WJM is on a Roll

_{Barry Arrington

October 22, 2014

Intelligent Design}

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In response to this post rich says:

It’s a bit like looking at a clock for a tenth of a second and lamenting you’ve witnessed no hours. Did you expect to?

To which WJM responds:

what I’m lamenting is not that we do not see hours pass on the clock, but rather, I’m lamenting the faith-based, infinite credulity and certitude expressed by those that have looked at “the clock” for a 10th of a second (as you say) and have extrapolated that into virtual certainty that “the clock”, over time, came into being by chance and natural forces and through those processes developed all the different kinds of functional, accurate time pieces found on Earth.

Even when there is no evidence obtained in that 10th of a second to believe that chance and natural forces are capable of creating a single clock.

And yet, that which is known to regularly create a wide variety of functioning clock-like mechanisms is dismissed out of hand.

That is what we call “selective hyper-skepticism” combined with “selective hyper-credulity”

Comments

Box said, ID: True, there may be unknown forces capable of producing CSI. However, until we have discovered those forces, the best explanation for CSI is intelligent design. I say, This is the real stopping point to the debate. The question of "other minds". It's possible that I'm the only true consciousness in the universe and everyone else is nothing more than a sophisticated zombie. To be skeptical of "other minds" is to consign yourself to a very lonely existence. Aiguy will object that he is only skeptical of minds that are different than his. But just a moments reflection will reveal that every other mind is different than his to some extent and even his own brain drifts in and out of consciousness at different times. Since he can never know what it is about him that makes his consciousness possible he has no objective place to draw the line. No way to delineate the boundary between persons and unthinking zombies that only appear conscious. ID proposes that we draw the line at CSI. It's not a perfect indicator but it allows us to escape the hyper-skeptical lonely hell of our own heads. peacefifthmonarchyman_{October 31, 2014
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F/N: C G Finney, notes for a lecture course he taught at Oberlin, on self-aware conscious mind: __________ >>1. We should by all means avoid tempting God by demanding an impossible or unreasonable kind of evidence. Some students have approached this subject and determined in the beginning to take absolutely nothing for granted. They have not considered what kind of evidence is reasonable to expect; they have therefore demanded that every truth shall be demonstrated, or seen with intuitive certainty. In settling some questions, we first enquire what proof of its truth, considering the nature of the question and our circumstances, we may expect to find, what kind and degree of evidence ought to be satisfactory; and if such kind and degree of evidence is found to be within our reach, we should rest satisfied, and not tempt God by refusing to receive a truth upon a reasonable kind and degree of testimony. [--> I was amused to see this point on selective hyperskepticism at the outset] . . . . 5. Avoid calling in question first truths. These truths can in no way be proven, as we shall see, except by the perfection of their chronological antecedency. If we attempt to prove them by logic we shall often find it impossible. Who by logic can prove that time or space exists? Who by logic can prove that every event must have a cause? These truths cannot be proved for the reason that they are too evident to need any proof. There is nothing more simple and evident that can be laid down as premises from which they are to be deduced. They lie at the foundation of all reasoning, and are in themselves the major premises upon which we construct our syllogisms . . . . I. DO WE KNOW ANYTHING? Answer, yes; we know ourselves. Should anyone say, I doubt this; I enquire, Do you know that you doubt it? Should he reply, I doubt that I doubt it; I enquire again, Do you know that you doubt that you doubt it? Should he reply, No, I do not know anything; I enquire again, Do you know that you do not know anything? Should he say, No, I only guess that I do not know anything; I enquire again, Do you know that you thus guess? Should he reply, It only seems as if I thus guess; I enquire, Do you know that so it seems? Should he reply, No, this seeming is nothing; I enquire again, Do you know that this seeming is nothing? Should he reply, No, but only so it seems; I reply, Then you are sure that so it seems; and if you are sure of this, or if you are sure that you are not sure of this, it amounts to the same thing. We know something - we know ourselves; it is impossible to doubt this. II. HOW DO WE KNOW OURSELVES? I answer, in consciousness. That is, we are directly aware of ourselves in what we call consciousness. But what is consciousness? The word has been used ambiguously. Some times as the general faculty of knowledge; in this sense Sir William Hamilton often used it. Sometimes it is used as a function by which we know ourselves. Sometimes it is spoken of as self-knowledge. It is common to use the term as signifying either that particular function of the intellect by the use of which we know ourselves, or the knowledge of ourselves given by this function. More generally the term is used in this last sense, to signify self-knowledge; but often the faculty by which we obtain this knowledge is called by the same name by which we designate the knowledge itself. The connection in which the term is used will in general show the sense in which it is used. If we speak of the intuitions of consciousness, of course we speak of it as a function or faulty of self-knowledge; if we speak of self-knowledge as a consciousness, then it is plain that by consciousness we mean the knowledge of self. I say then, IN CONSCIOUSNESS WE KNOW OURSELVES. Of this knowledge I remark: 1. That it is intuitive knowledge; that is, a knowledge obtained by a direct beholding of ourselves in the exercise of our various faculties. 