Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Please Take the Time to Understand Our Arguments Before You Attack Them

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The comments our Darwinist friends put up on this site never cease to amaze.  Consider, as a for instance, Kantian Naturalist’s comment that appears as comment 9 to kairosfocus’ Infographic: The science of ID post.  The post sets forth a simple summary of the case for ID, and KN responds: 

What I like about this infographic is that it makes really clear where the problem with intelligent design lies.

Here’s the argument:

(1) We observe that all As are caused by Bs. (2) Cs are similar to As in relevant respects. (3) Therefore, it is highly probable that Cs are also caused by Bs.

But this is invalid, because the conclusion does not follow from the premises.

KN has been posting on this site for years.  He is obviously an intelligent man.  He is obviously a man of good will.  I will assume, therefore, that he is attacking ID as he believes it to be and not a straw man caricature of his own making.  And that is what is so amazing.  How can an intelligent person of good will follow this site for several years and still not understand the basics of ID?  It beggars belief. 

Maybe it will help if I explain ID using the same formal structure KN has used. 

KN:

(1) We observe that all As are caused by Bs.

ID as it really is:

(1)  For all As whose provenance is actually known, the cause of A was B. 

Here “A” could be complex specified information or irreducible complexity.

B, of course, stands for “the act of an intelligent agent.”

In step 1 KN is actually not far off the mark.  I have reworded it slightly, because ID does not posit there is no possible explanation for A other than B.  ID posits that in our universal experience of A where its provenance has been actually observed, it has always arisen from B.  Now, there may be some other cause of A (Neo-Darwinian evolution – NDE – for instance), but the conclusion that NDE causes A arises from an inference not an observation.  “NDE caused A” is not just any old inference.  We would argue that it is an inference skewed by an a priori commitment to metaphysical materialism and not necessarily an unbiased evaluation of the data.  

KN:

(2) Cs are similar to As in relevant respects.

ID as it really is:

(2)  We observe A to exist within living systems. 

In (2) KN starts to go off the rails in a serious way.  Here we have the tired old “ID is nothing by an argument from analogy” argument.  KN is saying that the complex specified information in a cell is “similar in relevant respects” to the complex specified information found, for example, in a language or a code.  He is saying that the irreducible complexity of any number of biological systems is “similar in relevant respects” to the irreducible complexity of machines. 

No sir.  That is not what ID posits at all, not even close.  ID posits that the complex specified information in a cell is identical to the complex specified information of a computer code.  The DNA code is not “like” a computer code.  The DNA code and a computer code are two manifestations of the same thing.  The irreducible complexity of the bacterial flagellum is identical to (not similar to) the irreducible complexity of an outboard motor.  

ID proponents obviously have the burden of demonstrating their claims.  For example, they have the burden of demonstrating that the DNA code and a computer code are identical in relevant respects.  And if you disagree with their conclusions that is fair enough.  Tell us why.  But it is not fair to attempt to refute ID by attacking a claim ID proponents do not make.

KN:

(3) Therefore, it is highly probable that Cs are also caused by Bs. 

ID as it really is:

(3)  Therefore, abductive reasoning leads to the conclusion that B is the best explanation of A. 

The Wikipedia article on abductive reasoning is quite good.  [I have changed the symbols to correspond with our discussion]: 

to abduce a hypothetical explanation “B” from an observed surprising circumstance “A” is to surmise that “B” may be true because then “A” would be a matter of course. Thus, to abduce B from A involves determining that B is sufficient (or nearly sufficient), but not necessary, for A.

For example, the lawn is wet. But if it rained last night, then it would be unsurprising that the lawn is wet. Therefore, by abductive reasoning, the possibility that it rained last night is reasonable. . . . abducing rain last night from the observation of the wet lawn can lead to a false conclusion. In this example, dew, lawn sprinklers, or some other process may have resulted in the wet lawn, even in the absence of rain.

[Philosopher Charles Sanders] Peirce argues that good abductive reasoning from A to B involves not simply a determination that, e.g., B is sufficient for A, but also that B is among the most economical explanations for A. Simplification and economy call for the ‘leap’ of abduction.

For what seems like the ten thousandth time:  ID does not posit that the existence of complex specified information and irreducibly complex structures within living systems compels “act of an intelligent agent” as a matter of logical necessity.  ID posits that given our universal experience concerning complex specified information and irreducibly complex structures where the provenance of such has been actually observed, the best explanation of the existence of these same things in living structures is “act of intelligent agent.” 

