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Is Atheism Rationally Justifiable?

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First, I’d like to thank Mr. Arrington for granting me posting privileges.  I consider it quite an honor, and I hope this post (and any future posts) warrants this trust.

Second, the following is an argument I think will help us to focus on a fundamental issue that lies behind ever so many of the debates here at Uncommon Descent, and elsewhere.  That is, is the sort of implicit or even explicit atheism that is so often built in on the ground floor of a “scientific” mindset truly rationally justifiable? Such cannot be assumed, it needs to be shown.

I’ll begin by defining some terms for the sake of this argument:

Definition of God (for the purpose of this thread): First cause, prime mover, root of being, objective source of human purpose (final cause) and resulting morality, source of free will, mind, consciousness; omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent inasmuch as principles of logic allow; an interventionist as necessary to facilitate movement towards final cause and also inasmuch as logical principles are not violated; source of logic — “reason itself.” (I am not talking in particular about any specifically defined religious interpretation of god, such as the Chrstian or Islamic God.)

Definition: Weak, or negative atheism is the lack of any belief that a god exists, and the position that a god probably doesn’t exist, and is not the positive belief that gods do not exist (strong atheism), and is not agnosticism (the lack of belief that god either does or does not exist and the further view that there is a lack of sufficient probability either way).  Strong atheism is the belief that no god or gods exist at all.

Definition: A worldview or mindset is rationally justified when it answers adequately to the facts of the real world as we experience or observe it, makes good sense and fits together logically, is simple but not simplistic, and honestly faces the issues and difficulties that all worldviews face.

Definition: Intellectual dishonesty occurs when (1) one deliberately mischaracterizes their position or view in order to avoid having to logically defend their actual views; and/or (2) when someone is arguing, or making statements against a position while remaining willfully ignorant about that position, and/or (3) when someone categorically and/or pejoratively dismisses all existent and/or potential evidence in favor of a conclusion they claim to be neutral about, whether they are familiar with that evidence or not.

These will be important as we consider:

Evidence in favor of God:  The following is a brief summary of the evidence that typically leads many people to make a general finding that a god (as described above) exists, even if variantly interpreted or culturally contextualized:

(1)
Anecdotal evidence for the apparently intelligently ordered anomalous, miraculous (defying expected natural processes and probabilities) events attributed to god, such as signs, supernatural events (e.g. Fatima, Guadeloupe, Paul’s Damascus Road Experience), or answers to prayers to god;

(2)
Testimonial evidence (first-hand accounts) of experience of such phenomena, including interactions with a god-like being or accounts of god-like interventions;  Also, the testimony of religious adherents of various specific gods can be counted as evidence of the god premised in this argument in the manner that various cultures can vary widely in their description of certain phenomena or experiences, and come up with widely variant “explanations”; what is interesting as evidence here, though, is the widespread crediting of similar kinds of phenomena and experience to a “god” of some sort (which might be the case of blind or ignorant people touching different parts of an elephant and thus describing “what the elephant is” in various ways). Such testimonial evidence can be counted in favor of the premise here, but cannot be held against it where it varies, because it is not testimony that such a god doesn’t exist.

(3)
The various Cosmological and Ontological Arguments for the existence of god;

(4)  The Strong Anthropic (or Fine Tuning) argument and other evidences for design of our world and of life in it;

(5) The empirical, scientific evidence assembled in support of the design arguments in #4 (such as recently persuaded Antony Flew — formerly the world’s leading philosophical atheist — that there is a god);

(6) The Moral arguments for the existence of god.

(7) Empirical and testimonial evidence of phenomena closely correlated to the existence of a god as described above, such as the survival of consciousness after death, and the existence of an afterlife realm; the evidence for interactions with correlated entities such as angels and demons (which seem to act to influence our free will towards or away from our human purpose), etc., gathered by various serious and scientific investigations into what is often referred to as the “paranormal”, including mediumship studies dating back to William Crooke and ongoing through the work at Pear Labs and the Scole Experiment, including consciousness-survival research published in the Lancet. While indirect, this evidence tends to support the proposition that god exists.

While the various arguments listed above have been subjected to counter-arguments and rebuttals of varying strengths and weaknesses across the ages, one must not lose sight that while there is much evidence of all sorts (as listed above) in favor of the existence of god; there is zero empirical evidence (to my knowledge) or and little in the way of rational argument that no such god exists.  In other words, decreasing the value of the arguments and evidence for god does not increase the value of the position that there is no god; it can only increase the reasonableness of the “weak atheist” (there isn’t enough evidence) or an agnostic position.

The commonly seen rebuttals to these argument are simply attempting to show weaknesses in or alternatives to the arguments themselves so that such arguments cannot be taken as demonstratively convincing (that god exists); such counter-arguments as a rule do not actually make the case that god (as described above) in fact does not exist.

The argument against weak atheism:

The above shows us that, ironically, strong atheism is a weak position. That is probably why atheism advocates seldom defend it in informed company. So, we must first focus on the “stronger” atheist position, the one they defend in public: “weak atheism,” generally described as absence of belief in god or gods. I will argue that it too is far weaker than is commonly recognized.

I know of no positive arguments for the strong “there is no god” position, other than the argument from evil which has been addressed by Boethius, Adams  and Platinga. Aside from that, there are only rebuttals/reactions to various “there is a god” arguments. This exemplifies how rebutting an argument does not eliminate it as evidence, it only offers an alternative perspective that one  can evaluate along with the original argument.   Depending on the strength of the rebuttal or alternative explanation, that particular positive evidence for god may be decreased in value, but there is no concurrent increase in the value of an argument against the existence of god (as described above).

If a “weak atheist” claims to “lack belief” because there is “no evidence for god,” he or she is necessarily being intellectually dishonest, because we certainly aren’t privy to all potential or available evidence. Are such atheists claiming to be omniscient? If not, then, a more modest and reasonable point would be that they are not aware of evidence for god. However, given what we have already seen, such “weak atheists” cannot genuinely claim to not know of “any” evidence for god after having perused any of the above evidence.  That is to say, there is evidence for god, just, they don’t accept it. But incredulity or hyper-skepticism on your part does not equate to “no evidence” on my part. Testimony from otherwise credible sources is not made “less credible” simply because the testimony is about something the listener personally finds to be in-credible; it is not intellectually honest to discredit the credibility of testimony only on the basis of the subject matter being debated.

