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UB Sets It Out Step-By-Step

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UD Editors:  No one has come close to refuting UB’s thesis after 129 comments.  We are moving this post to the top of the page to give the materialists another chance.

I take the following from an excellent comment UB made in a prior post.  UB lays out his argument step by step, precept by precept.  Then he arrives at a conclusion.  In order for his argument to be valid, the conclusion must follow from the premises.  In order for his argument to be sound, each of the premises must be true.

Now here is the challenge to our Darwinist friends.  If you disagree with UB’s conclusion, please demonstrate how his argument is either invalid (as a matter of logic the conclusion does not follow from the premises) or unsound (one or more of the premises are false).  Good luck (you’re going to need it).

Without further ado, here is UB’s argument:

1.  A representation is an arrangement of matter which evokes an effect within a system (e.g. written text, spoken words, pheromones, animal gestures, codes, sensory input, intracellular messengers, nucleotide sequences, etc, etc).

2.  It is not logically possible to transfer information (the form of a thing; a measured aspect, quality, or preference) in a material universe without using a representation instantiated in matter.

3.  If that is true, and it surely must be, then several other things must logically follow. If there is now an arrangement of matter which contains a representation of form as a consequence of its own material arrangement, then that arrangement must be necessarily arbitrary to the thing it represents. In other words, if one thing is to represent another thing within a system, then it must be separate from the thing it represents. And if it is separate from it, then it cannot be anything but materially arbitrary to it (i.e. they cannot be the same thing).

4.  If that is true, then the presence of that representation must present a material component to the system (which is reducible to physical law), while its arrangement presents an arbitrary component to the system (which is not reducible to physical law).

5.  If that is true, and again it surely must be, then there has to be something else which establishes the otherwise non-existent relationship between the representation and the effect it evokes within the system. In fact, this is the material basis of Francis Crick’s famous ‘adapter hypothesis’ in DNA, which lead to a revolution in the biological sciences. In a material universe, that something else must be a second arrangement of matter; coordinated to the first arrangement as well as to the effect it evokes.

6.  It then also follows that this second arrangement must produce its unambiguous function, not from the mere presence of the representation, but from its arrangement.  It is the arbitrary component of the representation which produces the function.

7.  And if those observations are true, then in order to actually transfer recorded information, two discrete arrangements of matter are inherently required by the process; and both of these objects must necessarily have a quality that extends beyond their mere material make-up. The first is a representation and the second is a protocol (a systematic, operational rule instantiated in matter) and together they function as a formal system. They are the irreducible complex core which is fundamentally required in order to transfer recorded information.

8.  During protein synthesis, a selected portion of DNA is first transcribed into mRNA, then matured and transported to the site of translation within the ribosome. This transcription process facilitates the input of information (the arbitrary component of the DNA sequence) into the system. The input of this arbitrary component functions to constrain the output, producing the polypeptides which demonstrate unambiguous function.

9.  From a causal standpoint, the arbitrary component of DNA is transcribed to mRNA, and those mRNA are then used to order tRNA molecules within the ribosome. Each stage of this transcription process is determined by the physical forces of pair bonding. Yet, which amino acid appears at the peptide binding site is not determined by pair bonding; it is determined  by the aaRS. In other words, which amino acid appears at the binding site is only evoked by the physical structure of the nucleic triplet, but is not determined by it. Instead, it is determined (in spatial and temporal isolation) by the physical structure of the aaRS. This is the point of translation; the point where the arbitrary component of the representation is allowed to evoke a response in a physically determined system – while preserving the arbitrary nature of the representation.

10.  This physical event, translation by a material protocol, as well as the transcription of a material representation, is ubiquitous in the transfer of recorded information.

CONCLUSION:  These two physical objects (the representation and protocol) along with the required preservation of the arbitrary component of the representation, and the production of unambiguous function from that arbitrary component, confirm that the transfer of recorded information in the genome is just like any other form of recorded information. It’s an arbitrary relationship instantiated in matter.

