Atheism’s problem of warrant (–> being, Logic and First Principles, No. 23)

The next section by Plantinga.

The main story of twentieth-century epistemology is the story of three connected notions: justification, internalism, and deontology. I propose to begin my study of contemporary views of warrant by examining some internalist theories of warrant; but what is this ‘internalism’? What does it mean to call someone an internalist? The term is in considerable disarray. Different people use it differently; it expresses distinct ideas loosely related by analogies and family resemblance. How can we gain an understanding of internalism? What is the central notion here, the notion in terms of which we can see how the rest of those loosely related ideas hang together? What is the source of the attraction of internalism, and what makes it plausible? And how is it connected with the fundamental question of the nature of warrant?

This is odd. Already he is preparing for confusion.

The basic internalist idea, of course, is that what determines whether a belief is warranted for a person are factors or states in some sense internal to that person; warrant conferring properties are in some way internal to the subject or cognizer. But in what way? The pH level of my blood is a condition internal to me, as is the size of my heart; but clearly these are not internal in the relevant way. So what is the relevant way? The first thing to see, I think, is that this notion of internality is fundamentally epistemic. Warrant and the properties that confer it are internal in that they are states or conditions of which the cognizer is or can be aware; they are states of which he has or can easily have knowledge; they are states or properties to which he has cognitive or epistemic access. But not just any old epistemic access will do; I have epistemic access to the distance from the earth to the moon and to the depth of the Pacific Ocean (I own an encyclopedia), but that is not access of the relevant sort. What is required is some kind of special access. Perhaps (as Chisholm suggests) S can determine by reflection alone whether a belief has warrant for him; or perhaps he can determine with certainty whether a belief has the property that grounds and confers justification; or perhaps there is a certain kind of mistake—a mistake about warrant or the properties that confer it—that he cannot nonculpably make. So the relevant sense of ‘internal’ is strongly epistemic; the internalist holds that a person has some kind of special epistemic access to warrant and the properties that ground it.

haven’t a clue what this means. But it sounds ominous for the concept of “warrant” if things that affect its validity vary by individual

The externalist, by contrast, holds that warrant need not depend upon factors relevantly internal to the cognizer; warrant depends or supervenes upon properties to some of which the cognizer may have no special access, or even no epistemic access at all. Take a paradigm externalist view: that of the early Alvin Goldman, for example, who holds “to a first approximation” that a belief has warrant if and to the degree that it is produced by a reliable belief-producing mechanism. What makes this view externalist? Why isn't it internalist? After all, my belief-producing mechanisms, unlike my house or my car, are surely internal to me. What makes the claim externalist, I suggest, is that the properties that on this view confer warrant are not such that I need have any special kind of epistemic access to them. On externalist views, warrant-making properties are such properties (of a belief) as being produced by a reliable belief-producing mechanism, or standing in a causal chain appropriately involving the subject of belief, or standing in probabilistic relation R to certain other relevant propositions; and none of these properties is one to which we have the relevant kind of special access. The basic thrust of internalism in epistemology, therefore, is that the properties that confer warrant upon a belief are properties to which the believer has some sort of special epistemic access. But why think a thing like that? What is the source of internalism, and why is it attractive? To see why, we must turn to a different but connected idea: that of epistemic justification.

Plantinga in this section is at best talking to a few people. He needs an interpreter for most of educated humanity. In other words I have no idea what he’s talking about and I showed it to someone better educated than myself who had no idea what he was saying. This seems enough to dismiss the concept of warrant from further consideration as a useful idea. But the initial sections discussed some obviously relevant considerations.

jerry

Next Plantinga paragraph

Second, a problem that is less trivial than it initially seems: what shall we call this quantity? I propose to call it ‘warrant’; but those of us brought up in that benighted pre-Gettier era learned at our mother's knee that knowledge is justified true belief; and even in this enlightened post-Gettier age we still think of justification and knowledge as intimately related.

Plantinga is talking to a select few which is the main problem. He believes the creation of a new term will solve a problem that he hasn’t defined but which he assumes his audience (the select few) will understand. Just what is “true belief?” Not defined.

So why not call this property ‘justification’? Because it would be both misleading and unfair. ‘Justification’ suggests duty, obligation, requirement; it is redolent of permission and rights; it brings to mind exoneration, not being properly subject to blame—it connotes, in a word (or two) the whole deontological stable.

Here Plantinga is discarding a clear term to be replaced by an obscure term because there are sometimes when the clear term may be misleading. But is he in doing so introducing an even more unclear term in its place? Again for the select few.

And the problem is that one of the main contending theories or pictures here (one with impressive historical credentials going back at least to Descartes and Locke) explicitly explains the quantity in question at least partly in terms of fulfilling one's epistemic duties, satisfying one's epistemic obligations, conforming to one's epistemic requirements. To use the term ‘justification’, then, as a name for that quantity would be to give this theory and its relatives a confusing and unwarranted (if merely verbal) initial edge over their rivals. So ‘justification’ is not the right choice.

introduction of the concept of quantity as an important part of an argument. He believes use of the concept of justification is not appropriate. Instead he introduces a word with multiple meanings that then actually obscures in other ways.

In earlier work I borrowed Roderick Chisholm's more neutral term “positive epistemic status” as my official name for the quantity in question. That locution, however, is too long; so I shall use the term ‘warrant’ in its place. Of course, ‘warrant’ has deontological associations of its own (even if they are not quite so insistent); perhaps (as Ernest Sosa suggested in conversation) ‘epistemic aptness’ is a better term. On balance, however, I prefer ‘warrant’—but we must be careful not to be misled by its residual deontological insinuations.

he recognizes the problem of his choice of terms but again the few will understand while the average person will be confused. But he ignores the possible alternatives for the very simple and important question of quantity in validating a belief.

