Please Take the Time to Understand Our Arguments Before You Attack Them

_{Barry Arrington
October 1, 2013

Intelligent Design

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Intelligent Design}

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The comments our Darwinist friends put up on this site never cease to amaze. Consider, as a for instance, Kantian Naturalist’s comment that appears as comment 9 to kairosfocus’ Infographic: The science of ID post. The post sets forth a simple summary of the case for ID, and KN responds:

What I like about this infographic is that it makes really clear where the problem with intelligent design lies.

Here’s the argument:

(1) We observe that all As are caused by Bs. (2) Cs are similar to As in relevant respects. (3) Therefore, it is highly probable that Cs are also caused by Bs.

But this is invalid, because the conclusion does not follow from the premises.

KN has been posting on this site for years. He is obviously an intelligent man. He is obviously a man of good will. I will assume, therefore, that he is attacking ID as he believes it to be and not a straw man caricature of his own making. And that is what is so amazing. How can an intelligent person of good will follow this site for several years and still not understand the basics of ID? It beggars belief.

Maybe it will help if I explain ID using the same formal structure KN has used.

KN:

(1) We observe that all As are caused by Bs.

ID as it really is:

(1) For all As whose provenance is actually known, the cause of A was B.

Here “A” could be complex specified information or irreducible complexity.

B, of course, stands for “the act of an intelligent agent.”

In step 1 KN is actually not far off the mark. I have reworded it slightly, because ID does not posit there is no possible explanation for A other than B. ID posits that in our universal experience of A where its provenance has been actually observed, it has always arisen from B. Now, there may be some other cause of A (Neo-Darwinian evolution – NDE – for instance), but the conclusion that NDE causes A arises from an inference not an observation. “NDE caused A” is not just any old inference. We would argue that it is an inference skewed by an a priori commitment to metaphysical materialism and not necessarily an unbiased evaluation of the data.

KN:

(2) Cs are similar to As in relevant respects.

ID as it really is:

(2) We observe A to exist within living systems.

In (2) KN starts to go off the rails in a serious way. Here we have the tired old “ID is nothing by an argument from analogy” argument. KN is saying that the complex specified information in a cell is “similar in relevant respects” to the complex specified information found, for example, in a language or a code. He is saying that the irreducible complexity of any number of biological systems is “similar in relevant respects” to the irreducible complexity of machines.

No sir. That is not what ID posits at all, not even close. ID posits that the complex specified information in a cell is identical to the complex specified information of a computer code. The DNA code is not “like” a computer code. The DNA code and a computer code are two manifestations of the same thing. The irreducible complexity of the bacterial flagellum is identical to (not similar to) the irreducible complexity of an outboard motor.

ID proponents obviously have the burden of demonstrating their claims. For example, they have the burden of demonstrating that the DNA code and a computer code are identical in relevant respects. And if you disagree with their conclusions that is fair enough. Tell us why. But it is not fair to attempt to refute ID by attacking a claim ID proponents do not make.

KN:

(3) Therefore, it is highly probable that Cs are also caused by Bs.

ID as it really is:

(3) Therefore, abductive reasoning leads to the conclusion that B is the best explanation of A.

The Wikipedia article on abductive reasoning is quite good. [I have changed the symbols to correspond with our discussion]:

to abduce a hypothetical explanation “B” from an observed surprising circumstance “A” is to surmise that “B” may be true because then “A” would be a matter of course. Thus, to abduce B from A involves determining that B is sufficient (or nearly sufficient), but not necessary, for A.

For example, the lawn is wet. But if it rained last night, then it would be unsurprising that the lawn is wet. Therefore, by abductive reasoning, the possibility that it rained last night is reasonable. . . . abducing rain last night from the observation of the wet lawn can lead to a false conclusion. In this example, dew, lawn sprinklers, or some other process may have resulted in the wet lawn, even in the absence of rain.

[Philosopher Charles Sanders] Peirce argues that good abductive reasoning from A to B involves not simply a determination that, e.g., B is sufficient for A, but also that B is among the most economical explanations for A. Simplification and economy call for the ‘leap’ of abduction.

For what seems like the ten thousandth time: ID does not posit that the existence of complex specified information and irreducibly complex structures within living systems compels “act of an intelligent agent” as a matter of logical necessity. ID posits that given our universal experience concerning complex specified information and irreducibly complex structures where the provenance of such has been actually observed, the best explanation of the existence of these same things in living structures is “act of intelligent agent.”

KN, I hope this helps. If you disagree with any of the premises or the abuction that we say follows from the premises, by all means attack them with abandon. But please don’t attack an argument we do not make. That just wastes everyone’s time.

