptic's claim. It is self referential and self defeating, as say Bradley pointed out for the Kantians. KF PS, I clip:
We may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole [--> i.e. the focus of Metaphysics is critical studies of worldviews] . . . . The man who is ready to prove that metaphysical knowledge is wholly impossible . . . himself has, perhaps unknowingly, entered the arena . . . To say the reality is such that our knowledge cannot reach it, is a claim to know reality ; to urge that our knowledge is of a kind which must fail to transcend appearance, itself implies that transcendence. [--> this is the "ugly gulch" of the Kantians] For, if we had no idea of a beyond, we should assuredly not know how to talk about failure or success. And the test, by which we distinguish them, must obviously be some acquaintance with the nature of the goal. Nay, the would-be sceptic, who presses on us the contradictions of our thoughts, himself asserts dogmatically. For these contradictions might be ultimate and absolute truth, if the nature of the reality were not known to be otherwise . . . [such] objections . . . are themselves, however unwillingly, metaphysical views, and . . . a little acquaintance with the subject commonly serves to dispel [them]. [Appearance and Reality, 2nd Edn, 1897 (1916 printing), pp. 1 - 2; INTRODUCTION. At Web Archive.]
kairosfocus_{December 20, 2022
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@65 I've given an argument for why Origenes is wrong. My argument is based upon my having read Sextus Empiricus (Outline of Pyrrhonism), Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond) and Hume. Can you show where I've made a mistake? What's your evidence? Have I misunderstood those texts?PyrrhoManiac1_{December 20, 2022
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"It doesn’t." It does. Andrewasauber_{December 20, 2022
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@63
So then why should or would I ever give skepticism a second of my time, since the rule breaks itself?
It doesn't. Origenes is mistaken. I've tried explaining why but to no avail.PyrrhoManiac1_{December 20, 2022
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PM1, So the skeptic's position is that you can't rationally make a claim about reality. So then why should or would I ever give skepticism a second of my time, since the rule breaks itself? Andrewasauber_{December 20, 2022
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@61
That sounds like an attempted account of reality.
Yes, that was Origenes's mistake as well. The mistake rests on a conflation between claims about reality and claims about claims about reality. The former is about how the world really is; the second is about what people say about how the world really is. It seems like some people here are just really committed to not understanding a fairly basic distinction. Understanding skepticism correctly is not the end of the world. As I've said repeatedly, I'm not a skeptic myself. I just think it's a really interesting concept to wrestle with.PyrrhoManiac1_{December 20, 2022
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"The Skeptic’s project is to show that no account of reality, as distinct from appearance, is rationally defensible." That sounds like an attempted account of reality. Andrewasauber_{December 20, 2022
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re 59: Yes. My contribution to the discussion. I've been on the receiving end of this misunderstanding of skepticism, so I appreciate what PM has to say.Viola Lee_{December 20, 2022
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@57 I really don't think that's at all true. You are erecting a massive castle out of our one line from the SEP entry. SEP entries are fine (I use them and recommend them all the time) for getting basic understanding of the issues. But they are really limited. While I'm no expert, I have read Sextus Empiricus and Montaigne, and from those sources, I can say with some confidence that the Skeptic does not take the Dilemma of the Criterion to apply to all beliefs: it applies only to beliefs about "reality", as distinct from "appearance". That is, the skeptic accepts the metaphysician's distinction between "how things appear" and "how they really are" (a distinction that in Western phil goes back to Parmenides). The Skeptic's project is to show that no account of reality, as distinct from appearance, is rationally defensible. I think that your allegation that Skepticism is self-referentially incoherent rests on a pretty serious misunderstanding of what the Skeptic is really saying.PyrrhoManiac1_{December 20, 2022
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Origenes, sobering point, worth headlining, so here goes. KFkairosfocus_{December 20, 2022
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The skeptic wants to criticize, but he doesn’t want to be criticized himself. We all make statements of belief, skeptics included. But the skeptic posits a closed circle in which no beliefs are justified. Yet at the same time, he arrogates to himself a position outside of this circle by which he can judge the beliefs of others, a move he denies to his opponents. Since the raison d’être of his thesis is that there is no outside of the circle, he does not have the epistemic right to assume a position independent of it, and so his belief about the unjustifiability of beliefs or reasoning is just as unjustifiable as those he criticizes. If the circle encloses all beliefs, if all beliefs are unjustifiable, he cannot judge between truth and falsity, since any such judgment would be just as unjustifiable as what it seeks to adjudicate. At no point can he step out of the circle to a transcendent standpoint that would allow him to reject some beliefs as tainted while remaining untainted himself.Origenes_{December 19, 2022
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PM1@55
SEP: “It is interesting to note that Agrippa’s trilemma is perfectly general; in particular, it applies to philosophical positions as well as to ordinary propositions.”

