Please Take the Time to Understand Our Arguments Before You Attack Them

_{Barry Arrington

October 1, 2013

Intelligent Design}

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The comments our Darwinist friends put up on this site never cease to amaze. Consider, as a for instance, Kantian Naturalist’s comment that appears as comment 9 to kairosfocus’ Infographic: The science of ID post. The post sets forth a simple summary of the case for ID, and KN responds:

What I like about this infographic is that it makes really clear where the problem with intelligent design lies.

Here’s the argument:

(1) We observe that all As are caused by Bs. (2) Cs are similar to As in relevant respects. (3) Therefore, it is highly probable that Cs are also caused by Bs.

But this is invalid, because the conclusion does not follow from the premises.

KN has been posting on this site for years. He is obviously an intelligent man. He is obviously a man of good will. I will assume, therefore, that he is attacking ID as he believes it to be and not a straw man caricature of his own making. And that is what is so amazing. How can an intelligent person of good will follow this site for several years and still not understand the basics of ID? It beggars belief.

Maybe it will help if I explain ID using the same formal structure KN has used.

KN:

(1) We observe that all As are caused by Bs.

ID as it really is:

(1) For all As whose provenance is actually known, the cause of A was B.

Here “A” could be complex specified information or irreducible complexity.

B, of course, stands for “the act of an intelligent agent.”

In step 1 KN is actually not far off the mark. I have reworded it slightly, because ID does not posit there is no possible explanation for A other than B. ID posits that in our universal experience of A where its provenance has been actually observed, it has always arisen from B. Now, there may be some other cause of A (Neo-Darwinian evolution – NDE – for instance), but the conclusion that NDE causes A arises from an inference not an observation. “NDE caused A” is not just any old inference. We would argue that it is an inference skewed by an a priori commitment to metaphysical materialism and not necessarily an unbiased evaluation of the data.

KN:

(2) Cs are similar to As in relevant respects.

ID as it really is:

(2) We observe A to exist within living systems.

In (2) KN starts to go off the rails in a serious way. Here we have the tired old “ID is nothing by an argument from analogy” argument. KN is saying that the complex specified information in a cell is “similar in relevant respects” to the complex specified information found, for example, in a language or a code. He is saying that the irreducible complexity of any number of biological systems is “similar in relevant respects” to the irreducible complexity of machines.

No sir. That is not what ID posits at all, not even close. ID posits that the complex specified information in a cell is identical to the complex specified information of a computer code. The DNA code is not “like” a computer code. The DNA code and a computer code are two manifestations of the same thing. The irreducible complexity of the bacterial flagellum is identical to (not similar to) the irreducible complexity of an outboard motor.

ID proponents obviously have the burden of demonstrating their claims. For example, they have the burden of demonstrating that the DNA code and a computer code are identical in relevant respects. And if you disagree with their conclusions that is fair enough. Tell us why. But it is not fair to attempt to refute ID by attacking a claim ID proponents do not make.

KN:

(3) Therefore, it is highly probable that Cs are also caused by Bs.

ID as it really is:

(3) Therefore, abductive reasoning leads to the conclusion that B is the best explanation of A.

The Wikipedia article on abductive reasoning is quite good. [I have changed the symbols to correspond with our discussion]:

to abduce a hypothetical explanation “B” from an observed surprising circumstance “A” is to surmise that “B” may be true because then “A” would be a matter of course. Thus, to abduce B from A involves determining that B is sufficient (or nearly sufficient), but not necessary, for A.

For example, the lawn is wet. But if it rained last night, then it would be unsurprising that the lawn is wet. Therefore, by abductive reasoning, the possibility that it rained last night is reasonable. . . . abducing rain last night from the observation of the wet lawn can lead to a false conclusion. In this example, dew, lawn sprinklers, or some other process may have resulted in the wet lawn, even in the absence of rain.

[Philosopher Charles Sanders] Peirce argues that good abductive reasoning from A to B involves not simply a determination that, e.g., B is sufficient for A, but also that B is among the most economical explanations for A. Simplification and economy call for the ‘leap’ of abduction.

