In a meaningless world, does truth always have value over delusion?

_{Salvador Cordova

July 6, 2013

Atheism, Philosophy, Religion}

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I care about truth if there is a God. But why should I care about truth if there is no God? In fact if there is no God, maybe I shouldn’t care about truth because it would be too sad to know…I’d rather live out my life with the illusion of happily ever after in that case.

Two thousand years ago, someone echoed those sentiments:

What do I gain if, humanly speaking, I fought with beasts at Ephesus? If the dead are not raised, “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die.”

Paul of Tarsus
1 Cor 15:32

There was an exchange between KeithS and I in another thread, and he fired off this comment:

Your comment epitomizes one of the biggest problems with Pascal’s Wager. It doesn’t ask the question “What is most likely to be true?” It only asks, “How can I get the best payoff?”

That’s anathema to anyone who truly cares about truth.

Holy Rollers, Pascal’s Wager;Comment 100

To which I responded:

But why should I care about truth if there is no God? In fact if there is no God, maybe I shouldn’t care about truth because it would be too sad to know…I’d rather live out my life with the illusion of happily ever after in that case.

Why, logically speaking should an atheist care about truth in a meaningless universe? Perhaps the logical answer is no answer. If you say, truth has a better payoff, well, then you’ve just put payoffs ahead of truth! Right back where you started.

Further KeithS wrote:

Because the value of truth doesn’t depend on the existence of God.

To which I responded:

Value means PAYOFF! What is the payoff if there is no God?

I recall Dawkins in a debate with Lennox was asked about how humans can live their lives in a meaningless world. Dawkins said, “we create our own meaning”. Other atheists have repeated that statement such KeithS:

Life is full of meaning even without God. We create our own meanings, whether you realize it or not.

Holy Rollers, Pascal’s wager; Comment 59

to which I responded:

[the phrase] “we create our own meaning” is pretty much to me “we concoct our own unproven falsehoods to make us feel better”.
…
this whole “we create our own meaning” is worse than the religious ideas you are criticizing. You “know” there is no meaning, but you’ll pretend there is anyway. Reminds me of Coyne who “knows” there is no free will but he’ll pretend there is anyway.

And that is what continues to puzzle me about the atheistic variety of Darwinists (not Christian Darwinists). They seem to find much purpose in life in proving life has no purpose!

[posted by scordova to assist News desk with content and commentary until 7/7/13]

