The Circularity of the Design Inference

_{Winston Ewert

November 14, 2014

Intelligent Design}

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Keith S is right. Sort of.

As highlighted in a recent post by vjtorley, Keith S has argued that Dembski’s Design Inference is a circular argument. As Keith describes the argument:

In other words, we conclude that something didn’t evolve only if we already know that it didn’t evolve. CSI is just window dressing for this rather uninteresting fact.

In its most basic form, a specified complexity argument takes a form something like:

Premise 1) The evolution of the bacterial flagellum is astronomically improbable.
Premise 2) The bacterial flagellum is highly specified.
Conclusion) The bacterial flagellum did not evolve.

Keith’s point is that in order to show that the bacterial flagellum did not evolve, we have to first show that the evolution of the bacterial flagellum is astronomically improbable, which is almost the same thing. Specified complexity moves the argument from arguing that evolution is improbable to arguing that evolution didn’t happen. The difficult part is showing that evolution is improbable. Once we’ve established that evolution is vastly improbable, it seems a very minor obvious point that it would therefore not have occurred.

In some cases, people have understood Dembski’s argument incorrectly, propounding or attack some variation on:

The evolution of the bacterial flagellum is highly improbable.
Therefore the bacterial flagellum exhibits high CSI
Therefore the evolution of the bacterial flagellum is highly improbable
Therefore the bacterial flagellum did not evolve.

This is indeed a very silly argument and people need to stop arguing about it. CSI and Specified complexity do not help in any way to establish that the evolution of the bacterial flagellum is improbable. Rather, the only way to establish that the bacterial flagellum exhibits CSI is to first show that it was improbable. Any attempt to use CSI to establish the improbability of evolution is deeply fallacious.

If specified complexity doesn’t help establish the improbability of evolution what good is it? What’s the point of the specified complexity argument? Consider the following argument:

Each snowflake pattern is astronomically improbable.
Therefore it doesn’t snow.

Obviously, it does snow, and the argument must be fallacious. The fact that an event or object is improbable is insufficient to establish that it formed by natural means. That’s why Dembski developed the notion of specified complexity, arguing that in order to reject chance events they must both be complex and specified. Hence, its not the same thing to say that the evolution of the bacterial flagellum is improbable and that it didn’t happen. If the bacterial flagellum were not specified, it would be perfectly possible to evolve it even thought it is vastly improbable.

The notion of specified complexity exists for one purpose: to give force to probability arguments. If we look at Behe’s irreducible complexity, Axe’s work on proteins, or practically any work by any intelligent design proponent, the work seeks to demonstrate that the Darwinian account of evolution is vastly improbable. Dembski’s work on specified complexity and design inference works to show why that improbability gives us reason to reject Darwinian evolution and accept design.

So Keith is right, arguing for the improbability of evolution on the basis of specified complexity is circular. However, specified complexity, as developed by Dembski, isn’t designed for the purpose of demonstrating the improbability of evolution. When used for its proper role, specified complexity is a valid, though limited argument.

