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Is Atheism Rationally Justifiable?

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First, I’d like to thank Mr. Arrington for granting me posting privileges.  I consider it quite an honor, and I hope this post (and any future posts) warrants this trust.

Second, the following is an argument I think will help us to focus on a fundamental issue that lies behind ever so many of the debates here at Uncommon Descent, and elsewhere.  That is, is the sort of implicit or even explicit atheism that is so often built in on the ground floor of a “scientific” mindset truly rationally justifiable? Such cannot be assumed, it needs to be shown.

I’ll begin by defining some terms for the sake of this argument:

Definition of God (for the purpose of this thread): First cause, prime mover, root of being, objective source of human purpose (final cause) and resulting morality, source of free will, mind, consciousness; omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent inasmuch as principles of logic allow; an interventionist as necessary to facilitate movement towards final cause and also inasmuch as logical principles are not violated; source of logic — “reason itself.” (I am not talking in particular about any specifically defined religious interpretation of god, such as the Chrstian or Islamic God.)

Definition: Weak, or negative atheism is the lack of any belief that a god exists, and the position that a god probably doesn’t exist, and is not the positive belief that gods do not exist (strong atheism), and is not agnosticism (the lack of belief that god either does or does not exist and the further view that there is a lack of sufficient probability either way).  Strong atheism is the belief that no god or gods exist at all.

Definition: A worldview or mindset is rationally justified when it answers adequately to the facts of the real world as we experience or observe it, makes good sense and fits together logically, is simple but not simplistic, and honestly faces the issues and difficulties that all worldviews face.

Definition: Intellectual dishonesty occurs when (1) one deliberately mischaracterizes their position or view in order to avoid having to logically defend their actual views; and/or (2) when someone is arguing, or making statements against a position while remaining willfully ignorant about that position, and/or (3) when someone categorically and/or pejoratively dismisses all existent and/or potential evidence in favor of a conclusion they claim to be neutral about, whether they are familiar with that evidence or not.

These will be important as we consider:

Evidence in favor of God:  The following is a brief summary of the evidence that typically leads many people to make a general finding that a god (as described above) exists, even if variantly interpreted or culturally contextualized:

(1)
Anecdotal evidence for the apparently intelligently ordered anomalous, miraculous (defying expected natural processes and probabilities) events attributed to god, such as signs, supernatural events (e.g. Fatima, Guadeloupe, Paul’s Damascus Road Experience), or answers to prayers to god;

(2)
Testimonial evidence (first-hand accounts) of experience of such phenomena, including interactions with a god-like being or accounts of god-like interventions;  Also, the testimony of religious adherents of various specific gods can be counted as evidence of the god premised in this argument in the manner that various cultures can vary widely in their description of certain phenomena or experiences, and come up with widely variant “explanations”; what is interesting as evidence here, though, is the widespread crediting of similar kinds of phenomena and experience to a “god” of some sort (which might be the case of blind or ignorant people touching different parts of an elephant and thus describing “what the elephant is” in various ways). Such testimonial evidence can be counted in favor of the premise here, but cannot be held against it where it varies, because it is not testimony that such a god doesn’t exist.

(3)
The various Cosmological and Ontological Arguments for the existence of god;

(4)  The Strong Anthropic (or Fine Tuning) argument and other evidences for design of our world and of life in it;

(5) The empirical, scientific evidence assembled in support of the design arguments in #4 (such as recently persuaded Antony Flew — formerly the world’s leading philosophical atheist — that there is a god);

(6) The Moral arguments for the existence of god.

(7) Empirical and testimonial evidence of phenomena closely correlated to the existence of a god as described above, such as the survival of consciousness after death, and the existence of an afterlife realm; the evidence for interactions with correlated entities such as angels and demons (which seem to act to influence our free will towards or away from our human purpose), etc., gathered by various serious and scientific investigations into what is often referred to as the “paranormal”, including mediumship studies dating back to William Crooke and ongoing through the work at Pear Labs and the Scole Experiment, including consciousness-survival research published in the Lancet. While indirect, this evidence tends to support the proposition that god exists.

While the various arguments listed above have been subjected to counter-arguments and rebuttals of varying strengths and weaknesses across the ages, one must not lose sight that while there is much evidence of all sorts (as listed above) in favor of the existence of god; there is zero empirical evidence (to my knowledge) or and little in the way of rational argument that no such god exists.  In other words, decreasing the value of the arguments and evidence for god does not increase the value of the position that there is no god; it can only increase the reasonableness of the “weak atheist” (there isn’t enough evidence) or an agnostic position.

The commonly seen rebuttals to these argument are simply attempting to show weaknesses in or alternatives to the arguments themselves so that such arguments cannot be taken as demonstratively convincing (that god exists); such counter-arguments as a rule do not actually make the case that god (as described above) in fact does not exist.