Also, strong atheists often only refer to themselves as weak atheists because they have realized that the strong atheist position is an assertion they cannot support in informed company.  They do this to provide cover for their real view, which is an obvious form of intellectual dishonesty.  One can often discern when this is going on when the person ridicules belief in god or makes categorical dismissals about evidence they have never even seen; they believe there is no god, and so assume there can be no valid evidence for god, and advocate for that position rhetorically via ridicule.

Even if the “weak atheist” is not aware of any compelling evidence for god, he or she must know that we humans are quite limited in what we know, and may often be unaware of mistakes in what we think we know. That means that any categorical claim a “weak” atheist makes about the available evidence he or she is not privy to — that it is not credible or convincing — is again intellectually dishonest because you cannot justifiably make a categorical claim about something you have no knowledge of.

So, if we have a weak atheist who is aware of the existence of the above evidence and agrees that there might be more evidence they are not privy to; and who does not categorically assert problems with the evidence they have not yet seen; and who does not categorically dismiss the available evidence as “non-evidence” due to hyper-skeptical bias but rather states that the available evidence they have seen is not compelling towards a conclusion that god exists; then one must ask the following:

In the face of such overwhelming amounts of evidence — thousands of years of testimony and anecdotal stories; many serious arguments based on credible empirical evidence and apparently necessary logical premises and inferences; and, the complete lack of any generally successful attempt to make a sound argument that god in fact does not exist — one must ask: how can any intellectually honest person come to any conclusion other than that on the balance of the evidence, god probably existseven if god is poorly and diversely defined, and even if the experience of god is open to various interpretations and even to misunderstanding?

As an analogy: even if one has never personally experienced “love”; in the face of thousands of years of testimony and anecdotal stories that love exists, and empirical evidence supporting that certain physical states correspond to assertions of experiences of love, would it be intellectually honest to “lack belief” that love exists, or would it be intellectually honest to hold the view that even though one doesn’t experience love (or using the same argument, color, joy, dreams, etc.), that love probably exists – even if people are widely disparate in their explanation, description, or presentation of what love is?

Another analogy: because witnesses disagree in their description of a criminal suspect in a crime, or disagree about the particulars of the crime they witnessed, this doesn’t mean there is no criminal at all.  Depending on the testimony and evidence, one may hold that it is likely that a crime occurred, and so it is likely that a criminal exists, but that the arguments, testimony and evidence are  not enough reach a finding of “guilty” for any particular suspect.

As far as I am aware of there is no anecdotal or testimonial evidence that god does not exist (because lack of experience of a thing isn’t evidence the thing doesn’t exist), very little in the way of logical argument towards that conclusion, and there is a vast array of logical, anecdotal, testimonial and empirical evidence that god (at least as generally described above) does exist. Because a billion people did not witness a crime, and only a handful did, doesn’t tilt the scales in favor of no crime having been committed at all; imagine now a billion people that report witnessing a crime, and handful that did not, and you have something more comparable to the state of evidence concerning the existence of god.

Even if one doesn’t find that evidence compelling for for a final conclusion that god exists,  when one weighs the balance of the evidence for and against god, one should be willing to at least consider whether it is more probable that god (as described above) exists than that god does not exist.  Problematically (for the atheist), the view that it is more likely that god exists than not is not any sort of an atheistic position.

The argument against strong atheism:

Strong atheism is defined as the assertion that no god or gods exist whatsoever.

First, it is obvious that strong atheism cannot be logically supported, simply because it is impossible to prove (not in the absolute sense, but in the “sufficient evidence” sense). There may be evidence and good argument that certain gods, or kinds of gods, do not exist; but there is certainly no generally accepted evidence or successful argument that no significant, meaningful god or gods whatsoever exist, including the one as defined for this thread.

Instead of trying to actually support their own claim, strong atheists usually attempt to shift the burden of proof onto theists by essentially asking the theists to prove the atheist position wrong, implying or asserting that atheism must be held true by default.  That is, such try to argue that they have nothing to argue and can sit comfortably on their view as a default. However, that is not so; every worldview of consequence has a duty to show that it is factually adequate, coherent and explains reality powerfully and simply.  Strong atheism is not a default position; it is a positive assertion that no god or gods exist.  The default position is always “I don’t know” or true agnosticism.

Strong atheism is a sweeping, categorical assertion that something does not exist. As such, It has the job of proving a universal negative.  Perhaps this could be accomplished by showing the converse positive claim to be self-contradictory, and readers advocating strong atheism are invited to make their case based upon the definition of God at the top of this post.

Also, however unlikely it may seem to an atheist, it might be true that a god of some sort exists outside of the circle of what she or he knows or what the collective of atheists actually know. After all, we all know full well that “to err is human.” So, since the atheist could be mistaken or ignorant of the key fact or argument that would be decisive,  the strong atheist position unjustifiably excludes a potentially true explanation from consideration.  What is the rationally useful point of a metaphysical position that excludes a potentially true explanation from consideration?  Especially when it requires asserting an unsupportable universal negative? What, then, does strong atheism bring to the table of debate other than the potential for intractable error and denial of potential truth for the sake of a sweeping, unsupportable, universally negative assertion?

Conclusion: atheism is an untenable position for any intellectually honest, rational, and informed person. The belief that god (as described above, which is supported by the listed evidence) does not exist, or that it isn’t more likely that god exists than not, can only be a position based on ignorance of the available evidence and argument for god, or a hyper-skeptical, intellectually dishonest, ideologically biased, a priori dismissal of all of the evidence for the existence of god.

