Why Can’t God Be More Like All the Nice People I Know?

Jerry writes,

In this world, a privation, perversion or frustration of the good could mean almost anything since the world is flawed. Not all things people discuss as evil lead to chaos and destruction. The frequently used standard of evil on UD, the torturing of infants, does not lead to chaos. One may find a situation where it might contribute to it but it would be a stretch.

Any evil act, if repeated, becomes an evil habit. Bad habits are inflationary in the sense that they produce an increased proclivity to act that way. The effects are certain but not always immediately evident. There is no such thing as a private vice. All wars, for example, are extensions of the lost war between good and evil that goes on in the soul of the perverted leaders who start them. If these men had won the internal battle for peace in their own soul—if they had not allowed their will to become perverted--they would not have projected their internal war outward. SB: I think evil is, indeed, a privation of the good.

Too vague, could mean anything in this world from a stubbed toe to loss of life. Where is the line drawn? There is a lot in-between.

I don’t think it is too vague. Both examples that you cite represent evil in varying degrees. Remember, definitions must be general, not specific. They must cover a broad range of examples. Specificity comes in the examples. To be general is not to be vague. I think it is [also] a perversion of the will.

Too vague, could mean anything from a minor inconsideration of another to taking their life or torturing them. There is a lot in-between.

Again, I don’t think it is too vague. The will can be perverted in varying degrees (as per my earlier example).

I was not trying to nullify what you wrote, only that it does not get at the problem which is of most relevance to God which is the theodicy issue.

By “it,” do you mean the two definitions? If so, I need to know why you think they fail and which examples you would offer in support that proposition. Keep in mind that unspoken corollaries follow from those definitions: A definition of evil as a “privation of a good” for example, cannot be separated from the definition of the good which has been taken away. What, for example, does “good” mean with respect to moral acts. A good moral act, by definition, is one in keeping with the nature and purpose of a human being. An evil act is one that violates that same nature and purpose. The privation which inevitably follows from an immoral act can, among other things, be the absence of physical comfort, the lost potential for intellectual or spiritual growth, a missed opportunity to practice virtue, or countless other deprivations. It isn’t just limited to environmental, material or economic loss.

I am mainly saying that your definitions are too broad to be of any use and the one by kairosfocus is too narrow.in one sense and too broad on another. Most people when they bring up the element of evil it is in the context of the theodicy issue or how could an all-good, all-knowing, all powerful God allow evil to happen. Thus, it is necessary to be more specific about what the term refers to that would cause one to doubt God.

Again, definitions are supposed to be broad. Evil, for example, accounts for both the sum total of malicious acts and the sum total of their effects, including physical suffering. If my definitions were too broad, then I couldn’t apply them. So we must test them with some examples that you think would invalidate them.

The author of the reading does make an attempt to discuss those types of events that would have to be considered in the theodicy issue. I happen to think that the term “evil” should be dropped altogether and be replaced by examples of the gratuitous suffering and death that are used to deny an all-good, all-knowing, all powerful God.

I like your point and I would agree that breaking things down that way would simplify matters. At the same time, I don’t think it is absolutely necessary. Physical and emotional suffering are subdivisions of evil, which is broader yet in scope. What you perceive as a problem in theodicy I don’t perceive as a problem in the same way. From my perspective, all natural disasters can be explained by the fact that original sin compromised man’s nature, nature itself, and man’s ability to interact with nature. For me, the deeper problem for theodicy is this: Why did God create a world in which the father’s sins (Adam) are visited on his children? In my judgment, this problem can be answered as well. God created us such that we are true moral agents. With the power to cause things, we naturally influence not just ourselves but everyone and everything else as well. Without that power, we would not really be causal agents at all.

The challenge to God is on natural evil and more importantly what the author describes as gratuitous horrible natural evil.

Agreed. However, I think the challenge has been met via the proposition that fallen human nature affected the world of matter and spirit in adverse ways.

I make very little assumptions about the world prior to the Fall other than it was different from our world and heaven.

Don’t you assume that the world was sub-optimal prior to the fall? That assumption may not be valid.

Once it is realized that all such events [natural disasters] even though they are described as horrific are finite in severity and extent, the argument falls apart.

As I understand your argument, the only true evil is the infinite evil of a lost soul. In this sense, you seem to be defining evil in a very restrictive way. By that account, Hitler’s acts were not evil if, as it turns out, some of his victims (or even their persecutors) were ultimately saved. Beyond that, I must point out again that evil is the counterpart to good. To say that there is only one evil is to also say that there is only one good. That would mean that there can be no such thing as a good person, which is defined as one who habitually does good things. You seem to be separating the [good or evil] act from its ultimate consequences [salvation or damnation] as if there was no relationship between the two. That fact is that damnation is the final result of a continuous series of damnable acts. The most serious effect of the fall, in my judgment, was not a compromised or sub-optimal nature. The most serious effect of the fall was man’s compromised intellect and will which, for the first time, formed in him a disposition to do evil things. Man literally perverted his own nature (as well as the natural world around him). While he was originally designed to be good [it was his nature], he now found it easy to do what is unnatural, namely to sin. This is far more serious than any natural disaster because only the former leads to damnation, which you and I agree is the greatest evil of all.

There are further elements of the issue that are important and not discussed and I am hoping to get at those issues. Namely, that the free will argument is applicable to the justification of events described as natural evil and not just limited to events described as moral evil.

This seems to be related to my above comments. StephenB

StephenB, I will try to list the definitions proposed :

A fairly common definition is the privation, frustration or perversion of the good that diverts from potential or purpose and as a result often ends in chaos and destruction.

In this world, a privation, perversion or frustration of the good could mean almost anything since the world is flawed. Not all things people discuss as evil lead to chaos and destruction. The frequently used standard of evil on UD, the torturing of infants, does not lead to chaos. One may find a situation where it might contribute to it but it would be a stretch.

I think evil is, indeed, a privation of the good.

Too vague, could mean anything in this world from a stubbed toe to loss of life. Where is the line drawn? There is a lot in-between.

I think it is a perversion of the will.

Too vague, could mean anything from a minor inconsideration of another to taking their life or torturing them. There is a lot in-between.

In my opinion, nothing that you wrote nullifies anything that I wrote. Indeed, the former seems almost unconnected to the latter.

I was not trying to nullify what you wrote, only that it does not get at the problem which is of most relevance to God which is the theodicy issue. I am mainly saying that your definitions are too broad to be of any use and the one by kairosfocus is too narrow.in one sense and too broad on another. Most people when they bring up the element of evil it is in the context of the theodicy issue or how could an all-good, all-knowing, all powerful God allow evil to happen. Thus, it is necessary to be more specific about what the term refers to that would cause one to doubt God.

Surprisingly, you decided to send me on a reading assignment, the content of which is, for me, of marginal interest. Your examples will suffice.

The author of the reading does make an attempt to discuss those types of events that would have to be considered in the theodicy issue. I happen to think that the term "evil" should be dropped altogether and be replaced by examples of the gratuitous suffering and death that are used to deny an all-good, all-knowing, all powerful God. The challenge to God is on natural evil and more importantly what the author describes as gratuitous horrible natural evil.

As a passing observation, I believe that you hold many unwarranted assumptions about the condition of the world prior to the fall, all of which need to be argued for.