The argument against weak atheism:

The above shows us that, ironically, strong atheism is a weak position. That is probably why atheism advocates seldom defend it in informed company. So, we must first focus on the “stronger” atheist position, the one they defend in public: “weak atheism,” generally described as absence of belief in god or gods. I will argue that it too is far weaker than is commonly recognized.

I know of no positive arguments for the strong “there is no god” position, other than the argument from evil which has been addressed by Boethius, Adams  and Platinga. Aside from that, there are only rebuttals/reactions to various “there is a god” arguments. This exemplifies how rebutting an argument does not eliminate it as evidence, it only offers an alternative perspective that one  can evaluate along with the original argument.   Depending on the strength of the rebuttal or alternative explanation, that particular positive evidence for god may be decreased in value, but there is no concurrent increase in the value of an argument against the existence of god (as described above).

If a “weak atheist” claims to “lack belief” because there is “no evidence for god,” he or she is necessarily being intellectually dishonest, because we certainly aren’t privy to all potential or available evidence. Are such atheists claiming to be omniscient? If not, then, a more modest and reasonable point would be that they are not aware of evidence for god. However, given what we have already seen, such “weak atheists” cannot genuinely claim to not know of “any” evidence for god after having perused any of the above evidence.  That is to say, there is evidence for god, just, they don’t accept it. But incredulity or hyper-skepticism on your part does not equate to “no evidence” on my part. Testimony from otherwise credible sources is not made “less credible” simply because the testimony is about something the listener personally finds to be in-credible; it is not intellectually honest to discredit the credibility of testimony only on the basis of the subject matter being debated.

Also, strong atheists often only refer to themselves as weak atheists because they have realized that the strong atheist position is an assertion they cannot support in informed company.  They do this to provide cover for their real view, which is an obvious form of intellectual dishonesty.  One can often discern when this is going on when the person ridicules belief in god or makes categorical dismissals about evidence they have never even seen; they believe there is no god, and so assume there can be no valid evidence for god, and advocate for that position rhetorically via ridicule.

Even if the “weak atheist” is not aware of any compelling evidence for god, he or she must know that we humans are quite limited in what we know, and may often be unaware of mistakes in what we think we know. That means that any categorical claim a “weak” atheist makes about the available evidence he or she is not privy to — that it is not credible or convincing — is again intellectually dishonest because you cannot justifiably make a categorical claim about something you have no knowledge of.

So, if we have a weak atheist who is aware of the existence of the above evidence and agrees that there might be more evidence they are not privy to; and who does not categorically assert problems with the evidence they have not yet seen; and who does not categorically dismiss the available evidence as “non-evidence” due to hyper-skeptical bias but rather states that the available evidence they have seen is not compelling towards a conclusion that god exists; then one must ask the following:

In the face of such overwhelming amounts of evidence — thousands of years of testimony and anecdotal stories; many serious arguments based on credible empirical evidence and apparently necessary logical premises and inferences; and, the complete lack of any generally successful attempt to make a sound argument that god in fact does not exist — one must ask: how can any intellectually honest person come to any conclusion other than that on the balance of the evidence, god probably existseven if god is poorly and diversely defined, and even if the experience of god is open to various interpretations and even to misunderstanding?

As an analogy: even if one has never personally experienced “love”; in the face of thousands of years of testimony and anecdotal stories that love exists, and empirical evidence supporting that certain physical states correspond to assertions of experiences of love, would it be intellectually honest to “lack belief” that love exists, or would it be intellectually honest to hold the view that even though one doesn’t experience love (or using the same argument, color, joy, dreams, etc.), that love probably exists – even if people are widely disparate in their explanation, description, or presentation of what love is?

Another analogy: because witnesses disagree in their description of a criminal suspect in a crime, or disagree about the particulars of the crime they witnessed, this doesn’t mean there is no criminal at all.  Depending on the testimony and evidence, one may hold that it is likely that a crime occurred, and so it is likely that a criminal exists, but that the arguments, testimony and evidence are  not enough reach a finding of “guilty” for any particular suspect.

As far as I am aware of there is no anecdotal or testimonial evidence that god does not exist (because lack of experience of a thing isn’t evidence the thing doesn’t exist), very little in the way of logical argument towards that conclusion, and there is a vast array of logical, anecdotal, testimonial and empirical evidence that god (at least as generally described above) does exist. Because a billion people did not witness a crime, and only a handful did, doesn’t tilt the scales in favor of no crime having been committed at all; imagine now a billion people that report witnessing a crime, and handful that did not, and you have something more comparable to the state of evidence concerning the existence of god.

Even if one doesn’t find that evidence compelling for for a final conclusion that god exists,  when one weighs the balance of the evidence for and against god, one should be willing to at least consider whether it is more probable that god (as described above) exists than that god does not exist.  Problematically (for the atheist), the view that it is more likely that god exists than not is not any sort of an atheistic position.

The argument against strong atheism:

Strong atheism is defined as the assertion that no god or gods exist whatsoever.

