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Why do evolutionary psychologists exist?

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A reader wrote to me to say,

I greatly enjoy your writing and I would like to ask your opinion about something I really find puzzling.

Well, once someone has decided to praise my writing, how can I resist responding? Anyway, this person goes on to say,

My question concerns the so-called agent detection device” and the affirmation that it disproves God’s existence beyond any reasonable doubt.

Sounds like a scam to me, but then I have shut the door on the feet of so many people selling winter home heating plans that I may have an innate door-shutting mechanism that “evolutionary psychology” can explain … (Like, it would never have anything at all to do with suspicion that the new plan would end up sticking me with more expenses than the present one – or anything else that suggests that the human mind is real, right?)

According to many experimental studies, human beings seem to have an innate mechanism enabling them to identify the presence of an agent under some circumstances. ( if one is in a deep wood, the shuffling of trees and bushes and a sudden silence would lead one to believe some creature is present).

Well, all I can say is, when that happens to me in the deep woods, I institute my wilderness survival plan immediately.

Admittedly, the last time that happened to me, wandering down a trail in Muskoka, the creature I nearly collided with was a fox that had apparently missed his rabbit. So the fox ran off. But what if it had been a bear who had missed his deer? …

Anyway, my correspondent went on to explain,

However, this mechanism can easily fool us. What if we are, for instance, alone in an old house and hear some noise. We may be inclined to assume, too easily, that someone or something must be there, even if other explanations (like wind) would be much more likely.

Okay, not me. I’ve never had any trouble detecting the difference between, say, a fox and a ghost.

Not that I believe in ghosts. I figure, either a spirit is a holy soul or it is not. If it is a holy soul, I need not worry. And if it is not a holy soul, it would never approach a baptized and confirmed Christian like me.

True, during high summer, the floorboards of old houses can start to creak. It can sound like someone is walking there, due to the wood’s adjustment to the temperature difference between day and night. I learned that as a small child.

(This was especially useful information for us girls because we were often yakking far into the night when we should have been asleep. … So it was important for us to know whether an adult was sneaking in to check on us, as opposed to natural night noise that we could ignore.)

My correspondent advises me that evolutionary psychologists think that this “agent detection” mechanism is hyperactive and therefore completely unreliable.

That doesn’t sound right to me. (Admittedly, not much about “evolutionary psychology” – a discipline without a subject – sounds right to me. But this “agent detection” stuff sounds especially unright.)

I wrote back and said, essentially,

I am nearly 60 years old, and have often faced real danger – and have never found the mechanism unreliable at all.

In every situation in which I suspected real danger, I was right to be concerned.

Yes, false alarms are common, but people learn to ignore them after a while.

If the mechanism is so unreliable, why am I still here? Why are you? Why is anyone?

Re God: I never thought God existed on those terms! I assumed it was because of the majesty and fine tuning of the universe and the moral law, and reason and revelation.

However, I have never uncovered a really good reason for why evolutionary psychologists exist, apart from taxpayer-funded universities. But if someone comes up with one, please let me know.