Again Plantinga discusses an important issue in validation of one’s beliefs. Namely, quantity. jerry

Next analysis of Plantinga article More from the Plantinga article on warrant. I am going to use the words warrant and justification interchangeably till I see where one is preferred over the other.

In the same way we may appraise the belief that all contemporary flora and fauna arose by way of random genetic mutation and natural selection from primitive forms of life, which in turn arose via similarly ateleological processes from inorganic material. And of course the less spectacular beliefs of everyday life are also subject to such evaluation and appraisal.

in other words we use the concept of warrant and justification all the times in our lives and couldn’t get along without it. But rarely use these specific words. This begs the question that many or even most things/beliefs in our everyday life may not be warranted but it doesn’t affect our everyday existence. For example, I can believe the galaxy is full of alien civilizations and it wouldn’t affect one thing I did in the next 10 years or longer.

We appraise a person’s beliefs, but also her skepticisms or (to use another Chisholmian term) her withholdings, her refrainings from belief. An unduly credulous person may believe what she ought not; an unduly skeptical (or cynical) person may fail to believe what she ought.

A lot of people hold or withhold justified beliefs. Or all of us have some of each. So everyone can be challenged on their opinions for or against something. But again it may affect nothing in our daily lives.

Further, we may hold a belief more or less strongly, more or less firmly; we appraise not only the belief itself, but also the degree to which it is accepted. If I believe that Homer was born before 800 B.C. and believe this with as much fervor as that New York City is larger than Cleveland, then (given what are in fact my epistemic circumstances) my degree of confidence in the former proposition is excessive and unwarranted.

Important point is that some of our opinions are strongly held while some are weakly so. This is different from that there is strong justification or weak justification for holding an opinion which is next paragraph. Again may have little or no effect on everyday life.

Finally, warrant comes in degrees. Some of my beliefs have more by way of that quantity for me than others. Thus my belief that I live in Indiana has more by way of warrant, for me, than my belief that Shakespeare wrote the plays commonly attributed to him; my belief that 2 + 1 = 3 has more warrant than my belief that the Axiom of Choice is equivalent to the Hausdorff Maximal Principle. (This is not to say, of course, that I am not equally rational and equally justified in accepting these beliefs to the degrees to which I do in fact accept them; for I believe the latter member of each pair less firmly than the former.) But then we can distinguish degrees of positive epistemic status, at least for a given person. Initially, then, and to a first approximation, warrant is a normative, possibly complex quantity that comes in degrees, enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief.

still no understanding of the difference between knowledge and true belief. I know the sun will rise tomorrow morning and that’s knowledge as well as it rose this morning. But what is a true belief? My initial reading of Plantinga is that he does not define it clearly.

Interesting paper so far but there’s a good reason few trust philosophy and philosophers to explain the real world clearly. The first three paragraphs have been enlightening. jerry

Found this thread from almost 2 years ago on “warrant” and will place my comments here on understanding Plantinga’s paper on warrant. If anyone comes across this, it is in response to the lack of a clear understanding of the concept by commenters such as myself. Kf referred to the following paper which has been very useful. https://www.giffordlectures.org/books/warrant-current-debate/1-justification-internalism-and-deontology

This is first paragraph of the article which is long. whatever precisely warrant is, which together with truth makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief.

Difference between knowledge and true belief not explained

More specifically, my topic is contemporary views of warrant. I shall begin by looking briefly at the twentieth-century received tradition with respect to warrant; but first, how shall we initially pin down, or locate, or characterize this property or quantity I propose to discuss?

There seems to be a difference in quality as well as quantity that comprise a warrant

It is that which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief, of course; but note also that there is obviously something normative or evaluative about warrant. To attribute warrant to a belief is to appraise that belief, and to appraise it favorably; and we use such terms as ‘warranted’, ‘justification’, ‘justified’, and the like as “terms of epistemic appraisal.”1 To say that a belief is warranted or justified for a person is to evaluate it or him (or both) positively; his holding that belief in his circumstances is right, or proper, or acceptable, or approvable, or up to standard.

it seems warrant applies to all of our beliefs and is used to assess which are valid or more likely valid by using some process that evaluates the belief. We frequently hear the comment, in my opinion this is so. But the real question is do we have a good basis for that opinion or do we have a valid warrant for that opinion

whatever precisely it is, which together with truth makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. More specifically, my topic is contemporary views of warrant. I shall begin by looking briefly at the twentieth-century received tradition with respect to warrant; but first, how shall we initially pin down, or locate, or characterize this property or quantity I propose to discuss?

sounds like how do we evaluate the level of the warrant to justify the belief or opinion

It is that which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief, of course; but note also that there is obviously something normative or evaluative about warrant. To attribute warrant to a belief is to appraise that belief, and to appraise it favorably; and we use such terms as ‘warranted’, ‘justification’, ‘justified’, and the like as “terms of epistemic appraisal.”1 To say that a belief is warranted or justified for a person is to evaluate it or him (or both) positively; his holding that belief in his circumstances is right, or proper, or acceptable, or approvable, or up to standard. We evaluate a person’s beliefs (more exactly, her believings) as warranted, or justified, or rational, or reasonable, contrasting them with beliefs that are unwarranted, unjustified, irrational, unreasonable. The evidentialist objector to theistic belief, for example, claims that a theist who believes in God without evidence or argument is so far forth unwarranted and unjustified in that belief; he offers a negative appraisal of the belief or its holder. (Perhaps he claims that in believing in God in that way she is flouting some duty, or (more charitably) is suffering from a sort of cognitive dysfunction, or (still more modestly) that the module of our cognitive establishment that issues in theistic belief is not aimed at truth but at something else.) (is this being turned around on the atheist who traditionally claimed that beliefs in God were unwarranted because they were just superstitious while today the belief there is no God is really the unwarranted belief and the atheist is the superstitious one) We evaluate a person’s beliefs (more exactly, her believings) as warranted, or justified, or rational, or reasonable, contrasting them with beliefs that are unwarranted, unjustified, irrational, unreasonable. The evidentialist objector to theistic belief, for example, claims that a theist who believes in God without evidence or argument is so far forth unwarranted and unjustified in that belief; he offers a negative appraisal of the belief or its holder.