KN, I hope this helps.  If you disagree with any of the premises or the abuction that we say follows from the premises, by all means attack them with abandon.  But please don’t attack an argument we do not make.  That just wastes everyone’s time. 

 

 

 

Comments
Sorry Phinehas, here's the last paragraph again:
So again, my universal and repeated experience of your stated perspectives points to an underlying commitment to materialism on which your empiricism hangs.
How do you define "materialism"? How do you define "empiricism"?RDFish
October 14, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
I’m not sure it is that simple. I had a cousin who dislocated his shoulder. When I took him to the hospital, they gave him a drug that didn’t address the pain so much as his memory of the pain. I watched as he experienced the pain of them putting his shoulder back in place. I also watched as, a few minutes later, he asked when they were going to do the procedure. So, what did he experience? That we are not aware of having experienced something post medication doesn’t necessarily mean we haven’t experienced something. It seems quite plausible to me that I and my experiences persist even when my body’s ability to remember those experiences is shut down temporarily.
Ah, you are deep in the thick of it now! How can we tell that anything is real? Perhaps you are the only consciousness in existence, and the world is your dream! Would you endure pain and torture that was more horrible than the worst you could imagine, and suffer that for a hundred years, if you could guarantee that at the end you would emerge, physically unscathed, and that no Eartly time had passed, and that you had no memory of your ordeal, for the sum of $10? Why not? I'm not interested in these sorts of questions. I assume that the world exists when I am not conscious of it. I assume that when I lose consciousness I assume I lose consciousness. We could all be wrong, but there's no way of ever knowing.
But you’ve said that ID turns on disembodied minds, which you say stands in contradiction of our experiences. So, disembodied minds are very much what is at issue and your appeal to the lack of intelligent behavior among the dead as evidence against disembodied minds does not follow.
I'm not talking about "the dead" in particular; I'm simply pointing out the obvious: Each time we observe that complex mechanism requires the operation of an intelligent agent (the basis for the design inference), we also observe that intelligent agents require the operation of complex mechanism. So, you agree that it may be possible to experience the metaphysical? "The metaphysical" does not refer to particular types of experiences; rather, it refers to our understanding of what underlies our experiences.
Why then, in your discussion with RD Miksa, did you seek to set aside metaphysical issues when taking your empirical approach?
Because we cannot resolve metaphysical questions by appeal to the empircal. There is no experiment we can run to determine whether the moon exists when you are not observing at it.
Well, if you’ve ruled out the possibility that your disembodied mind spontaneously and creatively directs your body...
You can stop there: My body is a complex physical mechanism, without which I can do nothing at all. You think of yourself as a mind inhabiting a body; I think of myself as my mind and body in a unified whole; others think of themselves differently still. There is no empirical test to see which one of us is correct.
So again, my universal and repeated experience of your stated perspectives points to an underlying commitment to materialism on which your empiricism hangs.</blockquote How do you define "materialism"? How do you define "empiricism"? Cheers, RDFish
RDFish
October 14, 2013
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Box: And allow me stress the fact that internal experience (mind) is fundamental to external experience.
RDFish #341: I don’t understand what you mean by “external experience”. (...) I do not agree that empiricism excludes “internal experience”. I think there is only experience – that which we apprehend in our conscious awareness.
You don't seem to make a distinction between the realm of internal experience (thoughts, feelings, meaning, consciousness, plans, ethics) and the realm of external experience (rocks, bodies, moon, water). For several posts now, I'm arguing on the basis of this distinction. Do you have an objection to this distinction or did I not express myself clearly enough?Box
October 14, 2013
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RDF:
In that case, if ID posits that an extra-terrestrial life form was the proximate origin of complex form and function on Earth, why don’t you simply assume that life on Earth descended from those prior life forms?
I suppose for the same reason that Darwinist's don't stop at, "Your mom," as a proximate origin for your complex form and function. Even more, I don't see self-replication as an adequate explanation of self-replication. I'm looking for the proximate origin, but this doesn't mean that I'm not looking for the proximate origin.Phinehas
October 14, 2013
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RDF:
But even if the experience you describe was our uniform and repeated experience, it appears that even you require a functioning brain in order to have that experience! You do not have that experience when your brain is physically interfered with (say, with a dose of propofol). That is the ubiquitous evidence I’m referring to that nothing experiences anything – even thought – without a complex functional mechanism processing information.
