In a meaningless world, does truth always have value over delusion?

_{Salvador Cordova

July 6, 2013

Atheism, Philosophy, Religion}

Share: Facebook; Twitter; LinkedIn; Flipboard; Print; Email

I care about truth if there is a God. But why should I care about truth if there is no God? In fact if there is no God, maybe I shouldn’t care about truth because it would be too sad to know…I’d rather live out my life with the illusion of happily ever after in that case.

Two thousand years ago, someone echoed those sentiments:

What do I gain if, humanly speaking, I fought with beasts at Ephesus? If the dead are not raised, “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die.”

Paul of Tarsus
1 Cor 15:32

There was an exchange between KeithS and I in another thread, and he fired off this comment:

Your comment epitomizes one of the biggest problems with Pascal’s Wager. It doesn’t ask the question “What is most likely to be true?” It only asks, “How can I get the best payoff?”

That’s anathema to anyone who truly cares about truth.

Holy Rollers, Pascal’s Wager;Comment 100

To which I responded:

But why should I care about truth if there is no God? In fact if there is no God, maybe I shouldn’t care about truth because it would be too sad to know…I’d rather live out my life with the illusion of happily ever after in that case.

Why, logically speaking should an atheist care about truth in a meaningless universe? Perhaps the logical answer is no answer. If you say, truth has a better payoff, well, then you’ve just put payoffs ahead of truth! Right back where you started.

Further KeithS wrote:

Because the value of truth doesn’t depend on the existence of God.

To which I responded:

Value means PAYOFF! What is the payoff if there is no God?

I recall Dawkins in a debate with Lennox was asked about how humans can live their lives in a meaningless world. Dawkins said, “we create our own meaning”. Other atheists have repeated that statement such KeithS:

Life is full of meaning even without God. We create our own meanings, whether you realize it or not.

Holy Rollers, Pascal’s wager; Comment 59

to which I responded:

[the phrase] “we create our own meaning” is pretty much to me “we concoct our own unproven falsehoods to make us feel better”.
…
this whole “we create our own meaning” is worse than the religious ideas you are criticizing. You “know” there is no meaning, but you’ll pretend there is anyway. Reminds me of Coyne who “knows” there is no free will but he’ll pretend there is anyway.

And that is what continues to puzzle me about the atheistic variety of Darwinists (not Christian Darwinists). They seem to find much purpose in life in proving life has no purpose!

[posted by scordova to assist News desk with content and commentary until 7/7/13]

Comments

keiths: Do you think that people can’t (or shouldn’t) be passionate about issues unless there is “ultimate meaning” in the universe?
Sure you can. And I'm sure you are. Lions are passionate about gazelles too. No doubt about it.
Perhaps it would help if you would state what “tacit assumptions” you think are being made in statement #2 (We are better off as a democracy than we would be as a dictatorship.)
The tacit assumption involves what you think is "better." I have no doubt you really believe some things are better than others for society. But the punch line is: so what? Still don't get it?CentralScrutinizer_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
07:28 PM
7
07
28
PM
PDT}

CentralScrutinizer, From my most recent comment to you:
Do you think that people can’t (or shouldn’t) be passionate about issues unless there is “ultimate meaning” in the universe? Perhaps it would help if you would state what “tacit assumptions” you think are being made in statement #2. ["2. We are better off as a democracy than we would be as a dictatorship."]
keiths_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
07:10 PM
7
07
10
PM
PDT}

keiths: I still don’t get it.
I understand. Some of my friends don't understand why I think Seinfeld is funny. Don't worry about it.CentralScrutinizer_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
07:00 PM
7
07
00
PM
PDT}

Barb,
...have you ever typed anything while dreaming? I haven’t. Sleepwalking would be a better argument...
Umm, Barb -- I'm talking about typing something in the dream, not typing something in reality while dreaming.
The logical knots that you tie yourself up with in an attempt to deny a simple truth (DonaldM is awake and conscious and typing) is astonishing.
I wasn't denying any of those things. I was denying that Donald could be absolutely certain of any of those things, beyond the slightest sliver of a shadow of a doubt. Do you have a counterargument?keiths_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
06:54 PM
6
06
54
PM
PDT}