First, it is obvious that strong atheism cannot be logically supported, simply because it is impossible to prove (not in the absolute sense, but in the “sufficient evidence” sense). There may be evidence and good argument that certain gods, or kinds of gods, do not exist; but there is certainly no generally accepted evidence or successful argument that no significant, meaningful god or gods whatsoever exist, including the one as defined for this thread.

Instead of trying to actually support their own claim, strong atheists usually attempt to shift the burden of proof onto theists by essentially asking the theists to prove the atheist position wrong, implying or asserting that atheism must be held true by default.  That is, such try to argue that they have nothing to argue and can sit comfortably on their view as a default. However, that is not so; every worldview of consequence has a duty to show that it is factually adequate, coherent and explains reality powerfully and simply.  Strong atheism is not a default position; it is a positive assertion that no god or gods exist.  The default position is always “I don’t know” or true agnosticism.

Strong atheism is a sweeping, categorical assertion that something does not exist. As such, It has the job of proving a universal negative.  Perhaps this could be accomplished by showing the converse positive claim to be self-contradictory, and readers advocating strong atheism are invited to make their case based upon the definition of God at the top of this post.

Also, however unlikely it may seem to an atheist, it might be true that a god of some sort exists outside of the circle of what she or he knows or what the collective of atheists actually know. After all, we all know full well that “to err is human.” So, since the atheist could be mistaken or ignorant of the key fact or argument that would be decisive,  the strong atheist position unjustifiably excludes a potentially true explanation from consideration.  What is the rationally useful point of a metaphysical position that excludes a potentially true explanation from consideration?  Especially when it requires asserting an unsupportable universal negative? What, then, does strong atheism bring to the table of debate other than the potential for intractable error and denial of potential truth for the sake of a sweeping, unsupportable, universally negative assertion?

Conclusion: atheism is an untenable position for any intellectually honest, rational, and informed person. The belief that god (as described above, which is supported by the listed evidence) does not exist, or that it isn’t more likely that god exists than not, can only be a position based on ignorance of the available evidence and argument for god, or a hyper-skeptical, intellectually dishonest, ideologically biased, a priori dismissal of all of the evidence for the existence of god.