I'm not sure it is that simple. I had a cousin who dislocated his shoulder. When I took him to the hospital, they gave him a drug that didn't address the pain so much as his memory of the pain. I watched as he experienced the pain of them putting his shoulder back in place. I also watched as, a few minutes later, he asked when they were going to do the procedure. So, what did he experience? That we are not aware of having experienced something post medication doesn't necessarily mean we haven't experienced something. It seems quite plausible to me that I and my experiences persist even when my body's ability to remember those experiences is shut down temporarily.
Because in ID, it is not thought that is at issue! It is in fact the formation of complex form and function such as we observe in biological systems, and that ID purports to explain, that is at issue.
But you've said that ID turns on disembodied minds, which you say stands in contradiction of our experiences. So, disembodied minds are very much what is at issue and your appeal to the lack of intelligent behavior among the dead as evidence against disembodied minds does not follow. So again, what experience can you provide that intelligent thought cannot persist without a brain/body?
P: You are basically claiming that only the physical can be experienced and that the metaphysical cannot be experienced. How will you warrant such a claim? For someone who isn’t a materialist, once again, you seem to assume its premises with fascinating consistency.
RDF: On the contrary...
So, you agree that it may be possible to experience the metaphysical? Why then, in your discussion with RD Miksa, did you seek to set aside metaphysical issues when taking your empirical approach?
I don’t believe in disembodied entities that can produce effects in the material world, however. For example, I’ve never seen a novel complex mechanism arise spontaneously as if assembled by a spirit. That would certainly constitute evidence for disembodied intelligence, but it is not what we experience – ever.
Well, if you've ruled out the possibility that your disembodied mind spontaneously and creatively directs your body to give rise to novel complex mechanisms (like this post, for example), then I don't suppose you would ever accept such as evidence. However, what you've described is pretty much exactly what I experience - all. the. time. So again, my universal and repeated experience of your stated perspectives points to an underlying commitment to materialism on which your empiricism hangs.Phinehas
October 14, 2013
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Hi Box,
I would like to stress the fact that internal and external experience leads to two different semi-permeable realms. There are no physical objects in the internal realm. The mental, by contrast, does have to capacity to enter the physical realm, in many ways.
There are many, many, many different views on the relationship between the mind and the body; if you put five philosophers in a room and ask for their solution to the mind/body problem you will get ten different answers. I personally don't think we understand the categories in a way that would enable anyone to explain the relationship - but of course that's just my take, and I'd never claim my understanding could be grounded in our shared experience. The reason this issue is unresolved - not even approaching a consensus view - is because it cannot be tested against our shared experience.
And allow me stress the fact that internal experience (mind) is fundamental to external experience.
I don't understand what you mean by "external experience".
Without internal experience there is no experience at all.
I would certainly agree with this.
My question to RDFish is: what does this tell us about empiricism that excludes internal experience with regard to the logical fallacy of “self-referential incoherence.”?
I do not agree that empiricism excludes "internal experience". I think there is only experience - that which we apprehend in our conscious awareness. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 14, 2013
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RDF:
What most people think of as “materialism” is somthing like “matter in motion” or “particles bumping into each other”, but physicists have known this view to be false for 100 years, since the advent of quantum physics. Even before then, concepts that seemed “immaterial” – like fields – had been accepted into our physical ontology. Einstein worked hard to reject both the indeterminacy and non-locality of quantum mechanics, but both of these distinctly non-material concepts are part of modern physics anyway. Why? Because they successfully explain and predict our uniform and repeated experience.
Red herring and strawman. In several ways. First, the self referential incoherence and want of empirical grounding for evolutionary materialism are not dependent on whether or not one uses the more sophisticated term, physicalism. (On this multidimensional self referential incoherence cf here.) Next, in terms of neurons, ion flows and the like, there is nothing inherent in a neural network that is not a matter of software sitting on hardware. Both need to be accounted for, and the emergence of complex software by successive accidents yielding incrementally improved performance has yet to be empirically grounded, other than on materialist just so stories and gross extrapolations. Going one way, the emergence of conscious, self aware mind from software riding on hardware has simply not been demonstrated, nor is it reasonable that this will be so, as software is inherently about deterministic processes with maybe controlled random processes involved. Software has no conscious awareness, genuine understanding [Chinese rooms notwithstanding] or common sense, which is what is captured in GIGO. Going another way, OOL -- which involves a considerable amount of software (and thus language, algorithms and more) -- is simply not empirically grounded in