Comments

I characterize the argument of specified complexity as starting as assuming that evolution is highly improbable.
No. CSI isn't an argument; it's a measurement. CSI doesn't assume evolution is highly improbable; it makes no assumption about evolution whatsoever. CSI is posited as a measurement of an objective value. The value of CSI found in an artifact can, in theory, be determined to either be within the range of known natural forces to plausibly generate, or outside of that range.
Specified complexity assumes that we already know that life is highly improbable.
No, it doesn't. The CSI measurement doesn't assume that life is highly improbable. The CSI argument determines that life as a result of natural forces is highly improbable.William J Murray_{November 15, 2014
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I really must stop asking Kairosfocus to explain things on a level that relates to people with a modest capacity of understanding such as myself. Let post #13 be the last request of many.Box_{November 15, 2014
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PS: Specified complexity is first an observable phenomenon (as noticed by Orgel and Wicken etc) that becomes puzzling as it seems intuitively unlikely to result from blind watchmaker type mechanisms. On comparing alternative explanations, we see that BW mechanisms face a sparse needle in haystack search that easily swamps solar system or observable cosmos resources. Intelligently directed configuration faces no such limiting challenge ans knowledgeable designers routinely generate things with FSCO/I. Invention may be a challenge but that is a different issue. FSCO/I is then a reasonable and reliable sign of design as cause per trillions of cases in point.kairosfocus_{November 15, 2014
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Winston said, Premise 1) The evolution of the bacterial flagellum is astronomically improbable. Premise 2) The bacterial flagellum is highly specified. Conclusion) The bacterial flagellum did not evolve. I say, I would phrase the argument like this Premise 1) the bacterial flagellum is specified and highly complex. Premise 2) Algorithms(can not/have not been demonstrated to) produce highly specified complex things Conclusion)The bacterial flagellum did not arise through an algorithmic process like evolution. peacefifthmonarchyman_{November 15, 2014
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WE: Pardon, a note. The point on multipart interaction to achieve a specific function is not necessarily an appeal to irreducible complexity. That is possible in some cases where there is a core set of parts that are all so necessary to function that loss of any one destroys performance. But in other contexts with redundancies that is not so. A good example is an error correcting code lets use 3m triple repetition for concreteness and simplicity: Message as sent = [M1m2m3 . . . mn] x 3. By a voting algorithm, received bit values are ascertained. By the algorithm an error in any one bit say mi on any one of its three appearances cannot corrupt the overall message, but an error in two of the appearances can if it changes the vote. Just as a simple example. KFkairosfocus_{November 15, 2014
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With the circularity issue out of the way, I’d like to draw attention to the other flaws of Dembski’s CSI.
Before I'd even consider discussing these other alleged flaws, I need you to explicitly acknowledge that the alleged circularity isn't a flaw in specified complexity, but only in some people's mistaken interpretation of it. Dembski's original argument isn't circular.
Ewert characterizes the ID position as having assumed the very thing it is attempting to demonstrate. Of course his characterization is circular.
No, I don't. I characterize the argument of specified complexity as starting as assuming that evolution is highly improbable. Specified complexity assumes that we already know that life is highly improbable. Intelligent design as a whole combines specified complexity with other arguments to show that evolution did not happen. I was discussing only the issue of specified complexity, not the whole of the intelligent design argument.
1) First, the premise is that the bacterial flagellum is highly specified, and also contingent upon having many parts working together in concert to be of any use whatsoever. 2) We only know of things being specific, and requiring many units working together in concert, arising from intelligent sources. 3) Since evolution does not utilize intelligence, or methods which intentionally construct things which work in integrated concert, the bacterial flagellum is highly unlikely to be constructed by evolution.
That's a fine argument. But its a combination of irreducible complexity and specified complexity to produce a whole argument for intelligent design. That's exactly how its supposed to work. Specified complexity is supposed to be combined with other arguments to form a complete argument for ID. The problem is that people like Keith attempt to critique specified complexity as though it were a complete argument by itself.Winston Ewert_{November 15, 2014
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Winston:
In its most basic form, a specified complexity argument takes a form something like: Premise 1) The evolution of the bacterial flagellum is astronomically improbable. Premise 2) The bacterial flagellum is highly specified. Conclusion) The bacterial flagellum did not evolve.
More like: Premise 1) No one knows the step-by-step process that constructed the bac flag Premise 2) No one can even model such a thing Premise 3) Therefor we need to use probabilities to flesh out how the bac flag came to be Premise 4) Bac flags are both specified and complex Premise 5) Given the above the unguided evolution of bac flags is highly improbable Premise 6) Bac flags fit the criteria of intelligent design Premise 7) To refute the design inference for bac flags all one has to do is demonstrate that unguided evolution can produce one. That the inference can be refuted is evidence against circularity.Joe_{November 15, 2014