Keiths @ 40: considering that I have a book on the great philosophers on my bookshelf, it's safe to say I've heard of Descartes. Putting aside philosophical arguments for a second, you stated that DonaldM might be dreaming (have you ever typed anything while dreaming? I haven't. Sleepwalking would be a better argument), hallucinating (again, hallucinations cause us to see things, not do them), or in the Matrix. The logical knots that you tie yourself up with in an attempt to deny a simple truth (DonaldM is awake and conscious and typing) is astonishing.Barb_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
06:34 PM
6
06
34
PM
PDT}

Keiths, The Matrix was not a documentary.
Cute, but besides the point -- if "I am certain of p" means "it is logically impossible that not-p", then any fantastic scenario is legitimate. Descartes did not really believe that he was being deceived by an evil demon -- he wanted to show that, even if he were being deceived by an evil demon, it would still be logically impossible that he would not be thinking (since being deceived is itself a kind of thinking), and so he was entitled to assert that he was certain that he thinking; and that if he was thinking, then he must exist, in order to think. That's the whole point of the Cogito argument.Kantian Naturalist_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
06:27 PM
6
06
27
PM
PDT}

Barb:
Keiths, The Matrix was not a documentary.
Thanks for clearing that up, Barb. By the way, have you heard of Descartes?keiths_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
06:23 PM
6
06
23
PM
PDT}

keiths @ 38: "No, because you might be dreaming, or hallucinating, or in the Matrix." Keiths, The Matrix was not a documentary.Barb_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
06:19 PM
6
06
19
PM
PDT}

DonaldM,
I am absolutely certain I am typing this sentence.
No, because you might be dreaming, or hallucinating, or in the Matrix.
I am absolutely certain I love my wife. I’m not “fairly” certain or even “quite fairly certain” of that. I am absolutely certain.
No, because it is possible for you to be systematically deceived about that. You might think that you are experiencing that emotion, but only because your brain is making a flawed inference matching your current state to the one referred to by the word "love".
I am absolutely certain that 1+1=2
No, because your sense of certainty about that might be mistaken. Even a mathematical proof can't give you absolute certainty, because it depends on the axioms and the rules of deduction, neither of which are absolutely certain!
I am absolutely certain red is a color and not a fish.
Again, your sense of certainty could be flawed. It may be that red is a fish in some way that you haven't considered or can't comprehend. It may be that the rules of logic you apply in deciding that red is not a fish are flawed in some way that you haven't noticed. Don't get me wrong -- I am almost certain that you are right about all of those assertions. Just not absolutely certain. And I would be willing to bet an extremely large amount of money on the fact that 1 + 1 = 2 (in decimal arithmetic). Am I absolutely certain of it, without the tiniest room for doubt? No, of course not. I could be wrong, and so could you. To say that it is impossible for you to be mistaken about certain claims seems like hubris to me.keiths_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
06:04 PM
6
06
04
PM
PDT}