For what seems like the ten thousandth time: ID does not posit that the existence of complex specified information and irreducibly complex structures within living systems compels “act of an intelligent agent” as a matter of logical necessity. ID posits that given our universal experience concerning complex specified information and irreducibly complex structures where the provenance of such has been actually observed, the best explanation of the existence of these same things in living structures is “act of intelligent agent.”

KN, I hope this helps. If you disagree with any of the premises or the abuction that we say follows from the premises, by all means attack them with abandon. But please don’t attack an argument we do not make. That just wastes everyone’s time.

Comments

So I hear you saying that the criteria for a good theory are the things that are needed to produce or further validate the true warranted belief we have about some phenomenon (in our case, biological origins).
Not quite -- all I mean by "epistemic desiderata" (a phrase I introduced in 39) are the qualities that we want in a theory -- that it " generates better explanations of the data, predicts new data, opens up new avenues for investigation, and so on." Perhaps the design hypothesis is true. (It certainly is logically possible, after all!) But it does not (yet) warrant the privilege we normally bestow on scientific theories. But isn't that what the whole debate is about -- whether ID is a scientific theory or not? If the design hypothesis is true as the conclusion of a philosophical argument, or as a piece of metaphysical speculation, that's a very different kettle of fish!Kantian Naturalist_{October 2, 2013
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KN @ 44: “the criteria are the epistemic desiderata.” Just so everyone is on the same page: “epistemic”: of or relating to knowledge or to the degree of its validation “knowledge”: True warranted belief “desiderata”: plural of desideratum “Desideratum”: That which is desired or needed. So I hear you saying that the criteria for a good theory are the things that are needed to produce or further validate the true warranted belief we have about some phenomenon (in our case, biological origins). If that is the case, why do we always argue about which side of some arbitrary line of demarcation our theory falls on? If my beliefs about biological origins are true, what difference does it make to me whether Karl Popper would have said those beliefs are on one side or the other of the line? The issue is the truth of the matter, not the boxes in which we choose to put that truth. In arriving at truth we summon and employ to the best of our ability our powers of observation and thought. We consider the alternatives. We attempt to put aside our biases and prejudices. We reach a conclusion. And if we are right, if our conclusion is true, why should we care if someone says, “Your conclusion is not valid because it doesn’t fit into this arbitrary epistemic box”? For the life of me I can’t see why we should.Barry Arrington_{October 2, 2013
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The kinds of reason aren't the criteria of a scientific theory being good (or not); the criteria are the epistemic desiderata. The kinds of reasoning are how the criteria are satisfied.Kantian Naturalist_{October 2, 2013
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KN @ 21: “In other words, a good scientific theory depends on abduction and deduction and induction.” KN @ 39: “But I don’t think of the presence of abduction, deduction, and induction as the criteria of a scientific theory, let alone a good one” Will the real KN, whatever his, her or its gender is, please step forward?Barry Arrington_{October 2, 2013
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"Oh, and by the way, in response to Barry Arrington and Mapou — when did I ever say that I was a man?" You never did as far as I know. Not sure what your point is unless you are suggesting I kludge up all my posts with the insufferably pc “he or she” until you choose to reveal your gender. If that’s your point you are bound to be disappointed, cuz it ain’t gonna happen.Barry Arrington_{October 2, 2013
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a good scientific theory is one that pays its own way, generates better explanations of the data, predicts new data Yes indeed.
Elizabeth B Liddle_{October 2, 2013
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Oh, and by the way, in response to Barry Arrington and Mapou -- when did I ever say that I was a man?Kantian Naturalist_{October 2, 2013
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In response to RD Miksa @ 28 and 31:
First off, any attempt to delineate a “good” scientific theory as one that depends on abduction, deduction, and induction would run face first into the Demarcation Problem, thereby placing the onus on you to show why all three of these aspects need to be met by a scientific theory before it is considered “good.” This, I think, would be very difficult to do.