Comments
E: In addition to Mung's point (which is much like trying NOT to think about strawberry ice cream cones . . . ), if God is, then that would be so regardless of whether or not people accept it. And indeed, remember the price tag for the assertion that there is no God: as God is a serious candidate necessary being, inherently, the thing that would block God from being is that such a being is IMPOSSIBLE. As can be seen from above in this thread. Are you prepared to argue that God is IMPOSSIBLE? If so, on what grounds, especially after the fate of the deductive form of the problem of evil post Plantinga's free will defense. KFkairosfocus
January 23, 2013
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StephenB 621; You have nothing to say. Exit StephenB...Elvis4708
January 23, 2013
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Elvis4708
I understand it´s very painful for you to think about a world without your god. But imagine! Try to imagine! Think of a world without your god. Think of a world where all humans totally agree that there is no god! Given this; where do your objective moral codes come from other than some sort of consensus or pure reason(Kant)?
Objective moral codes coming from pure reason? Kant the moral subjectivist as the source for objective morality? Even after multiple correctives, you still do not know the difference between a subject and an object. It seems that you are not capable of rational thought.StephenB
January 23, 2013
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Think of a world without your god.
To think of a world without God is to think of God. So, StephenB, do the impossible, go ahead.Mung
January 23, 2013
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StephenB 601; Am I so special? Thank you! But I think you are wrong. I´m not that special. Check your sources! I understand it´s very painful for you to think about a world without your god. But imagine! Try to imagine! Think of a world without your god. Think of a world where all humans totally agree that there is no god! Given this; where do your objective moral codes come from other than some sort of consensus or pure reason(Kant)? You are cornered StephenB!Elvis4708
January 23, 2013
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KN, re:
604: I think that if we’re really going to draw the line between the subjective and the objective in the right place, then “social facts” (prices, laws, etc.) will have to come out as objective. I’d like to place the onus on those who deny that social facts are objective to explain why that is. So just because something is objective, doesn’t really tell us where in the ultimate ontology it will fall. The objectivity of social facts is clearly quite different from the objectivity of logical principles or physical laws, and the objectivity of morality is almost certainly different from all of them. 606: it’s not really clear to me just why it is that objective knowledge needs to be ‘grounded’ in a ‘world-view’. If we have really good reasons to accept that morality is objective, why does it need to be ‘grounded’ in anything else? And as I’ve indicated many times before, I worry that ‘grounded’ in an “accordion word”: the meaning of it stretches and collapses according to context and use. I can think of at least three different senses of ‘grounding’: causal explanation, rational justification, and phenomenological elucidation. And while we do need all of them, they are not the same thing!
First, we live in a world where we face those who operate on the nihilist premise and praxis that might and manipulation make 'right,' and who routinely employ selectively hyperskeptical objections. So, coherence in warrant leads to moving across a range of knowledge areas and points. Next, warrant is inherently going to ask for underlying support. That process of challenge is going to have to end up somewhere, not least because we are finite, so we are forced to stop somewhere. In addition, we have things like the first principles of right reason that are rooted in the necessities of the world, i.e identity is a first step, distinction is locked into it and confusion is locked out, or we get nowhere. Similarly, once a thing exists, it is legitimate to ask, why and to seek a good answer. That leads to issues of causation and contingency and to the contrasted necessity. All of these and more push us to think worldviewishly. Certainly, as a community of thought and argument towards understanding and action. In that context what you call social facts are objective though often conventional. As the posted definition above highlights, they are of course understood and known by subjects but they are not simply in the minds of subjects. The definition of the unit of temperature, or length, or speed etc are objective but are conventional. That does not at all mean that all facts are conventional, nor that the use of language or symbols renders such facts to be mere conventions. The truth in 3 + 2 = 5 is necessary, and will hold in any possible world. And I use possible world talk to underscore the radical contingency in our course of events, the sheer, it could have significantly been otherwise-ness of it. That is as legitimate an entry point to discuss contingency/necessity and cause etc as any other alternative. And because it is empirical, it is far more appealing to our common sense ability to reason. A world in which instead of typing just now I had decided to go get a fruit snack, is obviously a logically and physically possible state of affairs that just happens not to have been realised because I made a choice to type rather than to eat. (Onlookers, believe it or not, this is a debated point in the rarified heights of philosophy.) Yes, the way in which something is objective varies on a case by case basis. No one pretended otherwise. But the basic point remains, such things are not figments of our fevered imaqinations, and hold regardless of our opinions, power games and manipulation games. We defy them to our peril. As the people of the Orient used to say, it is futile to try to order water to flow uphill. It would be even worse to try to build a social world on the assumption that water flowing downhill is a matter of convention and we can redefine reality to suit ourselves by making an agreement. Or, in Abraham Lincoln's deceptively simple example, he once asked one of his advisors what would happen if we defined that a sheep's tail were a leg. How many legs would a sheep then have. Five. Nope, simply saying that a tail is a leg does not make it into a leg, e.g. it simply cannot do what legs do. (For just one current instance on the significance of this sort of word magic confusion, those who are tossing around clever slogans on "marriage equality" and the like just now should do some serious rethinking about why marriage has universally been understood to be a way to stabilise and recognise the bond between man and woman in the context of raising up the next generation. And, we should ask ourselves some pretty hard questions about who would benefit from radical destabilisation of society through further undermining of marriage and/or who seeks to gain something enough for themselves that they are willing to run the social risks involved in