Perhaps he claims that in believing in God in that way she is flouting some duty, or (more charitably) is suffering from a sort of cognitive dysfunction, or (still more modestly) that the module of our cognitive establishment that issues in theistic belief is not aimed at truth but at something else

I’m trying to use Kf’s frequently used term to assess just what an opinion means. Is it a warranted opinion or not? My guess is that a lot of people who say my opinion is just as good as yours don’t want the scrutiny implied by the concept of warrant. Actually some opinions are more valid than others. The term “warrant” is the evaluation of that opinion or belief. So is belief in a naturalistic system of evolution unwarranted? That is really turning the tables on a lot of people who thrived on making this claim against those who believed in ID or its equivalent throughout history. Is the term “warrant” best replaced by the term “justified.?” jerry

FYI-FTR: The answer given to attempts to undermine moral government (and to those that — even worse — suggest that Christians must become/are vigilantes), here: https://uncommondescent.com/atheism/fyi-ftr-the-answer-given-to-attempts-to-undermine-moral-government-and-to-those-that-even-worse-suggest-that-christians-must-become-are-vigilantes/ kairosfocus

EG, immaterial, your track record of enabling behaviour speaks for itself. Besides, there are too many theists who are also unaware of the significance of logic of being. Where, a theme that emerged above is that that gap drives much of the misunderstanding and dismissiveness we have been seeing, for example it is not an accident that both dismissive arguments from infidels dot org become strawmannish because of that gap. At core, non-being [the proper no-thing] has no causal power and were there ever utter non-being that would therefore forever obtain. So as a world is, some-thing always was. I stipulate that the OP etc outline impossibility vs possibility of being and contingent vs necessary being. This context points to a necessary being that has causal independence from external factors as world root. For example, a proposed beginningless temporal causal succession of prior finite duration stages ["years," for convenience] poses the supertask of traversing an implicit transfinite span in successive steps. Finitely remote necessary being causally adequate for a fine tuned cosmos, etc. Where, further, we are rational (not merely computational) morally governed creatures, starting with our intellectual faculties, pointing to an inherently good and utterly wise world root entity. And more. In short, the no evidence, default claim we have seen collapses, and we need to look at worldviews options in light of the cumulative force of the logic of being considerations on why there is a world (one with morally governed, freely rational creatures) rather than utter non-being. And if one rejects that characterisation of our race (however cleverly worded), the whole project of reasoned discussion is utterly discredited; a reduction to absurdity. KF kairosfocus

KF

ET, EG continues to studiously evade the challenge of worldview level warrant. Above, you will see that as a theist I have stepped up to the plate and have taken time to find objections in the wild and answer them. The difference is telling. KF

I thought the challenge was directed towards atheists. I am a theist. Ed George

ET, EG continues to studiously evade the challenge of worldview level warrant. Above, you will see that as a theist I have stepped up to the plate and have taken time to find objections in the wild and answer them. The difference is telling. KF kairosfocus

Ed George:

Someone pointed out that it is not atheism that must meet the challenge, it is theism.

Just saying something is not pointing something out. And atheists will just say anything to try to distract from the fact that theirs is an untenable position

I haven’t seen anything that is a showstopper for atheism.

Other than the fact that atheists have NOTHING to explain our existence... ET

Ed George:

I have been following this on the sidelines for over 470 comments and I am still waiting for anything of substance to be said from either side.

How would you know? You're not the person to be making such a claim... ET

BB, the convenient surfacing of your stable-mate EG has not made me forget your latest stunt of dismissing cogent answers to your alleged contradictions without actually dealing with substance, to double down on ill-founded assertions of "contradictions," etc. You full well know that the path of reform pioneered by Wilberforce, pivoting on making the case so that law will have a critical mass of support that renders it enforceable is eminently reasonable, and that empty vigilantism and violent radical revolutions have a consistent track record of bloody failure. You full well know that in the case of a citizen coming to the rescue of another being assaulted, the law will take a very different view from a case of vigilantism. Therefore, your rhetorical gambit collapses, exposing how fundamentally unserious it always was. And if that sort of stunt is what you have to resort to to suggest that the issue of moral government from our intellectual faculties on is not real, then it shows just how weak the case you are advocating is. Not least, as just to work as an argument, it appeals to our known intellectual duties, It is thus exposed as self-referentially incoherent and self-refuting, thus utterly false. It actually inadvertently supports the implications of our intellectual faculties being under known, inescapable moral government: to try to refute, you have to assume the truth of what you oppose. KF kairosfocus

EG, you know full well that from the outset the default talking point was raised. It was corrected, through the force of SEP's highly relevant article and the general responsibility of worldview warrant. You have not addressed these, which are a simple scroll up away, but wish to sweep away an extensive cogent addressing of those and associated issues, then try the old trick of sitting on a selective hyperskepticism based, question begging default. That insistent repetition is telling. Address substantially and cogently or stand exposed as trying a rhetorical stunt to evade worldview warrant responsibilities. KF PS: As a start-point, SEP from 11 above (and the OP), which you have hitherto studiously avoided (given your claim to have monitored the thread):