Comments
Mr TCS, As a working clinical psychologist, I was wondering if you could share something with us. First let me say that I would never ever ask you to violate the confidentiality your clients deserve. Have you ever had a patient that described having an impression, either auditory or purely mental, that God was communicating directly with them? If so, is there a clinical protocol for deciding if this person is actually receiving a message from the Creator, or is suffering from disturbance? I realize this might not be something they teach in school, but if you have had any experience with such people, have you developed your own protocol? I hope it is clear that I am asking with the greatest respect for your practice of your profession. If you feel this is off topic for the thread or inappropriate, I accept your reason not to answer. Thank you.Nakashima
May 3, 2009
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Hi TCS, I can't find a study I read of last year and hope maybe you can help. Are you aware of the one (Dutch?) in which atheists/agnostics were found to be less apt than believers to see patterns and designs in computer images? The kicker is, the designs actually existed and they were unable to see them. I have been unable to find it again via Google. Thanks.Charlie
May 3, 2009
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As a clinical psychologist, I have no use for evolutionary psychology. It contributes nothing practical to the understanding of the human mind, and most often amounts to little more than story telling. That said, it is about as useful as the average evolutionary scientific field. Let's extend the hyperactive agency detection idea a little further. By attributing religious belief to a "hyperactive" agency detector, there is an implicit point being made that those who are atheist have a normally active agency detector. Linking this to theory of mind, one might infer that atheists have a less well-developed theory of mind, which could be related to quantifiable biological processes. Heck, there may even be a mutation that causes them to have a hypoactive theory of mind, which has a positive side effect of having a normally active agency detector. Would one of the atheists here please conduct a short personal experiment? Please go outside and see if you are able to see any faces or other objects in the clouds. This will be helpful in examining the idea of pareidolia in the areligious. Perhaps we could even get some grant funding to examine this further. Hold on a second, I'll save you some time. Do you see anything here? Of course this is all nonsense, and contributes nothing at all to the good of society or the lives of individuals. But speculation can be an enjoyable pasttime, which will likely be the subject of future research.TCS
May 3, 2009
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vjtorley:
If you’re looking for a book that argues along those lines, you might like to try Daniel Dennett’s book, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Viking Penguin, 2006 )... I don’t have a copy of the book, but I understand that Dennett has argued that religion arises form a Hyperactive Agent Detection Device [HADD].
Dennett's position isn't that simple. The HADD, which originated with Justin Barrett, is just one of many factors to which Dennett attributes the origins of folk religions. And he doesn't argue that religions are necessarily wrong; rather his primary thesis throughout the book is that religions, like everything else, have historical origins and "free floating rationales" that should be subject to examination, given their importance.Diffaxial
May 3, 2009
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There are significant epistemic problems with the program of evolutionary psychology, but also significant insights to be had by thinking about human psychology and human behavior, and the relationship of those to human neurobiology, in evolutionary terms. The epistemic problems concern the direction of inferences and the soundness of those inferences, particularly with respect to human psychological features that are purported to have arisen in their entirety long after the divergence of the hominid line from the other great apes. The hypothesis is that human psychological and cognitive functioning developed many unique features due to selection within the "environment of evolutionary adaptedness," most often (in EP) the Pleistocene (the period from approximately 1.8 million years ago to 10,000 years ago.). However, we have no direct way of knowing with any precision what those selection pressures were. Although reasonable surmises are possible, these don't have the specificity required to generate many testable hypotheses, and we often end of inferring features of that selective landscape from current psychological research rather than driving psychological research with hypotheses arising from an evolutionary perspective. In short, psychology may have more to tell us about human evolution than evolutionary psychology can tell us about psychology. The picture improves significantly, however, when those inferences are augmented by additional findings, such as findings from neurobiology, cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and comparative primatology. A large body of careful and often ingenious research from within these fields has enabled us to "triangulate" upon evolutionarily derived psychological and cognitive features in a way that is both informative about out evolutionary past and drives substantial current empirical investigation in all of these fields. "Theory of Mind" is perhaps the most investigated of these phenomena. A large literature addressing theory of mind has emerged over the last 30 years from a remarkable counterpoint between primatology and developmental psychology. Questions regarding the ability of the great apes to attribute mental states to others (see Premack & Woodruff's seminal 1978 paper, "Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind") have been transposed to a human developmental context, contributing to the discovery of a rich and largely unsuspected cache of cognitive competencies in infancy and early childhood. These competencies are best understood as evolutionary adaptations. A propensity to represent others’ behavior in terms of underlying states of attention, knowledge, desire, intent, and belief appears to be one such adaptation. Many nonhuman primates, particularly the great apes, exhibit sensitivity to several of these states. As examples, chimpanzees display sophisticated gaze-following, are sensitive to what their conspecifics have seen and therefore know as they compete for foodstuffs, engage in deception that may include the misdirection of competitors’ attention, discriminate intentional and accidental behaviors, acquire referential gestures in captivity with no explicit training, and imitate sequences of actions in a way that suggests an appreciation of others’ goals. The latter is a probable basis (along with other forms of social learning) for cultural variations of many social and foraging