I make very little assumptions about the world prior to the Fall other than it was different from our world and heaven. So we know of three worlds, all different. But it is our world that I am interested in and God's relationship to it. I am trying to bring a different understanding of those events which are called natural, horrific evil and are used to disprove the existence of God. Once it is realized that all such events even though they are described as horrific are finite in severity and extent, the argument falls apart. There are further elements of the issue that are important and not discussed and I am hoping to get at those issues. Namely, that the free will argument is applicable to the justification of events described as natural evil and not just limited to events described as moral evil. jerry

Jerry:

One very key aspect of the events are the severity.

Yes, I agree.

Is this severity, subjective or objective?

An objetively mild evil can be received subjectively as a great evil (getting snubbed), or an objectively great evil can be subjectively shrugged off as a minor evil (abortion). In the first case, the receiver's will is perverted (remember my definition which you omitted) insofar as he overestimate the harm which has been done. In the second case, the interpreter's will is perverted insofar as he underestimates the harm that has been done.

What one thinks is extremely severe, others may think it is of not much consequence. A good example is abortion but this subjective appraisal could be applied to every event designated as evil.

The objective natural moral law and reason, each of which is inseparable from the other, will inform these kinds of determinations. Abortion is an objectively grave evil because it violates an objective moral code. Subjective impressions are irrelevant. We are discussing what is evil, as opposed to what seems evil to those who are ignorant (or dismissive) of the moral law. StephenB

Jerry @33, I cannot, for the most part, make out what you are saying or why you are saying it. I did notice that you omitted one of my definitions of evil and the reason that I offered it. In my opinion, nothing that you wrote nullifies anything that I wrote. Indeed, the former seems almost unconnected to the latter. As a passing observation, I believe that you hold many unwarranted assumptions about the condition of the world prior to the fall, all of which need to be argued for. In keeping with that point, I question the value of injecting a many-worlds perspective into a discussion about the effects of the fall on nature's operation. On the matter of unsatisfactory definitions and the specific reasons why you think they fail, I asked you to provide two examples that we could both examine together. Surprisingly, you decided to send me on a reading assignment, the content of which is, for me, of marginal interest. Your examples will suffice. StephenB

God is not like x.” It certainly does not mean that God does not exist.

Absolutely. The fallacy of the all the arguments from evil is two fold. (maybe a lot more upon reflection) The first is as I have been trying to make is that

so called events are trivial and of no consequence except for some purpose unrelated to the actual suffering. The so-called evil events are a necessary part of the world we find ourselves in. The question is why?

(there are some arguments that say the purpose of the afflictions is to spur humans on and that without such problems we would not discover the world we see.) The second part of the fallacious nature of the arguments is that we assume we know better than God as to what is optimal. We tell Him how it should be done. A very presumptuous attitude with humans. I like to repeat this example based on a lecture I have listened to several times. Michael Sugure in a lecture on Job talks about the seemingly in-comprehensive nature of evil by using the following comparison. We are closer to a slug or worm than we are to God. The slug knows more about us that we could ever hope to know about an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God. We are incapable of knowing what God is like. So

God is not like x

is a truism. We can never hope to learn the truth but we can try to understand some things. Have a good day. jerry

StephenB, I will deal with your comments piecemeal as a long comment gets tedious and less likely to be read and I have work to do besides this.

If those are the conditions, then you will surely win every debate. No matter what the offering, you can simply say, “I am not satisfied.”

I dealt with all the definitions of evil proffered including the one by kairosfocus. If I haven't then present yours. If it is the absence of good which is often used then I might agree but this encompasses nearly if not every action that takes place in the world. As such it it not helpful. Actually I will get back to this later and say we may live in a perfect world in one sense but not another. This assumes that there is more than one world and that we use our conception of the perfection of another world as the measure of perfection these other worlds. The world before the Fall was certainly sub-optimal in many ways, one being the direct knowledge of God was not available to Adam and Eve. These worlds are not the same but if designed by God they are perfect in one sense and not another. The world before the Fall could be one of these worlds but the world after the Fall could be another world, both perfect in their own ways. Then there is our perception of heaven, the gold standard. If we live in a perfect world (one designed by God) then all that takes place in the world might be a fulfillment of that perfect design but a design different from the other world(s). As such can anything be said not to be in harmony with the design if it was foreseen and set in motion by God. In other words, I believe Leibniz was right and we live in the "best" of all possible worlds. The only question is what is meant by "best."

I have always held that more than one definition is evil necessary because of the many aspects involved: From one perspective, I think evil is, indeed, a privation of the good. From another perspective, I think it is a perversion of the will. It matters whether one is talking about the intention of the act or the consequences of the act.

You are making my point. We should have terms for each and use them appropriately but nearly every commenter just sprinkles in the one word as if it means the same thing. There is the event that causes suffering or death that is looked at from the perspective of the person doing it, the person receiving it, the person observing it and it this latter case, the closeness of the person observing it to the actual event. One very key aspect of the events are the severity. Is this severity, subjective or objective? What one thinks is extremely severe, others may think it is of not much consequence. A good example is abortion but this subjective appraisal could be applied to every event designated as evil. I suggest you read the link above referred to by VJ Torley as it tries to order so called "evil" events. (it is very long and it seems to have influence Dr. Torley as parts of it were in his OP on Sean Carroll) I have not finished with the article but have found nothing in it so far that is not handled if one considers all the events so designated as evil, as finite in both magnitude and extent. The question then becomes what is the purpose of these events. The use of free will takes care of a lot of the objections to events where humans are directly responsible for the event. Usually there is intention involved with this but there are occasions where there was no intention and unfortunate things happened. Free will in one sense does not take care of natural evil but it may be essential for natural evil to exist in order for free will to operate freely. That is the argument that seems to be missing from the theist explanations for the reason so called evil events exist. Can we truly be free to choose if the world is so ordered that the good always win, the bad punished and nothing bad happens to us here. No, the key is to understand there must always be a divide. See the probabilistic argument made in the article for atheism. Here is the link again: http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-evi/ Bye for now. This was too long. jerry

Just for fun, 1. Assume some kind of trans-universe creator exists 2. Suffering exists on earth (no assumption required) Make a list of plausible scenarios how this could be so. Believe me, there's a quite a few scenarios possible. One that I don't see discussed much is that humans suffer because we deserve it. Apparently people shy away from the idea that there is a pre-existing "world of spirits", i.e, some interdimensional reality of conscious entities, that are us, and that we who are living as mortal humans now, are attached to this world though limited brains. Due to our limitations of brains that we are attached to, have no direct access to any more to our Real World, the "world of spirits", and that when we did have direct access we may have done "bad things" in that state that landed us on a cursed planet, a prison planet, if you will, where Really Bad Things are available for us to do to each other, to cause suffering and experience suffering while we're imprisoned here to some end, the knowledge of which we no longer have access to. This effectively removes any blame from the creator, since we deserve what we get here because we chose to enter this limited state. We "ate from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil" when we could have "eaten from the Tree of Life" from very beginning. But it's only a temporary situation. Free will effectively explains theodicy IF one accepts the view that the creator basically has no choice but to create, and that, like the creator, "spirits", i.e, individual conscious entities, do not have a beginning, and the whole goal of the creator is to unify the spirits as much as possible, to create as much stability in the uncreated "world of spirits" as possible. CentralScrutinizer