2. I remark of this knowledge, or of consciousness, that it is a certain knowledge, knowledge of the highest possible kind, a knowledge that cannot be doubted. To call its validity in question is to question the validity of all knowledge, which we have seen, is nonsense. III. WHAT DO WE KNOW OF OURSELVES IN CONSCIOUSNESS? 1. We know our existence. This is not an inference; "Cogito ergo sum," (I think, therefore I exist, Latin) is a mere sophism. If I am not directly aware of my existence, how do I know that I think; and from the consciousness of mere thought, what right have I to infer that I think, or that I exist at all. There is no premise from which this can be inferred. The mere consciousness of thought affords not the least evidence that I am the thinking substance [--> phil sense], or that I exist. And why should I say, I think? The very language implies that I know that I am, in knowing that I think. The very conception of thinking includes the assumption that I am. In consciousness, then, I know my own existence. 2. In consciousness I know that I have three distinct faculties: The faculty of knowledge; the faculty or susceptibility of feeling; the faculty or power of willing, choosing, acting. I know in the exercise of these different faculties or susceptibilities, that I posses them. I know, for instance, that I know; and in this knowledge I know that I am and that I have a faculty of knowledge, because I am conscious of using it. I know that I feel; and in the exercise of feeling I know that I possess and use the power or faculty of willing and choosing. This knowledge, this feeling, this willing, I know to be my own; and it is impossible for me to doubt either the exercise or the existence of the faculties thus exercised. 3. In consciousness I know all of myself that is knowable by me of myself. 4. In consciousness I know myself as distinct from that which is not myself; and in the very conception of myself as self I know that that exists which is not myself. Of this I am in some way as certain as that I exist myself. Indeed the conception of self implies the conception of not self. Self can be defined only as we discriminate between that which is self and that which is not self. I am, then, in consciousness directly aware of myself, which implies that I am also aware of that which is not myself. Because of his peculiar definition of consciousness, Sir William Hamilton insist that this awareness of that which is not myself is strictly a consciousness. It is true that we are conscious of knowing that there is a not self; but is not this knowledge an intuition of the faculty of perception and distinct from consciousness but known in consciousness? It is sufficient to say that whether this as a knowledge of the not self, is a direct intuition of consciousness, or is an intuition of the perception faculty, which intuition is given to us in consciousness - certain it is that we have this knowledge, which we can no more doubt than we can doubt the knowledge of ourselves. 5. In consciousness we know that the intellect has various functions; some of which are: Consciousness, sense, reason, conscience, memory, imagination, etc. Of consciousness I shall say no more at present, as it has been, for our present purpose sufficiently defined. Of sense, reason, and conscience, more things need in this place to be said . . . >> ______________ I think, a relevant breath of fresh air, to clear the fog of hyperskeptical dismissiveness. KFkairosfocus_{October 31, 2014
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RDF
1) We know that artifacts containing CSI can be produced without aspects of general intelligence. (There are examples of this in the animal kingdom, in cases of human savantism, and in the case of computer systems).
Incorrect. Computer systems cannot produce CSI without aspects of general intelligence. They must be intelligently programed. RDF's definition of intelligence is flawed since it does not include problem solving abilities, which can, and has been, defined as intelligence.
2) Whatever caused the first biological systems to exist was obviously not itself a biological organism of any sort, nor anything in our shared experience; it was something with unknown attributes.
Bad logic. The last statement in the sentence does not follow from the two statements that preceded it. The evidence that points to the designer's attributes dpes not need to be a part of our shared experience.
3) Therefore, there is no a priori justification for assuming that some unknown process (or entity or system or being or mechanism or whatever) that resulted CSI-rich biological systems had any particular aspect of general intelligence.
Bad Logic. The argument for intelligence is not assumed apriori." It is concluded aposteriori.
4) Therefore, any claim that the cause of CSI in biology possessed any particular mental trait (consciousness, novel problem solving, natural language ability, and so on) would require empirical evidence; ID provides no such evidence.
Statement from ignorance. Just because RDF is not aware of the evidence does not mean that it doesn't exist. Also, the three points that preceded this final claim have been refuted, so the "therefore" is out of place.
There you go – now you get to ignore my argument again :-)
The argument against UB is worthless. It deserves to be ignored.StephenB_{October 30, 2014
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Hi Upright BiPed,
1) Do you believe that ID shows that the cause of biological systems was capable of using a generally expressive natural language? 2) Do you believe that ID shows that the cause of biological systems experienced conscious self-awareness like human beings (and perhaps other animals) do? 3) Do you believe that ID shows that the cause of biological systems could produce something other than biological systems – for example, it could build a computer out of metal and silicon chips and so on?