blind chemistry and physics in a warm little pond or elsewhere. The same extends to origin of body plans, including our own. And that brings us right back full circle to the point that our very first experience is that we are minded, responsible, choosing creatures, who are not controlled by blind chance and mechanical necessity but who can and do reason and act in light of reason, evidence and principles. Just what is such mind made up of, or is that even the right question? We do not know, and it is folly to pretend that -- as we live in a physical world -- we must confine our discussions tho that which we are not in a position to show accounts for mind. However dressed up, that boils down to begging some pretty big questions. What we can and do show empirically, is that functionally specific complex organisation and associated information is not credibly reachable by blind chance and mechanical necessity on the gamut of solar system or observable cosmos, but is routinely produced by design, which in turn depends on intelligent action. That is, we empirically know and can back up on the needle in haystack search analysis, that FSCO/I is an empirically reliable indicator of design as cause. Based on what we know. Going further, at OOL we know that cell based life is chock full of FSCO/I. Such could possibly be accounted for on a molecular nanotech lab some generations beyond Venter et al. We cannot rule that out so we must be open. When we move on to looking at a cosmos finely tuned in ways that set it at a narrow operating point that enables cell based life, we are looking again at signs that point to design, and raise serious questions of a designer that is beyond matter, a designer with the power to build a cosmos. Yes, all of this is very uncomfortable for materialists of one stripe or another. But it does not mean that these things do not sit at the table as of right, not sufferance. KFkairosfocus
October 14, 2013
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ID consists of two hypotheses: (1) something that is itself a complex physical entity was responsible for first life, and (2) something that was not itself a complex physical entity was responsible.
ID posits that there are observations made of nature which are best explained by the act of an agent, as opposed to undirected material process. The inference is derived from nature as we find it. This does not require knowledge of the physical complexity of the agent.
If we posit (1), then ID is simply invoking a cause that is precisely what it purports to explain, and thus it fails to explain where complex mechanisms originated.
ID does not purport to explain ultimate causes, including where complex mechanisms ultimately originate; it can only seek to explain the appearance of biological complexity on earth.
once we posit that some complex physical beings existed extra-terrestrially, we may as well simply assume that we are their descendents rather than the products of their bio-engineering.
You are certainly welcome to that belief if you wish. It does nothing to alter the inference to design on earth, although it might be difficult to understand why a descendent capable of the dimensional semiotic code required for cell organization would not rise on Earth for billions of years later. But again, you are welcome to that speculation if you wish.Upright BiPed
October 14, 2013
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I would like to stress the fact that internal and external experience leads to two different semi-permeable realms. There are no physical objects in the internal realm. The mental, by contrast, does have to capacity to enter the physical realm, in many ways. And allow me stress the fact that internal experience (mind) is fundamental to external experience. Without internal experience there is no experience at all. My question to RDFish is: what does this tell us about empiricism that excludes internal experience with regard to the logical fallacy of "self-referential incoherence."?Box
October 14, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
Absolute baloney. I’ve never heard any ID claim to explain ultimate origins. ID only looks to explain the proximate origin of any instance of CSI.
In that case, if ID posits that an extra-terrestrial life form was the proximate origin of complex form and function on Earth, why don't you simply assume that life on Earth descended from those prior life forms? Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 14, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
Again, my self-reflective experience of mind is non-localized. Though my senses feel tied to my body, the part of me that thinks, reasons, dreams, and wills does not feel connected in the same way.
Mine does. The way it feels to me is that my thoughts occur in my head, a few inches behind my eyes. I'm not being facetious here - that honestly is my subjective experience. But even if the experience you describe was our uniform and repeated experience, it appears that even you require a functioning brain in order to have that experience! You do not have that experience when your brain is physically interfered with (say, with a dose of propofol). That is the ubiquitous evidence I'm referring to that nothing experiences anything - even thought - without a complex functional mechanism processing information.
You are basically claiming that only the physical can be experienced and that the metaphysical cannot be experienced. How will you warrant such a claim? For someone who isn’t a materialist, once again, you seem to assume its premises with fascinating consistency.