Comments
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code
A code is a rule for converting a piece of information (for example, a letter, word, phrase, or gesture) into another form or representation (one sign into another sign), not necessarily of the same type.
It follows that there are no real codes. That pesky I word.Mung
January 11, 2013
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Today theoretical biology has genetic, developmental, and evolutionary components, the central connective themes in modern biology, but also includes relevant aspects of computational biology, semiotics, and cognition research, and extends to the naturalistic philosophy of sciences.
The Vienna Series in Theoretical Biology Gerd B. Muller, Gunter P. Wagner, and Werner Callebaut, editorsMung
January 9, 2013
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RB:
In short, semiotic theory is an empirical bridge to nowhere, an empirical ship in a bottle.
To you and your ilk of scientifically illiterate dogmatists, I am sure that it is. To the rest of the world who understand that it makes all the difference in the world to any investigation whether or not that which is being investigated arose by design or some stochastic process. Even though Stonehenge is made out of stones that mother nature produced, we could never understand the structure by looking at it as something mother nature produced.
It goes nowhere, as it has no empirical purchase on only issue it purports to address.
With you at its helm I am surprised it can even stay afloat. Look, science isn't for everyone. Finger painting may be more your speed.Joe
January 6, 2013
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Forget the evidence, it's the argument we can't stand.Mung
January 6, 2013
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From 571 comments, and 91 days ago...
Onlooker, Your entire involvement here has been an attempt to massage over the unambiguous definitions given in the argument, in the hopes that you can make them malleable for a counter-argument. This has already been discussed here and here among other places. Unfortunately for you, your strategy has been transparent for the entire duration of your stay. You are now left with nothing but to return here and use the repetition of your attempts as an opportunity to sling more insults. It’s all you have left. As I have already pointed out, it’s a terrible way to have to protect your worldview. - – - – - – - – - – - – - Representation: An arrangement of matter which evokes an effect within a system, where the arrangement is materially arbitrary to the effect it evokes. Protocol: An arrangement of matter that physically establishes the otherwise non-existent relationship between a representation and its effect. Materially arbitrary: The relationship between the representation and its material effect is context specific; not reducible to physical law (regardless of any mechanism proposed as the origin of the system). Evoke: The representation can evoke an effect within a system, but because it is materially arbitrary to that effect, it cannot determine what that effect will be – the effect is physically determined by the protocol alone. - – - – - – - – - – - – - These two arrangements of matter are ubiquitous in any transfer of recorded information, and they must operate as described in order to accomplish what must be accomplished – the transfer of form via a material medium. These objects are both a logical necessity and a universal empirical observation. You cannot refute them, and your unending attempts to redefine them (with added ambiguity) have grown stale, even on your own side of the fence.
Upright BiPed
January 6, 2013
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...it is clear that a capacity to encode information is of decisive importance for evolution in general and evolvability in particular. - Alister E. McGrath
Mung
January 6, 2013
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No time for trolling. Such a shame. onlooker, Please don't bother to return until you know the meaning of the word arbitrary. Once you've learned the meaning of the word, select an arbitrary day and time for your return. Then construct a post where the letters used are determined by physical law or by a stochastic distribution.Mung
January 6, 2013
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Upright BiPed, This is a courtesy note to explain my recent lack of participation. Over the past few weeks I've been focused on work, spending time with my family on the holidays, and more work. I do not anticipate having time to devote to this discussion for the near future. Given your resistance to answering direct questions, that's unlikely to yield significantly different results from my active participation. I will note for now that your original post is still word salad, you fail to use terms consistently even on those few occasions where you have agreed on definitions, and you obviously have no interest in clarifying your position such that others can discuss it with you. It's quite clear that preventing your ideas from being exposed to scrutiny and challenge, while still claiming to have an "argument", is your actual goal. I'll check in from time to time to see if you have developed any integrity, but I'm not holding my breath. Even if you continue to hide from my questions, the 800 pound gorilla in the room remains: Granting for the sake of argument that your position is correct, how does it support ID?onlooker
January 6, 2013
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The problem of semiosis isn't going away. If anything, it's going to get worse. You'd think the critics would want to deal with it sooner rather than later. Or next they'll be saying it's always been part of the Darwinian paradigm. Nothing new here. Move along.Mung
January 4, 2013