manipulating society like this. [Onlookers, cf here and here on the Acts 27 challenge to democratic and managerial decision-making, in light of a highly relevant and instructive historical case. One I have used to teach the pitfalls in collective and managerial decision making.]) Just so, in the moral sphere, if lying were universalised, society would break down. That is one way of reasoning about the destructive nature of evils, and it helps people see the importance of keeping to moral principles and cultivating the character that habitually lives by the right and the truth. But an analytical concept such as the CI, as just used, does not substitute for character cultivation or sound instruction in principles and examples, or the influence of positive models of the principles. So, we see the very process of showing things objective puts them in a worldviews context, and points onward to the need for general grounding of a worldview. Absent that, we find the sort of all too malleable ignorance, lack of capability to think for oneself and resulting vulnerable instability that too many radicals are only too happy to find. Wolves love nice, peaceable, gullible sheep, for lunch. As in: easy meat. And yes, there may be sufficient grounding in a narrow sense in showing a narrow warrant for a given case, but that normally happens in cases where there is a general agreement on underlying principles, premises and contexts of wisdom. We no longer have that state, we live in a world where radical, ruthless, polarising pressure groups are perfectly willing to try to overthrow any and everything, in the interests of pushing their agendas. So, we need to address grounding issues in the full orbed worldviews sense. Which as a philosopher, you should be well aware of. Perhaps, you are trying to play at Socrates to pull out. Never mind, by the time of Aristotle, we see full didactic exposition as a standard approach and even in Plato's Socrates, we often enough see Socrates or some other stand-in going into full lecture or presentation mode. There is a place for back-forth conversation, thee is a place for formal debates and panels, and there is a place for exposition and articulation of views or cases. Then, one may carry out a critical review or even a discussion. Indeed that is exactly what the UD blog often provides. So, we live in a time where there are so many intersecting, interacting crises and issues and contentions that we routinely need to address worldviews level issues. Indeed, given what we have seen ever so often at UD, we too often have to start as far back as the credibility of first principles of right reason. (Onlookers, cf here on to see what that looks like at 101 level, in a Judaeo-Christian worldview context.) That is how bad things are with our mortally wounded civilisation. My only real hope for us, is that I do believe in miracles. And, on morality, we need to start from key moral facts or points of consensus, and draw out the deeper implications and contexts that make sense of that, leading onward to the worldview context. So, we start with a point that no-one will dare deny (but many will try to brush aside or ignore), e.g. that it is objectively , horrifically wrong to kidnap, rape, torture and murder a young child, to make a snuff video fro sick fun and blood money profit. This brings to bear many of the issues, current (sadly, snuff videos are credibly real through thankfully rare) and recently historical (e.g. what was happening in the Nazi death camps or the various Gulags was close enough to give pause), as well as from the deeper past (I could give you some horror stories on slavery . . . let's just say that the second motto of the antislavery movement, based on Philemon vv 1 - 3 and 15 - 17, was "Am I not a Woman and a Sister?" The horrors that patently lie behind that, we need not elaborate. Just say, I am descended from slaves liberated in material part through the work of that society and its leaders. We must never ever ever forget.) This brings us to the issue of rights, a universally recognised principle: fairness and fundamental moral worth behind it, raising issues of equality and duties of care to respect the other. Even, if marginalised, oppressed and voiceless. That such basic rights are objective is seen from the patent absurdities and hopeless morass of contradictions and hypocrisies that result from ignoring or manipulating them. That is, I argue here in a nutshell that once we listen to and cultivate the voice of conscience as the candle within and do not snuff it out, we will see that certain moral principles are fundamental and are self-evident, such that to abandon them comes at a price of absurdity, hypocrisy and destructive evil. And, onward, of crushing conscience and descending into a morass of darkness and evil as does not bear raising from the depths of our worst nightmares. But we have had several examples in living memory. Why is it that we are so often so insistent on forgetting or dismissing them? Will we not even learn from history, if from nothing else? Indeed, sadly, in the current pushes by radical agendas of various stripes but a common ruthless nihilism, we see that freedom of conscience, worship, opinion, speech, association and expression are -- yet again! -- under threat, with government backing in too many cases, all in the false name of liberation and agendas being pushed by radicals of several stripes. When for instance we see so-called new atheists standing up in public or in print and declaring that raising a child in a Christian tradition is child abuse, given the laws and bureaucracies on such abuse that is a shocking declaration not only of contempt and willfully arrogant ignorance, but it is a threat, one that is already being acted on in subtle ways. And, we do not hear a call to stop, rein in and apologise for such foolish, polarising and wicked rhetoric. Instead, such men are feted and celebrated. That speaks volumes, telling, shameful and horrific volumes. But now, let us look at a pair of key historical state papers on the subject of rights and how pivotal such are , and their worldview connexions. Notice, also the clear historical links on the flow and further articulation of key ideas:
Dutch DOI, 1581: . . . a prince is constituted by God to be ruler of a people, to defend them from oppression and violence as the shepherd his sheep; and whereas God did not create the people slaves to their prince, to obey his commands, whether right or wrong, but rather the prince for the sake of the subjects (without which he could be no prince), to govern them according to equity, to love and support them as a father his children or a shepherd his flock, and even at the hazard of life to defend and preserve them. And when he does not behave thus, but, on the contrary, oppresses them, seeking opportunities to infringe their ancient customs and privileges . . . then he is no longer a prince, but a tyrant, and the subjects are to consider him in no other view . . . This is the only method left for subjects whose humble petitions and remonstrances could never soften their prince or dissuade him from his tyrannical proceedings; and this is what the law of nature dictates for the defense of liberty, which we ought to transmit to posterity, even at the hazard of our lives. . . . . So, having no hope of reconciliation, and finding no other remedy, we have, agreeable to the law of nature in our own defense, and for maintaining the rights, privileges, and liberties of our countrymen, wives, and children, and latest posterity from being enslaved by the Spaniards, been constrained to renounce allegiance to the King of Spain, and pursue such methods as appear to us most likely to secure our ancient liberties and privileges. US DOI, 1776: When . . . it becomes necessary for one people . . . to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, [cf Rom 1:18 - 21, 2:14 - 15], that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. --That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security . . . . We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions [Cf. Judges 11:27 and discussion in Locke], do, in the Name, and by the Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.
