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The Incredible Shrinking Timeline

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A new study has come out that tracks ‘tracks’; i.e., reptile ‘tracks’. It seems that the transition from a straddled to an upright position of reptilian limbs took place almost immediately. So scientists say that have studied fossilized tracks prior to, and immediately after, the end-of-the Permian mass extinction.

Fossil Reptilian Tracks

[BTW, let’s remember that the Darwinian objection to an absence of intermediate forms is the imperfection of the fossil record, with the difficulty of ‘soft-tissue’ fossilizing as a partial reason. But here we’re talking fossil footracks, which would seem even harder to form, and yet they’re found!]

Professor Mike Benton offers this:

“As it is, the new footprint evidence suggests a more dramatic pattern of replacement, where the sprawling animals that dominated Late Permian ecosystems nearly all died out, and the new groups that evolved after the crisis were upright. Any competitive interactions were compressed into a short period of time.”

Scientists (=evolutionists) were of the assumption that this pre-to-post Permian transition took 20-30 million years. It now appears to have been almost immediate.

Ah, yes, the incredible shrinking timeline for the Cambrian Explosion, the Reptilian Explosion and the Mammalian Explosion (This last one has been coming out over the last year or so, and now we’re seeing the Reptilian Explosion come to the fore). Let’s hear it for Darwinian ‘gradualism’. When will these guys ever give up?!? Behe, in his Edge of Evolution, documents that it has taken 10^16 to 10^20 replication events (progeny) of the eukaryotic malarial parasite for it to come up with a two amino acid change as a way of resisting cholorquinone. Assuming one year/generation for the reptiles, this meant evolutionists before had 20-30 million generations for ‘something’ to happen. And now? Darwinism is hopeless to explain these new discoveries. And, yet, they persist. Scientific faith is a wonderful thing, isn’t it?

Comments
StephenB:
I am going to let this be one of my final responses on the most important matter on the thread
I'm pretty burnt out myself, so the final words are all yours. Thank you for the discussion, and I'll be seeing you around.R0b
September 24, 2009
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Rob: I am going to let this be one of my final responses on the most important matter on the thread, and one which kairosfocus, myself, and vjtorley all seem to agree, namely, anything that begins to exist must have a cause. Each new question that you ask, including those alluding to comments I made on earlier threads are, in my judgement, distractions. As I stated earlier, this premise is not circular for reasons that I have indicated. Many great minds agree with me, including some of the most influential philsophers who ever lived. I will let someone else do the talking. He is William Lane Craig, one of the most talented [and thorough] philosophers that I know. "Premise [Anything that begins to exist] strikes me as relatively non-controversial. It is based on the metaphysical intuition that something cannot come out of nothing. Hence, any argument for the principle is apt to be less obvious than the principle itself. Even the great skeptic David Hume admitted that he never asserted so absurd a proposition as that something might come into existence without a cause; he only denied that one could prove the obviously true causal principle. With regard to the universe, if originally there were absolutely nothing-no God, no space, no time-, then how could the universe possibly come to exist? The truth of the principle ex nihilo, nihil fit is so obvious that I think we are justified in foregoing an elaborate defense of the argument's first premiss. Nevertheless, some thinkers, exercised to avoid the theism implicit in this premiss within the present context, have felt driven to deny its truth. In order to avoid its theistic implications, Davies presents a scenario which, he confesses, "should not be taken too seriously," but which seems to have a powerful attraction for Davies. He has reference to a quantum theory of gravity according to which spacetime itself could spring uncaused into being out of absolutely nothing. While admitting that there is "still no satisfactory theory of quantum gravity," such a theory "would allow spacetime to be created and destroyed spontaneously and uncaused in the same way that particles are created and destroyed spontaneously and uncaused. The theory would entail a certain mathematically determined probability that, for instance, a blob of space would appear where none existed before. Thus, spacetime could pop out of nothingness as the result of a causeless quantum transition."] Now in fact particle pair production furnishes no analogy for this radical ex nihilo becoming, as Davies seems to imply. This quantum phenomenon, even if an exception to the principle that every event has a cause, provides no analogy to something's coming into being out of nothing. Though physicists speak of this as particle pair creation and annihilation, such terms are philosophically misleading, for all that actually occurs is conversion of energy into matter or vice versa. As Davies admits, "The processes described here do not represent the creation of matter out of nothing, but the conversion of pre- existing energy into material form."