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WJM, Good points. I happen to find the argument that evolutionists always pull out, of snowflakes showing complexity, as using a giant trickery that is not pertinent to the argument at all. Snowflakes don't show complexity. They show repeated patterns, that is not even close to complexity. The fact that snowflakes just so happen to look like something someone would draw that is complex and artistic, does not mean it is complex in the sense of complex functionality. It just looks cool. I don't think any IDst are arguing that something that looks cool must be designed, so that is the basis for the argument. The design people see is not about looking cool, its about something performing or relating to functionality. It has nothing to do with snowflakes or ripples on water, or doggie shaped clouds-so I don't think that argument even needs refuting.phoodoo_{November 15, 2014
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Oops, sorry, wasn't paying attentionJoe_{November 15, 2014
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Joe, language tone please. KFkairosfocus_{November 15, 2014
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PS: Also, 17 just above. I adjust Ph: 1) First, the premise is that the bacterial flagellum is highly specified, and also contingent upon having many correctly arranged parts working together in concert to be of any use whatsoever. (This is a case of CSI, specifically FSCO/I.) 2) We only know by observation of things being specific, and requiring many units working together in concert, arising from intelligently directed configuration. (This is vera causa.) 3) On analysis of sparse blind search of large configuration spaces and the implications of FSCO/I that we have islands of function that will be deeply isolated, blind watchmaker thesis searches by dust or random walk with drift or both etc are maximally likely to fail to hit on islands of function. (The needle in haystack, blind sparse search challenge.) 4) Since blind watchmaker thesis evolution does not utilize intelligence, or methods which intentionally construct things which work in integrated concert, the bacterial flagellum is highly unlikely to be constructed by blind watchmaker thesis evolution. (Negative conclusion regarding a candidate.) 5) By contrast, the relevant FSCO/I is known to be something produced by design, and it is reasonable to explain this feature as due to intelligently directed configuration. But this is central to the flagellum, so it is credibly in material part the result of design. (Positive inference.) 6) Where, we note that Irreducible Complexity is a subset of FSCO/I cf. 12 above.kairosfocus_{November 15, 2014
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Box, cf 11 above, it is inductive. KFkairosfocus_{November 15, 2014
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Winston, If you want to put the argument in simple terms, I don't think you have done the correct job of that at all: Its not: Premise 1) The evolution of the bacterial flagellum is astronomically improbable. Premise 2) The bacterial flagellum is highly specified. Conclusion) The bacterial flagellum did not evolve. 1) First, the premise is that the bacterial flagellum is highly specified, and also contingent upon having many parts working together in concert to be of any use whatsoever. 2) We only know of things being specific, and requiring many units working together in concert, arising from intelligent sources. 3) Since evolution does not utilize intelligence, or methods which intentionally construct things which work in integrated concert, the bacterial flagellum is highly unlikely to be constructed by evolution. Not circular in any way shape or fashion. Finally, don't expect Keith to have a good handle on when an argument is circular and when it is not, this is not his forte.phoodoo_{November 15, 2014
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BTW ID uses probabilities because there isn't any evidence for unguided evolution producing CSI so all we have left are probabilities. And it is the evolutionists who have to provide them yet they try to blame us for not providing them. Talk about cowardice.Joe_{November 15, 2014
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It’s ironic that ID proponents are always demanding mutation-by-mutation accounts of how this or that biological feature evolved,
Lol! We ask for such a thing because your position says it has such a thing.
because that is the level of detail they must provide in order to justify the values they assign to P(T|H).
Wrong! That is the level of detail YOU need to provide as YOURS is the position that says it has a step-by-step process capable of producing the diversity of life as well as the diversity of the systems and subsystems. Our opponents are so clueless and apparently proud of it.Joe_{November 15, 2014
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markf:
If you want to define to CSI to include IR then that changes the argument. However, that is not how Dembski defines it.
Yes, he does- read "No Free Lunch"- hDEmbski states that IC is a special case of specified complexity (page 289)- and he provides a formula for IC - P(dco) = P(orig)xP(local)xP(config), where dco is a discrete combinatorial object, orig is the origin of the parts, local is getting them in the proper spot and config is getting the proper configuration.
You cannot observe CSI without observing or deducing that any known natural process would be so unlikely to meet the specification that it is effectively impossible that it did so.