I would worry about the demarcation problem if I thought that a distinction had to completely unambiguous in order to work as distinction in the first place. A few fuzzy cases here and there don't trouble my sleep. But I do think that Peirce was pretty much right that a scientific theory contains all three forms of reasoning, because empirical inquiry generally is reliable when different kinds of reasoning hold each in check, and that the checks-and-balances is intersubjective or communal. But I don't think of the presence of abduction, deduction, and induction as the criteria of a scientific theory, let alone a good one -- a good scientific theory is one that pays its own way, generates better explanations of the data, predicts new data, opens up new avenues for investigation, and so on. The combination of abduction, deduction, and induction has been, historically speaking, an effective way of arriving at those epistemic desiderata.
Furthermore, it is logically fallacious to claim, as you did above, that just because ID is not a “good” scientific theory, it is therefore not a scientific theory at all. After all, something could still be a scientific theory, even if it is a poor one; indeed, this is arguably one reason why we sometimes speak of “soft” and “hard” sciences. Maybe ID is just a “soft” science, but that does not make it unscientific. And so, your claim above just is not coherent.
The distinction between the "hard" (natural) and "soft" (social) sciences does not, in my view, have anything to do with how good or bad a scientific theory is. I subscribe to the view that there is a fundamental difference in methodologies between the social and natural sciences, and so the criteria are implemented in markedly different ways. As for the forensic science example in 31, I don't really see the point of the example. Sure, the forensic scientist in the example makes use of abduction, deduction, and induction. Here's a somewhat better way of seeing how the forensic scientist could reason:
If the victim were murdered, then the wounds and blood would be a matter of course (abduction). In order to cause this kind of damage, the murderer must have used a weapon of such-and-such length (deduction). But no such weapon has been found at the crime scene (observation). Therefore, the weapon is probably elsewhere (induction).
That's all well and good, and I don't think the basic pattern of reasoning is all that different between forensics and physics. It's the techniques that differ. The question is, what does this tell us about ID? And the answer is, nothing at all. For what we get at the end of the example is just this:
Now, given that this exact example could be transferred to an ID scenario—after all, the same phrase could, for example, be found on the side of a cell wall, etc.—then it is hard to see why ID cannot count as a “good” scientific theory.
If I was understood to have claimed that intelligent design could not be a scientific theory, good or otherwise, I must clarify (or perhaps I misspoke). That is not my position -- not at all! My position, rather, is that at present, design theorists have not done the hard work of implementing the deductive and inductive stages of inquiry that would lend empirical warrant to the hypothesis. And that means that design theory does not yet deserve serious consideration as an alternative to other explanations of biological phenomena. Whether it will merit serious consideration in the future, I don't know and have no intuitions about, one way or the other.Kantian Naturalist_{October 2, 2013
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RDF: Millions, would disagree with you that our uniform, repeated experience of intelligence is embodied. We cannot even see embodiment as a basis for the intelligence in embodied beings. More to the point, intelligence is inferred based on evidently purposeful directed contingency, precisely what is manifested in FSCO/I. Absent prior good reason to infer that say the fine tuned cosmos could not possibly have been created by an unembodied intelligence [and there is a world of discussion linked to the nature of necessary, minded being as root of existence . . . ], that conclusion is possible and it is reasonably inferred on the evidence of such fine tuning. However, this debate is irrelevant tot he world of life, save insofar as Darwinists have nailed their flags to the mast of materialism. If it is reasonable that a molecular nanotech lab some generations beyond Venter et al could do what we have seen these 60 years, then there is no reason to try to inject debates over embodied vs unembodied intelligences in discussing signs of design in the world of life on earth. Apart from, of course, the ideological phobias of materialists in lab coats for a Divine Foot in the door of their temple of materialism. KFkairosfocus_{October 2, 2013
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@ 33: UB also picks his argument back up @ 100 here > https://uncommondescent.com/convergent-evolution/a-software-engineer-on-convergent-evolution/equate65_{October 1, 2013
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(1) For all As whose provenance is actually known, the cause of A was B. Here “A” could be complex specified information or irreducible complexity. B, of course, stands for “the act of an intelligent agent.”
