Please Take the Time to Understand Our Arguments Before You Attack Them

_{Barry Arrington

October 1, 2013

Intelligent Design}

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The comments our Darwinist friends put up on this site never cease to amaze. Consider, as a for instance, Kantian Naturalist’s comment that appears as comment 9 to kairosfocus’ Infographic: The science of ID post. The post sets forth a simple summary of the case for ID, and KN responds:

What I like about this infographic is that it makes really clear where the problem with intelligent design lies.

Here’s the argument:

(1) We observe that all As are caused by Bs. (2) Cs are similar to As in relevant respects. (3) Therefore, it is highly probable that Cs are also caused by Bs.

But this is invalid, because the conclusion does not follow from the premises.

KN has been posting on this site for years. He is obviously an intelligent man. He is obviously a man of good will. I will assume, therefore, that he is attacking ID as he believes it to be and not a straw man caricature of his own making. And that is what is so amazing. How can an intelligent person of good will follow this site for several years and still not understand the basics of ID? It beggars belief.

Maybe it will help if I explain ID using the same formal structure KN has used.

KN:

(1) We observe that all As are caused by Bs.

ID as it really is:

(1) For all As whose provenance is actually known, the cause of A was B.

Here “A” could be complex specified information or irreducible complexity.

B, of course, stands for “the act of an intelligent agent.”

In step 1 KN is actually not far off the mark. I have reworded it slightly, because ID does not posit there is no possible explanation for A other than B. ID posits that in our universal experience of A where its provenance has been actually observed, it has always arisen from B. Now, there may be some other cause of A (Neo-Darwinian evolution – NDE – for instance), but the conclusion that NDE causes A arises from an inference not an observation. “NDE caused A” is not just any old inference. We would argue that it is an inference skewed by an a priori commitment to metaphysical materialism and not necessarily an unbiased evaluation of the data.

KN:

(2) Cs are similar to As in relevant respects.

ID as it really is:

(2) We observe A to exist within living systems.

In (2) KN starts to go off the rails in a serious way. Here we have the tired old “ID is nothing by an argument from analogy” argument. KN is saying that the complex specified information in a cell is “similar in relevant respects” to the complex specified information found, for example, in a language or a code. He is saying that the irreducible complexity of any number of biological systems is “similar in relevant respects” to the irreducible complexity of machines.

No sir. That is not what ID posits at all, not even close. ID posits that the complex specified information in a cell is identical to the complex specified information of a computer code. The DNA code is not “like” a computer code. The DNA code and a computer code are two manifestations of the same thing. The irreducible complexity of the bacterial flagellum is identical to (not similar to) the irreducible complexity of an outboard motor.

ID proponents obviously have the burden of demonstrating their claims. For example, they have the burden of demonstrating that the DNA code and a computer code are identical in relevant respects. And if you disagree with their conclusions that is fair enough. Tell us why. But it is not fair to attempt to refute ID by attacking a claim ID proponents do not make.

KN:

(3) Therefore, it is highly probable that Cs are also caused by Bs.

ID as it really is:

(3) Therefore, abductive reasoning leads to the conclusion that B is the best explanation of A.

The Wikipedia article on abductive reasoning is quite good. [I have changed the symbols to correspond with our discussion]:

to abduce a hypothetical explanation “B” from an observed surprising circumstance “A” is to surmise that “B” may be true because then “A” would be a matter of course. Thus, to abduce B from A involves determining that B is sufficient (or nearly sufficient), but not necessary, for A.

For example, the lawn is wet. But if it rained last night, then it would be unsurprising that the lawn is wet. Therefore, by abductive reasoning, the possibility that it rained last night is reasonable. . . . abducing rain last night from the observation of the wet lawn can lead to a false conclusion. In this example, dew, lawn sprinklers, or some other process may have resulted in the wet lawn, even in the absence of rain.

[Philosopher Charles Sanders] Peirce argues that good abductive reasoning from A to B involves not simply a determination that, e.g., B is sufficient for A, but also that B is among the most economical explanations for A. Simplification and economy call for the ‘leap’ of abduction.

For what seems like the ten thousandth time: ID does not posit that the existence of complex specified information and irreducibly complex structures within living systems compels “act of an intelligent agent” as a matter of logical necessity. ID posits that given our universal experience concerning complex specified information and irreducibly complex structures where the provenance of such has been actually observed, the best explanation of the existence of these same things in living structures is “act of intelligent agent.”

KN, I hope this helps. If you disagree with any of the premises or the abuction that we say follows from the premises, by all means attack them with abandon. But please don’t attack an argument we do not make. That just wastes everyone’s time.

Comments

RD Fish, if I may offer a bit of advice: your interlocutors are assuming (as it seems to me) that the possibility of x follows from the conceivability of x. Put otherwise,
If x is conceivable, then x is possible.
One way to argue against this would be argue that we can conceive of things that are impossible. But this is a tall mountain to climb, it turns out. (For example, consider the fabled square circle. I say, "I can conceive of it, but it's impossible!" But you say, "nope -- for it you could conceive of it, it would be possible; since it's impossible, you're not really conceiving of it at all -- you're just asserting that you're conceiving of it!" What could I say in response?) A safer route, maybe, would be to say that from the sheer conceivability of something, nothing follows one way or the other about whether it is possible or impossible. Neither is the default. One can, as it were, "stay in neutral" about the modal question. And it seems to me, based on what I've read here, that that is indeed the route you'd like to take. Interestingly, it's actually a new kind of agnosticism -- whereas the old agnostic is neutral about whether or not God actually exists, the new agnosticism is neutral about whether or not it is possible for God to exist. Anyway, maybe this helps and I'm glad if it does.Kantian Naturalist_{October 3, 2013
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RD Miksa #66: Now, if this happened, would we be irrational in inferring design even though we would know that no other embodied beings could have caused this to occur. Of course not!