These questions entirely fall outside of the operational definition given, and are therefore irrelevant to the validity of that definition.
Huh? You may use your operational definition, or one that deals with CSI, or any other one of your choosing. The questions remain the same. Do you, or do you not, believe that ID provides empirical support that these particular propositions are true? Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{October 30, 2014
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1) Do you believe that ID shows that the cause of biological systems was capable of using a generally expressive natural language? 2) Do you believe that ID shows that the cause of biological systems experienced conscious self-awareness like human beings (and perhaps other animals) do? 3) Do you believe that ID shows that the cause of biological systems could produce something other than biological systems – for example, it could build a computer out of metal and silicon chips and so on?
These questions entirely fall outside of the operational definition given, and are therefore irrelevant to the validity of that definition.Upright BiPed_{October 30, 2014
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RDF, The operational definition given to you does not even mention CSI. You failed to address the definition.Upright BiPed_{October 30, 2014
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Hi Upright BiPed, Just to make sure I do understand your position here, let me ask you these questions: 1) Do you believe that ID shows that the cause of biological systems was capable of using a generally expressive natural language? 2) Do you believe that ID shows that the cause of biological systems experienced conscious self-awareness like human beings (and perhaps other animals) do? 3) Do you believe that ID shows that the cause of biological systems could produce something other than biological systems - for example, it could build a computer out of metal and silicon chips and so on? Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{October 30, 2014
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Sorry, typo: 1) We know that artifacts containing CSI can be produced without aspects of general intelligence. (There are examples of this in the animal kingdom, in cases of human savantism, and in the case of computer systems).RDFish_{October 30, 2014
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Hi Upright BiPed, Your bizarre dialogue had too many misrepresentations to begin to deal with. Here is your failure in a nutshell: 1) We know that artifacts containing can be produced without aspects of general intelligence. (There are examples of this in the animal kingdom, in cases of human savantism, and in the case of computer systems). 2) Whatever caused the first biological systems to exist was obviously not itself a biological organism of any sort, nor anything in our shared experience; it was something with unknown attributes. 3) Therefore, there is no a priori justification for assuming that some unknown process (or entity or system or being or mechanism or whatever) that resulted CSI-rich biological systems had any particular aspect of general intelligence. 4) Therefore, any claim that the cause of CSI in biology possessed any particular mental trait (consciousness, novel problem solving, natural language ability, and so on) would require empirical evidence; ID provides no such evidence. There you go - now you get to ignore my argument again :-) Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{October 30, 2014
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Hi Mung, For RD to be consistent with his earlier remarks (regarding the methodology of operationalization) he will have to refute the validity of the definition given. He cannot be consistent by asking for an operational definition, then suddenly start ignoring the methodological purpose of that definition -- after it’s been given to him. Of course, this would be the case only if he cares about being consistent. While we may assume he would typically prefer to be consistent, the validity of the definition in this case will not allow it. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - RD: Why does ID think the cause of life was generally intelligent? UB: Because we find the effects of intelligence in the coding of organic polymers in the cell. RD: But “intelligence” can mean many things, so proper projects like SETI operationalize the term. UB: Yes, both SETI and ID can operationalize intelligence by its unambiguous physical effects RD: What physical effects can ID use to define intelligence? UB: The observation of dimensional semiosis to encode memory. RD: Well okay fine, but that has nothing to do with other things that intelligence can mean. UB: The purpose of the methodology is to isolate a thing by its unambiguous measurable effects. RD: But you are just an anonymous poster on an internet forum, right? UB: The reality of the matter is totally unaffected by who I am. RD: That’s true, but the probability of you providing any useful observation is practically nil. UB: Then what I provide should be judged on what I provide. RD: But it doesn’t answer any questions about the other things that intelligence might mean. UB: Again, the purpose of an operational definition is to isolate an unambiguous effect. RD: Okay, but I’ve never heard of this stuff in the context of ID, so it strikes me as a pathetic joke. UB: You have been given the definition, and I’m prepared to defend it. RD: You don’t seem to understand my point; your definition DOES NOT ADDRESS other attributes. UB: You are being incoherent with regard to what an operational definition is used for. RD: No, you are NOT RESPONDING TO MY POINTS!!!! UB: You asked for an operational definition of intelligence, and I gave you one. RD: Like I’ve said all along, ID cannot provide an operational definition of intelligence. :|Upright BiPed_{October 30, 2014
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Again, Mung misreads the thread:
Do you have a response to Upright BiPed that consists of something more substantive than an admission of ignorance?
I made clear why Upright BiPed's arguments fail to address the problem I've pointed out. The problem is that none of the proposed operationalized definitions of ID have anything to do with the mental traits we commonly associate with a general intelligence, including consciousness, learning and adaptability, use of natural language, and so on. As usual, UB's only response was to call me names and run away.RDFish_{October 30, 2014
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RDF #367,
ID: True, there may be unknown ~~natural~~ forces capable of producing CSI. However, until we have discovered those forces, the best explanation for CSI is intelligent design.
[ Quote adjusted, still looking fine ] Consciousness? Yes, logic informs us that one has to be aware of the materials that are being arranged. Conceptual thinking? Yes, how else can anyone create IC? Purpose? Sure. ... RD, how many do I need?Box_{October 30, 2014
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RDFish:
I’m afraid that is the case, UB – you really haven’t been clear at all. In fact, I have no idea at all what you are talking about.
Is this a case of me no speaka da engliss?Mung_{October 30, 2014
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RDFish:
Everybody here has gotten to this point of the debate with me, and then they quit and go away, because nobody can resolve this problem for ID.
Most of us here simply think you are delusional and ignore you. Do you have a response to Upright BiPed that consists of something more substantive than an admission of ignorance?Mung_{October 30, 2014
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Hi Box,
ID: True, there may be unknown natural forces capable of producing CSI. However, until we have discovered those forces, the best explanation for CSI is intelligent design.
1) Why do you put the word "natural" in that sentence - how would the meaning of that sentence change if you took that word out? 2) When you say "intelligent design", which of the attributes commonly associated with "intelligence" does ID mean to imply? Consciousness? The ability to learn? The ability to adapt to new environments? The ability to converse in a generally expressive grammatical language? What else? 3) Take your list of the attributes that you think ID claims applied to the cause of life. For each attribute on the list, tell me the justification for believing that attribute did in fact apply to the cause of life. But of course you can't do that, because there is no way to do that without observing or interacting with the cause of life. Everybody here has gotten to this point of the debate with me, and then they quit and go away, because nobody can resolve this problem for ID. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{October 30, 2014
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RDFish, RD: Why does ID think the cause of life was generally intelligent? ID: Because anything that could produce CSI must be generally intelligent. RD: Why does ID think that anything that could produce CSI must be generally intelligent? ID: Because humans produce CSI and humans are generally intelligent. RD: But that is fallacious reasoning – other CSI producers may not be generally intelligent ID: True, there may be unknown natural forces capable of producing CSI. However, until we have discovered those forces, the best explanation for CSI is intelligent design.Box_{October 30, 2014
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Hi StephenB,
I said that I wasn’t emotionally attached to the model I just presented–not ID.