Comments

@Elizabeth #74
it seems to me that any concept stealing is being done by the theists
Theists and religious people are not the same, since not all theists believe in the God of the Bible (or any god written on paper), and therefore are not biased by predetermined concepts of morality and good and evil that are independent from the material world.
In other words, it makes more sense to recognise God as present in that which is good, than to define good as that which is commanded by God, given that there is no objective way of determining what those commands are.
I agree. We should learn about the Creator by looking at the creation, not by reading religious text about it/him/her.Proton_{July 7, 2013
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Not quite. Plantinga makes a clear distinction between behavior that ensures survival and whether or not that behavior is grounded in true beliefs. He makes quite clear that true beliefs are not required to ensure behavior that enhances survival. Survival will occur as long as one gets one body parts to a safe place. But one believes about the world that causes the behavior that results in survival does not entail that the belief be actually true.
I agree with that take on Plantinga -- so far, so good.
The leap that Churchland makes is he already assumes that NS has given us “true” beliefs…and that IS the point at issue. He tries to get at it a clever, but ultimately inaccurate way, because he conflates behavior that ensures survival with true beliefs. The two are not the same, and need not be. And further to Plantinga’s argument, Churchland et.al., have no way to discern what the true belief is under Naturalism.
Churchland does not "assume that natural selection has given us 'true' beliefs". Instead he makes the following counter-moves: (1) he grants Plantinga's point that we will have a lot of wildly false beliefs, and indeed thinks that evolutionary naturalism explains why our cognitive capacities tend not to do very well when it comes to "worldview-level" questions; (2) but, while we human beings are prone to all sorts of wild speculation and fantasizing about worldview-level stuff, what we do have is reliable cognition about our practical environment, because; (3) on a naturalistic account of semantic content, semantic content just is synaptically-encoded feature-space mappings of the environment; therefore (4) whereas Plantinga simply gives us fanciful scenarios for how belief and behavior can be conceived as coming apart ("Perhaps Paul believes that tigers are friendly, but that running away from the tiger will make it like him"), Churchland gives us a theory about how exactly representations of the world -- construed as naturalism construes them -- are tightly bound up with successful reproduction. (5) and that, with language, culture, and technology, the collective scientific enterprise boot-straps our 'native' cognitive capacities into forming better and better theories about the world -- including the theories of evolution and of cognitive neuroscience that are used to ground (a)-(d). [In short, Churchland is using our best current scientific theories to explain our ability to do science -- while also explaining why science is such a recent development in the history of our species. If nothing else, this should at least show how much Churchland is an anti-foundationalist in the tradition of Hegel, Peirce, and Sellars. In fact Churchland wrote his undergrad senior thesis on Peirce and did his PhD under Sellars.]Kantian Naturalist_{July 7, 2013
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William:
Nothing can be “objective” tested, Liz. Not even gravity. Gravity can only be subjectively tested and then subjectively agreed upon by a consensus. Nothing is “objectively” tested. You are apparently slipping/sliding on the use of the term “objective”, instead referring to “objective” as what it appears to an individual that the consensus agrees upon. That is also still a subjective interpretation. We can ascertain the properties of morality in much the same way – by finding self-evidently true properties of morality and building upon that. Just because morality cannot be seen, but must be experienced another way, doesn’t mean it is not as objectively real as gravity.
My position is that the best evidence we have that an objective reality is "out there" as it were, is that independent observers can get substantially the same answers to within a small amount of variance. Of course all measurements are "subjective" in that that each person interprets sensory information through their own sensory apparatus, and two people reading the same thermometer will not read it in exactly the same way. But the point is that independent observers read thermometers to within a very small degree of variance. This tells us that thermometer reading gives us a very "objective" measure of temperature, even though there is still a small amount of "measurement error". The same is NOT true of morality. Non-independent observers may get similar results, while a second set of non-independent observers may get different results. Therefore we know that morality is not something that we can get a reliable measure of. That said, there is still a broad consensus about some fundamental principles, such as the value of altruism for maintaining