That is incorrect. We can observe CSI without knowing its origins. The point of CSI is that no one has ever observed non-telic processes producing it and every time we have observed CSI and knew the cause it has always been via some intelligent agency.Joe_{November 15, 2014
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Kairosfocus, Can you provide the premisses and conclusion of the specified complexity argument? IOW can you improve on Winston Ewert's version:
In its most basic form, a specified complexity argument takes a form something like: Premise 1) The evolution of the bacterial flagellum is astronomically improbable. Premise 2) The bacterial flagellum is highly specified. Conclusion) The bacterial flagellum did not evolve.
Can you point out where Winston goes wrong?Box_{November 15, 2014
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MF: Pardon a point of clarification. The just above helps you see how IC entities are linked to FSCO/I, as in that case the interactive organised complex functionality includes a core of parts that are each necessary for the core functionality. IC is thus a subset of FSCO/I, which is the relevant form of CSI. By contrast dFSCI is another sub set of FSCO/I, but in many cases due to redundancies [error correcting codes come to mind], there will be no set of core parts in a data string such that if any one of such is removed function ceases. CSI is a superset that abstracts specification away from being strictly functional. KFkairosfocus_{November 15, 2014
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WJM, well said. 1: FSCO/I -- the operationally relevant thing -- is observable as a phenomenon in and of itself. It depends on multiple, correctly arranged and coupled, interacting components to achieve said functionality. 2: That tight coupling and organisation with interaction sharply constrains the clusters of possible configs consistent with the functionality. Where, 3: There are a great many more clumped configs in the possibilities space that are non functional. (An assembled Abu 6500 C3 reel will work, you can shake up a bag of parts as long as you like, generating all sorts of clumped configs, which predictably will not.) 4: The number of ways to scatter the parts is even hugely more, and again, non functional. 5: The wiring diagram for the reel is highly informational, and the difference between scattered or clumped at random in a bag and properly assembled is manifest. That is, qualitatively observable. 6: The wiring diagram can be specified in a string of structured y/n q's defining the functional cluster of states (there are tolerances, it is not a single point.) That allows us to quantify the info in bits, functionally specific info. 7: Now, let us define a world as a 1 m^3 cubic vat in which parts are floating around based on some version of Brownian motion, with maybe drifts, governed by let's just use Newtonian dynamics. Blind chance and mechanical necessity. 8: It is maximally unlikely that under these circumstances a successful 6500 C3 will be assembled. 9: By contrast, feed in some programmed assembly robots, that find and clump parts then arrange in a complete reel per the diagram . . . quite feasible. And such would with high likelihood, succeed. 10: So, we see that blind chance and mechanical necessity will predictably not find the island of function (it is highly improbable on such a mechanism) but is quite readily achieved on intelligently directed configuration. 11: Now, observe sitting there on your desk, a 6500 c3 reel. It is not known how it came to be, to you. But it exhibits FSCO/I . . . just the gear train alone is decisive on that, never mind the carbontex slipping clutch drag and other features such as the spool on bearings etc. 12: On your knowledge of config spaces, islands of function and the different capabilities of the relevant mechanisms, you would be fully entitled to hold FSCO/I is a reliable sign of design, and to -- having done a back of envelope calc on the possibility space of configs and the search limitations of the sol system (sparse, needle in haystack search) -- hold that it is maximally implausible that a blind dynamic-stochastic mechanism as described or similar could reasonably account for the reel. 13: Thus, the reasoning that infers design on FSCO/I is not circular, but is empirically and analytically grounded. 14: It extends to the micro world also. For, say the protein synthesis mechanism in the ribosome and associated things, is a case of an assembly work cell with tape based numerical control. There is no good reason to infer that such a system with so much of FSCO/I came about by blind chance and mechanical necessity on the gamut of the observable cosmos. But, assembly according to a plan, makes sense. 15: Some will object by inserting self replication and an imagined deep past. That simply inadvertently highlights that OOL is pivotal, as the ribosome system is key to the cell and proteins. 16: Where, the origin of the additional capacity of self replication becomes important, and brings to bear Paley's thought exercise of the time keeping self replicating watch in Ch II of his 1804 Nat Theol. (Which, for coming on 160 years, seems to have been shunted to one side in haste to dismiss his watch vs stone in the field argument. And BTW, Abu started as a watch making then taxi meter manufacturing company, then turned to the SIMPLER machine, fishing reels, when WW II cut off markets. A desperation move that launched a legend.) 17: So, FSCO/I remains a pivotal issue, once we start from the root of the TOL. And, it allows us to see how it is that design is a better explanation for specified, functional complexity than blind chance and mechanical necessity. (Never mind side tracks on nested hierarchies and the like.) KFkairosfocus_{November 15, 2014
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SB