Comments

RDFish:
I argue that our experience confirms no such thing, for the reasons I’ve given over and over: Arguing for either complex mechanism without mind or mind without complex mechanism is fully counter to our current knowledge and experience, and so we can accept neither as a justified explanation without further evidence.
Wait a second. I'm confused. So is the following true or not?
It is quite obvious that our experience confirms that ... all complex mechanisms arise only by means of intelligent action
As to...
It depends on how they define “intelligent action”. If, like most people, they mean that intelligent action entails “conscious, rational thought” then no, Darwinists would be bound to disagree with that statement. If they take a more general meaning for “intelligence” – something like “capable of learning and solving problems”, then some Darwinists may consider evolutionary mechanisms (or algorithms) to be intelligent per se.
If you are saying that Darwinists equivocate from time to time, then I'd have to agree. Would you make the same equivocation? Or would you accept that we are talking about what most people mean by intelligent action?Phinehas_{October 4, 2013
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KN:
No, that’s perfectly right. In fact, I believe that’s an axiom of symbolic modal logic.
OK, then I submit: If x is conceivable, and If what is conceivable is logical possible, and If it is possible that logical possibility entails metaphysical possibility, Then it is possible that x is metaphysically possible. Therefore, if x is conceivable, then x is possible. I'm pretty sure that if you plug nomological possibility into the above formulation for metaphysical possibility, you'll still end up at the same place. Such is the power of possibility! As a more theologically inclined musing, the possibility inherent in possibility helps confirm to me that God has placed eternity in our hearts.Phinehas_{October 4, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
Interesting. Would you agree that living organisms are complex mechanisms?
Yes, very complex mechanisms indeed.
Do you suppose that Darwinists will agree with you that, “It is quite obvious that our experience confirms that…all complex mechanisms arise only by means of intelligent action?”
It depends on how they define "intelligent action". If, like most people, they mean that intelligent action entails "conscious, rational thought" then no, Darwinists would be bound to disagree with that statement. If they take a more general meaning for "intelligence" - something like "capable of learning and solving problems", then some Darwinists may consider evolutionary mechanisms (or algorithms) to be intelligent per se.
Would they also agree that it is quite obvious that our experience confirms that all living organisms arise only by means of intelligent action?
See above. I argue that our experience confirms no such thing, for the reasons I've given over and over: Arguing for either complex mechanism without mind or mind without complex mechanism is fully counter to our current knowledge and experience, and so we can accept neither as a justified explanation without further evidence. Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 4, 2013
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Hi KN,
[regarding possibilities...] How does that work with what you were arguing?
Actually these distinctions are irrelevant to my arguments. As I've made clear, my arguments do not hinge on possibility or impossibility of anything. Rather, my argument is that given our knowledge of consciousness and intelligent behavior, the a priori probability of these things occurring independently of a complex physical mechanism is low, and certainly outside of our uniform and repeated experience. In fact, it is no more likely than complex mechanisms arises absent intelligent behaviors. This means that ID is nothing but an unlikely hypothesis, and would require strong evidence that disembodied minds exist. Unfortunately, ID researchers don't seem to be interested in pursuing actual research in this area, which means their theory has no support at all. Given this, ID proponents appear to fall back something along the lines of "Well, a disembodied mind is still the best explanation we have for first life, etc., since all the 'natural' explanations are even more ridiculous." If that is the best ID can do, then it obviously has no merit as a justified theory or explanation. Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 4, 2013
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RDFish:
It is quite obvious that our experience confirms that (1) all complex mechanisms arise only by means of intelligent action and (2) all intelligent action arises by means of complex mechanism. ID relies on (1), but tries to ignore (2). Yet both statements are confirmed by exactly the same set of observations.
Interesting. Would you agree that living organisms are complex mechanisms? Do you suppose that Darwinists will agree with you that, "It is quite obvious that our experience confirms that...all complex mechanisms arise only by means of intelligent action?" Would they also agree that it is quite obvious that our experience confirms that all living organisms arise only by means of intelligent action?Phinehas_{October 4, 2013
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No, that's perfectly right. In fact, I believe that's an axiom of symbolic modal logic.Kantian Naturalist_{October 4, 2013
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KN:
I think, remarkably enough, that we’re in agreement, if what you’re saying is the following: it is possible that Kripke is mistaken, and if Kripke is mistaken, then logical possibility does entail metaphysical possibility — so yes, it is possible that logical possibility (necessarily) entails metaphysical possibility.
Yay! Now, would you agree with the following? IF it is possible that x is possible THEN x is possible Or is this a bridge too far?Phinehas_{October 4, 2013