behaviors across populations. These elements of theory of mind were also very likely present in the ancestor common to human beings and chimpanzees. Human theory of mind also includes many elements that are absent in other primates, however. Most strikingly, from 12 to 24 months of age the gaze-following of human infants is folded into uniquely human episodes of coordinated joint attention, social referencing, and triadic interaction that incorporate an external object or other shared referent. It is also through joint attention that infants discern adult referential intent and disambiguate the referents of novel words. With language comes the capacity to express propositions (beliefs that…, desires that…, intentions that…), and with propositional speech children attain the ability to fully represent others as in possession of mental states, including states of belief (and false belief). By age 4 years children become full participants in the sense that we share “contentful and causally efficacious mental states” that impel, explain, and justify our actions, and thereby represent others as intentional beings like the ourselves. All of this research has been founded upon an evolutionary perspective, and many of these discoveries arose as a result of the heuristics of a broadly construed evolutionary psychology. Posts such as the above do this exciting (and difficult) work into the origins of some of our deepest human characteristics a disservice. Denyse, in your book The Spiritual Brain you and Dr. Beuaregard describe findings that are entirely consistent with an evolutionary view of some quite fundamental human characteristics. For example, you reported the efforts of Jeffrey Schwartz to understand OCD through neuroimaging. On page 128 you describe his conclusions:
Schwartz noted that the most recent (and thus most sophisticated) prefrontal parts of the human brain, in evolutionary terms, are almost entirely unaffected by OCD. That is why patients perceive compulsions as alien. They are alien to the most characteristically human parts of the brain. To the extend that the patient's reasoning power and sense of identity remain largely intact, they can actively cooperate with their therapy.
In short, the human ability to reason over a representation of one's identity and one's behavior in the context of one's place in the world - sophisticated representational skills that are the foundation of some our most characteristically human psychological competencies - are generated by specific neural structures of recent evolutionary origin that lie in the prefrontal areas of the brain. Therefore some account of the evolutionary emergence of these quintessentially human psychological structures and characteristics must be the right account, although the specifics of that evolutionary story may never be knowable. That is a very intriguing idea, one that deserves further research, as does ongoing inquiry into human theory of mind. That is why evolutionary psychology exists. (The existence of evolutionary psychologists has more to do with parental canoodling in recent decades, but that's another story.)Diffaxial
May 3, 2009
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Allem MacNeill #3 Your correspondent wrote:
My correspondent advises me that evolutionary psychologists think that this “agent detection” mechanism is hyperactive and therefore completely unreliable.
If you're looking for a book that argues along those lines, you might like to try Daniel Dennett's book, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Viking Penguin, 2006 ), 108-109. See Angus Menuge's presentation, "Does Neuroscience Leave Room for God?" at http://72.14.235.132/search?q=cache:RmM-hvdTpdIJ:www.arn.org/docs/menuge/am_doesneuroscienceleaveroomforgod.ppt I don't have a copy of the book, but I understand that Dennett has argued that religion arises form a Hyperactive Agent Detection Device [HADD].vjtorley
May 3, 2009
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As a matter of fact, I went to my bookshelf and dug out my copy of Boyer's Religion Explained and searched for any statement similar to this one:
"[E]volutionary psychologists think that [our] “agent detection” mechanism is hyperactive and therefore completely unreliable."
My copy is falling apart from overuse and has my underlining and annotations on almost every page. I didn't remember anything like that quote in the book, but just spent about an hour combing through my annotations looking for something like it. My conclusion: as I suspected, it's not there, nor is there anything in Boyer's book upon which someone might draw such a conclusion. That is, nowhere in Boyer's book is there a sentence, paragraph, page, section, or chapter in which he asserts or concludes that we have a unitary "intentional agency detector", nor that this single "agency detector" is "hyperactive", and most importantly that this therefore implies that our perceptions relating to God or religion are "unreliable." On the contrary, Boyer provides a very thorough analysis of what various religions consist of in the broad diversity of human cultures, and how regularities in what constitutes religion cross-culturally are correlated with mental functions that have been identified and studied by cognitive psychologists. His conclusion is that there is a surprisingly large number of different "mental modules" that contribute to our tendency to believe in the content of religions, and that most of these mental modules can be (and indeed have been) studied using empirical methods. To be as specific as possible, he does not conclude anywhere in the book that Gods or other supernatural beings do or do not exist, nor that the alleged "unreliability" of our "innate agency detectors" (stemming from it's/their "hyperactivity") either rules out (or rules in) the actual existence of God(s) or other supernatural agents. Here is as close as he gets to writing explicitly about this:
"...people who think that religion is true (or their version of it is, or perhaps other, still-to-be-discovered version is) will find little here to support their views and in fact no discussion of these views. [Emphasis added] Boyer, P. (2001) Religion Explained; The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought, Basic Books, ISBN #0465006957, pg. 48
His book, in other words, contains an investigation of the phenomenon of religion, without any speculation whatsoever as to whether and religion (or religions) are either true or false.Allen_MacNeill
May 2, 2009
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Start with Pascal Boyer and work your way out from there.
That's not very specific, Denyse. Are you referring to Religion Explained, the book Allen MacNeill referred to in #3? Assuming that's your source, I don't have access to that book right now, but surely you do if you're relying on it for the proposition that evolutionary psychologists think that the agent detection device "disproves God’s existence beyond any reasonable doubt" and is "completely unreliable." So, please provide a citation to where Pascal Boyer asserts that the agent detection device "disproves God’s existence beyond any reasonable doubt" and is "completely unreliable." After you provide your source, I'll be happy to go confirm it at the library. (I suspect Allen would be able to check it as well.)Ludwig