[32] Hence, Davies greatly misleads his reader when he claims that "Particles . . . can appear out of nowhere without specific causation" and again, "Yet the world of quantum physics routinely produces something for nothing." On the contrary, the world of quantum physics never produces something for nothing. But to consider the case on its own merits: quantum gravity is so poorly understood that the period prior to 10[-43] sec, which this theory hopes to describe, has been compared by one wag to the regions on the maps of the ancient cartographers marked "Here there be dragons": it can easily be filled with all sorts of fantasies. In fact, there seems to be no good reason to think that such a theory would involve the sort of spontaneous becoming ex nihilo which Davies suggests. A quantum theory of gravity has the goal of providing a theory of gravitation based on the exchange of particles (gravitons) rather than the geometry of space, which can then be brought into a Grand Unification Theory that unites all the forces of nature into a supersymmetrical state in which one fundamental force and a single kind of particle exist. But there seems to be nothing in this which suggests the possibility of spontaneous becoming ex nihilo. Indeed, it is not at all clear that Davies's account is even intelligible. What can be meant, for example, by the claim that there is a mathematical probability that nothingness should spawn a region of spacetime "where none existed before?" It cannot mean that given enough time a region of spacetime would pop into existence at a certain place, since neither place nor time exist apart from spacetime. The notion of some probability of something's coming out of nothing thus seems incoherent. I am reminded in this connection of some remarks made by A.N. Prior concerning an argument put forward by Jonathan Edwards against something's coming into existence uncaused. This would be impossible, said Edwards, because it would then be inexplicable why just any and everything cannot or does not come to exist uncaused. One cannot respond that only things of a certain nature come into existence uncaused, since prior to their existence they have no nature which could control their coming to be. Prior made a cosmological application of Edwards's reasoning by commenting on the steady state model's postulating the continuous creation of hydrogen atoms ex nihilo: It is no part of Hoyle's theory that this process is causeless, but I want to be more definite about this, and to say that if it is causeless, then what is alleged to happen is fantastic and incredible. If it is possible for objects-objects, now, which really are objects, "substances endowed with capacities"-to start existing without a cause, then it is incredible that they should all turn out to be objects of the same sort, namely, hydrogen atoms. The peculiar nature of hydrogen atoms cannot possibly be what makes such starting-to-exist possible for them but not for objects of any other sort; for hydrogen atoms do not have this nature until they are there to have it, i.e. until their starting-to-exist has already occurred. That is Edwards's argument, in fact; and here it does seem entirely cogent. . . . Now in the case at hand, if originally absolutely nothing existed, then why should it be spacetime that springs spontaneously out of the void, rather than, say, hydrogen atoms or even rabbits? How can one talk about the probability of any particular thing's popping into being out of nothing? Davies on one occasion seems to answer as if the laws of physics are the controlling factor which determines what may leap uncaused into being: "But what of the laws? They have to be 'there' to start with so that the universe can come into being. Quantum physics has to exist (in some sense) so that a quantum transition can generate the cosmos in the first place." Now this seems exceedingly peculiar. Davies seems to attribute to the laws of nature themselves a sort of ontological and causal status such that they constrain spontaneous becoming. But this seems clearly wrong-headed: the laws of physics do not themselves cause or constrain anything; they are simply propositional descriptions of a certain form and generality of what does happen in the universe. And the issue Edwards raises is why, if there were absolutely nothing, it would be true that any one thing rather than another should pop into being uncaused? It is futile to say it somehow belongs to the nature of spacetime to do so, for if there were absolutely nothing then there would have been no nature to determine that spacetime should spring into being. Even more fundamentally, however, what Davies envisions is surely metaphysical nonsense. Though his scenario is cast as a scientific theory,. someone ought to be bold enough to say that the Emperor is wearing no clothes. Either the necessary and sufficient conditions for the appearance of spacetime existed or not; if so, then it is not true that nothing existed; if not, then it would seem ontologically impossible that being should arise out of absolute non-being. To call such spontaneous springing into being out of non-being a "quantum transition" or to attribute it to "quantum gravity" explains nothing; indeed, on this account, there is no explanation. It just happens. It seems to me, therefore, that Davies has not provided any plausible basis for denying the truth of the cosmological argument's first premiss. That whatever begins to exist has a cause would seem to be an ontologically necessary truth, one which is constantly confirmed in our experience."StephenB
September 24, 2009
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StephenB, I'd like to tie up some loose ends by getting answers to some heretofore unanswered question. For starters, in #240: - "Where did you explain that?" - "Aside from it roughness, why do you reject this as a description of determinism?" - "Which comment [are you saying I may want to revise]?" - "Which heavy thinkers define uncaused such that “To be uncaused, it must have NO NECESSARY OR SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS whatsoever”?" [Obviously those heavy thinkers don't include vjtorley or Robert Koons.] Also, I'm curious, what is the basis for your statement: "Obviously, you know nothing about compatibilism." [Keeping in mind that the common usage of the term entails no position on the existence or non-existence of free will, regardless of how free will is characterized.] I'll wait until those are answered. Thanks in advance.R0b
September 24, 2009
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StephenB:
Is my assumption correct?