In our uniform and repeated experience, all intelligent agents are complex biological organisms with brains, sense organs, motor effectors, etc - just the sorts of things ID purports to explain in the first place. So ID can't propose exactly what we observe to be the cause of CSI in other contexts as the explanation of CSI in biological systems. Rather, ID hypothesizes the existence of something else - something completely outside of our uniform and repeated experience of intelligent agency. ID hypothesizes something that is not itself a complex biological system but somehow has the same sorts of abilities that we do (i.e. the engineering and construction of complex mechanisms). Based on our knowledge and experience, nothing without complex physical mechanisms for data aquisition, information processing, and motor output could produce other complex physical systems. In other words, it's a priori unlikely that the ID hypothesis is true. In order for ID to be taken seriously as a scientific project, then, it must provide good empirical evidence that such a thing exists, or has existed in the past, or at the very least that such a thing is possible in principle. Nobody ever attempts to provide such evidence, which is why ID is a non-starter as a science. And no, there is no reasonable justification for saying that there are only two games in town, and so even if both NDE and ID are empirically unsupported we must believe on of them to be true. On the contrary, the intellectually honest answer is "We do not know". Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 1, 2013
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Dear Barry Arrington, You are quite correct. In fact, your line of argumentation could be summed up as the following: absence of evidence is evidence of absence if certain evidences would be expected given the truth of a certain hypothesis and yet that expected evidence is not present. And this is a totally valid method of argumentation that is used in the sciences all the time! And given that certain evidences on Blind Watchmaker Neo-Darwinian Evolution (BWNDE) are expected, and yet these evidences are not present, then this counts as evidence against that hypothesis. Furthermore, given that the only other viable option is ID of some sort, than the failure on the part of the BWNDE hypothesis immediately strengthens the ID hypothesis. I would also add that any attempt by the BWNDE proponent to object that they "just need a little more time" and then they will have the answers is both fallacious and irrational. After all, how much more time would we give to the Forensic Scientist who claimed that with just a little more time he could show us that the wounds on the corpse's chest in the form of words came about by natural means? Obviously, giving him more and more time would be irrational, especially if his current attempts had shown themselves to be failures. Indeed, instead, we would simply understand that it would be rational to see ID as the currently best explanation in such a case, and then, if somehow it could be shown that such wounds could come about be accident, only then would it be rational to stop seeing ID as the best explanation of the evidence. Take care, RD MiksaRD Miksa_{October 1, 2013
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KN @ 21: “design theory stops there” [i.e., at the abductive leap]. No, it does not. See RD Midso’s excellent comments at 28 and 31. I would add to RD Midso’s comment the following: When it comes to biology we are really in a zero sum game between ID and theories that posit some combination of chance and necessity (Neo-Darwinian Evolution (NDE) is obviously the dominant such theory). There are two and only two games in town, and to the extent one advances the other must retreat. NDE has been trying and failing to demonstrate that chance and necessity can create complex specified information, new body plans, or new irreducibly complex structures for over 150 years. The main result has been a lot of dead irradiated fruit flies lying around in a lab. NDE’s failure actually to demonstrate as opposed to question begging – which it is very good at indeed – is powerful evidence for ID. KN, let me put it this way: I will abandon ID and become a card carrying NDE advocate the very day someone demonstrates natural forces creating new complex specified information. Finally, you conceded the validity of the abductive leap that ID makes. For that I thank you.Barry Arrington_{October 1, 2013
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Upright @ 16: “The material conditions required for the genetic code to produce a specific material effect are exactly the same as those for a computer code to produce a specific material effect.” Just so. As Upright has demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt in these pages, the genetic code operates on the same principles as any other code that produces a material effect. See his argument at: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/ub-sets-it-out-step-by-step/Barry Arrington_{October 1, 2013