No, I don't think that Churchland is begging the question against Plantinga. He would be begging the question against Plantinga if he needed to first demonstrate his entitlement to evolutionary naturalism before proceeding further. But from what I understand, that's not how the EAAN is supposed to work -- the EAAN is supposed to work by granting evolutionary naturalism and then generating an incoherence -- that if I believe that evolutionary naturalism is true, then I have a reason for doubting the reliability of my cognitive faculties, including all the beliefs formed by those faculties, including the belief in evolutionary naturalism. Compressed: if I believe that evolutionary naturalism is true, then I shouldn't believe that evolutionary naturalism is true. [Here I'm following Churchland's lead and using "evolutionary naturalism" as a stand-in for "naturalism + evolution" -- I'm well aware that Plantinga would be more or less happy with theistic evolution. For that matter, I have no complaints against theistic evolution. I'm only taking issue with Plantinga's argument for theistic evolution on epistemological grounds.] I mean, the EAAN is not supposed to be a 'starting out from first principles' sort of argument, right? It's supposed to be an internal critique of evolutionary naturalism -- it's supposed to show that evolutionary naturalism is self-refuting. And it's not, because given our current grasp of evolutionary theory and of cognitive neuroscience, there's no reason not to believe that unguided natural selection does, in fact, tend to produce organisms that have roughly accurate partial maps of their practical environments, and indeed lots of reasons to think that that is exactly what evolution tends to do. So then all Churchland needs is an account that shows how to get from reliable non-propositional representations (roughly accurate neurocognitive feature-maps) to propositional representings (mostly true beliefs) -- and to do that, all he needs is an account of the origins of language. To reiterate: the reason why this works as a response (I wouldn't say "refutation") to the EAAN is because the EAAN is supposed to grant everything that the evolutionary naturalist wants to say, and then generate the incoherence -- but Churchland has a way of getting around that, and the key move is to locate semantic content directly at the neurological level -- so that the teasing apart of 'belief' and 'behavior', which is crucial to making the EAAN work, doesn't go through. Churchland can effectively say, "yes, it's true that natural selection has shaped our cognitive mechanisms for sustaining successful reproductive behavior rather than for tracking truth, but (i) successful reproductive behavior itself requires mostly accurate map-like representations of the practical environment, and (ii) successful representations of the practical environment, in conjunction with the acquisition of a language, produces mostly true beliefs about that environment."Kantian Naturalist_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
05:56 PM
5
05
56
PM
PDT}

KN in #32
Unguided natural selection will tend to produce living creatures with cognitive feature-maps that are at least roughly accurate partial portrayals of the practical environments in which the creature must make its way. In the case of social creatures, there are vastly more resources for evaluating the adequacy of any individual’s cognitive representings of its environment, just because the creatures can ‘triangulate’ their mappings of the environment. The more sophisticated the forms of sociality involved, the more thoroughly they can grasp the objective layout of reality. And, in those cases of creatures that also have a language, those creatures will tend to have mostly true beliefs about their practical environments, because true beliefs just are what successful cognitive mappings become when they are expressed through language. If the creatures can extend their ‘practical environment’ through technology, then there will be a corresponding extension of the domains about which they can mostly true beliefs.
The problem with this argument, even your restated version of what Churchland should have said is it assumes but does not demonstrate the very point at issue. Churchland just assumes natural selection produces cognitive faculties in living creatures that more or less map to their environment. But whether or not NS is capable of accomplishing this feat is exactly the point at issue in the entire EAAN. Thus Churchland is guilty of assuming the consequent, or as we say here in the street, begging the question. And that doesn't even touch on whether or not NS is even capable of doing anything noteworthy in terms of providing living organisms the right cognitive faculties required to survive in their environment. But I don't want to sidetrack into a debate on NS...we can save that for another day. The point for now is Churchland just assumes it...but that is the point at issue.DonaldM_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
05:19 PM
5
05
19
PM
PDT}

Keiths
Hi RB, I was wondering when you would show up. We’ve been having lots of discussions that are right up your alley.
I've been meaning to comment for some time now.Reciprocating Bill_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
05:14 PM
5
05
14
PM
PDT}

KeithS "Can you give us an example of something you believe that could not possibly, noway, nohow, be wrong?" Yes, I can. I can give you more than one. I am absolutely certain I am typing this sentence. I am absolutely certain I love my wife. I'm not "fairly" certain or even "quite fairly certain" of that. I am absolutely certain. I am absolutely certain that 1+1=2 I am absolutely certain red is a color and not a fish. Its just absurd to pretend that there isn't anything of which we can be certain. Even absurder to try form an argument to state it because the argument itself must assume a certainty to claim uncertainty. There is no way around it.DonaldM_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
05:13 PM
5
05
13
PM
PDT}