On the contrary, I am saying that what is "physical" is not restricted to our everyday concepts of matter in motion. Physical reality is quite bizarre and unintuitive, and physics requires belief in all sorts of things that are distinctly "immaterial". I believe in all of that, and I believe that those beliefs are grounded in experiences that are available to anybody. I don't believe in disembodied entities that can produce effects in the material world, however. For example, I've never seen a novel complex mechanism arise spontaneously as if assembled by a spirit. That would certainly constitute evidence for disembodied intelligence, but it is not what we experience - ever.
Should anyone be surprised that, at this point, materialism is the unavoidable result of empiricism so defined?
You have not taken my point about how our modern understanding of the physical universe is not "material" in any intuitive, normal sense of that word.
Why do you insist on an instance of intelligent behavior, when it is thought that is at issue?
Because in ID, it is not thought that is at issue! It is in fact the formation of complex form and function such as we observe in biological systems, and that ID purports to explain, that is at issue.
As far as I know, no one is claiming that we can experience others performing physical acts without a physical body.
??? That is the claim of ID (at least the form of ID that seeks to explain the origin of complex form and function in the universe). Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 14, 2013
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RDF:
If we posit (1), then ID is simply invoking a cause that is precisely what it purports to explain, and thus it fails to explain where complex mechanisms originated.
Absolute baloney. I've never heard any ID claim to explain ultimate origins. ID only looks to explain the proximate origin of any instance of CSI.Phinehas
October 14, 2013
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RDF:
Show me an instance of intelligent behavior without a physical body and you’d be right.
Why do you insist on an instance of intelligent behavior, when it is thought that is at issue? As far as I know, no one is claiming that we can experience others performing physical acts without a physical body. Instead, why don't you show empirically that intelligent thought requires a physical body. Otherwise, our experience leaves open the question of disembodied minds, at least to those who are not already committed to only material explanations.Phinehas
October 14, 2013
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RDF:
Empiricism does not entail naturalism any more than it entails materialism. It simply requires that evidence for any claim need be grounded in facts that anyone can ultimately verify by sensory experience.
LOL! So internal experience of self is ruled out a priori. And the focus on sensory experience limits us to what can be ascertained through the physical senses. Should anyone be surprised that, at this point, materialism is the unavoidable result of empiricism so defined?Phinehas
October 14, 2013
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RDF:
P: If experience counts for evidence, then my internal experience of mind is indeed of a disembodied mind. Further, it is of a mind that can freely and willfully choose.
RDF: This would be true if you were in fact disembodied, or for example if you could continue to act intelligently when your brain was rendered inoperable or removed. I do not believe this to be the case.
Again, my self-reflective experience of mind is non-localized. Though my senses feel tied to my body, the part of me that thinks, reasons, dreams, and wills does not feel connected in the same way. There is nothing of my self-reflective experience of these processes that would indicate they must end when my body or brain ceases to function. In fact, it is not inconsistent with my experiences at all to suppose that I will go on thinking, reasoning, dreaming, and willing forever. And while I may have experienced through my external-facing senses that those without a brain do not continue to act intelligently, I have no experience indicating that do not continue to think intelligently. Do you? If you stop to think about it, the moment you separate the "metaphysical" from the "empirical" you have already started down the path to assuming materialism. You are basically claiming that only the physical can be experienced and that the metaphysical cannot be experienced. How will you warrant such a claim? For someone who isn't a materialist, once again, you seem to assume its premises with fascinating consistency.Phinehas
October 14, 2013
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Hi Upgright BiPed,
The design inference is reached without any dependence whatsoever in an unembodied agent. This is just false.
ID consists of two hypotheses: (1) something that is itself a complex physical entity was responsible for first life, and (2) something that was not itself a complex physical entity was responsible. If we posit (1), then ID is simply invoking a cause that is precisely what it purports to explain, and thus it fails to explain where complex mechanisms originated. Moreover, once we posit that some complex physical beings existed extra-terrestrially, we may as well simply assume that we are their descendents rather than the products of their bio-engineering. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 14, 2013
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Hi StephenB,
The issue is whether one adopts [a] an epistemological philosophy of radical empiricism or whether one uses [b] empirical methods to arrive at a conclusion. The former approach imposes methodological naturalism,...
Empiricism does not entail naturalism any more than it entails materialism. It simply requires that evidence for any claim need be grounded in facts that anyone can ultimately verify by sensory experience.
... in which case all evidence for an immaterial mind (placebo effect, mind over matter, self discipline, self reflection etc) is reinterpreted in materialistic terms.