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RDFish, it sounds to me as if the concept you need is "nomological possibility" -- possibility under the laws of nature. (This is narrower than I was referring to as metaphysical possibility.) One might say, non-embodied minds are conceivable, hence logically possible, but (for all we all at present) not nomologically possible. (Notice that this is different from saying, conceivable but not logically possible, and also different from saying that they are logically possible but metaphysically impossible.) And whether non-embodied minds are nomologically possible or impossible depends on what else we find out about the laws of nature -- we might (for all we know) discover laws of nature which show that non-embodied minds are nomologically or physically possible, or we might (for all we know) discover laws of nature which show that non-embodied minds are nomologically or physically impossible. Since nomological possibility and necessity are keyed to our best science, and scientific theories are always provisional, there is a non-zero chance that some future discoveries will show that non-embodied minds are nomologically possible. But, given what we do know about the laws of nature at present, the more prudent view is to say that non-embodied minds are almost certainly nomologically impossible. How does that work with what you were arguing?Kantian Naturalist_{October 4, 2013
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Hi RD Miksa, Dear RDFish:
When we make a design inference, and thus conclude that something was designed, we are saying that something was “made or done intentionally; intended; planned.” This is an incredibly meaningful statement to make. Not only is it meaningful, but it is informative; for example, it means that the thing designed was not made by un-intentional forces, which is an informative fact.
There are a couple of problems with your view. First, stating that something was or was not designed by "something intentional" is not informative in a scientific sense, since nothing observable follows from that statement. Not one single additional piece of information can be gleaned by labelling something "intentional". If you disagree, simply tell me one thing that label actually tells us about the observable properties, characteristics, or abilities of an intentional cause. Can it write a poem? Understand a joke? Play the piano? Could it do anything whatsoever besides spelling out those particular sentences? Now, if we had a chance to interact with this entity, that would be a different story. We could ask it questions or give it problems to solve, and by its responses (or lack of same) we could begin to characterize what it was that we were dealing with. Clearly if it could carry on a conversation in English, we would know we were dealing with something with a mind quite similar to a human mind! But this has nothing at all to do with Intelligent Design theory, obviously. Second, we have no reason to assume that conscious thought is required for design. I have often had the experience of coming up with solutions to difficult technical problems (e.g. envisioning a complex algorithm) in my sleep, or while consciously thinking about other things. It is not unusual - lots of people report this experience, where the solution just "comes to you" when you aren't consciously thinking about it. Our brain continuously generates complex plans without conscious involvement. Imagine if you attempted to compute the trajectory of a fly ball given the images projected on your retinas. You would have to be a very competent mathematician to do that, but we can all do these calculations without thinking about it when we play baseball. The point here is that once you realize that conscious thought and design abilities are not necessarily associated in all conceivable intelligent agents, you begin to see that simply calling something "intelligent" really doesn't tell us whether or not it has anything resembling a conscious human mind.
Even if I grant your contention that your uniform and repeated experience is so uniform that it only points to embodied designing agents—which is dubious—remember that our uniform and repeated is only one aspect of our background knowledge. If, for example, I have a deductive argument that makes it plausible that an un-embodied intelligent agent exists, then this argument will strongly counter my alleged uniformed and repeated experience against such an agent, and thus, the existence of such an un-embodied intelligent agent will not have a low probability.
It is quite obvious that our experience confirms that (1) all complex mechanisms arise only by means of intelligent action and (2) all intelligent action arises by means of complex mechanism. ID relies on (1), but tries to ignore (2). Yet both statements are confirmed by exactly the same set of observations.
I contend, honestly, that if you truly say that a design inference is unwarranted in such a case—ie – seeing stars rearrange themselves into an English paragraph directed at us—then we have thrown rationality out the window and we could never make a rational design inference again.
Again, you are missing the point regarding "design inference". You need to tell me exactly what it means. If it means that a conscious, sentient being is responsible, then sorry, you simply have no warrant for it. Whatever might be able to move stars around the galaxy is so radically foreign to our understanding that we can't possibly be justified in attributing particular human-like attributes to it! Again, if this thing actually conversed with us, that would be a different story.
Furthermore, I think that you are conflating a design inference and a conceptual analysis (or an inference as to how the designer is). These two tasks are logically separate, and this separation is critical. Indeed, if I saw a complex English paragraph written on a piece of paper, I would first infer that the best explanation of that English paragraph was that it was obviously designed by some intelligent agent;
I would infer that it was designed by a human being. For you to fail to make that specific inference would be irrational, since human beings are the one and only thing that can write an English paragraph (except for of course human-programmed computers or the like).
... then, separately, I would infer that the best explanation of who the intelligent agent was, was that he was a human being.
Really??? Would you sit there and go down some list of all the intelligent agents you know of and try to decide which was responsible? Hmmm...was it a space alien? A ghost? A poltergeist? A fairy? An elf? A god? No, I'd say it was a human being!!!!
But these are two separate steps.
Sorry, but only the most credulous of people would actually consider anything but a human being when they find some English writing on a piece of paper. We do not make "design inferences" that consider a general class of "intelligent agents" in forensics or archeology - that's just nonsense. As my definition showed, archeologists study human artifacts, and do not entertain hypotheses that ghosts or fairies were responsible.