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KN @ 15: “I framed the premise as an analogy (“the genetic code is like a language”) because I think that the claim about identity (“the genetic code is a language”) is much, much harder to make.” The relevance of this remark is not clear to me. I never claimed the genetic code is a language or like a language. I claimed that the genetic code is a code. KN @ 15: “So the claim would have to be that the genetic code is a language in exactly the same way that a computer language is a language, right?” No, the claim would be that the genetic code is a code.Barry Arrington_{October 1, 2013
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Dear Kantian Naturalist: So, does ID extend beyond just abduction? Absolutely. To see why, consider this analogous example from Forensic Science. A Forensic Scientist is investigating a corpse. The corpse was found in a kitchen lying in a pile of kitchen knives and by the knife block. Now, on the chest of the corpse are knife wounds that appear to match the following: “I, THE DESIGNER, DID THIS. I DID IT. THIS IS MY WORK.” There is absolutely no other evidence except for the evidence described. Now given this evidence, and given that the wounds on the corpse contain massive amounts of complex specified information, the Forensic Scientist obviously concludes, on the basis of this evidence alone—and as we all would—that the best explanation for this evidence is that the person was murdered rather than dying of natural causes such as an accident. This is the abduction portion. After this, notice that the Forensic Scientist can deduce certain things about the murderer. He could deduce that he or she would have to be strong enough to inflict such wounds and that he or she had enough stamina to do. He could also deduce the amount of time that was needed for such an event to occur, etc. Numerous other deductions could be made as well. The Forensic Scientist could also make inductive generalizations based on his abductive inference. He could, for example, positively state that every time something like words/sentences appear in the form of wounds on a corpse, that corpse was murdered. Furthermore, negative inductive generalizations could be made, such as that natural causes could never inflict wounds on a corpse in the form of words/sentences. Next, these inductive generalizations could be tested. For example, an experiment could be run demonstrating that a person could indeed inflict such wounds, thereby confirming that an intelligent agent could cause such a thing to occur. Also, numerous experiments could be run to see if the wounds could have been caused naturally. Perhaps the knife block fell over, and the knives bounced off the ground repeatedly, thereby inflicting the wounds. Or perhaps the person slipped and fell, knocking the knife block over in the process; then, in trying to get up, the person slipped further into the knives and inflicted all the wounds on his (or her) body. Both these options are logically possible, and they could have happened, so such a claim could be empirically tested. Now, given that this exact example could be transferred to an ID scenario—after all, the same phrase could, for example, be found on the side of a cell wall, etc.—then it is hard to see why ID cannot count as a “good” scientific theory. Take care, RD MiksaRD Miksa_{October 1, 2013
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Yeah, what he said. Let's be nice, and argue fair! -ly. We can share, learn, discuss, disagree, and not waste time. :-)Querius_{October 1, 2013
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Please visit my new domain, inhumanextension.comMung_{October 1, 2013
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Dear Kantian Naturalist: You said: “In other words, a good scientific theory depends on abduction and deduction and induction. Design theory gets far as the first stage — abduction — stops there, and still wants to be understood as a scientific theory. And that’s intellectually dishonest.” First off, any attempt to delineate a “good” scientific theory as one that depends on abduction, deduction, and induction would run face first into the Demarcation Problem, thereby placing the onus on you to show why all three of these aspects need to be met by a scientific theory before it is considered “good.” This, I think, would be very difficult to do. Furthermore, it is logically fallacious to claim, as you did above, that just because ID is not a “good” scientific theory, it is therefore not a scientific theory at all. After all, something could still be a scientific theory, even if it is a poor one; indeed, this is arguably one reason why we sometimes speak of “soft” and “hard” sciences. Maybe ID is just a “soft” science, but that does not make it unscientific. And so, your claim above just is not coherent. Finally, ID does substantially more than just abduction, and it actually does contain all three aspects of abduction, deduction, and induction. And I will explain how shortly. Take care, RD MiksaRD Miksa_{October 1, 2013