RDFish #68: But I have no comprehension of what sort of being could re-arrange the stars, and I believe that nobody else does either.
We all know at least two things about this being: - it is intelligent, since it can produce meaningful sentences - it is unembodied, since no human being can rearrange the stars. tBox_{October 3, 2013
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RDFish:
We’re miscommunicating here due to an ambiguity over “possible” vs. “conceivable”. We agree that disembodied conscious minds are conceivable – there is nothing logically contradictory about imaging such things. I said you were assuming that disembodied minds were possible, by which I meant that you seemed to be asserting that nothing in the nature of conscious minds required physical mechanism, and therefore we ought to judge their existence possible. My position is that there may well be something about conscious minds that requires the operation of complex mechanism. We do not know one way or the other at this point, but according to the current state of our knowledge and experience regarding conscious minds, it appears that complex mechanism is critically required for conscious thought.
Good grief. Unless you are able to demonstrate that disembodied minds are impossible, then they remain possible. Unless you can demonstrate that something in the nature of conscious minds requires physical mechanism, then it is possible that nothing in the nature of conscious minds requires physical mechanism. You say you are not a materialist, but you appear to fall into that particular mindset so readily that you are stumbling over the meanings of words that are quite easily understood from a non-materialist's viewpoint.Phinehas_{October 3, 2013
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Axel@ 71, yes, you are truly comical. The existence of America and the existence of ghosts on a comparable evidential footing? I like it! You do realise that ID is meant to be a scientific enterprise right?5for_{October 3, 2013
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RDFish @ 68: “when you say ‘inferring design’ you are not saying anything with specific meaning.” 5for @ 70. “And likewise @RDFish. Always edifying to hear your analyses.” Seriously? Blithering idiocy like this statement edifies you? You have a very low edification threshold.Barry Arrington_{October 3, 2013
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#70: Not. Comical actually. Utter nonsense. 'But I have no comprehension of what sort of being could re-arrange the stars,...' Are we supposed to go into mourning that you lack the most elementary faculty possessed by the vast majority of mankind. 'If “design inference” means “concluding the existence of a non-physical being with human mental attributes” then no, it would not be warranted – it would only be an hypothesis.' Absolute rubbish! You are squarely at odds with the most of the greatest thinkers in recorded history of mankind. Sure, the existence of ghosts is only anecdotally recorded, but as C S Lewis, I believe pointed out, so is the existence of America. 'No, a “thought” is an abstract concept,' Indeed, it is, but not only in the sense you mean, or indeed primarily, as it obtains in this context! If you can't distinguish between a thought as a concept and as a cognitive experience of the mind, well, words fail me. Are you totally unaware, RDFish, of the mind/body dualism, proved experimentally, with irrefragable certainty, during 'out of body' experiences of patients undergoing surgery under controlled conditions? And you are presuming to hold forth in a scientistic vein in rebuttal.Axel_{October 3, 2013
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And likewise @RDFish. Always edifying to hear your analyses.5for_{October 3, 2013
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@ RD Miksa Always a pleasure to read cogent arguments! Keep it up :)Optimus_{October 3, 2013
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Hi RD Miksa,
Now, imagine that as we are watching the night sky, the stars literally re-arrange themselves to form a long paragraph of English words that is addressed to us Earthlings. Now, if this happened, would we be irrational in inferring design even though we would know that no other embodied beings could have caused this to occur. Of course not! It would be the height of irrationality not to infer design in such a case. Thus, just because we could not infer an embodied human designer, does not mean that we could not infer a designer at all. For given such evidence, of course we would infer a designer, even if it had to be a disembodied one.”
First of all, one of my points is that when you say "inferring design" you are not saying anything with specific meaning. It would of course be meaningful to say you are inferring "a conscious, sentient being", because we all know what it means to experience sentience and conscious awareness. But I have no comprehension of what sort of being could re-arrange the stars, and I believe that nobody else does either. Given the mysteries of existence and our desire for answers, humans tend toward anthropomorphic projections as explanations, and come up with gods who are in many respects like human beings (in that they are sentient and conscious, for example) but in other respects are unlike human beings (in that they lack eyes and brains, for example). It is conceivable that such a thing exists, but we have no evidence of any such thing in our uniform and repeated experience and given what we know about mental abilities in humans (and other animals), it has a low a priori probability.
Now, forget for a moment the question of whether ID is science or not, or whether it is a good scientific theory or not, just thing of this example as a rational human being. Obviously, in such a case, a design inference is warranted, is it not?
If "design inference" means "concluding the existence of a non-physical being with human mental attributes" then no, it would not be warranted - it would only be an hypothesis. Other hypotheses would be that we are hallucinating this star re-arranging, or that our own mental activity is unconsciously causing these changes in the universe, and so on. We would have no way of knowing what might be true - at least until we investigate further.
Now this reply is not only confused, but literally contradictory. Here is why (and I will shift the order of your sentences slightly). You said: “You are assuming your conclusion.” No I am not. I am saying that an un-embodied designer is possible, not that he certainly exists. Unless you have an absolute proof for materialism and against theism/deism, then an un-embodied designer is at least possible.