May 2, 2009
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International Journal of Fun and Games – You’re too Clever – Gotcha!,sparc
May 1, 2009
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Thanks Allen. As a regular reader of your rebutal posts it is always refreshing to hear an explanation so clearly given. I'm a person who became interested in the furor surrounding ID since Dover, and believe Miss O'Leary needs to punch a little more convincingly if she truly wishes to contribute further to a debate existing mainly in the North of America, cyberland,and the courts, (where it has yet to register any returns on effort expended - surely a debate on science should be held by scientists, we amateurs can follow as best we can, and be deeply interested to be certain, as I am,, but what can we effectively contribute, not being experts in the fields because we have not studied it our entire lives). To Denyse, being a moderately sized fish in a tiny pond is proof of neither writing ability, nor fan appeal; is it? Rob.rvb8
May 1, 2009
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Sorry, I somehow deleted the rest of the second paragraph in my previous post. Here it is in its entirety: "Agency detection is part of what is known as the “theory of mind” (TOM), which is the ability to infer the existence and intentions in other minds than our own. The well-known phenomenon of pareidolia (in which people “see” human faces in clouds, rocks, and so forth) is probably a side-effect of the operation of our IAD."Allen_MacNeill
May 1, 2009
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Your correspondent wrote:
"My correspondent advises me that evolutionary psychologists think that this “agent detection” mechanism is hyperactive and therefore completely unreliable."
Your correspondent is deeply confused about the characteristics of the mental module that has become known as our "innate agency detector" (IAD). First of all, there has been a great deal of empirical research into the characteristics of the IAD, both in humans (especially infants) and in some primates. Here's a blogpost in which research into such a detector is described: http://scienceblogs.com/mixingmemory/2007/10/do_infants_have_an_innate_spid.php Agency detection is part of what is known as the "theory of mind" (TOM), which is the ability to infer the existence and intentions in other minds than our own. The well-known phenomenon of pareidolia (in which people "see" human faces in clouds, rocks, and so forth) In both the case of the IAD and the TOM (and probably also pareidolia), virtually all of the very complex information processing that goes into infering and identifying "agents" and their intentions takes place unconsciously. One of the first researchers to study these phenomena is Dan Sperber, a French anthropologist currently a Research Director at the Jean Nicod Institute, CNRS. Pascal Boyer (currently Henry Luce Professor of Individual and Collective Memory at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri and author of Religion Explained) was one of Sperber's students, and has applied some of the central concepts and findings about IAD and TOM to the development of religion in human cultures. Scott Atran (currently research director in anthropology at the Jean Nicod Institute of the French Centre national de la recherche scientifique, and author of In gods We Trust) has also done considerable empirical research into the origin, development, and evolutionary dimensions of the IAD and TOM and their relationship to religion. All three of these authors and researchers are very careful to point out that their research can in no way be interpreted as either confirming nor denying the actual existence or non-existence of any supernatural entity (demons, gods, spirits, etc.) Indeed, some have argued that the evolution of the IAD and TOM have made it possible for us to actually identify the existence of such supernatural entities, which appears to be a characteristic unique to humans. As for the IAD being "hyperactive", this refers to the tendency for the IAD to produce "false positives". That is, it identifies intentional agents in a great many situations, in some of which such an agency clearly does not exist. The evolutionary argument for this tendency to produce false positives is simple: the consequences of inferring agency where it does not exist are mild at worst (as in the case of initially having the feeling that there is a predator stalking you in the woods, when in fact it's just the wind rustling the leaves). However, the consequences of not inferring agency where it does in fact exist can be deadly. One of the students (Elaine Broaddus) in my notorious 2006 "evolution and design" seminar at Cornell wrote a brilliant paper summarizing the theory of innate agency detection and its evolutionary implications. She also pointed out that autistics have been hypothesized to have a defective IAD and TOM, which would explain many (although not all) of their behavioral signs and symptoms. You can download a copy of Broaduss research paper (and read some comments about it) here: http://evolutionanddesign.blogsome.com/ So, to summarize: 1) the existence and operation of a putative innate agency detector (especially in human infants) has been inferred on the basis of considerable empirical research; 2) the operation of our IAD is biased toward inferring agency in many different, extremely variable environmental contexts; this makes it prone to producing false positives; 3) the existence of the IAD and its tendency to produce false positives is explained by the evolutionary context in which it is presumed to have evolved; 4) in any case, the IAD and TOM have not (indeed, cannot) be used to either verify or falsify the existence of supernatural agents; and 5) some people have asserted that the IAD and TOM have evolved in order to make it possible for us (and, perhaps, other sentient organisms) to be able to detect and appreciate the attributes of supernatural entities.Allen_MacNeill
May 1, 2009
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Start with Pascal Boyer and work your way out from there.O'Leary
May 1, 2009
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Denyse, You report that your correspondent wrote of the
"agent detection device" and the affirmation that it disproves God’s existence beyond any reasonable doubt.
and that
evolutionary psychologists think that his “agent detection” mechanism is hyperactive and therefore completely unreliable.
"Disproves God's existence"? "Completely unreliable"? Could you please point me to your source for the proposition that evolutionary psychologists make either of these claims? (I'm assuming you wouldn't just take the word of a reader about what evolutionary psychologists think without doing your own research.)Ludwig
May 1, 2009
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