Ori: If true, it follows that Agrippa’s trilemma can rightly be applied to itself.
This would right if the Trilemma were itself a philosophical statement in the required sense. I don’t think that it is, because I think there’s a difference here.
Again, SEP: “… it applies to philosophical positions as well as to ordinary propositions” The Trilemma is a philosophical position, is it not? So, it follows that we can apply it to itself, right?
The difference between “ordinary statements” and “philosophical statements” (as per the SEP) could be construed as a difference of scope.
Again, according to SEP, the Trilemma applies to both kinds of statements.
Ordinary statements about everyday objects and events as we practically perceive and manipulate them; philosophical statements are about everything. They are comprehensive. If that’s right, then that’s compatible with my claim that the Skeptic is demonstrating the absence of justification for any metaphysical doctrines.
I take it that, unlike SEP, you want skepticism to limit its scope to metaphysical doctrines.
Again, and this is crucial: the Skeptic is not saying, about ultimate reality, that no claim about it is justifiable. She is saying, about claims about ultimate reality, that none of those claims are justifiable. In other words, here’s the issue. Are the following claims equivalent? For each claim about ultimate reality, there is no justification for that claim and It is a truth of ultimate reality that no claim about it is justifiable I can agree with you up to this point: Skepticism would be self-referentially incoherent if the two claims were equivalent or if the first entailed the second.
To me, the statements are equivalent. At this point, the difference between a Skeptic and a Taoist is unclear to me. - - - - - edit: The claim “it is not possible to justify any claim about women” would tell us, that women are such that no claim about them is justified. IOW it is (also) a claim about women — and therefore self-contradictory.Origenes_{December 19, 2022
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@54
the contrary, it is stated that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is absolute and applies to any claim/proposition: “It is interesting to note that Agrippa’s trilemma is perfectly general; in particular, it applies to philosophical positions as well as to ordinary propositions.” If true, it follows that Agrippa’s trilemma can rightly be applied to itself.
This would right if the Trilemma were itself a philosophical statement in the required sense. I don't think that it is, because I think there's a difference here. The difference between "ordinary statements" and "philosophical statements" (as per the SEP) could be construed as a difference of scope. Ordinary statements about everyday objects and events as we practically perceive and manipulate them; philosophical statements are about everything. They are comprehensive. If that's right, then that's compatible with my claim that the Skeptic is demonstrating the absence of justification for any metaphysical doctrines. Again, and this is crucial: the Skeptic is not saying, about ultimate reality, that no claim about it is justifiable. She is saying, about claims about ultimate reality, that none of those claims are justifiable. In other words, here's the issue. Are the following claims equivalent?
For each claim about ultimate reality, there is no justification for that claim
and
It is a truth of ultimate reality that no claim about it is justifiable
I can agree with you up to this point: Skepticism would be self-referentially incoherent if the two claims were equivalent or if the first entailed the second.PyrrhoManiac1_{December 19, 2022
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PM1 @53 In the Stanford article, in particular concerning Pyrrhonian Skepticism, it is not stated anywhere that Skepticism restricts its focus to ‘doctrines about the ultimate nature of reality.’ On the contrary, it is stated that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is absolute and applies to any claim/proposition:
“It is interesting to note that Agrippa’s trilemma is perfectly general; in particular, it applies to philosophical positions as well as to ordinary propositions.”