1. Definitions of “Atheism” “Atheism” is typically defined in terms of “theism”. Theism, in turn, is best understood as a proposition—something that is either true or false. It is often defined as “the belief that God exists”, but here “belief” means “something believed”. It refers to the propositional content of belief, not to the attitude or psychological state of believing. This is why it makes sense to say that theism is true or false and to argue for or against theism. If, however, “atheism” is defined in terms of theism and theism is the proposition that God exists and not the psychological condition of believing that there is a God, then it follows that atheism is not the absence of the psychological condition of believing that God exists (more on this below). The “a-” in “atheism” must be understood as negation instead of absence, as “not” instead of “without”. Therefore, in philosophy at least, atheism should be construed as the proposition that God does not exist (or, more broadly, the proposition that there are no gods). This definition has the added virtue of making atheism a direct answer to one of the most important metaphysical questions in philosophy of religion, namely, “Is there a God?” There are only two possible direct answers to this question: “yes”, which is theism, and “no”, which is atheism. Answers like “I don’t know”, “no one knows”, “I don’t care”, “an affirmative answer has never been established”, or “the question is meaningless” are not direct answers to this question. While identifying atheism with the metaphysical claim that there is no God (or that there are no gods) is particularly useful for doing philosophy, it is important to recognize that the term “atheism” is polysemous—i.e., it has more than one related meaning—even within philosophy. For example, many writers at least implicitly identify atheism with a positive metaphysical theory like naturalism or even materialism. Given this sense of the word, the meaning of “atheism” is not straightforwardly derived from the meaning of “theism”. While this might seem etymologically bizarre, perhaps a case can be made for the claim that something like (metaphysical) naturalism was originally labeled “atheism” only because of the cultural dominance of non-naturalist forms of theism, not because the view being labeled was nothing more than the denial of theism. On this view, there would have been atheists even if no theists ever existed—they just wouldn’t have been called “atheists”. (Baggini [2003] suggests this line of thought, though his “official” definition is the standard metaphysical one.) Although this definition of “atheism” is a legitimate one, it is often accompanied by fallacious inferences from the (alleged) falsity or probable falsity of atheism (= naturalism) to the truth or probable truth of theism. Departing even more radically from the norm in philosophy, a few philosophers and quite a few non-philosophers claim that “atheism” shouldn’t be defined as a proposition at all, even if theism is a proposition. Instead, “atheism” should be defined as a psychological state: the state of not believing in the existence of God (or gods). This view was famously proposed by the philosopher Antony Flew and arguably played a role in his (1972) defense of an alleged presumption of “atheism”. The editors of the Oxford Handbook of Atheism (Bullivant & Ruse 2013) also favor this definition and one of them, Stephen Bullivant (2013), defends it on grounds of scholarly utility. His argument is that this definition can best serve as an umbrella term for a wide variety of positions that have been identified with atheism. Scholars can then use adjectives like “strong” and “weak” to develop a taxonomy that differentiates various specific atheisms. Unfortunately, this argument overlooks the fact that, if atheism is defined as a psychological state, then no proposition can count as a form of atheism because a proposition is not a psychological state. This undermines his argument in defense of Flew’s definition; for it implies that what he calls “strong atheism”—the proposition (or belief in the sense of “something believed”) that there is no God—is not really a variety of atheism at all. In short, his proposed “umbrella” term leaves strong atheism out in the rain. Although Flew’s definition of “atheism” fails as an umbrella term, it is certainly a legitimate definition in the sense that it reports how a significant number of people use the term. Again, there is more than one “correct” definition of “atheism”. The issue for philosophy is which definition is the most useful for scholarly or, more narrowly, philosophical purposes. In other contexts, of course, the issue of how to define “atheism” or “atheist” may look very different. For example, in some contexts the crucial issue may be which definition of “atheist” (as opposed to “atheism”) is the most useful politically, especially in light of the bigotry that those who identify as atheists face. The fact that there is strength in numbers may recommend a very inclusive definition of “atheist” that brings anyone who is not a theist into the fold. Having said that, one would think that it would further no good cause, political or otherwise, to attack fellow non-theists who do not identify as atheists simply because they choose to use the term “atheist” in some other, equally legitimate sense. If atheism is usually and best understood in philosophy as the metaphysical claim that God does not exist, then what, one might wonder, should philosophers do with the popular term, “New Atheism”? Philosophers write articles on and have devoted journal issues (French & Wettstein 2013) to the New Atheism, but there is nothing close to a consensus on how that term should be defined. Fortunately, there is no real need for one, because the term “New Atheism” does not pick out some distinctive philosophical position or phenomenon. Instead, it is a popular label for a movement prominently represented by four authors—Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens—whose work is uniformly critical of religion, but beyond that appears to be unified only by timing and popularity.

For cause, I went on to comment in that light, in light of the dictionary stack noted in the OP and in light of the underlying logic of being and worldview root challenge that is pivotal above:

This underscores several points in the OP (pace BB) and points to the onward significance of the logic of being issue being underscored. Namely, denial of the reality of or -- on the part of a reasonably intelligent and informed person -- holding oneself to be without belief in a serious candidate necessary being's existence is in a very different epistemological category from disbelieving that in this world some contingent entity X exists. For instance I believe that no unicorns exist today but due to demand for exotic pets and the reality of genetic engineering one will within 100 years. When one holds oneself to be warranted as without belief in a serious candidate necessary being, say, S, then it seems to me that one has a worldview level burden to show impossibility of S or else that S is at most contingent. I take it that those professing to be without belief in the number 2 will not be seen as sitting on no affirmation and needing to provide no warrant for such an absence of belief, while demanding arbitrarily high warrant for those so benighted as to imagine that 2 is real.