We're miscommunicating here due to an ambiguity over "possible" vs. "conceivable". We agree that disembodied conscious minds are conceivable - there is nothing logically contradictory about imaging such things. I said you were assuming that disembodied minds were possible, by which I meant that you seemed to be asserting that nothing in the nature of conscious minds required physical mechanism, and therefore we ought to judge their existence possible. My position is that there may well be something about conscious minds that requires the operation of complex mechanism. We do not know one way or the other at this point, but according to the current state of our knowledge and experience regarding conscious minds, it appears that complex mechanism is critically required for conscious thought. In sum, my position is that disembodied consciousness is logically possible, but it is a priori unlikely, and further research would be required to demonstrate such a thing is actually possible, much less is the answer to the question of origin of life.
RDF: “Since we do not know the necessary and sufficient conditions for thought, we cannot assume that un-embodied thought is possible.” RDM: Which means that we must, for some reason, assume that materialism is true (which is what your argument implies)? Why assume one over the other?
No, I do not believe we should assume one over the other! Again, I am not a materialist (I actually do not believe the term is even well defined at this point, given the state of fundamental physics). Again, I believe that ontology is an open question - we do not know the answer. We ought not concern ourselves here with metaphysics that we cannot solve. Instead, my argument is about what we can agree on - our uniform and repeated experience. We both experience consciousness, and neither of us experience rocks or rivers being conscious or acting intelligently, and we both lose consciousness when we fall into a dreamless sleep, or are given propofol, and so on. These are the sorts of data that we can use to judge the a priori probability that consciousness (and learning, problem solving, etc) requires complex physical mechanism, rather than any prior commitment to a paticular metaphysic.
RDF: “Our experience is only of embodied thought, however, and everything we understand regarding the acquisition and processing of information entails physical mechanism.” RDM: But you see that you are automatically assuming the falsehood of idealism here. If idealism is true, then we don’t acquire and process information via physical mechanism, but rather via immaterial mechanisms.
Again, even under idealism, our phenomenal experience of material and immaterial aspects of reality is distinct! We cannot tell if idealism is true or false, but we can tell if our phenomenal experience of something appears to be material or not. Even if idealism is true, a rock is experienced as material and a belief is not.
But again, even your claim above is false, because people have had numerous experiences of un-embodied thought, thus negating your claim that our only experience is of embodied thought.
People themselves are embodied, and thus cannot experience un-embodied thought. Our uniform and repeated experience with thought is that it is invariably associated with embodied humans (or other animals).
Plus, as a side-note, I might ask: have no ever seen a thought in a body? Have you seen one in your brain?
No, a "thought" is an abstract concept, referring to something that does not reflect electro-magnetic radiation in the visible spectrum, so they can't be "seen".
But at the same time, even if I admit that all our experience is only of embodied thought, the fact that an un-embodied designer is possible—as you actually admit above—means that a design inference could be so powerful in and of itself to warrant seeing an un-embodied designer as the best explanation of the design inference.
Un-embodied thought is conceivable; we do not know if it is actually possible. We do not have sufficient evidence that it is actually possible, much less that it actually exists. Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 3, 2013
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Dear RDFish, I said: “Sixth, if an un-embodied designer is even possible, as it obviously is…” You replied: “You are assuming your conclusion. Since we do not know the necessary and sufficient conditions for thought, we cannot assume that un-embodied thought is possible. Our experience is only of embodied thought, however, and everything we understand regarding the acquisition and processing of information entails physical mechanism. Again, this doesn’t mean that disembodied thought is impossible; what it means is that such a thing is a priori improbable.” Now this reply is not only confused, but literally contradictory. Here is why (and I will shift the order of your sentences slightly). You said: “You are assuming your conclusion.” No I am not. I am saying that an un-embodied designer is possible, not that he certainly exists. Unless you have an absolute proof for materialism and against theism/deism, then an un-embodied designer is at least possible. You said: “Again, this doesn’t mean that disembodied thought is impossible; what it means is that such a thing is a priori improbable.” Which means that disembodied thought is at least possible, which is exactly what I said in the first place! You said: “Since we do not know the necessary and sufficient conditions for thought, we cannot assume that un-embodied thought is possible.” Which means that we must, for some reason, assume that materialism is true (which is what your argument implies)? Why assume one over the other? You said: “Our experience is only of embodied thought, however, and everything we understand regarding the acquisition and processing of information entails physical mechanism.” But you see that you are automatically assuming the falsehood of idealism here. If idealism is true, then we don’t acquire and process information via physical mechanism, but rather via immaterial mechanisms. But again, even your claim above is false, because people have had numerous experiences of un-embodied thought, thus negating your claim that our only experience is of embodied thought. Plus, as a side-note, I might ask: have no ever seen a thought in a body? Have you seen one in your brain? But at the same time, even if I admit that all our experience is only of embodied thought, the fact that an un-embodied designer is possible—as you actually admit above—means that a design inference could be so powerful in and of itself to warrant seeing an un-embodied designer as the best explanation of the design inference. So the design inference, if powerful enough, would be sufficient to warrant believing in the existence of an un-embodied designer. More to follow when I have a few minutes. Take care, RD MiksaRD Miksa_{October 3, 2013