Comments
Elvis4708
Thus, you DEFINE moral codes that come from outside human beings as objective, universal and absolute.
No, I DEFINED moral codes that come from outside the human mind as objective. I was very careful to make that point at least five times. That they are also universal and absolute can be easily deduced. However, I am certainly not going to go to the trouble of explaining arguments to someone who cannot even grasp definitions. Since you do not understand (or refuse to accept) the basic difference between a subject and an object, you are clearly not ready to engage in a rational dialogue on the subject of objective morality.StephenB
January 22, 2013
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Another pair of brilliant essays, KF. 589 contains that which I was attempting to lead Elvis to via a line of questioning, but he - like so many others - refuse to engage such lines of questioning, either out of duplicity or a simple inability to see into their blind spot. I have noticed that many atheists & materialists have an apparent,recurring cognitive difficulty when it comes to understanding the role of fundamental principles, often implicitly (and in some cases, explicitly) contradicting the very principles they are necessarily employing to make their case. I ask Elvis,"why democratic morality", and he is incapable of providing an answer, other than offering rhetoric that democracy is best. But best by what measure, and why should anyone submit to such measure, or feel confident in forcing it upon those who wish otherwise? And so the serpent consumes its own tail; without an assumed objectively valid source for their insistence upon "democratic morality", they have no justification other than might - the might of the many to impose their moral will on the few. Fundamentally, the principle that Elvis ultimately advances - the might of the many - is no different in nature than that which he (in his mind) fights against: the might of the church, or the might of the few. Elvis, like so many others, seem oblivious to the role that principle plays in any moral argument. As in, what is the principle by which you feel confident in your moral judgements? Why that principle, and not some other? If there is no answer that assumes any grounding other than, ultimately, "because I say so", or "because we have the might", then the morality one argues for is no different in principle than the morality one is arguing against. Ironically (and tragically, really), that which they so emotionally object to (which is, rationally, an erroneous interpretation of divine morality) - the "might" of the one (god) to force moral judgements on humans and punish them eternally for what they see as trivial offensives - is the very principle behind what they offer to replace it - nothing but "might", and "because I say so". Unfortunately, in their righteous outrage, they refuse to examine the nature of the moral argument because they are so emotionally tied to their erroneous concept of divine morality, as if some capricious king on a throne was hurling lightning bolts of eternal condemnation upon hapless, unwitting, good-natured people who simply fail to flip some arbitrary switch. Like Elvis, many anti-theists attempt to replace divine morality, as they see it, with something they consider more kind, more tolerant, more pragmatic, or more "evolved", but cannot offer anything more substantial than "might makes right" or "because I say so" as their fundamental principle. IMO, the moral argument, and the necessary being argument, each by themselves are compelling arguments for belief in the existence of god; taken together with all of the other arguments and evidence, the case for theism is, in every sense, overwhelming.William J Murray
January 22, 2013
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PS: Godel's form of argument is also suggestive (and remember I am taking a comparative difficulties, metaphysical price tag approach to all of this). Let me clip wiki for the skeletal form:
Mathematician Kurt Gödel provided a formal argument for God's existence. The arguments were constructed by Gödel but not published until long after his death. He provided a logically valid argument based on modal logic; he uses the conception of properties, ultimately concluding with God's existence.[27]
Definition 1: x is God-like if and only if x has as essential properties those and only those properties which are positive Definition 2: A is an essence of x if and only if for every property B, x has B necessarily if and only if A entails B Definition 3: x necessarily exists if and only if every essence of x is necessarily exemplified
Axiom 1: If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive Axiom 2: Any property entailed by—i.e., strictly implied by—a positive property is [--> also] positive Axiom 3: The property of being God-like is positive Axiom 4: If a property is positive, then it is necessarily positive Axiom 5: Necessary existence is positive Axiom 6: For any property P, if P is positive, then being necessarily P is positive
Theorem 1: If a property is positive, then it is consistent, i.e., possibly exemplified Corollary 1: The property of being God-like is consistent Theorem 2: If something is God-like, then the property of being God-like is an essence of that thing ____________________ Theorem 3: Necessarily, the property of being God-like is exemplified
Gödel defined being "god-like" as having every positive property. He left the term "positive" undefined. Gödel proposed that it is understood in an aesthetic and moral sense, or alternatively as the opposite of privation (the absence of necessary qualities in the universe). He warned against interpreting "positive" as being morally or aesthetically "good" (the greatest advantage and least disadvantage), as this includes negative characteristics. Instead, he suggested that "positive" should be interpreted as being perfect, or "purely good", without negative characteristics.[28]
Again, we see the sort of price tag game out there. So, folks, what is the metaphysical, epistemological, logical and moral price tag of atheism, especially the evolutionary materialist, scientism form that is so rampant and brashly assertive today? Yes, you can object to and even dismiss, but what are you implicitly committing yours3elf to in so doing? Or, are you just playing at being selectively hyperskeptical against what you would not like or where you would not go? (And, underlying influences in my own thinking on these subjects should be evident.) KFkairosfocus
January 22, 2013
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F/N: Over the past day or two, this thread has looped back around to the issue of arguments towards God and particularly the ontological ones. In picking back up, I would like to note that a key background idea is the explanation of being. Arguably, there is a first principle of right reason that we all accept in practice: if something exists, we may properly ask and seek to answer as to why. If it begins or ends or may do so, it is plainly dependent on external factors, i.e it is caused. In particular, there will be at least one factor that is such that it is causally enabling or disabling according as it is on or off. I have spoken of the fire tetrahedron as an example, where heat, fuel, oxidiser and chain reaction are all required for a fire to begin, be sustained or not end. Block or remove any one and the fire is gone or could not begin. This then points to something more exotic, necessary beings. Things that have no such necessary enabling factors. That is, things that would exist in all possible worlds, including the actual ones. The truth in 3 + 2 = 5 is a case in point. It never began, cannot cease, and is not caused, indeed it causally constrains. Also, considering candidate necessary beings, such a candidate if serious will be of one of two states: either it is such that it will exist in all possible worlds, or else it will be impossible in all possible worlds and so will not exist at all. Indeed, if something is such a candidate and would exist in any particular possible world that things would not be impossible and so would be in all possible worlds, so long as it meets the criterion of independence of enabling on/off factors. Where, also, God is going to be a necessary being, if he is there at all. As a second preliminary, I tend to put up a skeletal cosmological argument, not as an argument to a full orbed existence of God, but to the existence of a being with this character of necessity of being, as causal ground of a contingent observed universe. In short, as already appeared above:
Cosmological: (NB: This appears out of the classical order, as IMHO it makes A far more clear if this is done, by distinguishing and rationalising "contingent" and "necessary" beings. This is an example of a cumulative argument.): 1. Some contingent beings exist. (E.g.: us, a tree or a fruit, an artifact, the planets and stars, etc. -- anything that might not have existed, i.e. is caused.) 2. Contingent beings do not exist by themselves – that is in part what “contingent” means - so they require a necessary being as their ultimate cause. 3. If any contingent being exists, then a necessary being exists. ___________________________________ 4. Thus, there exists a necessary being, the ultimate cause of the existence of the many contingent beings in the cosmos.
The point is that, self evidently, we undeniably live in a shared common world. That world is full of contingent beings, and it is itself credibly contingent per the Big Bang etc. So, it is in turn dependent on something else and at the root, a being that is causally sufficient for the world but is not itself dependent on further beings. Nor will an attempt to appeal to an infinite chain of contingent causes work, as it is impossible to traverse a countable infinity step by step to reach the present. What that means is that going infinity, infinity less 1, infinity less 2 to go down to zero just does not work. For many excellent reasons that should have long since been evident to those who often offer such arguments rhetorically, cf Hilbert's Hotel Infinity. (Indeed, we normally present such infinities as wholes, or as examples and hints to keep on going: N = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4 . . .} etc. Where we can show the set transfinite by showing that the set of evens and that of odds can both be put in one to one correspondence with the whole set N.) So, let us set that predictable objection aside. Now, too, we could go on looking at the evident design of cosmos, life in it and all the way up to our own intelligence as signs pointing to the intelligence and purposeful intent of the underlying necessary being. Similarly, we can look at the cosmos and see that such a being is of enormous skill, knowledge and power. Our being under evident moral government points to the moral nature of such a being. All of these can be raised and raised in the context where the cumulative metaphysical price tag of the positions one has to take to reject them, becomes quite stiff indeed. In short, I am here pointing to comparative difficulties of worldview foundational faith points. And yes, I freely accept that we all live by faith, the issue is to find a reasonable faith that is factually adequate, coherent and explanatorily elegant and powerful: not ad hoc, simple, but not simplistic. Such a view is entirely consistent with the idea of objective truth and right, and it is entirely consistent with the point that we can adequately know the grounds of reality. But we have been working towards a form of modal ontological argument. Let me clip from a phil of rel page:
(1) If God exists then he has necessary existence. (2) Either God has necessary existence, or he doesn‘t. (3) If God doesn‘t have necessary existence, then he necessarily doesn‘t. ____________________________ Therefore: (4) Either God has necessary existence, or he necessarily doesn‘t. (5) If God necessarily doesn‘t have necessary existence, then God necessarily doesn‘t exist. ________________ Therefore: (6) Either God has necessary existence, or he necessarily doesn‘t exist. (7) It is not the case that God necessarily doesn‘t exist. Therefore: (8) God has necessary existence. (9) If God has necessary existence, then God exists. ___________________________ Therefore: (10) God exists.
The focal issue of interest here is the concept that inherently, what God is about is in part that he is a necessary being, the ground of the existence of a contingent world. And in that context (and given the earlier discussion in this post), as a serious candidate necessary being, either God's existence is possible or impossible. SO, IF YOU REJECT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, YOU ARE IMPLICITLY -- OR EVEN EXPLICITLY -- COMMITTED TO THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A BEING LIKE GOD. (Cf here.) Formerly, back in my young college days, atheists were quite happy to say that, trotting out the problem of evil in deductive form, as the proof positive of the point. But, along came Plantinga and the Free Will defence back in the 70's and 80's [it took time to filter down to college student discussion level], and poof, the confident dismissal collapsed. So, there is a serious issue now, and the metaphysical and epistemological commitments price tag for such atheism just went up rather steeply. KFkairosfocus
January 22, 2013
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E: BZZT, error alert. Sorry, if we have a definite nature and purpose (which would be the result of being created by a Creator for a purpose and would provide grounds for binding expectations that others not interfere with fulfilling our purposes under our Creator), then that means there is such a thing as the law of our nature which would have an objective character. Including, morality. That is, morality would not be simply a social construct or a matter of preferences and the out-turn of the rhetoric, propaganda and power games, but would have a baseline referent. An intelligible natural law in short, that stands above and judges the laws of communities at given times. Such as happened to end slavery, which had been embedded in human laws. Perhaps, you need to ask yourself why it is that the US founders started their argument in the 1776 DOI, from the concept that it is self-evident that all men are created equal and are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, starting with that to life and liberty. (When one denies an actual self evident truth, one finds oneself in a morass of patent absurdities.) That is why I keep pointing to a key, fairly concrete example:
it is objectively wrong to kidnap, rape, torture and kill a child for purposes of sick fun and blood money profit by making a snuff video.
Kindly show me why this is not so, and if you deny this, then show me how you do not end up in the sort of nihilistic morass that has been warned against ever since The Laws, Bk X by Plato. Let me clip [go there for onward links], as it is important to see what we were warned against on the example of what happened to Athens 2400 years ago:
Athenian Stranger: . . . [[The avant garde philosophers and poets, c. 360 BC] say that fire and water, and earth and air [[i.e the classical "material" elements of the cosmos], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in order-earth, and sun, and moon, and stars-they have been created by means of these absolutely inanimate existences. The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them-of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures of opposites which have been formed by necessity. After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only. [[In short, evolutionary materialism premised on chance plus necessity acting without intelligent guidance on primordial matter is hardly a new or a primarily "scientific" view! Notice also, the trichotomy of causal factors: (a) chance/accident, (b) mechanical necessity of nature, (c) art or intelligent design and direction.] . . . . [[Thus, they hold that t]he Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- [[Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT. (Cf. here for Locke's views and sources on a very different base for grounding liberty as opposed to license and resulting anarchistic "every man does what is right in his own eyes" chaos leading to tyranny. )] These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might [[ Evolutionary materialism leads to the promotion of amorality], and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [[Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality "naturally" leads to continual contentions and power struggles; cf. dramatisation here], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others [[such amoral factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless tyranny], and not in legal subjection to them.