a society that works well for everyone. That may indeed represent an "objective truth" - that societies of intelligent social animals like us thrive when moral principles such as "do as you would be done to" are upheld, and when those who don't are penalised. But that conclusion is not altered depending on whether or not we believe that there is a God. Indeed, I'd say the opposite is the case. We can conclude that regardless of whether there is a God, and moreoever, draw from that conclusions the inference that if there is a good God who made us able to discern that morality, that God must endorse those principles. In other words, it makes more sense to recognise God as present in that which is good, than to define good as that which is commanded by God, given that there is no objective way of determining what those commands are. As I said, it seems to me that any concept stealing is being done by the theists, rather than secular society, although I do not grudge it. You can gladly have it for free :)Elizabeth B Liddle_{July 7, 2013
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I'm absolutely certain that in all cases anywhere and in any culture, torturing children for one's personal pleasure is immoral.
There is nothing subjective about that; if you agree, you are tacitly agreeing that morality refers to something absolute. You cannot have your subjective cake and eat it too.William J Murray_{July 7, 2013
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No, because I’m not absolutely certain that nothing is absolutely certain.
Then your entire argument about the necessary moral uncertainty of others fails. You can't have it both ways. Either you can argue that others cannot be certain of their moral position, which necessarily implies certainty that they are not certain, or you agree that they might be certain, which destroys the basis for your argument.William J Murray_{July 7, 2013
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Keiths: Central Scrutinizer, in the very first comment of this thread: Of course, the whole “morality argument” doesn’t prove there is a God, but if reality has no ultimate meaning and I’m free to concoct my own, don’t be surprised (or give me a bunch of subjective sentimental hogwash) why I shouldn’t slit your throat for whatever you may have in your wallet. Or kill you and eat your liver with fava beans.
I read the entire TSZ thread you cited. I don't see how it's relevant to my statement. If it helps, I'll drop the conditional nature from my from my original statement and add an italic: Reality has no ultimate meaning. I’m free to concoct my own. So don’t be surprised (or give me a bunch of subjective sentimental hogwash) why I shouldn’t slit your throat for whatever you may have in your wallet. Or kill you and eat your liver with fava beans. OK, so how is that other thread relevant?CentralScrutinizer_{July 7, 2013
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Yes, I know you have. And I think that the “ramifications” are irrelevant, if they don’t make any difference to how we discern what is moral.
It doesn't make any difference to you because you are stealing an entire conceptual framework that you have no right to. Under naturalism/materialism, you do not "discern" what "is" moral; you just make it up according to however you happen to feel.
I don’t see why. Morality is an abstract concept, like love, or justice.
Is? You believe it is. Most of us do not. Most of us hold morality to be a concept that describes an actuality.
We don’t have to think that they exist as a force in the universe that can be objectively tested for us to regard them as having validity as constructs. Especially, as we can’t objectively test them, unlike:
Nothing can be "objective" tested, Liz. Not even gravity. Gravity can only be subjectively tested and then subjectively agreed upon by a consensus. Nothing is "objectively" tested. You are apparently slipping/sliding on the use of the term "objective", instead referring to "objective" as what it appears to an individual that the consensus agrees upon. That is also still a subjective interpretation. We can ascertain the properties of morality in much the same way - by finding self-evidently true properties of morality and building upon that. Just because morality cannot be seen, but must be experienced another way, doesn't mean it is not as objectively real as gravity.
Morality may or may not be, but as we can’t test it, asserting it to be so doesn’t help us find out anything about it.
Why can we not test morality? You then go on to say:
If morality really was as objective as you say, then most observers would reach very similar answers.
and then, bizarrely, :
In fact, I’d say that there is a fair degree of consensus.
So on the one hand you rate consensus agreement as that which defines the objective reality of a thing, but even though there is, and has been through many cultures and over centuries if not thousands of years, a fair consensus about basic moral principles (as shown by so many versions of the Golden Rule in so many cultures), you reject the idea that morality is based upon an objective (absolute) commodity, like gravity? You've undermined your own argument.
But if so, why should that objective morality have anything to do with whether we believe in God or not? Why should that “objective morality” not simply be a truth about the way people tend to think they should behave with regard to one another?