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A new year, and the argument in the OP still stands unrefuted. The more we learn about life, the more semiotic it seems. The more we learn about Darwinian evolution, the more it appears to depend upon semiosis. Happy New Year!Mung
January 1, 2013
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If modern science ever came up with an agreed definition of life I can just hear Reciprocating Bill... It's not based upon observations. What good is it? It's not as if we need to know what to look for when looking for signs of life "out there."Mung
December 30, 2012
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..."begs the question of whether semiotic theory contributes to our understanding of the system by means of which DNA is translated in to proteins, and therefore what is required of a causal account of the emergence of that system.
The argument in the OP provides a coherent model for the transer and translation of recorded information. The argument is built on universal observation and logical necessity. It then demonstrates that this model is faithfully exemplified in the processing of genetic information. Any "causal account of the emergence of that system" will be required to demonstrate the material establishment of materially-arbitrary relationships, as such relationships are fundamental to the system by which "DNA is translated in to proteins". Knowling what is required of a proposition in order to be successful is an inseparable contribution to knowing if it was successful.Upright BiPed
December 26, 2012
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Surely the system in the OP doesn't actual exist anywhere. at least not any place where's it's actually been observed. And far be it from any scientist to develop a definition for the phenomena under observation rather than merely a description.Mung
December 26, 2012
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UB has characterized his opening post as presenting “observations” followed by logical conclusions. But there are no observations in the OP above.
Ah yes. Let us not forget another round of the ridiculously-strained and notoriously-idiosyncratic parsing of words. What better way to deal with observations than to simply say they don't exist? - - - - - - - - - "Observation is the most pervasive and fundamental practice of all the modern sciences, both natural and human. Its instruments include not only the naked senses but also tools such as the telescope and microscope, the questionnaire, the photographic plate, the notebook, the glassed-in beehive, and myriad other ingenious inventions designed to make the invisible visible, the evanescent permanent, the abstract concrete." - Histories of Scientific Observation (ISBN: 9780226136790) - - - - - - - - What do observation reports describe? One answer to this question assumes that observation is a perceptual process so that to observe is to look at, listen to, touch, taste, or smell something, attending to details of the resulting perceptual experience. Observers may have the good fortune to obtain useful perceptual evidence simply by noticing what's going on around them, but in many cases they must arrange and manipulate things to produce informative perceptible results. In either case, observation sentences describe perceptions or things perceived ... so much so that Carl Hempel could characterize the scientific enterprise as an attempt to predict and explain the deliverances of the senses (Hempel 1952, 653). - Stanford eduUpright BiPed
December 26, 2012
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Ah, the return of the onlooker effect.Mung
December 26, 2012
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Perhaps a more prepared materialist will come along and actually attack the observations themselves.
UB has characterized his opening post as presenting "observations" followed by logical conclusions. But there are no observations in the OP above. Instead, we find a definition followed by a string of assertions. Specifically, “A representation is an arrangement of matter which evokes an effect within a system” is a definition, not an observation. Everything that follows in the OP is built one way or another upon that definition. But definitions are not self-evidently useful or correct. The usefulness of a definition is seen in the phenomena in the world that are picked out out by that definition. Some definitions call out referents and classes in a way that “carve nature at the joints.” Others don’t. Those that do can be useful conceptual tools and may become components of testable scientific hypotheses. Those that don’t have less use or are misleading. Ultimately, the scientific usefulness of a definition, and of hypotheses that may be built upon it, lies in its ability to generate testable empirical predictions. That is how theories become responsive to evidence and guide research. Semiotic theory as articulated above is neither responsive to evidence in that sense, nor capable of guiding research in a way that is scientifically useful. We know that because UB has told us so. UB’s reasoning in the OP ends with this conclusion: “The transfer of recorded information in the genome is just like any other form of recorded information.” UB has elsewhere stated, “The final conclusion of this Semiotic Argument is that a) genetic information observably demonstrates a semiotic system, and b) it therefore will require a mechanism capable of establishing a semiotic state.” It is fair to ask, “so what?” The follow-on questions are obvious (although not so easily asked), and pull for the empirical consequences of those conclusions. UB telegraphed their importance by ignoring them for months, and continues to telegraph that importance by attempting to unsay what he obviously wishes he hadn’t said, even at the expense of uttering flatly contradictory statements. Two of those questions are: - What class of mechanism does semiotic theory assert is required to create (result