Hi Jerry “I object to the use of the term by anyone” Fair enough. You’ll appreciate that selective demands for definitions could be used as a sophist trick to wreck a discussion, either by starting off on that infinite regress or by raising pedantic and irrelevant micro-objections to any definition offered. I was being over-wary of this possibility and, as a result, over-suspicious of your motives. Not very charitable of me: I apologise. And back to the discussion: “How can one tell if a proposition is true without a definition of its terms.” Haven’t I just shown you? What is missing from: 1. All men are mortal 2. Socrates is a man 3. Socrates is mortal that a definition supplies and only a definition can supply? That particular syllogism is all over the place, I’ve yet to see anyone define “man”, “mortal” or “Socrates” when using it. So we can use logic “positively” without definitions. We can also use definitions free logic “negatively”. Your example of a valid argument with false premises can still lead to useful outcomes, and lead to them because it is valid. If we examine the chariot and find it not to be a rock then we establish that either “all birds are rocks” or “this chariot is a bird” are false (inclusive “or”), and does so without any of the terms being defined. The argument wouldn’t tell us this were it invalid. “All birds are rocks, this chariot is a marsmallow” is compatible with both rock and non-rock chariots and, so, observing that the chariot is not a rock tells us nothing about either of the two premises. Before thinking that finding out “this or that is false” is pretty trivial consider the state of knowledge in the early nineteenth century. From two of the propositions believed, a picture of the solar system (SS) and Newton’s mechanics (NM), the orbit of Uranus and, following from that, Uranus’ apparent position in the sky (UR) were calculated. The problem was that when they looked Uranus wasn’t in that apparent position: either SS or NM was wrong. Urbain Le Verrier calculated how the solar system would have to be for the argument “NM, SS thus UR” to be true with the existing value of NM and the observed value of UR. To get this to work he needed to add a planet to SS, which he did, then he calculated where the planet would be seen and got someone to have a look. The planet was observed, they called it Neptune: they found a whole planet by taking validity seriously (but not by defining everything). Of course, as validity is independent of the definitions of terms there are criticisms to be leveled at arguments and defenses against those criticisms that are nothing to do with the definitions of the terms. This is where we came in, with Barry Arrington’s claim that “[The Argument from Evil] is true only if it is false.” (because evil doesn’t exist unless God does). To which my reply: if God doesn’t exist and so evil doesn’t exist then God doesn’t exist. “Definitions are essential for good logic.” We can reason, quite correctly, to a conclusion without defining terms. We can use logic as an essential part of finding out that some propositions are false without defining terms and we can criticise and defend arguments purely on the basis of formal logic. What else is there for definitions to do? Definitions can’t tell us whether the argument is valid: that is independent of definitions. It can’t tell us if the premises are true or not; to tell whether or not “birds are rocks” is true we’d have to, at a minimum, have a look at some birds. We might have a problem, as you point out, if you mean something different to me by “birds”. But: “If there is something that is not clear, I will re-phrase it.” Pre-cisely. We may need to clarify on occasion, but we do not need to define in order to clarify. What’s wrong with the following scenario? Jerry: Birds are rocks. Tony: By birds do you mean those tweety, flappy things? Jerry: No, I mean the lying still made out of minerals things Either of us using a full-on definition would appear to be overkill. Far from being necessary for logic I see no way that definitions are even useful. Eric: “Fleshing it out in other terms, the argument from evil is essentially as follows: “If God were like x, then y would not exist.” “y exists. Therefore no god.” Even if we accept this proposition 100% at face value, the only thing we can conclude from the argument is that “God is not like x.” It certainly does not mean that God does not exist. No. The only valid conclusion is “God is not like x or there is no God” “Unfortunately, your logic took leave a while ago.” ~ Hmmm. Tony Lloyd

Tony Lloyd @3:

Assume God. Argument from evil No God

Unfortunately, your logic took leave a while ago. You started off alright with your commentary, but then went astray with a glaring non-sequitur. Let's correct your approach to be more accurate: 1. Assume God. 2. Argument from evil (i.e., failed argument that, ironically, itself depends on a particular and strange definition of God). 3. No relevance to God's existence one way or another, because the argument is flawed. There. Fixed it for you. ----- Fleshing it out in other terms, the argument from evil is essentially as follows: "If God were like x, then y would not exist." "y exists. Therefore no god." Even if we accept this proposition 100% at face value, the only thing we can conclude from the argument is that "God is not like x." It certainly does not mean that God does not exist. The whole argument against God's existence due to the existence of evil is completely failed beyond repair. Eric Anderson

Eric, I think you are argument is: 1. The materialist believes that particles in motion account for everything real meaning, real purpose, real values, etc. “In other words, at some stage a particular arrangement of molecules produces these non-materialistic things.” 2. The theist also believes that “at some level, we are what we are because a bunch of molecules were put together in a particular arrangement — thus creating us.” 3. Thus, the only difference between the materialist view and the theists view is that the materialist has no answer for the question of where did the molecules come from and the theist does (i.e., God).

Not quite. Is is more nuanced than that. Also, I should point out that I am not making an argument against any theistic position, per se. Simply pointing out that the quick rejection of the materialistic viewpoint is not quite as simple, straight-forward, and automatic as we might like to think. It is not the slam dunk that is sometimes supposed. To be sure, there are aspects of the materialist storyline that might not pass an evidential test, but the blanket assertion that any sense of morality evaporates under the materialist storyline at least misrepresents the materialistic storyline as many materialists would see it. First of all, some materialists do not take the viewpoint that because everything is the result of purely natural processes that there is no such thing as good and evil. Some might take that viewpoint, to be sure. However, it is not necessary. Obviously a materialist could argue that good and evil are definitional propositions that exist as subjective criteria in a particular place and time (i.e., the moral relativists). More relevant for the point I was making, however, some materialists take the view (in the spirit of Huxley) that at some point in the evolutionary process things like intelligence, consciousness, good (and therefore evil) arose in an "emergent" fashion. Now, we can take a contrary position and argue that this is all nonsense, but we would hopefully do so on the basis of evidence, rather than definitional fiat. Stepping back for a moment, it is OK to ask: Is it possible that a certain arrangement of matter could result in, say, intelligence? Whatever we may think the answer to that question is, the question itself is perfectly legitimate -- and quite interesting. Certainly the theist and the materialist both think that a certain arrangement of matter results in, for example, a body that can experience, perceive, feel pain, feel pleasure, and so on. At that level (and, yes, I am careful to limit it to that level), there is little difference in the story: a certain arrangement of particles results in such a system. Now, there are two important places where the materialist story and the theistic story begin to deviate: First, the materialist, in addition to describing the body as a wonderfully remarkable system, also asserts that aspects beyond the body's basic ability to sense and feel and experience -- things like consciousness and intelligence -- also arise from a particular arrangement of matter. As you point out, many theistic thinkers reject this idea. (Although as I also pointed out, they do so by relying on somewhat esoteric and often quite nebulous concepts like "spirit" or "God's sustaining influence" or the "ocean of being" like the quote you cited.) Second, the materialist asserts that materialism is all there is. In that sense the materialist of course differs from the theist who asserts that there is something beyond the physical and the material. The theist, in an attempt to explain, might further assert that there is some primal quality or essence to an individual that constitutes the real intelligent, thinking, conscious part of that individual, and that the latter somehow interacts with the physical body. So, yes, there are important differences between a materialist position and a theistic position. And I think the evidence as a whole best supports the idea that there is something beyond the physical and the material. Yet I also recognize that a particular arrangement of matter can produce marvelous systems -- indeed systems that we are not even close to fully understanding -- and that at least at that initial basic level, that of the functioning, physical organism, the difference between the materialist and the theist lies not in whether a particular arrangement of matter can result in x, but in whether such a particular arrangement of matter can result from purely natural processes without guiding intervention. Anyway, this is somewhat OT, and is a rather nuanced, though I think important point. ----- As to the main OP, I am already on record on numerous occasions for the position that the argument for God's nonexistence due to the existence of "evil" is a terrible argument, a broken argument, an embarrassing argument for anyone to make. No disagreement from me on that general point. Eric Anderson

Jerry writes,

I will repeat my question which I do not believe anyone has answered satisfactorily.