If true, it follows that Agrippa’s trilemma can rightly be applied to itself. - - - - Back to your statement:
The Skeptic claims that it is not possible to justify any doctrine about the ultimate nature of reality. Since that claim is not itself about the ultimate nature of reality, it is not self-contradictory.
If your statement is true, then the claim tells us exactly nothing about the ultimate nature of reality. However, the claim tells us, that the ultimate nature of reality is such that we cannot justify any doctrine about it. A first-order claim. Certainly, it can be argued that this does not tell us much about the ultimate nature of reality, but it undeniably tells us something. Moreover, your statement presupposes a held justified doctrine about the ultimate nature of reality to ascertain that it is such that one cannot hold justified propositions about it. However, this contradicts the skeptic claim, as you defined it, that one cannot have justified doctrines about it.Origenes_{December 19, 2022
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@52
There is a problem with your claim: how do you know that ‘The Dilemma of the Criterion’ is not about the ultimate nature of reality? In order to make that claim coherently, in order to know what you are talking about, you must hold some belief/doctrine about the ultimate nature of reality, which informs you that ‘The Dilemma of the Criterion’ has no bearing on it.
As I understand it, the dilemma of the criterion is about what we say about the ultimate nature of reality, not about the ultimate nature of reality itself. It is a second-order claim, not a first-order claim. It's comparable to the difference between "the cat is on the mat" and "the sentence 'the cat is on the mat' is true": the first sentence is about a state of affairs in the world, and the second sentence is about the first sentence. Likewise, the dilemma of the criterion takes metaphysical doctrines as its object and is making a claim about them -- that none of them can be justified -- which is different from making a claim of metaphysics. I don't know if this is sufficient to refute the charge of self-referential incoherence, but it seems like an important distinction to make.PyrrhoManiac1_{December 19, 2022
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PM1@51
The Skeptic claims that it is not possible to justify any doctrine about the ultimate nature of reality. Since that claim is not itself about the ultimate nature of reality, it is not self-contradictory.
There is a problem with your claim: how do you know that ‘The Dilemma of the Criterion’ is not about the ultimate nature of reality? In order to make that claim coherently, in order to know what you are talking about, you must hold some belief/doctrine about the ultimate nature of reality, which informs you that ‘The Dilemma of the Criterion’ has no bearing on it. However, according to skepticism, no doctrine about the ultimate nature of reality is justified. According to skepticism, there is no way of knowing what the ultimate nature of reality is, so, there is no way to ascertain which proposition is about it and which is not. Your claim “‘The Dilemma of the Criterion’ is not about the ultimate nature of reality” tells us something about the ultimate nature of reality and is therefore a claim about the ultimate nature of reality. A claim that, according to Skepticism, cannot be justified. You draw a closed circle around ‘doctrines about the ultimate nature of reality’, and next you arrogate to yourself a position outside of this circle by which you can judge those doctrines. But how do you justify the presumed epistemic right to be outside of this circle? You cannot. - - - - - Edit: It just occurred to me that an even more direct response is available: The claim “it is not possible to justify any doctrine about the ultimate nature of reality” tells us something about the ultimate nature of reality. It tells us that the ultimate nature of reality is such that no justified doctrine about is possible. Therefore it is incoherent to state that the skeptic’s claim is not about the ultimate nature of reality.Origenes_{December 18, 2022
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@49 and @50 I'm no expert in Skepticism (or anything else, really), but based upon my limited reading in the area, here's a response. Bear in mind please that I'm not trying to defend Skepticism, only explain why I think it's really fascinating. The Dilemma of the Criterion goes something like this: consider any doctrine that purports to contain true claims about the ultimate nature of reality. What justifies this doctrine, such that it would be rational to accept it? Suppose that we need some criterion or standard by which to evaluate this doctrine. If the criterion is itself part of the doctrine, then we're begging the question. If the criterion is not part of the doctrine, then either it is merely arbitrary or we can ask the question as to what justifies that criterion. Then it would be some other doctrine that justifies the criterion, and we can raise the question of what other criterion justifies that other doctrine that justifies the first criterion, etc. One philosopher who puts this dilemma to great effect is Michel de Montaigne in his Apology for Raymond Sebond. Montaigne argues that any claim from a great philosopher of antiquity can be opposed with another claim from an equally great philosopher. We have (he claims) no criteria that would allow us to decide between Platonic idealism, Epicurean atomism, or Stoic pantheism, nor are we entitled to the claims about our own rational powers that would ground Scholastic rational theology. Montaigne concludes with fideism: the Christian should accept the teachings of the Church based on faith alone, since reason cannot help us. A century later, Hume would use very similar arguments to come to an anti-fideist conclusion. So, in response to this:
My challenge to you: formulate the claim of skepticism without raising self-contradiction. Formulate that truth does not exist, without making a truth statement. Give it your best.