The definition does not exclude volition or anything else, so if I understand you right, your assumption is correct.
If so, then please explain to me how anything I have said indicates that I hold this position.
Positions #1 and #2 in 162 together entail determinism. I'm sure you understand why, but if not, I'm happy to explain it. From previous conversations, I understand you as holding those positions, and I'll ask again: Do you? If you don't, we can refer to previous conversations and I can show why I impute those positions to you.R0b
September 24, 2009
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StephenB:
—Rob: “I’ve said repeatedly that StephenB’s definition of cause renders his causality rule trivial.” Where did I define cause?
Nowhere on this forum, as far as I know, but you've made the following entailment of your definition repeatedly and adamantly clear: "To be uncaused, it must have NO NECESSARY OR SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS whatsoever."
Theoretically, the universe could have existed for all eternity. So, to say that everything that begins to exist has a cause, is a meaningful statement. The rule is not circular.
The fact that the universe could have existed for all eternity is compatible with the proposition "everything that begins to exist has a cause" being meaningful or not. Another non sequitur. I never said that the rule is circular. I said that it precludes no conceivable events. If it can't rule out any conceivable state of affairs, then I consider it trivial, and obviously you're welcome to consider it otherwise. I have asked you if you can conceive of an event that is uncaused, according to your definition of the term. You said no, but you also told Diffaxial that some quantum phenomena may be uncaused. Now you seem to be backpedaling on that. (Are you? Are there or are there not some quantum phenomena that may be uncaused? Were you "expressing it the wrong way" throughout your back-and-forth with Diffaxial on the issue?)
You can hardly put kairosfocus, myself, and vj at odds.
StephenB: "To be uncaused, it must have NO NECESSARY OR SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS whatsoever." vjt: "Defining “cause” as a necessary or sufficient condition is far too broad" So does a necessary condition count as a cause or not?R0b
September 24, 2009
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--Rob: "So do you find the definition acceptable or not?" I responded earlier with this comment. I appreciate the tidiness of your definition but it does not tell me whether or not you are including human cognition [also human volition] and human behavior in the mix. Given that formulation, [which I read from your symbols] I assume that you are. If my assumption is correct, then I accept the definition. Fair enough? Is my assumption correct? If so, then please explain to me how anything I have said indicates that I hold this position.StephenB
September 24, 2009
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---Rob: "I’ve said repeatedly that StephenB’s definition of cause renders his causality rule trivial." Where did I define cause? The causal rule is not trivial because it is not circular. If you wanted to aak me if it was, all you had to do was raise the issue -[as opposed to going fishing on previous threads looking for loopholes]. Theoretically, the universe could have existed for all eternity. So, to say that everything that begins to exist has a cause, is a meaningful statement. The rule is not circular. You can hardly put kairosfocus, myself, and vj at odds. We all three agree with the rule and we all three agree that it is meaningful. The necessary/sufficient hangup up was all yours inasmuch as you injected it into the discussion and obsessed over it all throughout the remainder of the thread as a distraction to the real point, which was the non-negotiability of causation.StephenB
September 24, 2009
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vjtorley:
Defining “cause” as a necessary or sufficient condition is far too broad, as R0b’s example shows, since even the non-occurrence of a state of affairs might qualify as a necessary condition for the occurrence of some other event.