Do you see what is at stake here? And, what evolutionary materialism and its fellow travellers open the door to? With some pretty grim living memory cases in point? Not to mention not only the cries of the 55 million ghosts of the aborted int eh USA since 1973 {and many, many more from around the world], as well as the sort of bully-boy tactics that are now being openly contemplated against people of Christian conscience and convictions all across our civilisation just now? KFkairosfocus
January 22, 2013
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StephenB 586; My suspicions are confirmed. The problem with your definition of "objectivity" is found in this citation; "If the moral code comes from God, then it comes from outside human beings and is, therefore, defined as objective morality, which means that it is also universal and absolute." Thus, you DEFINE moral codes that come from outside human beings as objective, universal and absolute. But what are your justifications for doing that? Your definition is obviously not applicable to polytheistic, monolatric or to discriminating monotheistic religions like pre-rabbi/nationalistic judaism and arabic islam. It has no meaning at all to atheists and sceptics. In fact, only believers in the one and only universal god, i.e. christians, are able to fully understand - and accept - your definition! You do not seem to be aware of the limitations of your own terminology. Don´t you communicate with people outside your congregation?Elvis4708
January 22, 2013
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His critique of the ontological argument is, I think, pretty interesting: existence is not a property, “exists” is not a predicate.
How long ago was it that God said to Moses, "I AM."Mung
January 21, 2013
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“Divine morality, is, by definition, objective with respect to humans.” Elvis4708
Could you please tell me the exact axioms and conditions you use to reach this conclusion?
With respect to morality, subjective means in the subject. It comes from our human minds. Objective means outside of the subject. It does not come from human minds. It comes from the outside of human minds. A moral proposition can come either from human beings (subjective) or it can come from outside of human beings (objective). If the moral code comes from the subject, the human, it will be different for every person and every situation. It will not be universal or absolute. If the moral code comes from God, then it comes from outside human beings and is, therefore, defined as objective morality, which means that it is also universal and absolute. If the moral code comes from God, it will be the same for everyone. It will be universal (binding on every person) and absolute (binding in every situation). HOWEVER: We are speaking so far of the CODE itself. The APPLICATION of that code will be DIFFERENT for each individual and each situation, but the code itself will be objective, universal, and absolute. None of this is to argue for the EXISTENCE of objective morality. The point is to focus on the meaning and implications of the word "objective" as it pertains to morality.StephenB
January 21, 2013
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E: Perhaps you can start with this from SB at 566:
The question of objectivity vs subjectivity is defined by this question: Where is the morality coming from? If humans could create their own morality, then it would subjective; If morality is inherent in human nature as part of a Divine creation (the natural moral law), then it is objective.
KF PS: We need to understand too that objectivity and proof (especially deductions from premises uncontroversial to all rational minds) are different. The latter no longer holds for even Math, post Godel, once we have sufficiently rich axiomatic systems in hand. If we see objectivity in the context of warrant as having good grounds for a given belief, even if there is an abstract possibility of error, i.e. evidence that on balance confers moral certainty or even just sufficient that a reasonable person will accept in a context where valuable things are in the stakes, then there is excellent grounds to see that we have good (and even compelling) warrant for the reality of God, as has been discussed earlier in this very thread. Warrant comparable to things we do not ordinarily doubt such as that others have minds of their own and make responsible choices using same. For some, like this poster, we have met God in miracle working, life transforming power and would be no more inclined to doubt the reality of God than that of the love of mother or the reality of relationship with same. In my particular case, absent miraculous guidance, I would be dead these forty years now. There are millions of people across thousands of years with a similar experience and report. Sufficiently so that to deny and dismiss such would at once bring the general credibility of the human mind as an instrument of accurate perception, good reasoning and credible knowing into serious doubt indeed.kairosfocus
January 21, 2013
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StephenB 583; I´m pondering on the following statement of yours; "Divine morality, is, by definition, objective with respect to humans." Could you please tell me the exact axioms and conditions you use to reach this conclusion?Elvis4708
January 21, 2013
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Elvis4708
Kant pointed out to us that we can never verify the existence of the divine objectively.
Kant was wrong, but that is not the issue at the moment. We are not discussing the verification of objectivity. We are discussing the meaning of objectivity, which you do not yet grasp.
How can you then talk about divine morality as objective? That´s rubbish!
Divine morality, is, by definition, objective with respect to humans. If you like, you can assert that there is no such thing as a Divinely instituted objective moral law, a point that I could easily refute, but you cannot rationally argue that it isn't objective if it exists.
If an agent´s existence is not objectively verified, so are not her injunctions. Divine morality is absolute, non-negotiable, but that´s another thing.
You continue to confuse the verification of objective morality with the definition of objective morality. The definitions of the words "subjective" and "objective" can be found in my earlier post.
The concept of “objectivity” emanates from the empirical science, a science that has been repudiated by theists in, inter alia, the existence debate.
The concept of objectivity does not emanate from science. It is a philosophical formulation with a long history. I can't imagine how you cultivated the notion that theists have "repudiated" empirical science.
Why do you persist in fallaciously using one of its most central concept? Religious rhetoric? Nice connotations in the “rational belief” debate?
I am simply trying to help you understand the meanings of the words you are using. We cannot have a rational discussion about whether or not an objective Divine morality exists if you don't even know what the term "objective morality" means. Laboring under such a disadvantage, you are no position to analyze the difference between the "objective" natural moral law and the "subjective" morality that humans try to invent for themselves.StephenB
January 21, 2013