Do you notice how both these papers pivot on issues of rights, linked duties of office and general care, and the underlying premise that our nature is rooted in the law of our nature under our Creator, the good God who has given us a fundamental moral worth? Let me further underscore, from the extended citation by Locke in the passage in his second treatise on civil gov't, Ch 2 sect 5, in which he referred to "the judicious [Anglican Canon Richard] Hooker," to ground such pivotal concepts:
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant . . . [[Hooker then continues, citing Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 8:] as namely, That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That since we would not be in any thing extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain, with such-like . . . ] [[Eccl. Polity,preface, Bk I, "ch." 8, p.80]
We had better wake up and think through what is going on, before it is too late for even a miracle to save us. KFkairosfocus
January 23, 2013
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If atheism is true, why argue against theism?William J Murray
January 22, 2013
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If atheism is true, why does it need justification?Mung
January 22, 2013
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KN
I don’t quite disagree with you, but let’s keep some distinctions clear. Scientific theories are objective but not absolute; that’s just why we can talk about scientific progress at all.
Agreed. That is why I am not writing about science. It is not relevant to the discussion.
Likewise, moral positions or views can be objective without being absolute.
How can an objective moral law possibly be relative to any person, culture, or situation? Take any specific example of a moral law that you like to make your case.
But as for what the absolute moral law is, I don’t think there’s much improvement over the categorical imperative. But we can talk about that, too.
Except for the golden rule, the categorical imperative is without content. As such, it provides no guidance either for the foundation of natural rights, the development of conscience, or the formation of virtue. For Kant, morality is subjective, which means that, for him, it does not come from God or any outside source. It is, therefore, non-binding except to the extent that we bind ourselves. As a standard for human behavior, this empty notion cannot even begin to approach the Ten Commandments, The Sermon on the Mount, or the Natural Moral Law.StephenB
January 22, 2013
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To be sure, social justice is a distinct matter from personal morality. However, the objective natural moral law, insofar at it is recognized, informs both personal and institutional morality. Thou Shalt Not Steal applies to both governments that would steal from the people and to people who would steal from each other. The broader point is that subjective morality, and the tyranny that always follows from moral conflict, is inappropriate for both the state and its citizens. To reject the natural moral law is to support both immorality and tyranny. Does the natural moral law require any grounding? Of course it does. The natural moral law, like any law, requires a lawgiver. From whence comes the lawgiver? Can it be evolution? Obviously not. Evolution, which denies the reality of a fixed human nature must, by logical necessity, deny any fixed morality proper to human nature--unchanging morality cannot be grounded in changing evolution. Can a physical law create morality? No. Physical laws, by definition, cannot create or do anything different from what they have always done. The only other option is a personal, unchanging, eternal, intelligent agent.StephenB
January 22, 2013
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There would be if justification and/or truth are subjective, or if knowledge does not depend on either truth or justification. But I do think that knowledge requires both truth and justification, and it does not make any sense to suppose that either of those could be subjective in the sense I’d specified above.
I just realized that this bit here means that there cannot be any subjective knowledge at all, and that can't be right. So, please ignore!Kantian Naturalist
January 22, 2013
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StephenB: I don't quite disagree with you, but let's keep some distinctions clear. Scientific theories are objective but not absolute; that's just why we can talk about scientific progress at all. Likewise, moral positions or views can be objective without being absolute. But as for what the absolute moral law is, I don't think there's much improvement over the categorical imperative. But we can talk about that, too. Mung: probably not. There would be if justification and/or truth are subjective, or if knowledge does not depend on either truth or justification. But I do think that knowledge requires both truth and justification, and it does not make any sense to suppose that either of those could be subjective in the sense I'd specified above.Kantian Naturalist
January 22, 2013
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(1) is there any objective knowledge at all?
Does it even make sense to say that all knowledge is subjective?Mung
January 22, 2013
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"...every attempt to deny the possibility of metaphysics rests on some prior arbitrarily restrictive epistemology or theory of knowledge." - W. Norris Clarke, S.J.Mung
January 22, 2013
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Kantian Naturalist:
So we shall need more than one set of distinctions: objective/subjective, local/universal, and (maybe) relative/absolute. I think that nothing but nonsense and confusion will result from conflating these distinctions. To aspire to true systematicity will also require thinking about how these distinctions interact with the a priori/a posteriori distinction.