Much appreciated, vjtorley, as I've been making that point ad nauseam from my first post in this affair until now. I've pointed out the strangeness in saying that Russia caused the Celtics to fall out of the 2009 playoffs by not nuking Boston 20 years ago. I've said repeatedly that StephenB's definition of cause renders his causality rule trivial. I have been unable to get agreement from either kairosfocus or StephenB, but now that you've made the same point, they appear to finally agree. Thank you. And thanks for the pointer to Dr. Koons' paper, which I'll read at my first opportunity.R0b
September 24, 2009
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StephenB @ 257: A definition could be faulty due to incoherence, ambiguity, or departure from commonly accepted uses of the term. (Note that being false is not a potential problem, as definitions have no truth value.) Your concern about my definition seems to fall into none of these categories. You state as fact the incompatibilist view that determinism does not allow for human choices, which I won't argue with as it has nothing at all to do with the acceptability of my definition. The definition is independent of any assumptions for or against compatibilism, incompatibilism, the meaning or existence of free will, or the truth or falsehood of determinism as defined. So do you find the definition acceptable or not?R0b
September 24, 2009
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---Rob: "StephenB @ 255, I don’t see how that answers my question, but it seems to lean toward a “yes.” It's a no.StephenB
September 24, 2009
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I, too, agree with vjt's comment, including his comment about radio-activity. I was referring again to the element of predictability vs. causation and I simply expressed it the wrong way.StephenB
September 24, 2009
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VJT: Excellent. this also substantiates my point at 244. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 24, 2009
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R0b: Might I make a suggestion? Earlier (#145) you wrote that:
The rule [i.e. the law of causality - VJT] says only that no event can occur, or nothing can come into existence, unless at least one necessary or sufficient condition obtains. But considering that “Nothing prevents E from occurring” is a necessary condition for any conceivable event E, there is no conceivable scenario that is precluded by the rule.
I'd like to make a proposal: let's not be too broad in our definition of cause. Defining "cause" as a necessary or sufficient condition is far too broad, as R0b's example shows, since even the non-occurrence of a state of affairs might qualify as a necessary condition for the occurrence of some other event. Dr. Robert Koons, in his article, A New Look at the Cosmological Argument stipulates three axioms about causality that are assumed in his cosmological argument. One is that only actual facts can serve as causes or effects. If we adopt Koons' proposal here, then the mere absence of things which prevent the occurrence of an event E, does not qualify as a cause of E. The second axiom is that cause and effect are "separate existences," as Hume called them. More precisely: a cause must not have any parts in common with its effect. Koons' third and most controversial axiom is that every wholly contingent fact has a cause. (A contingent fact is defined as a fact such that none of its parts are necessary.) However, Koons stresses that nothing in his argument requires him to assume that a cause determines its effect. Thus I cannot agree with StephenB when he writes:
The law of causality does not apply to the timing of radioactive decay, nor, for that matter, does it apply to the changes in position of sub atomic particles.
The decay of an atom may not be determined, but it certainly has at least one actual cause: the existence of the original atom. That would qualify as a probabilistic cause of decay. The effect would then be a mereologically separate state of affairs: the products of decay. The attempt to explain the appearance of something from nothing in terms of quantum physics makes no sense unless your "nothing" is also governed by probabilistic rules. But then it is no longer a nothing, but a something.vjtorley
September 23, 2009
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---Rob: "Determinism is the proposition that, for the set of all antecedent states A and the set of all consequent states C, ¬(?a?A ?x?C ?y?C: x?y ? a?x ? a?y" I appreciate the tidiness of your definition but it does not tell me whether or not you are including human cognition and human behavior in the mix. Given that formulation, I assume that you are. Thus, you seem to assume that the uncompromising causality of physical events translates into an unbroken causal chain which swallows up human cognition, human behavior, and human choice. Put another way, you seem to be confusing uncompromised causality, which allows for human choices [and free will], with determinism, which does not.StephenB
September 23, 2009
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StephenB @ 255, I don't see how that answers my question, but it seems to lean toward a "yes". BTW, when you get around to demonstrating hidden variables in QM, you'll be a shoo-in for a Nobel. When that happens, please remember us little people.R0b
September 23, 2009
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---Rob: "So when you told me that I wasn’t answering questions, you were referring to questions you hadn’t asked yet?" Here was your opening gambit on this thread: "Adding to the confusion is the fact that StephenB sometimesakes the position of strict determinism, but this position is not entailed by his causality rule." Since I am not a determinist and since my characterization of causality does not constitute determinism, I was naturally curious about what you understand determinism to be. Later on, you introduced the related terms "compatibiism" and incompatibilism." Accordingly, I wondered if you understood the relationship between all three terms and the traditional meaning of free will.StephenB
September 23, 2009
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The broken link in 252 refers to 240. Sorry.R0b
September 23, 2009
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StephenB:
So, if by “event” you mean something coming into existence without a cause, then the question answers itself. No.