The underlying logic of being issue is brought up in the OP and across the life of the thread has been shown to be a key gap in atheistical views. Why is there a world rather than utter non-being, in which case we would not be here to have any exchange? (Never mind that by the rhetorical stunt of dismissiveness and claimed default on your part you are trying to force me to go over already addressed issues that you have refused to engage on merits either the first time or this -- so actually conceding the matter.) That takes us to being vs non-being. No-thing has no causal powers and so were there ever utter non-being that state would forever obtain. A world manifestly is, so something has always existed, as root of reality. The question is which candidate is best warranted. Also, this surfaces possibility vs impossibility of being and possible worlds semantics as a context of discussion; this last denoting a sufficiently complete description of a state of affairs plausibly feasible or actually existing. In that context, some suggested entities [square circles etc] are impossible of being, there being no PW in which they could be, as there are contradictions between proposed core characteristics. Possible beings would exist in at least one PW, were it instantiated. Contingent beings depend on on/off enabling factors [causes] and so will not exist in at least one PW. Necessary beings are framework to any world and will exist in all PWs. I discussed how distinct identity implies that core mathematical structures and quantities are such, hence accounting for Wigner's amazement on the effectiveness of Mathematics. Logic of being gives Mathematics a lot of its power. In that context, unicorns are contingent beings and so would be flying sphagetti monsters. Any composite entity or entity that begins, ceases or depends on external enabling factors is contingent. By contrast, we cannot have a PW without framework NB's. One of these is the required root that would give existence to this or any other actualised world as a world does not pop into existence from non-being, which cannot have causal powers; it is literally a label for non-existence. There would be literally no-thing there. We therefore have a world-source or root, something causally adequate to account for all actualised worlds which at least includes this one. And no, this is not credibly a beginningless chain of prior finite duration states of our world and whatever extends (speculatively! so, philosophy not science!) beyond the bang. For, such is implicitly transfinite, and it is an infeasible supertask to try to span the transfinite in finite successive steps. Russell's rhetorical stunt from his debate with Copleston, fails. We have in hand a finitely remote world root, and that root in addition has to account for a world including morally governed, rational creatures -- us. Where, moral government begins with known and inescapable [cf. your stable-mate BB's falling into incoherence above] duties to truth, right reason, prudence (so, warrant), sound conscience, justice, etc. This means that the IS-OUGHT gap [never mind your stable-mate's attempt to brush it aside, it is real and central] has to be bridged, which on pain of ungrounded ought is only feasible in the world root. Such requires -- and this answers Euthyphro's so-called dilemma -- that the world root is inherently good and utterly wise. Such and linked considerations are why, after centuries of debate, there is just one serious candidate NB world root adequate to ground ought. Where, a serious candidate -- flying spaghetti monsters need not apply (composite . . . ) and show the gaps in understanding logic of being of too many atheists -- NB will be either impossible of being or actual. Those who claim to know there is no God have the logic of being challenge to show God as understood to be impossible of being. Where, post Plantinga, the problem of evil collapsed and indeed should have been seen as only reflecting the issue of good long since pointed out by Boethius: yes, if God is, why evil, but if God is not, whence good? Plantinga gives a good defense relative to the former, appealing to the good only points to its only credible source. Such appeals include, calling us to duties to truth, right reason, prudence (so, warrant), justice etc. -- i.e., appeals to the moral government of our intellectual faculties. In such light, the notion of posing on an imagined oh we make no positive claims on what is or is not and so can assume a default, are distinctly hollow. Indeed, on fair comment this reflects the dubious rhetoric of question-begging evasion, not serious shouldering of worldview warrant responsibilities i/l/o logic of being considerations. kairosfocus

KF

EG, you are simply doubling down on a refuted talking point....

I’m confused. How do I double down on something I haven’t single downed on? Ed George

EG, you are simply doubling down on a refuted talking point. Atheistical views make major worldview commitments and every worldview faces a comparative difficulties test. And if you imagine nothing substantial stands above simply make a cogent case for your known evolutionary materialistic scientism ____ . Where, recall, credibility of mind is on the table and you need to resolve why there is a world with rational, morally governed creatures, rather than utter non-being, no world at all. Failing that, we have every good reason to infer that you are trying a rhetorical bluff, as was already tried in thread. KF PS: If you failed to observe substantial arguments in the thread, that is a direct confession that you did not actually read it. kairosfocus

KF

EG, In fact, it has been clearly established that atheism has an unmet challenge of worldview level warrant.

No, it hasn’t. You just think it has. Someone pointed out that it is not atheism that must meet the challenge, it is theism. I haven’t read everything in this bloated thread, but I haven’t seen anything that is a showstopper for atheism. All I have read is insults and accusations. From both sides. Ed George

EG, In fact, it has been clearly established that atheism has an unmet challenge of worldview level warrant. Standard atheism (given the logic of being issues) has a challenge to show the existence of God is impossible; failed -- God is a serious candidate, necessary world-root being, such are either impossible of being or else are actual. Likewise, any suggestion of a beginningless causal-temporal past advancing in say years to now has to traverse an implicitly transfinite span in finite steps, a supertask. So-called weak form atheism redefines atheism in ways that imply that standard form is not atheism (as SEP showed); it also fails the comparative difficulties test, and has no epistemic right to assert an atheistical default. The issues of logic of being and world root have been drawn out. It turns out that modal and ontological issues are pivotal. Theism is a responsible view, and latterly, the attempted takedowns of major theistic arguments pivot on failing to soundly address logic of being issues -- and infidels dot org was used as giving in the wild cases. We only needed to refresh memories on the failed logical problem of evil argument and to point out the Boethius challenge: the problem of good. The Euthyphro dilemma is dead as it fails to cogently address an inherently good and utterly wise, necessary world root, without which there is no world with morally governed creatures . Oh yes, multiplying this: our intellectual life is morally governed, inescapably, leading to a needed world root capable of bearing the weight of ought. The famous dumb ox from 800 years ago still fills the world with his bellowing. Along the way, attempts to imply that moral government has no objective substance turn out to undermine the credibility of reasoning itself. Nothing much, I suppose. KF kairosfocus

I have been following this on the sidelines for over 470 comments and I am still waiting for anything of substance to be said from either side. I suspect both sides are just too entrenched in their own dogma to seriously listen to the other side Ed George

KF

Also, if we are not bound by duties to truth and right reason etc, why should we be troubled over a mere contradiction, real or apparent?