In fact, this separation is exactly why a project like SETI is both rational and scientific, because we can rationally make a design inference even if we do not know who the intelligent designing agents are.
As I've already explained, SETI is not a theory, nor an inference - it is a search for signals that extra-terrestrial life forms might send out into space. The data for whatever SETI might find would have to be analyzed to see what sort of life form was responsible.
It seems to me that your whole point rests on the fact that our uniform and repeated experience allegedly points to the fact that the only designing agents that we know are embodied ones.
Moreover, everything we understand about how information is represented and processed requires complex physical mechanism (i.e. highly structured complex physical states).
But this fact in no way overrides the validity of the design inference, even if such an inference leads to a designing agent that we have no experience with.
It means that as far as we know, "design inferences" point to complex physical beings. Other sorts of hypotheses would be a priori highly unlikely.
Now here is the key part: Notice how this example demonstrates that even though we may have absolutely no prior experience or knowledge with quadriplegics finding ways to carve words into their chest, the “design” explanation would still be better than the “natural” explanation even in such a case, because the design inference would be so strong that it would overwhelm any lack of experience with such cases.
I'm not talking about "natural" explanations (whatever that means). I'm talking about the probability that the cause of first life in the universe was a conscious, sentient being. The a priori probability of that being true is very low, and the a posteriori evidence is non-existent. That doesn't mean that some "natural" explanation is true, it just means we do not know.
In this way, this example address the issue of why the explanation “an un-embodied intelligent agent designed X” could still be a “best” explanation for something even though we have no past experience (for the sake of argument) of an un-embodied agent or how it would design.
Where there are mysteries that we have not solved, it is not rational to pick some explanation we dream up and without any actual evidence go ahead and claim that it it the "best" explanation we have and pretend that this gives it scientific support, just because we think the rest of the candidate explanations are even worse! The intellectually honest response is to say "We do not (yet) know the answer".
There exists testimonial evidence of allegedly veridical experiences of un-embodied intelligent agents (NDE experiences, experiences of the divine, etc.); since these experiences could be true, then this at least shows that an un-embodied intelligent agent is possible.
I actually follow such things with great interest, and would love to see some compelling evidence. I've seen none, however. If you believe there is good evidence for such a thing, could you provide a citation?
There are deductive arguments that demonstrate that the existence of an un-embodied intelligent agent is possible. There is not clear argument or reason to posit that such un-embodied agents are not possible.
Again, I do not say that are not possible. I say we do not have good reason to imagine they exist, and that it appears complex mechanism is required to process information. In any event, disembodied minds are most certainly not part of our uniform and repeated experience. You could just choose to say that despite all this you'd like to believe that somehow, some way, conscious thought can proceed without a working brain (or other complex physical mechanism). That's fine, but by the same token, somebody else could just choose to say that despite all evidence to the contrary, complex physical mechanism can simply appear by random chance.
Quick question: how do we demonstrate the non-possibility of an un-embodied intelligent being? Essentially, by conclusively demonstrating something like theism (and its off-shoots: deism, polytheism, etc.) to be absolutely false. But since we have not done so, and since this, arguably, could never be done, then an un-embodied intelligent being is possible.
And yet again (please read this carefully): The question is not whether or not it is impossible for conscious thought to occur absent complex mechanism. Rather, the question is whether or not we have warrant to believe such a thing exists. Again, the confusion arises because it may be that the nature of conscious thought turns out to be such that complex mechanism is necessary for it to occur, which would make disembodied minds impossible. But nobody knows the necessary and sufficient conditions for conscious thought, so we cannot conclude that impossibility at this time. Still and yet, the totality of our experience confirms two things: (1) Complex mechanism does not arise absent intelligent, and (2) intelligence does not arise absent complex mechanism. Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 4, 2013
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Box @75:
We all know at least two things about this being: - it is intelligent, since it can produce meaningful sentences - it is unembodied, since no human being can rearrange the stars.
You can't name one single thing that this being can do besides rearranging stars into these particular sentences. Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 4, 2013
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Hi Phinehas (@74),
Good grief. Unless you are able to demonstrate that disembodied minds are impossible, then they remain possible. Unless you can demonstrate that something in the nature of conscious minds requires physical mechanism, then it is possible that nothing in the nature of conscious minds requires physical mechanism.
As I've made clear, what we are justified in saying is that the probability that disembodied minds can exist is low a priori, given our uniform and repeated experience of conscious minds and their dependence upon brain function. In my opinion the a posteriori evidence for disemodied consciousness (e.g. paranormal phenomena) is not sufficiently well established to conclude that it exists, given the low priors. Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 4, 2013
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Hi Barry Arrington,
@72: Seriously? Blithering idiocy like this statement edifies you? You have a very low edification threshold.