If you're okay with calling slavery, child abuse and ethnic genocide, in principle, as moral as any other behavior if that is the way people tend to think they should behave, then ... there's no reason at all.William J Murray_{July 7, 2013
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DonaldM,
No matter how you parse this, Keith, you entire argument comes down to “I’m absolutely certain that nothing is absolutely certain”.
No, because I'm not absolutely certain that nothing is absolutely certain. If I were absolutely certain about that, then I would be saying that it is impossible -- probability 0.0 -- for anyone, anywhere to come up with a statement that is absolutely certain. I'm not that hubristic. Why is that so hard for you to grasp?keiths_{July 7, 2013
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Keiths in #38
No, because your sense of certainty about that might be mistaken. Even a mathematical proof can’t give you absolute certainty, because it depends on the axioms and the rules of deduction, neither of which are absolutely certain!
You keep missing the point. No matter how you parse this, Keith, you entire argument comes down to "I'm absolutely certain that nothing is absolutely certain". You can put all the "fairly certain" qualifiers you wish in front of that, you still can't avoid the "I'm absolutely certain..." implied in front of all of it. The argument is entirely self-refuting. And of that, I am absolutely certain.DonaldM_{July 7, 2013
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KN
mean, the EAAN is not supposed to be a ‘starting out from first principles’ sort of argument, right? It’s supposed to be an internal critique of evolutionary naturalism — it’s supposed to show that evolutionary naturalism is self-refuting. And it’s not, because given our current grasp of evolutionary theory and of cognitive neuroscience, there’s no reason not to believe that unguided natural selection does, in fact, tend to produce organisms that have roughly accurate partial maps of their practical environments, and indeed lots of reasons to think that that is exactly what evolution tends to do. So then all Churchland needs is an account that shows how to get from reliable non-propositional representations (roughly accurate neurocognitive feature-maps) to propositional representings (mostly true beliefs) — and to do that, all he needs is an account of the origins of language.
Not quite. Plantinga makes a clear distinction between behavior that ensures survival and whether or not that behavior is grounded in true beliefs. He makes quite clear that true beliefs are not required to ensure behavior that enhances survival. Survival will occur as long as one gets one body parts to a safe place. But one believes about the world that causes the behavior that results in survival does not entail that the belief be actually true. The leap that Churchland makes is he already assumes that NS has given us "true" beliefs...and that IS the point at issue. He tries to get at it a clever, but ultimately inaccurate way, because he conflates behavior that ensures survival with true beliefs. The two are not the same, and need not be. And further to Plantinga's argument, Churchland et.al., have no way to discern what the true belief is under Naturalism. Churchland jumps from NS as explanation for our existenece to it also being the explanation for our true beliefs...and that is begging the question. Granting NS as he does, Plantinga is not granting that entails the formation of true beliefs. His point is that there is no way to claim that it does. Churchland's argument assmues but does not demonstrate it. That is fatal to his critique of the EAAN. I'm out of the loop the next couple of days, so won't be able to engage further on this until later this week. Skeet shooting and a Cubs game! (not at the same time!)DonaldM_{July 7, 2013
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William:
Liz, I’ve told you at least a dozen times now that the issue is not about discerning that the “morality information” is, in fact, objectively accurate; it’s about the ramifications of the premise of subjective morality vs objective (absolute) morality.
Yes, I know you have. And I think that the "ramifications" are irrelevant, if they don't make any difference to how we discern what is moral. It might be of mild philosophical interest to wonder whether, if we figure out that action X is probably the right thing, whether God does too, but without any way of telling, it doesn't help us figure it out. No concept has been "stolen" because either way, we have to figure it out.
When we gather information about anything, and construct a perspective on that thing, and how we go about making inferences to conclusions, entirely depends on if we premise (assume) that thing to be a subjective commodity or an objective (absolute, independently existent) commodity.
I don't see why. Morality is an abstract concept, like love, or justice. We don't have to think that they exist as a force in the universe that can be objectively tested for us to regard them as having validity as constructs. Especially, as we can't objectively test them, unlike:
gravity.