He makes a statement trying to affirm something and says at the same time that the truth or falsehood of his views has no relevance or meaning. Silver Asiatic

F/N: Let us proceed to their objections to moral arguments, recognising again that the central error will be failing to address logic of being thence necessary, world root being. With that in mind we will again see just how strawmannish the "standard" atheistical rebuttals to warrant for theism as a responsible worldview are:

https://infidels.org/library/modern/theism/moral.html >>Moral arguments for theism include attempts to establish the existence of God from some (alleged) fact about morality.>> a: notice, again, the supercilious dismissiveness, failing to recognise that reason itself is morally governed, inescapably (we are responsibly, rationally FREE creatures so face what we OUGHT to do as opposed to what we OFTEN DO instead), and that this manifests through duties we know and cannot evade, to truth, to right reason, to prudence, to sound conscience, to fairness and justice etc. b: This means we operate on both sides of the IS-OUGHT gap and it requires that such be bridged, which post Hume is known to only be possible in the world root level. c: That is we need a world root, necessary being that is inherently good and utterly wise. >> Many people hold that objective moral values are required to make sense of certain facets of human life, for instance,>> d: Such as moral government of our intellectual faculties, so even this argument you make appeals inevitably to our duties to truth, to right reason, to prudence, etc. So, any dismissal of such is self referentially absurd, as we have seen in thread in recent days. >>and that God is the only possible source of such values.>> e: More properly, we need a necessary being world root for reality to exist, given that there is a world, and as the world contains morally governed creatures, that requires a being that is inherently good and utterly wise. For which, there is precisely one serious candidate, the inherently good and wise creatur God, a necessary and maximally great being. Who, is worthy of our loyalty and of the reasonable, responsible service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature. f: If you doubt this, kindly provide another _____ and show that it is a superior serious candidate per comparative difficulties, on factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power _____ . >>The metaethical moral argument contends that the existence of objective moral values either entails the existence of God or at least is best explained by theism (e.g., William Lane Craig, Robert Adams).>> g: a summary. A self-evident, objective moral truth, regarding government of our intellectual faculties required to address this argument, is already on the table, Many others obtain, some were already discussed above. >>One version of the argument runs as follows: 1. If there are objective moral values then God exists. 2. There are objective moral values. 3. Therefore, God exists.>> h: Skeletonised into strawman caricature, and lacking in a LOT of relevant context. >>Even if we grant the existence of objective moral values, the argument fails because the first premise is groundless.>> i: Notice, how by strawmannising the matter, the substance already highlighted is suppressed, creating a false impression of question-begging. >>The rationale for thinking that objective moral values require God is the assumption that only God could ground the objectivity of ethics.>> j: Notice, the strawman caricature projection of question-begging assumption. >>But, in fact, there appears to be no way that the existence of God could ground moral truths--anymore than it could ground mathematical or scientific truths.>> k: Again, strawman. God is a serious candidate world root. As such, he would ground the existence of something rather than nothing, which WOULD ground not only moral but physical, logical and mathematical truths. l: By sharpest contrast, the evolutionary materialist world frame is unable to bridge the IS-OUGHT gap, cannot found rational, responsible freedom and can ground neither mathematics nor morality. >> The standard objection to the divine command theory of ethics, discussed elsewhere on this site [--> the link goes to the so-called Euthyphro dilemma], shows that the objectivity of ethics cannot be grounded in God.>> m: Note a bare assertion on a long since answered dilemma argument. Where, such was originally addresssed to the gods of the Greeks, who were not anywhere near an inherently good, utterly wise creator God, a necessary and maximally great being who is root of reality. n: By contrast, God is the only serious candidate to be that root, and by the coherence of his goodness, wisdom, power, creation and sustaining the world, more than founds morality. o: As for the attempt to suggest that his commands would be arbitrary or link to an order of goodness separate from his reality as root of the world, his wisdom and goodness will mean his commands are for our own good based on utter wisdom. Likewise, as root of reality, there is no origin or manifestation of reality outside of his action. (Cf. here for an in-brief on the dilemma.)

Again, failure to address wider context leading to knocking over a strawman caricature. KF kairosfocus

BB, Wilberforce's work directly ended the slave trade, the root of the system, others did the work that broke the trade over a century as noted: the royal navy, backed by reformed society; law and government broke the trade as a major instrument of policy for the leading maritime nation. The system was abolished in 1833 in the British Empire, effected 34 - 38 across the Caribbean region. That set global, decisive, irreversible momentum. Yes, in the American case, it took a civil war with 600 k dead. And no, there is utterly no contradiction between acting under recognised law of defence to deal with an attacker and seeking to reform a major flaw in law where the ultimate innocents are freely and for profit put to death, with widespread, propaganda induced support that has eroded our recognition of the value of innocent life. Serious harm has been done to our civilisation, and I fear -- as Lincoln warned -- that a reckoning may come in blood. For sure, I see that those who would most naturally support leading democratic countries are gradually becoming disaffected. Historically, that is a dangerous sign. But then, trying to undermine the moral underpinnings of reason and responsibility simply tells us that you have left off from credible, cogent discussion. The question is whether you will wake up before it is too late. KF kairosfocus