Actually, I meant "event" as the word is normally used. Reading some of your comments to Diffaxial, I see that you can conceive of some events being uncaused, so I apologize for asking the question when you had already stated your position to Diffaxial. For instance, you said that "CHANGE OF MOVEMENT" may be uncaused. But obviously, a change of movement cannot occur if the particle doesn't exist. The existence of the particle is therefore a necessary condition, which means that the change of movement is caused. That's what has me confused.R0b
September 23, 2009
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StephenB:
—Rob: “Once again, please tell me what questions I haven’t answered so that I can answer them. Define determinism as you see it. Define compatibilism and incompatibilsim in the context of free will.
So when you told me that I wasn't answering questions, you were referring to questions you hadn't asked yet? Anyway, answered here.R0b
September 23, 2009
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As biased as I am, this question does not take a side in the present discussion. Or at least not intentionally. It seems to me that the universe must result from either an uncaused cause or an infinite regression of causes. Is there a third possibility I don't know of? The reason I ask is that various arguments often hinge on the seeming impossibility of one or the other, when both actually appear to be impossible, and yet at least one must be the case. (Unless there's something I haven't considered, a possibility I'm wide open to.)ScottAndrews
September 23, 2009
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---"(P, 132, Philosophy in Circles. See also p. 76-79, Philosophy by Definition.)" As usual, Diffaxial is confused about the meaning of "circular," when it applies and when it doesn't. Meanwhile, all my questions go unanswered, which is just as well. Who needs another 1248-word evasion.StephenB
September 23, 2009
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----Rob: "Can you logically conceive of an event that is uncaused according to your definition?" Inasmuch as the statement "anything that begins to exist must have a cause," defines causality, then it follows that nothing that begins to exist can be uncaused. So, if by "event" you mean something coming into existence without a cause, then the question answers itself. No. Indeed, you agreed with the definition yesterday, first calling it "trivially true," and later confessing that it applies to everything, including the universe and quantum mechanics. If it applies to everything, then obviously there are no situations in which it would not apply.StephenB
September 23, 2009
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---Rob: "Once again, please tell me what questions I haven’t answered so that I can answer them. Define determinism as you see it. Define compatibilism and incompatibilsim in the context of free will. Since you have falsely accused me of advocating determinism, I want to make sure that you understand the meaning of the term, and for that matter, the meaning of words compatibilism and incompatibilism, especially with respect to free will.StephenB
September 23, 2009
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----"Diffaxial: "You display an astonishing vulnerability to circular arguments, Stephen. Here’s the title of your new book: Philosophy in Circles. This a sequel to your first volume, Philosophy by Definition." Anything that begins to exist must have a cause The universe began to exist The universe was caused. Learn it, live it, love it. ---"Of course it follows that if you define your law such that quantum occurrences that reflect acausality are NOT, by definition, effects or events to which your “law of causality” applies, you may then claim that “causality” (by which you mean, “the law I invented three weeks ago”) is not violated by those (otherwise acausal) occurrences." There you go twisting in a fog again. Anything that begins to exist must have a cause. Certain corollaries follow, and,as the misguided objections come in, I must further clarify ----"Were you aware, by the way, of my newly discovered law that “all objects are spheres?” That follows if I define “object” as “things that are spherical.” You may protest that a cube demonstrates a violation of the law “all objects are spheres,” but you are mistaken, because cubes are not objects, given my definition of object. I can’t understand how the MacArthur people overlooked me again." Apples and oranges. ---"Although I’m no physicist, your further comments indicate that you haven’t a clue vis quantum physics, Stephen." I have heard no substantial arguments against my assertions. Even as I answer your questions and provide all the needed clarifications, you dodge all my questions.StephenB
September 23, 2009
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StephenB at 238:
If an event is defined as a change of movement, then the movement [when and where it may go] may or may not be acausal. That is not causality breaking down, because the law of causality refers to the particles coming into existence.