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KN 581; Isn´t the superking´s ban on Kant´s writing a good example of a necessary social adaptation? And think about all yes-sayers and whistle-blowers, keen to catch the benevolence of Frederick, surrounding Kant.Elvis4708
January 21, 2013
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I didn't mean to imply that I thought Kant really was an atheist, or should have been, or chose to conform to societal expectations, or lacked the courage of his convictions, etc. On the contrary: I think that Kant really did believe that the fully active/creative, infinite divine mind transcends our semi-creative, finite mind. The ontological gulf is so radical that we cannot know that He exists, in the sense of 'know' that "I know that 2+3=5" or "I know that Alpha Centauri is the closest star to our solar system" or "I know that I'm seated at my desk". I have no reason not to take Kant at his word when we says that he wanted to restrict knowledge to make room for faith, or when he says that he wants to arrive at a religion within the bounds of reason alone. There's plenty of evidence that Kant's philosophy of religion was not the route of social conformity at the time. I say that because Frederick II prohibited Kant from writing on religion in 1794, a prohibition that Kant honored until Frederick II died in 1797. For more, see Kant's Philosophy of Religion (SEP)Kantian Naturalist
January 21, 2013
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Kantian Naturalist 579; Elegant and short summary! Kant had his own terminology and he didn´t use the very word "objectivity"(as far as I remember). But that´s what he meant. Kant was quite a famous guy in Königsberg, having been brought up in a strict religious home. To proclamate adherence to atheism - in case he wanted to - was therefore hardly on the agenda. Such an act would have caused a lot of social and familiar troubles. So he chosed the "practical"(socially acceptable) way as did many other prominent thinkers in those days(e.g. Pascal and his wager).Elvis4708
January 21, 2013
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In re: Kant, he argued that the existence of God can be neither proven nor disproven. The existence of God cannot be proven because the argument from design ("physico-theological argument) and cosmological argument presuppose the ontological argument, and the ontological argument does not work. His critique of the ontological argument is, I think, pretty interesting: existence is not a property, "exists" is not a predicate. There is no conceptual difference between an imaginary $100 bill and a real one in my hands: they are both specified by the concept of a $100 bill. Only one exists, and the other doesn't. The conclusion is that mere conceptual specifications alone won't tell us anything about what exists -- in order to determine what exists, one needs a non-conceptual component to experience, what Kant calls "intuition." But, since all of our intuitions are "sensible intuitions" (i.e. sensed spatio-temporal particulars), and God is (ex hypothesi) outside of space and time, we cannot determine if God exists -- nor can we determine if He does not. However -- and this is also quite interesting for the present discussion -- Kant also argued that it was necessary to believe in God in order to be moral. In effect, practical reason gets to 'cast a vote' when theoretical reason is neutral.Kantian Naturalist
January 21, 2013
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E: In no way does the concept of objectivity emanate form the sciences, it is an epistemological-logical concept and is thus a matter of philosophy. Next, you betray a prejudice against theism WRT science that points to a problem of adherence to the ideology of scientism and its dismissive talking points, rather than any reasonable response. I think the likes of a Newton or a Kelvin or a Townsend would have something to say to you. KFkairosfocus
January 21, 2013
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E; Kant showed no such thing, nor could he have. I think you have a problem understanding what objective means. KFkairosfocus
January 21, 2013
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Elv, Since you don't think objective morality actually exists perhaps you would care to inform Darwinists to stop using Theodicy as the main staple in their arguments for evolution and against Theism? The role of theology in current evolutionary reasoning - Paul A. Nelson - Biology and Philosophy, 1996, Volume 11, Number 4, Pages 493-517 Excerpt: Evolutionists have long contended that the organic world falls short of what one might expect from an omnipotent and benevolent creator. Yet many of the same scientists who argue theologically for evolution are committed to the philosophical doctrine of methodological naturalism, which maintains that theology has no place in science. Furthermore, the arguments themselves are problematical, employing concepts that cannot perform the work required of them, or resting on unsupported conjectures about suboptimality. Evolutionary theorists should reconsider both the arguments and the influence of Darwinian theological metaphysics on their understanding of evolution. http://www.springerlink.com/content/n3n5415037038134/?MUD=MP The Descent of Darwin - Pastor Joe Boot - (The Theodicy of Darwinism) - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HKJqk7xF4-g “The strength of materialism is that it obviates the problem of evil altogether. God need not be reconciled with evil, because neither exists. Therefore the problem of evil is no problem at all.,,, And of course since there is no evil, the materialist must, ironically, not use evil to justify atheism. The problem of evil presupposes the existence of an objective evil-the very thing the materialist seems to deny. The argument (from Theodicy) that led to materialism is exhausted just when it is needed most. In other words, the problem of evil is only generated by the prior claims that evil exists. One cannot then conclude, with Dawkins, that there is ‘no evil and no good’ in the universe.,,, The fact that evolution’s acceptance hinges on a theological position would, for many, be enough to expel it from science. But evolution’s reliance on metaphysics is not its worst failing. Evolution’s real problem is not its metaphysics but its denial of its metaphysics.,,, Cornelius Hunter – Darwin’s God – pg. 154 & 159 It is interesting to point out that the ‘inconsistent identity of cause', that has been pointed out by Alvin Plantinga, which leads to the failure of neo-Darwinists to be able to make any absolute truth claims for their naturalistic beliefs, is what also leads to the failure of neo-Darwinists to be able to account for any standards of objective morality, in that neo-Darwinists cannot maintain a consistent identity towards a stable, unchanging, cause for objective morality within their lives; The Knock-Down Argument Against Atheist Sam Harris' moral landscape argument – William Lane Craig – video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xL_vAH2NIPc Further notes: Richard Dawkins and the Moral Argument for God by William Lane Craig - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4f3I2QGpucs Stephen Meyer - Morality Presupposes Theism (1 of 4) - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSpdh1b0X_M Objective Morality – The Objections – Frank Turek – video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N5MWBsPf5pg Objective Morality (1 of 5) - William Lane Craig - video playlist http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3sPn_cIh_Cg&feature=bf_prev&list=PL3DBE77BB622A22F7bornagain77
January 21, 2013
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StephenB 566; Kant pointed out to us that we can never verify the existence of the divine objectively. How can you then talk about divine morality as objective? That´s rubbish! If an agent´s existence is not objectively verified, so are not her injunctions. Divine morality is absolute, non-negotiable, but that´s another thing. The concept of "objectivity" emanates from the empirical science, a science that has been repudiated by theists in, inter alia, the existence debate. Why do you persist in fallaciously using one of its most central concept? Religious rhetoric? Nice connotations in the "rational belief" debate?Elvis4708