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I don't know about you Timaeus, but I'm here for the intimacy. signed MUNGRESSIVE!Mung_{October 1, 2013
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"God would want us to." LOL!Mung_{October 1, 2013
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Kantian (20): I agree with your approach to debating here. In an electronic text medium such as this it is very hard to convey subtleties to people one has never met personally . Smiley faces and so on just aren't adequate. And devices such as boldface or caps for emphasis can seem like shouting or browbeating, especially if they are overused, and especially when they are used by people whose style is already somewhat aggressive. Thus, the safest thing is to write somewhat formally (not stiffly or pedantically, but as a traditional gentleman or lady would address another to whom one is well-disposed but with whom one is not intimate). If one follows the normal rules of politeness -- not accusing others of dishonesty or cowardice or envy etc. -- and focuses on basic things like establishing definitions, and sticks closely to evidence and logic, one can carry on a civilized disagreement in this medium quite well. In a group of people who know each other really well on a personal level, more leeway can be granted, but even with old friends, I find that one cannot convey emotions, deep religious convictions, warm sentiments, etc. accurately in this medium. This is not the right medium for personal, heart-to-heart, bare-your-soul conversation. As he does so often, Gregory raises the dialogical temperature by using a word with a strong rhetorical coloring. He says that your style of conversation is "inhumane" -- but of course to most English-speaking people "inhumane" initially suggests "cruel"; at the very least, it indicates a callous indifference to human beings and human concerns. To characterize your writing in such a way is to offer a gratuitous (even if unintended) insult, and is unnecessarily provocative. It is no mark of indifference to humanity that one argues formally and politely rather than with ferocious passion and with his heart on his sleeve. Indeed, it can be a mark of caring for human things that one restrains one's passion. A politician, a courtroom lawyer, or a journalist who is always pouring out passion may seem more "human," but in fact such passion can serve the interests of ideology, self-interest, revenge, and in general injustice. The politician or lawyer or journalist who restrains his passions and strives simply to get at the truth is in the long run more likely to be a better servant of human values such as charity, dignity, and justice. And of course the philosopher is always keenly aware of the danger that passion will cloud thought. This has been a motif in philosophy since the time of Socrates. It is not that passions are in themselves bad, but they tend to regard themselves too highly in the scheme of things. So the philosopher is naturally going to be less effusive than certain other kinds of "intellectuals" who think that thought should be put into the service of the dominant passions. In other words, the true philosopher is going to be less passionate in his presentation than the ideologue. And this distinction, between the philosopher and the ideologue, is a very important one which Gregory, among many others, does not seem to pay enough attention to. Thus, whereas the philosopher traditionally wishes to contemplate "the beings," the ideologue is interested in studying not "the beings", but the motivations of people, so that he can better manipulate them for social and political ends. My goal, in thinking about ID, is to contemplate "nature" and ask whether or not nature reveals any "ends" or is in any sense teleological. I am not really interested in the real or alleged religious or political motivations of all the people involved in the ID movement. My interest is philosophical, not ideological. So I want to inquire dispassionately about possible ends in nature, whether in living systems, in the fine-tuning of the universe, etc. But when I do so, I am criticized at the same time for two very opposite faults: of being too impersonal or too "inhumane" (as if I kick dogs when I'm angry, or pull the wings off flies for fun); and of being too contaminated by personal interests, i.e., of being governed by hidden religious passions which I conceal for political reasons. It does not occur to my critic that I might simply be interested in the philosophy of nature, and hence in knowing the truth about nature, for its own sake. He cannot imagine that such a person exists, I guess. For him, it seems, all thought is automatically in the service of some ideology or -ism. But this just shows that he does not understand the philosophical quest. Philosophy, at least according to its own original intention, is the attempt to rise above ideologies and -isms. It is hard to carry out in practice, but unlike some people, I do not scorn but rather honor the attempt, as one of the highest aspirations of the human soul.Timaeus_{October 1, 2013
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Thanks again, bornagain77, for your links and commentary. The possibility of quantum entanglement in the genetic code is absolutely amazing! Then, Kantian Naturalist contended