Irreducible complexity if a form of CSI.
If you want to define to CSI to include IR then that changes the argument. However, that is not how Dembski defines it. In fact I am not aware of anywhere that it is defined that way. Remember CSI is usually presented as something you calculate. I have never known anyone calculate IR or even show how to do it.
Also, CSI is not restricted to living things. A sand castle contains CSI.
True. That is why I talked about observing CSI in living things. In non-living things then it has to be phrased more generally. You cannot observe CSI without observing or deducing that any known natural process would be so unlikely to meet the specification that it is effectively impossible that it did so. Therefore, you cannot use the presence of CSI to deduce that something was not the result of any known natural process.markf_{November 15, 2014
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Ewert said:
In its most basic form, a specified complexity argument takes a form something like: Premise 1) The evolution of the bacterial flagellum is astronomically improbable. Premise 2) The bacterial flagellum is highly specified. Conclusion) The bacterial flagellum did not evolve.
Ewert characterizes the ID position as having assumed the very thing it is attempting to demonstrate. Of course his characterization is circular. Premise 1 is incorrect. ID doesn't premise that the evolution of the bacterial flagellum is astronomically improbable. Premise 2 is incorrect. ID doesn't hold as a premise that the bacterial flagellum is highly specified. We do not "begin" with the improbability of the evolution of something. What we begin with is the prima facie appearance design/artificiality. Just because something has the appearance of design/artificiality doesn't mean it has been demonstrated (1)beyond the plausible reach of natural forces and (2)that design is a good alternative explanation. On first blush, snowflakes and rainbows appear to be designed. The paths of the planets around the sun appear to have been designed. This appearance of design (meaning, something that looks lie it was was deigned) is cause for further investigation, not assuming that the thing in question is beyond the reach of natural forces. As with the cases of snowflakes, rainbows and solar systems, we look for natural causes - some combination of the causal categories natural law and chance - to account for the effect/phenomena in question. In the course of this investigation, we find that many biological artifacts hold very high levels of CSI in the form of highly precise, organized, functional 3D mechanisms and a corresponding systems operation code. We research how much CSI can be attributed to any known natural forces combined with generous statistical leeway and find that the CSI found in living organisms cannot be accounted for. Looking around, we find that the only known source of CSI beyond the range of nature to produce is design. Ewert begins his argument at the conclusion by inserting as premise the very thing ID attempts to demonstrate - that natural forces are an implausible explanation, and that design is a plausible explanation.William J Murray_{November 15, 2014
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CSI may not be synonymous with evolution being improbable but you cannot observe CSI in a living thing without first observing or deducing that evolution is improbable.
I don't think so. Irreducible complexity if a form of CSI. Also, CSI is not restricted to living things. A sand castle contains CSI.StephenB_{November 15, 2014
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CSI is related to, but not synonymous with the process of rendering evolution improbable. It isn’t simply a negative argument against evolution. It is a positive affirmation based on our observational experience of how designers operate and make choices among several possibilities.
CSI may not be synonymous with evolution being improbable but you cannot observe CSI in a living thing without first observing or deducing that evolution is improbable. Dembski is quite clear about this. As many people have pointed out, you can even point to the term in the mathematical definition that corresponds to "evolution is improbable". Therefore it is circular to use the presence of CSI to deduce that evolution is improbable in a living thing.markf_{November 15, 2014
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Sorry Winston, but I don’t think your analysis is quite on the mark. CSI is related to, but not synonymous with the process of rendering evolution improbable. It isn’t simply a negative argument against evolution. It is a positive affirmation based on our observational experience of how designers operate and make choices among several possibilities. Yes, it is related to the chance hypothesis, but it is not exactly the same thing. CSI is a confirmation, not a copy. Dembski’s argument is circular only if CSI is mere window dressing. It isn’t. Otherwise, he would not given it equal billing. As he puts it," To safely conclude that an object is designed, we need to establish that it exhibits specificity, and that it has an astronomically low probability of having been produced by unintelligent natural causes. Also, KeithS, as I understand him, is not, as you suggest, simply saying that it is circular to argue for the improbability of evolution on the basis of specified complexity. He is attributing this argument to Dembski. Frankly, I think you need to go back to the drawing board and rework you post.StephenB_{November 15, 2014
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Winston - you explained that very well. I wonder if VJ would like to comment?markf_{November 15, 2014