DonaldM, You keep insisting that I must be absolutely certain about something, but why? To claim absolute certainty is to say that one could not possibly be wrong, that the probability of being incorrect is 0.0 and the probability of being correct is 1.0. I can't think of any statement for which I would be willing to make such an extreme claim. Can you? The cogito doesn't cut it, and neither does KF's favorite example: Josiah Royce's argument that "error exists". Both of those depend on logic itself, and we can't be 100.0 percent sure that we're doing the logic correctly! Can you give us an example of something you believe that could not possibly, noway, nohow, be wrong? (I should note that in colloquial usage "I am absolutely certain" doesn't mean "the probability of my correctness is 1.0", it just means "I am so certain that I can reasonably ignore the chance that I am mistaken". I wouldn't advise you to dispute this since most ID arguments depend on it.)keiths_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
04:50 PM
4
04
50
PM
PDT}

And I think Churchland is basically wrong for all the reasons that Plantinga and Segal give here in their response to Churchland. Churchland’s argument really doesn’t work…Plantinga’s does. No one has really successfully refuted Plantinga. At best, they’ve poked around the edges, but the core of his argument is unscathed and unrefuted. You can’t get to rationality from chance and/or necessity alone.
I've re-read the Churchland article and the Plantinga-Segal response, and I'm prepared to return to that conversation. I think that Plantinga and Segal have evaded a quite crucial element of Churchland's positive thesis, which is his concept of representation -- what he calls, in his new book (Plato's Camera), "Domain-Portrayal Semantics." Here's the key move:
Consider a broader concept of representation, and of successful representation, than that embodied in the familiar framework of broadly sentence-like representations, and of their truth (2009, p. 139)
and
the dominant scheme of representation in biological creatures generally, from the Ordovician to the present, is the internal map of a range of possible types of sensorily accessible features . . . Now a map achieves its representational successes by displaying some sort of homomorphism between its own internal structure and the structure of the objective domain it purports to portray . . . [under natural selection] there will be a strong tendency for living creatures to develop cognitive feature-maps that are least roughly accurate partial portrayals of the practical environment in which the creature must make its way. (2009, p. 140)
But when Plantinga and Segal take up the response, they seem to miss the point, because they take the relevant question to be
is it all likely that our cognitive faculties, given naturalism and their evolutionary origin, would have developed in such a way at to be reliable, that is, to furnish us with mostly true beliefs? (2009, p. 202)
It's the "that is" which bothers me -- that they take "to furnish us with mostly true beliefs" as a gloss on what "to be reliable cognitive faculties" means. What Churchland has done, in effect, is to give us a theory of semantic content according to which "reliable cognition" and "mostly true beliefs" are teased apart from one another. Plantinga and Segal fail to grasp this, and so their response to him doesn't take the full measure of his criticism of the EAAN. What Churchland should have said, on my grasp of his work as a whole, is something like this:
Unguided natural selection will tend to produce living creatures with cognitive feature-maps that are at least roughly accurate partial portrayals of the practical environments in which the creature must make its way. In the case of social creatures, there are vastly more resources for evaluating the adequacy of any individual's cognitive representings of its environment, just because the creatures can 'triangulate' their mappings of the environment. The more sophisticated the forms of sociality involved, the more thoroughly they can grasp the objective layout of reality. And, in those cases of creatures that also have a language, those creatures will tend to have mostly true beliefs about their practical environments, because true beliefs just are what successful cognitive mappings become when they are expressed through language. If the creatures can extend their 'practical environment' through technology, then there will be a corresponding extension of the domains about which they can mostly true beliefs.
Kantian Naturalist_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
04:40 PM
4
04
40
PM
PDT}

@Elizabeth B Liddle "Truth is just as important “in atheism” as it is in anything else. If someone lies to me, that matters just as much to me as it would to you. Lying is just as destructive to relationships between atheists as it is destructive to relationships between non-atheists." I’m glad you think that truth is important and that lies can be destructive to an atheist, but who cares Elizabeth? Your worldview does not sustain objective morals, only subjective morals that are merely self-serving preferences. Which then begs the question; why should anyone (but yourself) care what you think? Subjective morals will always have their feet planted firmly in midair with no ultimate or objective value. Naturalism also offers humanity NO intrinsic worth or real value, so how then can truth (outside of the individual) have any "built in" value?KRock_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
04:16 PM
4
04
16
PM
PDT}