Subjectivism, multiculturalism, and relativism are three related dimensions of the same intellectual and moral error. Can you think of even one objective moral law (not civil law or custom) that is not also universally and absolutely binding? Can you think of even one society or unique set of conditions where people advanced and prospered in a culture that encouraged impiety, pornography, murder, adultery, theft, and dishonesty? The reason I introduced the terms “absolute” and “universal” was to show that these dimensions are inseparable from the dimension of objectivity, and to indicate that the contrast between subject vs. object is analogous to the contrast between absolute vs. relative and universal vs. particular. The point being that one element in a dichotomous relationship is always defined in terms of its relationship with the other element, something that Elvis4708 has yet to grasp. The role of "plurality" is to recognize that each culture must find its own unique way of applying these objective, universal, and absolute moral laws, not, as you suggest, to characterize them as local customs. In keeping with that point, it seems odd that you would complain about the "nonsense and confusion of conflating distinctions" even as you discuss the "good life" in the context of the moral code as if the two terms were interchangeable.StephenB
January 22, 2013
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Since you do not understand (or refuse to accept) the basic difference between a subject and an object, you are clearly not ready to engage in a rational an objective dialogue on the subject of objective morality. =PMung
January 22, 2013
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KN: Going now, but pardon: to imply or outright assert that we know that we cannot know is self referentially absurd. KFkairosfocus
January 22, 2013
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I'm not so sure that skepticism is as absurd as you make it out to be, but I'm not defending skepticism, so we can leave that one side. On moral subjects, I'm quite happy to defend objectivity (on my generous construal) of morality up and down; however, I think that further distinctions are required. In particular, I think that the priority of the right over the good is important here: "the right" here being the the fair and equitable distribution of material and social goods necessary for each and every individual to develop his or her own capacities, including his or her capacity to conceive of the good and construct a plan of life informed by that conception. I think that some pluralism about the good is a basic feature of contemporary life in Western societies (at least), and I don't think that the good life is the same for all peoples, at all times, and in all places. What counts as the good life will depend on tradition, religion, culture, language, physical circumstances -- and while it is not subjective, it is local or non-universal. By contrast, I do think that the right is universal, or at least universalizable. So we shall need more than one set of distinctions: objective/subjective, local/universal, and (maybe) relative/absolute. I think that nothing but nonsense and confusion will result from conflating these distinctions. To aspire to true systematicity will also require thinking about how these distinctions interact with the a priori/a posteriori distinction. That said, it's not really clear to me just why it is that objective knowledge needs to be 'grounded' in a 'world-view'. If we have really good reasons to accept that morality is objective, why does it need to be 'grounded' in anything else? And as I've indicated many times before, I worry that 'grounded' in an "accordion word": the meaning of it stretches and collapses according to context and use. I can think of at least three different senses of 'grounding': causal explanation, rational justification, and phenomenological elucidation. And while we do need all of them, they are not the same thing!Kantian Naturalist
January 22, 2013
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KN: The attempt to deny objective knowledge immediately implies a claim to objective knowledge and is thus self referentially absurd. The first is thus a non-question that eats itself from the tail on up. The second, over-generalises and in so doing loads the issue improperly. To claim that there is objective knowledge on moral subjects, does not entail that all moral claims constitute such knowledge. For a case in point, however, try to deny that it is objectively wrong and known or knowable to be wrong, to kidnap, rape, torture and murder a little child for sick fun and blood money profit by making a snuff film. Thirdly, the issue is not whether objective knowledge, moral or not relies on theism, but what worldview best grounds objectivity of moral knowledge. KFkairosfocus
January 22, 2013
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There are at least three separate questions here: (1) is there any objective knowledge at all? (2) is morality a kind of objective knowledge? (3) does objective morality depend on theism being true and/or justified? Comment 1: I said "true and/or justified" because one might reason as follows: "the truth of objective morality depends upon the existence of God, so an atheist who believes in objective morality has a true belief, but is not justified in having it.") Comment 2: if one believes that all objective knowledge depends on theism, then there's nothing distinct about morality. Here could reason as follows: (1) all objective knowledge depends on theism; (2) morality is a kind of objective knowledge; (3) hence morality depends on God. Comment 3: the objectivity of morality is a formal commitment -- it says that this:
judgments about the good and the right are objective if and only the states of affairs to which the truth of those judgments correspond are not themselves entirely constituted by the first-person (subjective, conscious) states of those forming and assessing the relevant judgment.
(Apologies for the 'word-salad,' but I'm trying to be precise here.) By contrast, judgments are "subjective" if and only if the truth-value of those judgments consists in corresponding to, or failing to correspond to, states of affairs constituted entirely by first-person reportable psychological states. So, "I love her" is subjective in the relevant sense. (Things might get a bit trickier when contrasting "the table looks brown to me" with "the table is brown," but we can leave that to one side. I raise it only to indicate how tricky things are.) On this characterization, it will follow that sentences such as "A double espresso costs $2.50" and "it is illegal to exceed the posted speed-limit" are objective. I have no problem with that -- I think that if we're really going to draw the line between the subjective and the objective in the right place, then "social facts" (prices, laws, etc.) will have to come out as objective. I'd like to place the onus on those who deny that social facts are objective to explain why that is. So just because something is objective, doesn't really tell us where in the ultimate ontology it will fall. The objectivity of social facts is clearly quite different from the objectivity of logical principles or physical laws, and the objectivity of morality is almost certainly different from all of them.Kantian Naturalist
January 22, 2013