@78: KN @ 76. Why would you seek to enable RDFish to continue wallowing in his sophistry? It seems to me that you, a teacher, of all people would take Phinehas’ advice and seek to help him evaluate his position and see his errors. Perhaps it amuses you to watch him spew inanities and run in linguistic and logical circles so long as it vexes the ID nuts at UD.
Your incisive refutation of my arguments is a testament to your intellect, Barry. Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 4, 2013
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Axel @71:
Utter nonsense.... you lack the most elementary faculty...Absolute rubbish!... words fail me...
Apparently you disagree with my position?
Are you totally unaware, RDFish, of the mind/body dualism, proved experimentally, with irrefragable certainty, during ‘out of body’ experiences of patients undergoing surgery under controlled conditions?
Yes, I am unaware, Axel, of irrefragably certain proof of mind/body dualism from OOB/NDE experiences or any other phenomena. Citation please? Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 4, 2013
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KN,
One way to argue against this would be argue that we can conceive of things that are impossible. But this is a tall mountain to climb, it turns out. (For example, consider the fabled square circle. I say, “I can conceive of it, but it’s impossible!” But you say, “nope — for it you could conceive of it, it would be possible; since it’s impossible, you’re not really conceiving of it at all — you’re just asserting that you’re conceiving of it!” What could I say in response?)
The difference between conceivability and possibility can lead into a thicket, but really needn't in this context. Square circles are logically impossible, as the definition entails a contradiction. Disembodied minds are not logically impossible, as no contradiction is entailed by that. Disembodied minds may be physically impossible, however (what I have been calling here actually impossible), depending on how the mind relates to the brain. Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 4, 2013
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Phinehas, that's much clearer -- thank you! I think, remarkably enough, that we're in agreement, if what you're saying is the following: it is possible that Kripke is mistaken, and if Kripke is mistaken, then logical possibility does entail metaphysical possibility -- so yes, it is possible that logical possibility (necessarily) entails metaphysical possibility. That's very good. I like it. :)Kantian Naturalist_{October 4, 2013
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KN:
I had intended those as scare-quotes, not as quoting you. But I do worry that the notion of ‘possible entailment’ is implicit in your view.
No worries...on either account. :)
As for Kripke, the possibility of his being wrong just means that his argument is invalid. If he’s wrong, then logical possibility would entail metaphysical possibility after all; put otherwise, if Kripke is wrong, then we can treat logic as a guide to metaphysics after all.
Not being any kind of formalist when it comes to logic, please forgive me if I am not being clear in my formulation, but it seems to me that: - IF it is possible that P is wrong, and - IF P is wrong THEN !A - THEN it is possible that !A Where A = logical possibility does not entail metaphysical possibility, then it is possible that logical possibility entails metaphysical possibility. It seems to me that possibility is a powerful concept, and one does philosophical battle against it at one's own philosophical peril. :)Phinehas_{October 4, 2013
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Phinehas said:
You’ve used quote marks around “possible entailment” as if you are quoting me, but that’s not really what I said, is it? Your nice explanation of entailment is not contradicted by the notion that it is possible that something entails something else since it is also possible that something does not entail something else. This is exactly what I was pointing out when I pointed out that it is possible that the logical possibility of unembodied minds does entail the metaphysical possibility of unembodied minds.
I had intended those as scare-quotes, not as quoting you. But I do worry that the notion of 'possible entailment' is implicit in your view. When you say, "it is possible that the logical possibility of unembodied minds does entail the metaphysical possibility of unembodied minds," I don't know what to make of that. Either an assertion is entailed by another, or it is not, and if it is entailed, then it is entailed necessarily. (If it is not entailed necessarily, then I don't know what entailment is.) Put otherwise: to say that logical possibility entails metaphysical possibility is to say that if it something is logically possible, then it must be metaphysically possible. So to say, "it is possible that the logical possibility of unembodied minds does entail the metaphysical possibility of unembodied minds" would mean, "it is both necessary [since it an entailment relation] and not necessary [since it is merely possible] that . . . ". I trust that makes clear why this phrasing concerns me. As for Kripke, the possibility of his being wrong just means that his argument is invalid. If he's wrong, then logical possibility would entail metaphysical possibility after all; put otherwise, if Kripke is wrong, then we can treat logic as a guide to metaphysics after all. Kripke's point was that some things can be metaphysically necessary without being logically necessary. And if anything can be metaphysically necessary without being logically necessary, then logically necessity cannot entail metaphysical necessity. I myself don't really know what to make of Kripke's arguments. I'm sympathetic to Kant's distinction between analytic a priori and synthetic a priori claims, which means that I do think that something can be necessarily so (a priori) without being necessarily so on the basis of logic alone (analytic). So then the question would be whether Kant's distinctions can be phrased in terms of possible-world semantics, and whether that's a good thing. On the first point, Robert Hanna has put forth a proposal for translating Kant's distinction into Kripkean terms. But this makes me uneasy, because possible-world semantics is usually construed in terms of an extensionalist logic, and I've become convinced from my study of C. I. Lewis and Wilfrid Sellars that a study of modality really does require an intensionalist logic if we're not going to end up with modal realism. I would need to read a lot more before commenting further on this point, however.Kantian Naturalist_{October 4, 2013