If those are the conditions, then you will surely win every debate. No matter what the offering, you can simply say, "I am not satisfied." I have always held that more than one definition is evil necessary because of the many aspects involved: From one perspective, I think evil is, indeed, a privation of the good. From another perspective, I think it is a perversion of the will. It matters whether one is talking about the intention of the act or the consequences of the act. Thus, if someone says, "what is your definition of evil?" my likely response would be, "which aspect of evil are you alluding to?"

The real issue with the all good, all knowing, all powerful God is suffering and death due to the laws of nature. That can only be attributed to God, since He created the world and its laws and is responsible for what ensues.

I think a case can be made for saying that humans and even animals can suffer a privation of the good owing to the effects of original sin on nature. There could be a chronology problem, of course, but I think the notion of retroactive fall out can address that objection.

As aside to this, notice that no one will ever attribute what an animal does to another entity as evil due to the animal.

Perhaps it wasn't always that way. Of course, you could come back and say that some animals are natural carnivores and that their prey has always been destined to suffer. However, I think it is possible that our world may not have been designed to operate in exactly that fashion. Perhaps nature, the environment, and the animal kingdom were all adversely affected by man's fall from grace.

Second, the definition of the concept is still too vague to include all the exemplars of the concept. You have described some outcomes of some exemplars but not all.

I don't fully understand the point here. Perhaps a couple of examples would help.

All will be finite in nature and limited suffering. Except one!

I think I know what you are saying here, and I would agree that the ultimate evil is the loss of one's salvation. Everything else would be trivial by comparison. Still, what we do here does play a role in determining our final destiny. Thus, any temporal threat to the health of one's soul, such as an evil influence or temptation--especially if it changes our behavior for the worse--would, in my judgment, qualify as an evil, albeit an evil of far less magnitude than the ultimate evil. StephenB

So has Barry Arrington and so have Torley and Beebe. All five have used the term. Of those five you object to the lack of definition by Torley, Beebe and myself, but not by yourself or Barry. Is this because asking for definitions is a “tactic” used to avoid arguments you find difficult, or is there another reason?

I object to the term since it has no definition that leads to anything consistent. So I object to the use of the term by anyone. I have listed scholarly works that don't define it but speculate on it. This is far from anything new as I objected to the term over 5 1/2 years ago https://uncommondesc.wpengine.com/intelligent-design/is-god-really-good/#comment-176451years ago Here is a comment from over 6 years ago on why I consider the term relative and as such useless. https://uncommondesc.wpengine.com/intelligent-design/the-science-rule-the-christian-darwinist-doesnt-want/#comment-146116 I certainly object to how Barry uses it since this is his thread and I am objecting. It is not the first time I objected to the term. He devoted a whole thread to my supposed ignorance of evil. https://uncommondesc.wpengine.com/intelligent-design/lets-see-if-graham2-sticks-to-his-nihilist-guns/#comment-478373 If you follow it through you will see I never backed down in my dispute with Barry. And by the way, why make this point anyway since it has nothing to do with my objection.

So have you.

I just read all my comments and did not see my use of the word in any definitive way except to refer to events that are classified as moral and natural evil. If there is something that is not clear, I will re-phrase it. Most of the pixels expended were to say there is no consistent definition.

Moving beyond validity to soundness (an argument is “sound” if and only if it is valid and the premises are true), we still have no need of definitions.

This is an incredible statement. How can one tell if a proposition is true without a definition of its terms. In my understanding of Aristotle he is very interested in a good definition. All my propositions were false according to your definitions but the logic was valid. Maybe I define bird, rock and chariot in ways you don't so my logic could be both valid and "sound." Definitions are essential for good logic. jerry

Larry, ” I was taught that part of Aristotelean logic was definitions This reminds me of Sam Harris’ behavior in defending his claim that science can determine morality. He has this tendency to come in with the big claim that science determines morality and, when attacked, argues that science can have something to do with morality. The concept of definitions has been used as an explanation of how logic works. I think though that this owes more to Kant than Aristotle, and does not lead to any idea that before one uses logic one needs to have a definition of terms. It supports the idea that definitions have something to do with logic (however tangential) rather than “terms have to be defined before we use logic”. If the former was what your teachers were telling you, then that doesn’t support “(b)efore we can use Aristotelean logic we have to have a definition of terms” . If your teachers were telling you that definitions are necessary before using Aristotelean logic then you were taught wrong: you’ve just seen, with Socrates is mortal, an Aristotelian syllogism that “runs” perfectly well without defining anything. I don’t see the point of your valid syllogism with untrue premises, nor how definitions would help. Saying that an argument can be factually as well as formally wrong tells us nothing about formality other than that it is insufficient. How would definitions help? What would they do? Does anybody believe that a bird is a rock? What’s important for the syllogism is that a bird is not a rock, whatever else a bird is. What’s important for the other syllogism is that men are mortal, whatever else they are. Imagine that someone did think that a bird was a rock. If you tell them “a bird is a warm-blooded egg-laying vertebrate animal distinguished by the possession of feathers, wings, a beak, and typically by being able to fly” will they change their mind? Only if they think that rocks are not warm-blooded egg-laying vertebrate animals distinguished by the possession of feathers, wings, a beak, and typically by being able to fly. They are not going to get that from the definition of rock: “the solid mineral material forming part of the surface of the earth and other similar planets, exposed on the surface or underlying the soil.” The definition of rock says nothing about whether they are warm-blooded, egg-laying, vertebrate and so on. “Why don’t you try defining the word “evil.” From the above, it is both unnecessary and useless. Secondly, it is impossible to fully define one’s terms. A definition of a term requires more terms to define it. These, being terms, would require definition if we were to fully define terms. The terms used to define the terms used would, in turn need definition and so ad infinitum. We are finite beings and unable to complete infinite tasks. Importantly, it’s distracting. At best. One little part of the Argument from Evil is that “natural” evils become moral evils when a person who produced nature is involved. If God produced nature and made it torture children to death then He tortures children to death. Now is that always “evil”? Messing around with definitions doesn’t answer that: it gets in the way. “Why don’t you try defining the word “evil.” Give it a shot since you used the word.” So have you. So has Barry Arrington and so have Torley and Beebe. All five have used the term. Of those five you object to the lack of definition by Torley, Beebe and myself, but not by yourself or Barry. Is this because asking for definitions is a “tactic” used to avoid arguments you find difficult, or is there another reason? (It's Tony Lloyd btw: the preview of the comment has "Anonymous") Tony Lloyd

Vivid @ 13

What I have not heard from those who put out the various forms of this argument is how God would go about doing that? For instance how would God go about not allowing murder or rape by an individual?