Blue Savannah:
In atheism, truth has no more value than lies.
This is, in my view, completely untrue, Blue Savannah, and as evidence for its untruth, I am an atheist and I care deeply about the fact that you have said something untrue about atheism! Truth is just as important "in atheism" as it is in anything else. If someone lies to me, that matters just as much to me as it would to you. Lying is just as destructive to relationships between atheists as it is destructive to relationships between non-atheists. And of course it matters to scientists that things are true, which is why we go to so much trouble to try to quantify the probability that a hypothesis is true. We may acknowledge that no certainty is possible but that does not mean that we do not care about the truth, or it has no value. I do find these claims about atheism are quite extraordinary.Elizabeth B Liddle_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
02:31 PM
2
02
31
PM
PDT}

Donald M:
I’m a musician too, so I an relate to that part anyway.
Hey! What do you play?
... just because you ascribe meaning to something doesn’t mean it actually has meaning
This doesn't make any sense to me. The way we create meaning is to ascribe meaning to something. At its most basic, because we both ascribe the meaning "small furry feline" to the word "cat" we can understand each other. More usefully, it means that I can say to you "I have two black cats" and it means something to you - you now have information that you did not have before. And if I demonstrate to you just why it must be true that the square on the hypoteneuse of a right angled triangle must be equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides" not only have a communicated my meaning to you, but you yourself can see what I have claimed to be true, must be, in fact true. And I could say to you "I love you", and that might have enormously important meaning to you, especially if you knew that I meant it :) So you must be using a different meaning of "meaning" to the one I am using! I find it hard to think of a meaning of "meaning" that would not be possible in the absence of a god. Buddhist religion, for example, does not posit a deity, and yet I don't see it regarded as "meaningless" generally. As for Dawkins' quote - what he means is no more and no less than what he says - the universe does not appear to be much bothered about you and me, or what we do, whether good or evil. Yet it (in my view and Dawkins') created us. But that doesn't mean (heh) that we must have those properties as well, and clearly we do not. The universe may be pitiless, but you and I are not. The universe may have no opinion on what is good or evil, but you and I do. Dawkins makes the point that as far as we can tell, we were not created by the universe for the universe's purpose,but emerged from it with the capacity to form our own purposes, and select our actions so as to give us the best chances of achieve them. And those purposes, rather wonderfully, can include the welfare of our fellow organisms.Elizabeth B Liddle_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
02:26 PM
2
02
26
PM
PDT}

Fascinating argument scordova and one I agree with completely. In atheism, truth has no more value than lies. What human has the authority to declare one moral and the other immoral, especially if their brain is just the product of random chance and without free will (as atheists allege)? Only God can do that. Only someone superior can give value to something. For example, would the Mona Lisa painting be valuable if nobody wanted it? Can it give value to itself as atheists contend humans have? Nothing makes sense without GOD.Blue_Savannah_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
02:12 PM
2
02
12
PM
PDT}

Elizabeth
Nor does science seem “meaningless” to me – to hypothesise an explanation, and then test its predictions and find them confirmed is enormously meaningful – it means that I have probably found out something true about the world. So what does “meaningless” mean in the context of the OP? If I can “make a difference” in the world – that is meaningful, is it not? If not, what am I missing?
I'm a musician too, so I an relate to that part anyway. What you're missing as I see it is that just because you ascribe meaning to something doesn't mean it actually has meaning. If the atheistic worldview is correct (and I am completely certain it is NOT) then Dawkins's claim that "The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind pitiless indifference.” From The Blind Watchmaker In other words, the universe is ultimately meaningless. What then is gained by ascribing meaning to anything in a meaningless universe? It might make you feel better, but the truth is that the meaning is an illusion. Who needs allusions!DonaldM_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
02:09 PM
2
02
09
PM
PDT}