F/N: In absence of responses here, I have gone to Infidels dot org. Let's start with their presentation of cosmological arguments: >>Incorporating Aristotle's notion of a "prime mover" into Summa Theologica and elsewhere, Thomas Aquinas famously formulated his version of the cosmological or "first cause" argument. According to this argument, the things which we see around us now are the products of a series of previous causes. But that series cannot go back in time forever. Thus there must be some first cause which was not itself caused by anything else. And that first uncaused cause is God. The argument can be put more formally as follows: 1. Every thing has either been caused to exist by something else or else exists uncaused. 2. Not every thing has been caused to exist by something else. 3. Therefore, at least one thing is itself uncaused. There are several problems with this argument. The most crucial objection to the argument itself is that unless we know that premise 2 is true, the argument fails. If the universe is infinitely old, for instance, every thing could indeed be caused by something else before it; the series of causes could go back forever. But perhaps more importantly, one could hold that the argument succeeds without believing that God exists.>> Now, let's note that as usual, there is an obvious gap due to lack of understanding of the logic of being and several linked factors. Let's look in steps:

>> https://infidels.org/library/modern/theism/cosmological.html Incorporating Aristotle's notion of a "prime mover" into Summa Theologica and elsewhere, >> a: Loaded language, a first initiating and/or sustaining cause is not a mere arbitrary notion. and of course we saw that the root argument goes back at least to Plato. b: Clipping from The Laws Bk X, we see Plato speak to causal chains -- accidental AND essential BTW (the latter being simultaneous):

Ath. . . . when one thing changes another, and that another, of such will there be any primary changing element? How can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving principle? . . . . self-motion being the origin of all motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second. [[ . . . .] Ath. If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound-how should we describe it? Cle. You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving power life? Ath. I do. Cle. Certainly we should. Ath. And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same-must we not admit that this is life? [[ . . . . ] Cle. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul? Ath. Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things? Cle. Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things. Ath. And is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower number which you may prefer? Cle. Exactly.

c: Here we see that a causal chain (even one of indefinite length) is not self-explanatory, pointing beyond itself to an antecedent initiating cause. d: We may also note that traversal of a transfinite span of linked stages in steps successively is a supertask and cannot credibly be completed this way. e: Those who claim otherwise need to not beg the question of an always already traversed transfinite span and show how such can be traversed successively and completely from an alleged beginningless past. f: More to the point, the whole chain requires support, so we see how contingent being requires antecedent world root necessary being. g: Where, numbers such as 2 demonstrate actual, world framework necessary beings. >>Thomas Aquinas famously formulated his version of the cosmological or "first cause" argument. According to this argument, the things which we see around us now are the products of a series of previous causes. But that series cannot go back in time forever.>> g: Not just in time, the whole context of the chain -- a world -- has to be accounted for. And of course we see back to Plato already. >> Thus there must be some first cause which was not itself caused by anything else.>> h: Skips over logic of being, possible vs impossible being, non-being and contingent vs necessary being. Thus, strawman fallacy exploiting widespread ignorance. Likely, involving their own ignorance but if one sets out to teach and correct others, there is some homework to do first. i: Not all beings are caused, this is the issue of contingent vs necessary being. j: Were there ever nothing utterly, non-being having no causal powers that would forever obtain. So that a world is implies something always was, a necessary, world-root being, which is a first cause. The question is of what character, where an infinite beginningless chain of successive finite stages is not credibly spanned in such steps. >> And that first uncaused cause is God.>> k: Context and issues suppressed to the point of strawman fallacy. >>The argument can be put more formally as follows: 1. Every thing has either been caused to exist by something else or else exists uncaused. 2. Not every thing has been caused to exist by something else. 3. Therefore, at least one thing is itself uncaused.>> l: Strawman caricature, driven by failing to address logic of being. Observe, Aquinas, skeletonised in his first three arguments:

The First Way: Argument from Motion 1 Our senses prove that some things are in motion. 2 Things move when potential motion becomes actual motion [–> this uses the idea of potential –> motion or change –> actualisation, it is broader than physical movement]. 3 Only an actual motion can convert a potential motion into an actual motion. 4 Nothing can be at once in both actuality and potentiality in the same respect (i.e., if both actual and potential, it is actual in one respect and potential in another). 5 Therefore nothing can move itself. [–> I would add, directly, given f/b loops and cybernetic systems] 6 Therefore each thing in motion is moved by something else. 7 The sequence of motion cannot extend ad infinitum. [–> not temporal sense but antecedent] ________ 8 Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. The Second Way: Argument from Efficient Causes 1 We perceive a series of efficient causes of things in the world. 2 Nothing exists prior to itself. 3 Therefore nothing [in the world of things we perceive] is the efficient cause of itself. 4 If a previous efficient cause does not exist, neither does the thing that results (the effect). 5 Therefore if the first thing in a series does not exist, nothing in the series exists. 6 If the series of efficient causes extends ad infinitum into the past, for then there would be no things existing now. 7 That is plainly false (i.e., there are things existing now that came about through efficient causes). 9 Therefore efficient causes do not extend ad infinitum into the past. _____________ 10 Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. The Third Way: Argument from Possibility and Necessity (Reductio argument) 1 We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, that come into being and go out of being i.e., contingent beings. 2 Assume that every being is a contingent being. 3 For each contingent being, there is a time it does not exist. 4 Therefore it is impossible for these always to exist. 5 Therefore there could have been a time when no things existed. 6 Therefore at that time there would have been nothing to bring the currently existing contingent beings into existence. 7 Therefore, nothing would be in existence now. 8 We have reached an absurd result from assuming that every being is a contingent being. 9 Therefore not every being is a contingent being. ____________ 10 Therefore some being exists of its own necessity, and does not receive its existence from another being, but rather causes them. This all men speak of as God.

m: Strawman caricature exposed. A more modern summary that brings the necessary being issue in is:

B. Cosmological: (NB: This appears out of the classical order, as IMHO it makes A far more clear if this is done, by distinguishing and rationalising “contingent” and “necessary” beings. This is an example of a cumulative argument.): 1. Some contingent beings exist. (E.g.: us, a tree or a fruit, an artifact, the planets and stars, etc. — anything that might not have existed, i.e. is caused.) 2. Contingent beings do not exist by themselves – that is in part what “contingent” means – so they require a necessary being as their ultimate cause. 3. If any contingent being exists, then a necessary being exists. 4. Thus, there exists a necessary being, the ultimate cause of the existence of the many contingent beings in the cosmos. A. Ontological: 1. If God exists, his existence is necessary. (NB link to B.4 just above.) 2. If God does not exist, his existence is impossible. 3. Either God exists or he does not exist. 4. God’s existence is either necessary or impossible. 5. But, God’s existence is possible (i.e. not impossible). 6. So, God’s existence is necessary.