in, cause) the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state? - What class of mechanism does semiotic theory assert cannot create (result in, cause) the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state?” In response UB has affirmed: - It does not follow from semiotic theory “per se” that a particular class or classes of mechanism is required to create (result in, cause) a semiotic state. - Nor does it does not follow from semiotic theory that a particular class or classes of mechanism cannot create a semiotic state. UB objects that in posing these questions I’m “asking the argument to do something it was not intended to do.” He is right about that. I am asking the argument to do something that demonstrates scientific value in the sense that I describe in my initial remarks above. Semiotic theory has no such value because it is not intended to have such value. No wonder UB objects. The third and perhaps most important question one could ask in evaluating the theory in a scientific context is the following: - What does a semiotic state entail that a contemporary understanding of the physicochemical interactions evident in the transcription of DNA into proteins does not? This goes directly to both the scientific testability and the utility of semiotic theory. Semiotic theory might yet be found useful if unique predictions arise from it that can guide research. But semiotic theory does not generate unique entailments beyond those that follow from contemporary understanding of the physicochemical interactions evident in the transcription of DNA into proteins: RB:
For “It displays the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state” to improve upon the current description, testable empirical consequences must follow from that further characterization beyond those that follow from the physiochemical description. As you say, “Like, what it entailed?”
UB in response:
What you say here is flatly untrue. The argument presented above needn’t do any more than it does; it employs universal observation and logical necessity to establish what is materially necessary for the transfer of recorded information. But you want to impose on it questions that it does not answer.
Semiotic theory fails to generate testable empirical consequences. UB has told us so; to ask for testable empirical consequences is to impose on it questions that it does not answer. UB nevertheless insists that semiotic theory can be useful in the sense that the fire tetrahedron is useful. After all, he asks, am I suggesting that we should attempt to apprehend a causal mechanism without understanding what is necessary of it? That, of course, begs the question of whether semiotic theory contributes to our understanding of the system by means of which DNA is translated in to proteins, and therefore what is required of a causal account of the emergence of that system. Such begging aside, UB constructed a illustration in which I am on trial for arson and in my defense utilizes elements of the fire tetrahedron. He insisted that semiotic theory can be similarly useful, in many ways for many people, in evaluating hypotheses regarding the origin of the system by means of which DNA is translated into proteins. Accordingly, I’ve twice asked UB to provide a similar illustration of the empirical use of the entailments of semiotic theory, at the same (very low) level of detail as he supplied in his one-paragraph arson fantasy. His reply is that the question is “obtuse and ignorant.” I suspect he in fact is unable to construct such an example. But perhaps UB has an illustration up his sleeve that will enable him to rescue at least this role for semiotic theory. It is for the forgoing reasons that I argue that semiotic theory as UB articulates it is useless in a scientific context. It’s only conclusion is “it therefore will require a mechanism capable of establishing a semiotic state,” yet it fails to even broadly constrain the possible mechanisms either by requiring agency or excluding unguided processes. It generates no testable entailments. Its advocate declines to provide examples illustrating remaining possible empirical applications. In short, semiotic theory is an empirical bridge to nowhere, an empirical ship in a bottle. It goes nowhere, as it has no empirical purchase on only issue it purports to address.Reciprocating Bill
December 26, 2012
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“clairvoyant hubris…” Weirdo.
You are not capable of reading my mind when I asked the questions leading to this argument. Those questions - if valuable themselves and successfully answered - establish the usfulness of the answers (i.e. not you). Feel free to sling insults, I am not the one in the materialist hat arguing that the accurately-described material conditions of a system are usless in understanding it. Perhaps a more prepared materialist will come along and actually attack the observations themselves, given that you are unable.Upright BiPed
December 26, 2012
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RB,
UB: As for usefullness, you have already acknowledged that an accurate description of the system is a “crucial element” in undestanding it. RB: Of course. But not that semiotic theory usefully contributes to that description. See the difference?
Yes I do, and I think most others do as well. When you respond to critique, you deliberately stay clear of the critical point being made. It's a defense mechanism, forced upon you by the unacknowledged need to protect your position from evidence and reason. Here is the critical point you selectively avoided in your last post:
As for usefullness, you have already acknowledged that an accurate description of the system is a “crucial element” in undestanding it. You only want to equivocate on that assessment when the description of the system turns to its semiotic reality, but you have done nothing to demonstrate that the semiotic decription is inaccurate, and therefore have done nothing to demonsrtate that a semiotic description of the process of protein synthesis is useless to biology. Can you transfer and translate the information contained in DNA without an arrangement of matter to evoke a response within the system? Can you do so without a second arrangement of matter to establish the otherwise non-existent relationship between the first arrangement and its resulting effect? Is the arbitrary relationship between the first arrangement and the resulting effect a necessary component to achieve the result? Only by answering these kinds of questions can you make your claim meaningful in any way. Thus far you have been unwilling to take on this task, making your equivocation of “cruicial element” a strategic necessity, and your claim of “uselessness” a transparently obvious deception.
Upright BiPed
December 26, 2012
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UB:
If you brought a thermometer to a geometry class in order to measure the degrees in an angle, you would be admonished for using the wrong tool.
Which is exactly what you've done, and what I've done. You've brought a thermometer to a geometry class - a tool devoid of usable empirical implications to bear upon a scientific question. Upon receiving the admonishment even you recommend, you spit out your medicine and assert "you've brought the wrong tool" is "a patently false claim." But it is, in fact, the wrong tool. I stated:
semiotic theory’s inability to answer the questions posed above establishes its uselessness in a scientific context. (new emphasis)
UB responded:
The question to which the argument in the OP was posed was “what are the material conditions necessary to transfer and translate recorded information”. I know this as an unassailable fact because I am the specific individual who posed the question. I am not certain what level of clairvoyant hubris you are attempting to demonstrate here, but I can assure you that this was the question asked.
Now you're simply not tracking the conversation. 'The questions posed above' to which I refer - the questions I've "imposed": - Does semiotic theory per se assert that a particular class or classes of mechanism is required to create (result in, cause) the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state? - Does semiotic theory per se assert that a particular class or classes of mechanism cannot create (result in, cause) the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state?” - What does a semiotic state entail that a contemporary understanding of the physicochemical interactions evident in the transcription of DNA into proteins does not? - My twice repeated request that you provide an illustration of the empirical use of the entailments of semiotic theory at the same (very low) level of detail as you supplied in your one-paragraph arson fantasy. Your responses (in the last instance, your non-response) reflect semiotic theory's geometric uselessness.
As for usefullness, you have already acknowledged that an accurate description of the system is a “crucial element” in undestanding it.
Of course. But not that semiotic theory usefully contributes to that description. See the difference?
"clairvoyant hubris..."
Weirdo.Reciprocating Bill
December 26, 2012
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Well this should be interesting. Your job is to argue that the inability of a thermometer to tell you how many degrees are in an angle is a valid argument against it’s ability to tell you what temperature it is.
So he's using a semiotic system to argue against the utility of semiotic systems?Mung
December 24, 2012
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Bill, we're stall waiting for you to address #1342.Mung
December 24, 2012
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RB at 1379,
UB: Bill deliberately reposts the same quote over and over, but he knows the falsity of the statement doesn’t turn on whether my argument does or doesn’t demonstrate a particular class of cause. The falsity of the claim is tied to Bill asking the argument to do something it was not intended to do. A thermometer cannot tell you how many degrees are in an angle. Claiming that “it can’t” is factually true. Claiming that “it can’t” as an argumentative strategy against the thermometer, is a patently false claim. UB: I want you to argue that ‘asking an argument to answer a question it was not intended to answer’ is a valid defense against the actual claim it makes. RB: By all means. In fact, by means of your own analogy
Well this should be interesting. Your job is to argue that the inability of a thermometer to tell you how many degrees are in an angle is a valid argument against it's ability to tell you what temperature it is. Lets see how you do it:
Unless you’ve brought the thermometer to a geometry class, in which case “it can’t” is both true and devastating, as it establishes the uselessness of the thermometer in that context.
Nonsense. If you brought a thermometer to a geometry class in order to measure the degrees in an angle, you would be admonished for using the wrong tool. That does nothing whatsoever to invalidate the ability of the thermometer to measure tempurature. You would be the flaw in that scenario, not the usefulness of the tool.
Which is exactly analogous to the state of affairs here, as semiotic theory’s inability to answer the questions posed above establishes its uselessness in a scientific context.