In other words, a good scientific theory depends on abduction and deduction and induction. Design theory gets far as the first stage — abduction — stops there, and still wants to be understood as a scientific theory. And that’s intellectually dishonest.
I don't see a necessary progression. If we could base a good scientific theory on deductive reasoning we would certainly do so. But since there are not a lot of interesting things that unfold with deductive logic, we create and test hypotheses instead. Inductive and abductive reasoning lead us only to likelihoods (which are very susceptable to wild swings of probability based on new data). Ideally, we use them to try to construct experiments that eliminate possibilities. I don't think intellectual honesty is in question here. Kantian remarked
(If someone wants to claim that “Darwinism” is not a good scientific theory by those criteria, go right ahead — I’m not terribly interested in defending Darwinism. It could be that we don’t have any good theories of biology.)
I understand what you're trying to say, and I agree. In my view, neither Darwinism nor Intelligent Design nor Uniformitarianism are very good theories, but they are all paradigms upon which we build theories. The key here is that the discipline of Science provides us with approximations---models---tools with which we can design or predict things. They are not to be confused with reality (this is easier to claim in the physical sciences than the biological sciences). Then, when we inevitably outgrow the tool, we build a better one. God would want us to. :-)Querius_{October 1, 2013
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Mung:
This is precisely how Meyer presents it in his book. There is no mention of “common descent” in the definition because it’s about the mechanism.
From Meyer's Chapter 1:
Biologists often call Darwin's theory of the history of life "universal common descent" to indicate that every organism on earth arose from a single common ancestor by a process of "descent with modification." Darwin argued that this idea best explained a variety of biological evidences: the succession of fossil forms, the geographical distribution of various species (such as Galapagos finches), and the anatomical and embryological similarities among otherwise highly distinct organisms. The second pillar of Darwin's theory affirmed the creative power of what he called natural selection, a process that acted on random variations in the traits of features of organisms and their offspring. Whereas the theory of universal common descent postulated a pattern (the branching tree) to represent the history of life, natural selection referred to a process that he said could generate his branching tree of life.
And it is that pattern that Meyer is disputing in Chapter 2 of his book (and elsewhere) with the aid of diagrams that call into question the pattern predicted by Darwin, as being not what is actually observed. And it is with that argument - that the pattern expected under Darwin's theory (i.e. the theory of common descent/descent with modification) is not what we observe, that I am taking issue with Meyer.Elizabeth B Liddle_{October 1, 2013
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In order to defend the conception of the genome as a genetic program, Maynard Smith must solve the following two problems. ...
Did someone say genetic program? The "Genetic Program" Program: A Commentary on Maynard Smith on Information in BiologyMung_{October 1, 2013
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ID posits that given our universal experience concerning complex specified information and irreducibly complex structures where the provenance of such has been actually observed, the best explanation of the existence of these same things in living structures is “act of intelligent agent.”
The abductive leap would be
It is surprising that there is complex, specified information in living things, but if living things were brought about by an intelligent agent, then the presence of complex, specified information in living things would be a matter of course.
and that's perfectly right, as far it goes. But it does not go very far, because design theory stops there. It does not go on the next stage of inquiry, which would be test the abductive leap. To do that, one would have to deduce observable consequences from the hypothesis that would not follow from the converse, and then conduct the lab or field work to see if the observables are actually, in fact, observed. In other words, a good scientific theory depends on abduction and deduction and induction. Design theory gets far as the first stage -- abduction -- stops there, and still wants to be understood as a scientific theory. And that's intellectually dishonest. (If someone wants to claim that "Darwinism" is not a good scientific theory by those criteria, go right ahead -- I'm not terribly interested in defending Darwinism. It could be that we don't have any good theories of biology.)Kantian Naturalist_{October 1, 2013