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Putting in a nutshell: the real issue in democracy is not just that the people get their say, but that the people make it their responsibility to make sure that what they say is sound and wise, or else we end up in the march of folly. KFkairosfocus
January 22, 2013
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PPS: Also cf here.kairosfocus
January 22, 2013
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Elvis4708
If there is no such god your argumentation loses all of its content. Why can´t you accept that instead of vomiting a lot of arrogance
Except for you, everyone, including the most partisan theist and the most partisan atheist, understands the meaning of objective morality. Except for you, everyone, including the most partisan theist and atheist, understands the difference between a subject and an object. Except for you, everyone, including the most partisan theist and atheist, understands the difference between defining objective morality and presenting an argument for it. It has nothing at all to do with faith and everything to do with the ability to think rationally. You need more preparation. You are not ready to enter into the fray.StephenB
January 22, 2013
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ouch . . .kairosfocus
January 22, 2013
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PS: Definitions that may help: Collins English Dict:
OBJECTIVE: objective [?b?d??kt?v] adj 1. (Philosophy) existing independently of perception or an individual's conceptions are there objective moral values? 2. undistorted by emotion or personal bias 3. of or relating to actual and external phenomena as opposed to thoughts, feelings, etc. SUBJECTIVE: subjective [s?b?d??kt?v] adj 1. belonging to, proceeding from, or relating to the mind of the thinking subject and not the nature of the object being considered 2. of, relating to, or emanating from a person's emotions, prejudices, etc. subjective views 3. relating to the inherent nature of a person or thing; essential 4. (Philosophy) existing only as perceived and not as a thing in itself
Notice, it is subjects who know, so the bridge between the mentality of the subject and the objectivity of what is known is warrant. Warrant that creates the status of beliefs that are credibly true and well warranted. It should be patent that the vote of 51% or more generally of three wolves and two sheep on what is for lunch, is not sufficient to provide warrant that would lead to the conclusion that the result of a vote is warranted as true, rather than reflective of the agendas and desires of a given cluster of subjects at a given time on a particular topic. This in turn may well simply be the result of the sort of manipulations and distortions that led to the famous incident of sailing out from Fair Havens when that sweet south wind blew, in Acts 27. Foer here we have acase wher4e prudent counsels based on the warrant of wide and painful experience (three shipwrecks to that date) were brushed aside in light of the smooth words of an inrterested ship's ownwr and his kubernete, playing on the discomfort of the general lot of passengfers and suppressing the pivotal issue of the risks that were being run. Kindly, cf the study on this incident here. I fear, this is all too relevant to where our civilisation as a whole now is, and so also to where all too many of its governments, dominant media houses, opinion leaders, countries and communities are at this time. KFkairosfocus
January 22, 2013
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E: With all due respects, you asked a question and SB answered it, namely that if we are creatures made for a purpose, then morality will not just boil down to the issue of might and/or manipulation making 'right.' Now, you object that this implication ASSUMES God? Pardon me but the first point of IF p THEN q is the logic, not the status of the antecedent in the first instance. As to the question of whether morality is objective, I again suggest with all due respect that it is objectively so, that it is wrong to kidnap, rape, torture and murder a young child to make a snuff video for sick pleasure and blood money profit. Just as, that Hitler slaughtered 6 mn Jews and 5 - 7 million others in his death camps etc was inescapably a case in point of wrong. So, we are credibly under moral governance, and that points strongly to a moral governor. The pattern of argument above tells us that you are plainly simply trying to dress up the radical relativism and amorality of your worldview in democratic clothes, and in so doing, hoping to distract from how it opens the door to outright destructive nihilism, the might/manipulation makes 'right' game that has already played out so destructively within living memory. No wonder it has been said history repeats -- we refuse to learn its lessons. Which is exactly where our civilisation -- having refused to learn from Plato, much less Paul, Yeshua d' Nazaret, or Moshe -- now is. As to the move from validity of an argument on implication that posits God in its antecedent, to credible soundness, there is abundant and good reason, some of it shown above in this thread. (Onlookers may want to start here as a 101 level sampler.) KFkairosfocus
January 22, 2013
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Stephen B 593; 1. I have used the copy/paste-function as you easily can verify. 2. Our clash boils down to the fact that I do not believe in your god. Because if I did I would wholeheartedly support what you are saying. Your argumentation is short, strict and easy to grasp(!) - in short elegant - but it presupposes a universal, monotheistic god. If there is no such god your argumentation loses all of its content. Why can´t you accept that instead of vomiting a lot of arrogance?Elvis4708
January 22, 2013
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PPS: Feser's discussion, here.kairosfocus
January 22, 2013
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PS: Some back-forth points on objections, here.kairosfocus
January 22, 2013
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WJM: We need to think through some big issues here. Accordingly, I think we need to look at several related forms of argument, here adapted from Hartshorne:
(1) If God exists, he must exist necessarily, if God does not exist his existence is impossible. ____________________ Therefore, (2) God is either necessary or impossible. (3) God can be conceived without contradiction _______________________ Therefore, (4) God -- a serious candidate necessary being -- is not impossible (5) Since God is not impossible he must be necessary. ______________________ So: (6)Since God is necessary (and not impossible) he must exist. (7) The assumption that God cannot be contingent is implicit in the concept of God itself. _____________________________ Therefore: (8) God cannot exist contingently.
This is a different angle on the same basic point. And, remember, the issue is not in whether one accepts this, but what is the price tag -- metaphysical, epistemological, logical, moral/ethical -- in rejecting it. Especially in light of what else it costs to reject the related reasoning. Then, let us look at the balance of difficulties and come to a conclusion as to which is better to live with, why. KFkairosfocus
January 22, 2013
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