And yet you can't explain how ID can empirically support the claim that the cause of life was conscious, or that it could explain what it was doing, or that it could solve novel problems, or that had any of these other attributes commonly associated with "intelligence". That must make you sad.
Your whole approach is irrational, as everyone keeps telling you.
Most people I talk to tell me that my approach is insightful, original, interesting, and perfectly valid. It's pretty much only religious people on this board who tell me its irrational. This is essentially our debate here, and this is why you've lost: RD: Why does ID think the cause of life was generally intelligent? SB: Because anything that could produce CSI must be generally intelligent. RD: Why does ID think that anything that could produce CSI must be generally intelligent? SB: Because humans produce CSI and humans are generally intelligent. RD: But that is fallacious reasoning – other CSI producers may not be generally intelligent SB: I prefer to think that the cause of life was generally intelligent. RD: That’s fine – just don’t pretend you’re doing science. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{October 30, 2014
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StephenB:
I said that I wasn’t emotionally attached to the model I just presented–not ID. That is why your irrational response did not bother me. Your whole approach is irrational, as everyone keeps telling you.
Is it just me, or does RDFish seem to be emotionally attached to ID?Mung_{October 30, 2014
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Hey Alan, I haven't read the books yet. There is just too much free information available. Lots of the relevant papers are public access. If I understand correctly it was Tononi who got the ball rolling. Here is the manifesto. again free http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19098144 I think the profound incite in the field so far is Phil Maguire's observation that in consciousnesses information integration is non-lossy, In other words irreducibly complex. peacefifthmonarchyman_{October 30, 2014
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You seem very emotionally attached to ID, and until this problem is resolved (and some other problems too) ID is not a scientifically valid theory at all, but rather a collection of poor arguments for theism.
I said that I wasn't emotionally attached to the model I just presented--not ID. That is why your irrational response did not bother me. Your whole approach is irrational, as everyone keeps telling you.StephenB_{October 30, 2014
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OT @ GEM Did you overlook my comment in another thread? I was on Jersey a couple of weeks ago and visited the Durrell wildlife Centre where I was interested to learn about the efforts to save the Mountain chicken from extinction. I see from press reports that fifty frogs bred at Durrell were released back into the wild on Montserrat just recently. I did have to smile that this involved funding from the Darwin Initiative.Alan Fox_{October 30, 2014
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FMM Are you talking about Tononi and integrated information theory? A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination? or Phi: A Voyage from the Brain to the Soul?Alan Fox_{October 30, 2014
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RDFish:
I’m afraid that is the case, UB – you really haven’t been clear at all. In fact, I have no idea at all what you are talking about.
Yet he's refuted you. Repeatedly. /end sarcasm RDFish:
Sarcasm isn’t an effective debating method...
I work with the materials available.Mung_{October 30, 2014
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Just Google “Is Consciousness Computable” and check it out.
OK will do.Alan Fox_{October 30, 2014
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F/N: I suggest that the first fact of experience we have is conscious mindedness, and that for mind to be valid in knowledge and meaning, we have no proper basis for equating rational contemplation with computation, as the latter is a strictly blind mechanistic process that has no inherent connexion to logic, truth, validity etc, as say the Pentium recall shows. Next, this means that we cannot smuggle in a materialist assumption and imposition on mindedness. Minds may be embodied, as we experience, we have no reason to imagine that they may only be embodied materially. Of course in terms of the world of cell based life on earth as has been pointed out to RDF et al any number of times but willfully ignored, nothing is required beyond a molecular nanotech lab some generations beyond Venter et al; that is, by itself that would be a sufficient explanation of what we observe, a point