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KN:
I resist this line of thought, because I think of entailment as a necessary relation — to say that “A entails B” is to say that “if A is the case, then B must be the case”. So “possible entailment” doesn’t make sense to me.
You've used quote marks around "possible entailment" as if you are quoting me, but that's not really what I said, is it? Your nice explanation of entailment is not contradicted by the notion that it is possible that something entails something else since it is also possible that something does not entail something else. This is exactly what I was pointing out when I pointed out that it is possible that the logical possibility of unembodied minds does entail the metaphysical possibility of unembodied minds.
Now, here’s the problem. Suppose logical possibility (or necessity) entails metaphysical possibility (or necessity). Then there couldn’t be any cases of metaphysical impossibility (or necessity) that aren’t also logically possible (or necessary). But, importantly, Saul Kripke (in Naming and Necessity) argued that there are. So metaphysical possibility/necessity cannot be entailed by logical possibility/necessity.
Yes, Kwipke argued that there are. Now, is it possible that he was wrong?Phinehas_{October 4, 2013
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Phinehas:
Do you see any reason to think that it would contradict proven facts, laws, or circumstances for the logical possibility of unembodied minds to entail the metaphysical possibility of unembodied minds? In other words, isn’t it still possible that the logical possibility of unembodied minds entails the metaphysical possibility of unembodied minds? (Are you sensing the potential for an infinite regress about now?)
I resist this line of thought, because I think of entailment as a necessary relation -- to say that "A entails B" is to say that "if A is the case, then B must be the case". So "possible entailment" doesn't make sense to me. Now, here's the problem. Suppose logical possibility (or necessity) entails metaphysical possibility (or necessity). Then there couldn't be any cases of metaphysical impossibility (or necessity) that aren't also logically possible (or necessary). But, importantly, Saul Kripke (in Naming and Necessity) argued that there are. So metaphysical possibility/necessity cannot be entailed by logical possibility/necessity. Axel:
It seems, however, that ID, as RDM explains, is very much scientific fact, with no conceptual leap involved, but, rather, mere logic.
If it based on "mere logic" (a priori), then it isn't "scientific fact" (a posteriori). That much is, I would hope, be obvious. I'd still like to hear RD Miksa's response to the worries I'd raised here about the relation between conceivability and possibility. Note: as I indicated in my 79, I actually don't have a problem with the general principle that conceivability entails possibility. (That's actually a difference between RD Fish and myself.) For him/her, there's a fault-line between conceivability and logical possibility; for me, there's fault-line between logical possibility and metaphysical possibility. I stress this just so those of you arguing against us don't conflate his/her position and mine.Kantian Naturalist_{October 4, 2013
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No. Surely, YOU have it the wrong way round, KN. Your argument is precisely an example of what IDers complain about most bitterly. You wish to repudiate the 'a priori' conjectures of others, even when they show a rational underpinning of their postulates - which I believe RDM had identified. In other words, A rejection of science, in favour of the Greek Philosophers 'armchair' theorising; indeed, subject to it. Pope Benedict spoke recently, I believe, about what he called, 'positive science fiction', such as evolution, which he seems to admire; seemingly referring to the original, scientific hypotheses, which may eventually turn out to be true or not, as the case may be. It seems, however, that ID, as RDM explains, is very much scientific fact, with no conceptual leap involved, but, rather, mere logic.Axel_{October 4, 2013
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KN:
But I think that one has got to distinguish between logical possibility and metaphysical possibility (post-Kripke, this is the dominant view), and then the question would be, does the logical possibility of unembodied minds entail that unembodied minds are metaphysically possible? And I see no reason to think that that is the case. So even if unembodied minds are logically possible (because they are conceivable), that doesn’t help the metaphysical dualist one bit. (Likewise for zombies — logically possible, metaphysically impossible.)
Truly, you have a dizzying intellect.
And I see no reason to think that [the logical possibility of unembodied minds entails the metaphysical possibility of unembodied minds].
Do you see any reason to think that it would contradict proven facts, laws, or circumstances for the logical possibility of unembodied minds to entail the metaphysical possibility of unembodied minds? In other words, isn't it still possible that the logical possibility of unembodied minds entails the metaphysical possibility of unembodied minds? (Are you sensing the potential for an infinite regress about now?) It would appear that unembodied minds remain an open possibility, at least until it is demonstrated that it is impossible for it to be possible.Phinehas_{October 4, 2013
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There exists testimonial evidence of allegedly veridical experiences of un-embodied intelligent agents (NDE experiences, experiences of the divine, etc.); since these experiences could be true, then this at least shows that an un-embodied intelligent agent is possible. There are deductive arguments that demonstrate that the existence of an un-embodied intelligent agent is possible. There is not clear argument or reason to posit that such un-embodied agents are not possible.
This looks backwards to me. Don't we need to establish the a priori possibility of unembodied minds before determining whether these experiences could be veridical? If you want to say that it's possible that those experiences (either experiencing oneself as non-embodied, or experiencing the presence of a non-embodied mind) are veridical, then the possibility of the states of affairs to which those experiences correspond would have to be established first, and only then determine the veridicality of the experiences on that basis. So the a priori part of the argument has to come first, and the experiences can't be part of that argument, unless you want to argue that non-embodied minds are metaphysically possible but to which we have a posteriori access. If that's the approach, then we don't need to worry about whether conceivability entails logical possibility at all.Kantian Naturalist_{October 4, 2013