None of these things you mention are evidence for any particular ontology; they are all equally compatible with idealism or monism of any sort.
It is not a requirement for empirical methods that the scientist must study nature as if nature is all there is.
Empiricism does not define what "nature" is! Empricism simply says whatever we wish to claim has objective reality must be grounded in our uniform and repeated experience.
In the final analysis, your objection amounts to nothing more than a refusal to respect the logical conclusions of empirical evidence if it happens to point to an immaterial mind.
Show me an instance of intelligent behavior without a physical body and you'd be right. There are people who believe these things are in evidence of course - they are called paranormal investigators, who claim to have evidence of poltergesists, ghosts, demons, and other ostensibly immaterial beings acting displaying intelligent behavior. The evidence is very poor, however, and so is not accepted yet by the scientific community in general. There is nothing in principle preventing clear, repeatable evidence of these phenomena, however, which is why I encourage ID proponents to invest in paranormal research. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 14, 2013
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ID is unscientific because it requires an assumption (viz that disembodied minds can produce complex physical mechanisms)
The design inference is reached without any dependence whatsoever in an unembodied agent. This is just false.Upright BiPed
October 14, 2013
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@327, You should read comments 321 and 325, then. Now, are you claiming that CSI can be produced without an embodied mind? Are you claiming that this is part of our uniform and repeated experience?LarTanner
October 14, 2013
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LT: "Is it your contention that the Intelligent Designer (of life on Earth, including humanity) possesses a body and a mind (i.e., discrete parts)?" According to our uniform and repeated experience, mind (not body, its parts, or CSI) is responsible for CSI. The presence of CSI in nature, therefore, points only to the presence of mind. There is no indication that the designer has a body.StephenB
October 14, 2013
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Mung@325, OK, but is it your inference? Yes or no, does the ID of life and humanity have a body and a mind?LarTanner
October 14, 2013
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LarTanner:
Is it your contention that the Intelligent Designer (of life on Earth, including humanity) possesses a body and a mind (i.e., discrete parts)?
Give that is is our uniform and repeated experience that minds are embodied, that would be a reasonable inference. Therefore ID is scientific.Mung
October 14, 2013
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RDF: --- "ID is not unscientific because it leads to a metaphysical conclusion. Rather, ID is unscientific because it requires an assumption (viz that disembodied minds can produce complex physical mechanisms) which is contrary to our uniform and repeated experience, and it fails to provide new evidence that such things take place." The issue is whether one adopts [a] an epistemological philosophy of radical empiricism or whether one uses [b] empirical methods to arrive at a conclusion. The former approach imposes methodological naturalism, in which case all evidence for an immaterial mind (placebo effect, mind over matter, self discipline, self reflection etc) is reinterpreted in materialistic terms. The latter approach allows the researcher to follow the evidence of empirical observation wherever it might lead. It is not a requirement for empirical methods that the scientist must study nature as if nature is all there is. That limitation is found only in radical empiricism and methodological naturalism, both of which rule out immaterial minds apriori and in principle. In the final analysis, your objection amounts to nothing more than a refusal to respect the logical conclusions of empirical evidence if it happens to point to an immaterial mind. --"If ID wishes to be considered a science, it ought to actually perform scientific research into paranormal phenomena. There are people who do this already, of course, but they have yet managed to provide strong evidence that disembodied intelligence can act in the physical world." We need no scientific proof of that which is obvious. That we can reflect on our own existence is proof enough that we can get outside our own matter, which means that we have an immaterial mind. Matter cannot get outside of itself .StephenB
October 14, 2013
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@321: Is it your contention that the Intelligent Designer (of life on Earth, including humanity) possesses a body and a mind (i.e., discrete parts)?LarTanner
October 14, 2013
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RDFish:
In our uniform and repeated experience, information exists only as patterns in some physical substrate, and intelligent behavior requires the operation of some sort of complex physical state machine. There is no prescription for observing intelligence operating outside of physical information processing mechanisms.
In our repeated and uniform experience information exists only in minds, for only a mind is capable of understanding and interpreting "informational patterns."Mung
October 14, 2013
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It's our uniform and repeated experience that minds are embodied. Therefore ID is scientific.Mung
October 14, 2013
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Hi Brent,