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Dear RDFish, I will address your other points shortly (and likely not in order), but before I do, I noticed that you failed to address my other example, and thus I would like your thoughts on it before I proceed. Here it is: From Comment 61: “If so, then let me give you this example. Imagine—for the sake of argument—that we, as humans being in our present state of technology, somehow also know that we are the only embodied beings in all of existence. Now, imagine that as we are watching the night sky, the stars literally re-arrange themselves to form a long paragraph of English words that is addressed to us Earthlings. Now, if this happened, would we be irrational in inferring design even though we would know that no other embodied beings could have caused this to occur. Of course not! It would be the height of irrationality not to infer design in such a case. Thus, just because we could not infer an embodied human designer, does not mean that we could not infer a designer at all. For given such evidence, of course we would infer a designer, even if it had to be a disembodied one.” Now, forget for a moment the question of whether ID is science or not, or whether it is a good scientific theory or not, just thing of this example as a rational human being. Obviously, in such a case, a design inference is warranted, is it not? Take care, RD MiksaRD Miksa_{October 3, 2013
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Hi RD Miksa,
Actually, you are slightly incorrect here. The inference would ultimately be a two-step process. First, the archaeologist would infer that the best explanation was that an “intelligence” caused the scratches, and then, on the basis of other, separate evidence, he would secondarily conclude that the best explanation was that the intelligence was a human being.
No, archaeologists do not study "intelligence" in general. Here is what archeologists study:
Archaeology... is the study of human activity in the past, primarily through the recovery and analysis of the material culture and environmental data that they have left behind, which includes artifacts, architecture, biofacts and cultural landscapes (the archaeological record).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archaeology, my emphasis
And thus, while you are correct, for all practical purposes, that the archaeologist would make the inference in one step, you are incorrect in the logical sense, because the two inferences are separable in-principle. And it is this latter aspect that is the key for this argument.
I understand that it is possible to hypothesize the activity of a disembodied intelligent entity. My point is that such a thing does not exist in our uniform and repeated experience, and ID fails to provide any evidence that such a thing exists, or existed, or even could possibly exist.
SETI, for example, provides a non-human design inference.
No, SETI is not a theory or explanation of anything, it is a search for things that might indicate intelligent life elsewhere in the universe. Since they haven't found anything yet, nobody has inferred anything.
RDF: “In that case, we would have no theory as to what might have caused the scratches.” RDM: Are you crazy?
If I was, perhaps I wouldn't be able to tell. But that's true for all of us :-)
Of course we would have an explanation of what caused the scratches: an intelligent agent of some type.
The only thing you would know about the cause of the scratches would be that it was, somehow, capable of causing those scratches. You would not be able to characterize the cause in any scientifically meaningful way: You would not be able to say anything at all about one single other thing that this cause was capable of, and so your "explanation" would be scientifically vacuous.
Again, this is just crazy.
No, it's not.
Are you honestly and seriously saying that if I observed a sequence of the first hundred prime numbers laid out in a clear row of scratches, then I would be irrational in inferring design just because I could not attribute it to a human being or any other embodied agent? Seriously?
When you say you are "inferring design" in these contexts (the cave that no human has entered, or the cause of first life), what you are actually inferring is the existence of something that has the general abilities of a human being - in particular that they can learn, reason, solve novel problems, consciously experience beliefs and desires, and design and build complex machinery - but is not itself a complex physical entity. This is just an hypothesis, not something that can be inferred from our observations. Whatever caused first life might be utterly different from human beings in every respect, without beliefs and desires and lacking in consciousness entirely.
First, most people are either implicitly and explicitly dualists, so their uniform and repeated experience is of something immaterial (their mind) influencing the material (their body), thus giving weight to the claim that the immaterial can affect the material.
You (and the dualists you mention) are assuming your conclusion. Nobody knows the truth about mind/body ontology. We do not experience the truth of dualism, physicalism, idealism, or any variant of these or other metaphysical stances. We just make them up and debate them. The reason the debates are ancient and unresolved is because we can't appeal to our uniform and repeated experience in order to settle the matter.
If you wish to state that their uniform and repeated experience is wrong, then you would need to demonstrate the clear falsity of dualism, which is a tall order.
Nobody can demonstrate the falsity of any solution to the mind/body problem. (My personal belief is that we cannot comprehend the fundamental nature of reality, but I can't demonstate that to be true either).
Second, certain deductive arguments—such as the Kalam Cosmological Argument, for example—could give rational grounds to already believe that something immaterial can affect the material, thus making the inference to an un-embodied designer no real problem giving the already existent evidence that such a thing could occur.
I don't think Kalam is a good argument at all, but what is clear is that these sorts of philosophical arguments are not matters of observation in our uniform and repeated experience. There is a vast number of things that are in our uniform and repeated experience (or can be simply and clearly inferred therefrom), but at this time the cause of the universe is not among them.
Third—as such a book like Craig Keener’s Miracles demonstrates—the uniform and repeated experience of humanity is not of materialism, but rather of the “supernatural” affecting the natural. It is of miracles, and of having experiences of the divine, etc. Now you may dispute these claims, but you cannot claim that uniform and repeated human experience is of materialism.
I make no such claim. We do not experience the solution to questions of metaphysical ontology, and miracles are by definition not part of our uniform and repeated experience.