which we can,because independent observers can do the same measurements and verify that they get the same answers.
We expect to be able to independently reach necessarily corresponding results and conclusions when we do things that involve gravity; this is because we hold gravity to be an objectively (absolute) commodity independent of our subjective interpretations and views.
No, it's because we can do actual measurements to test the concept.
We expect our results and conclusions to apply to everyone, regardless of their culture or individual ideas.
Precisely, because the very fact that our measurements converge indicates that gravity is part of objective reality. Morality may or may not be, but as we can't test it, asserting it to be so doesn't help us find out anything about it.
If anyone disagrees, we do not hold it as a matter of personal preference; we expect them to be able to justify their disagreement, or we hold them in error.
Precisely, and we can check their work, and if they get a wildly discrepant answer, we can figure out why. This is not the case with morality, as I think you agree.
However, all information about gravity is subjectively gathered, subjectively interpreted, and subjectively considered. No “objective” information is accessible from an individual, subjective perspective;
Yes, indeed, but we can converge on a result, and estimate our measurement error from the variance in those results. This is why we can regard gravity as an "objective" entity - because the answers we get are only minimally dependent on the observer. This is not the case with morality.
but if we assume what we are talking about is objective (absolute), then we expect that our views on the thing in question – gravity – must conform as much as possible to what we assume is an independently objective commodity.
No, what we must expect is that our measurements will give us very similar answers, regardless of what our prior beliefs are about gravity. And they do. If morality really was as objective as you say, then most observers would reach very similar answers. In fact, I'd say that there is a fair degree of consensus. So it may be true that there really is an "objective morality" that we can measure. But if so, why should that objective morality have anything to do with whether we believe in God or not? Why should that "objective morality" not simply be a truth about the way people tend to think they should behave with regard to one another? Because we cannot gain any “more” (any at all, in fact) “objective” information about gravity does not limit us to assuming gravity must be a subjective phenomena. That is the path to solipsism, and everything falls back into Plato’s cave under your “no additional objective information” argument.Elizabeth B Liddle_{July 7, 2013
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In re: William Murray: In re: (55): I already noted that this is not circular reasoning (see my (37)), precisely because of the exact nature of the debate between Plantinga and Churchland. Plantinga's EAAN takes the question, "If one begins by assuming evolutionary naturalism, do we have any reasons for thinking that our cognitive capacities are reliable, i.e. that our beliefs are mostly true?" And to this Churchland gives a perfectly cogent answer:
If one begins by assuming evolutionary naturalism, then our present knowledge of evolutionary theory and cognitive neuroscience gives us very good reasons for thinking that cognitive capacities are mostly accurate, partial maps of the practical environment, and also very good explanations for why we tend to go so wildly awry when it comes to understanding the world in more comprehensive terms.
And he further makes the very interesting point that science works by augmenting our perceptual and motor capacities through technology -- effectively turning what was formerly the domain of myth and story into extensions of our practical environment. Now, I am not quite as gung-ho neo-positivistic at Churchland, but it's a compelling account. (One point of difference between Churchland and myself: he sometimes writes as if he wants to complete the positivist replacement of metaphysics with science, whereas I want to continue the pragmatist transformation of pre-scientific metaphysics into scientific metaphysics.) So I don't see Churchland (or myself) as begging any questions. The EAAN, remember, is supposed to conclude that one is not entitled to evolutionary naturalism -- but it reaches that conclusion by granting that one is, and then explicating the incoherence of that position. Churchland's response is that, once granted, the position is not incoherent. And the key difference between Churchland and Plantinga -- a subtle difference but really 'the difference that makes the difference' -- lies in their respective conceptions of representation. Plantinga frames the EAAN in terms of "mostly true beliefs", and takes it that it is beliefs which represent the world. And with that assumption in place, all Plantinga bothers to do is through in some fanciful scenarios that pry apart 'belief' and 'behavior.' And since natural selection only acts on behavior, not on belief . . . QED. To this Churchland responds by saying, implicitly, "OK, if you want to generate the supposed incoherence, then you've got to let me start off with everything that evolutionary naturalism is committed to -- so don't saddle me with your old-school concept of "belief" as the basic cognitive unit. Instead, here's an naturalistic theory of what representation really is: synaptically-encoded feature-space maps. And now, with a naturalistic theory of semantic content, grounded in cognitive neuroscience, to complement what we know about evolutionary processes, the supposed incoherence doesn't arise." In re: (57): let us note that, in a previous thread, I gave an argument for why "the stolen concept fallacy" is itself a fallacy -- because it rests on a conflation of validity and genesis. In reply, Murray accused me of "sophistry" but did not reply further, and did not notice that I had, in fact, given an argument against the very idea of a "stolen concept fallacy". Given that Murray has continued to use this same notion without any engagement with my criticism, it's clear that Murray is the real sophist.Kantian Naturalist_{July 7, 2013
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Anyone who values relationships, Krock, which is most of us.
We value relationships because we were designed to do so.Joe_{July 7, 2013
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Liz, I've told you at least a dozen times now that the issue is not about discerning that the "morality information" is, in fact, objectively accurate; it's about the ramifications of the premise of subjective morality vs objective (absolute) morality. When we gather information about anything, and construct a perspective on that thing, and how we go about making inferences to conclusions, entirely depends on if we premise (assume) that thing to be a subjective commodity or an objective (absolute, independently existent) commodity. Such as, gravity. We expect to be able to independently reach necessarily corresponding results and conclusions when we do things that involve gravity; this is because we hold gravity to be an objectively (absolute) commodity independent of our subjective interpretations and views. We expect our results and conclusions to apply to everyone, regardless of their culture or individual ideas. If anyone disagrees, we do not hold it as a matter of personal preference; we expect them to be able to justify their disagreement, or we hold them in error. However, all information about gravity is subjectively gathered, subjectively interpreted, and subjectively considered. No "objective" information is accessible from an individual, subjective perspective; but if we assume what we are talking about is objective (absolute), then we expect that our views on the thing in question - gravity - must conform as much as possible to what we assume is an independently objective commodity. Because we cannot gain any "more" (any at all, in fact) "objective" information about gravity does not limit us to assuming gravity must be a subjective phenomena. That is the path to solipsism, and everything falls back into Plato's cave under your "no additional objective information" argument.William J Murray_{July 7, 2013
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And that is precisely why my question is NOT absurd, William. If there is no way in which information about "objective" morality can be obtained, then there is nothing "objective" about any derivable morality. We are still stuck with our best subjective efforts.Elizabeth B Liddle_{July 7, 2013
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In support of my thesis, I ask what additional reliable non-subjective information about morality is gained from the assumption that morality proceeds from a deity, as opposed to a deity being the personification of human morality.
What an absurd question. ALL information is subjectively interpreted, whether it has to do with morality, gravity, or a brick wall.William J Murray_{July 7, 2013
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I don’t understand what you are saying here. Can you rephrase? I am not clear of the distinction you are drawing between “intrinsic” worth and mere “worth” and why “intrinsic” worth is better.
I don't know if you play video games, but there are online video games where you compete against others. There are people that use hacks and become unbeatable not because they are more skilled, but rather because they manipulate the code in a way it was not designed in order to win. I was once involved in an online game where there were local game "masters" that housed the base game code for a city, and various cities around the country would compete. It was a great game, where "winning" meant you beat others on a level playing field - you had superior tactics. Our local game master figured out how to hack the code so we would win every time. I immediately lost interest and stopped playing. At the time, I could not imagine how anyone could enjoy "winning" a game by cheating. "Meaning" beyond trivial descriptive references - like what liquid "means" - depends upon the assumed frame of reference. If one assumes that what one personally feels is a valid measurement of meaning, then if one feels gratified if they win by hacking the game, then that is a "meaningful" accomplishment. Their win, for them, has "meaning" - as much meaning, under materialist atheism, as winning without hacking, because it gave that person a sense of satisfaction that they "won". To the rest of us, however, that "win" has no game-intrinsic value, because they did not win by playing the game - they hacked it. "Winning" is a concept they have no right to employ, nor is it a sensation they have any right to. "Winning", as a concept and as a sensation, only applies to those that played the game fairly. The game, in this sense, is an absolute, objective construct within which there are absolute, objective rules as set forth in the authorized code. Winning the game fairly has a huge amount of meaning. Hacking it, and producing a faux "win", has no objective meaning or value; it only has subjective value for the individual who is applying an ersatz definition of "winning" as opposed to the objective, value-laden definition. Under atheism, life is a game without any rules (other than the basic rules of physics (even our hacker cannot violate those). Beyond that, however, there are only subjectively invented goals and subjectively felt meaning, which all boils down to "what I feel personally benefits me, or makes me feel good or happy", which is directly comparable to the hacker's views and feelings. He invents his own rules to acquire whatever sensation he enjoys. The ultimate meaning of life, in a godless world, boils down to hedonism, no matter how that hedonism is played out. In a godless world, even Gandhi was a hedonist. This brings up an interesting opportunity to illustrate what I mean by a stolen concept. Note that the hacker's concept of winning, and his/her sense of elation or enjoyment at having won, is genetically descended from the general assumption that the game is fair, and that the rules of the game are being obeyed; IOW, it's that everyone else thinks the hacker won fair and square, or it's his ability to beat everyone else who is obeying the rules he breaks, that gives him his sense of pleasure. His sense of "winning" is genetically rooted in the very thing that he considers inapplicable to his own play. IOW, Liz, in a truly godless world, and operating from a truly atheistic foundation, your "meaning" would have no frame of reference to give it any value - like our ersatz hacker without a pre-existent objective framework to hack and without a pre-existent concept of "winning" available for him/her to steal.William J Murray_{July 7, 2013
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I suggest that far from stealing the concept of morality from theism, theistic morality is simply an anthropomorphic personification of human conclusions about what is moral, given, spurious authority by the label "deity". In support of my thesis, I ask what additional reliable non-subjective information about morality is gained from the assumption that morality proceeds from a deity, as opposed to a deity being the personification of human morality.Elizabeth B Liddle_{July 7, 2013
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This is, in my view, completely untrue, Blue Savannah, and as evidence for its untruth, I am an atheist and I care deeply about the fact that you have said something untrue about atheism!
Because one refers to themselves as an "atheist" doesn't mean that they live, order their thoughts from the ground up and argue as if atheism is actually true. Calling yourself an atheist doesn't mean you actually exist in world that is the result of godless physics, nor does it mean your beliefs and arguments are in accordance with what such a world would produce.William J Murray_{July 7, 2013
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Let's note KN's stolen concept (under presumed naturalism), where "roughly accurate" cannot mean "more or less true according to what really exists" as he implies. Under presumed naturalism, "true" and "what really exists" are concepts that mean something else, since they cannot refer to any absolute standard. Under naturalism, anything can be labeled "roughly accurate" by the physics computation. "Roughly accurate", as a label under naturalism, can be put both on a thing and its opposite without issue, because "roughly accurate" means, and is applied to, whatever the computation happens to dictate, and there is no standard to say otherwise. So, among the many stolen concepts KN uses as he argues for naturalism from a necessarily idealist or theistic position, "roughly accurate" points to an absolute standard naturalism cannot offer, and the phrase "reason to believe" suffers from the same subjective meaning value and application if used from a naturalist perspective.William J Murray_{July 7, 2013
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Krock:
I’m glad you think that truth is important and that lies can be destructive to an atheist, but who cares Elizabeth?
Anyone who values relationships, Krock, which is most of us.
Your worldview does not sustain objective morals, only subjective morals that are merely self-serving preferences.
I don't see why, unless you think that doing something to make someone else happier is ultimately "self-serving" because making someone else happier also makes me happier.
Which then begs the question; why should anyone (but yourself) care what you think?
Nobody has to care. I simply offer it as my view.
Subjective morals will always have their feet planted firmly in midair with no ultimate or objective value. Naturalism also offers humanity NO intrinsic worth or real value, so how then can truth (outside of the individual) have any “built in” value?