implicit in ID discussions since the very first ID technical work in 1984 by Thaxton et al. The issue that RDF will not squarely face, is that the design of the cosmos shows evidence of fine tuning for cell based, C-Chemistry, aqueous medium life, and that this, even through a multiverse, puts mind beyond matter on the table. By tagging this as "religious," RDF wishes to play at dismissive well poisoning, but in fact the issue is a philosophical one that needs make no reference whatsoever to the ideas of any particular religious tradition, yes, it is beyond the scope of science, but that has to do with the subject matter of ultimate origins, inherently. And, in fact it is these phil questions that set the context in which science happens. What is clear, is that our notions of mind should not lock out what for all we know may yet prove true. Otherwise we are locked into worldviews level question begging. For a long time, unfortunately, RDF has ducked, dodged, distorted and side tracked rather than face the real issue on the table on this point. I simply note for record, not expecting him at this stage to be willing to change. KFkairosfocus_{October 30, 2014
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Here is the path to paper Ive been mostly referring to http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.0126 But to fully understand the discussion going on you need to just use it as a starting point and dig deeper from there peacefifthmonarchyman_{October 30, 2014
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I’m only doubtful that an explanation of phenomenology will be forthcoming, because nobody can even say what such a theory would even look like. Imagine we discovered precisely what physical structures and functions were necessary and sufficient to produce conscious awareness – that still wouldn’t begin to answer the questions of phenomenology.
Come to the dark side! As much as it has occupied the minds of many respected philosophers, I think phenomenology is a useless concept in understanding how we think.Alan Fox_{October 30, 2014
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Hey Alan, I mean that consciousness is not computable. In other words there is no algorithmic function that can produce consciousnesses. If we can say nothing else about evolution we can say it is an algorithmic function. As far as consciousness being ill-defined I really suggest you check out IIT. It has some valuable things to say about the subject. Just Google "Is Consciousness Computable" and check it out. peacefifthmonarchyman_{October 30, 2014
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Hi Box,
If that is true, how am I to understand the following: RDFish: But unless there is evidence to the contrary, what appears to our uniform experience is that nothing can design anything without a well-functioning brain.
That means just what it says - that in our experience, nothing can design anything without a well-functioning brain. What part don't you understand?
RDFish: What is generally unspoken in these discussions is what ID folks actually think they are talking about when they refer to an “intelligent agent”. Of course they are talking about something with a conscious mind like their own, with perceptions and sensations and conscious beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions.
This too means just what it says. I don't understand why you think this is in contradiction to what I've said about operational definitions. Just because our experience of general intelligence is that it is dependent upon our brains doesn't mean that it always must be the case; it simply means that is our empirical data currently. And you are still free to offer any hypothesis, using any definition, that you wish - nobody is demanding that you not hypothesize immaterial intelligence or anything else.
RDF: So this thing is supposed to be able to think, feel, and build things like human beings do, without the benefit of being a complex physical organism. It’s supposed brainy without a having brain, to have a heart without having a heart, to be handy without having hands, and so on. Well, anyone can hypothesize whatever they’d like to of course, but we have no experience of anything like this in our uniform and repeated experience.
Ah yes - not sure where you found this, but I would say it is pretty nicely said :-) Again, I've emphasized that all testable hypotheses are legitimate, just don't pretend that they are empirically supported until you provide operational definitions that can be evaluated in the context of ID.
This thinking – and ID in general – is strictly religious, and has nothing at all to do with science.
What I meant by "religious" here was that if you accept these ideas about immaterial minds without providing any method to test your claims, you are justifying your claims by means of faith rather than empirical evidence. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish_{October 30, 2014