Fourth, evidence from Near-Death Experiences provides some empirical evidence that the immaterial can affect the material, and that the material can also affect the immaterial.
Yes, this is precisely the sort of thing that ID ought to be researching. I think NDE evidence is utterly insufficient at this point to make any sorts of truth claims, but there are definitely ways of furthering the research on this and other paranormal phenomena, and that is where ID "researchers" ought to be focussing their efforts! So far they haven't even tried.
Fifth, to become philosophical for a moment, you should note that you are actually presupposing materialism here.
No, I'm not (I am not a materialist).
I, after all, could be a Berkeley-style idealist of a certain type, and thus hold that only the immaterial exists. And therefore, positing an un-embodied non-human designer is no problem, because all designers are ultimately immaterial.
Even if idealism were true (and I'm rather sympathetic to that notion in a way, although I am a neutral monist rather than an idealist), there would still be a distinction in our phenomenal experience between an "embodied" and a "disembodied" entity.
Sixth, if an un-embodied designer is even possible, as it obviously is, ...
You are assuming your conclusion. Since we do not know the necessary and sufficient conditions for thought, we cannot assume that un-embodied thought is possible. Our experience is only of embodied thought, however, and everything we understand regarding the acquisition and processing of information entails physical mechanism. Again, this doesn't mean that disembodied thought is impossible; what it means is that such a thing is a priori improbable. Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 3, 2013
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Hi KF,
In short, you are a committed materialist.
No, I'm not. You'll need to read what I write and respond to my actual argument rather than making up easier arguments to rebut.RDFish_{October 3, 2013
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Hi Box,
Why the metaphysical claim that humans are the sole source of intelligence?
I haven't made any metaphysical claims, and what I have claimed is plainly true: In our uniform and repeated experience, all intelligent behavior emanates from complex physical entities that are chock-full of CSI - just the sorts of things that ID is trying to explain in the first place.
We are often told by astrophysicists that it is arrogant for us humans to insist that the only life is on Earth, and by doing so excluding the possibility of different life forms and intelligence elsewhere in the universe.
You are pretending that I have made the claim that non-human intelligence is impossible, but that is not what I have claimed. You'll need to read what I write and respond to my actual argument rather than making up easier arguments to rebut. Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 3, 2013
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Dear RDFish: You said: “You might wish to hypothesize that something without a physical body could somehow have the same sorts of abilities that human beings do. It contradicts everything we know from our uniform and repeated experience…” Actually, I have to seriously dispute this. First, most people are either implicitly and explicitly dualists, so their uniform and repeated experience is of something immaterial (their mind) influencing the material (their body), thus giving weight to the claim that the immaterial can affect the material. If you wish to state that their uniform and repeated experience is wrong, then you would need to demonstrate the clear falsity of dualism, which is a tall order. Second, certain deductive arguments—such as the Kalam Cosmological Argument, for example—could give rational grounds to already believe that something immaterial can affect the material, thus making the inference to an un-embodied designer no real problem giving the already existent evidence that such a thing could occur. Third—as such a book like Craig Keener’s Miracles demonstrates—the uniform and repeated experience of humanity is not of materialism, but rather of the “supernatural” affecting the natural. It is of miracles, and of having experiences of the divine, etc. Now you may dispute these claims, but you cannot claim that uniform and repeated human experience is of materialism. Fourth, evidence from Near-Death Experiences provides some empirical evidence that the immaterial can affect the material, and that the material can also affect the immaterial. Fifth, to become philosophical for a moment, you should note that you are actually presupposing materialism here. I, after all, could be a Berkeley-style idealist of a certain type, and thus hold that only the immaterial exists. And therefore, positing an un-embodied non-human designer is no problem, because all designers are ultimately immaterial. Sixth, if an un-embodied designer is even possible, as it obviously is, then the design inference could itself be so strong as to give us the grounds to infer such a designer. And I could provide numerous examples where this would be the case. So even if, for the sake of argument, it is admitted that our uniform and repeated experience supports materialism, it is nevertheless possible that a design inference, in and of itself, could be so strong that it overrides this uniform and repeated experience by the strength of its own evidentiary value. You said: “So ID, with additional information attached (if such information could be had), could lead to rationally conclude that an un-embodied intelligence was the designing agent.” But the information above already gives us grounds to do so, and thus I don’t see what the problem is. Take care, RD MiksaRD Miksa_{October 3, 2013
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Dear RDFish, You said: “Well no, “an intelligence” is not what any real archaeologist would conclude. An archaeologist would conclude that the scratches were the product of human beings; they would not broaden their conclusion to include other hypothetical entities that might produce such sequences (aliens, ghosts, demons, Bigfoot, etc), as no such entities are known to exist.” Actually, you are slightly incorrect here. The inference would ultimately be a two-step process. First, the archaeologist would infer that the best explanation was that an “intelligence” caused the scratches, and then, on the basis of other, separate evidence, he would secondarily conclude that the best explanation was that the intelligence was a human being. However, both inferences are ultimately separable. And thus, while you are correct, for all practical purposes, that the archaeologist would make the inference in one step, you are incorrect in the logical sense, because the two inferences are separable in-principle. And it is this latter aspect that is the key for this argument. You said: “This is only true if the term “design inference” means “attributing something to human craftsmanship.” Completely and utterly incorrect in general terms. SETI, for example, provides a non-human design inference. And numerous other examples could be provided as well (see below). You said: “In that case, we would have no theory as to what might have caused the scratches.” Are you crazy? Of course we would have an explanation of what caused the scratches: an intelligent agent of some type. Maybe we would be rational in remaining agnostic about the type of intelligent agent, but of course an inference to design would be rational for a sequence of the first hundred prime numbers. You said: ‘Now, would the overwhelmingly obvious design inference suddenly become irrational and unwarranted? Of course not.’ “Yes, of course it would, since you just got through saying that humans could not have accomplished it.” Again, this is just crazy. Are you honestly and seriously saying that if I observed a sequence of the first hundred prime numbers laid out in a clear row of scratches, then I would be irrational in inferring design just because I could not attribute it to a human being or any other embodied agent? Seriously? If so, then let me give you this example. Imagine—for the sake of argument—that we, as humans being in our present state of technology, somehow also know that we were the only embodied beings in all of existence. Now, imagine that as we are watching the night sky, the stars literally re-arrange themselves to form a long paragraph of English words that is addressed to us Earthlings. Now, if this happened, would we be irrational in inferring design even though we would know that no other embodied beings could have caused this to occur. Of course not! It would be the height of irrationality not to infer design in such a case. Thus, just because we could not infer an embodied human designer, does not mean that we could not infer a designer at all. For given such evidence, of course we would infer a designer, even if it had to be a disembodied one. More to follow…RD Miksa_{October 3, 2013
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RDF, re 55: In short, you are a committed materialist. In that case your problems are deeper, starting with grounding our own minds as able to know accurately, to warrant and to reason. And more than that, just read on. KFkairosfocus_{October 3, 2013
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RDFish #58
This is only true if the term “design inference” means “attributing something to human craftsmanship”.
Why the metaphysical claim that humans are the sole source of intelligence? We are often told by astrophysicists that it is arrogant for us humans to insist that the only life is on Earth, and by doing so excluding the possibility of different life forms and intelligence elsewhere in the universe.Box_{October 3, 2013
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Hi RD Miksa,
Clearly, such an archaeologist would immediately conclude (and so would anyone else) that the best explanation (if not the ONLY reasonable explanation) for that sequence of prime number scratches was that an intelligence designed those scratches
Well no, "an intelligence" is not what any real archaeologist would conclude. An archaeologist would conclude that the scratches were the product of human beings; they would not broaden their conclusion to include other hypothetical entities that might produce such sequences (aliens, ghosts, demons, Bigfoot, etc), as no such entities are known to exist.
This design inference would be immediate and overwhelming, and rightfully so.
This is only true if the term "design inference" means "attributing something to human craftsmanship".
But then consider this. Consider–for the sake of argument–that it was somehow known, beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that humans beings were the only embodied beings in all of existence but also that no human being had ever entered the cave with the prime number scratches.
In that case, we would have no theory as to what might have caused the scratches.
Now, would the overwhelmingly obvious design inference suddenly become irrational and unwarranted? Of course not.
Yes, of course it would, since you just got through saying that humans could not have accomplished it.
Instead, the design inference would still be rational, but then, with the additional information at hand, it would thus also be rational to posit an un-embodied intelligence as the cause of the prime number scratches.
You might wish to hypothesize that something without a physical body could somehow have the same sorts of abilities that human beings do. It contradicts everything we know from our uniform and repeated experience, however, so the a priori probability that your hypothesis is true would be very low. You would thus be obliged to provide empirical evidence to demonstrate that such a thing was in fact the cause of biological complexity; at the very least you would need to demonstrate that such a thing is possible. That is why ID should be focused on paranormal research. Why isn't ID involved in paranormal research, trying to demonstrate that intelligent behavior can occur independently of living biological systems?
So ID, with additional information attached (if such information could be had), could lead to rationally conclude that an un-embodied intelligence was the designing agent.
You can hypothesize such a thing, but there is no evidence to support such a conclusion. Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 3, 2013
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Dear RDFish: I think you are mistaken. Consider the following example: Suppose an archeologist enters a cave. Suddenly, the archeologist finds two scratches together on the wall of the cave. OK, nothing surprising at that. But then suppose that the archeologist sees a space by the two scratches, and then sees three scratches together. And then a space, and five scratches together. And then another space, and seven scratches together. And then another space, and eleven scratches together. And then another space, and thirteen scratches together. And then another space, and seventeen scratches together. And so on and so forth for all the first one hundred prime numbers. Clearly, such an archeologist would immediately conclude (and so would anyone else) that the best explanation (if not the ONLY reasonable explanation) for that sequence of prime number scratches was that an intelligence designed those scratches rather than them being the product of natural forces (they possess massive amounts of CSI, after all). This design inference would be immediate and overwhelming, and rightfully so. But then consider this. Consider--for the sake of argument--that it was somehow known, beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that humans beings were the only embodied beings in all of existence but also that no human being had ever entered the cave with the prime number scratches. Now, would the overwhelmingly obvious design inference suddenly become irrational and unwarranted? Of course not. Instead, the design inference would still be rational, but then, with the additional information at hand, it would thus also be rational to posit an un-embodied intelligence as the cause of the prime number scratches. So ID, with additional information attached (if such information could be had), could lead to rationally conclude that an un-embodied intelligence was the designing agent. Take care, RD MiksaRD Miksa_{October 2, 2013