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The improbability argument seems weak on the surface but if one looks deep enough, one can see that it quickly turns into a rock solid, impossibility argument. I am surprised that nobody in the ID camp ever seems to notice this. IMO, Darwinian evolution is problematic, not because it is improbable but because it is logically impossible before it even starts. Why? It is because genes cannot survive, let alone evolve, unless there is a gene repair mechanism in place that repairs mutations. As any programmer knows, almost all changes in a program are deleterious. A viable repair mechanism cannot exist because it would need to know in advance which mutations to fix and which ones to allow. Darwinian evolution eats its own tail.Mapou_{November 14, 2014
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And some more: keiths on June 16, 2013 at 7:37 pm said:
Well, essentially, this is what Dembski is getting at with his concept of “Specification”.
“Specification” is Dembski’s attempt at dealing with the fact that vastly improbable things happen all the time. Problem is, specifications are usually too specific. For example, Dembski knows that he would be committing the lottery winner fallacy if he claimed that the bacterial flagellum, exactly as it appears today, was evolution’s “target”. Instead, he broadens the specification to include any “bidirectional rotary motor-driven propeller.” But this is still far too specific. Even “propulsion system” is too specific, because evolution didn’t set out to produce a propulsion system. Evolution’s only “target” is differential reproductive advantage, and even then the word “target” is too strong.
keiths on June 17, 2013 at 12:57 am said:
In short, Dembski is hosed. 1) His concept of specification is too narrow, but even if it weren’t, 2) P(T|H) can’t be computed for realistic biological cases, but even if it could, 3) you have to answer the relevant question — “Could this have evolved?” — without the use of CSI, when you calculate P(T|H), 4) so the concept of CSI adds nothing, and if you invoke it the entire argument becomes circular: X couldn’t have evolved, so it must have CSI; X has CSI, therefore it couldn’t have evolved. Dembski’s “solution” to these problems: A. Retreat. Renounce the explanatory filter but affirm the value of CSI, as if these were separable concepts. B. Give up arguing that evolution cannot produce adaptive complexity, without actually admitting that it can. C. Argue instead that any adaptive complexity produced by evolution was already implicit in the environment, and that a Designer must have placed it there. Not much of an improvement, but at least he’s fighting a different set of battles.
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With the circularity issue out of the way, I'd like to draw attention to the other flaws of Dembski's CSI. Here are some relevant comments from TSZ: keiths on June 14, 2013 at 12:59 am said:
Lizzie,
However, let’s suppose that he does manage to compute the probability distribution under some fairly comprehensive null that includes “Darwinian and other material mechanisms”.
It’s ironic that ID proponents are always demanding mutation-by-mutation accounts of how this or that biological feature evolved, because that is the level of detail they must provide in order to justify the values they assign to P(T|H). It’s even worse for them, in fact, because P(T|H) must encompass all possible evolutionary pathways to a given endpoint. P.S. Winston’s last name is “Ewert”, with two E’s.
keiths on June 14, 2013 at 8:56 am said:
Dembski is notorious for scoffing that
ID is not a mechanistic theory, and it’s not ID’s task to match your pathetic level of detail in telling mechanistic stories.
His statement was mocked for obvious reasons, but it was also unintentionally prophetic. He’s right that ID’s job isn’t to match evolution’s “pathetic level of detail” — ID has to exceed that level of detail in order to establish the value of P(T|H). Without a value for P(T|H), or at least a defensible upper bound on its value, the presence of CSI can never be demonstrated — by Dembski’s own rules. Think of what that would involve in the case of biology. You’d not only have to identify all possible mutational sequences leading to the feature in question — you’d also have to know the applicable fitness landscapes at each stage, which would mean knowing things like the local climatic patterns and the precise evolutionary histories of the other organisms in the shared ecosystem. If he didn’t realize it then, Dembski must certainly see by now that it’s a quixotic and hopeless task. That may be why he’s moved on to “the search for a search”.
keiths on June 16, 2013 at 8:37 am said:
timothya,
That is to say, any investigator wanting to eliminate “chance and necessity” or any other non-design cause, would need to work through all possible mutational sequences to prove they couldn’t have done it?
It depends on what you mean by “work through”. Dembski’s approach depends on being able to eliminate all non-design explanations, so every possible non-design cause must at least be considered. However, it may be possible to reject some of them without doing a detailed analysis. For example, the probability of the vertebrate eye evolving in a single generation is vanishingly small. It’s not impossible, but the associated probability is so small as to be negligible. It will have almost no effect on the overall P(T|H) and can therefore be neglected. The problem for Dembski et al is that even without considering these vastly improbable outliers, the difficulty in calculating P(T|H) for a complicated biological structure is overwhelming. The required information is simply not available. That’s why IDers haven’t done it, and that’s why no one expects them to.
keith s_{November 14, 2014
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Winston, Thank you for that straightforward acknowledgement.keith s_{November 14, 2014
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