Two, ID cannot be ruled unscientific because the science leads to a metaphysical conclusion!
ID is not unscientific because it leads to a metaphysical conclusion. Rather, ID is unscientific because it requires an assumption (viz that disembodied minds can produce complex physical mechanisms) which is contrary to our uniform and repeated experience, and it fails to provide new evidence that such things take place. If ID wishes to be considered a science, it ought to actually perform scientific research into paranormal phenomena. There are people who do this already, of course, but they have yet managed to provide strong evidence that disembodied intelligence can act in the physical world.
Once that conclusion is reached, fine, call it philosophy. But don’t say ID isn’t science.
In order for ID to be considered scientific, it must provide evidence grounded in our uniform and repeated experience, just as Stephen Meyer says. But when only that evidence is considered (and we do not consider the life of Jesus Christ, miracles, and so on), then the likelihood that ID is true is very low. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 14, 2013
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Well, now it's my time for a break. I'll be interested to see your response to the very last bit of my previous, though, when I get back later. And I know, of course, you didn't define empiricism all by yourself. And I said, ". . . I would tell you personally two things." But yes, I get that you are using someone's own position against them. But please think about the last remark I made (#2), which seems the more reasonable and obvious way to look at it.Brent
October 14, 2013
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Hi Brent,
Wrong as a matter of fact. You and others (here, at least, hiding behind empiricism) simply define what evidence counts as evidence, and then say there is no evidence.
No, I am not defining what counts as evidence. Rather, I am pointing out what empiricists define as evidence. Empiricism is not the only theory of knowledge of course; rationalism for example considers that reason, rather than shared experience, is the primary method for justifying our beliefs.
And what of the miracle accounts?... And the life of Jesus, and resurrection?
The reason Stephen Meyer speaks of "uniform and repeated experience" is to exclude the idea that ID appeals to miracles. If ID proponents were justifying their theory on the basis of miracles and the life of Jesus, then they would not use the language of empiricism.
So you’re a materialist? No. What are you? An empiricist.
Actually no, I'm neither a materialist nor an empiricst, as I've made clear many times.
What’s the difference practically? One is an ontological philosophy while the other is an epistemological theory (i.e., FACT).
No, an epistemological theory is not a "fact". It is a theory of how beliefs are justified.
One, it isn’t necessary for me or others to accept your definition of empiricism.
It isn't my definition. Look it up, or ask ID proponents like Stephen Meyer. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 14, 2013
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So no, it isn’t because of “materialism” that we say that there is no evidence for disembodied mind; it is because there is no evidence.
Wrong as a matter of fact. You and others (here, at least, hiding behind empiricism) simply define what evidence counts as evidence, and then say there is no evidence. We have thus concluded our search and have found no material evidence for a proposed immaterial being. And what of the miracle accounts? Well, miracle accounts, besides being witnessed by superstitious people (obviously, because they believed they had seen a miracle), happened in the physical world, and therefore physics would explain it if we just had our equipment in the right place at the right time. And the life of Jesus, and resurrection? Well, again, superstitious people, ya know? A little embellishing here, a little stretching there, and well, you can create quite a story. One compelling enough to become lion lunch, even? Yeah. Well, clearly, there is no evidence then, except that logical reasoning forces us to believe in something outside of our realm of existence which must be able to bring what exists into existence. Ah! But you are not being empirical now. You're just doing metaphysics. So you're a materialist? No. What are you? An empiricist. What's the difference practically? One is an ontological philosophy while the other is an epistemological theory (i.e., FACT). No. I said practically. Well, if you cannot see the difference between a philosophy and a theory, I don't know what else to say. Oh, I see the difference quite well. But I also see the similarity, which you seem to avoid, that if empiricism as understood today is accepted as a true epistemological theory, materialism will necessarily follow. So, practically, what is the difference between an empiricist and a materialist? And further, how can a materialist ever hope to have evidence of an immaterial being? . . . As for the argument you have been making directly at ID, I would tell you personally two things: One, it isn't necessary for me or others to accept your definition of empiricism. It seems that definition is used to hold to materialism, but materialism is what informed the current idea of empiricism in the first place. Two, ID cannot be ruled unscientific because the science leads to a metaphysical conclusion! Once that conclusion is reached, fine, call it philosophy. But don't say ID isn't science. That's like saying because there are boundaries around the football field that a player is disallowed the yards he gained while in the field of play because he eventually stepped out. Ridiculous!Brent
October 14, 2013
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