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Hi StephenB
RD, as you know I take a different approach in the sense that I think operational definitions are contextual.
No, we actually agree on this point - it is obviously true in fact. Of course operational definitions are contextual, SB, which is why I constantly say "in the context of ID" when I ask you for operational definitions of these mental attributes.
However, if I was going to address this issue (I don’t really perceive it as a big problem like you do),...
It's not a problem at all, unless you wish to claim that Intelligent Design Theory is a scientific theory of life origins, or something like that.
I define conceptual understanding to mean exactly what it sounds like, the capacity to grasp concepts, meanings, first principles, and such. It is the ability to internalize the big picture and the way constituent parts relate to the larger whole
Ok, that is an abstract concept with multiple components, and would need to be operationalized in order to be studied scientifically.
I define problem solving intelligence to mean the capacity define a problem, compare alternative solutions, make a decision, absorb feedback and take new action based on the feedback. Some people might even say that these steps are similar to the scientific method itself.
Ok, that too is an abstract concept with multiple components, and would need to be operationalized in order to be studied scientifically.
In my judgment, blending both categories, while reasonable from a big picture perspective, misses the point about what CSI is really supposed to represent. That is why i think that problem solving ability is the correct meta-paradigm. We can think of in terms of what the designer does to design a function for a purpose.
Here is how I explained this issue to UB above:
RDF: Regarding problem-solving, you’ve left out a critical component: It is not problem-solving, but the solving of novel problems that is typically considered as a requisite component of intelligence. The classic illustration of why this is so is the sphex wasp, which appears to solve complex problems in a thoughtful way until presented with a novel problem, at which point the apparent general intelligence is revealed to be rigidly sterotyped behavior that cannot adapt. In the context of ID, one could say that whatever caused biological systems solved the problem of producing biological systems (by definition). What we’d like to know, however, is for example could this cause of biological system solve other sorts of problems, such as verbal analogies? Or could it solve design problems other than producing the particular designs that we observe? If we assume that the cause of life was something with human-like intelligence, then the answer to these questions would be “yes”. But why would we imagine that something that was not at all human like (perhaps it didn’t even have a human-like brain) have human-like intelligence? In science you can’t simply assume your conclusions, you actually have to provide empirical justifications for them. So can we empirically demonstrate that the cause of life had general human-like mental abilities? The answer, of course, is no, we can’t.

In a way, CSI seems to be the mark left by the designer who goes through the aforementioned steps to reach the design and intelligence is simply the ability to do it.
Here is how ID attempts to support its central claim, that life was created by something with a general intelligence (i.e. a conscious rational mind with human-like mental abilities): RD: Why does ID think the cause of life was generally intelligent? SB: Because anything that could produce CSI must be generally intelligent. RD: Why does ID think that anything that could produce CSI must be generally intelligent? SB: Because humans produce CSI and humans are generally intelligent. RD: But that is fallacious reasoning - other CSI producers may not be generally intelligent SB: I prefer to think that the cause of life was generally intelligent. RD: That's fine - just don't pretend you're doing science.
Anyway, for what it is worth, that’s my hasty and undeveloped (underdeveloped really) perspective on the relationship of CSI with the definition of intelligence and the definition of design. I have no emotional attachment to the idea, nor have I invested very much time trying to articulate it, so I don’t mind whatever criticism comes my way.
You seem very emotionally attached to ID, and until this problem is resolved (and some other problems too) ID is not a scientifically valid theory at all, but rather a collection of poor arguments for theism. Cheers, RDFishRDFish_{October 30, 2014
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