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Dear Kantian Naturalist: You said: “My position, rather, is that at present, design theorists have not done the hard work of implementing the deductive and inductive stages of inquiry that would lend empirical warrant to the hypothesis. And that means that design theory does not yet deserve serious consideration as an alternative to other explanations of biological phenomena.” Consider, then, the following: Let’s start with the abductive leap that you accept: “The abductive leap would be: ‘It is surprising that there is complex, specified information in living things, but if living things were brought about by an intelligent agent, then the presence of complex, specified information in living things would be a matter of course.’ and that’s perfectly right, as far it goes.” Now you say: “But it does not go very far, because design theory stops there. It does not go on the next stage of inquiry, which would be test the abductive leap. To do that, one would have to deduce observable consequences from the hypothesis that would not follow from the converse, and then conduct the lab or field work to see if the observables are actually, in fact, observed.” But this is just incorrect. Why? Because if we admit the abductive “leap” that complex specified information is best explained as the product of ID, and that there is CSI in living things, then the deductive and inductive aspects follow naturally. First, we can deduce that the designing intelligence would have had to be intelligent as well as possess a knowledge of biology that rivaled if not surpassed our own. Next, the intelligent agent would have to have had synthetic engineering skills. Furthermore, depending on the time when the organism in question first existed, we could deduce the rough time-frame when the design of the organism occurred. And a number of other deductions could be made. Second, we could form general inductive “laws” based on ID that would be both predictive and could be easily tested empirically and confirmed via observation. For example, we could establish a “law” that “no CSI rich biological organism could come about via unintelligent means.” This would also be a prediction. Next, another prediction: an intelligence, such as us, could create biological organisms with CSI in them. And another prediction: if ID occurred, then it is likely that the foundation of life was designed rather than coming about by natural means. (And of course, many more predictions could be made). Third, a research program could be completed to search as many biological organisms as possible in order to determine which ones exhibited CSI. Then, once this list was completed, the predictions could be tested and observations made. If ID came out successful, then this would explain the data better. So, again, all the criteria of a good scientific theory can be met by ID. Note, furthermore, that ID might be false—meaning that perhaps the abductive leap that there is CSI in living things is incorrect—and yet ID could still be a scientific theory that meets all the criteria required of science. Thus, ID does not need to better explain or account for the data before it can be considered scientific, because even if ID is false—for the sake of argument—it could still have shown itself capable of doing all the things a good scientific theory does. A clear differentiation needs to be made between a theory that is scientific in terms of its ability to meet all the requirements necessary to be considered a science, and a scientific theory that is currently the one that best explains the data. Newton’s theory, for example, is clearly a scientific theory, and yet it is not the best one anymore. Just because it is no longer accepted does not suddenly mean that it is no longer scientific. RD MiksaRD Miksa_{October 2, 2013
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KF,
RDF: Millions, would disagree with you that our uniform, repeated experience of intelligence is embodied.
In that case, they would all be mistaken. Our uniform and repeated experience confirms that CSI never occurs absent intelligence, but it confirms as well that intelligence never occurs absent CSI. ID fails to deal with this, so ID fails. Again, we're free to hypothesize that intelligence could operate without the benefit of physical sense organs and information processing mechanisms, but such things (for example, ghosts or demons) are outside of our uniform and repeated experience. It is therefore a mistake to imagine that this hypothesis constitutes a scientific result. The research that ID ought to be conducting has nothing to do with trying to prove over and over again that NDE doesn't account for speciation. Rather, ID ought to be conducting research into the paranormal, to demonstrate that intelligence can operate outside of the body.RDFish_{October 2, 2013
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Dear Kantian Naturalist: You said: “As for the forensic science example in 31, I don’t really see the point of the example.” Well, one of the points was to show that a science of design detection, which is what Forensic Science is, can easily and readily meet all the criteria that you laid out for something to be a rigorous scientific theory. And given that one type of design detection science could do so means that there is no in-principle reason that ID could not. You said: “That’s all well and good, and I don’t think the basic pattern of reasoning is all that different between forensics and physics. It’s the techniques that differ. The question is, what does this tell us about ID? And the answer is, nothing at all. For what we get at the end of the example is just this:” Perhaps the part that you missed was that since it would be in-principle possible to find the exact same type of pattern of “words” from my analogy on or in a biological organism or biological feature of some type, and then since the exact same type of reasoning used in the forensic science example could be used in such a case of ID (meaning abduction, deduction, and induction), then ID, in-principle, meets all the criteria of a good scientific theory. Now you may claim that nothing like that has been discovered in a biological organism yet, but that fact does not negate the truth that ID, in-principle, meets all the criteria necessary to be a good scientific theory. You said: “If I was understood to have claimed that intelligent design could not be a scientific theory, good or otherwise, I must clarify (or perhaps I misspoke). That is not my position — not at all!” OK, fair enough. But I still think that you are incorrect, as I will demonstrate shortly. More to follow…RD Miksa_{October 2, 2013