January 21, 2013
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I appreciate the point, Mung, but I take that as actually bolstering my general line of thought there -- I don't think we really have any choice in whether or not we will feel empathy for other people, animals, whatever. Of course we can deliberate on whether or not to act on those feelings, but I don't think we can chose to have them or not have them. A child who is loved by his or her parents, and well-raised, and brought up in a moderately well-functioning society will naturally feel empathy for at least some people. Human beings, being unfortunately rather tribal creatures, will tend to have natural empathy for those we feel are 'like us' and direct aggression towards those who are 'not like us'. But I think that a cultivation of imagination and the capacity to universalize that comes with practical reason can go a long way towards mitigating our tribalism.Kantian Naturalist
January 20, 2013
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KN, Does a sociopath have any choice in the matter or can one choose to be a sociopath? If not, then the following is not the case: So the question, “why should I be concerned with others?” turns into the question, “why shouldn’t I be a sociopath?”Mung
January 20, 2013
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Mung posted this:
[A]s is becoming increasingly clear – it is not so easy to justify any moral values purely rationally, by reason alone, as Sigmund Freud would have liked to do; to prove by reason alone why under any circumstances freedom is supposed to be better than oppression, justice better than self-interest, non-violence better than violence, love better than hate, peace better than war. Or, to put it more forcefully: why, if it is to our advantage and our personal happiness, should we not just as well lie, steal, commit adultery and murder; indeed, why should we be humane or even ‘fair’? – Why I am Still a Christian, Hans Kung.
(1) I'm troubled by Kung's subtle equivocation between rationality and egoism. The suggestion here seems to be that we are "naturally" self-interested or egoistic, and that we would need some "reason" to be altruistic, only there doesn't seem to be any such reason -- so, whatever it is that draws us out of our rational interest and into direct concern with others, it cannot be reason alone. (2) It does seem to me that the 'foundation' of morality is not reason -- at least not reason in a narrow sense -- but rather empathy, fellow-feeling, the other as a second self. Practical reason guides and informs our empathy, and if I were really pressed for a "definition" of morality, I'd give that one: morality is empathy informed by reason. (3) If the question were raised, "but why should we be empathetic at all?", I find myself perplexed by the question -- for this question seems to come from a place of skepticism, or maybe cynicism, about human nature that I find unintelligible. A lack of empathy is what characterizes sociopaths. So the question, "why should I be concerned with others?" turns into the question, "why shouldn't I be a sociopath?" But it just seems completely wrong-headed to me to think that a decent human being would have been a sociopath if he or she hadn't been persuaded not to be by some sort of argument. Sociopaths are broken in ways that we're still trying to understand, and perhaps to some degree they are the results of dysfunctional families or even societies, but it seems like bad philosophy to begin with the abnormal case as if it were the default setting and proceed from there. Sociopaths are rational egoists; normal human beings are not, whether religious or not.Kantian Naturalist
January 20, 2013
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In no particular order, rhyme, or reason: (1) Ok, so we can do set-theory, and set-theory is universally and necessarily true (i.e. a priori). That's deeply interesting, but I don't see how it tells us anything about the fundamental nature of reality. The pragmatist logician can still say to the Platonist, "sure, set-theory is wicked awesome, but all that tells us at the end of the day is that we can construct really interesting systems that satisfy certain criteria that we find desirable, like consistency and non-contradiction". (2) In response to the following:
Where in the pre-biotic world, for example, do we find any evidence for consciousness, self-reflection, compassion, or ratiocination? These capacities simply are not there for the organism to draw on. Either they come from out of nowhere, uncaused by the structures of the world, or they must be created in such a way that they correspond to the structures of the world.
I think this is just a false dichotomy. There's plenty of evidence, both anecdotal and rigorous, that non-human animals have capacities for compassion and some kind of self-awareness (depending on how seriously you take the mirror test). And it certainly seems as though many higher mammals make inferences -- though what it seems they cannot do is regard themselves as making inferences. (I suspect that that is the real difference that language makes.) Are non-human animals not part of nature? There's a really interesting problem I keep hammering away on, but no one here seems to notice. If we have a conception of nature that is basically Epicurean -- chance and necessity, atoms and the void -- then yes, of course, obviously one cannot account for consciousness or normativity. But I've been reading philosophy of biology and history of philosophy of biology for a while now, and I see absolutely no reason why evolutionary theory must be, or ought to be, committed to an Epicurean metaphysics. (Of course there are Epicurean Darwinists, like Monod and Dawkins, but I'm not interested in talking to their epigones.) (3) In response to the following:
I take no joy in pointing out that the second clause in that sentence contradicts the first clause. If, on the one hand, we “produce” the intelligibility of nature by choosing to dominate it, then we preceded the origins of nature’s intelligibility. If, on the other hand, nature’s intelligibility was already there to be dominated, then the origins of nature’s intelligibility preceded us. I recommend that you negate the first proposition and affirm the second proposition.
What, not even a little joy? :) You're right that the position as stated above contradicts itself, though my (561) was vague enough to avoid outright contradiction. What I really would need to say here is that nature in itself has "pre-intelligibility". Consider the question, "what must the world be like in order for us to have any knowledge of it at all?" At this point, then, I endorse a pragmatist epistemology according to which all knowledge -- indeed, all conceptual activity of any kind -- is active, creative, and social -- not merely passive receiving how things are. (This is ultimately because of what concepts are, for pragmatists: concepts are ways of classifying what is given in experience, and to classify is to do something, so all conceptual thinking is a kind of doing, and so all knowing is a kind of doing, if -- as I think -- there is no such thing as non-conceptual knowledge.) But we can still pose the question, "what must the world be like in order for us to make sense of it?" And I think the answer to that is, "it must have at least a minimally detectable degree of order and regularity amongst its basic constituents such that the dynamics of the world can synchronically interact with and diachronically give rise to our cognitive practices." For a while now I've been trying to find the right language to express what I call "weak metaphysical realism". I actually think I might have found it, in Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of the distinction between the logos endiathetos and the logos prophorikos. So, back to reading on this lovely Sunday afternoon!Kantian Naturalist
January 20, 2013