You display an astonishing vulnerability to circular arguments, Stephen. Here's the title of your new book: Philosophy in Circles. This a sequel to your first volume, Philosophy by Definition. Of course it follows that if you define your law such that quantum occurrences that reflect acausality are NOT, by definition, effects or events to which your "law of causality" applies, you may then claim that "causality" (by which you mean, "the law I invented three weeks ago") is not violated by those (otherwise acausal) occurrences. Were you aware, by the way, of my newly discovered law that "all objects are spheres?" That follows if I define "object" as "things that are spherical." You may protest that a cube demonstrates a violation of the law "all objects are spheres," but you are mistaken, because cubes are not objects, given my definition of object. I can't understand how the MacArthur people overlooked me again. Although I'm no physicist, your further comments indicate that you haven't a clue vis quantum physics, Stephen.Diffaxial
September 23, 2009
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kairosfocus:
What’s so hard to understand about this?
Nothing, except for your reference to a "strawman" condition. How is the necessary condition stated in 242 a "strawman"?R0b
September 23, 2009
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Rob: Re yr at 242:
As previously described, an event is uncaused only if it has no necessary or sufficient causes whatsoever. As I’ve repeatedly pointed out, this type of causality precludes nothing. For example, it does not preclude a wall from randomly appearing in the road. In order for a wall to randomly appear in the road, it is necessary that there be no physical law that renders the existence of walls impossible. That necessary condition renders the event caused, according to your definition.
Basics again: 1: When sufficient causal factors are present, an event WILL happen. 2: Unless necessary causal factors are present it CANNOT happen. 3: For an event to occur without cause, it must have neither necessary nor sufficient factors. 4: Absence of necessary factors, will block it. In the case of your wall appearing, walls in the relevant sense are made of atomic materials. No atoms -- notice how I give a real example of a necessary condition here, not a strawman one -- no wall. No atoms, no wall appearing suddenly and "spontaneously" across the road. So, absence of necessary factors is a block. Now, let's say that we pay a contractor and supply him with bricks, mortar etc [made of atoms!] and give him the time, workmen and opportunity to carry out a wall building contract. After a day or so, we now have a wall across the road, as sufficient factors to make it happen were applied. What's so hard to understand about this? GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 23, 2009
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It didn’t use the word, “inference,”
Yes, I know, but you referred to rules "which among other things, allow us to eliminate possibilities so that we can move logically from point A to point B." Moving logically from point A to point B falls within the purview of logic, and rules that eliminate possibilities in doing so are called rules of inference.R0b
September 23, 2009
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StephenB, the reason I re-asked the first two questions above is this: The version of causality that you're defending to Diffaxial seems to be different from the version that was described in previous threads. As previously described, an event is uncaused only if it has no necessary or sufficient causes whatsoever. As I've repeatedly pointed out, this type of causality precludes nothing. For example, it does not preclude a wall from randomly appearing in the road. In order for a wall to randomly appear in the road, it is necessary that there be no physical law that renders the existence of walls impossible. That necessary condition renders the event caused, according to your definition.R0b
September 23, 2009
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And StephenB, since you have repeatedly accused me of not answering your questions, may I remind you of a few of my own unanswered questions: From #147
Which of your PRRs precludes these events, assuming that at least one necessary condition obtains in their occurrence?
From #188
Can you logically conceive of an event that is uncaused according to your definition?
And ironically: #214
Please tell me what questions I haven’t answered so I can remedy the situation.
#219
Once again, please tell me what questions I haven’t answered so that I can answer them.
R0b
September 23, 2009
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