The question to which the argument in the OP was posed was “what are the material conditions necessary to transfer and translate recorded information”. I know this as an unassailable fact because I am the specific individual who posed the question. I am not certain what level of clairvoyant hubris you are attempting to demonstrate here, but I can assure you that this was the question asked. And the argument which you've been unable to refute is the direct result of that question. Your repeated attempt to impose your own questions onto that argument would simply be judged as invalid logic - if you weren't doing it as a strategic manuever. As it stands, it is a deliberate intellectual deception on your part. As for usefullness, you have already acknowledged that an accurate description of the system is a “crucial element” in undestanding it. You only want to equivocate on that assessment when the description of the system turns to its semiotic reality, but you have done nothing to demonstrate that the semiotic decription is inaccurate, and therefore have done nothing to demonsrtate that a semiotic description of the process of protein synthesis is useless to biology. Can you transfer and translate the information contained in DNA without an arrangement of matter to evoke a response within the system? Can you do so without a second arrangement of matter to establish the otherwise non-existent relationship between the first arrangement and its resulting effect? Is the arbitrary relationship between the first arrangement and the resulting effect a necessary component to achieve the result? Only by answering these kinds of questions can you make your claim meaningful in any way. Thus far you have been unwilling to take on this task, making your equivocation of “cruicial element” a strategic necessity, and your claim of “uselessness” a transparently obvious deception.Upright BiPed
December 24, 2012
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And seeing that Reciprocating Bill's position, unguided evolution, is totally useless in a scientific context, he knows all about that uselessness. Unfortunately he doesn't know anything about usefulness and couldn't indentify something useful if his life depended on it.Joe
December 24, 2012
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UB:
I want you to argue that ‘asking an argument to answer a question it was not intended to answer’ is a valid defense against the actual claim it makes.
By all means. In fact, by means of your own analogy: UB:
A thermometer cannot tell you how many degrees are in an angle. Claiming that “it can’t” is factually true. Claiming that “it can’t” as an argumentative strategy against the thermometer, is a patently false claim.”
Unless you've brought the thermometer to a geometry class, in which case "it can't" is both true and devastating, as it establishes the uselessness of the thermometer in that context. Which is exactly analogous to the state of affairs here, as semiotic theory's inability to answer the questions posed above establishes its uselessness in a scientific context.Reciprocating Bill
December 24, 2012
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For it is an empirical scientific fact that the equivalent of measuring processes do undoubtedly take place in every living system, and this basic semiotic activity alone amply justifies the study of living systems as semiotic entities.
Mung
December 23, 2012
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Its [Biosemiotics] main challenge, as we have seen, is to introduce meaning in biology, on the grounds that organic codes and processes of interpretation are fundamental components of the living world. Biosemiotics has become in this way the leading edge of the research of the fundamentals of life, and is a young exciting field on the move. - Introduction to Biosemiotics
Mung
December 23, 2012
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UB: It’s apparent from your disengagement that you do not wish to argue the point presented in 1351. As is typical of rhetorical defense, your position has been defeated by the logic you ignored in contriving it. RB: This from the guy who fled precisely these questions for months, only engaged them when they were placed right under his nose, and is now defending himself by changing the definition of “true” and “false” as a way to unsay what he has already said.
Yet another lavish positioning statement! Point 1: I freely spent over two months arguing over your idiosyncratic use of the term “entailment” where you insisted that an entailment could only refer to the testable product of a thing, but not the existence of thing. This ended only when you were forced to concede that the existence of a thing quite obviously entailed the necessary conditions of its existence, and that my referring to those material conditions as entailments was entirely valid. My question to you (which you are responding to in the above quote) was not even a part of that conversation, so I hardly “fled” from it. As an aside, your positioning of my departure from TSZ as something I “fled from” misses the reality of the situation by a country mile. After two months of pointless attack, you conceded that the basis of your attack (your own idiosyncratic use of “entailment”) was in fact invalid. You did so by agreeing that my use (i.e. the standard dictionary use) of “entailment” was correct after all (i.e. June 2012 ”Yes, it does. So that would be a valid use of “entailment” … I take your point.”). Your follow-on response at the time was the same as it is now - uvas agrias - and I was by no means obligated to entertain your unfortunate disposition. Referring to that as “fled” is opportunistically delusional. Point 2: No one is changing the definitions of true and false, Bill. The question to you is simple: If there is an argument which cannot be refuted with logic or evidence, is it then valid or invalid to attack that argument by deliberately and knowingly forcing it to answer a question it was never intended to answer? This was the question raised in my post 1351, where I asked you to put your position on the line and “Argue it out”.
From #1351: Bill deliberately reposts the same quote over and over, but he knows the falsity of the statement doesn’t turn on whether my argument does or doesn’t demonstrate a particular class of cause. The falsity of the claim is tied to Bill asking the argument to do something it was not intended to do. A thermometer cannot tell you how many degrees are in an angle. Claiming that “it can’t” is factually true. Claiming that “it can’t” as an argumentative strategy against the thermometer, is a patently false claim.” Argue it out.