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[A]s is becoming increasingly clear - it is not so easy to justify any moral values purely rationally, by reason alone, as Sigmund Freud would have liked to do; to prove by reason alone why under any circumstances freedom is supposed to be better than oppression, justice better than self-interest, non-violence better than violence, love better than hate, peace better than war. Or, to put it more forcefully: why, if it is to our advantage and our personal happiness, should we not just as well lie, steal, commit adultery and murder; indeed, why should we be humane or even 'fair'? - Why I am Still a Christian , Hans Kung.
Mung
January 20, 2013
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Kantian Naturalist:
I think that the rational, and especially mathematical, intelligibility of nature has two different aspects, a natural aspect and a cultural aspect. Here I think that Dewey (on the natural side) and Adorno (on the cultural side) express the relevant insights.
OK. Let’s examine both areas: Dewey
The world is subject-matter for knowledge, because mind has developed in that world; a body-mind, whose structures have developed according to the structures of the world in which it exists, will naturally find some of its structures to be concordant and congenial with nature, and some phases of nature with itself. …
Notice the heavy-handed assumption that drives this statement, namely that mind can arise from matter. That is precisely the point that needs to be argued for. If we grant that expansive premise, then it is only a baby step to the equally unjustified claim that mind can align itself to material conditions. There is much bad logic here. In fact, none of the mind’s “structures” (he should have used the word “capacities”) can be explained by the “structures of the world.” Where in the pre-biotic world, for example, do we find any evidence for consciousness, self-reflection, compassion, or ratiocination? These capacities simply are not there for the organism to draw on. Either they come from out of nowhere, uncaused by the structures of the world, or they must be created in such a way that they correspond to the structures of the world. Kantian Naturalist
To Dewey’s naturalism I would also add the insight of C. I. Lewis: nature appears to us as quantifiable because we choose to quantify it.
[a] If our personal choices were responsible for the relationship between the quantifiable world and our ability to quantify the world, there would be no assurance that the two are in correspondence. Our experience proves that they are correspondence. [b] Our choices have nothing to do with the fact that a falling object descends at a rate of sixteen times the time squared. If it were otherwise, we could choose another rate or even choose to dispense with gravity altogether.
So the “intelligibility of nature” is, on the one, something that we produce or construct through the historical, political, and economic practices of dominating nature — and yet, at the same time, there must be something really there to be dominated, something which has the right kind of dynamics to interact with our own.
I take no joy in pointing out that the second clause in that sentence contradicts the first clause. If, on the one hand, we “produce” the intelligibility of nature by choosing to dominate it, then we preceded the origins of nature’s intelligibility. If, on the other hand, nature’s intelligibility was already there to be dominated, then the origins of nature’s intelligibility preceded us. I recommend that you negate the first proposition and affirm the second propositiStephenB
January 20, 2013
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KN: Nope, Dewey is simply repackaging the problem tossing on a dollop of naturalistic faith and handing it back as the solution. And as for Math, I like to start with actual math: {}. Define = 0. Go on to {0} = 1, then {0,, 1} = 2, and so forth. Thus, we see a 1-set, a 2-set etc and any other set will have one-ness or two-ness etc on being capable of one to one correspondence. Put in some operations, and away we go. a priori properties that are necessarily true in any coherent cosmos. As one result, the truth 2 + 3 = 5 will hold as necessarily and self-evidently so. Much follows from making sense of a world that is like that. KFkairosfocus
January 20, 2013
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E: Pardon but you seem to be struggling with the meaning of objectivity. If something is objective, it goes beyond what you or I perceive or believe. For example, I would suggest as an example, that it is objectively wrong to kidnap, rape and torture to death a little child for personal pleasure and profit through making a snuff video. In saying this, I am saying the exact opposite to, it is just my perception that, and you are free to differ as you please. KFkairosfocus
January 20, 2013
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Elvis4708
Divine morality is NOT objective as it is a matter for believers only! No universal religion is universal in practice and we cannot have truly universal words defined on a narrow base, particularly not a word like objectivity.
The lack of universal agreement among religions has nothing to do with the objective nature of morality. If Divine morality exists, then those religions that teach it are, in that context, objectively true, and those which do not teach it are objectively false. The question of objectivity vs subjectivity is defined by this question: Where is the morality coming from? If humans could create their own morality, then it would subjective; If morality is inherent in human nature as part of a Divine creation (the natural moral law), then it is objective.StephenB
January 20, 2013
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(1) Dewey wasn't trying to establish naturalism (at least not in that quote); he was showing that the intelligibility of nature makes sense, given naturalism. Which is, I take it, the challenge you were raising: that the intelligibility of nature doesn't make sense in light of naturalism, but does make sense in light of theism. Dewey responds to that challenge. (2) Adorno is arguing against Carnap's appeal to "the stroke of good luck." (3) Obviously I don't dispute that mathematics is a priori and non-empirical, but that's a fact about the epistemology of mathematics that still leaves wide open the metaphysics of mathematics. More precisely: from the claim that the objective validity of an assertion does not depend on sense-experience, it simply does not follow that the state of affairs referred to by that assertion existed prior to all physical reality.Kantian Naturalist
January 20, 2013
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KN: I'd suggest both cites are off, pardon. There is no naturalistic basis for Dewey, he is handing back the problem as the solution. As for stroke of luck, we have no right to get that lucky, or to assume we are. The testimony of Math is, there are realities built into the order of the world that are prior to matter. For instance, numbers can be built up from abstract procedures on the empty set, as you will recall me outlining. Assign number symbols, relationships and operations and away we go. Necessary truths, self evident and antecedent to matter. Matter, indeed, is forced to conform to it, e.g. three pennies joined to two more will necessarily yield the cardinality of the five-set. Iron logical properties. We can go on and on noticing the pattern that indeed if A and B have the right connexions and A is nailed down, B will follow with the force of necessity. And where we end up in the astonishing place where entirely diverse provinces of math come together in one astounding expression 0 = 1 + e^i*pi. That betrays an underlying unity that is shocking in its impact. Coherent unity amidst diversity to the point of known irreducible complexity of the Godel kind. On that sheer raw hard logical, abstract unity alone I would be forced to look for Reason himself behind the cosmos. KFkairosfocus
January 20, 2013
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