The Skeptic claims that it is not possible to justify any doctrine about the ultimate nature of reality. Since that claim is not itself about the ultimate nature of reality, it is not self-contradictory.PyrrhoManiac1_{December 18, 2022
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Stanford article on “Pyrrhonian Skepticism”:
But some skeptics are skeptics regarding second- (and higher-) order propositions as well as regarding first-order propositions. Following the same ancient tradition, we will call that kind of skepticism “Pyrrhonian Skepticism”. Without any claim to historical accuracy, we will take Pyrrhonian Skepticism to be absolute skepticism—the thesis that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to any proposition p. Is Pyrrhonian Skepticism so understood self-refuting?
Allow me to answer this question: (1.) Suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to ANY proposition p. (2.) (1.) is itself a proposition. From (1.) and (2.) (3.) Suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to (1.) What does conclusion (3.) mean? It means that we do not know whether or not “Suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to any proposition p” is true. So, applied to itself, proposition (1.) undercuts itself. It is clearly a self-contradictory statement. The Stanford article goes on to argue that the proposition “the only justified attitude with respect to the proposition that p is suspension of judgment” is not self-contradictory. I agree with this, of course. Surely, it might be the case that suspension of judgment is the justified attitude towards some particular proposition. However, the claim becomes self-contradictory when it is about ANY proposition (which includes itself). So, what is the Stanford article doing here? I really don’t know. Perhaps someone can explain. - - - - More Stanford:
Agrippa’s trilemma, then, can be presented thus: (1.) If a belief is justified, then it is either a basic justified belief or an inferentially justified belief. (2.) There are no basic justified beliefs. Therefore, (3.) If a belief is justified, then it is justified in virtue of belonging to an inferential chain. (4.) All inferential chains are such that either (a) they contain an infinite number of beliefs; or (b) they contain circles; or (c) they contain beliefs that are not justified. (5.) No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to an infinite inferential chain. (6.) No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to a circular inferential chain. (7.) No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to an inferential chain that contains unjustified beliefs. Therefore, (8.) There are no justified beliefs.
At first glance (8.) is clearly a self-contradictory statement. But perhaps there is a reason that it cannot be applied to itself? Unwittingly the Stanford article assures us that it can be applied to itself:
It is interesting to note that Agrippa’s trilemma is perfectly general; in particular, it applies to philosophical positions as well as to ordinary propositions.
OK! It applies to everything! Well, let’s apply it to itself then: (1.) There are no justified beliefs. (2.) (1.) is itself a belief. From (1.) and (2.) (3.) (1.) is not a justified belief. What does (3.) mean? It means that it is not justified to hold the belief that there are no justified beliefs. It follows that there are justified beliefs. Conclusion: ‘Agrippa’s trilemma’ is perfectly self-refuting nonsense ... The Stanford article somehow fails to notice this obvious fact.Origenes_{December 18, 2022
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PM1 @ 48 The claim, as you formulated it, “it’s not possible for anyone to know the truth about the world” is itself a truth about the world, so what we have here is once again a case of self-contradiction. As I said, skepticism is only expressible in self-contradictory statements. My challenge to you: formulate the claim of skepticism without raising self-contradiction. Formulate that truth does not exist, without making a truth statement. Give it your best.