Premise 1: If there is a god he should rush down from heaven in a superman costume to save the day. Premise 2: Since we did not observe that, therefore: Conclusion: there is no god. Shogun

Tony Lloyd #3: Let ‘s go beyond that and accept, for the purposes of argument, that no evil exists if God does not exist. So if there is no God there is no evil.

“In the early days of the German advance into Eastern Europe, before the possibility of Soviet retribution even entered their untroubled imagination, Nazi extermination squads would sweep into villages, and after forcing villagers to dig their own graves, murder their victims with machine guns. On one such occasion somewhere in Eastern Europe, an SS officer watched languidly, his machine gun cradled, as an elderly and bearded Hasidic Jew laboriously dug what he knew to be his grave. Standing up straight, he addressed his executioner. “God is watching what you are doing,” he said. And then he was shot dead. What Hitler did not believe and what Stalin did not believe and what Mao did not believe and what the SS did not believe and what the Gestapo did not believe and what the NKVD did not believe and what the commissars, functionaries, swaggering executioners, Nazi doctors, Communist Party theoreticians, intellectuals, Brown Shirts, Black Shirts, gauleiters, and a thousand party hacks did not believe was that God was watching what they were doing.” - David Berlinski,‘The Devil’s Delusion’. Box

I have just downloaded the article that VJ Torley pointed to titled "The Evidential Problem of Evil" Here is the link again http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-evi/ There essentially no definition of evil offered.

The terms “good” and “evil” are, if nothing else, notoriously difficult to define. Some account, however, can be given of these terms as they are employed in discussions of the problem of evil. Beginning with the notion of evil, this is normally given a very wide extension so as to cover everything that is negative and destructive in life. The ambit of evil will therefore include such categories as the bad, the unjust, the immoral, and the painful. An analysis of evil in this broad sense may proceed as follows:

There is a second related article titled "Logical Problem of Evil" http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/ There is no definition of evil in this article at all. This was offered:

Journalist and best-selling author Lee Strobel commissioned George Barna, the public-opinion pollster, to conduct a nationwide survey. The survey included the question “If you could ask God only one question and you knew he would give you an answer, what would you ask?” The most common response, offered by 17% of those who could think of a question was “Why is there pain and suffering in the world?” (Strobel 2000, p. 29). If God is all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good, why does he let so many bad things happen? This question raises what philosophers call “the problem of evil.”

This confirms my observations of the inability to define this concept and the use of the word should be restricted to very specific cases if at all. These are long articles and maybe can be read in a day but my guess is that most will avoid it. There are also books on the topic and a Teaching Company course. It really shows the complexity of this topic as we take thoughts from one stream and apply it to another as if it had the same meaning. Aristotelean logic at its worst. jerry

The argument from evil does not work because God could be evil. The argument from Evil does not work against the God os Islam because he can choose what he wants to choose. The argument from Evil does not work against the Christian God due to Plantiga's excellent arguments. Dan

All Ps are Q, S is a P, thus S is a Q” is valid,whatever the meanings of “P”, “Q” and “S”

I am always willing to learn but how do we determine if something is P or not. It is one thing to use the form of the argument, it is quite another to use this form when it is nonsense or not true. All birds are rocks, this chariot is a bird, therefore this chariot is a rock. Yes, valid but I was taught that part of Aristotelean logic was definitions. He was interested in truth. I can see Aristotle cringing now.

Is it always evil to torture a child to death? If “yes”, then the Argument from Evil appears sound. Should I take from “I maintain all that we call evil is relative and finite and of no consequence except that it is necessary to accomplish God’s objectives” that you are of the opinion that “no” is the correct answer?

Since I do not believe there is a good definition for evil, the sentence makes no sense to me. If it was reworded

Is it always wrong to torture a child to death?

I would agree. There will always be exceptions but that is another day. For example, if the person was insane, is it wrong? What do we mean by wrong? By the child's point of view, by society's point of view, by God's point of view but certainly not by the actual torturer who could be thinking that what he/she is doing is a positive act. Where would horror movies be without the insane thinking what they were doing is right? And the discussion has moved from natural evil into moral evil. The original post brought up bone cancer, tsunamis etc. The issue with the existence of God is primarily based on natural evil. Why don't you try defining the word "evil." Give it a shot since you used the word. jerry

Jerry: “Before we can use Aristotelean logic we have to have a definition of terms.” No. We do not. Not needing to define terms is almost logic’s main schtick. Logic, Aristotelian or otherwise, looks at the form of arguments and seeks to distinguish those forms that are valid from those that are fallacious without regard to the content of the arguments. (Hence “formally valid”) “All Ps are Q, S is a P, thus S is a Q” is valid,whatever the meanings of “P”, “Q” and “S” and whether or not they have been defined. Similarly,“All Ps are Q, S is a Q, thus S is a P” is fallacious whatever the meanings of “P”, “Q” and “S” and whether or not they have been defined. Moving beyond validity to soundness (an argument is “sound” if and only if it is valid and the premises are true), we still have no need of definitions. To recongise the soundness of the hoary old chestnut of “All men are mortal, Socrates is a man , thus Socrates is mortal” we need define neither “man”, nor “mortal”, nor “Socrates”. We can have got most of our thinking about men, mortality and Socrates hopelessly wrong and the argument is still sound: it is sufficient all men are mortal is true and that Socrates really does happen to be one. Evil does not need to be defined for the Argument from Evil. We need to establish “Evil” or “not Evil” in order to conclude, but not define it. So, (as an example) juvenile bone cancer, is this evil or not? I’ve shown you a way where I will accept that it is not evil; but that involves assuming that God does not exist. On the assumption that you maintain that an omnipotent God exists you also maintain that God allows a universe that tortures a child to death. Is it always evil to torture a child to death? If “yes”, then the Argument from Evil appears sound. Should I take from “I maintain all that we call evil is relative and finite and of no consequence except that it is necessary to accomplish God’s objectives” that you are of the opinion that “no” is the correct answer? Tony Lloyd

I think the definition is useful – as it has been historically. As to the particular case, let’s name a name that shows the point — Nero

Kairosfocus, a couple points: First, no doubt Nero was a bad guy. And I will concede that a lot of what Nero did, people will call evil. But it is all about moral evil, or the suffering and death unleashed by a human. Some will use this to argue against God but the easy defense is that it is the result of another will that God allows for very good reasons. The real issue with the all good, all knowing, all powerful God is suffering and death due to the laws of nature. That can only be attributed to God, since He created the world and its laws and is responsible for what ensues. As aside to this, notice that no one will ever attribute what an animal does to another entity as evil due to the animal. They are then admitting that it is only humans that have will. Second, the definition of the concept is still too vague to include all the exemplars of the concept. You have described some outcomes of some exemplars but not all. I personally believe there is no good definition and the exemplars used will be different from person to person and from time to time. All will be finite in nature and limited suffering. Except one! I will try to read the article linked to by VJ Torley. It is quite long and is one of two on the topic at the site that is using different forms of reasoning to address evil. If I find a definition that is useful, I will let you know. jerry