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5for: Indeed, I do know that ID has been a perfectly successful, scientific enterprise. The problem is that twerps like you two don't want to know, so introduce questions about the nature of the agent!!!!! Very scientific. Go to the top of the class.Axel_{October 4, 2013
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Quick question: how do we demonstrate the non-possibility of an un-embodied intelligent being? Essentially, by conclusively demonstrating something like theism (and its off-shoots: deism, polytheism, etc.) to be absolutely false. But since we have not done so, and since this, arguably, could never be done, then an un-embodied intelligent being is possible.RD Miksa_{October 3, 2013
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A quick note ref. the possibility of an un-embodied intelligent agent actually existing. There exists testimonial evidence of allegedly veridical experiences of un-embodied intelligent agents (NDE experiences, experiences of the divine, etc.); since these experiences could be true, then this at least shows that an un-embodied intelligent agent is possible. There are deductive arguments that demonstrate that the existence of an un-embodied intelligent agent is possible. There is not clear argument or reason to posit that such un-embodied agents are not possible. Given all this, it is obviously true that it is at least possible that an un-embodied intelligent agent could exist. And with this possibility, all the design inference arguments that I previously made are entirely possible. Take care, RD MiksaRD Miksa_{October 3, 2013
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Dear RDFish, It seems to me that your whole point rests on the fact that our uniform and repeated experience allegedly points to the fact that the only designing agents that we know are embodied ones. But this fact in no way overrides the validity of the design inference, even if such an inference leads to a designing agent that we have no experience with. Let me give you an example: You are a Detective. Now, you have a suspect for a certain crime. This suspect is a quadriplegic who lives in an apartment that you have under complete and total surveillance. You know with absolute certainty—for the sake of argument—that no one has been in or out of the apartment for days. Suddenly, however, you are advised by your surveillance team that they have not seen the suspect in some time. Bursting into the apartment, you find your quadriplegic suspect dead on the floor with these words carved into his chest: “I did it. I am responsible. I deserve to die. I am sorry for what I have done. Please forgive me.” Now, based on your uniform and repeated experience as a Detective, you immediately infer that the best explanation for this situation is that your quadriplegic suspect killed himself. Why do you infer this? Because your experience tells you that there is no natural way that a knife can just naturally happen to accidently carve words into a person; in fact, all your experience tells you that someone having words carved into his chest only happens when someone either stabs themselves or when someone else stabs them. But knowing that absolutely no one else was in the apartment, the “best” explanation is thus that the quadriplegic suspect found a way to stab himself. Now here is the key part: Notice how this example demonstrates that even though we may have absolutely no prior experience or knowledge with quadriplegics finding ways to carve words into their chest, the “design” explanation would still be better than the “natural” explanation even in such a case, because the design inference would be so strong that it would overwhelm any lack of experience with such cases. In this way, this example address the issue of why the explanation “an un-embodied intelligent agent designed X” could still be a “best” explanation for something even though we have no past experience (for the sake of argument) of an un-embodied agent or how it would design. And yet, the above example analogically shows why accepting the design explanation as best would still be rational even if we had no experience of the way in which a being designed whatever it is that he designed or even if we had no past experience of such an agent having the ability to design. Why? Because the design inference to such an agent could be so strong as to overpower any lack of past experience with such an agent. Take care, RD MiksaRD Miksa_{October 3, 2013
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Dear RDFish: You said: “First of all, one of my points is that when you say “inferring design” you are not saying anything with specific meaning.” I completely disagree. When we make a design inference, and thus conclude that something was designed, we are saying that something was “made or done intentionally; intended; planned.” This is an incredibly meaningful statement to make. Not only is it meaningful, but it is informative; for example, it means that the thing designed was not made by un-intentional forces, which is an informative fact. You said: “But I have no comprehension of what sort of being could re-arrange the stars, and I believe that nobody else does either.” So what? The design inference gives you the grounds to form a conceptual analysis of what type of a being would be required to re-arrange the stars into an English paragraph. For example, via conceptual analysis, we can deduce that such a being would have to be intelligent enough to know English, that he knows English, that he is interested in human beings, that he is powerful enough to move stars, etc. All these factors can be logically deduced from the design inference itself via a conceptual analysis. So I definitely have a comprehension of what sort of being could re-arrange stars. You said: “It is conceivable that such a thing exists, but we have no evidence of any such thing in our uniform and repeated experience and given what we know about mental abilities in humans (and other animals), it has a low a priori probability.” Even if I grant your contention that your uniform and repeated experience is so uniform that it only points to embodied designing agents—which is dubious—remember that our uniform and repeated is only one aspect of our background knowledge. If, for example, I have a deductive argument that