I don't understand what you are saying here. Can you rephrase? I am not clear of the distinction you are drawing between "intrinsic" worth and mere "worth" and why "intrinsic" worth is better. Also, how, in practice, you tell the difference between something that has "intrinsic" worth, and something that may only have "worth". This is not a sarcastic request - I really want to know.Elizabeth B Liddle_{July 7, 2013
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And it’s not, because given our current grasp of evolutionary theory and of cognitive neuroscience, there’s no reason not to believe that unguided natural selection does, in fact, tend to produce organisms that have roughly accurate partial maps of their practical environments, and indeed lots of reasons to think that that is exactly what evolution tends to do.
"Given our current grasp ... there's no reason not to believe..." Circular reasoning assuming a consequent under debate. To restate: "Given naturalism produced thoughts (which produces widely contradictory and irreconcilable beliefs), there's no reason to doubt those thoughts are not roughly accurate." Of course there is; even if we are the product of naturalism-generated thoughts (arguendo), billions of people have believed wildly different things about almost everything for thousands of years. There is no reason to think naturalism produces roughly "accurate" maps in any sense other than "accurate for survival", which is not necessarily the same as "correspondence to truth".William J Murray_{July 7, 2013
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KeithS “Can you give us an example of something you believe that could not possibly, noway, nohow, be wrong?”
I am absolutely certain that I think I think "I" am typing this. Vividvividbleau_{July 7, 2013
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keiths:
Like you, William J. Murray posits an objective/ultimate/absolute morality. I state my case against his position in this thread.
Central Scrutinizer:
I’m not positing any such thing here. So that thread is irrelevant.
Central Scrutinizer, in the very first comment of this thread:
Of course, the whole “morality argument” doesn’t prove there is a God, but if reality has no ultimate meaning and I’m free to concoct my own, don’t be surprised (or give me a bunch of subjective sentimental hogwash) why I shouldn’t slit your throat for whatever you may have in your wallet. Or kill you and eat your liver with fava beans.
keiths_{July 6, 2013
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keiths: Rational and justifiable, basically.
That tells me nothing. What's the final basis of your "sensible moral arguments?" Your starting point, rationally, and well, scientifically?
Like you, William J. Murray posits an objective/ultimate/absolute morality. I state my case against his position in this thread.
I'm not positing any such thing here. So that thread is irrelevant. All I'm saying (again) is: "I guess some people don’t understand why I would think moralizers are funny who have no ultimate morality underneath their moralizing. I guess that’s not humorous to you. It is to me. But don’t worry about it." (Italics added for emphasis.) But don't sweat it, Keith. Like I said, some people don't understand why I think Seinfeld is humorous.CentralScrutinizer_{July 6, 2013
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Central Scrutinizer,
How do you define “sensible?”
Rational and justifiable, basically. Like you, William J. Murray posits an objective/ultimate/absolute morality. I state my case against his position in this thread.keiths_{July 6, 2013
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Keiths: It’s obvious that ultimate morality isn’t needed in order to make sensible moral arguments.
How do you define "sensible?"CentralScrutinizer_{July 6, 2013
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Central Scrutinizer, It's obvious that ultimate morality isn't needed in order to make sensible moral arguments. Odd that you find it humorous when people acknowledge the obvious.keiths_{July 6, 2013
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keiths: Regarding your second point, this sounds like just another version of “If there is no ultimate meaning or morality, then everything is just mere preference“. Is that what you’re saying?
Of course not. Re-read what I wrote. I'm saying it's humorous to me. As in ironical. Still don't get it? Like I said. Some of my friends don't understand why I think Seinfeld is funny. I guess some people don't understand why I would think moralizers are funny who have no ultimate morality underneath their moralizing. I guess that's not humorous to you. It is to me. But don't worry about it.CentralScrutinizer_{July 6, 2013
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CentralScrutinizer, You didn't answer the full question. I've bolded the part you skipped over:
Do you think that people can’t (or shouldn’t) be passionate about issues unless there is “ultimate meaning” in the universe?
Regarding your second point, this sounds like just another version of "If there is no ultimate meaning or morality, then everything is just mere preference". Is that what you're saying?keiths_{July 6, 2013
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