J: I see, I think someone just put up a lecture course worth of reviews on Darwin's Doubts by Paul Giem. I think the definition is useful - as it has been historically. As to the particular case, let's name a name that shows the point -- Nero, read Suetonius' Lives of the twelve Caesars (but not just before, during or soon after a meal or just before going to bed . . . it is THAT bad). KF kairosfocus

Hi everyone, I'm rather busy at the moment, but here's an article I came across recently, that should interest many readers: The Evidential Problem of Evil by Nick Trakakis (Australian Catholic University), in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It is a pretty substantive article, and it treats the problem very seriously. Cheers. vjtorley

kairosfocus, For some more of my rationale about evil see this remark I made on one of VJTorley's OP's https://uncommondesc.wpengine.com/intelligent-design/is-god-a-good-theory-a-response-to-sean-carroll-part-three/#comment-482118 The main reason I came back to UD after a couple years was to discuss theodicy and secondarily to see what has been said about Meyer's new book. I started thinking about the theodicy issue about 20 years ago long before I knew there was an evolution debate. I had never heard of the term theodicy but thought it odd when I did because I never thought evil was a problem. God allowed it to test us or permitted it because it was necessary to have a meaningful world and in reality evil is not a big deal. I was quite surprised to see how many people thought otherwise. jerry

kairosfocus,

A fairly common definition is the privation, frustration or perversion of the good that diverts from potential or purpose and as a result often ends in chaos and destruction.

Too general to mean anything. How does it point to pain due to cancer in a person and not something like nearsightedness. Neither will rarely if ever cause chaos or destruction. I am not sure that if we had an individual who tortured infants it would lead to chaos or destruction but this is the favorite evil here.

Also, I suggest you look at the previously linked summary on Plantinga’s free will defense.

I have. I do not necessarily disagree with most of what you presented here: https://uncommondesc.wpengine.com/intelligent-design/most-forms-of-the-argument-from-evil-are-incoherent/#comment-483103 See my comment here following your comment about Plantinga: https://uncommondesc.wpengine.com/intelligent-design/most-forms-of-the-argument-from-evil-are-incoherent/#comment-483178 I believe the whole theodicy argument dissolves when one looks at so called "evil" more closely and realizes everything people are calling evil is trivial and has a function. So your proposition 6 is really

6a. The world contains apparently undesirable events (death, pain, emotional afflictions, shortcomings etc.) but they are all trivial and are used for a greater good. 6b. All these undesirable events can be ordered based on several different criteria but when this is done even the most undesirable event will be judged trivial

Now, just what that function is can be debated but free will is certainly part of it. jerry

J: A fairly common definition is the privation, frustration or perversion of the good that diverts from potential or purpose and as a result often ends in chaos and destruction. Also, I suggest you look at the previously linked summary on Plantinga's free will defense. KF kairosfocus

Jerry

I will repeat my question which I do not believe anyone has answered satisfactorily. What does the word “evil” mean?

Perhaps it might be productive to think about what evil is not? You could start with its counterpart which is good, evil is not good. I guess if we knew what is good we can define evil. For sure evil produces effects but it is not a thing. Can evil or good exist without intent and motivation? General question

If an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being (i.e., God) existed, he would not allow evil

What I have not heard from those who put out the various forms of this argument is how God would go about doing that? For instance how would God go about not allowing murder or rape by an individual? Vivid vividbleau

BA: That's him, and nope I did not start it. Did it all by himself, and seems he is writing something he wanted a thought or two on. KF kairosfocus

Despite our continued lack of success in spotting a unicorn, atheists, quantum mechanics (the most successful physical paradigm ever, which you would not have pursued, on principle - while your Brightest and Best aspire to produce serious hypotheses) has revealed that MAGIC is not only a reality, it is at its very core. Get over it. Axel

We always come back to one of Einstein's most wrily perceptive of axioms: 'No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it.' We can certainly see the applicability of that dictum in relation to physics, where, while trying to ape the modus operandi of Einstein, the positively lyrically worshipful deist, and Intelligent Einstein colossus, atheist theoretical physicists, correction: 'conjectural physicists', have signally failed to produce one paradigm-changing giant of the stature of Einstein, Planck and Bohr, not to speak, of course, of Newton and Galileo, both passionate Christians and similarly vocal ID practitioners. Doubtless foreseeing the abyss of folly to which atheists would sink with their inevitably lame adoption of his wise, deistic assumptions, Einstein actually warned against having recourse to his aesthetic criterion or elegance, without reference to empirically-established reality. How would they recognise non-sensual beauty, anyway. It's all about molecules, isn't it? That same level of deism- denial thinking has now spawned the multiverse, rainbows and goodness knows what else. Well, hat-tip to Mae West, goodness would not have figured among their motivations. As if God hadn't made the interface between spirit and matter arcane and mysterious enough, from a theoretical viewpoint they don't want to know anything about QM and the Big Bang that is not necessitated by their need to earn a crust. Wizards and enchanters all. And the Emperor, 'naked as the day that he was born', the multinationals and corporate Leviathons, look set fair to bring down the global economy within a year or two. Well, with a little help from a seemingly, decidedly disaffected God, who is 'scattering the proud in the imagination of their hearts', by doing nothing more than giving them free rein to fulfil Marx's prediction, through massive, transglobal fraud and an insensate rapine of the world's natural resources. Add a spoonful of 'unseasonal' weather patterns to taste. Oh, and not forgetting the seemingly probable Fukushima catastrophe in the pipeline. Axel

EA #1: I think the only way out for the materialist is to propose (as some no doubt do), that at some stage of evolutionary development what was previously but a series of purposeless natural processes gives rise to real meaning, real purpose, real values, etc. In other words, at some stage a particular arrangement of molecules produces these non-materialistic things.

You are saying this, I believe, because morality is about sentient (self-conscious) beings. Obviously, if an event does not affect sentient beings there is no morality involved. IOW if materialism cannot accommodate for consciousness it is excluded from any discussion about morality.

EA #1: Is it possible that a particular arrangement of molecules can give rise to intelligence, consciousness, etc.?

BA #2: The answer to that question is, “no, not even in principle” and this has been known since antiquity. Lucretius knew in the first century BC that his materialism could not in principle be reconciled with consciousness, and he postulated his famous ad hoc “swerve” to dodge the issue. But here we are, thousands of years later, and the materialists are no closer to answering the question, “if particles in motion are all there are, how can those particles become aware of themselves?”

If materialism cannot accommodate for consciousness - and is therefore restricted to eliminative materialism - then there is one more reason why no coherent argument from evil can be made by any materialist. No consciousness no morality.

BA #2: In the interests of full disclosure, Hart also blasts the ID movement as a manifestation of “demiurge” type thinking, because he mistakenly believes that ID is tied to a mechanistic view of design. That is not true, but why it is not true is a topic beyond the scope of our discussion.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this topic. Box

I will repeat my question which I do not believe anyone has answered satisfactorily. What does the word "evil" mean? Do we have a definition? How do we know that what some might call evil, is of any consequence to God? Does what the people here describe as evil, have a purpose? What is that purpose? These are a few unanswered questions but certainly not all.

Let’s start off with something we should be able to agree on: juvenile bone cancer, or the recent Japanese earthquake and tsunami . These are both “natural evils” which, in the asbence of God, are not the result of any act and so, dreadful as they are, they are not “evil”.

