Oh, and the mind is an illusion that the meat somehow produces?
A new book noted at Springer seems poised to try:
Many believe that the language and concepts of philosophy will eventually be superseded by those of neuroscience. This collection of essays questions this assumption and attempts to show how philosophy can contribute to real explanatory progress in neuroscience while remaining faithful to the full complexity of the phenomena of life and mind. The general orientation of the volume is Aristotelian, as it seeks to promote a non-reductive understanding of subjectivity that is firmly rooted in biology, paying close attention to the special formal and material properties of living systems. However, its contributors represent a diversity of perspectives and traditions: drawing from hylomorphism to pragmatism, dynamical systems, enactivism, and value theory, among others, this collection of essays presents an unusually rich form of interdisciplinary exchange. Each chapter addresses one or more aspects of subjectivity in relation to neuroscience,
such as the meaning and scope of naturalism and the place of consciousness in nature, or the relation between intentionality, teleology, and causality. This collection will be of interest to philosophers and neuroscientists alike, as well as to those engaged in interdisciplinary
cooperation between philosophy and science. More.
If the authors do not cave too much to naturalist claims that are never demonstrated, but often refuted, it might be worth a look.
See also: Evolution bred a sense of reality out of us NPR’s Adam Frank: I find the logic in Hoffman’s ideas both exciting and potentially appealing because of other philosophical biases I carry around in my head. (But he suspects the theory is ultimately wrong.)
Objectivity is sexist.
Neuroscience tried wholly embracing naturalism, but then the brain got away
Follow UD News at Twitter!