KeithS
True, and I’m fairly certain. :) (Actually pretty damn certain — but not absolutely certain. There could be something systematically wrong with my brain that makes me perceive certain mathematical falsehoods as true.)
And with that we've entered the theater of the absurd. Are you kidding here? I hope so. Because if you're being serious, then you are grasping at straws...and phantom straws at that, since you can only be "fairly certain" the straws are even there. Keith, how can you claim to be taking the road of logic and reason here? You left that road several miles back, and are now wandering in the desert of absurdity!
But I’m not absolutely certain that I’m fairly certain. I’m fairly certain that I’m fairly certain. Why overreach with absolute claims when provisional claims work just fine?
Because the "provisional" quotes, as you so quaintly put it, make no sense whatsoever. You can put as many "fairly certains" as you wish in front of whatever claim you want to make, but in the end what you actually mean is that you are absolutely certain of your "fairly" certain-ness. In fact your "fairly" certain-ness is quite resolute and absolute, and contradicts everything else you're trying to say. Your entire line of argument is totally, and completely self-refuting, so why continue to cling to it? Give it up. What your whole argument boils down to is another form of "There's no such thing as absolute certainty". Even if you say "I'm fairly certain that there's no such thing as absolute certainty" or "I'm fairly certain that I'm fairly certain that..." In the end it boils down to an absolute claim, because you are absolutely certain that your "fairly" certain. There's no way to get around it Keith! Give it up!DonaldM_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
02:02 PM
2
02
02
PM
PDT}

CentralScrutinizer, I still don't get it. Do you think that people can't (or shouldn't) be passionate about issues unless there is "ultimate meaning" in the universe? Perhaps it would help if you would state what "tacit assumptions" you think are being made in statement #2.keiths_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
12:20 PM
12
12
20
PM
PDT}

Keiths: Why do you find that humorous? Are you amused by the juxtaposition of perfectly compatible statements?
I did not say they are "not compatible" nor did I say there are "contradictory." What I said was that #2 "is humorous to me because there are tacit assumptions made which are rarely justified or even acknowledged. Pulpit pounding by a group who holds there is no ultimate meaning is still pulpit pounding. I dunno. That seems pretty humorous to me." I have italicized certain words above to help clarify to you why I might think it humorous.CentralScrutinizer_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
12:14 PM
12
12
14
PM
PDT}

CentralScrutinizer, Consider these two statements:
1. Ultimate meaning and ultimate morality do not exist. 2. We are better off as a democracy than we would be as a dictatorship.
I assert the truth of both statements, and I see no contradiction. You find the juxtaposition humorous:
The humorous thing is, on the one hand they’ll tell you there is no ultimate meaning, and then straight-away tell you why you should believe this social model or that social model “for the betterment of society”…
Why do you find that humorous? Are you amused by the juxtaposition of perfectly compatible statements?keiths_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
11:56 AM
11
11
56
AM
PDT}

DonaldM:
And do you know that the above comment is absolutely correct?
Of course not. I can't know with absolute certainty that any statement is correct, and that includes the cogito.
If not, why bother with it?
Because truth is worth pursuing even if we can't be sure that we've attained it.
The problem here is claiming some form of “It is absolutely certain that nothing is absolutely certain”…which on its face is self-refuting. That is the upshot of your argument.
No, that is not what I have claimed. I don't think absolute certainty is possible.
The weaker form is “I’m fairly certain, but not quite sure, that nothing is certain.” That’s a nice concept, and it might be right, but then again it might not, and, on your view, we really can’t know. But, it could also be stated “I’m absolutely certain, that I’m fairly certain, but not quite sure that nothing is certain.”
But I'm not absolutely certain that I'm fairly certain. I'm fairly certain that I'm fairly certain. Why overreach with absolute claims when provisional claims work just fine?
And then there’s math. 2+2=4 True or false? Are you certain or uncertain?
True, and I'm fairly certain. :) (Actually pretty damn certain -- but not absolutely certain. There could be something systematically wrong with my brain that makes me perceive certain mathematical falsehoods as true.)
Why? If nothing is certain, then no mathematical formula is trustworthy either.
"Trustworthy" and "certain" aren't synonymous. I think "2 + 2 = 4" is trustworthy, but am I absolutely -- absolutely -- certain that it's true? No.
No matter how you parse it, you have to assume a certainty to argue for uncertainty!
Not true, for reasons I've already given.keiths_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
11:41 AM
11
11
41
AM
PDT}