Why are these things evil? Before we can use Aristotelean logic we have to have a definition of terms. Why isn't a recurrent pain, evil? Or nearsightedness? Or a storm during a couple's wedding or a stay at a vacation house? Or Barry failure to make quarterback or my failure to make a foul shot in high school and not allow our team to make the playoffs (actually happened and I felt bad for a year afterwards). And why juvenile bone cancer? Are adults excluded? The whole argument from evil will fall apart when one tries to define evil and see it has certain characteristics that limit just what it is. I maintain all that we call evil is relative and finite and of no consequence except that it is necessary to accomplish God's objectives, which by definition we will never be able to understand completely in this world. jerry

Good to hear KF! Although many people may think, if they heard him asking about such abstract things as 'countable infinities and time', he may not be completely back to being himself yet :) ,,, bornagain77

Hey, BA: I see I made it into your clips vault! You made my day! ;) KF PS: The young man is back to being himself, a good sign. Asking about countable infinities and time just now. kairosfocus

F/N: The argument from evil against God has been a publicly acknowledged failure for 40 years, since Plantinga's free will defense [as opposed to theodicy]. And frankly, it has been in serious trouble since Boethius, at the very least, because of the pre-supposed but typically un-addressed prior problem of the good. I thought all significant atheism debaters had got the message not to try to use something that shows them to be dated and/or manipulative. KF PS: Ever had to deal with a judge who routinely has to deal with pretty awful cases? Very nice, highly cultured, unquestionably upright, and utterly deadly serious about upholding justice in defense of the civil peace from the barbarians inside the gates. (Reminds me of my favourite judge, a former beauty queen.) kairosfocus

Simple solution eh Lloyd? A person need not think any of his actions are evil if he simply imagines that God does not exist?

John 3:19 This is the verdict: Light has come into the world, but people loved darkness instead of light because their deeds were evil.

But before we resign ourselves to a world of irrational/nihilistic denialism Lloyd, let's dig a bit deeper shall we? The problem with your simplistic solution to the problem of evil, of denying God's existence, is that most people with common sense hold that objective morality is self evidently true.

Understanding self-evidence (with a bit of help from Aquinas . . . ) - November 30, 2013 Conclusion: Therefore, the amorality of evolutionary materialist ideology stands exposed as absurd in the face of self-evident moral truths. Where, such moral yardsticks imply that we are under government of OUGHT, leading onward to the issue that there is only one serious explanation for our finding ourselves living in such a world — a theistic one. https://uncommondesc.wpengine.com/atheism/understanding-self-evidence-with-a-bit-of-help-from-aquinas/

And as the preceding article, in concise fashion, shows, refusing to acknowledge that objective morality is self evidently true results in logical absurdities. Yet to make the case for objective morality even more watertight, since, as a Christian Theist, I hold that God continuously sustains the universe in the infinite power of His being, and since I also hold that God created our 'inmost being', i.e. our souls, then I also hold that morality is a real, objective, tangible, part of reality that we should be able to 'scientifically' detect in some way. I think this quote from Martin Luther King is very fitting as to elucidating what the Theist’s starting presupposition should be for finding objective morality to be a ‘real, tangible, objective’ part of reality:

“The first principle of value that we need to rediscover is this: that all reality hinges on moral foundations. In other words, that this is a moral universe, and that there are moral laws of the universe just as abiding as the physical laws.” - Martin Luther King Jr., A Knock at Midnight: Inspiration from the Great Sermons of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.

And, contrary to what the materialist/atheist would presuppose, we find much evidence to back up Dr. King’s assertion that “there are moral laws of the universe just as abiding as the physical laws”. For instance, we find that babies have an innate moral sense thus directly contradicting the notion that morals are learned as we grow older: For instance, a caring, loving, touch from the baby towards the mother's uterine wall is found very early on in a baby's development:

Wired to Be Social: The Ontogeny of Human Interaction - 2010 Excerpt: Kinematic analysis revealed that movement duration was longer and deceleration time was prolonged for other-directed movements compared to movements directed towards the uterine wall. Similar kinematic profiles were observed for movements directed towards the co-twin and self-directed movements aimed at the eye-region, i.e. the most delicate region of the body. http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0013199

Even toddlers display a highly developed sense on 'moral justice:

The Moral Life of Babies – May 2010 Excerpt: From Sigmund Freud to Jean Piaget to Lawrence Kohlberg, psychologists have long argued that we begin life as amoral animals.,,, A growing body of evidence, though, suggests that humans do have a rudimentary moral sense from the very start of life. With the help of well-designed experiments, you can see glimmers of moral thought, moral judgment and moral feeling even in the first year of life. Some sense of good and evil seems to be bred in the bone.,,, Despite their overall preference for good actors over bad, then, babies are drawn to bad actors when those actors are punishing bad behavior. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/magazine/09babies-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Please note the highly developed moral sense of justice that was detected in toddlers in the preceding study when even the bad actors enforced moral justice! The following study goes even further in establishing the objective reality of morality by showing that 'Moral evaluations of harm are instant and emotional':

Moral evaluations of harm are instant and emotional, brain study shows – November 29, 2012 Excerpt: People are able to detect, within a split second, if a hurtful action they are witnessing is intentional or accidental, new research on the brain at the University of Chicago shows. http://medicalxpress.com/news/2012-11-moral-instant-emotional-brain.html

Of course, despite the inherent wonder of the preceding study which is inexplicable on atheistic materialism, some atheists will, for whatever reason, try to claim that this instantaneous moral compass which humans have, contra the ‘survival of the fittest, dog eat dog’ mantra, 'just so happened' to evolve to be an instant moral reaction to violent actions (despite the fact that Darwinists cannot even explain how a single neuron of the brain arose in the first place). But the following study, completely contrary to what atheists/materialists would presuppose beforehand, shows that morality is embedded on a much deeper ‘non-local’, beyond space and time, level.

Quantum Consciousness – Time Flies Backwards? – Stuart Hameroff MD Excerpt: Dean Radin and Dick Bierman have performed a number of experiments of emotional response in human subjects. The subjects view a computer screen on which appear (at randomly varying intervals) a series of images, some of which are emotionally neutral, and some of which are highly emotional (violent, sexual….). In Radin and Bierman’s early studies, skin conductance of a finger was used to measure physiological response They found that subjects responded strongly to emotional images compared to neutral images, and that the emotional response occurred between a fraction of a second to several seconds BEFORE the image appeared! Recently Professor Bierman (University of Amsterdam) repeated these experiments with subjects in an fMRI brain imager and found emotional responses in brain activity up to 4 seconds before the stimuli. Moreover he looked at raw data from other laboratories and found similar emotional responses before stimuli appeared. http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/views/TimeFlies.html

As well, the following experiment, from Princeton, is very interesting in that it was found that ‘perturbed randomness’ precedes a worldwide ‘moral crisis’:

Scientific Evidence That Mind Effects Matter – Random Number Generators – video http://www.metacafe.com/watch/4198007 Mass Consciousness: Perturbed Randomness Before First Plane Struck on 911 – July 29 2012 Excerpt: The machine apparently sensed the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre four hours before they happened – but in the fevered mood of conspiracy theories of the time, the claims were swiftly knocked back by sceptics. But it also appeared to forewarn of the Asian tsunami just before the deep sea earthquake that precipitated the epic tragedy.,, Now, even the doubters are acknowledging that here is a small box with apparently inexplicable powers. ‘It’s Earth-shattering stuff,’ says Dr Roger Nelson, emeritus researcher at Princeton University in the United States, who is heading the research project behind the ‘black box’ phenomenon. http://www.network54.com/Forum/594658/thread/1343585136/1343657830/Mass+Consciousness-+Perturbed+Randomness++Before+First+Plane+Struck+on+911 Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research - Scientific Study of Consciousness-Related Physical Phenomena - publications http://www.princeton.edu/~pear/publications.html

There is simply no coherent explanation that a materialist/atheist can give as to why morally troubling situations are detected prior to our becoming fully aware of them. The materialist/atheist simply has no beyond space and time cause to appeal to to explain why the phenomena should happen! Whereas as a Theist, especially as a Christian Theist who believes that the Lord Jesus Christ died and rose again to pay for our sins, I fully expect morality to have such a deep, ‘spooky’, beyond space and time, effect since, of course, I hold that God sustains the universe, and I also hold that we have ‘transcendent souls’, not limited by time and space, which were created by God.