makes it plausible that an un-embodied intelligent agent exists, then this argument will strongly counter my alleged uniformed and repeated experience against such an agent, and thus, the existence of such an un-embodied intelligent agent will not have a low probability. You said: “If “design inference” means “concluding the existence of a non-physical being with human mental attributes” then no, it would not be warranted – it would only be an hypothesis. Other hypotheses would be that we are hallucinating this star re-arranging, or that our own mental activity is unconsciously causing these changes in the universe, and so on. We would have no way of knowing what might be true – at least until we investigate further.” All you are doing here, ultimately, is avoiding the question. Let’s say that we confirm that we are not hallucinating, that we are not causing these changes in the universe, nor anything else of this sort. We are in full possession of our faculties, we are not being deceived in any way, and we are not causing the changes. Given this, I ask again, is the design inference, followed by a conceptual analysis that leads us to an un-embodied intelligent agent of some type, warranted or not based on the evidence given in my example? I contend, honestly, that if you truly say that a design inference is unwarranted in such a case—ie – seeing stars rearrange themselves into an English paragraph directed at us—then we have thrown rationality out the window and we could never make a rational design inference again. Furthermore, I think that you are conflating a design inference and a conceptual analysis (or an inference as to how the designer is). These two tasks are logically separate, and this separation is critical. Indeed, if I saw a complex English paragraph written on a piece of paper, I would first infer that the best explanation of that English paragraph was that it was obviously designed by some intelligent agent; then, separately, I would infer that the best explanation of who the intelligent agent was, was that he was a human being. But these are two separate steps. Now why is this important? Because if that exact same English paragraph appeared written in the stars—and if I knew that no other embodied intelligent could have done this (and that I was sane, not hallucinating, etc.)—then it would be absolutely warranted to infer that the paragraph was designed and it would be irrational not to infer this (it is exactly the same paragraph after all). So the design inference would be absolutely sound in either case. It would be the second inference where the conceptual analysis would be needed to determine what type of intelligent agent caused the design. So it is critical not to conflate these two different and separate inferences. In fact, this separation is exactly why a project like SETI is both rational and scientific, because we can rationally make a design inference even if we do not know who the intelligent designing agents are. More to follow…RD Miksa_{October 3, 2013
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I would argue that if x is conceivable and x is not impossible (i.e. it doesn’t contradict proven facts, laws, or circumstances), then x is possible.
That's an interesting position to take; good luck convincing RDFish of it.
KN @ 76. Why would you seek to enable RDFish to continue wallowing in his sophistry? It seems to me that you, a teacher, of all people would take Phinehas’ advice and seek to help him evaluate his position and see his errors. Perhaps it amuses you to watch him spew inanities and run in linguistic and logical circles so long as it vexes the ID nuts at UD.
Because I think RDFish is raising exactly the right issu (even though his/her phrasing is less than clear): is it the case that conceivability entails possibility? Is something logically possible just by virtue of my being able to conceive that it is so? Consider the problem this way: if we assert that conceivability entails possibility, then by modus tollens, impossibility entails inconceivability. So, logically impossible objects cannot be conceived of. So where does that leave the guy who says, "I'm conceiving of a square circle!"? Alternatively, if conceivability does not entail possibility, then RDFish could have a valid point -- just because we can conceive of disembodied minds, that tells us nothing at all about whether disembodied minds are logically possible or impossible. A third option -- and the one I myself prefer, actually -- is to say that conceivability does entail possibility, but that the bar for conceiving is pretty high -- just asserting that one is conceiving of x, or imagining that one is conceiving of x, won't do the trick. But I think that one has got to distinguish between logical possibility and metaphysical possibility (post-Kripke, this is the dominant view), and then the question would be, does the logical possibility of unembodied minds entail that unembodied minds are metaphysically possible? And I see no reason to think that that is the case. So even if unembodied minds are logically possible (because they are conceivable), that doesn't help the metaphysical dualist one bit. (Likewise for zombies -- logically possible, metaphysically impossible.)Kantian Naturalist_{October 3, 2013
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KN @ 76. Why would you seek to enable RDFish to continue wallowing in his sophistry? It seems to me that you, a teacher, of all people would take Phinehas’ advice and seek to help him evaluate his position and see his errors. Perhaps it amuses you to watch him spew inanities and run in linguistic and logical circles so long as it vexes the ID nuts at UD.Barry Arrington_{October 3, 2013
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KN:
A safer route, maybe, would be to say that from the sheer conceivability of something, nothing follows one way or the other about whether it is possible or impossible. Neither is the default.
It is interesting that you've placed this within the context of safety. This tends to imply that RDFish ought to protect his position more than evaluate it for its veracity. While I cannot speak to the safety of such a thing, perhaps it would be helpful in some way or another (depending upon one's goals, I suppose) to take a gander at the most common usage of "possible" from The Free Dictionary:
1. Capable of happening, existing, or being true without contradicting proven facts, laws, or circumstances.
I would argue that if x is conceivable and x is not impossible (i.e. it doesn't contradict proven facts, laws, or circumstances), then x is possible.Phinehas_{October 3, 2013
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