>>There are several problems with this argument. The most crucial objection to the argument itself is that unless we know that premise 2 is true, the argument fails.>> n: Premise 2: Not every thing has been caused to exist by something else. Notice this is tagged number 2, depending on two-ness. Try to imagine a world in which that two-ness does not exist or ceases to be -- impossible. Many times we saw that 2-ness is part of the framework for any possible world to exist. o: 2 is a distinct entity, which is not contingent and is not caused, it is a necessary being. Lack of understanding of logic of being has led to a needless objection. p: We then seek, of course not just a necessary, world framework being but a world root. And one capable of bearing the weight of oughtness. >> If the universe is infinitely old, for instance, every thing could indeed be caused by something else before it; the series of causes could go back forever.>> q: Sparta was once challenged to battle by another state that suggested if this and if that, then whatever. Sparta sent back one of their famous laconical responses: IF. r: If you are suggesting a beginningless causal-temporal successive chain for the observed cosmos and its presumed antecedents beyond the bang, kindly provide warrant for traversing the implied transfinite chain from the transfinitely remote past to now, in successive finite sage steps, years for convenience: ________ s: In short, you are implying a pretty strong worldview, world root claim, and need to provide adequate warrant. On pain of begging huge, logic of being and roots of reality shaped questions. >>But perhaps more importantly, one could hold that the argument succeeds without believing that God exists.>> t: In the narrow context, we need to account for a necessary being world root, which is an eternal entity with power to cause and sustain a cosmos. That is a pretty good slice of God's job. u: Where, the cosmological argument by itself never told the whole story. Blend in that part of the world to be explained is minded, responsible, morally governed creatures, us, and we need to bridge the IS-OUGHT gap in the only place that can be done, the world root. v: Blend that in and we need an eternal, world creating and sustaining entity that is inherently good and utterly wise. That is a whole lot more of God's job there.

So, again and again we see that preliminary thought on logic of being is needed to make better sense of the worldview issues at stake. The objectors fail here. Aquinas and others, of course typically spent hundreds of pages on relevant context that provides the background for the skeletal 101 arguments. KF kairosfocus

It took the bloodiest war in US history to do that.

The Emancipation Proclamation was not a war.

Frankly, I am not bothered by the contradiction …

Clearly you are as you invented it where there wasn't any. ET

KF

BB, your there is no answer carries about as much weight as your earlier there is no evidence. Nil, being assertions presented and doubled down on in the teeth of contrary evidence. Lawful, peaceful reform rooted in building a sound moral understanding answers to deeply entrenched evils; as Wilberforce demonstrated.

Wilberforce didn't end slavery. It took the bloodiest war in US history to do that.

Also, if we are not bound by duties to truth and right reason etc, why should we be troubled over a mere contradiction, real or apparent?

Frankly, I am not bothered by the contradiction as it is what I would expect of a system of moral values that are subjective in nature. Brother Brian

F/N: Let us observe just how gun-shy the usual objectors are on the substantial, focal issues raised from the OP on. KF kairosfocus

BB, your there is no answer carries about as much weight as your earlier there is no evidence. Nil, being assertions presented and doubled down on in the teeth of contrary evidence. Lawful, peaceful reform rooted in building a sound moral understanding answers to deeply entrenched evils; as Wilberforce demonstrated. The history of radical revolutions shows what predictably happens when such is ignored. Also, if we are not bound by duties to truth and right reason etc, why should we be troubled over a mere contradiction, real or apparent? That shows the REAL contradiction here, you tried to subvert the very principles you must appeal to. Sawing off the branch on which we must all sit is not a well advised action. KF kairosfocus

"Brother Brian is in complete desperation mode:" I agree. He needs to get a job or otherwise do something constructive. The planet is going to hell in a handbasket due to a Climate Change/Disruption/Disaster and he wastes everyone's time excessively trolling when he could be riding his bicycle to offset his carbon emissions and hopefully lose a few pounds. Andrew asauber

Brother Brian is in complete desperation mode:

So, if the law says that you must report the location of all Jews to the authorities, you would do so because you are morally obliged to do so?

I wasn't there so your cowardly distraction is moot. But we all understand why you try such desperate ploys. ET

Brother Brian:

KF, I’m impressed. 9018 words and you still have not addressed the moral contradiction that I presented.

You didn't present a moral contradiction. Your challenge has been answered. Everyone can see that you just ignore it because you have serious personal issues. All you are doing is proving that you are nothing but a belligerent troll. ET

Brother Brian:

KF, I’m impressed. 9018 words and you still have not addressed the moral contradiction that I presented.

You didn't present a moral contradiction. Your challenge has been answered. Everyone can see that you just ignore it because you have serious personal issues. All you are doing is proving that you are nothing but a belligerent troll. ET

KF, I'm impressed. 9018 words and you still have not addressed the moral contradiction that I presented. A moral contradiction which, by the way, completely undermines your assertion that we are bound by an objectively derived (God given) moral governance. A contradiction that goes to the heart of your entire argument. Brother Brian