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Dear Kantian Naturalist: You said: “I would worry about the demarcation problem if I thought that a distinction had to completely unambiguous in order to work as distinction in the first place. A few fuzzy cases here and there don’t trouble my sleep.” Not that it is critical to the discussion, but you do realize that your claim here just pushes the problem back one step and then rotates it right back into the Demarcation Problem. After all, who decides which ones are the fuzzy cases or not? You? Me? If I claim that ID is rock-solid science and you do not, then how do we objectively decide who is correct? Well, by having an objective Demarcation Criteria, and thus, we are right back at that particular problem. So, ultimately, the Demarcation Problem is an inescapable problem when discussing whether an idea, such as ID, is scientific or not. You said: “But I do think that Peirce was pretty much right that a scientific theory contains all three forms of reasoning, because empirical inquiry generally is reliable when different kinds of reasoning hold each in check, and that the checks-and-balances is intersubjective or communal.” So you do have essentially clear Demarcation criteria for what you think is needed for a scientific theory (ie – “…all three forms of reasoning…”). You said: “But I don’t think of the presence of abduction, deduction, and induction as the criteria of a scientific theory, let alone a good one…” Which seems, at least to me, to contradict what you said above. You said: “…— a good scientific theory is one that pays its own way, generates better explanations of the data, predicts new data, opens up new avenues for investigation, and so on. The combination of abduction, deduction, and induction has been, historically speaking, an effective way of arriving at those epistemic desiderata.” But this is, in essence, just another way of saying: a scientific theory needs abduction, deduction, and induction because that combination gives a scientific theory the means to better explain data, predict new data, open new avenues for investigation, etc. And thus I repeat: you definitely seem to have clear Demarcation criteria that you subscribe to. More to follow…RD Miksa_{October 2, 2013
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Dear Box, You said: "Allow me to use the analogy by RD Miksa; the corpse in the kitchen (post #31). Let’s assume that a forensic scientist is able to prove that the wounds could have been caused naturally. Does that prove that an accident occurred? There is a tendency to be lenient towards evolution theory: it only has to be possible in principle in order to be declared “true”." Very good point. In such a case, the only thing that could give the Forensic Scientist the grounds to prefer the naturalistic explanation to the design explanation is an application of Occam's Razor. And even in such a case, Occam's Razor is just a principle, not a "law" of rationality, and thus, it is arguable that as far as you could rationally go is agnosticism about the ultimate explanation of the evidence, rather than preferring one explanation over the other. And the same, arguably, would hold true in the ID versus Blind Watchmaker Neo-Darwinism debate. Take care, RD MiksaRD Miksa_{October 2, 2013
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FYI....will be answering KN in detail shortly. RD MiksaRD Miksa_{October 2, 2013
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Good point, Box. If we could demonstrate the origin of life in a laboratory environment, it still wouldn't prove that it was actually what had happened. It would make that scenario much more likely, however . . . until someone else was able to demonstrate the same OOL under different conditions.Querius_{October 2, 2013
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BA #34: Let me put it this way: I will abandon ID and become a card carrying NDE advocate the very day someone demonstrates natural forces creating new complex specified information.
This is an interesting statement. Allow me to use the analogy by RD Miksa; the corpse in the kitchen (post #31). Let’s assume that a forensic scientist is able to prove that the wounds could have been caused naturally. Does that prove that an accident occurred? There is a tendency to be lenient towards evolution theory: it only has to be possible in principle in order to be declared “true”.Box_{October 2, 2013
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CLAVDIVS,
You are arguing the material conditions are the same in all relevant respects.
Yes.
Obviously, therefore, there is disagreement about what are the *relevant* similarities and differences between computers and DNA.
I am prepared to defend my position. What is materially relevant is that both systems (as a matter of physical necessity) include an arrangement of matter to evoke a functional effect within the system where the arrangement is physicochemically arbitrary to the effect it evokes, as well as a second arrangement of matter to establish the otherwise non-existent relationship between the first arrangement and its effect. The first arrangement inputs form into the effects produced by the system, and the second establishes what those effects will be. I believe it’s also relevant that this physical architecture (the instantiation of a local relationship within a system) is found nowhere else in the physical world except during the translation of recorded information.Upright BiPed_{October 2, 2013
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ID is a conclusion based on deductive reasoning. P1: bio-systems and processes have significance(intra-relation) in one another (sperm-egg, RNA splicing-protein production, G1-S-G2 phases in cell cycle, ...) P2: bio-systems are arrangement of matter. P3: natural processes can't ipso facto create significance of one arrangement of matter in another arrangement of matter. Evolution by definition creates effects related to environment(extra-relation) not the effects related to cell systems(intra-relation). Likewise, processes of inanimate nature heads toward a state of minimum total potential energy(equilibrium) and not toward a state necessary for cell-systems to function. P4: ID creates significance of one arrangement of matter in another arrangement of matter(key-lock, screw-nut, ...). C: Therefore, bio-systems are created by ID.dziskov_{October 2, 2013
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