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First, you still refuse to capitalise ‘Intelligent Design Theory’ qua theory. You could explain why, but it might get a bit personal. I linked you already to the importance of the distinction, but you didn’t respond.
True, and I apologize for neglecting it. From where I sit, if I make the distinction between 'the design argument' (as a well-examined argument in Western philosophy), 'design theory' (as a purported scientific theory), and 'the ID movement' (as a cultural-political rejection of atheism/materialism), isn't that good enough?
Second, though I agree with your languages vs. machines talk, I find your ‘philosophical’ approach quite inhumane. Iow, there are no ‘persons’ in your ‘argument’ just as with the religious studies scholar timaeus. You two fit ripely together with this (western) style that you were both trained in and currently live in.
Yes, my style is highly impersonal. I do this party to avoid even the appearance of ad hominem fallacies, and partly because we're arguing on-line. In on-line communications, the subtle nuances of gesture and tone are much harder to convey, and remarks are more prone to misinterpretation. (Besides which, most of us are posting anonymously.)
Francis Collins speaks of DNA as “the Language of God”. To him, of course, all you can do as an atheist/agnostic is disagree. But are you protesting your position at BioLogos?
No, I'm not. Posting at Uncommon Descent and The Skeptical Zone is all I have time for. I don't argue against theistic evolutionists because I don't think that my differences with them can be resolved by argument. I tend to think that one's "world-view" (which is not a term I like using) is an expression of temperament rather than of argument. Take, for example, a basic difference between myself and the other philosophically-sophisticated commentators here, such as Kairosfocus, William Murray, and StephenB. (Though we haven't heard from StephenB in a long time.) They are rationalists and foundationalists. I'm a pragmatist and coherentist, or possibly a "foundherentist", as Susan Haack calls her position. The quarrel between foundationalists and coherentists has been going on for a long, long time, and each position been improved by taking seriously the criticisms raised by the other. But resolution is nowhere in sight. I think that I just don't have the craving for certitude that they have; it's not part of my temperament. I don't feel what Richard Bernstein calls "the Cartesian anxiety". And I don't think it's just because I've read so much Nietzsche and Dewey; it's because I don't experience the Cartesian anxiety in the first place that Nietzsche and Dewey (among others) speak to me in the first place.Kantian Naturalist_{October 1, 2013
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'beyond space and time quantum' Philip, whatever you do, on no account EVER use normal words, such as 'supernatural' or 'transcendental', instead of your chosen phrase, 'beyond space and time', will you? There's a good chap. I've seen grown men and women become very querulous, plaintive and whiney, almost indeed, to the point of bursting into tears, at the mention of such words in relation to physics. You're asking them to run, before they can walk, as it is.Axel_{October 1, 2013
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Upright BiPed @ 16
The material conditions required for the genetic code to produce a specific material effect are exactly the same as those for a computer code to produce a specific material effect.
No, the material conditions are different in some respects: for example, computers use silcon whilst the genetic code uses organic molecules. You are arging the material conditons are the same in all relevant respects. Obviously, therefore, there is disagreement about what are the *relevant* similarities and differences between computers and DNA. Given that modern science does not have a very good handle on information qua meaning, then your case for the identity of computer code and genetic code really can't be made on empirically testable scientific grounds at present; instead, its a philosophical or metaphysical argument.CLAVDIVS_{October 1, 2013
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KN, you're obviously 'correct' to a certain extennt. But where your 'gaping hole' shows your 'undies' is wrt univocal predication. First, you still refuse to capitalise 'Intelligent Design Theory' qua theory. You could explain why, but it might get a bit personal. I linked you already to the importance of the distinction, but you didn't respond. Second, though I agree with your languages vs. machines talk, I find your 'philosophical' approach quite inhumane. Iow, there are no 'persons' in your 'argument' just as with the religious studies scholar timaeus. You two fit ripely together with this (western) style that you were both trained in and currently live in. Francis Collins speaks of DNA as "the Language of God". To him, of course, all you can do as an atheist/agnostic is disagree. But are you protesting your position at BioLogos?Gregory_{October 1, 2013
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