Mark 10:18 “Why do you call me good?” Jesus answered. “No one is good–except God alone. Black Eyed Peas - Where Is The Love? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WpYeekQkAdc

bornagain77

One doesn't need evil to exist for the Argument from Evil to "work". Let's start off with something we should be able to agree on: juvenile bone cancer, or the recent Japanese earthquake and tsunami . These are both "natural evils" which, in the asbence of God, are not the result of any act and so, dreadful as they are, they are not "evil". They could only be called "evil" were there some actor, which in the materialist world is absent. In the abscence of God juvenile bone cancer is not evil, both the theist and atheist should agree on that. Let 's go beyond that and accept, for the purposes of argument,,that no evil exists if God does not exist. So if there is no God there is no evil. Sounds like curtains for the Argument from Evil. But, if there is no God then there s no God! Assume God. Argument from evil No God Assume no God No God Assume either God or no God and we end up at no God. Tony Lloyd

Eric, I think you are argument is: 1. The materialist believes that particles in motion account for everything real meaning, real purpose, real values, etc. “In other words, at some stage a particular arrangement of molecules produces these non-materialistic things.” 2. The theist also believes that “at some level, we are what we are because a bunch of molecules were put together in a particular arrangement — thus creating us.” 3. Thus, the only difference between the materialist view and the theists view is that the materialist has no answer for the question of where did the molecules come from and the theist does (i.e., God). Eric, your view betrays a profound misunderstanding of at least the Christian view of the relation between God and his creation. In fact, it is a view much criticized by David Bentley Hart in his latest book, The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss. Hart writes:

As it happens, the god with whom most modern popular atheism usually concerns itself is one we might call a “demiurge” []: a Greek term that originally meant a kind of public technician or artisan but that came to mean a particular kind of divine “world-maker” or cosmic craftsman. . . . Suffice it to say that the demiurge is a maker, but not a creator in the theological sense; he is an imposer of order, but not the infinite ocean of being that gives existence to all reality ex nihilo. And he is a god who made the universe “back then,” at some specific point in time, as a discrete event within the course of cosmic events, rather than the God whose creative act is an eternal gift of being to the whole of space and time, sustaining all things in existence in every moment.

Your view of God as merely some cosmic tinkerer by whom a “bunch of molecules were put together in a particular arrangement” is not even close to the God of the classical theism of any of the great monotheistic traditions. In the interests of full disclosure, Hart also blasts the ID movement as a manifestation of “demiurge” type thinking, because he mistakenly believes that ID is tied to a mechanistic view of design. That is not true, but why it is not true is a topic beyond the scope of our discussion. Your write:

Thus, the question of whether a particular arrangement of molecules can “produce” or “result in” or “cause to emerge” a living, breathing, thinking, reasoning, loving, intelligent human, is a question that is not necessarily a materialist-vs-design question.

Of course it is a “materialist-vs-design question” question. How can I be so sure? Because I know the answer to another question you ask:

Is it possible that a particular arrangement of molecules can give rise to intelligence, consciousness, etc.?

The answer to that question is, “no, not even in principle” and this has been known since antiquity. Lucretius knew in the first century BC that his materialism could not in principle be reconciled with consciousness, and he postulated his famous ad hoc “swerve” to dodge the issue. But here we are, thousands of years later, and the materialists are no closer to answering the question, “if particles in motion are all there are, how can those particles become aware of themselves?” Hart again:

All of our modern “scientistic” presuppositions may tell us that mind must be entirely a mechanical function or residue of the brain’s neuronal processes, but even the most basic phenomenology of consciousness discloses so vast an incommensurability between physical causation and mental events that it is probably impossible that the latter could ever be wholly reduced to the former. It may well be, in fact, that he widely cherished expectation that neuroscience will one day discover an explanation of consciousness solely within the brain’s electrochemical processes is no less enormous a category error than the expectation that physics will discover the reason for the existence of the material universe. In either case, the problem is not one of pardonably exaggerated hope but of fundamental and incorrigible conceptual confusion . . . It makes sense to say that a photosensitive cutaneous path may be preserved by natural selection and so become the first step toward the camera eye; but there is no meaning-sensitive or category-sensitive patch of the brain or nervous system that can become the first step toward intentionality, because meanings and categories are not physical things to which a neural capacity can correspond, but are instead products of intentional consciousness. By the same token, these questions cannot be answered by trying to show how consciousness can be built up from the raw accumulation of the purely physical systems and subsystems and modular concrescences constituting conscious organisms. At some stage of organic complexity . . .a qualitative abyss still must be bridged.

Barry Arrington

Barry: I think the only way out for the materialist is to propose (as some no doubt do), that at some stage of evolutionary development what was previously but a series of purposeless natural processes gives rise to real meaning, real purpose, real values, etc. In other words, at some stage a particular arrangement of molecules produces these non-materialistic things. Now we might be quick to react and accuse the materialist of an outrageous non-sequitur. But before I do that, I've realized that such a claim is not all that different from a claim made by many theists: namely, that meaning, purpose, intelligence, rationality, and so on (at least insofar as they relate to us mortals) came about because of our creation. That is, at some level, we are what we are because a bunch of molecules were put together in a particular arrangement -- thus creating us (or Adam and Eve or whomever). Thus, the question of whether a particular arrangement of molecules can "produce" or "result in" or "cause to emerge" a living, breathing, thinking, reasoning, loving, intelligent human, is a question that is not necessarily a materialist-vs-design question. Indeed, AI struggles with this very issue (i.e., is it possible?), and does so in a design-centric sense. So the materialist proposes that a particular arrangement of molecules can produce all that we see. The theist (at least of many stripes) proposes that a particular arrangement of molecules can produce much of what we see. The theist presumably also resorts to more esoteric notions of "spirit" or "soul" and the like. There may be excellent reasons for believing in the latter, but I've realized that I cannot be too quick to condemn the former aspect of the materialist creation story -- at least in principle. Is it possible that a particular arrangement of molecules can give rise to intelligence, consciousness, etc.? That is indeed a very interesting question. Whether the probabilistic resources of the known universe give the materialist creation story anything beyond a laughable shot in the dark at producing such an arrangement of molecules, is of course a separate question. ----- As to the specific statement at issue, I am not impressed by the idea that God should conform himself to commonly accepted morality. Why on earth would we think that? The logic is missing somewhere. Eric Anderson