If you are objecting to my use of the word “false” in this context, then I am certainly willing to entertain whatever suitable word you’d like to offer in its place. What word best suits a situation where someone simply cannot refute a claim made in an argument, so they insist the argument must address some other claim as a deliberate strategy against the claim they cannot refute? Would “incoherent” or “illogical” or “specious” or “phony” or “fallacious” or merely “unscientific” suit you better? I’ll let you suggest whatever word you wish, but more importantly, I want you to argue that ‘asking an argument to answer a question it was not intended to answer’ is a valid defense against the actual claim it makes. Set aside your positioning statements and sour grapes just long enough to do that. You can always go back to doing what you’ve been doing.Upright BiPed
December 23, 2012
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UB:
It’s apparent from your disengagement that you do not wish to argue the point presented in 1351. As is typical of rhetorical defense, your position has been defeated by the logic you ignored in contriving it.
This from the guy who fled precisely these questions for months, only engaged them when they were placed right under his nose, and is now defending himself by changing the definition of "true" and "false" as a way to unsay what he has already said.
Bill deliberately reposts the same quote over and over, but he knows the falsity of the statement doesn’t turn on whether my argument does or doesn’t demonstrate a particular class of cause. The falsity of the claim is tied to Bill asking the argument to do something it was not intended to do. A thermometer cannot tell you how many degrees are in an angle. Claiming that “it can’t” is factually true. Claiming that “it can’t” as an argumentative strategy against the thermometer, is a patently false claim.” Argue it out.
UB has characterized his opening post as presenting observations followed by logical conclusions. But there are no observations in the OP above. Instead, we find a definition followed by a string of assertions. Specifically, "A representation is an arrangement of matter which evokes an effect within a system" is a definition, not an observation. Everything that follows in the OP is built one way or another upon that definition. But definitions are not self-evidently useful or correct. The usefulness of a definition is seen in the phenomena in the world that are picked out out by that definition. Some definitions call out referents and classes in a way that “carve nature at the joints.” Others don’t. Those that do can be useful conceptual tools and may become components of testable scientific hypotheses. Those that don’t have less use or are misleading. Ultimately, the scientific usefulness of a definition, and of hypotheses that may be built upon it, lies in its ability to generate testable empirical predictions. That is how theories become responsive to evidence and guide research. Semiotic theory as articulated above is neither responsive to evidence in that sense, nor capable of guiding research in a way that is scientifically useful. We know that because UB has told us so. UB's reasoning in the OP ends with this conclusion: "The transfer of recorded information in the genome is just like any other form of recorded information." UB has elsewhere stated, "The final conclusion of this Semiotic Argument is that a) genetic information observably demonstrates a semiotic system, and b) it therefore will require a mechanism capable of establishing a semiotic state." It is fair to ask, "so what?" The follow-on questions are obvious (although not so easily asked), and pull for the empirical consequences of those conclusions. UB telegraphed their importance by ignoring them for months, and continues to telegraph that importance by attempting to unsay what he obviously wishes he hadn't said, even at the expense of uttering flatly contradictory statements. Two of those questions are: - What class of mechanism does semiotic theory assert is required to create (result in, cause) the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state? - What class of mechanism does semiotic theory assert cannot create (result in, cause) the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state?" In response UB has affirmed: - It does not follow from semiotic theory "per se" that a particular class or classes of mechanism is required to create (result in, cause) a semiotic state. - Nor does it does not follow from semiotic theory that a particular class or classes of mechanism cannot create a semiotic state. UB objects that in posing these questions I'm "asking the argument to do something it was not intended to do." He is right about that. I am asking the argument to do something that demonstrates scientific value in the sense that I describe in my initial remarks above. Semiotic theory has no such value because it is not intended to have such value. No wonder UB objects. The third and perhaps most important question one could ask in evaluating the theory in a scientific context is the following: - What does a semiotic state entail that a contemporary understanding of the physicochemical interactions evident in the transcription of DNA into proteins does not? This goes directly to both the scientific testability and the utility of semiotic theory. Semiotic theory might yet be found useful if unique predictions arise from it that can guide research. But semiotic theory does not generate unique entailments beyond those that follow from contemporary understanding of the physicochemical interactions evident in the transcription of DNA into proteins: RB:
For “It displays the entailments/the TRI/a semiotic state” to improve upon the current description, testable empirical consequences must follow from that further characterization beyond those that follow from the physiochemical description. As you say, “Like, what it entailed?”
UB in response:
What you say here is flatly untrue. The argument presented above needn’t do any more than it does; it employs universal observation and logical necessity to establish what is materially necessary for the transfer of recorded information. But you want to impose on it questions that it does not answer.</blockquote.
Semiotic theory fails to generate testable empirical consequences. UB has told us so; to ask for testable empirical consequences is to impose on it questions that it does not answer. UB nevertheless insists that semiotic theory can be useful in the sense that the fire tetrahedron is useful. After all, he asks, am I suggesting that we should attempt to apprehend a causal mechanism without understanding what is necessary of it? That, of course, begs the question of whether semiotic theory contributes to our understanding of the system by means of which DNA is translated in to proteins, and therefore what is required of a causal account of the emergence of that system. Such begging aside, UB constructed a illustration in which I am on trial for arson and in my defense utilizes elements of the fire tetrahedron. He insisted that semiotic theory can be similarly useful, in many ways for many people, in evaluating hypotheses regarding the origin of the system by means of which DNA is translated into proteins. Accordingly, I've twice asked UB to provide a similar illustration of the empirical use of the entailments of semiotic theory, at the same (very low) level of detail as he supplied in his one-paragraph arson fantasy. His reply is that the question is "obtuse and ignorant." I suspect he in fact is unable to construct such an example. But perhaps UB has an illustration up his sleeve that will enable him to rescue at least this role for semiotic theory. It is for the forgoing reasons that I argue that semiotic theory as UB articulates it is useless in a scientific context. It's only conclusion is "it therefore will require a mechanism capable of establishing a semiotic state," yet it fails to even broadly constrain the possible mechanisms either by requiring agency or excluding unguided processes. It generates no testable entailments. Its advocate declines to provide examples illustrating remaining possible empirical applications. In short, semiotic theory is an empirical bridge to nowhere, an empirical ship in a bottle. It goes nowhere, as it has no empirical purchase on only issue it purports to address.Reciprocating Bill
December 23, 2012
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UB and Mung, thanks for your replies. I always struggle with making what to me is complex into something concise, versus being long-winded and hard to follow. UB confirmed for me what I had suspected- that some number of ribosomes and associated machinery are shared with the daughter cell. One thing I am not quite clear on is if the information system properties are a necessary precursor to the synthesis of any and all of the machinery involved in the receipt/retrieval of the stored information. Not that this will clear it all up for me, but it will move me in the right direction- I realize it is extremely complicated. This has significant bearing on how I might conceptualize the introduction of information processing capabilities in cells and their precursors. I am inclined to assume that very few processes in the cell's entire life cycle can be reduced to mechanics sans the information processing apparatus. If there were a conceptual pathway for mechanical systems to handle the copying and reading of information (with whichever various mechanisms introducing information change... all irrelevant to this point), from the origin of life up until now - or even from some sort of prokaryotes until now- then I'd think common descent RM/NS advocates might have a small, tiny amount of breathing room. Because at least then you have a core part of what is doing the work of the theory being reduced to mechanical processes enveloping, or facilitating, everything else (potentially anyway). But it seems to me that even this scenario would do very little to solve the core problem: Namely, how within the confines of NDE theory (along with the generous scenario of a mechanical information storage and retrieval system (self-replication and whichever forms of mutation being key parts of the storage I'd think)), the primary information processing attributes could have originated, namely language and the information it describes existing arbitrarily with respect to the medium and without any physical necessity giving rise to it. From what I gather though, the generous scenario described is unrealistic, as even the information processing system itself exists "on top of" ***prior information and its arbitrarily descriptive language. I guess this must be one of those ways in which evolution evolved. (I know I have seen that phrase before- "evolution evolved") ***one possible loophole: I am aware that various organelles, including ribosomes, are present in the human ovum. Not that this fact does anything but make analysis of the system as a whole, over time, more complicated. I don't see it making the explanation of the arrival of information content and information processing apparatus any easier. MrMosis
December 23, 2012
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You are voices in the wilderness, UDers, crying out for every valley of ignorance to be filled with understanding, and every mountain and hill of nonsense to be be brought low; and the crooked to be made straight, and the rough ways to be made smooth and erudite;... Sisyphus didn't have such a thankless task.Axel
December 22, 2012
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