Descartes’s cogito argument ... at most shows the impossibility of doubting that one is conscious.
Suppose you are right, that spells the end of any ‘ambitious’ skepticism, right?Origenes_{December 17, 2022
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@47
Skepticism as a philosophy always looked like a self-contradictory project to me, only expressable in self-contradictory statements like “it is not possible to arrive at knowledge” or even worse “true statements do not exist.”
The point of Skepticism is to liberate us from the need to know the ultimate truth of things -- to accept that being guided by "the appearances" is sufficient for human happiness. On the Skeptical view, the need to be right about things is a major cause of suffering, conflict, and violence. Overcoming that need, by recognizing that it's not possible for anyone to know the truth about the world, would make us more contented, tolerant, and peaceable. Or so that the Skeptics would us believe. I'm certainly not persuaded -- I just think that the Skepticism has gotten a bad reputation that it doesn't deserve.
Not sure why it is still a thing, especially after Descartes undeniably showed that there is at least one thing immune to skeptical undermining — see also my post here.
Descartes's cogito argument -- which he borrowed from Augustine, by the way -- at most shows the impossibility of doubting that one is conscious. Some philosophers have argued that he was misled by grammar when he reasoned from "thinking is observed" to "therefore something must exist which is doing that thinking, a thinking thing". But the real question is whether Descartes could reason without circularity from the sheer awareness of having thoughts to any claims about the nature of mind-independent reality.PyrrhoManiac1_{December 17, 2022
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PM1 @45
As my nom de plume suggests, I find skepticism quite fascinating ...
Skepticism as a philosophy always looked like a self-contradictory project to me, only expressable in self-contradictory statements like “it is not possible to arrive at knowledge” or even worse “true statements do not exist.” Not sure why it is still a thing, especially after Descartes undeniably showed that there is at least one thing immune to skeptical undermining — see also my post here.Origenes_{December 17, 2022
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PM1, I have been busy elsewhere. I suggest, distinct identity is the pivot of rationality, without which we cannot even have language much less argument. At logic of being level, it is tied to what it is to be an X, i.e. any particular possible world W is marked out from its typical quite near neighbour W' by some A such that W - A = W' and thus we have that there are in common characteristics and distinguishing ones for specific worlds. These being of course sufficiently complete clusters of coherent propositions describing how this or another world is, might be etc. From this, elsewhere I drew out 0, 1, 2 then by von Neumann N, thence Z,Q,R,C,R* etc, leading to universal power of core math, answering Wigner. Distinct identity then has ontological significance for worlds, thoughts and beings. The attempt to sideline it is headed in the self referentially self defeating direction, where yes non contradiction and excluded middle are close corollaries. In particular, a vast infinity of distinct abstract entities and relationships tied to structure and quantity are therefore necessarily present and woven into the fabric of any possible world. Further, the general denial of objective knowledge is itself an objective knowledge claim, is self referential and is self defeating. Instead, that in any world, error is possible, is actual, is itself an undeniable proposition. It is known to incorrigible certainty. So the path is to acknowledge subjective vs objective vs absolute, and to reckon that knowledge is a property of the people and comes in similar degrees. So, weak sense knowledge is warranted [that's about Gettier etc], credibly true -- so, reliable -- belief. Reliable is key, and so are warrant and credibility. This defeasible weak sense is true about common sense, perception of ourselves and our orientation as well as the world we inhabit, serious thought, good newspaper reporting, education, courts, history, policy making, medicine, science etc. With Godel and co, even math. For some few items, knowledge becomes certain beyond correction, e.g. self evident first truths. But a worldview cannot be built up from such, they serve as sound plumb line tests. KFkairosfocus_{December 17, 2022
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