keiths: I don’t see anything humorous or odd about that. It makes perfect sense.
I didn't say it was odd. I said it was humorous. And it is humorous to me because there are tacit assumptions made which are rarely justified or even acknowledged. (And of course, nothing is objectively and ultimately justified.) Pulpit pounding by a group who holds there is no ultimate meaning is still pulpit pounding. I dunno. That seems pretty humorous to me.CentralScrutinizer_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
11:27 AM
11
11
27
AM
PDT}

Let me try that link to Plantinga again: Plantinga and SegalDonaldM_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
11:16 AM
11
11
16
AM
PDT}

KN in #7
(3) It is no part of my view that knowledge is the same as, or is logically connected with, certainty. I think that Dewey was exactly right when he argued that “the quest for certainty” is something better given up than continued.
In other words, Dewey is absolutely certain that we can not be certain of anything. If he's uncertain of that, then the statement really doesn't mean much. If he is certain of it then, this is a logically self-refuting statement any way you want to look at it...and that is the problem with this whole line of thinking. They are logically untenable.
(4) I think that Churchland is basically right is proposing that we explain the reliability of our cognitive capacities (our capacities for reliable perception, conceptualization, and action) in terms of sustaining a homomorphic relation between neurophysiological relations and somatic and environmental relations. (Notice, then, that it’s a second-order relation rather than a first-order relation.) And I think that Churchland’s response to Plantinga is exactly right. (For more on this, see: Churchland, P. (2009), “Is Evolutionary Naturalism Epistemologically Self-Defeating?”, Philo: A Journal of Philosophy 12:2.)
And I think Churchland is basically wrong for all the reasons that Plantinga and Segal give here in their response to Churchland. Churchland's argument really doesn't work...Plantinga's does. No one has really successfully refuted Plantinga. At best, they've poked around the edges, but the core of his argument is unscathed and unrefuted. You can't get to rationality from chance and/or necessity alone. Which lead me to KeithS:
We cannot know, in an absolute sense, that our cognitive faculties are trustworthy. We just have to do our best with what we have. This applies to you as much as it does to me. Materialists and non-materialists alike face this problem.
And do you know that the above comment is absolutely correct? If so, how? If not, why bother with it? The problem here is claiming some form of "It is absolutely certain that nothing is absolutely certain"...which on its face is self-refuting. That is the upshot of your argument. The weaker form is "I'm fairly certain, but not quite sure, that nothing is certain." That's a nice concept, and it might be right, but then again it might not, and, on your view, we really can't know. But, it could also be stated "I'm absolutely certain, that I'm fairly certain, but not quite sure that nothing is certain." This isn't meant to be sophistry, but to highlight the logical inconsistency with the claim in the first place. There's no reason at all to even remotely entertain it as being true. And then there's math. 2+2=4 True or false? Are you certain or uncertain? Why? If nothing is certain, then no mathematical formula is trustworthy either. No matter how you parse it, you have to assume a certainty to argue for uncertainty!DonaldM_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
11:15 AM
11
11
15
AM
PDT}

Sal,
One may feel something is meaningful, but how does that feeling accord with reality?
If I feel that something is meaningful, then it has meaning, by definition. It means something, because it means something to me.
If the universe is meaningless, how does it logically follow our feelings of meaning are logically correct versus being an illusion (like supposedly “free will” is an illusion).
The universe isn't meaningless. See above.keiths_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
11:12 AM
11
11
12
AM
PDT}

Hi RB, I was wondering when you would show up. We've been having lots of discussions that are right up your alley. It's interesting that Christians, who regard humans as important or even the focal point of the entire universe, are nevertheless so dismissive of human meaning. It apparently doesn't count, and the only real meaning is God's Meaning.keiths_{July 6, 2013
July
07
Jul
6
06
2013
11:08 AM
11
11
08
AM
PDT}

Prev 1 … 23 24 25 26 Next

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Leave a Reply